. STATE OF MICHIGAN

IN TilE SUPREME CXlURT

~tion To Be Amicus Qlrlae In re:

PEDPLE OF TilE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LONNIE JAMES ARNOLD;

' Defendant-Appellant.

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,HSC No. 154764

. <X>A'No. 325407

LC No. 13..()4()4()6-Fl!

BRIEF SUBMITl'ID IN AMIClJS ClJRIAE

Prepared and Suhnitted By:

CHRISTIAN PHILLIP MARGOSIAN #799744 .AmicUS QJriae oaks Correctional Facility 1500 Caberfae Highway Manistee; Michigan 49660

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TABLE OF cnmNI.'S

Index of :Authorities ......... · ............... . . ' . . Statsneni of Jurisdiction ... : .............. -. ............. ·.

' i . t Honorable Court's Questions . to Addres~ •.••.•••..•.. ' I . I ; Argument­!

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i 1HE :ONLY SENTENCE· A D~I\NT mNVICTED OF INDECENT : EXPOSURE tBY' A SEXUALLY DELINQUENT PERSON. CAN RECEIVE IS 1HE LEGISlATIVELY ENACTED MANDATED TERM OF 1 DAY TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN AccORDANCE WITH Kl. 750.335A(2)(C);

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I · . · i Relief R~uestec::t ... ~ ~ ........ ;. ~ ~ ~ ... ~ ...... ~ ...... .

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· PUnishrne~t and Rehabilitation; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 l ! .

Concludi~g Thought and Reiteration of Relief Requested •.••••.•. . . . • • . . • • . . 20 I . i ! i

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INDEX OF. AITmORITIES

Federal Case Law

Harrison ;v. Forrest, 2012 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 95820 ..................... 7 Helvermg' v. Halleck; 309 u.s. 106, 119; 60 s.ct. 444; 84 L.Ed. :604 (1940) ·i ........................................... 7

I : . _:~ . '' . :

'Hahn v. l.Jnited States, 524 U.S. 236,- 2511 118 S.Ct. 1969; ( 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998) .......... ; .................... · ." .•• 7. t

I : i. In re Grahamy. Florida, 560 u.s; 48 (2010) ..... ; ................ L .. 20

· I : -· · · i .· _ r ·_ ( ~Kimey,;v. Berguis; 2007 u.s;. Dist. LEXIS 63189 (2007) ' ......... ~ .. 7,

I 1 . : _ .- 1 1 u.s. ConStitutional !.Amendments I . "<·' -, ·,j , . i ~

j •• i. Arnenchnerlt VIII· .. :.! .. ~ ........................................... 17

\ : : . . : .Arnerlciment XIV .... · . -~ . ·. -.•..... -. o -. •••• ·• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •. • • • • • • • • 13

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. Mi.ch1gan ;ease Law , ' ! • I ·_ . '

·Attorney ·.General, ex rel Owen: v. Joyce, 233 Mich 619; 1207 N.w .. '863-(1926): ......... 1

.................................. 111 ' ! I I

Burton v.; Reed City'Hosp. Cor{>., 471 Mich 745, 752; 691 N.W.2d 424 (2005) ....... · ...................................... 1.3

' I . I ' , Detroit v.: Robinson; 462 Mich1439 (2000) .......••..•...•. : ..••..•..... 7, 17 . . . . . . I . .

Findling ~. T. P. ~rating Co!; , 139 Mich App 3o, 38; . . ·361 N.W.2d 376 (1984)· ••.••.. \. ...•. · .• : .. ; ............................... /11

·Huggett V· Dep't of Natural Re~urces, .464 Mich 711, 717; i629!N.W.4d 915 (2001) ..... ;.' ....... ; ............................ /3. I . l I , In r'e Johnson Estate 152 Mich App 200, 205; ·. 394 N.W.2d 136 (1986~ •..... ,i .................................. /if : ) I .

i In re KoStin, 278 Mich App 471, 57-58; '748 N.W.2d 583, 591 (2008) •. : ................................... 13

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Page(s)

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,Koontz v.' Ameritech Servs., 466 Mich 304 (2002) .................... 11,13,1'/, ' I

Mayor of !Port Huron v. City TI:easurer of Port Huron, 328 Mich ;99, 111-112; 43 N.W.2d 77 (1950) ........................ /'I

• People v) Arnold,. 2017 Mich Lkxis 677 (2017) .......................... vi, vii, 1,'1,15, 17.20 . . i· '\ .

People v .' Breidenbach, 489 Mich 1 (2011) ........................ 0 ., . . . . . . . ' . i

People v. Buehler, .474 Mich 1981; 711 N.W.2d 335 (2006) .............. '!,

'People v.i Buehler (Buehler u), 271 Mich App 653, 658-659; ; 723 N.W.~d 578 (2006) ..... ;,; ..................................... .3,'4,6,15,16

People v.; Butler, 2002 Mich Ai>P LEXIS 1182 (2002Upublisheci) .......... <f

People v.i Bywater, 2015 Mich App LEXIS 1081 (2015 Unpublished) ............ {,, 15 : . I

People v.; Campbell, Mich App ; 2016 Mich App LEXIS 1359 (2016) ... vii,/,6,16,17 ' - i-

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Mi.chigan :ease Law (Qmt.) Page(s)

People v.! Davis 468 Mich 77, 79; • 658 N. w. ~d 800 boo3) ••..•••..•..••..•••.••••••..••.•••••••..•••.• ,.,

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· People v .; English, 2014 Mich App LEXIS 1759 (2014 Unpublished) ........ 6, 15

~lev.; Esper, 155 Mich App 278; 3~9 N.W.2d 497 (1986); , . 1 rev d .on .other grounds, 429 ~ch 859 (1987) .. , . :: .. : ............ ~ .. ~ ... t · ,'

1 People v .1 Ferrier, 2015 Mich ~ 'u:xrs 949 ( 2015) ••• : .......... ~ f . 7,

I People v.; Ganez, 295 Mich App' 411, 414; 820 N.W.2d 217 (2012) ... i ...... //, ! r • ' •

People v ·! Gubachy, 272 Mich App 706, . 712; 7;;J._t N. W . .;~,.;( 8'11 ( ;;zoo6) • ~ • ~ ••• 5

