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Zubov’s Method for Differential Games Lars Gr¨ une Mathematisches Institut Universit¨ at Bayreuth Joint work with Oana Silvia Serea, ´ Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France International Workshop “The Dynamics of Control” Irsee, 1st–3rd October, 2010

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Page 1: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Zubov’s Method for Differential Games

Lars Grune

Mathematisches InstitutUniversitat Bayreuth

Joint work with Oana Silvia Serea,Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France

International Workshop “The Dynamics of Control”Irsee, 1st–3rd October, 2010

Happy Birthday Fritz!

Page 2: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Zubov’s Method for Differential Games

Lars Grune

Mathematisches InstitutUniversitat Bayreuth

Joint work with Oana Silvia Serea,Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France

International Workshop “The Dynamics of Control”Irsee, 1st–3rd October, 2010

Happy Birthday Fritz!

Page 3: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Introduction: The Uncontrolled CaseConsider the autonomous ODE

x(t) = f(x(t)), x ∈ Rd

with solutions Φ(t, x0) and locally exponentially stableequilibrium x∗ ∈ Rd

(without loss of generality x∗ = 0)

i.e., there exists a neighborhood N of x∗ = 0 and constantsc, σ > 0, such that for all x0 ∈ N :

‖Φ(t, x0)‖ ≤ ce−σt‖x0‖

Problem: What is the domain of attraction

D := {x ∈ Rd |Φ(t, x)→ x∗ = 0} ?

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 2 of 23

Page 4: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Introduction: The Uncontrolled CaseConsider the autonomous ODE

x(t) = f(x(t)), x ∈ Rd

with solutions Φ(t, x0) and locally exponentially stableequilibrium x∗ ∈ Rd (without loss of generality x∗ = 0)

i.e., there exists a neighborhood N of x∗ = 0 and constantsc, σ > 0, such that for all x0 ∈ N :

‖Φ(t, x0)‖ ≤ ce−σt‖x0‖

Problem: What is the domain of attraction

D := {x ∈ Rd |Φ(t, x)→ x∗ = 0} ?

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 2 of 23

Page 5: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Introduction: The Uncontrolled CaseConsider the autonomous ODE

x(t) = f(x(t)), x ∈ Rd

with solutions Φ(t, x0) and locally exponentially stableequilibrium x∗ ∈ Rd (without loss of generality x∗ = 0)

i.e., there exists a neighborhood N of x∗ = 0 and constantsc, σ > 0, such that for all x0 ∈ N :

‖Φ(t, x0)‖ ≤ ce−σt‖x0‖

Problem: What is the domain of attraction

D := {x ∈ Rd |Φ(t, x)→ x∗ = 0} ?

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 2 of 23

Page 6: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Introduction: The Uncontrolled CaseConsider the autonomous ODE

x(t) = f(x(t)), x ∈ Rd

with solutions Φ(t, x0) and locally exponentially stableequilibrium x∗ ∈ Rd (without loss of generality x∗ = 0)

i.e., there exists a neighborhood N of x∗ = 0 and constantsc, σ > 0, such that for all x0 ∈ N :

‖Φ(t, x0)‖ ≤ ce−σt‖x0‖

Problem: What is the domain of attraction

D := {x ∈ Rd |Φ(t, x)→ x∗ = 0} ?

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 2 of 23

Page 7: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Example for a Domain of AttractionFluid Dynamics: Explanation of the difference between linearstability and experimental instability for large Reynoldsnumbers [Trefethen et al., Science, 1993]

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 3 of 23

Page 8: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Zubov’s Equation [1964]For a continuous function h : Rd → R≥0 withh(x) = 0⇔ x = x∗ consider the PDE “Zubov’s Equation”

Dw(x) · f(x) = −h(x)(1− w(x))

with w : Rd → R and boundary condition w(x∗) = 0

Then: under suitable conditions on h this equation has aunique solution w : Rd → [0, 1] with

w(x) = 0 ⇔ x = x∗

and D satisfies the level set characterization

D = w−1([0, 1)) := {x ∈ Rd |w(x) ∈ [0, 1)}

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 4 of 23

Page 9: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Zubov’s Equation [1964]For a continuous function h : Rd → R≥0 withh(x) = 0⇔ x = x∗ consider the PDE “Zubov’s Equation”

Dw(x) · f(x) = −h(x)(1− w(x))

with w : Rd → R and boundary condition w(x∗) = 0

Then: under suitable conditions on h this equation has aunique solution w : Rd → [0, 1] with

w(x) = 0 ⇔ x = x∗

and D satisfies the level set characterization

D = w−1([0, 1)) := {x ∈ Rd |w(x) ∈ [0, 1)}

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 4 of 23

Page 10: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Example

x1(t) = −x1(t) + x1(t)3, x2(t) = −x2(t) + x2(t)3

D = [−1, 1]2

, h(x) = 5‖x‖2

−10

1

−1

0

1

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

x1

x2

v

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 5 of 23

Page 11: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Example

x1(t) = −x1(t) + x1(t)3, x2(t) = −x2(t) + x2(t)3

D = [−1, 1]2, h(x) = 5‖x‖2

−10

1

−1

0

1

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

x1

x2

v

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 5 of 23

Page 12: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Integral Equation

Dw(x) · f(x) = −h(x)(1− w(x))

D = w−1([0, 1)) := {x ∈ Rd |w(x) ∈ [0, 1)}

Why does this characterization hold?

Integration of Zubov’s equation and subsequentintegration by parts yields the integral equation

w(x) = 1− e−R∞0 h(Φ(t,x))dt

Thus:

Φ(t, x)→ x∗ ⇔∫ ∞

0

h(Φ(t, x))dt <∞ ⇔ w(x) < 1

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 6 of 23

Page 13: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Integral Equation

Dw(x) · f(x) = −h(x)(1− w(x))

D = w−1([0, 1)) := {x ∈ Rd |w(x) ∈ [0, 1)}

Why does this characterization hold?

Integration of Zubov’s equation and subsequentintegration by parts yields the integral equation

w(x) = 1− e−R∞0 h(Φ(t,x))dt

Thus:

Φ(t, x)→ x∗ ⇔∫ ∞

0

h(Φ(t, x))dt <∞ ⇔ w(x) < 1

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 6 of 23

Page 14: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Integral Equation

Dw(x) · f(x) = −h(x)(1− w(x))

D = w−1([0, 1)) := {x ∈ Rd |w(x) ∈ [0, 1)}

Why does this characterization hold?

