youth and government bench memo (2011)
DESCRIPTION
Bench Memo (2011) from Illinois Youth and Government's Judicial Program. Awards: First Place Written Argument, Second Place Verbal Argument, First Place OverallTRANSCRIPT
No. 2010-11-BIN THE YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
SUPREME COURT
Frank Fletcher )Appellant-Defendant ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Youth and Government) Circuit of Illinois)
vs. ) No. 2010-11-B)
People of the State of Illinois ) Honorable Cheryl FitzgeraldAppellee-Plaintiff ) Presiding Judge
)
BRIEF AND ARGUMENT FOR THE APPELLEE-PLAINTIFF
Anastasia GolovashkinaNaperville, IL [email protected]
Josie DaltonNaperville, IL [email protected]
Attorneys for the Appellee-Plaintiff, the People of the State of Illinois
I. THE SEVEN 9” BY 12” COLOR PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN AT THE CRIME SCENE WERE PROPERLY AND FAIRLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.
A jury trial found defendant Frank Fletcher guilty of the first-degree murder of
police officer Markus Kane. The defendant appealed the verdict based on the grounds that
he had not been granted a fair trial. The first issue presented by the Appellant is the trial
judge’s decision to overrule the defense’s objection to admission into evidence of seven 9”
by 12” color photographs depicting the crime scene. Trial Judge Fitzgerald allowed each
side to present its arguments for or against the photographs’ admission. Defense counsel
argued that the photographs were more prejudicial than probative, while prosecutors
countered that the photographs were necessary for Officer Kelly to explain his theory of
how the shooting took place. After hearing and carefully considering both sides’
arguments, the trial judge overruled the objection of defense counsel and admitted all
seven photographs into evidence. On appeal, the Appellant contends that Judge Fitzgerald
was incorrect to rescind this motion. The Appellee maintains that the trial judge did not err
in overruling the defense counsel’s objection to the introduction of seven 9” by 12” color
photographs of the crime scene into evidence.
Both the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the
State of Illinois affirm the trial judge’s ruling to admit the photographs in the case at bar.
Amendment V of the Constitution of the United States of America states that, “No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Amendment VI
further states, “The accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district where in the crime shall have been committed.”
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois further affirms, “In criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person…and to have
2
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to
have been committed.” Although the State of Illinois has provided defendant Frank
Fletcher with the full extent of these rights, Fletcher’s counsel argues that the trial court’s
admission into evidence of seven photographs of the crime scene undermined his
constitutional right to a fair trial. All seven of the photographs were taken at the crime
scene after the crime was committed, though only five of the photographs display blood.
Four of the photographs were wide-angle shots taken from different directions, showing
the open passenger door of the police car and the police car’s location relative to the
sidewalk, multi-lane intersection, other cars, and bus stop. The fifth photograph was a
tighter shot through the open passenger door, showing Officer Kane’s body in the driver’s
seat. The sixth photograph was a close-up shot of the bullet entry wound in Officer Kane’s
right temple, and the last shot showed the bullet’s exit wound in Officer Kane’s left
temple. The State maintains that these photographs were properly admitted into trial court
evidence, were indispensible to Officer Kelly’s witness testimony, and in no way infringed
upon the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
The issue of prejudicial evidence exists to curb counselors from submitting
exhibits that lack probative value but, instead, are intended to arouse jurors’ prejudicial
emotions against the defendant and to provoke them to deliver a more severe verdict.
Prejudicial exhibits can undermine a defendant’s right to the Constitution of the United
States of America’s guaranteed receipt of trial by a “fair and impartial jury,” as the jurors’
resulting prejudice tends to inhibit them from being impartial in their judgment. This issue
is especially complex concerning the admission of photographs into the evidence of a
murder case, since photographs related to a murder are often gruesome or graphic in their
3
depictions. The general rule of law in Illinois concerning the admission of photographs
into evidence states that, “Where photographs are relevant to establish any fact in issue
they are admissible in spite of the fact that they may be of a gruesome nature.” People v.
Henenberg. 55 Ill.2d at 13. We, the People of the State of Illinois, maintain that the
photographs admitted into the case at bar were relevant to establish and corroborate the
facts presented in the witness testimonies of Officer Frank Kelly, Ms. Beatrice Green, and
Mr. Richard Edwards, and were thus correctly and fairly admitted by Judge Fitzgerald into
trial court evidence.
The trial court’s decision to admit these photographs is supported by the case of
People v. Henenberg. 55 Ill.2d 5, 302 N.E.2d 27, 25 Ill.Dec. 5 (1973). In People v.
Henenberg, the defendant, Frank Alex Henenberg, was found guilty of armed robbery and
murder. At trial, three photographs were admitted into evidence depicting the decomposed
body of his victim. One featured the deceased’s skull and left arm, the latter of which was
in a plaster cast. The other two photographs showed different views of the deceased’s
skull. Two photographs were in color, and one was black-and-white. The defendant
appealed based on arguments that these photographs were cumulative, deliberately
prejudicial, and presented by the state solely to provoke adverse sentiments among the
jury towards the defendant. Despite these arguments, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld
the trial court’s decision to admit the photographs into evidence.
In Henenberg, the court applied the rule of law in Illinois to conclude that each
admitted photograph added factual information to the aggregate of court evidence:
“The photograph of the skull and left arm showed the condition of the body as it was found and corroborated the testimony concerning the cause of death and the identity of the victim. The other two photographs, which showed a bullet hole in the skull, tended to show the cause of death…[the photographs] did not become
4
unnecessarily cumulative because there was oral testimony concerning the same issues.” People v. Henenberg. 55 Ill.2d at 14.
The defendants in both Henenberg and the case at bar argued that the photographs
that were admitted into court evidence were more prejudicial than probative. Henenberg
indicates that the process of evaluating probative value—and thus, the correctness of a
photograph’s admission—must not be governed by the unpleasantness of the photographs’
depictions. Thus, though blood spatter is visible in five of the seven photographs admitted
into evidence in the case at bar, its presence must not govern our evaluation of their
potential prejudice and the correctness of their admission.
Rather, Henenberg indicates that the most important aspect of a piece of evidence
in assessing its admission into court is the evidence’s relevance to the trial itself.
Henenberg confirms that any photograph that is relevant to establish a fact on any issue is
admissible into evidence, further stating that the presence of relevant “oral testimony” can
corroborate this admission. People v. Henenberg. 55 Ill.2d at 14. Upon examination, the
court in Henenberg found each photograph to be justifiable in its inclusion. We shall now
demonstrate how the same holds true for each of the photographs admitted into evidence
in the case at bar.
In the case at bar, the first four admitted photographs offer wide-angle shots from
different directions, showing the location of the police car relative to landmarks such as
sidewalks, streetlights, intersections, and bus stops. These landmarks are mentioned
extensively throughout the testimonies of all three of the State’s witnesses. In addition to
confirming the testimony of Officer Frank Kelly, the first four photographs corroborate
and clarify the location-driven statements of witnesses Richard Edwards and Beatrice
Green. In his sworn statement, Mr. Edwards attempts to explain, “We ran up around the
5
squad car, and west on Division… We went right by [a woman] when we took off down
Division.” Ms. Green makes similar references to specific intersections: “I was on the
southeast corner of LaSalle and Division Streets” and, “There was a police officer sitting
in a squad car parked on the east side of LaSalle, just south of Division, about 20 feet from
me.” The jury’s access to these four photographs is crucial to its comprehension of these
complicated statements. Since both witnesses testified prior to Officer Frank Kelly (who
introduced the photographs, and whose entire testimony was based off of the evidence in
these photographs—an aspect further affirming their relevance to the case at bar), the
jury’s ability to examine the photographs during deliberation was crucial to achieving a
fact-based verdict. The photographs reveal such information as the bus stop’s true distance
from the crime scene, which would have been exaggerated by Ms. Green had the
photographs not been admitted. The ability to compare statements directly to photographs
granted the jurors a greater factual foundation for their decision.