People v ·i Helzer, 404 Mich 41(>; 273 N .w .2d. 44 (1975) •••..•••..• '$

1

People v.) Honeycutt; 163 Mic.hj App 757 (1987) •••••..••..•..••..•. f. II : People v ·[ Kelly, 186 Mich Appj524 ( 1990) .. : .· .• • • ....... ; ....... ; 19, 14 ••

:People v.) Lockridge, 498 Michl 358; 870 N.W.2d 502 (~015), ....... -f'o VII, l,t.,/5,/l,

: People v .! Maier, 2013 Mich ApP LEXIS 463 ( 2013 Unpublished) · ••• o . ~ •••• 6, 15 I j i _ ) . _ ~ ·

1 People v.! Maigosian, 2013 Mich App LEXIS 2047 (2013 Unpublished) lo .• o •••• o. 116, 'f, 15

! People v .J Murphy, 203 Mich Ap~ 738 (1994) •• o ..................... lo ... IJ, 'f, I . . ' . . . . , People v.! Pasha, 466. Mic~ .378!, .382; 645 N.W.2d 275 (2002) ... o ... i. H, II/

People v.l Payne, 304 Mich Appj667 (2014) .............. :,. ... · .. li.' . People v.: Redden; 2004 Mich APP LEXIS 2414 (2004 Unpubhshed), ., •••.•.••.. 'f

i PeOple v J Russell, 2004 Mich ~P LEXIS 13G6 (2004 Unpub~ished) •..•...•.. '1, · : ' ! . .

People v .' Shotinaker, 2014 Mieh APP LEXIS 1148 ( 2014) : ....... • ...... 7 ! 1 ' ' . '

Michigan Qmstitution I

art 1, § ;2 ....... : .. .......... :·.·.· ...... · .. ·.· ........................ · ....... /3

art 1, § i16 ....... o.o••···· .. 'o: ... · .. ,.· .. : .. :.:· ............. : ................ /7.

Mi.chigan :Compiled Laws '· ' . ' . 324.5532(6) .......... 0 •••••• 0 •••••••••••••• 0 ••••••• 0 0 ••••••••• • · ••• 20

7.50.10a .: .................... · ......... -....................... · ... · .. I 'I : ' ' . ' . . .

750.112 -~· ................ ·····. ··.··· .... -.· ... ·.·· ................................. 12

· 750.227b i ••••••••••••••••.••• · •••.•••••.••• .' ••.••••..••••••••••..•. II • ' - . •i'' •.

. 750. 227bC1) • 0 •••..• 0 •• 0 0 0 ••. · •.• 0 . 0 . 0 0 .• 0 •.; 0 •.. 0 0 . ~ 0 : 0 .•.. 0 • 0 0 •• 0 II ! • ! .

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i 750.335a ! • •• .'. · ••••••.••••• .-~.· ••. ~. ~--~ /. • ~ ."-~ • •.• :.: ~ .".".-:. :. ~ •· •• ·; ••• ~ ••••• ~,:S.,·7

750.335a~2)(c)' .... · .•• .' ..•. : .~ .• ~ .. .' .•..• · ... ; • .' .• · •. 0 ;;. o ; ....... .... lliiJI,2.,3,lf,S,6,7,'1;10, ( )' . . : · · · . · · • · · · · · . II, 13, 1'1, IS, lb, 17, 1'1,2.0

750.48 8 i •••. • ••••••••• •.• ••• ~:· ·.~ ................. ~ •••••••••••••••. _ ••• 12

750o520b~2)11b) ooooooo•·· .. :oo 1 .. ~ .. 0oooOO .......... ooooo ... oll 767 .61a .:. o o ........... ~ ·. ·•· .. o -~··: .. ·., .. o. o ·. · ...•.•. · •..... o · ....• · ...... o .. 3, 6, 7, /'I

769.31 et seq ...... o· ........ : ..... ; ........ o ... · ........... , ... · ........ z.,

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i ' · Mi.c:higan :Canpiled laws (C'Dnt.)

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' ' ' 769.34(2) ..... '! •••••• 0 •• ~ •••••••••••• 0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 'I 5 , I . . ' I

769.34(2):(a) ................. ~ ........... -... • • .. :. .... ~ .. ~ ~ .. ~ ... ~ ~ ~ ....... /21 jJ

769.34(3) .......... · ... ~ .....•... · ....... ~-.. ~ ..... ~ .... -....... -.· ... ~ .. 2~ I f · u

777.16q ............................... .' ........... · ..... ~ ........ VIIJ2.,~3~1/i15,/'f i . . . .

PUblic ACts 1 i'

l . . ._ . . . . . . . ; . 1998 PA 317 · ........ ~ ......... : ... _ ....................... ~ ......... ,\2,

' . ' 2005 PA 300 · ...... -........ .- .. ; ......... • ...... -.................... ~ .. 'I, 5, /,J

Other' Aulm.ties . . . ~ . . . . . f I · ,f ' , ' . , . i ' f 3A Michiian Dige~t CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 225 ·····················~········ '' I I ' ' I . I I i i i ' I

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' This brief prepared in 'amicus curiae is in acCordance with this Honorable

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Coutt's· ~ril 5,· 2017 Order; in People v. Arnold, 2017 Mlch tEXIS 677 (2017).

\.Jhere ~ Court ruis. offered Persons or groups interested in the determination of . ! !

i the issu$s presentei:l · in the \case . to . niove the Honorable Court f~r permission to . . . . : : I

I, l ( . · . ~ ·file .a brief in .amicus ~· Therefore, this ·amicus cuqae humbly and

·respectf~ly ~ames ~o this H~orable Court with this herein briefl this Hon9~able ; ·~ . .1.. ' ' • • ' ~ . . . "I

Oourt is v~~ted jurisdiction.\ · . I l : ' . ' I . ' .

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llmRAliLE CXXJRI'S QUES'I'IOOS TO ADDRESS . .

