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Deliberation, Phronesis, and Authenticity: Heidegger's Early Conception

of Rhetoric

Zickmund, Susan.

Philosophy and Rhetoric, Volume 40, Number 4, 2007, pp. 406-415 (Article)

Published by Penn State University Press

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Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2007.Copyright © 2007 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.

406

Deliberation, Phronesis, and Authenticity:Heidegger’s Early Conception of Rhetoric

Susan Zickmund

Interest in the writings of existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger has beenon the rise in the field of rhetoric (Scult 199; D. Smith 2003). Several essayshave been published over the last few years exploring the importance Heidegger attributes to rhetoric, especially in his major treatise, Being and Time (Hyde

1994; Ramsey 1993). These articles address the relationship of rhetoric to whatHeidegger labels as “the they,” a form of mass culture which embraces societalnorms in a nonreflective manner. Given that Heidegger associates speech or Rede with the “gossip” and “idle talk” used by the they, one must question whether rhetoric can play any positive role in fostering what Heidegger defines as an au-thentic existence: a life conducted in accordance with one’s own possibilities.

Hyde and Smith address this issue in their piece: “Aristotle and Heidegger on Emotion and Rhetoric.” They argue that rhetoric does not lead the human

being—or in Heidegger’s terms, “Dasein”—toward an authentic existence.Rather “the community of the ‘they’ and rhetoric go hand in hand” (1992, 92).By focusing on the everyday activities of the they, “rhetoric directs people to atemporal and spatial realm where their authenticity will be forsaken and forgot-ten” (92). Rhetoric is, thus, inextricably connected to those gossiping modesof conversation which embed Dasein within its inauthentic existence. Hyde,however, later qualifies this conclusion in the essay “The Call of Conscience:Heidegger and the Question of Rhetoric” (Hyde 1994). Here he finds that

rhetoric has the potential to produce a “call of conscience” which “leaps forthand liberates” others as a way of leading them toward an authentic existence(see Heidegger 1962, 164, 344). Rhetoric, used by an authentic Dasein who is“‘communicating’ and ‘struggling’ with others, can bring about a ‘modifica-tion’ of our publicness’” (Hyde 1994, 382). In doing so, rhetoric “can sound acall that interprets the complacency of our everyday world of common senseand common praxis and thereby summons us to choose, to act, and perhaps tochange our lives for the ‘better’” (382).

* Sources of Support: This work was suppoorted in part by the Veterans Administration HealthServices Research and Development Merit Review Entry Program Career Development Award.



407DELIBERATION, PHRÔNESIS, AND AUTHENTICITY

Given these apparently contradictory interpretations, a reexamination of the role rhetoric can play in leading Dasein toward its own most authentic pos-sibilities is warranted. In pursuing this goal, this essay will begin by definingHeidegger’s terminology as he theorizes on the nature of rhetoric and delibera-tion, and on the relationship rhetoric has to Dasein’s authenticity. Specifically,this essay will: (1) clarify Heidegger’s use of “the they” and “authenticity”;(2) examine Heidegger’s discussion of rhetoric as a guide to leading the soul;(3) explicate Heidegger’s use of deliberation [βουλεεσθαι] and phronesis[φρνησις ]; and, finally, (4) address the relationship of rhetoric and authentic-ity by examining Heidegger’s translation of φρνησις in Being and Time as“resoluteness.” This essay will conclude by assessing the salience Heidegger’s

work can have on contemporary issues in communication.

I. The Society of the They and Dasein’s Authenticity

The they or das Man are terms that Heidegger uses in Being and Time to de-scribe the social forces which dominate public opinion. Dreyfus translates this

term as “the one” in order to reflect the faceless nature of this mass culture(1991, 144). This anonymous community holds forth prescriptive norms whichdetermine what “one” should do. Heidegger describes this as the “dictatorshipof the ‘They’” which serves to drain away individuality: “we take pleasure andenjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literatureand art as they see and judge” (1962, 164). The they, in essence, functions as asocial conscience which informs its members of the proper and improper modeof living. It is not controlled by any specific group of individuals, but instead

is a “‘nobody’ to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-amongst-one-other” (166). This nobody is a social composite which “prescribesthe kind of Being of everydayness” or the world within which each undiffer-entiated Dasein exists (164). The they fosters an averageness, a leveling down,which reduces the choices of all humans who live within its community (212).Heidegger argues that Dasein, by living as a being-in-the-world-with-others,has in fact surrendered itself to the they.