Integration of Zubov’s equation and subsequentintegration by parts yields the integral equation

w(x) = 1− e−R∞0 h(Φ(t,x))dt

Thus:

Φ(t, x)→ x∗ ⇔∫ ∞

0

h(Φ(t, x))dt <∞ ⇔ w(x) < 1

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 6 of 23

Page 15: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Zubov’s Equation — DiscussionZubov’s Equation yields

a characterization of the domain of attraction D

an existence result for a Lyapunov function v on D, i.e.,on the the largest possible domain

an — in principle — constructive method for thecomputation of v and D — analytically or numerically

additional insight through PDE formulation

Generalizations exist, e.g., for

periodic orbits [Aulbach ’83]

perturbed systems (deterministic: [Camilli, Gr., Wirth ’01],

stochastic: [Camilli, Loreti ’06; Camilli, Gr. ’03])

control systems (deterministic: [Sontag ’83, Camilli, Gr.,

Wirth ’08], stochastic: [Camilli, Cesaroni, Gr., Wirth ’06])

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 7 of 23

Page 16: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Zubov’s Equation — DiscussionZubov’s Equation yields

a characterization of the domain of attraction Dan existence result for a Lyapunov function v on D, i.e.,on the the largest possible domain

an — in principle — constructive method for thecomputation of v and D — analytically or numerically

additional insight through PDE formulation

Generalizations exist, e.g., for

periodic orbits [Aulbach ’83]

perturbed systems (deterministic: [Camilli, Gr., Wirth ’01],

stochastic: [Camilli, Loreti ’06; Camilli, Gr. ’03])

control systems (deterministic: [Sontag ’83, Camilli, Gr.,

Wirth ’08], stochastic: [Camilli, Cesaroni, Gr., Wirth ’06])

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 7 of 23

Page 17: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Zubov’s Equation — DiscussionZubov’s Equation yields

a characterization of the domain of attraction Dan existence result for a Lyapunov function v on D, i.e.,on the the largest possible domain

an — in principle — constructive method for thecomputation of v and D — analytically or numerically

additional insight through PDE formulation

Generalizations exist, e.g., for

periodic orbits [Aulbach ’83]

perturbed systems (deterministic: [Camilli, Gr., Wirth ’01],

stochastic: [Camilli, Loreti ’06; Camilli, Gr. ’03])

control systems (deterministic: [Sontag ’83, Camilli, Gr.,

Wirth ’08], stochastic: [Camilli, Cesaroni, Gr., Wirth ’06])

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 7 of 23

Page 18: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Zubov’s Equation — DiscussionZubov’s Equation yields

a characterization of the domain of attraction Dan existence result for a Lyapunov function v on D, i.e.,on the the largest possible domain

an — in principle — constructive method for thecomputation of v and D — analytically or numerically

additional insight through PDE formulation

Generalizations exist, e.g., for

periodic orbits [Aulbach ’83]

perturbed systems (deterministic: [Camilli, Gr., Wirth ’01],

stochastic: [Camilli, Loreti ’06; Camilli, Gr. ’03])

control systems (deterministic: [Sontag ’83, Camilli, Gr.,

Wirth ’08], stochastic: [Camilli, Cesaroni, Gr., Wirth ’06])

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 7 of 23

Page 19: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Zubov’s Equation — DiscussionZubov’s Equation yields

a characterization of the domain of attraction Dan existence result for a Lyapunov function v on D, i.e.,on the the largest possible domain

an — in principle — constructive method for thecomputation of v and D — analytically or numerically

additional insight through PDE formulation

Generalizations exist, e.g., for

periodic orbits [Aulbach ’83]

perturbed systems (deterministic: [Camilli, Gr., Wirth ’01],

stochastic: [Camilli, Loreti ’06; Camilli, Gr. ’03])

control systems (deterministic: [Sontag ’83, Camilli, Gr.,

Wirth ’08], stochastic: [Camilli, Cesaroni, Gr., Wirth ’06])

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 7 of 23

Page 20: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Zubov’s Equation — DiscussionZubov’s Equation yields

a characterization of the domain of attraction Dan existence result for a Lyapunov function v on D, i.e.,on the the largest possible domain

an — in principle — constructive method for thecomputation of v and D — analytically or numerically

additional insight through PDE formulation

Generalizations exist, e.g., for

periodic orbits [Aulbach ’83]

perturbed systems (deterministic: [Camilli, Gr., Wirth ’01],

stochastic: [Camilli, Loreti ’06; Camilli, Gr. ’03])

control systems (deterministic: [Sontag ’83, Camilli, Gr.,

Wirth ’08], stochastic: [Camilli, Cesaroni, Gr., Wirth ’06])

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 7 of 23

Page 21: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Zubov’s Equation — DiscussionZubov’s Equation yields

a characterization of the domain of attraction Dan existence result for a Lyapunov function v on D, i.e.,on the the largest possible domain

an — in principle — constructive method for thecomputation of v and D — analytically or numerically

additional insight through PDE formulation

Generalizations exist, e.g., for

periodic orbits [Aulbach ’83]

perturbed systems (deterministic: [Camilli, Gr., Wirth ’01],

stochastic: [Camilli, Loreti ’06; Camilli, Gr. ’03])

control systems (deterministic: [Sontag ’83, Camilli, Gr.,

Wirth ’08], stochastic: [Camilli, Cesaroni, Gr., Wirth ’06])

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 7 of 23

Page 22: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Control and PerturbationIn this talk we consider generalizations of this method forcontrolled and deterministically perturbed systems

x(t) = f(x(t), u(t), v(t))

with x(t) ∈ Rd

u ∈ U = {u : [0,∞)→ U, measurable}v ∈ V = {v : [0,∞)→ V, measurable}U ⊂ Rm, V ⊂ Rl compact

Problem: stabilization under uncertainty

u = control, trying to achieve Φ(t, x0, u, v)→ x∗

v = perturbation, trying to keep Φ(t, x0, u, v) away from x∗

(convergence to x∗ = 0 can be generalized to arbitrary compact sets)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 8 of 23

Page 23: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Control and PerturbationIn this talk we consider generalizations of this method forcontrolled and deterministically perturbed systems

x(t) = f(x(t), u(t), v(t))

with x(t) ∈ Rd

u ∈ U = {u : [0,∞)→ U, measurable}v ∈ V = {v : [0,∞)→ V, measurable}U ⊂ Rm, V ⊂ Rl compact

Problem: stabilization under uncertainty

u = control, trying to achieve Φ(t, x0, u, v)→ x∗

v = perturbation, trying to keep Φ(t, x0, u, v) away from x∗

(convergence to x∗ = 0 can be generalized to arbitrary compact sets)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 8 of 23