1his' Honorable eourt pursuant with People v. Arnold, 2017 Mich LEX1S 677 ' ' i . . 'j

, (2017) res requested the follpwing questions be addressed:

(1) Whether MCL 750.335a(2)(c) · requires the mandatory i,mposition of ":l.mpr~sonment for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which is 1: day and the maximun of which is lif~" for a person who coomits the offense of indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person, or whether the sentencing court may impose a sentence with the applicable guidelines range. See MCl. 777 .16q; I : I . . ;

j (2) whether the :answer to this question is affected~ by this Court's decision in ~lev. Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870.N.W.2d 5p2 (2015),, which r~dered the sentencing guidelines acpisory; and ' · I · . · ' . i . l . } ! (3) vihether PeoPle V. · Cmnphe)] Mich App • 2016 Mich

App LEX1S 1359 (2016)(Docket No. 324708), was correctly decided.

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ARGUMENI'

'lliE ONLY SENTENcE A DEFENDANT CONVICI'ED OF INDECENI' EXPOSURE BY A SEXUALLY DELINQUENT PERSON CAN RECEIVE IS 'lliE ta;ISLATIVEI..Y ENACI'ED MANDATED TERM OF 1 DAY TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH MCL 750.335A(2)(C). .

! i ' ' ! 1 INIRODUCl'ION ! I . ; t

1 The :matter presently before this Honorable Court is People!v. Arnold, 2017 ; [ : \ i [Mich. LEXIS 6n (decided Aprtl 5, 2017), where therein this Hon6rable Court has , I j i I I ' l i asked oflthe parties invol~ and those persons or interested gtoups via andcus

! ~ 1 curiae tq address: . j I

I . ! i i (1~ Whet~r . M<f. 750.335a(2)(1c) requires the mimdatory i,inposiuon of l.lllpnsorunent for an indeterminate term, the(·minimum df- which is: 1 day ~ the maximum of which is life for a person·· Jho comnits the offense of indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person, ot whether the sentencing court may impose a ~entence within the applicable guidelines range, see MCL ?77.16q; ~2) whether the ans-Wer to this question is affected ;by this dOllrt •·s decision in 'P!;!ople v. Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 N.W.2d ~2 (2015), which rElndered the sentencing guidelines advisory; and (3) whether People v. Campbell, Mich App 2016 Mich ~ LEXIS 1359 (2016)11Docket No. 3247mf), was correct!~ decided.

Thi~ writer, Cltristian !Phillip Margosian (hereinafter ''Writer"), sul::mits ' 1

this bri~f as an amicus cudae. This Writer is interested and vested in the i

outcome pf this appeal in ~ very significant way~ For this Writer, just as

· defendani, Lonnie James Arrlold, presently before this Honorable Court, was !

sentenced as well by judicial discretion for the crime of indicent exposure by a ' ' ' ' I

sexually;delinquent person in~tead of the Legislatively enacted mandated sentence l ·,

of 1 day' to life, MCL 750.335a(2)(C). Please see People v. Margosian, 2013 Mich I l I

App LEXIS 2047 (Unpublished Opinion)(sentenced to 15 to 30 years' imprisonment !

for indedent exposure by a sexually delinquent person).

It is ·the intentions of this Writer to be a friend of the Court, to be l I

objectiV£i in the analysis, but to demonstrate through facts and law, how those

convicte4 of indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person must be sentenced i i

pursuant ;to MCL 750.335a(2)(C), i.e., 1 day to life. Furthermore, the analysis ! ' ! !

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' ' this Writer provides this Honorable Court entails facts and law that previous ' ' I '

: parties arguing this issue hafe neglected to deliberate upon. Such neglect is not ! ' .

; due tO :the faCtS and law i being inapplicable Or mundane f~r thiS iSSUe IS t ~ j . .

'conclusiqn, but rather becausi2 previous parties lack the breadth understanding of

I the sexuflly delinqyent persfn sentencing scheme and its idiocyfratic role and

! position (in our ju~isprudence. This Writer subnits to this Honotable Court that 1~ . : ) I i i this brief will serve as an , auspicious tool in this Honorable Court 1 s ultimate I I l t I , .\ : ; ruling. ' j ·

i i ANALYSIS i l. !

I I· stat1:1tory 1 In tugust of l998, 199S PA 317 was signed into law prm.ifding

I ' I i l sentenci~ guidelines, MCL 169.31 et seq., for virtually all jfelony offenses ~ ' i . l 0 .

i·camtitt1 on .oi: after January\1, 1999. Indecent exposure'by a se+lly delinquent

! person, ~· 750.335a(2)(a), tas included in the statutory. sente~cing guidelines ' I. ' i ! ' ' as a crinle .against a "person"} and a "Class A" offense. MCL 777.16q.

A r!~evant portion of hre guidelines read that, absent a departure for a ! !

substantijal and canpelling rfason, MCL 769.34(3}, the mininrum sentence· a court

; shall imPose o~. or after January 1, 1999, "shall be within the appropriate

' sentence irange." The convent~onal avenue (irrespective of the Lockridge deeision ' ' ' · which rerJdered the sentencing; guidelines advisory) that the sentencing. judge look

; . i i ' to find :that, "appropriate sentence range," is to rely on tallying up offense ' ! !

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variables ("OVs") and prior ~ecord variable ( 1'PRVs") to determine the "mininrum" :

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·and "maximuffi" sentence to impose. Here lies the concundrum. For, irrespective of ' ' ~ . )

determin~ a sentence thro~ the scoring of OVs and PRVs, the Legislature has

; enacted ~ mandatory minimum sentence for those convicted of indecent exposure by ' ' l ' ~

a sexuaJ.!ly delinquent . person. That sentence is expressly mandated in MCL ! .

· 750.335a(2)(c), which states' that, "... if the person was at the time of the t ;

' violation a sexually delihquent person, the violation is punishable by I !

·, · imprisClil!J!E!Ilt for an indeterminate term, the minimun of which is l day and the

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'maximum cif whiCh is life." Arid subsequently, MCL 767 .61a also states in relevant ' )· '

part that, "the (sentence i~ a) minimum of which is '1 day and the maximum of

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i which is Jife ••• " ;

The~efore, it begs to tnqu:lre therefrom that if the Legislature enacted a • ' 1 . l ·_ ! .

i specific: sentence ifor those cOnvicted cif indecent exposure i by a sexually I ; : t i

I delinquerlt person t6 be a seil~ence of 1 day to life, MCL 750.335a(2)(c), then why .I ! . : i

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: has this I conflict ~xis ted ~tween the sentencing guidelines, M9- m .16q., and ' . ' l . ' I the mand,tory minimum sentenCf of 1 day to life specifically mandtted by statute?

i See MCL ~50.33Sa(~){lc); MCL *7.61a. : . I .

