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The Idea of Dh„tu-v„da inYogacara and Tath„gata-garbha Texts

YAMABE Nobuyoshi

HAKAMAYA NORIAKI AND Matsumoto Shirõ are convinced thattath„gatagarbha theory and the Yogacara school share a com-mon framework that they call dh„tu-v„da or “locus theory.”

The word dh„tu-v„da itself is a neologism introduced by Matsumoto1

and adopted by Hakamaya.2 They argue that the dh„tu-v„da idea standsin direct contradiction to the authentic Buddhist theory of prat‡tya-samutp„da or “dependent origination,” which in turn leads them to con-sider tath„gata-garbha and Yogacara theories to be non-Buddhist. Intheir opinion, not only these Indian theories but also the whole of “orig-inal enlightenment thought” (hongaku shisõ) in East Asia fell under theshadow of the dh„tu-v„da idea,3 with the result that most of itsBuddhism is dismissed as not Buddhist at all.4

The idea of dh„tu-v„da is thus an integral part of the CriticalBuddhism critique and as such merits careful examination in any evalua-tion of the overall standpoint. Since Matsumoto ³rst found the dh„tu-v„da structure in Indian tath„gata-garbha and Yogacara literature, weneed to begin with a look at the texts in question. My approach here willbe purely philological and will limit itself to the theoretical treatises (sastras).

BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE DHÃTU-VÃDA THEORY

For Hakamaya and Matsumoto, the cardinal tenet of Buddhism isprat‡tyasamutp„da, which they understand as consisting of a temporalsequence of causally linked dharmas or “phenomena” that lack any solidbasis in reality. Matsumoto illustrates this by means of the followingchart.5

CHART 1

➛ dharma ➛ dharma ➛ dharma ➛

dh„tu

Chart 2, in contrast, illustrates the basic structure of dh„tu-v„da.6

This second model, in contrast to the prat‡tyasamutp„da model,introduces a universal, solid basis under such names as dharmadh„tu andbuddhadh„tu. In Matsumoto’s terminology, this universal dh„tu is a“locus” that supports phenomenal dharmas as “super-loci.” He enumer-ates the characteristic features of this dh„tu-v„da model as follows:7

1. “Locus” is the basis for “super-loci.”2. “Locus” gives rise to “super-loci.”3. “Locus” is one, “super-loci” are many.4. “Locus” is real, “super-loci” are not real.5. “Locus” is the essential nature of “super-loci.”6. “Super-loci” are not ultimately real, but have some reality in that

they have arisen from the “locus” and share its nature.8

Thus, the dh„tu-v„da model is essentially a monism (or, according toMatsumoto’s own terminology, a “generative monism” n´ÇísâÇ).9

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CHART 2

šr„vaka-dharma pratyekabuddha-dharma tath„gata-dharma

dharmadh„tu = ekay„na

= super-locus

= locus

Hakamaya and Matsumoto take this to be an Upani¤adic model and thusnot authentically Buddhist. Particularly problematic for them is the factthat this dh„tu-v„da framework is not as egalitarian as it appears. As theysee it, one can classify any number of different elements—from the threevehicles to social castes—as “super-loci” resting on the universal “locus.”Since the diversity of the “super-loci” is an essential element of the dh„tu-v„da structure, the distinction among “super-loci” remains unaffected.On the other hand, the apparent equality that obtains on the absolutelevel serves at once to justify, obscure, and con³rm the discrimination thatappears on the phenomenal level.10 In Matsumoto’s opinion, this essen-tially discriminatory nature of the dh„tu-v„da structure is clearlyexpressed in verse I.39 of the Abhisamay„la½k„ra:11

Because the dharmadh„tu has no distinction, any distinction amonggotra is unreasonable. Nevertheless, because the dharmas to be posited[on the “locus” of dharmadh„tu] are distinct, a distinction [amonggotra] is proclaimed.12

In the same way, the ideas of universal “Buddha-nature” and icchan-tika in the Mahayana Mah„parinirv„«a Sutra do not contradict eachother but combine to form a harmonious whole. The Mah„y„nasðtr„-la½k„ra asserts, on the one hand, that all sentient beings have tath„gata-garbha (verse IX.37)13 and, on the other hand, admits that some peoplewill never be able to attain nirvana (verse III.11). Hence the dh„tu-v„dastructure also represents a principle supporting the discriminatory gotratheory of the Yogacara school.14

MONISM OR PLURALISM?