Page 24: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Control and PerturbationIn this talk we consider generalizations of this method forcontrolled and deterministically perturbed systems

x(t) = f(x(t), u(t), v(t))

with x(t) ∈ Rd

u ∈ U = {u : [0,∞)→ U, measurable}v ∈ V = {v : [0,∞)→ V, measurable}U ⊂ Rm, V ⊂ Rl compact

Problem: stabilization under uncertainty

u = control, trying to achieve Φ(t, x0, u, v)→ x∗

v = perturbation, trying to keep Φ(t, x0, u, v) away from x∗

(convergence to x∗ = 0 can be generalized to arbitrary compact sets)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 8 of 23

Page 25: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Extension of Integral EquationRecall: Zubov’s method relies on the integral equation

w(x) = 1− e−R∞0 h(Φ(t,x))dt

For the solutions Φ(t, x, u, w) of x(t) = f(x(t), u(t), v(t)) define

J(x, u, v) = 1− e−R∞0 h(Φ(t,x,u,v),u(t),v(t))dt

Local exponential controllability and an appropriate choice ofh : Rd × U × V → R+

0 ensure

J(x, u, v) < 1 ⇔ Φ(t, x, u, v)→ 0

J(x, u, v) = 1 ⇔ Φ(t, x, u, v) 6→ 0

Thus, u should minimize J while v should maximize J zero sum differential game (min-max problem)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 9 of 23

Page 26: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Extension of Integral EquationRecall: Zubov’s method relies on the integral equation

w(x) = 1− e−R∞0 h(Φ(t,x))dt

For the solutions Φ(t, x, u, w) of x(t) = f(x(t), u(t), v(t)) define

J(x, u, v) = 1− e−R∞0 h(Φ(t,x,u,v),u(t),v(t))dt

Local exponential controllability and an appropriate choice ofh : Rd × U × V → R+

0 ensure

J(x, u, v) < 1 ⇔ Φ(t, x, u, v)→ 0

J(x, u, v) = 1 ⇔ Φ(t, x, u, v) 6→ 0

Thus, u should minimize J while v should maximize J zero sum differential game (min-max problem)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 9 of 23

Page 27: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Extension of Integral EquationRecall: Zubov’s method relies on the integral equation

w(x) = 1− e−R∞0 h(Φ(t,x))dt

For the solutions Φ(t, x, u, w) of x(t) = f(x(t), u(t), v(t)) define

J(x, u, v) = 1− e−R∞0 h(Φ(t,x,u,v),u(t),v(t))dt

Local exponential controllability and an appropriate choice ofh : Rd × U × V → R+

0 ensure

J(x, u, v) < 1 ⇔ Φ(t, x, u, v)→ 0

J(x, u, v) = 1 ⇔ Φ(t, x, u, v) 6→ 0

Thus, u should minimize J while v should maximize J zero sum differential game (min-max problem)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 9 of 23

Page 28: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Extension of Integral EquationRecall: Zubov’s method relies on the integral equation

w(x) = 1− e−R∞0 h(Φ(t,x))dt

For the solutions Φ(t, x, u, w) of x(t) = f(x(t), u(t), v(t)) define

J(x, u, v) = 1− e−R∞0 h(Φ(t,x,u,v),u(t),v(t))dt

Local exponential controllability and an appropriate choice ofh : Rd × U × V → R+

0 ensure

J(x, u, v) < 1 ⇔ Φ(t, x, u, v)→ 0

J(x, u, v) = 1 ⇔ Φ(t, x, u, v) 6→ 0

Thus, u should minimize J while v should maximize J zero sum differential game (min-max problem)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 9 of 23

Page 29: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Extension of Integral EquationRecall: Zubov’s method relies on the integral equation

w(x) = 1− e−R∞0 h(Φ(t,x))dt

For the solutions Φ(t, x, u, w) of x(t) = f(x(t), u(t), v(t)) define

J(x, u, v) = 1− e−R∞0 h(Φ(t,x,u,v),u(t),v(t))dt

Local exponential controllability and an appropriate choice ofh : Rd × U × V → R+

0 ensure

J(x, u, v) < 1 ⇔ Φ(t, x, u, v)→ 0

J(x, u, v) = 1 ⇔ Φ(t, x, u, v) 6→ 0

Thus, u should minimize J while v should maximize J

zero sum differential game (min-max problem)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 9 of 23

Page 30: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Extension of Integral EquationRecall: Zubov’s method relies on the integral equation

w(x) = 1− e−R∞0 h(Φ(t,x))dt

For the solutions Φ(t, x, u, w) of x(t) = f(x(t), u(t), v(t)) define

J(x, u, v) = 1− e−R∞0 h(Φ(t,x,u,v),u(t),v(t))dt

Local exponential controllability and an appropriate choice ofh : Rd × U × V → R+

0 ensure

J(x, u, v) < 1 ⇔ Φ(t, x, u, v)→ 0

J(x, u, v) = 1 ⇔ Φ(t, x, u, v) 6→ 0

Thus, u should minimize J while v should maximize J zero sum differential game (min-max problem)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 9 of 23

Page 31: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Information Exchange between u and vWhat do u and v know about each other?

Possible settings:

when the perturbation chooses v : [0,∞)→ V , it knowsu : [0,∞)→ U — overly conservative, non causal

when the control chooses u : [0,∞)→ U , it knowsv : [0,∞)→ V — unrealistic, non causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t] and the controlknows v|[0,t) — causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t) and the controlknows v|[0,t] — causal

The last two settings are also realistic, since by Hamilton-Jacobi theory for choosing the optimal u and v knowing u|[0,t)and v|[0,t) is equivalent to knowing the solution Φ|[0,t)General question for differential games: does the“infinitesimal” advantage make a difference?

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 10 of 23

Page 32: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Information Exchange between u and vWhat do u and v know about each other? Possible settings:

when the perturbation chooses v : [0,∞)→ V , it knowsu : [0,∞)→ U

— overly conservative, non causal

when the control chooses u : [0,∞)→ U , it knowsv : [0,∞)→ V — unrealistic, non causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t] and the controlknows v|[0,t) — causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t) and the controlknows v|[0,t] — causal

The last two settings are also realistic, since by Hamilton-Jacobi theory for choosing the optimal u and v knowing u|[0,t)and v|[0,t) is equivalent to knowing the solution Φ|[0,t)General question for differential games: does the“infinitesimal” advantage make a difference?