\ IN ORDER TO ~EQUATELY ANS\~ TIUS HONORABLE /COURT'S QUESTIONS, THIS WRITE;R I" .AS INCORPORATED THE FOllOWING ADpiTIONAL <)RITERIA OFiQUESTIONS) AND REASONED AN~S THERETO THAT SERVES AS A MOST COMPElLING, UEGALLY SOUND ANALYSIS THAT PROVES THAT THE dNLY SENTENCE FOR OOSE CONVICI'ED OF INDECENT EXPOSuRE BY A . SEXuALLY .• DELINQUENT EjERSON IS 1 DAY TO LIFE, MCL 750.335A(2)(C). ~ FIRST 'QUESTION IS WHETHER THE CONFLICTING LAWS ARE I~EED IN P;ARI MATERIA, .AND \IF CONSTRUED TO BE SO, WAS. THAT THE UEGISLATURES INTENTION WHEN IT PLACED INDECENT EXPOSuRE BY A SExuALLY DELINQUENT PERSON IN THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES • WHEN IT ENACTED THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN 1999 - OR COOLD 'iHERE BE .-iNOTHER. REASONABLE, ~ORE LOGICAL EXPLANATION TO. THIS CONFLICT? ~ECONDLY, WHAT' IS 'ftiE "PROPER" ROLE OF THE SENTENCING JUDGE; WHERE DOES A JUDGE TURN FOR INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDANCE WHEN IMPOSING

. A SENTENCE? tHIRDLY,; COULD THERE BE A PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION(g}l WHY THE SENTENCING' JUDGE WOULD NOT I~ANT TO FOLLOW . THE tiEGISLATURE' S MANDATORY INSTRUCTION. OF MCL 750.335AQ2)(C)?. wAS THE DECISION IN PEDPLE V •. IIUElU.EX (BUFllLER II), 271 MIOI APP 653, 658; 723 N.W.2D 578 (2006) CORRFtn.Y DECIDED? AND, SHOULD THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN SEN'fENCED BY JUDICIAL DISCRETION INSTEAD OF MCL 750.335A(2)QC) . BEEN ) DENIED DUE PROCESS TO THE EXTENT THAT RESENTENCING IS WARRANI'ED? .

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LAW~. IN PARI MATERIA? ~tin for "in the same manner," are the sentencing

guidelin~s, MCL 769.31 et. st¥~., specifically that section that houses indecent ' ; . .

·exposure !bY, a sexually delinduent person, MCL 777.16q, and the specific sentence i. '

for thos~ convicted of indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person (lday to 'r :

, life), M6:. 750.33Sa(2)0c), designed to be read in pari materia? That is, should ! : . .

' ' : the statiltes be construed tcigether, so that any alleged inconsistencies in one . 1 l ·statute niay be resolved by looking at another statute on the same subject? Or, is

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' I ' i ; there an~ther explanation fori this conundrum?

l i Thi~ Honorable Court, i!'l People v. Buehler, 474 Mich 1081; 711 N.W.2d 335

: (2006), remanded the case bkck to the ,Michigan Court of Appeals . (''MalA") to '

. detennim! "whether any tenn bf imprisonment that may be imposed by the circuit I f '

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i legislative sentencing guidelijes or by the·

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! indeterminate sentence )

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prescl:ibed by MCL 750.335a." A panel of! t~ MmA found i

that: I

I . '! ... insofar as MCL 1769.34(2) requires imposition of a sentence cjonsistent With a minP.num guideline range that mll vary With the qircumstances surrolll}ding each particular ~f~ense and Offender, <ji!d MCL 750,.335a exp~essly requires a defim.tl.v~. sentenc~ .of one qay to life, there can be no construction that wholly. avoids ~nfl~Ct-.be~ween the rWO StatuteS, II ~

Buehler fBUehie"r.: II), 271 Mtch App, at 658; 723 N.w;2d., at S78. The panel, I . . . . .

however, ist~t~dtha~: I . . , . ; . "Applying ~hses rules to the. instant case s,o as to rE!concile the statuteS at issue as nearly as possible, We find that even t!hougl:l MCL 750.335a ts inore specific 11ith respect to the tenn of ~ris()nment that may be imposed for a conviction of indecent Ejxposure as a sext,~ally delinquent person, the intent of the Ijegislature is best\ expressed in the more 'recently enacted ~entencing guideline$, which . are therefore controlling when a trial court elects to; impose imprisonment for such a conviction."

Id., at 659.

I ' Alt~ough this Court rev;ersed the M(X)A on other grourids, this Court sided

with the! panel at the M(X)A jthat the sentencing guidelines controlled over the :

• mandatory! i

minimum sentence ~f 1 day to life prescribed in MCL 750.335a(2)(c).

People v.1

Buehler, 477 Mich 1~, 24; 727 N.w.2d 127. ' I

There was, however, a critical oversight to the MmA decision that was ' .

never i

fully deliberated upon. This Oversight was Legislative amendment 2005 PA :JJO; MCL ~ ' I .

· 750.335a~2)1)c), that could h,ave rendered a different or subsidiary ruling for

'·future dfferiders. This amerlrnnent (immediately effective December 21, 2005), ; I

changed ilie impact in the warding of MCL 750.335a(2)Cc) in a very significant ' ' ' !

way. Before the amendment, th~ relevant language of the statute read that the !

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crime:

·~ ..• 'may' be punisheid by imprisonment ..• 1 day and the maxinnnn cif which shall be lif!;!."

. c. i i. ~ i Buehler, !477 Mich, at 21, n.5l (quoting MCL 750.335a). l . i . . 1 ..

1 In ~ts amendment (2005 ~A 300), however, the Legislature took a more direct I f ; !'

I a~roach ;with its ifstructi~s to the sentencing judge. For, insfead of allowing

i the statljte to be. cOnstrued as discretionary with its wording of ':'may be punished · 1 I · · i · !. , ! ... , " the· .. amendment professi!d that the accused sentence "'is~ punishable by 1 i · · : r . , . !. .