The they-self is differentiated from what Heidegger describes as an au-thentic self. He explains that “the Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, whichwe distinguish from the authentic Self—that is, from the Self which has beentaken hold of in its own way” (167). Heidegger refers here to the authentic lifethat each Dasein may choose to live. Authenticity is a process of being true toone’s own self, of living life according to one’s own being. The they relieves



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Dasein of the ability to choose its own most possibilities for existence. Yet inauthenticity, Dasein comes back from its they-self as an authentic being-one’s-Self. Here Dasein is the one:

choosing to make this choice —deciding for a potentiality-for-Being, and makingthis decision from one’s own Self. In choosing to make this choice, Dasein makes

possible, first and foremost, its authentic potentiality-for-Being. (312–13)

Heidegger argues that Dasein—having been thrown into its own particular world and having fallen into the activities of the they—can choose instead toturn away from the they and embrace its own most potentialities for existing.

This existence includes its furthest possibility—namely, its morality, its being-towards-death—which Dasein, through anxiety, must come to accept. This ac-ceptance of the finality of being must not divide Dasein from the world, rather “Dasein must arrive at a way of dealing with things and people that incorporatesthe insight gained in anxiety that no possibilities have intrinsic significance—i.e.,that they have no essential relation to the self, nor can they be given any—yetmakes that insight the basis for an active life” (Dreyfus 1991, 144). Thus, Das-ein remains active, even within its authenticity. If this is so, might there not bea connection between authentic Dasein and the use of rhetoric? Must speechand deliberation be inextricably bound to the they? To answer these questionsrequires a further examination of the authentic Dasein’s being-in-the-world andthe nature of rhetoric.

II. Heidegger’s Conception of Rhetoric

As Hyde and Smith note, Heidegger appears to have little to say about rhetoricin his main treatise (1992, 91). Indeed, his actual elaboration of the subject of rhetoric in Being and Time is limited to a single sentence. Nonetheless, he doesopenly address the topic in a more newly translated work: his 1925 Winter Semes-ter course on Plato’s Sophist . Here one finds the discussion under the heading of rhetoric and—to use the Greek words which appear in that edition— βουλεεσθαιor deliberation. To discover whether there is a potential relationship betweenrhetoric and authenticity, this section examines what Heidegger views as the

grounding for rhetoric and the justification he supplies for its existence.Heidegger examines three aspects which together provide the ground-

ing for rhetoric. Under the heading “Rhetoric as ψυχαγωγα [guiding the soul].The condition of its possibility and its justification,” Heidegger notes that the




grounding of rhetoric first involves grasping the nature of the human soul (1997,232). Drawing on Aristotle’s analysis in The Rhetoric, Heidegger argues thatif an orator is to be persuasive then the person must understand both the natureand the various types of souls belonging to the audience. The second aspect isa familiarity with the possible modes of leading and guiding those souls. Thefinal aspect relates to the orator’s appropriateness in choosing appeals whichcan move the audience (1997, 233). All together these possibilities demonstratethat the grounding of rhetoric comes from directing and guiding the souls of others by speaking to them.

The importance of rhetoric to Dasein’s everyday world is strongly apparentin the justification that Heidegger provides for its existence. This justification

extends from rhetoric’s role within practical “everyday interlocution.” Here Hei-degger argues that “this everyday speaking . . . does not aim at λθεια [truth] yetstill has a certain justification, since it pertains to the sense of everyday Daseinto move within the circuit of appearances” (234). The everyday orientation isagain strengthened in Plato’s Sophist when he argues that “true speech” shouldnot be limited to the discourse in the courts and in the parliament, but that itshould also include the everyday world of Dasein’s speaking-with-one-another (221). Thus, Heidegger defines rhetoric as a type of “know how” designed to

guide “the existence of others by means of speaking with them” (221).Heidegger explains that his task is to discover the ultimate grounding of

truth and deception, not to clarify the nature of authenticity or rhetoric’s relation-ship to the they. Indeed, with his focus on speech as part of the everydayness of being-in-the-world, it appears dif ficult to separate the “everyday interlocution,”the speaking in the courts and parliament, from the day-to-day existence of thethey. Given this ambiguity, we must return to Heidegger’s writings to discern if there is a possibility for rhetoric to play a positive role in fostering authenticity.

Fortunately there exists yet another area to explore for a clearer answer to thisquestion: Heidegger’s explication of βουλεεσθαι or deliberation.

III. βουλεεσθαι (Deliberation), Φρνησις (Phronesis)and the Grasping of Being through Speech

Within Heidegger’s discussion of deliberation one finds that being-together-as-speaking-together emerges as part of his overall philosophy of action. Action in-herently involves choice and decision-making, elements associated with Dasein’sdecision to embrace its authenticity. Heidegger explains that βουλεεσθαι or



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deliberation is not specifically directed toward the truthful disclosing of being, but to the ßουλ : to decision-making or to “being resolved” (105). Thus, it isimportant to look at Heidegger’s treatment of βουλεεσθαι (deliberation) to seehow speaking-with-one-another functions within his overall theory of action.