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 10 of 23

Page 33: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Information Exchange between u and vWhat do u and v know about each other? Possible settings:

when the perturbation chooses v : [0,∞)→ V , it knowsu : [0,∞)→ U

— overly conservative, non causal

when the control chooses u : [0,∞)→ U , it knowsv : [0,∞)→ V

— unrealistic, non causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t] and the controlknows v|[0,t) — causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t) and the controlknows v|[0,t] — causal

The last two settings are also realistic, since by Hamilton-Jacobi theory for choosing the optimal u and v knowing u|[0,t)and v|[0,t) is equivalent to knowing the solution Φ|[0,t)General question for differential games: does the“infinitesimal” advantage make a difference?

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 10 of 23

Page 34: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Information Exchange between u and vWhat do u and v know about each other? Possible settings:

when the perturbation chooses v : [0,∞)→ V , it knowsu : [0,∞)→ U

— overly conservative, non causal

when the control chooses u : [0,∞)→ U , it knowsv : [0,∞)→ V

— unrealistic, non causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t] and the controlknows v|[0,t)

— causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t) and the controlknows v|[0,t] — causal

The last two settings are also realistic, since by Hamilton-Jacobi theory for choosing the optimal u and v knowing u|[0,t)and v|[0,t) is equivalent to knowing the solution Φ|[0,t)General question for differential games: does the“infinitesimal” advantage make a difference?

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 10 of 23

Page 35: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Information Exchange between u and vWhat do u and v know about each other? Possible settings:

when the perturbation chooses v : [0,∞)→ V , it knowsu : [0,∞)→ U

— overly conservative, non causal

when the control chooses u : [0,∞)→ U , it knowsv : [0,∞)→ V

— unrealistic, non causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t] and the controlknows v|[0,t)

— causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t) and the controlknows v|[0,t]

— causal

The last two settings are also realistic, since by Hamilton-Jacobi theory for choosing the optimal u and v knowing u|[0,t)and v|[0,t) is equivalent to knowing the solution Φ|[0,t)General question for differential games: does the“infinitesimal” advantage make a difference?

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 10 of 23

Page 36: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Information Exchange between u and vWhat do u and v know about each other? Possible settings:

when the perturbation chooses v : [0,∞)→ V , it knowsu : [0,∞)→ U — overly conservative, non causal

when the control chooses u : [0,∞)→ U , it knowsv : [0,∞)→ V

— unrealistic, non causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t] and the controlknows v|[0,t)

— causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t) and the controlknows v|[0,t]

— causal

The last two settings are also realistic, since by Hamilton-Jacobi theory for choosing the optimal u and v knowing u|[0,t)and v|[0,t) is equivalent to knowing the solution Φ|[0,t)General question for differential games: does the“infinitesimal” advantage make a difference?

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 10 of 23

Page 37: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Information Exchange between u and vWhat do u and v know about each other? Possible settings:

when the perturbation chooses v : [0,∞)→ V , it knowsu : [0,∞)→ U — overly conservative, non causal

when the control chooses u : [0,∞)→ U , it knowsv : [0,∞)→ V — unrealistic, non causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t] and the controlknows v|[0,t)

— causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t) and the controlknows v|[0,t]

— causal

The last two settings are also realistic, since by Hamilton-Jacobi theory for choosing the optimal u and v knowing u|[0,t)and v|[0,t) is equivalent to knowing the solution Φ|[0,t)General question for differential games: does the“infinitesimal” advantage make a difference?

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 10 of 23

Page 38: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Information Exchange between u and vWhat do u and v know about each other? Possible settings:

when the perturbation chooses v : [0,∞)→ V , it knowsu : [0,∞)→ U — overly conservative, non causal

when the control chooses u : [0,∞)→ U , it knowsv : [0,∞)→ V — unrealistic, non causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t] and the controlknows v|[0,t) — causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t) and the controlknows v|[0,t]

— causal

The last two settings are also realistic, since by Hamilton-Jacobi theory for choosing the optimal u and v knowing u|[0,t)and v|[0,t) is equivalent to knowing the solution Φ|[0,t)General question for differential games: does the“infinitesimal” advantage make a difference?

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 10 of 23

Page 39: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Information Exchange between u and vWhat do u and v know about each other? Possible settings:

when the perturbation chooses v : [0,∞)→ V , it knowsu : [0,∞)→ U — overly conservative, non causal

when the control chooses u : [0,∞)→ U , it knowsv : [0,∞)→ V — unrealistic, non causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t] and the controlknows v|[0,t) — causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t) and the controlknows v|[0,t] — causal

The last two settings are also realistic, since by Hamilton-Jacobi theory for choosing the optimal u and v knowing u|[0,t)and v|[0,t) is equivalent to knowing the solution Φ|[0,t)General question for differential games: does the“infinitesimal” advantage make a difference?

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 10 of 23

Page 40: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Information Exchange between u and vWhat do u and v know about each other? Possible settings:

when the perturbation chooses v : [0,∞)→ V , it knowsu : [0,∞)→ U — overly conservative, non causal

when the control chooses u : [0,∞)→ U , it knowsv : [0,∞)→ V — unrealistic, non causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t] and the controlknows v|[0,t) — causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t) and the controlknows v|[0,t] — causal

The last two settings are also realistic, since by Hamilton-Jacobi theory for choosing the optimal u and v knowing u|[0,t)and v|[0,t) is equivalent to knowing the solution Φ|[0,t)

General question for differential games: does the“infinitesimal” advantage make a difference?

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 10 of 23

Page 41: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Information Exchange between u and vWhat do u and v know about each other? Possible settings:

when the perturbation chooses v : [0,∞)→ V , it knowsu : [0,∞)→ U — overly conservative, non causal

when the control chooses u : [0,∞)→ U , it knowsv : [0,∞)→ V — unrealistic, non causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t] and the controlknows v|[0,t) — causal

at time t, the perturbation knows u|[0,t) and the controlknows v|[0,t] — causal

The last two settings are also realistic, since by Hamilton-Jacobi theory for choosing the optimal u and v knowing u|[0,t)and v|[0,t) is equivalent to knowing the solution Φ|[0,t)General question for differential games: does the“infinitesimal” advantage make a difference?