! impris(t for a ; indetermtte term, the mininnnn of which i~ 1 day and the

i maximum of which . is life." ~005 PA 300; MCL 750.335a(2)(c)(nu;s amendment was I ': i I I ' : . I

[indeed s'gnificant pecause "tt is well settled that the statuto?' term 'may' is

I permissi.J.e ~d ther~fore indbtive of discretion." People v. Gliliachy, 272 Mich I ) • I l I I . ' ·'

! App 706,; 712; 728 N.W.2d 891 (2006); compared with 'is' ..• otkiously, a more I ; . . ; I

i commandirjg order) ;

'lhe !MCDA stated that ii held .•. "no opinion regarding whether a court is i ; I . :

bound wh$1 sentencing person of indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person ' ' . ; i

after th~ effective date of i005 PA 300 by the Legislative sentencing guidelines , f I . . . or the more specific indetel:minate sentence of 1 day to life again expressly

! . ! ' mandated .:under the version of! MCL 750.335a now in effect." This Court agreed that ' l ' : it was "imnecessary to deterlnine whether the recent amendment of MCL 750.335a, • ' 1

· 2005 PA iJo, has altered this' conclusion for future offenders." Buehler, supra. at I

' ' 24, n.18.' ' '

! H01~ever, the MCOA disinterest and. this Honorable Court's acquiesce to the

! ' ; MXJA decision is not at all dispositive or prove that 2005 PA 300 was irrelevant.

I i · ' i ' . ; For both ithe· MCOA and this Honorable Court knew precisely what the reading of MCL

i . ·,

· 769.34(2~ states, which is t~t the minimun sentence imposed by . a court of this i. . j '

· state "stiall be within the appropriate sentence range under the version of those !

. . ! sentencirig guidelines in effect ON 1HE DATE 1HE CRIME WAS COMMITTED." More

I

; importari#y, the sexually delinquent person statute at the time the Buehler 1

-5-

~ '

., ~

· defendan~ cannitted his crime\ read that "the indicbnent shall charge the offense

:and may also charge that the defendant was, AT TilE TIME SAID OFFENSE WAS

l GC.M-1~, a sexually delinq,uent person." See MCL 767.61a. 2005 PA 300. was an ~ . ' l i :amendment that occurred AITER the Buehler defendant committed his crime and

' •.· . I ; ! :.

j therefore was tmderstandably; not taken into account when the MrpA rendered its ! . ! ' ' 1 ~ 11 decision iand this Court affi~. However, in People v. Campbell, 2016 Mich App

i i . . i f ; LEXIS 13!p9 (Publis~ Opiniop) a different panel at the MroA a~knowledged: that i . ·: · · . ) r

I the Tl def~Ddant's frime took place after ; the ~dment · to. MCL

i 750.335a~2)(c); .and' in light of this Honorable Court's decision in People v. i . t . • ; . . • . i Lockridg~·' supra, held that )'after the decision in Lockridge, q-ial courts·nrust J •,) • • • ' t . . i . i sentence i a defendant convicted of indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent . . I ~ i . ' ' . . [person cdnsistent with the requirements of MCL 750.335a(2)(c)." : l ; ·. . ·. . ) : i Thid analysis by the cBmpbell Court, however, again, does not adequately \ ; ' ..... .

' . assess ~e credence of amendinent 2005 PA .300 pre-Lockridge, supra, because the

j. . j . . : . . :-~<

Court's 4ecision appears to ~ mainly predicated on Lockridge which left a windaw j ; .

fran the! Buehler decision (2006) to now the Campbell decision (2016) whfil:e' a . . . . handful of defendants have Jbeen grossly oversentenced (including Arnold) by

i • ' sentencirig judges who fashioned their sentences by gingerly tallying up OVs and ' .

, PRVs to find that "appropri8te guideline range." Proof of this is astonishing. : :·

See e.g.~ People v. Margosimr, 2013 Mich App LEXIS 2047 (Unpublished Opinion)(15-

. 30 yearsi1 imprisonment); PeoPle v. Maier, 2013 Mich App LEXIS 463 (Unpublished .

[ Opinion)(15 years to life imPrisonment); People v. English, 2014 Mich App LEXIS ' . ! 1759 (llnP,ublished Opinion)(135-270 months' imprisonnent); People v. Bywater, 2015

! Mich App :uns 1081 (Unpublished Opini6n)(281-720 months imprisonment).

! ' Th~e is, however, yet: another problem with this narrative. Despite the

i ' 1 doctrine i of

1 • l stare decisis sane sentencing courts disregarded; the ruling in

:Buehler II, 271 Mich App, at 659, which again annotmced that the sentencing ' ' ' .

guidelin~s control over the s!mtence of 1 day to life again expressly mandated in ' i,, ' ~. 0

' .u•-'' 0 •••''

0

'

0 .....

I ! -6-

' ·I

·.1 . -~ -~

I

i . in K:L 750.335a(2)(c). Please see e.g., tt:Kinney v. Berghuis, 2007 u.s. Dist.

)

· LEXIS 63~89 (sentence · of · 1 ; day to life); · People v. Breidenbach, 489 ·Mich 1 . .

(2011)(s~tence of 1 day to 'life despite 21· prior sexual offenses, 16 of which i i '

were feldnies); People v. F~, 2015 Mich App LEXIS 949 (sentence of 1 day to i : ' . i l ; ~ . i life). Ar)d some defendants e~n benefited from the alternate

~ . .

sen~ence of 5 years ~ i : ; !

i I l 1 probatio~ expressed in K:L 767.61a; See e.g., Harrison v. Forl:est, · 2012 U.S.

~ . i ; : . ! Dist. LEXIS 95820 (sentence of 5 years probation); People v. stw>e\voo.r, 2014:Mich

' i• . I . ~

App LEXIS. 1148 (sentence of 5j years probation). L :

___ Th~e was, h~, no :abuse of discretion by these sentericing courts for

_not givtpg credenc~ to ~er's ruling,. 271 Mich App, at 6~9. Because, by

correctl~ 1 -applyiilg'the.rnandatory term of imprisonment, 1 day to life, K:L i •

· 750.335a~2)1)c), ins~ead of r~lying on judicial discretion to fashion a lengthy ., . ' : .