Heidegger bases his discussion of βουλεεσθαι upon another term, that of φρνησις (phronesis) or prudence.Φρνησις is an Aristotelian intellectual virtuewhich is important for moral action.Φρνησις is “an excellence identical with thehabit of making good moral choices” (Grimaldi 1980, 10). In concentrating onφρνησις , Heidegger emphasizes the praxis orientation which reveals “practicalinsight in individual situations as what is fitting in relation to us, that is, in rela-tion to each individual in his or her own circumstances” (van Buren 1992, 175).

Heidegger highlights themes in this section traditionally associated with rhetoric,such as the fittingness of a subject to its occasion and the importance of choiceand decision-making within the realm of the contingent. Having introduced theintellectual virtue, Heidegger reveals the disclosive structure of φρνησις andβουλεεσθαι (phronesis and deliberation). For our purposes, two aspects standout:first, the description of what deliberation is able to do —its capacity to revealthe being of Dasein in action, and second, its ontological limitations.

In the first point, Heidegger discloses the connection between φρνησις

and βουλεεσθαι. In paragraph twenty-one in Plato’s Sophist , “The task of theclarifying of the βουλεεσθαι or the mode of carrying out φρνησις ,” Heidegger defines deliberation’s role in fostering φρνησις . Φρνησις is a disposition or habit which reveals the being of the action (1997, 99).Βουλεεσθαι is the modeof bringing about the “disclosive appropriation” of that action. It is μτ λγυ , “withlogos,” and in particular is a λογζεσθαι, a “discussion which presents.” Bydrawing on this particular form of μτ λγυ [with logos], βουλεεσθαι providesφρνησις with the capacity to make beings known via speech:

The mode of carrying out φρνησις is βουλεεσθαι, which itself is a λογζεσθαι, adiscussion. . . . The disclosure of φρνησις is carried out with μτ λγυ , in speech, inthe discussion of something. (99)

The second point to consider is deliberation’s ontological limitations, somethingwhich comes from its nature as part of λογζεσθαι [discussion]. Heidegger argues in paragraph eighty of Plato’s Sophist that two ways of grasping the be-ings of the world belong to logos. In the first, logos grasps a being as a “unitary

pregiven whole” (415). Heidegger avers that logos “possesses, as pregiven fromthe very first, the unarticulated unitary being” (415). He uses an example of acart’s wheel running across the pavement: “There belongs to λγο [logos], as adeterminate moment, the creaking wagon on the street” (415).




From this unitary pregiven whole, λογιζεσθαι , “discussion,” sets some-thing in relief, providing it with a linguistic structure: “the whole of what is pregiven, e.g. the creaking wagon, is then grasped in terms of the creaking itself:the wagon passing by on the street is now experienced and determined as creak-ing” (415). Elements of the “unarticulated unitary being” are brought to the foreand provided with predication. Speech is a λγειν τι κατ τινος , a “something

about something,” and as such, holds within it a διαρεσις ,a “taking apart.”The sound of the wagon can be described as “high pitched” or metaphoricallyas the “cry of wood.” The powers of disclosure are given to speech to thematizecertain elements of that “pregiven whole,” while other elements (such as, for example, the quiet, elusive sound of the wheel as it glides through snow) must

remain unrevealed. Thus, speech grasps those beings that can be “taken apart,”or thematized as λγειν τι κατ τινος , “something as something.”

Heidegger argues that beings that lie beyond linguistic description must be taken as a καθλου , a “whole.” Certain beings (for example, αρχη, a being’sorigin or its “from-out-of-which”) are “poured together” in such a way that theycannot be articulated as λγειν τι κατ τινος , “something as something” (1995,129; 1997, 99). These beings resist being “taken apart” (1997, 100). They must be comprehended instead through a sheer grasp, something akin to the nature of

intuitive thinking.Φρνησις can grasp these in a “mode of disclosure” that tran-scends the setting in relief of speech. In articulating this difference, Heidegger maintains that only those beings that are capable of being “taken apart,” can beopen to the mode of disclosure that deliberation provides. As a result, φρνησις is capable of grasping beings which must elude the ability of deliberation to put them into words.