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 10 of 23

Page 42: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Formalization of the Information StructureWe formalize the last two cases by defining the set ∆ ofnonanticipative strategies for the perturbation as the set ofmaps β : U → V with the following property for all u1, u2 ∈ Uand all s > 0:

u1(τ) = u2(τ) for almost all τ ∈ [0, s]

⇒ β(u1)(τ) = β(u2)(τ) for almost all τ ∈ [0, s]

similarly, we define the set Γ of nonanticipative strategiesα : V → U for the control

upper value: w+(x) := supβ∈∆

infu∈U

J(x, u, β(u))

lower value: w−(x) := infα∈Γ

supv∈V

J(x, α(v), v)

Keep in mind: the strategy player has an infinitesimal advantage

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 11 of 23

Page 43: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Formalization of the Information StructureWe formalize the last two cases by defining the set ∆ ofnonanticipative strategies for the perturbation as the set ofmaps β : U → V with the following property for all u1, u2 ∈ Uand all s > 0:

u1(τ) = u2(τ) for almost all τ ∈ [0, s]

⇒ β(u1)(τ) = β(u2)(τ) for almost all τ ∈ [0, s]

similarly, we define the set Γ of nonanticipative strategiesα : V → U for the control

upper value: w+(x) := supβ∈∆

infu∈U

J(x, u, β(u))

lower value: w−(x) := infα∈Γ

supv∈V

J(x, α(v), v)

Keep in mind: the strategy player has an infinitesimal advantage

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 11 of 23

Page 44: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Formalization of the Information StructureWe formalize the last two cases by defining the set ∆ ofnonanticipative strategies for the perturbation as the set ofmaps β : U → V with the following property for all u1, u2 ∈ Uand all s > 0:

u1(τ) = u2(τ) for almost all τ ∈ [0, s]

⇒ β(u1)(τ) = β(u2)(τ) for almost all τ ∈ [0, s]

similarly, we define the set Γ of nonanticipative strategiesα : V → U for the control

upper value: w+(x) := supβ∈∆

infu∈U

J(x, u, β(u))

lower value: w−(x) := infα∈Γ

supv∈V

J(x, α(v), v)

Keep in mind: the strategy player has an infinitesimal advantage

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 11 of 23

Page 45: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Formalization of the Information StructureWe formalize the last two cases by defining the set ∆ ofnonanticipative strategies for the perturbation as the set ofmaps β : U → V with the following property for all u1, u2 ∈ Uand all s > 0:

u1(τ) = u2(τ) for almost all τ ∈ [0, s]

⇒ β(u1)(τ) = β(u2)(τ) for almost all τ ∈ [0, s]

similarly, we define the set Γ of nonanticipative strategiesα : V → U for the control

upper value: w+(x) := supβ∈∆

infu∈U

J(x, u, β(u))

lower value: w−(x) := infα∈Γ

supv∈V

J(x, α(v), v)

Keep in mind: the strategy player has an infinitesimal advantage

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 11 of 23

Page 46: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Formalization of the Information StructureWe formalize the last two cases by defining the set ∆ ofnonanticipative strategies for the perturbation as the set ofmaps β : U → V with the following property for all u1, u2 ∈ Uand all s > 0:

u1(τ) = u2(τ) for almost all τ ∈ [0, s]

⇒ β(u1)(τ) = β(u2)(τ) for almost all τ ∈ [0, s]

similarly, we define the set Γ of nonanticipative strategiesα : V → U for the control

upper value: w+(x) := supβ∈∆

infu∈U

J(x, u, β(u))

lower value: w−(x) := infα∈Γ

supv∈V

J(x, α(v), v)

Keep in mind: the strategy player has an infinitesimal advantage

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 11 of 23

Page 47: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Domains of ControllabilityWe need two different domains of controllability

D+ = (w+)−1([0, 1)) and D− = (w−)−1([0, 1))

upper domain of uniform asymptotic controllability

D+ =

x ∈ Rd

∣∣∣∣∣∣there exists θ(t)→ 0 such thatfor each β ∈ ∆ there existsu ∈ U with ‖Φ(t, x, u, β(u))‖ ≤ θ(t)

lower domain of uniform asymptotic controllability

D− =

x ∈ Rd

∣∣∣∣∣∣there exists θ(t)→ 0 and α ∈ Γsuch that for each v ∈ V the inequality‖Φ(t, x, α(v), v)‖ ≤ θ(t) holds

Local exponential controllability is defined analogously withθ(t) = ce−σt‖x‖ (can be generalized to uniform convergence)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 12 of 23

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Domains of ControllabilityWe need two different domains of controllability

D+ = (w+)−1([0, 1)) and D− = (w−)−1([0, 1))

upper domain of uniform asymptotic controllability

D+ =

x ∈ Rd

∣∣∣∣∣∣there exists θ(t)→ 0 such thatfor each β ∈ ∆ there existsu ∈ U with ‖Φ(t, x, u, β(u))‖ ≤ θ(t)

lower domain of uniform asymptotic controllability

D− =

x ∈ Rd

∣∣∣∣∣∣there exists θ(t)→ 0 and α ∈ Γsuch that for each v ∈ V the inequality‖Φ(t, x, α(v), v)‖ ≤ θ(t) holds

Local exponential controllability is defined analogously withθ(t) = ce−σt‖x‖ (can be generalized to uniform convergence)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 12 of 23

Page 49: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Domains of ControllabilityWe need two different domains of controllability

D+ = (w+)−1([0, 1)) and D− = (w−)−1([0, 1))

upper domain of uniform asymptotic controllability

D+ =

x ∈ Rd

∣∣∣∣∣∣there exists θ(t)→ 0 such thatfor each β ∈ ∆ there existsu ∈ U with ‖Φ(t, x, u, β(u))‖ ≤ θ(t)

lower domain of uniform asymptotic controllability

D− =

x ∈ Rd

∣∣∣∣∣∣there exists θ(t)→ 0 and α ∈ Γsuch that for each v ∈ V the inequality‖Φ(t, x, α(v), v)‖ ≤ θ(t) holds

Local exponential controllability is defined analogously withθ(t) = ce−σt‖x‖ (can be generalized to uniform convergence)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 12 of 23

Page 50: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Domains of ControllabilityWe need two different domains of controllability

D+ = (w+)−1([0, 1)) and D− = (w−)−1([0, 1))

upper domain of uniform asymptotic controllability

D+ =

x ∈ Rd

∣∣∣∣∣∣there exists θ(t)→ 0 such thatfor each β ∈ ∆ there existsu ∈ U with ‖Φ(t, x, u, β(u))‖ ≤ θ(t)

lower domain of uniform asymptotic controllability

D− =

x ∈ Rd

∣∣∣∣∣∣there exists θ(t)→ 0 and α ∈ Γsuch that for each v ∈ V the inequality‖Φ(t, x, α(v), v)‖ ≤ θ(t) holds

Local exponential controllability is defined analogously withθ(t) = ce−σt‖x‖

(can be generalized to uniform convergence)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 12 of 23

Page 51: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Domains of ControllabilityWe need two different domains of controllability