- ' • j i

ridiculous sentence was well :within their means because, as this'Honorable-Court ~ . - . '

'upheld it\ Detroit v. Robinsor), "[s)tare decisis is a principle -of policy and not

a mechanical formula of adl~rence to the latest decision, however recent and I

I i · question~ble, HllEN SUOI AD~CE INVOLVES CXJU.ISIOO HI'IH A PRIOR OOCfRINE MORE

I ! EMBRACING IN ITS SCOPE, INTRINSICALLY SOUNDER, M'D VERIFIED BY EXPERIENCE." 462

l 1 . Mich 439 j(2000)(quoting Helverlng v. Hallock, 309 u.s. 106, 119; 60 s.ct. 444; 84

\ ' .

· L. Ed. 604 (1940)(upper case, added for snphasis). This Honorable Court further ( : .

stated ~t it ''must also rec~nize that stare decisis is a 'principle of policy'

rather t:lkn I an inexorable '~d I ' and that the Court iS not COnStrained tO I ' I ' .

follow precedent when governing decisions are UN\JORKABLE OR ARE BABLY REASONED." ' .

i ' Detroit, ! Id., veering to Holm v~ United States, 524 u.s. 236, 251; · 118 s.ct.

· 1969; 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998)(~per case added for emphasis). i .

Furthermore, this Honorable Court held in Detroit v. Robinson, supra, that '

·the I .

esserice of the rule of law is to know in advance what the rules of society I i

And: that, when the words of a. statute are clear ·then, "the actor shouid be ' ~

:are.

. able to expect, that is, rely, that they 1vill be carried out by all in society, I I

\

-7-

..

i-. ~

i · includtng the courts. In fact, should a court. confound those legitimate citizen

;

' : expectati:ons by misreading or misconstruing a statute, it is that Court itself

' ' ' i that has !disrupted the reliarjce interest. When that happens, a subsequent court,

~ ! i . . ! rather than holding to the distorted reading because of the doctrine of stare I , . r 1 • i 1

1 decisis, ;should.overrule the earlier court's misconstruction. The' reason for this ! i ; ; '· ! is that the court in distorting the statute was engaged in a form of judicial i i ! ~ ! i ' l ; -·. ~

! usurpation that 'runs colinter to the bedrock principl~ of. American

i Constitujiionalism, i.e., tha~ the lawmaking power is reposed ~ the .peop~e as . I ' ' ! reflect in the work of the ·~egislature, and, absent a constitutional violation, i I : I I

! the com!ts have no legi t~nacy in overruling or nullifying the people's I I ~

i representf.tives. Moreover, n7t only does such a compromising by~. a court of the

i citizen•d ~bility to rely o~ a statute have no constitutional ~arrant, it can i ; ·. ; t .

' . I '

gain no higher pedigree as la,ter courts repeat the error;·" I I ' ! : :******************************* ' 1 : !

Theri, there is another ;windo1v of defendants. Those sentenced prior to the I ' ; . i

· 1999· sen~encing guidelines 1-lho received the correct sentence of- 1 day to lile, ' .

\ t . MCL 7.50.335a(2)(c). See e.g.; People v. Esper, 155 Mich App 278; 399 N.W.2d 497

' . t

(1986), tev'd on other·grounds, 429 Mich 859 (1987)(sentence of •1 day to life); • I

i People vi Helzer, 404 Mich 4l0;· 273 N.W.2d 44 (1978)(sentence of 1 day to life); ' l . :.

People vl Murphy, 203 M:l.ch ;App 738 (1994 )(sentence of 1 day to life). These '

. exampled\ cases illustrate how thses defendants were able to be correctly !

senten~ to 1 day to life i:n accordance with MCL 750.335a without dealing with

' the fiasqo ·of judicial discr~tion. Because, the language of the statute was (and

·still is)- "clear and unambiguous (and because of this) no further construction is ' .

. necessari, or allowed to e~ what the Legislative clearly intended to cover." . i '

; I . People v.: Pasha, 466 ~t:l.ch 378.; 382; 645 N.w.2d 275 (2002).

I ' Furthermore, and perhaps more incredible, is how I .

even AFTER the 1999

' installm~nt of the sentencing' guidelines defendants convicted of indecent \ ~

-8-

,.

; i •i

I

, , . ' exposure i by a sexually delinquent persori were STill. receiving the correct

i : i sentence ,of 1 day to life, MCL 750.335a(2)(c). See e.g. 0 People v. Butler, 2002

' ,

i Mkh App jl.EXIS 1182 (Unpubli~hed Opinion)(sentenced to 1 day to life); People v. 1 ! .r . . I

j Redden, ?004 Mkh App LEXIS, 2414 (Unpublished Opinion)(sentenced to 1 day to

i life); :People· v. Russel~, 2004 Mich App I..EXIS 136G (Unpublished I 1 , !

I Opinion)(lsentenced to 1 day to life). I .. . ' ' 1.. . , 1 r.

[ It ts the aboVe cited c;ases pertaining to ·sexually delinquency heretofore t i.· 1 f ' I that illustrate how only a sinall select group of defendants, Arn,. old; Marg~ian; I I ! ! ! Mrler; BYWater; and: English, ; were sentenced to lengthy years of .i~' imprisorunent by I l· I .

j judges· ftshioning_ their sen~nces on judicial discretion, wher{ all the other

i defendants received the cod-e:.t sentence of 1 day to life, pursua.1t to MCL ! ! •

i 750.335a~2)(c). Thi~ Writer, ias any other person of ordinary 'intelligence would i ~ . . ' ' ~ [ try· to sunise. the reason for ,this, t.'1at perhaps these sentencing ~udges must have . : . . . 1 believed \hat the offense of ;indecent exposure that 'these' defendants allegedly

in 4omparison to the other .defendants who received , committed was heinous , i ,. l

sentence~ of 1 day to life,: MCI.. 750.335a(2)(c). nut tlus t."'eory, however, is

'docimed because the elements to convict for indecent exposure are the same ' ! ,

, criteria : to be proven against for every accused. Secondly, closer examination

: displays ! that t."'ose defendarlts previously before tllls Honorable Court and the '

: MOOA ~Jho's cases were publisl~ed; displayed conduct more reprehensible than some