Matsumoto’s arguments are well prepared, and the coexistence of a univer-sal “Buddha-nature”15 and unequal attainments is indeed problematic.Still, it may well be possible to explain this coexistence in somewhat dif-ferent terms.

A good place to begin is the famous de³nition of gotra in theBodhisattvabhðmi section of the Yog„c„rabhðmi :

What is gotra? In brief, gotra is twofold: the one existing by nature(prak£tistha) and the attained one (samud„n‡ta).

The gotra existing by nature is the distinct state of the six-sense-basis(¤a^„yatana-više¤a ) of bodhisattvas. That [distinct state] was naturally

THE IDEA OF DHÃTU-VÃDA

195

acquired in the beginningless past and has been transmitted as such [tothe present].

The attained gotra is what is acquired through the practice of meritsin the past [lives].

In this case, both meanings are intended. Further, this gotra is alsocalled seed (b‡ja), dh„tu, and origin (prak£ti ).16

Since Hakamaya himself quotes this last sentence as an example of themonistic dh„tu model,17 it is clear that he considers the gotra theory ofthe Bodhisattvabhðmi to be a form of monism. His argument is based onthe fact that all the terms given (gotra, b‡ja, dh„tu, prak£ti) appear in sin-gular forms.18 But the argument is not without its weaknesses.

First, the paired terms prak£tistha-gotra and samud„n‡ta-gotra have aclose analogue in the Vastusa½graha«‡ section of the Yog„c„rabhðmi:

In sum, dh„tus are twofold: the ones existing by nature (rang-bzhin gyisgnas pa, WÀ§ƒ, *prak£tistha19) and the ones enhanced through habitu-al practice (goms-pas yongs-su-brtas-pa, H†˜ƒ, *abhy„sa-paripu¤¦a).

The ones existing by nature are, for example, the eighteen dh„tus(khams), which are seeds (sa-bon, *b‡ja) staying in their own respectivecontinuities.

The dh„tus enhanced through habitual practice are enhanced seedsresting in the body (rten, *„šraya) so that the good or bad dharmashabitually practiced in other, former lives might arise [easily]….20

In these two passages, it is clear that the prak£tistha-gotra of the Bodhi-sattvabhðmi corresponds to the *prak£tistha-dh„tu of the Vastusa½-graha«‡. The correspondence between the samud„n‡ta-gotra, “attainedgotra,” of the Bodhisattvabhðmi and the *abhy„sa-paripu¤¦a-dh„tu, “thedh„tu enhanced through habitual practice,” of the Vastusa½graha«‡ maynot be immediately evident, but is con³rmed by the Mah„y„na-sðtr„la½k„ra-bh„¤ya, which equates samud„n‡tam [gotram], “attainedgotra,” and paripu¤¦a½ [gotra½], “enhanced gotra.”21 Consequently, acorrespondence between this portion of the Vastusa½graha«‡ and theaforementioned portion of the Bodhisattvabhðmi seems beyond dispute.

The basic message of the passage of the Vastusa½graha«‡ is thatthere are innumerable good and bad elements (dh„tu) in sentient beingsthat correspond to good and bad mental functions, and that one mustaccordingly cultivate the good elements in order to realize good mentalstates.22 In other words, here the dh„tu theory is clearly of a pluralisticsort. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the pluralistic structure of this

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CHART 3

sravaka pratyekabuddha bodhisattva

šr„vaka-dh„tu pratyekabuddha-dh„tu bodhisattva-dh„tu(gotra) (gotra) (gotra)

197

SA¢SKR. TA OR ASA¢SKR. TA?

There is more involved in what has been discussed above than merelywhether dh„tu is singular or plural. It has to do with the foundation forsupramundane attainment. If there is any possibility at all for us to acquiresupramundane wisdom, on what does such a possibility rest? TheBodhisattvabhðmi responds by referring to inherent gotra and de³nes thefoundation as ¤a^„yatana-više¤a, or “the distinct state of the six-sense-basis.” But just what does this ¤a^„yatana-više¤a mean? We get a clue, Ibelieve, from the following passage of the Abhidharmakoša-bh„¤ya:

The [distinction between noble ones and ordinary ones] is made in termsof the distinct states of bodies („šraya-više¤a). [This distinction is possi-

passage was recognized by Hakamaya himself in an earlier essay.23 At thesame time, we have established that the gotra theory of the Bodhisattva-bhðmi was closely related to the dh„tu theory of the Vastusa½graha«‡.This being the case, it is likely that the gotra theory of the Bodhisattva-bhðmi itself was pluralistic in structure.24

The pluralistic dh„tu model and the gotra theory are intrinsicallyrelated to one another. In the same way that the dh„tu of desire is inca-pable of generating hatred, the gotra of sravakas is unable to generate thesupreme wisdom of the Buddha. Without such distinct gotras, therefore,it would not be possible to establish a distinction among the three vehi-cles.25 Accordingly, at least as far as these passages are concerned, the onlychart we are able to draw is the one below (Chart 3). Obviously the plu-ralism it presents is not the same as the “generative monism” thatMatsumoto offers.