The fifth photograph showed a closer view through the police car’s open passenger
door, depicting the victim’s body in the driver’s seat. Once more, the image is relevant to
all three of the prosecution’s witnesses, each of whom referenced either the position of the
shooter, the accomplice, the victim, or all three. Ms. Green testified, “I looked over to the
squad car. The two guys were right there. One was standing next to the open front
passenger door. The other one was leaning inside the door, and backing out.” Mr. Edwards
testified, “Fletcher told me to tap on the passenger door and open it. When I did, Fletcher
just leaned in and shot the guy on the head.” This photograph demonstrates that the blood
spatter was on the driver’s side door—and in effect, corroborates both aforementioned
statements. The photograph is also critical to Officer Kelly’s testimony as to how the
6
shooting took place. This testimony hinged on the picture’s confirmation of blood spatter
on the driver’s-side door.
The sixth and seventh photographs showed close-ups of the bullet’s entry and exit
wounds, as well as flash burns from the gunshot. These depictions were critical to the
formulation of Officer Kelly’s testimony concerning the direction from which the victim
was shot. The photographs were relevant to statements made by both Mr. Edwards and
Ms. Green about the direction from which the victim was approached. By depicting the
size of the bullet hole, these two photographs further corroborated Mr. Edwards’ claim that
the victim had been shot with a “.38 caliber revolver.”
Moreover, human memory is an imperfect mechanism. The violent nature of the
crime in question predisposed its witnesses to err from correct recollection. Unlike the
indisputable image found in a photograph, Mr. Edwards and Ms. Green were prone to
making biased statements. The photographs also contributed to the core of Officer Frank
Kelly’s investigation and provided factual foundation for his testimony.
Each of the photographs presented in the case at bar, like each photograph in
Henenberg, was therefore supplemented by apposite oral testimony. Though the defendant
may argue that the black-and-white composition of one of the photographs admitted into
Henenberg contrasts with the color composition of the photographs in the case at bar, this
is an inappropriate comparison. The distinction between black-and-white and color
imaging is merely a byproduct of the thirty-year time span between Henenberg and the
case at bar. Black-and-white cameras were much more common and affordable than color
cameras in 1973; the opposite is true in 2010. Had Henenberg taken place in the present
decade, it is reasonable to believe that all three of its photographs would have been in
7
color. The rule in Illinois specifies that any photograph relevant to establishing a fact is
admissible—any photograph, any issue, and concerning any fact. The language of this law
alludes to neither specific quantities nor states of saturation; in implementing the law,
neither should the Illinois Supreme Court.
As in Henenberg, the photographs presented in the case at bar were both relevant
to and concerned the same issues as trial testimonies. Though some of the admitted
photographs depict some vivid details of the murder, Henenberg states that these qualities
cannot invalidate or even infringe upon their probative value. Like the photographs
admitted in Henenberg, each of the photographs admitted into the case at bar added
additional information and corroborated the testimonies of the State’s three witnesses.
Even if the defendant in the case at bar had argued that the photographs were cumulative,
Henenberg still states that photographs “relevant to establish any fact” are admissible and
cannot be considered cumulative People v. Henenberg. 55 Ill.2d at 13. The trial judge in
Henenberg was upheld in his admission of similar photographic evidence. As the
similarities between this case and the case at bar indicate, the decision in Henenberg can
and should be extended to the case at bar.
Judge Fitzgerald’s decision to overrule defense counsel’s objection to the
photographs in the case at bar is also supported by the court’s ruling in the case of People
v. Speck. 41 Ill.2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208, 22 Dec. 180 (1968). In People v. Speck, the
defendant, Richard Franklin Speck, was found guilty of murdering eight female nurses.
Photographs of the deceased girls were admitted into court evidence, showing the location
of their bodies in various locations and the manner in which their hands and feet were
bound. On appeal, the defendant argued that because he had agreed to confirm the
8
identities of his victims and the causes of their deaths, admission of photographs of their
bodies constituted prejudicial error. Much like the defendant in the case at bar, the
defendant in Speck argued that the photographs lacked any probative value and aroused
prejudicial emotions from the jurors; the court dismissed these allegations and affirmed
the trial court’s admission of the photographs.
The rule in Illinois concerning the admission of evidence states that,
“Evidence having a natural tendency to establish the facts in controversy should be admitted. A party cannot have competent evidence excluded merely because it might arouse feelings of horror and indignation in the jury. Any testimony concerning the details of a murder or other violent crime may have such tendencies, but manifestly this could not suffice to render it incompetent.” People v. Speck. 41 Ill.2d at 202.
In Speck, the court reasoned,
“The photographs of the deceased girls showing the location of the bodies in the various rooms corroborated, to some extent, the testimony of Miss Amurao. The photographs also illustrated the manner in which the hands and feet of the victims were bound, further corroborating Miss Amurao’s testimony. The bindings also tended to show premeditation and planning on the part of the killer and negated any claim that the slayings were done in an insane frenzy.” People v. Speck. 41 Ill.2d at 203.
Like the photographs admitted in Speck, the photographs admitted into evidence in
the case at bar supported the testimonies of Mr. Richard Edwards, Ms. Beatrice Green, and
Officer Frank Kelly, all three of whom spoke to the premeditated nature of the murder. In
a criminal case such as the case at bar, the difference between hot-blooded (an “insane
frenzy”) and cold-blooded (with “premeditation and planning”) often determines whether
the defendant will be sentenced for murder or for manslaughter. In Speck, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the images in the disputed photographs were integral to
corroborating the premeditated nature, distinguishing the crime as murder rather than
manslaughter.
9
In the case at bar, the first four photographs—wide-angle shots depicting the
victim’s police car in relation to its surroundings—illustrate the intricacies of the
labyrinth-like junction between LaSalle and Division Streets, and indicate the high degree
of planning required for the defendant to have executed his plot. In his sworn statement,
witness Richard Edwards made repeated references to both the apartment (which he shares
with the defendant) and to the LaSalle and Division Street intersection, stating, “I live
with Frank Fletcher in a two-bedroom apartment at 18 East Elm Street.” In describing the
night of the murder, Mr. Edwards further stated, “around 8:30 the two of us left the
apartment, walked over to LaSalle Street and started walking north.”
In addition to assisting the jurors’ comprehension of these complicated, street-
specific explanations, the admitted photographs verified the murder’s premeditated nature.
In order to arrive at the victim’s vehicle from his apartment building, the defendant would
have had to research both his victim’s usual parking spot and an appropriate route for him
to get there. The photographs demonstrate the defendant did not live in a location from
which the crime scene was visible—but rather, that he had to make a conscious and
deliberate effort to stalk his victim. The photographs also display the complicated
arrangement of streets where the crime took place, and further attest to the defendant’s
malicious intentions. Much like the photographs affirmed in Speck, the photographs in the
case at bar thus serve to establish the defendant’s malice aforethought.
The Court in Speck referenced numerous case precedents to assist its evaluation of
the photographs in question. In one such cited case, the court “held that there was no error
in admitting into evidence photographs of a deceased girl’s body showing the various
wounds inflicted upon her” People v. Speck. 41 Ill.2d at 203. Likewise, five of the seven
10
photographs admitted into the case at bar featured blood spatter, and two photographs—
close-up shots of the bullet’s entry and exit wounds—showed the specific, fatal wounds
inflicted upon the deceased officer. According to the precedents referenced in Speck, the
appearance of these terminal wounds did not make the photographs prejudicial or
erroneous.
Speck cites another case in which the trial Court admitted photographs of a
deceased woman as she had been found and additional photographs of her body at a
morgue. The Court again upheld their admission both at trial and on appeal, reasoning,
“The pictures were admissible to show the condition of the victim’s clothing, certain
bruises on her body, and to show the amount of force that had been used, and we held that
the ruling of the trial Court was not in error, in spite of the shocking nature of the pictures”
People v. Speck. 41 Ill.2d at 203. The photographs admitted into our case were critical to
depicting and corroborating similar conditions. The first four photographs added
indispensible clarification to the circumstances surrounding our case, much of which
depended on specific street and intersection names. The fifth photograph demonstrated the
exact position of the victim’s body. This corroborated the testimonies of Mr. Richard
Edwards, Ms. Beatrice Green, and Officer Frank Kelly, all of whom said that Mr. Fletcher
and Mr. Edwards ran from the crime scene immediately after the victim was shot—and
did not, for example, stall to shift the location of his body or to otherwise tamper with his
remains. The sixth and seventh photographs depict the entry and exit wounds of the bullet,
demonstrating that the distance between the gun and the victim was consistent with all
three witnesses’ statements, and that the officer’s vehicle was approached from the
passenger-side door. Since no bullet was recovered from the crime scene and no mention
11
of the bullet hole’s size was made in the autopsy report, these two final photographs also
demonstrated that the size of the victim’s wound was consistent with Mr. Edwards’ claim
that the victim was shot with a “.38 caliber revolver.”