:of the o~her defendants who :were sentenced by judicial discretion. Such as the·

i defendan~ in Murphy, supra. 'j:here the defendant, standing at a stranger's patio· ' ' 'window, ·masterbated ·while naked. ·or, the Bridenbach, supra, defendant ~mo was ' ! '

; sentenced ·post-Buehler, supra:, who· had 21 prior sexual offenses, 16 of which were

. felonies)· and \vas still seuienced to 1 day to life; MCI.. 750.335a(2)(c). v.llat

'ju.stifie~ the disparity in :.sentencing here? Why was the defendant in Arnold I

sentenceq to a' 25 year minimum? Why was the defendant in Margosian sentenced to a

' 15 year ~inimun? ' l,

-9-

-~ ., .:,;

' ;

' ., ':i

Wi~ the entirety of ~ above cited cases and law layed out, the answer to

, \llhether ·the laws are in pari materia becanes ripe to adjudicate• The answer can ) :

\only be a firm NO, the laws a~e not in pari materia. It was not the Legislature's : I J

: intentio~ ·that any "alleg~" "inconsistencies" in the sexual delinquent I !

! sentencmg schane .. be banged up when the Legislature next brc;mght forth the I ' ! •. ! l sentenc1.ng guidelines decades later. Because, first of all, !fe sentence for ) ' i !

1 those coificted of ·~ecent tposure by a sexually delinquent perfon has be~ for

) decades a tellll of 1: day to life, MCL 750.335a(2)(c), a sentence: the Legislature ! I : I ' • .

I wequivu~tingly p;anulgates i in its statute. Id. And1

secondly·, ·there are no

I inconsis~~ncies in. ;the statu~es governing sexual delinquency. Tne statutes_ have : I . .

i been' ame~ed over ;the years in subtle ways to presumably accomadate modicU:n l I ! I I

1 frustrat~ons in the statutes; But, to even rt!lnotely suggest that the sentencfrlg I I ! guidelines were designed to jnullify or abridge the sentence of 1 day to ·life · ~ I. . ; . ; · mandator~ly stated in MCL 750.335a(2)(c) is wholly erroneous to deduce.

' ' ' \

The i sentencing guidelinbs harbor virtually all felonies in the State of i ! \ I

,Michigan,: it was for classification ptirposes, and that only, why indecent

! exposure (by -a· sexually delin4ue..-at person was to be ClASSIFIED il1 the sentencing

guidelines as a Class "A" offense and a crime against a "person". Classified as a I \ !

class "A\' offense' because the statutory maximum penalty of MCL 750.335a(2)(c)

! carries a "potential" life sentence. But, the accused cannot receive a sentence ' j

! of life )imprisonment for this crime. See People v. Kelly, 186 Mich App 524

! (1990)(wrkre defendant was sentenced to a minimun of life imprisonment for· l

i indeeent ; · exposure by a sexually delinquent person, sentence egregiously I I ' : incorrec~, remanded for resentencing to· 1 day to life). And, because MCL

I I

: 750.335a(2)(c) and its superintendent imposition in sentencing because therein, ' i '

' ' ·,under ~heading bracket of "stat max" Gstatutory maximun penalty) as understood . i '11y veering to MCL 750.335a(2)(c), the sentence • • • is . • • 1 day • . • to •••

I

' ' :"life." So, for classificatior purposes, and nothing lllOre, indecent exposure by a

~

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\ 'J • ;

., !

-;

'

' .,

: sexually ! delinquent person ls housed :under the tab of Kl.. 777 .16q in the

. sentencitig guidelines (presur;.ably for every reference to rudim~tary questions

' , such as ~s the offense a crime ag~inst a person - or public safety?), but the i :

:sentence! to be imposed is i stated in mandatory terms, 1 day to life, MCL ) I

l750.335a(2)(c). ! . ,. i ! i i j I Fur~her evidele of this; can be seen by viewing other statut~s and case law.

.:·~ j ., ·' ·l I

. I

'I ·' -·~ : The follf'idng autl}orities tllustrate how, when crpnes are given

j mandate~: minimum. t:ntences lor specific instructions. • to sentef:ce a def~nt ;J I pursuant rth a timt frame of! the statute, how the sentercing judte lllliSt sen~ence . J I in accorrance wi~: that stitute, or simply . face. remand for ,resentencing. . on .A :appeal. ,ecause, "~e proper !role of the judic1ary is t~ interprft and not ;~te · J i the law, j<b;~m~e) rurts .silty lack authority to venttire beyondl the unainb1u. ous ';

!text. oft statute.'', KOCXJtz l Ameritech Servs•, 466 Mi.f .304.(2<f2). Pl~T.see j Kl. 750.~7b (felony firearm), which provides that: A person whO carries or has

I • ' • 1 in posse,sion a firearm at t:pe time he canmits or attempts to corrmit a felony'

except ti}e violation of MCL ~50. 227 or Kl.. 750. 227a, is guilty of a felony, and

shall ,be ;imprisoned for 2 years. Upon a second conviction under MCL 750.227b(1), i

'the 'perscin shall be imprisoned for 5 years. Upon a third or subsequent conviction

under K"4 750.227b(1), the ~son shall be imprisoned for 10 years. See People v.

' Hooeycutt, 163 Mich App 757 (1987)(holding that a sentence outside the mandatory . I

· felony-firearm statute was erroneous - remanded with instructions to resentece ~ !

defendant consistent with tru; mandatory 2 year sentence of Kl.. 750.227b for the l j

first tirpe offense); see al~o People v. Robertson, 2006 Mich 'App LEXIS 2305

(Unpublished Opinion)(where defendant was erroneously sentenced to 4 years for a I . ' I

· first offense of felony - firearm, the court reduced defendant "s sentence to 2 ; ' ' • I • years cops~stent with the felony - firearm statute, MCL 750.227b); and MCL I

750.520b(2)1Jb)I1Criminal Sexual Conduct - First-Degree)(this senten~ entails a I

' .

mandate~ minimum term 25 y~s' imprisonment where the defendant is 17 years of

-11- I !

· age or older and is less than, 13 years of age). See People v. Payne, 304 Mich App . . .

: 667 (2014)1iwhere defendant was 17 years of age or older and coornitted criminal ' . .