In summary, βουλεεσθαι or deliberation is the way in which the phroneticnature of Dasein’s insight is made manifest. To understand what deliberation

reveals and whether βουλεεσθαι can have any relationship to authenticity, wemust turn to an examination of Heidegger’s use of φρνησις in Being and Time.We will return to the significance of the ontological limitation of βουλεεσθαι when addressing rhetoric and the “call of conscience.”

IV. Resoluteness, Authenticity, and Deliberation

In Being and Time, Heidegger translates φρνησις as Entschlossenheit, or reso-luteness. He explains that resoluteness is that which brings Dasein through theanticipation of its own possibilities to choose authenticity. Resoluteness discloses



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the possibilities for existence—the potentality-for-being—that each Dasein pos-sesses (1962, 345). Taminiaux describes the German usage of Entschlossenheit as semantically combining a form of disclosure and a decision (1987, 150).The decision lies in choosing not to be irresolute, or in other words, choosingto avoid “Being-surrendered to the way in which things have been prevalentlyinterpreted by ‘the they’” (Heidegger 1962, 345). The irresolute Dasein livesin a society where “nobody” chooses a unique path for living. Resoluteness, onthe other hand, “signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one’s lostness inthe they” (345). With this summoning, Dasein becomes resolute when “takingaction” in such a way that it leads to its authenticity (345).

This process of attaining authenticity arises from Dasein’s choosing to

listen to the “call of conscience.” Heidegger explains that conscience beckonsDasein by “calling forth and summoning us to Being-guilty” (341). This guiltarises from Dasein’s fascination with the idle talk of “the they,” a guilt whichstems from not having followed one’s own most potentiality-for-being. The callsummons Dasein to understand its “null basis”—the finality of its death—whichexists as a necessary possibility (333). Thus, “wanting to have a conscience . . . asan understanding of oneself in one’s own most potentiality-for-Being” involvesauthentically embracing one’s own most potentiality for death. Heidegger argues

that Dasein’s desire to have a conscience is an “existential choosing” (314).Resoluteness is the choice of wanting-to-have-a-conscience, a desire whichemerges from Dasein’s having faced its final possibility, its own null basis.

In turning to the chief question at hand—whether rhetoric plays a role inDasein’s authenticity—we find Heidegger’s answer rather vague. He suppliesa potential role in a single passage:

Dasein’s resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the Otherswho are with it “be” in their own most potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose

this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein isresolute, it can become the “conscience” of Others. (344)

This “leaping forth and liberating” and the “becoming the conscience” providesa space for a resolute Dasein to guide others. Yet is this rhetoric? Hyde answersaf firmatively. He explains that upon hearing the call from a resolute Dasein,we may find “its voice to be ‘guilty’ of maintaining a wrong point of view.Yet, to the extent that this voice displays ‘considerateness’ and ‘forbearance’

towards us, it nevertheless provides time and space for an ‘authentic’ responsesuch that a co-disclosing of the situation becomes possible” (1994, 382). YetHeidegger appears explicit when he notes that the call does not come fromanother Dasein. The call is from one who has no voice (1962, 316). It asserts




“nothing.” Least of all “does it try to set going a ‘soliloquy’” (318). Its voice isthat of silence—the soundlessness of existential uncanniness—which calls usto our own authentic feeling guilty (343). This appears too far from the tradi-tional notion of rhetoric or deliberation to argue that rhetoric itself is the modewhereby the call is issued.

The distinction between the issuance of the call and rhetoric may beclarified by returning to the theme addressed above: deliberation’s incapacityto articulate beings that are καθλου , whole. For if βουλεεσθαι (deliberation)is unable to grasp the being of the call of conscience, it appears doubtful that itcould exist as its source. As noted above, Heidegger argues that φρνησις grasps beings that are διαρετον , or “indivisible.” Speech, on the other hand, must set

beings into relief as λγειν τι κατ τινος , something as something. In this case itappears reasonable to assume that the call would be categorized amongst those beings that are καθλου , that are “whole.” According to Heidegger, the call of conscience constitutes an instantaneous moment of vision. He describes it asan Augenblick , a moment. This is a term Heidegger used in his earlier work todescribe the sudden presence of God’s grace, one where a person experiencesa “moment, charged with mystery, of undivided unity of intuition and feeling”(Kisiel 1991, 91). This revelatory experience, what Kisiel describes as a “su-

percharged moment,” is the “moment of vision” found in religious conversion,where one accepts the deity in the “a twinkle of an eye” (19). From the descriptionof the call and the genesis of Augenblick , it would appear to be something moreakin to the ineffable, and, thus, would fall within the category of the διαρετον , the “indivisible.” As such, speech would be unable to fully grasp and articulatethis considering its λγειν τι κατ τινος structure, its “something as something.”This may explain why Heidegger views the call as saying “nothing” and whyDasein responds to the call with reticence. Here words, the essential element

of speech, fail. Within the call, authentic Dasein is left alone with its self in anexistential silence.Must it be, then, that rhetoric has no role in Dasein’s authenticity? Must

the subject matter of the discipline be consigned to the realm of the they?Before drawing this conclusion we should note that in the above passage it isclear that an authentic Dasein has a role in assisting another. Authentic Daseincan “co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liber-ates” (Heidegger 1962, 344). Yet rather than the call itself emerging by way of traditional rhetoric, this co-disclosing would appear to be more in keeping with