In the third case cited in Speck, the defendant argued that photographs of the
deceased victim should not have been admitted into evidence on the grounds that a police
officer had already provided an exhaustive description of the condition in which the
deceased was found. This cited defendant expressed similar arguments to those made in
the case at bar, arguing that the admitted photographs were submitted only to enflame the
jurors. In the cited case, the Court “held that the admission of photographs of a deceased is
discretionary with the trial judge and ruled that the trial judge had not abused that
discretion” People v. Speck. 41 Ill.2d at 203. In the case at bar, State witness Officer Kelly
supplied similar statements regarding the condition in which he found the victim.
Extending the precedents cited in Speck to the circumstances of the case at bar, we see
that the officer’s corresponding explanations did not render the photographs inadmissible.
Moreover, the photographs correctly admitted into Speck were far more gruesome
and prejudicial nature than the photographs admitted into the case at bar. In Speck, the
photographs depicted the slain bodies of eight females, whom had also been bound and
beaten by the defendant. These images were far more gruesome than the photographs
admitted into the case at bar, which only depicted a single gunshot wound in the deceased
police officer’s right temple. Despite these conditions, Speck was nonetheless denied a
second trial; due to similarities between these two cases, this precedent is fully applicable
to the decision in this case.
The rule in Illinois concerning admission of evidence states,
12
“Questions relating to the character of the evidence offered, and the manner and extent of its presentation are largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and the exercise of that discretion will not be interfered with unless there has been an abuse to the prejudice of the defendant.” People v. Speck. 41 Ill.2d at 203.
Since Speck holds that judgment of disputed evidence rests first with the trial
judge, we must also evaluate the manner in which our own judge handled the objection. In
doing so, we find that Judge Fitzgerald made a point to hear both sides’ arguments before
admitting the photographs. Although he did choose to admit all seven of the disputed
photographs, his decision was not indicative of a magistrate misusing his discretion.
Rather, it reflected the necessity of incorporating all of the photographs, as well as the
likelihood that the prosecution—elaborating upon these requisites—presented a more
persuasive argument. Unlike the trial judge in People v. Jackson, Judge Fitzgerald did not
allow any more photographs to be admitted, nor did he re-open the case to enter additional
evidence on behalf of the prosecution. The conduct of Judge Fitzgerald demonstrated a
deep level of respect towards both the defendant and defense counsel. In accordance with
the rule stated in Speck, our trial judge thus did not abuse his discretion. Consequently, as
derived from the strikingly parallel circumstances found between Speck and the case at
bar—in which those of Speck function as a much more exaggerated version of those in the
case at bar—we affirm that trial Judge Fitzgerald was correct to admit the photographs
into trial court evidence.
The case of People v. Jackson can be distinguished from the case at bar. 9 Ill.2d
484, 138 N.E.2d 528, 26 Ill.Dec. 485 (1956). In People v. Jackson, defendant Leroy
Jackson was convicted of the murder of Louise Jackson. Evidence admitted into trial court
included the defendant’s 23-page written confession, both weapons used in the crime (a
knife and a Nichols gun), the gun the defendant had when arrested, and two photographs
13
of portions of the victim’s apartment. Though the testimonies of all thirteen of the State’s
witnesses contradicted claims made by Mr. Jackson, the defendant made no attempts to
address the evidence presented against him, invite other witnesses to speak on his behalf,
or even take to the stand himself.
Prosecutors in Jackson went as far is to reopen the rested case to introduce one,
additional piece of evidence against the defendant—a single photograph taken of the
deceased after her autopsy. The photograph depicted the face and neck of an obese black
female with her mouth slightly open, her eyes nearly shut, and a pronounced view of the
wounds from her autopsy incisions. Mr. Jackson had written ‘this is the lady I stab’ and
signed his name on the photograph. Indeed, so overwhelming was the State’s argument
that even the prosecutors themselves did not hesitate to call the admission of this final
photograph “cumulative.” On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reinforced this
impression by remanding People v. Jackson for a new trial.
The rule in Illinois states that,
“Mindful of the prejudicial emotion that might be aroused by the introduction of a victim’s photograph, the courts have, on the whole, been strict in their requirement that a proper purpose be shown for the introduction of such an exhibit.” People v. Jackson. 9 Ill.2d at 490.
In Jackson, the Court based its decision to grant the defendant a second trial
exclusively on the admission of this final photograph. Not one of the photographs
presented in the case at bar, however, exhibits the distortional character found in Jackson’s
post-autopsy, incriminating, inflammatory, and excessive image.
In Jackson, the Court determined that,
“It is clear that…the only remaining use of the photograph from the State’s standpoint was to arouse the emotions of the jury so that they would administer a more severe penalty. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the
14
photograph also displays a portion of the autopsy incision, a feature which accentuated its inflammatory character.” People v. Jackson. 9 Ill.2d at 491.
However, the significant differences between Jackson and the case at bar render
Jackson inapplicable to the circumstances of our case. First, the photographed female in
Jackson owes her most prominent wound to an autopsy incision irrelevant to the tried
actions of the defendant. In the case at bar, all wounds shown in the admitted photographs
were inflicted by the defendant himself and did not reflect the actions of others. Though
not consistent with Jackson, this absence of post-autopsic incisions in the photographs
admitted into the case at bar is analogous to the precedents of both Henenberg and Speck,
both of which were affirmed.
Second, whereas the photograph in Jackson was taken at a hospital a number of
days after the crime had taken place, all seven of the photographs admitted into the case at
bar were taken on the night of the crime, at the scene of the crime. The photographs were
also taken several days before an autopsy was performed. Unlike the photograph in
Jackson, the photographs in the case at bar therefore did not spoil the body of evidence
with irrelevant information or with wounds resulting from a medical examination. Though
not similar to the circumstances of Jackson, this aspect of the case at bar is again
analogous to the conditions found in the affirmed case of People v. Speck, in which
correctly admitted photographs were taken at the scene of the crime.
Third, the defendant in Jackson wrote the self-incriminating and illiterate, ‘this is
the lady I stab,’ directly onto the photograph admitted into his case. In addition to
indicating his self-professed guilt to the jurors, the defendant’s handwritten confession on
Jackson’s single, admitted photograph also predisposed its jurors to prejudice against the
defendant. Mr. Jackson’s annotation indicated that he was illiterate (an hence predisposed
15
by his own lack of knowledge to act out in an impulsive, violent manner) and ignorant
(despite this annotation, the defendant maintained that he was innocent). Like the
defendants in the affirmed cases of Henenberg and Speck, the defendant in the case at bar
did not even write on the admitted photographs; Mr. Fletcher did not even acknowledge
personal involvement in the crime.
The rule in Illinois further states,
“Whether the photograph of a deceased is properly admissible depends upon whether it has probative value, such as aiding a jury in the better understanding of medical testimony or aiding them in determining the manner in which the crime was committed.” People v. Jackson. 9 Ill.2d at 490.
Unlike the photographs admitted into the case at bar, the photograph in Jackson
was supplemented by a far more comprehensive body of evidence. This included thirteen
witness testimonies; two murder weapons; two photographs of the victim’s apartment; the
defendant’s written confession; in addition, the defendant refused to take the stand and
addressed no evidence on his own behalf. Even prosecutors in Jackson did not hesitate to
call their own argument ‘cumulative.’ Though the photograph indicated that the victim
had been an obese, black female, these facts had already been established by thirteen
witness testimonies and an autopsic report. The photograph added no information that
could not already be procured from this evidence, and thus did not satisfy the law’s
requirement for an admitted photograph to have “probative” value—that is, that the
requirement that an admitted piece of evidence must prove something. People v. Jackson.