D+ = (w+)−1([0, 1)) and D− = (w−)−1([0, 1))

upper domain of uniform asymptotic controllability

D+ =

x ∈ Rd

∣∣∣∣∣∣there exists θ(t)→ 0 such thatfor each β ∈ ∆ there existsu ∈ U with ‖Φ(t, x, u, β(u))‖ ≤ θ(t)

lower domain of uniform asymptotic controllability

D− =

x ∈ Rd

∣∣∣∣∣∣there exists θ(t)→ 0 and α ∈ Γsuch that for each v ∈ V the inequality‖Φ(t, x, α(v), v)‖ ≤ θ(t) holds

Local exponential controllability is defined analogously withθ(t) = ce−σt‖x‖ (can be generalized to uniform convergence)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 12 of 23

Page 52: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

ExampleCan the upper and lower domain be different?

x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, x(t) ∈ R

x(t) ∈ R, u(t) ∈ U = {−1, 1}, v(t) ∈ V = {−1, 1}

upper domain: perturbation chooses strategy β

set β(u)(t) := u(t)

x(t) = −x(t) + x(t)3 for all u ∈ U D+ = (−1, 1)

lower domain: control chooses strategy α

set α(v)(t) := −v(t)

x(t) = −x(t)− x(t)3 for all v ∈ V D− = (−∞,∞)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 13 of 23

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ExampleCan the upper and lower domain be different?

x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, x(t) ∈ R

x(t) ∈ R, u(t) ∈ U = {−1, 1}, v(t) ∈ V = {−1, 1}

upper domain: perturbation chooses strategy β

set β(u)(t) := u(t)

x(t) = −x(t) + x(t)3 for all u ∈ U D+ = (−1, 1)

lower domain: control chooses strategy α

set α(v)(t) := −v(t)

x(t) = −x(t)− x(t)3 for all v ∈ V D− = (−∞,∞)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 13 of 23

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ExampleCan the upper and lower domain be different?

x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, x(t) ∈ R

x(t) ∈ R, u(t) ∈ U = {−1, 1}, v(t) ∈ V = {−1, 1}

upper domain: perturbation chooses strategy β

set β(u)(t) := u(t)

x(t) = −x(t) + x(t)3 for all u ∈ U D+ = (−1, 1)

lower domain: control chooses strategy α

set α(v)(t) := −v(t)

x(t) = −x(t)− x(t)3 for all v ∈ V D− = (−∞,∞)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 13 of 23

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ExampleCan the upper and lower domain be different?

x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, x(t) ∈ R

x(t) ∈ R, u(t) ∈ U = {−1, 1}, v(t) ∈ V = {−1, 1}

upper domain: perturbation chooses strategy β

set β(u)(t) := u(t)

x(t) = −x(t) + x(t)3 for all u ∈ U D+ = (−1, 1)

lower domain: control chooses strategy α

set α(v)(t) := −v(t)

x(t) = −x(t)− x(t)3 for all v ∈ V D− = (−∞,∞)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 13 of 23

Page 56: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

ExampleCan the upper and lower domain be different?

x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, x(t) ∈ R

x(t) ∈ R, u(t) ∈ U = {−1, 1}, v(t) ∈ V = {−1, 1}

upper domain: perturbation chooses strategy β

set β(u)(t) := u(t)

x(t) = −x(t) + x(t)3 for all u ∈ U D+ = (−1, 1)

lower domain: control chooses strategy α

set α(v)(t) := −v(t)

x(t) = −x(t)− x(t)3 for all v ∈ V D− = (−∞,∞)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 13 of 23

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ExampleCan the upper and lower domain be different?

x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, x(t) ∈ R

x(t) ∈ R, u(t) ∈ U = {−1, 1}, v(t) ∈ V = {−1, 1}

upper domain: perturbation chooses strategy β

set β(u)(t) := u(t)

x(t) = −x(t) + x(t)3 for all u ∈ U D+ = (−1, 1)

lower domain: control chooses strategy α

set α(v)(t) := −v(t)

x(t) = −x(t)− x(t)3 for all v ∈ V D− = (−∞,∞)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 13 of 23

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ExampleCan the upper and lower domain be different?

x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, x(t) ∈ R

x(t) ∈ R, u(t) ∈ U = {−1, 1}, v(t) ∈ V = {−1, 1}

upper domain: perturbation chooses strategy β

set β(u)(t) := u(t)

x(t) = −x(t) + x(t)3 for all u ∈ U D+ = (−1, 1)

lower domain: control chooses strategy α

set α(v)(t) := −v(t)

x(t) = −x(t)− x(t)3 for all v ∈ V D− = (−∞,∞)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 13 of 23

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ExampleCan the upper and lower domain be different?

x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, x(t) ∈ R

x(t) ∈ R, u(t) ∈ U = {−1, 1}, v(t) ∈ V = {−1, 1}

upper domain: perturbation chooses strategy β

set β(u)(t) := u(t)

x(t) = −x(t) + x(t)3 for all u ∈ U D+ = (−1, 1)

lower domain: control chooses strategy α

set α(v)(t) := −v(t)

x(t) = −x(t)− x(t)3 for all v ∈ V D− = (−∞,∞)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 13 of 23

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Formal Derivation of Zubov’s Equation

w+(x) := supβ∈∆

infu∈U

{1− e−

R∞0 h(Φ(t,x,u,v),u(t),v(t))dt

}satisfies for all T > 0 the optimality principle

w+(x) = supβ∈∆

infu∈U

{1− e−

R T0 h(Φ(t,x,u,v),u(t),v(t))dt[1− w+(Φ(T, x, u, v))]

}

Division by −T and passing to the limit for T → 0 yields theHamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs equation

H+(x,w+(x), Dw+(x)) = 0

with Hamiltonian

H+(x,w, p) = supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

“generalized Zubov Equation”

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 14 of 23

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Formal Derivation of Zubov’s Equation

w+(x) := supβ∈∆

infu∈U

{1− e−

R∞0 h(Φ(t,x,u,v),u(t),v(t))dt

}satisfies for all T > 0 the optimality principle

w+(x) = supβ∈∆

infu∈U

{1− e−

R T0 h(Φ(t,x,u,v),u(t),v(t))dt[1− w+(Φ(T, x, u, v))]

}Division by −T and passing to the limit for T → 0 yields theHamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs equation

H+(x,w+(x), Dw+(x)) = 0

with Hamiltonian

H+(x,w, p) = supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

“generalized Zubov Equation”

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 14 of 23

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Formal Derivation of Zubov’s Equation

w+(x) := supβ∈∆

infu∈U

{1− e−

R∞0 h(Φ(t,x,u,v),u(t),v(t))dt

}satisfies for all T > 0 the optimality principle

w+(x) = supβ∈∆

infu∈U

{1− e−

R T0 h(Φ(t,x,u,v),u(t),v(t))dt[1− w+(Φ(T, x, u, v))]