THE IDEA OF DHÃTU-VÃDA

ble] because the body („šraya) of noble ones is transformed (par„v£tta)by the power of the paths of seeing and practice (daršana-bh„van„-m„rga), so that [the body] is no more capable of generating thede³lements to be abandoned by the [paths of seeing and practice].Therefore, when one’s body has ceased to be the seed of de³lements(ab‡j‡-bhðte „šraye kleš„n„½), like a grain of rice consumed by the ³re,one is called [a noble person] who has abandoned de³lements.26

In the body of literature to which this text belongs, „šraya usually means,in the absence of further contextual speci³cation, “body,” or perhapsmore precisely, our personal existence centered on the body. This makesit virtually synonymous with ¤a^„yatana, which makes ¤a^„yatana-više¤aand „šraya-više¤a equivalent.27

In the passage cited, the body of a noble person is distinguished fromthe body of an unenlightened person in that the former no longer pro-duces de³lements. In other words, the bodies of the unenlightenedremain in a state that produces de³lements and such bodies are conceivedof as the b‡ja of de³lements.28

In the passage from the Bodhisattvabhðmi, the six-sense-basis (¤a^-„yatana) of a bodhisattva is distinguished from that of a sravaka and apratyekabuddha in that the ¤a^„yatana of a bodhisattva is capable, even-tually, of generating the supreme wisdom of the Buddha. The six-sense-basis of a bodhisattva who has the potentiality to give rise to the highestwisdom of the Buddha is considered to be the bodhisattva-gotra.

The important point here is that the gotra is taken to represent a par-ticular state of concrete physical-mental existence. In other words, thebasis for deliverance is posited on the phenomenal level—namely,sa½sk£ta—and not on the absolute level of asa½sk£ta.29

We are reminded here of an important theoretical requirement ofabhidharma Buddhism, namely that an asa½sk£ta or “unconditioned”dharma cannot be a generative cause of anything30 and therefore cannotdirectly generate supramundane wisdom.31 This same pattern is followedby the Yog„c„rabhðmi.32

Tathat„ is synonymous with dharmadh„tu, which, according toHakamaya and Matsumoto, gives rise to all the mundane and supramun-dane elements. It should be noted, however, that the role of tathat„ insoteriological contexts of the Yogacara system (especially in the Yog„c„ra-bhðmi ) is rather limited. If it is sometimes called the cause of holy dharmas(namely supramundane wisdom), it is because tathat„ assists the arising of

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supramundane wisdom by becoming its cognitive object or „lambana-pratyaya. In other words, meditation on tathat„ in the preliminary stageseventually induces supramundane wisdom.33 But tathat„, in principle,does not become a generative cause,34 which means that once again thesuitability of the dh„tu-v„da model as “generative monism” to theYogacara literature is suspect.35

Classical Yogacara theory regarding gotra maintains that the diver-gent attainments of the three vehicles are each based on their own dh„tuor gotra. Needless to say, this is a highly problematic position, and oneneeds to consider carefully why they were driven to take it. Merely interms of the formal logic involved, however, the argument is ratherstraightforward: divergent effects must have divergent causes. This ismuch easier to understand than the idea of divergent effects based on asingle cause, as the dh„tu-v„da model suggests.36 I do not believe thatthe universal dharmadh„tu was the leading principle that supported thegotra theory of the Yogacara school.37

GOTRA AND DHARMADHÃTU

The theory does not, however, hold universally. If we consider a typicaltath„gata-garbha text, the Ratnagotravibh„ga, we ³nd that such a cleardistinction between sa½sk£ta and asa½sk£ta is not strictly observed.38 Thetext does not hesitate to assert that the actions of the Buddha arise fromasa½sk£ta.39 Even the prak£tistha-gotra of the Bodhisattvabhðmi is linkedto the tath„gata-garbha, which is equivalent to tathat„.40 But ifprak£tistha-gotra is equated with the omnipresent tathat„, no theoreticalbasis remains to support the absolute distinction among the three vehi-cles. Thus, the Ratnagotravibh„ga states:

Eventually the rays from the sun-disk of the Tath„gata fall even on thebodies of sentient beings ³xed in state of evil (mithy„tva-niyata-sa½t„na)…. The statement that an icchantika never attains nirvana wasmade to remove the hatred against the teachings of Mahayana, becausethe hatred against the teachings of Mahayana is the cause of one’s beingicchantika. [In other words, this statement has] a hidden intention [thateven icchantikas will attain nirvana] at another, [later] time [if they aban-don their hatred of Mahayana]. Indeed, because the originally pure gotraexists (prak£ti-višuddha-gotra-sa½bhav„d), no one can be ultimatelyimpure by nature.41

THE IDEA OF DHÃTU-VÃDA

199

The dh„tu-v„da model of ultimate discrimination based on universalbuddhadh„tu does not seem to work very well on this end either. Logicrequires that divergent phenomena must have divergent bases. If the basisis universal, there is no logical reason to maintain an ultimate discrimina-tion among the “super-loci.” This structure is presented graphically inChart 4. Note that the “super-loci” here are no longer discriminatory:

DHÃTU-VÃDA

On the basis of the above arguments, I am persuaded that the classicalgotra theory of the Yogacara school was based on pluralistic dh„tus orgotras. Once the gotra is reinterpreted as universal dharmadh„tu ortathat„, it loses the theoretical basis that supports the absolute distinc-tion among the three vehicles.42

There is yet another factor to be taken into account. India is a coun-try in which tradition holds great authority. Old theories are not directlydiscarded when new ones come along, but are often retained and attemptsare made to reconcile the old with the new. Something like this seems tohave happened in the case of the gotra theory of the Yogacara school.

Actually, even within the Yog„c„rabhðmi the idea of tathat„ wascoming to play an ever greater role in the soteriological context. Forexample, a portion of the Vinišcayasa½graha«‡ section of the Yog„c„ra-bhðmi says that the cause of supramundane dharmas does not lie in ordi-nary seeds but in tathat„ as a cognitive object.43 The theoretical limitationof tathat„ to the realm of a cognitive object, and hence its exclusion fromthe realm of generative causes, seems still to be in force. And yet at thesame time one senses a dissatisfaction with the gotra theory of theBodhisattvabhðmi, which grounds supramundane attainment on the phe-

CHART 4

attainment of nirvana attainment of nirvana attainment of nirvana

prak£tistha-gotra = dharmadh„tu

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nomenal ¤a^„yatana-više¤a. This appears to indicate an expansion of therole of tathat„ into the realm of the soteriological.

Now if the source of supramundane attainment is not individual seedsbut universal tathat„, there seems no reason to sustain the idea of indi-viduals being predestined to a particular level of attainment.44 Never-theless, the idea of distinct gotras is not abandoned, and the attempt ismade to defend distinct, predestined goals by claiming that some peopleare faced with an ultimate obstacle that blocks the way into tathat„, whileothers are not.

At this point the argument, it seems to me, has ceased to be rationaland is simply concerned with preserving tradition. The Yog„c„rabhðmi isnot a coherent text but a composite of heterogeneous elements, somemore traditional, others more progressive. In general the material in theVinišcayasa½graha«‡ is more developed than what we ³nd in the basicseventeen sections of the Yog„c„rabhðmi. Still, the Vinišcayasa½graha«‡is part of the Yog„c„rabhðmi and presupposes what is contained in itsbasic sections. And since the basic sections clearly present the traditionalgotra theory, the authors of the Vinišcayasa½graha«‡ were not at libertydirectly to contradict or ignore that theory. This would appear to be thehistorical dynamic at work behind the inconsistency between the monis-tic tathat„ and the pluralistic three vehicles.

True, certain passages do suggest a dh„tu-v„da-type structure. Agood example is the verse of the Abhisamay„la½k„ra that we referred toat the outset:

Because the dharmadh„tu has no distinction, any distinction amonggotras is unreasonable. Nevertheless, because the dharmas to be posited[on the “locus” of dharmadh„tu] are distinct, a distinction [amonggotras] is proclaimed.