9 Ill.2d at 491. The photograph’s close-up of the victim’s face and neck made the victim’s
autopsic incisions the image’s most prominent feature. The photograph’s focus on the
victim’s face and neck did not help jurors to, for example, better understand the method
and nature of the victim’s injuries, as had been the case in both Henenberg and Speck.
16
This flagrant absence of probative purpose led the Court in Jackson to determine that the
sole motive behind the photograph was to inflame and upset the jurors.
In the case at bar, however, the photographs played a critical role in clarifying the
testimonies of the State’s three witnesses. Though their admission was most closely
associated with the testimony of Officer Frank Kelly, the photographs were available to
jurors throughout their deliberation, helping them evaluate all three witnesses’ statements
against the images depicted in the photographs. Like the photographs admitted into the
affirmed cases of Henenberg and Speck, the photographs admitted into the case at bar
were relevant to establishing facts that could not have been corroborated otherwise.
Moreover, the photographs admitted into the case at bar were both relevant to and vital to
the factual corroboration of the victim’s injuries. Whereas the zoomed-in, post-autopsic
photograph in Jackson failed to depict its victim’s injuries, and in fact obscured her
injuries with unrelated incisions made by a medical examiner, the photographs admitted
into the case at bar were selected for their precise relevance to and factual corroboration of
Officer Frank Kelly’s testimony. The first four photographs depicted the four-way
intersection and confirmed the crime scene’s setting; the fifth photograph indicated the
direction from which the victim was shot; the final images specified that the murder
weapon was consistent with Mr. Richard Edwards’ statement of a “.38 caliber pistol.”
Since the photographs indicate that the bullet passed through the victim’s entire skull, the
photographs also indicated the close range from which the victim was shot, corroborating
the testimonies of all three of the prosecutors’ witnesses.
Though Jackson establishes the precedent of a single piece of flawed evidence as
sufficient grounds for a trial’s reversal, the rule in Illinois for evaluating admitted evidence
17
is based on quality, not quantity. In comparing the precedents of Jackson and Henenberg,
for example, we see that although the single photograph admitted into Jackson was in
error, all three photographs admitted in Henenberg were deemed correct.
Whereas the trial judge in Jackson abused his discretion in allowing prosecutors to
both present the photograph into trial evidence and in allowing the case to be re-opened
for its excessive introduction, the trial judge in the case at bar not only admitted the
photographs during proper trial proceedings, but insisted on doing so only after
considering arguments from both sides. Normally, the nuances of court proceedings are
left to the discretion of a trial judge. Although the judge in Jackson clearly abused his
judgeship’s discretion, as Judge Fitzgerald’s insistence on considering both arguments
demonstrates, such violations were not made in the case at bar. Thus, due to the
overwhelming discrepancies between this case and the case of People v. Jackson, the
decision of Jackson cannot be applied to the case at bar.
The case of People v. Lefler can be distinguished from the case at bar. 38 Ill.2d
216, 230 N.E.2d 827, 29 Ill.Dec. 216 (1967). In People v. Lefler, the defendant, Theodore
Wayne Lefler, was found guilty of the involuntary manslaughter of his infant daughter.
Upon becoming frustrated with the newborn’s crying, the defendant proceeded to squeeze
the child, break her ribs, and bring about the her death. At trial, the judge permitted the
exhibition of several color photographs taken during the autopsy. The pictures were
projected onto a wall, and enlarged to a size of 44” x 26”. In one, the jury was able to see
the chest cavity after the breastbone, ribs, lungs, heart, and main blood vessels had been
removed. The other photographs showed the skull and portions of the brain after an area
of the skull had been removed. The doctor who had performed the autopsy later testified in
18
extensive detail about his findings, using a blackboard to illustrate the victim’s injuries
once more. On appeal, the defendant questioned the trial court’s admission of the
aforementioned photographs. Lefler’s trial judge—who was found to have abused his
discretion on a number of other issues throughout the trial, as well—was determined to
have, too, erred in admitting these photographs.
The rule in Illinois states that,
“Whether a photograph of a deceased person should be admitted in evidence normally rests within the discretion of the trial court and if such a picture has sufficient probative value it may be admitted in spite of the fact that the photograph may be gruesome and inflammatory.” People v. Lefler. 38 Ill.2d at 222.
In Lefler, the Court applied the precedent of Jackson, reasoning that,
“In the present case the testimony that the body of the testimony was that the body of the deceased bore little superficial evidence of injury to the gruesome nature of the pictures was caused almost entirely by the autopsy procedure. We believe that the pictures had little probative value in view of the detailed testimony by the physician and the fact that the nature and extent of the injuries was not disputed.” People v. Lefler. 38 Ill.2d at 222.
The trial judge in Lefler committed reversible error in allowing prosecutors to
present both the detailed testimony of a medical examiner and a series of enlarged
photographs whose gruesome wounds were almost completely attributable to individuals
other than the defendant. However, there are four fundamental differences between Lefler
and the case at bar that make the decision in Lefler inapplicable to the case at bar.
First, the photographs in both Jackson and Lefler were deemed erroneous largely
because of their depiction of prominent, gruesome wounds not associated with the crime
committed by the defendant, but with the incisions made during the victim’s autopsy. In
contrast, all seven photographs admitted in the case at bar were taken at the crime scene
19
prior to the victim’s medical examination; the injuries depicted in the admitted
photographs were attributable only to the defendant himself.
Second, whereas the photographs in Lefler were projected onto a screen
approximately 44” by 26” in size, the photographs in the case at bar were not enlarged and
were presented to the jury in their original 9” by 12” format. In Lefler, this enlargement
added excessive dramatization and aroused the emotions of the jurors—indeed, it were
almost as if the jurors were attending a horror movie, with the enlarged, gruesome images
of a murdered infant flashing on the screen in front of them. In the case at bar, the
photographs were kept to their initial size; the photographs were not dramatized in their
presentation.
Third, the expert oral testimony provided by the medical examiner in Lefler made
the photographs presented in that case excessive. The doctor testified about his findings in
great detail, using a blackboard to illustrate most of the victim’s injuries. Just as the
overwhelming aggregate of evidence supplied by prosecutors in Jackson helped render
Jackson’s admitted photograph excessive in its absence of probative value, so too did the
doctor’s testimony in Lefler render the case’s photographs excessive. In the case at bar,
however, the witness associated with the admitted photographs did not provide additional
visual images to illustrate the extent of the victim’s injuries. Whereas the doctor in Lefler
owed much of his evidence to injuries inflicted by his own examination, the witness in the
case at bar relied on photographic evidence that did not include injuries unrelated to the
defendant’s own actions. As the precedent previously cited in People v. Speck also
demonstrates, although Officer Kelly testified to the condition in which he found the
victim, his statements did not make the photographs inadmissible.
20
Fourth, whereas the nature and extent of the injuries in Lefler were not disputed,
the injuries in the case at bar were. In fact, Officer Kelly’s entire testimony concerned his
hypothesis about how he believed the shooting took place; his hypothesis, in turn, was
based on the evidence he gathered from the admitted photographs. In his sworn statement,
Defendant Frank Fletcher denied these claims and stated that he did not know anything
about the shooting: “What makes you think I would know anything about that?”
Moreover, neither witness Richard Edwards nor Beatrice Green testified to the extent of
the victim’s injuries, and added little to no factual foundation for Officer Kelly’s theories.
Though an autopsy report was entered into evidence in the case at bar, no medical
examiner was present to decipher the report’s technical and complicated language. The
minor overlap between the content of two photographs and that of the medical report was
neither harmful nor cumulative—rather, the photographs added an invaluable
representation of the autopsy report that was much more accessible and understandable to
jurors. The photographs were also more relevant to the testimony of the witness who
presented them, who formed his theories from the series of police photographs that were
properly presented at trial—not from an autopsy report. It would have been inappropriate
to force the officer to testify without the evidence on which he based his theories, let alone
to inhibit his precision by forcing him to decipher a cumbersome document composed by
experts outside of his profession, or to explain his hypotheses without the evidence on
which he had based them. Whereas the chalkboard drawings provided by the medical
examiner in Lefler show that his testimony did not require the additional visuals of
enlarged, post-autopsy photographs, the testimony of Officer Frank Kelly in the case at
bar depended wholly on the content of his correctly admitted, pre-autopsy photographs.