Heidegger’s description of rhetoric in Plato’s Sophist . Here rhetoric functionsas a guide for leading the souls of others. The “one proficient in speech” mustcome to understand the soul of the other and “how it itself can be touched, i.e.



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through speech” (233). Here the rhetor would not produce the actual call of conscience, but rather would place a particular Dasein in the space or the “clear-ing” needed in order to be receptive to the call. This could be accomplished byknowing how a Dasein can be led or “touched”—through speech. And whilethis role would not exonerate rhetoric from being associated with the idle talk of the they, it would provide a dual role for rhetoric in fostering both inauthenticityand authenticity. Thus, rhetoric, while not actually providing the call, wouldhave the chance to guide the souls of others, allowing them to listen resolutelyto the call of their own conscience.

V. Conclusion

In conclusion, by going beyond the issue of authenticity, let us ask what con-tributions Heidegger’s scholarship may make to rhetoric and communicationstudies. Unlike the enlightenment philosophers, Heidegger provides a theorywhere speech and deliberation play a necessary role. Within his fundamentalontology, Heidegger dedicates much energy to explicating the everydayness of

Dasein’s being-in-the-world. His focus on phenomenology—”as the investiga-tion of life itself”—causes Heidegger to seriously address those aspects whichDasein encounters in its world, including objects—or “equipment”—as well asthe relationship Dasein maintains with others through speaking-with-them (Kisiel1991, 91). As he writes in Plato’s Sophist, everydayness is enough to justify thestudy of rhetoric itself: “the insight into the justification of everyday Interlocutioncan provide the motive to create a rhetoric” (Heidegger 1997, 234).

This focus upon everydayness can be reflected within communication

studies. Currently in rhetoric, scholars are exploring the nature of community building and identity formation. Heidegger highlights a similar project throughhis uniquely existential interpretation. In his 1924 summer semester course,Grundbegriffe der Aristotelischen Philosophie, he focuses upon the societalnature of being-together-in-speech, within both ancient Greece and Germany(1924). Such a task leads Heidegger to highlight the temporal and kineticdimensions of life that are revealed within everyday deliberation. Similarly,we can examine the ontological dynamics of being-together-in-speech withincontemporary times. How is temporality and kinesis represented within today’sexperience? How does the infusion of technological mediation affect the modeof being together of everyday Dasein? What impact does the shifting from personalized communication in Greece, to mediated speech, to cyber discourse




have on the way time and movement are revealed? These changes reflect thehistoricity of contemporary Dasein and can be interpreted by seriously address-ing the nature of the everyday communicative transaction.

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tausgabe. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1919–1944, Band 18. ————. 1962. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. San Francisco:

Harper San Francisco. ————. 1995. Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Bloomington: Indiana UP. ————. 1997. Plato’s Sophist. Trans. Richard Rojecewicz and Andrew Schuwer. Bloomington:

Indiana UP.Hyde, M. J. 1994. “The Call of Conscience: Heidegger and the Question of Rhetoric.” Philosophy

and Rhetoric 27:374–96.

Hyde, M. J., and C. R. Smith. 1992. The Critical Turn: Rhetoric and Philosophy in Postmodern Discourse. Ed. Ian Angus and Lenore Langsdorf. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP.

Kisiel, T. 1991. The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time. Berkeley and Los Angeles: U of California P.

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Ramsey, E. R. 1993. “Listening to Heidegger on Rhetoric.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 26:266–76.Scult, A. M. 1999. “Aristotle’s Rhetoric as Ontology: A Heideggerian Reading.” Philosophy and

Rhetoric 32:146–59.Smith, D. L. 2003. “Intensifying Phronesis: Heidegger, Aristotle, and Rhetorical Culture.” Phi-

losophy and Rhetoric 36:77–102.Taminiaux, J. 1987. “Poiesis and Praxis in Fundamental Ontology.” Research in Phenomenology

17:150–58.van Buren, J. 1992. Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought. Ed. Arleen

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