The earliest extant commentary on the work, the Abhisamay„la½k„ra-v£tti of Ãrya-Vimuktisena, explains the meaning of the latter half of theverse as follows:

[Gotras are differentiated, just as the vessels] made from the same clayand baked in the same ³re [are differentiated] by the distinct names“honey pot,” “candy pot,” and so forth [according to what is put inthem].45

In Matsumoto’s phraseology, the V£tti would clearly hold that themanifold “super-loci” are posited on a single “locus,” and that this

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201

homogeneous “locus” is differentiated only in the sense that the hetero-geneous “super-loci” are differentiated one from another. It is preciselythis that he has chosen to name dh„tu-v„da. But if the distinction amonggotra amounts to no more than the super³cial temporary distinctionbetween a “honey pot” and a “candy pot,” it has ceased to characterizeanything essential. This is clearly different from the stringent gotra theoryof the Yogacara school.46 The great possibility for the conversion ofšr„vaka allowed for in the V£tti seems to justify my suspicions.47 It seemscertain that the distinction among the three vehicles in the V£tti is notthe absolute predestination of the Yogacara school.48

In addition, we might mention the following arguments:

Therefore, [the k„rik„ I.5cd of the Abhisamay„la½k„ra]49 teaches thatthe dharmadh„tu itself, [namely] the gotra existing by nature(prak£tistha½ gotra½), is the basis for practice, because [the dharma-dh„tu is] the cause of the holy dharmas….

Others hold that gotra is the distinct state of the six-sense-basis(¤a^„yatana-više¤a), which is twofold: one attained by conditions(pratyaya-samud„n‡ta) and one existing by nature (prak£ty-avasthita)….[This opinion is rejected.]50

[Objection:] If dharmadh„tu is gotra, does it not follow that all [thesentient beings] are [equally] established in the gotra (gotra-stha),51 sincethe [dharmadh„tu] is omnipresent?

[Answer: The dharmadh„tu] is called gotra [only] to the extent thatit is recognized („lambyam„na) and becomes the cause of holy dhar-mas….52

The context here is very similar to that of the Vinišcayasa½graha«‡on a number of points. First, the entire argument is necessitated by therejection of the classical Yogacara theory of gotra and the adoption oftathat„ or dharmadh„tu as the basis for supramundane attainment.Second, tathat„ or dharmadh„tu thus adopted aids the arising of supra-mundane wisdom by serving as its cognitive object. Third, in spite of theadoption of such a universal basis, the author does not discard the tradi-tional distinction among the three vehicles outright, but strives somehowto retain it.

Most likely the crucial factor once again was the authority of the pre-ceding tradition. The Abhisamay„la½k„ra had close ties with certainYogacara texts,53 which makes it easy to understand how the Abhisamay„-la½k„ra and its V£tti could not completely neglect the traditional gotra

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distinction of the Yogacara school. At the same time, the Yogacara tradi-tion seems not to have been so closely binding on the V£tti as the Viniš-cayasa½graha«‡. The logic of the V£tti that supports the differentiationof gotras is very weak. Hence, as we saw earlier, the distinction amonggotras in this text cannot be considered ³nal.

CONCLUSION

In the compass of this essay I have only been able to cover a small portionof the large number of texts analyzed by Hakamaya and Matsumoto, andhave had to exclude mention of any of the sutras. Obviously so limited anexamination cannot claim to have taken into account all the aspects oftath„gata-garbha thought. However, we can say that at least as far as thesastra texts we have discussed are concerned, the applicability of thedh„tu-v„da model of discrimination based on monism is questionable atbest. The Yogacara theory of gotra is indeed discriminatory, but it is notbased on monism. Tath„gata-garbha thought is clearly monistic, but thegotra distinction does not seem to signify anything essential. Some texts,such as the Abhisamay„la½k„ra-v£tti, show an apparent dh„tu-v„dastructure, but that structure would appear to be an inconsistency broughtabout by a reinterpretation of the gotra theory. That is, replacing the plu-ralistic gotras with monistic dharmadh„tu did not entirely do away withthe traditional distinction among the three vehicles.

I have tried to illustrate this in Chart 5, which presents my under-standing of the dh„tu-v„da structure. While it may look very similar toMatsumoto’s scheme, it is really a clumsy patchwork of the super-structureof Chart 3 with the infra-structure of Chart 4, aimed at showing how theinfrastructure and superstructure of Chart 5 contradict one another. I

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203

CHART 5

sravaka pratyekabuddha bodhisattva

dharmadh„tu = prak£tistha-gotra

superstructure ofYogacara

inconsistent with

infrastructure oftath„gatagarbha

➛

➛

remain rather skeptical of the position that the dh„tu-v„da had anythinglike the solid structure that Hakamaya and Matsumoto seem to accord it.I wish respectfully to acknowledge their contribution to Buddhist studiesin pointing out the problematics of the tath„gata-garbha thought so faroverlooked. At the same time, I have tried to indicate the possibility ofalternative interpretations based on the philological arguments presentedin the foregoing.

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