21
The trial judge in Lefler was incorrect to overrule defense counsel’s objection to admitting
the enlarged, prejudicial, and post-autopsy photographs into trial court evidence.
However, as the numerous discrepancies between this case and the case at bar
demonstrate, the court’s decision in Lefler cannot be extended to the case at bar.
However, the most important distinction that can be drawn from the precedents of
all four of these cases is the decisive importance of whether the admitted photographs
were taken before or after the victim’s autopsy. Both Lefler and Jackson were reversed on
the grounds that their admitted photographs depicted wounds attributable not to the
actions of the tried defendant, but to the gruesome, autopsic incisions executed by a
medical examiner. In contrast, like the photographs admitted and affirmed in Henenberg
and Speck, the photographs admitted into the case at bar did not depict any such post-
autopsic wounds. In both of the affirmed cases, like in the case at bar, the correctly
admitted photographs showed the victims’ bodies in the exact appearance in which the
defendant had left them, and did not prejudice jurors with evidence of irrelevant incisions.
Thus, although appellate courts have sustained “strict” requirements for trial courts to
establish a “proper purpose” for introducing photographs into evidence, comparing the
precedents of these four cases indicates that the display of post-autopsic wounds is a
decisive negation of this ‘strict’ ‘proper purpose.’ People v. Lefler. 38 Ill.2d at 222. The
photographs admitted in the affirmed cases of Henenberg and Speck, like the photographs
in the case at bar, however, do not depict post-autopsic wounds. Extending this precedent,
we see that the photographs in the case at bar were thus appropriately admitted into trial
court evidence.
Therefore, because the seven admitted, color photographs were not prejudicial,
22
corroborated the testimonies of the prosecution’s witness, established the premeditated
nature of the murder, cannot be challenged on the basis of their shocking images, and were
properly and respectfully admitted by Judge Fitzgerald into trial court evidence, based on
the rule of law, evidence, and precedents established by previous cases, the court should
affirm the trial court’s decision.
23
II. THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING THE INTRODUCTION OF FRANK FLETCHER'S PRIOR CONVICTION INTO EVIDENCE.
The second issue presented by the Appellant following the jury's finding of
Defendant Frank Fletcher guilty of first-degree murder is the trial judge's decision to
overrule defense counsel’s objection to entering records of Fletcher's earlier arrest into
evidence. The judge called a conference in the court’s chambers, and attorneys for each
side were invited to argue the objection out of the province of the jury; a court reporter
was present. The defendant argued that the evidence of Fletcher's prior conviction was
irrelevant to the charge concerned at the trial, and highly prejudicial to their client. Judge
Fitzgerald overruled the objection and allowed the evidence to be admitted. On appeal, the
Appellant argues that Judge Fitzgerald was incorrect to overrule this objection. The
Appellee maintains that the trial judge did not err in overruling the defense counsel’s
objection to the introduction of the defendant’s prior conviction into evidence.
Both the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the
State of Illinois support this decision. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the State
of Illinois states, "In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel…and to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed." Amendment V of the
Constitution of the United States of America further states, "No person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." Amendment VI states, "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district where in the crime shall have been committed." Though the State of
Illinois has provided Frank Fletcher with the full extent of these rights, defense counsel
24
argues that admission of Mr. Fletcher's prior conviction into evidence has infringed upon
Mr. Fletcher’s constitutional right to a fair trial. At trial, the Assistant State's Attorney
asked, "Mr. Fletcher, weren't you previously convicted of beating a man who argued with
you?" Defense counsel objected, arguing that such information was "irrelevant to the
charge concerned at the trial and highly prejudicial to the defendant." Judge Fitzgerald
overruled the objection and instructed Fletcher to answer the question accordingly.
Fletcher replied that he was invoking the privileges afforded to him by Amendment V of
the Constitution of the United States of America; the transcript of Fletcher's 2003
conviction was subsequently entered into evidence. Defense counselors objected, but were
overruled by Judge Fitzgerald. The Appellee maintains that evidence of Fletcher's prior
conviction was admissible, was properly and fairly entered into evidence, and that the
defendant did receive a fair trial.
The issue of prejudicial evidence exists to inhibit counselors from submitting
exhibits that lack probative value, and are instead intended to arouse jurors’ prejudicial
emotions and provoke a more severe verdict. Such exhibits can undermine a defendant’s
right, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States of America, to a fair trial by a
“fair an impartial jury.” In refusing to answer the Assistant State’s Attorney’s question
concerning his past conviction, the defendant was “invoking the privilege afforded to him
by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America,” which
granted him to right to refuse to be “compelled…to be a witness against himself.” Since
evidence of the defendant’s past conviction was crucial to the State’s argument, the
Assistant State’s Attorney proceeded to enter records of the defendant’s prior conviction
into evidence.
25
The rule of law in Illinois distinguishes between admitting specific evidence of a
prior conviction for the purpose of pure and prejudicial character testimony, and for
purpose of independent relevance—for example, to corroborate facts presented in the trial,
or to demonstrate a defendant’s pattern of action. In the case at bar, the transcript
corroborated the fact that the defendant had been found guilty of a felony on a prior
occasion, and that he had been sentenced to five years’ probation. Though the defendant
later admitted on direct re-examination that he had been going “through some personal
problems,” had been “drinking too much,” and had sought “anger-management help” after
the conviction, the defendant had made these statements voluntarily, consciously departing
from his previous invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
Concerning admission of a prior conviction into evidence, the rule in Illinois states,
“The real and sole test of admissibility is independent relevance … relevant evidence is evidence which tends to make the existence of any fact material to the issue more or less probable.” People v. Lee. 151 Ill. 2d at 406.
In the case at bar, admission of the defendant’s prior conviction into evidence was
relevant to establish facts of the defendant’s prior experience with law enforcement, as
indicated in the testimonies of Mr. Richard Edwards and Ms. Gina Larocca. The prior
conviction was also relevant to corroborate Mr. Richard Edwards’ claim that the
defendant’s “Off the Pigs” sign referenced the defendant’s animosity towards law
enforcement, and not, as the defendant had claimed, a “rock band.” When accompanied by
Mr. Fletcher’s voluntary testimony concerning this prior conviction, the conviction was
further relevant to establish the defendant’s aggressive tendencies, experience with past
legal violations (underage drinking and aggravated assault), prior negotiations with law
enforcement, and participation in anger management. These elements endorsed the facts
26
stated by Mr. Richard Edwards, Ms. Gina Larocca, and the defendant in the case at bar.
We, the People of the State of Illinois, maintain that this relevance made admission of the
transcript into court evidence appropriate, and request that the Illinois Supreme Court
affirm the trial court’s decision in the case at bar.
Judge Fitzgerald's decision in the case at bar is consistent with court's decision in
People v. Lee. 151 Ill. 3d 510, 502 N.E. 2d 399, 104 Ill Dec. 136 (1986). In People v. Lee,
Defendant Robert E. Lee was convicted of the murder and attempted armed robbery of
Mr. William Hawbecker. Since the defendant could not read or write very well, Assistant
State's Attorney Thomas Epach wrote Mr. Lee’s three-page confession for him. In the
confession, the defendant stated that he was a drug addict, needed money for his drugs,
and decided to take his silver .22-caliber handgun on his search for people to rob. The
defendant said that he tried to stick up his victim on Lakewood Street, but when Mr.
Hawbecker reached into his pockets, Mr. Lee shot him after repeatedly, hitting Mr.
Hawbecker in the face. The defendant then returned to his apartment until approximately
11 p.m., went back out to hail a cab with a man he did not know. Inside the cab, the two
men robbed and shot their driver, Peter Larson. At his trial for the murder of William
Hawbecker, the shooting of Peter Larson was brought up by the State's counsel and
entered into evidence. On appeal, Mr. Lee raised the issue of entering of evidence of this
past crime, arguing that such was in error.