}Division by −T and passing to the limit for T → 0 yields theHamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs equation

H+(x,w+(x), Dw+(x)) = 0

with Hamiltonian

H+(x,w, p) = supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

“generalized Zubov Equation”

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 14 of 23

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Formal Derivation of Zubov’s Equationw+ formally satisfies the generalized Zubov equation

H+(x,w+(x), Dw+(x)) = 0

with Hamiltonian

H+(x,w, p) = supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

Likewise, w− formally satisfies the generalized Zubov equation

H−(x,w−(x), Dw−(x)) = 0

with Hamiltonian

H−(x,w, p) = infv∈V

supu∈U{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 15 of 23

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Formal Derivation of Zubov’s Equationw+ formally satisfies the generalized Zubov equation

H+(x,w+(x), Dw+(x)) = 0

with Hamiltonian

H+(x,w, p) = supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

Likewise, w− formally satisfies the generalized Zubov equation

H−(x,w−(x), Dw−(x)) = 0

with Hamiltonian

H−(x,w, p) = infv∈V

supu∈U{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 15 of 23

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Nonsmooth SolutionProblem: w+ and w− from the integral equations are typicallynonsmooth

Example: w+ for x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, withU = V = {−1, 1}, h(x, u, v) = x2

−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 50

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

x

W+(x

)

viscositysolution

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 16 of 23

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Nonsmooth SolutionProblem: w+ and w− from the integral equations are typicallynonsmooth

Example: w+ for x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, withU = V = {−1, 1}, h(x, u, v) = x2

−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 50

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

x

W+(x

)

viscositysolution

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 16 of 23

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Nonsmooth SolutionProblem: w+ and w− from the integral equations are typicallynonsmooth

Example: w+ for x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, withU = V = {−1, 1}, h(x, u, v) = x2

−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 50

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

x

W+(x

)

viscositysolution

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 16 of 23

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Viscosity Solution

Super– and subdifferential:

v

x

v

x

D+v(x) D−v(x)

w viscosity supersolution: H(x,w(x), p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ D−w(x)

w viscosity subsolution: H(x,w(x), p) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ D+w(x)

w viscosity solution, if both holds [Crandall, Lions 82]

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 17 of 23

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Viscosity Solution

Super– and subdifferential:

v

x

v

x

D+v(x) D−v(x)

w viscosity supersolution: H(x,w(x), p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ D−w(x)

w viscosity subsolution: H(x,w(x), p) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ D+w(x)

w viscosity solution, if both holds [Crandall, Lions 82]

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 17 of 23

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Viscosity Solution

Super– and subdifferential:

v

x

v

x

D+v(x) D−v(x)

w viscosity supersolution: H(x,w(x), p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ D−w(x)

w viscosity subsolution: H(x,w(x), p) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ D+w(x)

w viscosity solution, if both holds [Crandall, Lions 82]

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 17 of 23

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Viscosity Solution

Super– and subdifferential:

v

x

v

x

D+v(x) D−v(x)

w viscosity supersolution: H(x,w(x), p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ D−w(x)

w viscosity subsolution: H(x,w(x), p) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ D+w(x)

w viscosity solution, if both holds [Crandall, Lions 82]

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 17 of 23

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Existence and UniquenessWith this solution concept and with the help of “sub– andsuperoptimality principles” for viscosity super– andsubsolutions [Soravia 95] we arrive at the following Theorem:

w+ is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the equation

supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)} = 0

with w+(0) = 0

w− is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the equation

infv∈V

supu∈U{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)} = 0

with w−(0) = 0

Furthermore, the characterizations D+ = (w+)−1([0, 1)) andD− = (w−)−1([0, 1)) hold

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 18 of 23

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Existence and UniquenessWith this solution concept and with the help of “sub– andsuperoptimality principles” for viscosity super– andsubsolutions [Soravia 95] we arrive at the following Theorem:

w+ is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the equation

supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)} = 0

with w+(0) = 0

w− is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the equation

infv∈V

supu∈U{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)} = 0

with w−(0) = 0

Furthermore, the characterizations D+ = (w+)−1([0, 1)) andD− = (w−)−1([0, 1)) hold

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 18 of 23

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Existence and UniquenessWith this solution concept and with the help of “sub– andsuperoptimality principles” for viscosity super– andsubsolutions [Soravia 95] we arrive at the following Theorem:

w+ is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the equation

supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)} = 0

with w+(0) = 0

w− is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the equation

infv∈V

supu∈U{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)} = 0

with w−(0) = 0

Furthermore, the characterizations D+ = (w+)−1([0, 1)) andD− = (w−)−1([0, 1)) hold

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 18 of 23

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ExampleConsider the example from before

x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, x(t) ∈ Rwith x(t) ∈ R, u(t) ∈ U = {−1, 1}, v(t) ∈ V = {−1, 1}

For h(x, u, v) = x2 we can compute explicitly

w+(x) =

{1−√

1− x2, |x| < 11, |x| ≥ 1

w−(x) =

√1 + x2 − 1√

1 + x2

−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 50

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

x

W+(x

)

−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 50

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

W−(x

)

This confirms D+ = (−1, 1) and D− = (−∞,∞)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 19 of 23

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ExampleConsider the example from before

x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, x(t) ∈ Rwith x(t) ∈ R, u(t) ∈ U = {−1, 1}, v(t) ∈ V = {−1, 1}

For h(x, u, v) = x2 we can compute explicitly

w+(x) =

{1−√

1− x2, |x| < 11, |x| ≥ 1

w−(x) =

√1 + x2 − 1√

1 + x2

−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 50

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

x

W+(x

)

−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 50

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

W−(x

)

This confirms D+ = (−1, 1) and D− = (−∞,∞)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 19 of 23

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ExampleConsider the example from before

x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, x(t) ∈ Rwith x(t) ∈ R, u(t) ∈ U = {−1, 1}, v(t) ∈ V = {−1, 1}

For h(x, u, v) = x2 we can compute explicitly

w+(x) =

{1−√

1− x2, |x| < 11, |x| ≥ 1

w−(x) =

√1 + x2 − 1√

1 + x2

−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 50

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

x

W+(x

)

−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 50

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

W−(x

)

This confirms D+ = (−1, 1) and D− = (−∞,∞)

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 19 of 23

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When does D+ = D− hold?

When does playing strategies yield no advantage?

The level set characterization implies that D+ = D− holds ifthere exists h such that w+ = w− holds.