The rule in Illinois concerning the admission of a defendant’s earlier crimes into
court evidence states that,
“Evidence of other crimes is admissible if it is relevant for any purpose other than to show the defendant’s bad character or propensity to commit a crime … such evidence is proper to show motive, modus operandi, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, criminal intent, defendant's state of mind, or the circumstances of his arrest,
27
or a common design or scheme.” People v. Lee. 151 Ill. 2d at 406.
The rule in Illinois further asserts,
“The real and sole test of admissibility is independent relevance … relevant evidence is evidence which tends to make the existence of any fact material to the issue more or less probable.” People v. Lee. 151 Ill. 2d at 406.
In Lee, the court determined,
“The two shootings bear several similarities … Larson's identification of Defendant placed a gun in Defendant's hand in the general vicinity and time frame of the shootings.” People v. Lee. 151 Ill. 2d at 521.
Lee establishes that the introduction of previous crimes into evidence is permissible
if such information does not simply pigeonhole the defendant’s character or his propensity
to commit a crime, but demonstrates relevance to the charge in question. In Lee, relevance
of the defendant's prior crime was demonstrated through essential parallels between his
prior conviction and the crime being presently tried; similar parallels exist between the
defendant’s prior and current charges in the case at bar.
In the case at bar, the defendant’s prior conviction was, like his current charge, a
felony, fulfilling Lee’s example qualification of common arrest circumstances. The prior
charge in the case at bar also illustrated the defendant’s past and current state of mind. In
conjunction with the defendant’s voluntary testimony on cross re-examination, the prior
conviction demonstrated the defendant’s previous experience with underage drinking (the
defendant had been nineteen when he admitted to “drinking too much”), problems
controlling his anger, undergoing anger-management, and experience negotiating with a
trial court judge. These facts corroborated the testimonies of Mr. Richard Edwards and
Ms. Gina Larocca, who both testified to the defendant’s violent means of conflict
resolution, drinking, and aversion to law-enforcement officials. The prior charge also
28
indicated an absence of a mistake on the behalf of the defendant, who had voluntarily
stated during cross re-examination that he had enrolled in an anger-management program
to encourage the trial judge in his prior charge to grant him a lighter sentence.
In aggregate, these elements thus also illustrated Mr. Fletcher’s criminal intent. The
admission of the defendant’s prior conviction corroborated Mr. Edwards’ witness
testimony concerning the defendant’s motives, in which he stated, “Fletcher was always
talking about getting back at the cops.” In the case at bar, the defendant had been tried for
the murder of a police officer, a representative of law enforcement officials, indicating that
the defendant had carried out this commitment as it had been expressed to Mr. Edwards.
At trial, Mr. Fletcher had also stated, “I know how you cops do things, just asking
questions until someone says something that gets them in trouble,” and had kept an “Off
the Pigs” sign on his dresser. Admission of the defendant’s prior conviction corroborated
Mr. Edward’s claim that this “Off the Pigs” sign had been associated with the anti-police
officer Black Panther movement, and not, as the defendant had claimed, a “rock band.”
These facts, as corroborated by the introduction of Mr. Fletcher’s prior conviction into
evidence, were critical to the prosecution’s argument in the case at bar.
While the prior conviction of the defendant in Lee was a shooting that took place in
the direct vicinity and within a few hours of crime in Lee, and that of the case at bar was a
violent beating several years before, the precedent of Lee indicates that similarity is not
necessary to show motive, modus operandi, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake,
criminal intent, defendant's state of mind, the circumstances of his arrest, or a common
design or scheme; the prior conviction is itself indicative of these elements. People v. Lee.
151 Ill. 2d at 406. Moreover, like both affirmed convictions of the defendant in Lee, both
29
of the defendant’s convictions in the case at bar were felonies. Though the degree of
damage inflicted upon the victim in the case at was is much more severe than in the
defendant’s prior conviction, both nonetheless reflected a common design scheme of
aggravated violence as a means of the defendant’s conflict resolution, a similar state of
mind, and the analogous motivations of anger.
The Appellant may argue that the differences in vicinity and time frame between Lee
and the case at bar are enough to prove the prior conviction of Frank Fletcher was
inadmissible. However, the precedent of Lee indicates that the mere presence of a separate
crime is sufficient to link the defendant to the crime committed; location and time frame
are irrelevant and should not bear weight on its admissibility into evidence.
The defendant further endorsed the transcript’s admission by discarding his prior
insistence on invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, and voluntarily testifying to his prior
experience with negotiating with law enforcement officials. This is demonstrated by the
trade-off of his participation in anger management programs in exchange for a lighter
sentence of five years’ probation, which the defendant voluntarily testified to having
negotiated with his trial judge during his prior conviction. While it may be argued that the
defendant’s participation in anger management is character testimony, the defendant
testified to his participation in such a program voluntarily. Mr. Fletcher had not been
forced to testify to his participation in such a program. As indicated by his prior
knowledge and invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights to not give testimony against
himself, the defendant made the decision to speak about his experience with alcohol and
anger-management consciously, knowledgeably, and willingly. Though the law in Illinois
does not permit the introduction of prejudicial character evidence, the law does not
30
disallow a defendant from presenting character testimony on his own behalf. Information
of the defendant’s experience with both alcohol and anger management was not included
in the disputed transcript submitted into evidence by the Assistant State’s Attorney, and
thus did not factor into the correctness of the transcript’s admission.
Extending the precedent found in Lee, admission of the defendant’s prior conviction
into evidence in the case at bar was thus correct, not prejudicial, and not merely character
testimony. As the precedent established in Lee and the parallels between Lee and the case
at bar indicate, the Illinois Supreme Court should affirm the trial court’s decision in the
case at bar.
The decision of Judge Fitzgerald to overrule the defense counsel's objection to the
admission of Fletcher's prior conviction is also supported by the court's ruling in People v.
Bartall. 98 Ill. 2d 294, 456 N.E. 2d 59, 74 Ill. Dec. 557 (1983). In People v. Bartall, the
defendant, Kurt Bartall, was convicted of both armed violence and of the murder of Betty
Quinn. The case involved the murder of Betty Quinn, who was standing in a parking lot on
Milwaukee Avenue with three friends - Eileen Kampwirth, Mark Tatum, and Bill Will – on
December 29, 1979, when the Defendant drove down Milwaukee Avenue and fired his
handgun in the general direction of the group. Eileen Kampwirth said in her testimony
that she heard a gunshot that sounded like "a very loud firecracker", and turned around to
see Betty Quinn lying face down on the ground, bleeding profusely from her face. Shortly
after the shooting, Betty Quinn was pronounced dead at a nearby hospital. At the trial of
the defendant for this offense, evidence of a subsequent offense was admitted by the trial
court. The testimony of a Kathy Preze revealed that on December 30, 1979, approximately
20 hours after the drive-by shooting of Betty Quinn, a silver automobile with the license
31
plate "KB 26" swerved in front of her and braked hard. Preze swerved into another lane,
and heard a noise that sounded like a firecracker. The vehicles continued down the
highway, and the man in the driver’s seat of the other automobile – who was identified as
the Defendant by Kathy Preze – made "an obscene gesture" and pointed a gun at her face.
98 Ill. 2d 294 at 310. Preze swerved into oncoming traffic to avoid the gun, and the
Defendant then turned off his automobile's lights and sped away. Preze reported the
incident, and police apprehended the defendant. At the time of his arrest, the defendant
was wearing a shoulder holster carrying a loaded handgun, and was in possession of two
empty rounds and a box of live ammunition for the same weapon. On appeal, the defense
counsel argued that the trial court erred in admitting this subsequent charge as evidence, as
it was a subsequent charge and therefore irrelevant to the charge concerned in this case.
The rule in Illinois states that,
“Generally, evidence of other crimes is inadmissible if relevant merely to establish the defendant's propensity to commit crime.” People v. Bartall. 98 Ill. 2d 294 at 310.