The existence and uniqueness theorem implies that w+ = w−

holds if H+ = H− holds. Thus: H+ = H− ⇒ D+ = D−

Recall:

H+(x,w, p) = supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

H−(x,w, p) = infv∈V

supu∈U{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 20 of 23

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When does D+ = D− hold?

When does playing strategies yield no advantage?

The level set characterization implies that D+ = D− holds ifthere exists h such that w+ = w− holds.

The existence and uniqueness theorem implies that w+ = w−

holds if H+ = H− holds. Thus: H+ = H− ⇒ D+ = D−

Recall:

H+(x,w, p) = supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

H−(x,w, p) = infv∈V

supu∈U{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 20 of 23

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When does D+ = D− hold?

When does playing strategies yield no advantage?

The level set characterization implies that D+ = D− holds ifthere exists h such that w+ = w− holds.

The existence and uniqueness theorem implies that w+ = w−

holds if H+ = H− holds.

Thus: H+ = H− ⇒ D+ = D−

Recall:

H+(x,w, p) = supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

H−(x,w, p) = infv∈V

supu∈U{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 20 of 23

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When does D+ = D− hold?

When does playing strategies yield no advantage?

The level set characterization implies that D+ = D− holds ifthere exists h such that w+ = w− holds.

The existence and uniqueness theorem implies that w+ = w−

holds if H+ = H− holds. Thus: H+ = H− ⇒ D+ = D−

Recall:

H+(x,w, p) = supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

H−(x,w, p) = infv∈V

supu∈U{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 20 of 23

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When does D+ = D− hold?

When does playing strategies yield no advantage?

The level set characterization implies that D+ = D− holds ifthere exists h such that w+ = w− holds.

The existence and uniqueness theorem implies that w+ = w−

holds if H+ = H− holds. Thus: H+ = H− ⇒ D+ = D−

Recall:

H+(x,w, p) = supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

H−(x,w, p) = infv∈V

supu∈U{−p · f(x, u, v)− h(x, u, v)(1− w)}

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 20 of 23

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When does D+ = D− hold?

For the special case of h(x, u, v) = h(x) we get

H+(x,w, p) = H−(x,w, p)

⇔ supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)} = inf

v∈Vsupu∈U{−p · f(x, u, v)}

This condition (for all p ∈ Rn) is known as Isaacs’ condition

Theorem: Isaacs’ condition implies D+ = D−

This theorem extends a well known result from capture basinsin finite time pursuit evasion games to domains ofcontrollability of asymptotically controllable sets

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 21 of 23

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When does D+ = D− hold?

For the special case of h(x, u, v) = h(x) we get

H+(x,w, p) = H−(x,w, p)

⇔ supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)} = inf

v∈Vsupu∈U{−p · f(x, u, v)}

This condition (for all p ∈ Rn) is known as Isaacs’ condition

Theorem: Isaacs’ condition implies D+ = D−

This theorem extends a well known result from capture basinsin finite time pursuit evasion games to domains ofcontrollability of asymptotically controllable sets

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 21 of 23

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When does D+ = D− hold?

For the special case of h(x, u, v) = h(x) we get

H+(x,w, p) = H−(x,w, p)

⇔ supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)} = inf

v∈Vsupu∈U{−p · f(x, u, v)}

This condition (for all p ∈ Rn) is known as Isaacs’ condition

Theorem: Isaacs’ condition implies D+ = D−

This theorem extends a well known result from capture basinsin finite time pursuit evasion games to domains ofcontrollability of asymptotically controllable sets

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 21 of 23

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ExampleIn our example

x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, x(t) ∈ Rwith x(t) ∈ R, u(t) ∈ U = {−1, 1}, v(t) ∈ V = {−1, 1}we have D+ = (−1, 1) 6= (−∞,∞) = D−

Isaacs’ condition must be violated

Indeed, for p = 1 and x = 1 we have

p · f(x, u, v) = −1 + uv

and thus

supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)} = sup

u∈Uinfv∈V{1− uv} = 0

but

infv∈V

supu∈U{−p · f(x, u, v)} = inf

v∈Vsupu∈U{1− uv} = 2

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 22 of 23

Page 87: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

ExampleIn our example

x(t) = −x(t) + u(t)v(t)x(t)3, x(t) ∈ Rwith x(t) ∈ R, u(t) ∈ U = {−1, 1}, v(t) ∈ V = {−1, 1}we have D+ = (−1, 1) 6= (−∞,∞) = D−

Isaacs’ condition must be violated

Indeed, for p = 1 and x = 1 we have

p · f(x, u, v) = −1 + uv

and thus

supu∈U

infv∈V{−p · f(x, u, v)} = sup

u∈Uinfv∈V{1− uv} = 0

but

infv∈V

supu∈U{−p · f(x, u, v)} = inf

v∈Vsupu∈U{1− uv} = 2

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 22 of 23

Page 88: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Conclusions

Zubov’s method gives a characterization of the domain ofasymptotic controllability via the level set of a solution ofa first order PDE

Using viscosity solutions, the method can be extended toa differential game setting

Upper and lower value w+ and w− and the respectivedomains of controllability D+ and D− are defined andanalyzed seperately

Under the well known Isaacs condition the upper andlower domains of controllability D+ and D− coincide

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 23 of 23

Page 89: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Conclusions

Zubov’s method gives a characterization of the domain ofasymptotic controllability via the level set of a solution ofa first order PDE

Using viscosity solutions, the method can be extended toa differential game setting

Upper and lower value w+ and w− and the respectivedomains of controllability D+ and D− are defined andanalyzed seperately

Under the well known Isaacs condition the upper andlower domains of controllability D+ and D− coincide

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 23 of 23

Page 90: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Conclusions

Zubov’s method gives a characterization of the domain ofasymptotic controllability via the level set of a solution ofa first order PDE

Using viscosity solutions, the method can be extended toa differential game setting

Upper and lower value w+ and w− and the respectivedomains of controllability D+ and D− are defined andanalyzed seperately

Under the well known Isaacs condition the upper andlower domains of controllability D+ and D− coincide

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 23 of 23

Page 91: Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games - uni-bayreuth.denumerik.mathematik.uni-bayreuth.de/irsee_2010/download/... · 2010. 10. 8. · Zubov’s Method for Di erential Games Lars

Conclusions

Zubov’s method gives a characterization of the domain ofasymptotic controllability via the level set of a solution ofa first order PDE

Using viscosity solutions, the method can be extended toa differential game setting

Upper and lower value w+ and w− and the respectivedomains of controllability D+ and D− are defined andanalyzed seperately

Under the well known Isaacs condition the upper andlower domains of controllability D+ and D− coincide

Lars Grune, Zubov’s Method for Differential Games, p. 23 of 23