In Bartall, the court ruled that,
“The Preze shooting incident was sufficiently similar to the Quinn homicide to make it admissible on the issue of intent. The evidence of the Preze shooting showed more than the defendant's general propensity to commit crime; it established that on at least two occasions within 24 hours the defendant had acted as a roving, mobile sniper. Whereas the Quinn homicide, standing alone, might have some ambiguity about it, the two incidents, taken together, increase the certainty that the defendant deliberately acted in this fashion.” People v. Bartall. 98 Ill. 2d 294 at 312.
While Bartall involves the entry of a subsequent offense as evidence rather than a
prior charge, the court's decision to affirm the trial court on this issue can still be applied
to the case at bar. Bartall, much like in People v. Lee, established that evidence of crimes
separate from those concerned in the trial are admissible if they demonstrate independent
32
relevance and are not simple presentations of the defendant's propensity to commit a
crime. In the case at bar, the defendant’s prior conviction was a necessary piece of
evidence for the State's counsel to demonstrate Frank Fletcher's intent, motive, and state of
mind involved in the crime committed. The transcript also corroborated the testimonies of
Mr. Richard Edwards, Ms. Gina Larocca, and the defendant himself, each of who alluded
to the facts affirmed in the properly admitted transcript of Mr. Fletcher’s prior conviction.
In 2003, the defendant in the case at bar was convicted of beating a man who argued
with him. This not only displays his tendencies towards violence and aggression, but also
demonstrates the defendant’s familiarity with the criminal process. In his trial testimony,
Mr. Edwards spoke much about Mr. Fletcher’s negative contempt of police officers.
Corroboration of such a grudge is relevant to the circumstances of the case at bar, in which
the defendant planned and executed the murder of a police officer. In a similar vein,
Bartall found that the defendant's subsequent offense was admissible as evidence because
it demonstrated the defendant’s intent. In Bartall, the two convictions acted together to
demonstrate the deliberate and aggressive fashion of the defendant’s actions. People v.
Bartall. 98 Ill. 2d 294 at 312. This is similar to the circumstances of the case at bar, in
which both the defendant’s prior conviction and his charge in the case at bar arose from
the defendant’s problems with anger management and conflict resolution. In both
convictions, the defendant had relied on violent means (aggravated assault in 2003, and
armed homicide in 2010) to settle his disputes and grievances.
Moreover, although the circumstances of the defendant’s prior conviction in Bartall
were much more prejudicial towards the defendant than those in the case at bar, the
Illinois Supreme Court nonetheless upheld Bartall’s trial court’s decision on this issue. In
33
Bartall, the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that a prior conviction’s corroboration of how
a defendant “had acted” is sufficient to affirm its admission into trial court evidence.
People v. Bartall. 98 Ill. 2d 294 at 312. In the case at bar, the defendant’s prior conviction
not only demonstrated that the defendant “had acted” in a violent fashion in the past, but
also corroborated the witness testimonies of Mr. Edwards and Ms. Larocca, who testified
to the defendant’s violent tendencies and hostile attitude towards the law. The prior
conviction also indicated that the defendant had a history of “acting” in a violent rage to
the point of inflicting aggravated assault, which is consistent with Ms. Larocca’s
testimony of the defendant having “grabbed Edwards and [thrown] him out into the hall”
in the past, and indicated that the defendant’s “Off the Pigs” sign registered a message
against law enforcement, and not, as Mr. Fletcher had claimed, an extinct “rock band.”
The Appellant might also argue that the principles in Bartall cannot be applied to this
case because the separate offense in Bartall was a subsequent crime, rather than the prior
charge entered in the case at bar. The prior conviction of Frank Fletcher was not entered to
show the defendant’s location, the time the crime was committed, or any other logistical
facts, but rather, to demonstrate the defendant’s intent, motive, and state of mind. In
Bartall, the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that the defendant’s other conviction was
admissible on its relevance to “the issue of intent.” People v. Bartall. 98 Ill. 2d 294 at
312. The same relevance holds true in the case at bar.
The defendant in the case at bar may also argue that since both offenses in Bartall
were shootings, while the prior offense in the case at bar was an aggravating beating, the
precedent of Bartall cannot be applied. Though the charges in the case at bar were
different in their logistical execution, both were acts of aggression and violence; both were
34
also felonies. Like the convicted felons in both affirmed cases of Lee and Bartall, the
defendant in the case at bar had been convicted of two felonies with similar intentions and
states of mind. Moreover, as the precedent established in Lee and applied in Bartall
indicates, similar circumstances are not necessary to demonstrate any of the elements that
qualify the admission of a defendant’s prior conviction as more than character testimony;
the prior conviction itself fulfills such stipulations. People v. Lee. 151 Ill. 2d at 406.
The trial judge in Bartall was correct in his admission of the defendant's subsequent
offense as evidence. According to Bartall, evidence of other crimes is fair and admissible
if such evidence is relevant to the existence of any material fact admitted into evidence,
such as criminal intent. Extending the precedent of Bartall, we thus see that admission of
the defendant’s prior conviction in the case at bar was relevant to corroborate the facts of
the case, to demonstrate the defendant’s criminal intent, to establish prosecutors’ argument
within the case, and did not inhibit the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The Illinois
Supreme Court’s decision to affirm Bartall on the issue of admitting a concurrent
conviction into evidence should thus be extended to the case at bar.
The trial judge's decision in the case at bar is further supported by the case of
People v. Harris. 46 Ill. 2d 395 N.E. 2d 35 (1980). In that case, the defendant, Robert
Harris, was convicted of armed robbery. According to the testimony of John Doyle, the
defendant came into a Van's Drug Store, where he and two other girls pulled revolvers on
the storeowners and instructed them to open the safe and the cash register. They took all
of the money in the register and $135 from the safe, and asked for cocaine. When they
were told that there was no cocaine, Harris rooted through a drawer and pulled out one
bottle of a narcotic drug. The defendant was later arrested in a car that matched the
35
description of a stolen vehicle. At trial, the testimonies of the two police officers and John
Doyle described the theft and use of the car by the defendant. The defendant’s counsel
brought out these statements during cross-examination. On appeal, the Appellant argued
that these statements drew attention to separate crimes, were prejudicial against the
defendant, and had denied him his right to a fair trial.
The rule in Illinois states that,
“Ordinarily, evidence of separate offenses unconnected with crime for which defendant is on trial is incompetent, but evidence of other offenses may be introduced if it tends to identify accused as person who committed crime under investigation and to disprove alibi.” People v. Harris. 46 Ill. 2d at 395.
Harris determined that one reason that can make evidence of separate convictions
admissible is identification of the defendant or a renunciation of his alibi. In Harris, the
court affirmed the decision of the trial judge to admit the testimonies of the police officers
and storeowner John Doyle, which involved the defendant's theft of the car, as evidence.
Much like the defendant’s car theft in Harris, the prior conviction of the defendant in the
case at bar was not simply prejudicial or irrelevant - it was an important component of
prosecutors’ evidence, and was of utmost importance to their presentation of a fact-based
argument concerning the defendant’s guilt.
The defendant in Harris’s use of a stolen car disproved his alibi and identified him
with the crime concerned. Similarly, the defendant’s prior conviction in the case at bar had
identified him as a man with aggressive, impulsive, and grudge-holding tendencies.
Though Mr. Fletcher’s prior conviction did not explicitly denounce the defendant’s alibi,
unlike the defendant in Harris, the defendant in the case at bar did not attempt to present
an alibi to begin with; he did, however, insist on his innocence. However, though the
defendant’s prior conviction in the case at bar does not directly disprove an alibi as it does
36
in Harris, the prior conviction does corroborate other elements of the testimonies of both
Ms. Gina Larocca and Mr. Richard Edwards, the latter of whom also testified as a direct
crime scene witness. Mr. Fletcher also expressed a sort of alibi for his ownership of an
“Off the Pigs” sign, dismissing the statement as the name of a “pretty good,” albeit extinct,
“punk band.” However, the defendant’s prior conviction indicates that he had been
familiar with both the criminal process and had acquired a grudge against law
enforcement, and corroborates Mr. Edwards’ claim that Mr. Fletcher had in fact, acquired
the sign in support of the anti-law enforcement Black Panther movement.
The defendant in the case at bar may argue that admission of his prior conviction
into evidence was prejudicial because it had taken place several years before his present
charge, and did not involve as short of a timing connection as the defendant’s car theft had
in Harris. While the defendant’s prior conviction in the case at bar had taken place seven
years prior to his present charges, this fact was used by prosecutors to further their
argument, and thus fulfills the requirements of relevance and demonstrated intent as
indicated in Lee, Bartall, and Harris. In the voluntary testimony he had provided following
the introduction of his prior conviction into trial court evidence, the defendant in the case
at bar had indicated that the prior conviction had been “a real wake up call,” that it had
inspired him to enroll in anger management counseling, and to discontinue his pattern of
underage drinking (the defendant had been nineteen years old at the time he claimed to
have been “drinking too much”). In his voluntary testimony, the defendant further stated
that the trial judge in his prior conviction had sentenced him to five years’ probation. In
conjunction with the testimonies of Mr. Edwards, Ms. Larocca, and Mr. Fletcher himself,
prosecutors used this seven-year difference to demonstrate that the defendant’s violent
37
predisposition had not changed throughout this time. To borrow the language of Bartall, a
case that, like both Lee and Harris, had been affirmed on the issue admitting prior
convictions into evidence, prosecutors used evidence of Mr. Fletcher’s past conviction to
demonstrate that the aggressive nature of the defendant’s actions had not changed. People
v. Bartall. 98 Ill. 2d 294 at 312.
The trial judge in Harris was correct in his admission of the defendant's separate
crime as evidence. As the essential similarities between Harris and the case at bar
demonstrate, the Court’s decision in Harris should be extended to the case at bar.
The trial judge’s decision in the case at bar is also upheld by the court's ruling in
People v. Baptist. 76 Ill. 2d 19, 389 N.E. 2d 1200 (1979). In that case, the defendant,
Elijah Baptist, was convicted of the murder of Sam Blue, as well as an attempted armed
robbery. According to witness Leo Carter, Elijah Baptist and two other individuals
approached storeowner Sam Blue, placed a hand around Blue's neck, and put his other
hand to Blue's head. A gun was fired, and the defendant ran away. Blue began to chase
the Defendant and shoot at him, but after shooting three or four shots, was shot and fell to
the ground near the side of his store. A few months after the initial shooting, Leo Carter
was standing behind a building with his brother Henry and a Leslie Scott, when the
defendant's brother Michael Baptist and three others forced Scott and the two Carter
brothers against a wall and began to shoot at them. Leo Carter survived, but Henry Carter
and Leslie Scott were killed; the defendant was found guilty. On appeal, the Appellant
argued that the shootings of Henry Carter and Leslie Scott were irrelevant to the charge
concerned, prejudicial towards the defendant, that the attention drawn to this separate
crime inhibited the defendant's right to a fair trial, and that the trial judge thus erred in
38
admitting the separate charge as evidence.
The rule in Illinois states that,
“As a general rule, evidence of other crimes committed by Defendant, independent of crime for which he is being tried, is inadmissible; if relevant, however, for any purpose other than to show propensity to commit a crime, evidence of other crimes is admissible.” People v. Baptist. 76 Ill. 2d 19 389 at 369.
In Baptist, the court ruled that,
“If the June 14, 1975 shootings of Leslie Scott and the Carter brothers can be connected to the defendant, evidence of these shootings is admissible. Consequently, the trial court properly allowed evidence of the subsequent shootings to go to the jury.” People v. Baptist. 76 Ill. 2d 19 389 at 1205.
Although the court in Baptist reversed its decision, the trial judge was still found to
have been correct in admitting the Scott and Carter shootings into evidence. In Baptist, the
defendant's subsequent offense was deemed admissible because it linked the defendant to
the charge concerned and established a consciousness of guilt.
In the case at bar, the defendant’s 2003 conviction linked him in principle to the
charge concerned in the case at bar, corroborating such links as they had been established
in the testimonies of Mr. Edwards and Ms. Larocca. Such links included the defendant’s
prior aggressive tendencies, underage alcohol abuse, understanding of the criminal
process, and experience negotiating with a trial court judge. The prior conviction also
corroborated his grudge against police officers as Mr. Edwards and Mr. Fletcher’s
possession of an “Off the Pigs” sign had indicated. Both the defendant’s prior conviction
and his conviction in the case at bar were also felonies, linking them with a common
degree of violent aggression.
Moreover, witness Richard Edwards’ burglary conviction was also entered into
evidence, and was extensively employed by the defendant to discredit this witness at trial.
39
Since both burglary and aggravated assault are classified as felonies, and since the jurors’
decision in the case at bar revealed that Mr. Edwards’ own conviction did not prejudice
them against his testimony, the same reasoning should be extended to the introduction of
the defendant’s prior conviction.
Having considered this, the defendant's prior conviction was an essential element of
evidence for the State's counsel to determine the intent, motive, and state of mind of the
defendant. This is supported by Baptist, which – like Lee, Bartall, and Harris – stated that
evidence of a separate crime is admissible evidence if it serves a relevant and independent
purpose. The defendant’s prior conviction in the case at bar is not simply character
testimony or demonstrative of his propensity to commit crime; it fairly and properly
corroborated details that were crucial to the prosecutors’ argument. The introduction of the
defendant's prior conviction as evidence was not done in a flagrant desire to prejudice
against the character of the defendant. Instead, the properly admitted transcript held
substantial probative value towards corroborating the testimonies of Mr. Edwards and Ms.
Larocca, both of whom were contradicted by the defendant.
The Appellant may argue that Baptist is inapplicable because it involves the
admission of a subsequent shooting as evidence, rather than a prior unarmed assault as in
the case at bar. While the weapons used by the defendant in the case at bar and in his prior
conviction were different (and, thus, did inflict different degrees of damage upon the
defendant’s victim), the aggressive and impulsive nature of the defendant is consistent in
both convictions. The mere presence or absence of a specific weapon should not guide the
Court in determining the conviction’s relevance to the case at bar. Baptist, like Lee,
Bartall, and Harris, indicate that evidence of other crimes is admissible if it possesses any
40
purpose other than to prejudice against the defendant. These purposes include the
establishment of intent, motive, state of mind, knowledge and identity, the absence of
mistake, and the corroboration of witness testimonies, all of which have been
demonstrated in the prior conviction in the case at bar.
The Appellant might also argue that Baptist cannot be applied to the case at bar
because the victim of the separate offense in Baptist was the original victim’s brother, and
in the case at bar, the victims of the defendant’s crimes were presumably unrelated.
However, a common thread of law enforcement does relate the victims in both of the
defendant’s convictions in the case at bar. Whereas Mr. Fletcher’s earlier conviction and
subsequent hassles with law enforcement first inspired his dislike of police officers, his
crime in the case at bar was directed at a police officer. Moreover, as the precedent
established in Lee and applied in Bartall, Harris, and Baptist indicate, similar
circumstances are not necessary to demonstrate any of the elements that qualify the
admission of a defendant’s prior conviction as more than character testimony; the prior
conviction can itself fulfill such requirements. People v. Lee. 151 Ill. 2d at 406.
Baptist's trial judge did not err in admitting the evidence of the Scott and Carter
shootings, as they were relevant and admissible elements in the argument of the
prosecution. Extending the principles established in Baptist, the trial judge in the case at
bar was correct to admit the defendant’s prior conviction into evidence, and the Illinois
Supreme Court should affirm the trial court’s decision.
Therefore, because the transcript of the defendant’s prior conviction was relevant to
establish facts presented by Mr. Edwards, Ms. Larocca, and Mr. Fletcher, was not
prejudicial against the defendant, and demonstrated his aggressive nature, motive, intent,
41
experience with and grudge against law enforcement, it was properly admitted by Judge
Fitzgerald into trial court evidence. Based on the rule of law, evidence, and precedents
established by the previous cases, the Illinois Supreme Court should affirm the trial
court’s decision.
42
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellee-Plaintiff respectfully requests that the
Honorable Illinois Supreme Court affirm the trial court’s decision in the case at bar.
Respectfully submitted,
Attorneys for the Appellee-Plaintiff,
The People of the State of Illinois
Anastasia Golovashkina
Josie Dalton
43