, sexual cc;mduct - first-degre~ against a victim less than 13 years of age, the

. court wa~ required to impose k mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years, the court, I i : i however, i imposed ~ 30 y~r minimum. Judgement vacated an4 remanded for , , . ; r i resenten~ing consistent with MCL 750.520b(2)(b)); see also MCL 75p.48(8)(Inciting I ' : : ; i Fighting !Animal Resulting in Oeath)(where if the judge does not iinpose a sentence ) I ! j · ~ .

i of life,! the sente~~e imposed must be ... "for a term :of years !greater than 15 I I ' I :. 1 years")(~ote: This ~tatute d~s not entail a mandatory minimum, if does, however,

l deliver ~ clear abd unamb~guous instruction to the. sentenc~hg judge which ! . I . I j ' j .

demonstr~tes .the Legislaturejs. superintendent implication over ~ guidelines); I . . '

and MCL 750.112 :(Bu\:.glary wirlh Explosives)liwhere the crime is • .l "punishable by

! imprisoJ~t · in ·· ilie stat~ hrison not less than 15 years nJ more ttmri 30 ! i i . ' • . ' years")(~ote: Again, one C;!m see the Legislature's clear 8nd unambiguous

. ' instruct~ons to the sentencink judge, which again holds superintendent imposition

I : . regarding the available length in sentencing for this specific offense).

! I ' All iof the above examples are "Class A" felonies against a "person" that are

j .

. housed with the Michigan sentencing guidelines. Just as indecent exposure by a

·sexually !person is. And, all; of these crimes, including indecent exposure .by a : J .

i . , sexually ;delinquent person, carry the possibility of a life sentence. However, it

i : ' • is critical to this thesis that it must be acknowledged that as explained at I . ,·

supra, tlje sentencing guidelihes were enacted in 1999 - where for ''most" offenses i

. the sent~ "shall be within: the appropriate guidelines range," where sentencing I •

judges r~ly on calculating :ovs and PRVs to find that "appropriate guideline i I

range." However, MCL 769.34(2)(a) plainly states that: f .. . .

i "If a statute nuiooates a minimum sentence for an individual ~entenced to the jurisdiction of the department of corrections, the court shall impose septence in accordance with the. statute. l;mposing a mandatory' minimum sentence is not a departure under .this section." ' i .

i

-12- )

" ••• i [ S ]hall impose I

i sentence

i in accordance with the statute ..• , "· id. , can

! ONLY be : understood as . • mandatory and NOT discretionary. For •. "shall II is

imandator;J, it is not discretionary, nor permissive,. it is MANDATaRY. See Burton j l . .

• v. Reed <;ity Hosp. Corp., 471: Mich 745, 752; 691 N.W.2d 424. (2005); In re Kostin, t ! 1 I I ! . . ' ;

!278 Mich' App 47, :i7-58; 748 N.W.2d 583, 591· (2008)(holding that "shall" is i : ' l f

i mandatorY>. Furthermore, the' language of MCL 769.34(2)Ca) is un~ssailably clear

to under~ tand, it ~s s tated1 in unambiguous , unequi vacating 1akuage that any

reasonab~e person ot ordinary! intelligence would understand. And kcause of this, ~ ' I I l . ! ' i . '

'\men the Legislature has unambiguously conveyed its intent in' a sta.tute, the I . !

statute ~peaks for itself, ahl judicial construction i\l not perrjiitted." Koontz, I . ; I ' f

; 466 Mich; at .304 (citing HI.J3gett v. Dep't of Natural :Resources', 464. Mich 711,

1717~ · 629[N.W.2d 9~ (2001)) ·l And, it is through theses laws ,t entitle those

l convict~·of indecent exposu~ by a sexually delinquent person to[ be sentenced to ' ! i • ) 'the MANDi\TORY minimum sentence of 1 day, MCI. 750.335a(2)(c).: Even the ·pro-• I ! guideli,s advocate should) acknowledge entitlement by .and through MCL

I I

. 769.34(2)(a). For as citizen~ of the United States, our legal jurisprudence is I i .

:rooted irj our state and federal constitutions. ·And because of this, the art 1, § 1 !

2 of the ;Michigan Constitutiqn anA the Fourteenth Amendment of the United .States ' ;

Constitution, U.S.Canst.Amend.XIV., affords every single American citizen the --- ' . I

equal protection of the lm~s-· it is our due process right. And th~refore, because : !

· the abovb mentioned statutes: and case law (and the vast majority of the other ' ' I

statutes ' and case law not ·mentioned for purposes of reaching a cumulative) I '

; clearly ~emonstrates how t~ Legislature holds superintendent· imposition ·that I ! 1

( I 1 requires :of the sentencing judge to impose a sentence from within the respective

l ,

statute :_ for those convicted of indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent ~ !

person i(e., 1 day to life; MCL 750.335a(2)(c). Why then should a defendant . . i . ' I .

convicted of indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person be sentenced using j :

judicial ~iscretion - When the Legislature has instructed the sentencing judge to : i I .

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' ' '1 , i

:: • ' 1

/

; sentence )the defendant to a n)andatory minimum of 1 day? Is it not true that "the ! I. ,· !

! proper ri>le of the judiciary is to interpret and not write the law, (because) . I .

; courts simply lack authori~y to venture beyond the unambiguous text of a i !

: statute"-i Koontz, . supra. Is it not also true that, rega~ding statutory I 1 1 t ! i construdion that, ! "lli)f t~ language is clear and unambigucn,ls, 'no further ' ' I :. ' ; ! construCtlOn is necessary or allowed to expand what the Legi!slature clearly ! ; ; : . : ! intended I to cover!'" Peop~~ v. Davis, 468 Mich 77, 79; ~58 N.W.2d 800 I : · i . ; j (2003)llqtjoting People v. Pasha, 466 Mich 378, 382; 645 N.W.2d 275[(2002)). I ~ . : i I .

i To f\trengthen this dispo~ition even further. that those convi~.ted of indecent I . ' . l :

exposure !bY a sexua,lly delinquent person must be sentenced to the Legislatively ! . I ;

enacted ~andatory .'minimum 9f 1 day to life, MCL 750.335a(2)(c), the MOJA I I ; l i :deliberated on a similar ma~ter in People v. Kelly, supra, where the defendant ! I . : . : :was remanded for resentencing because he could not receive a ~datory minimum

sentence bf life in prison fo~ indecent exposure by a sexually detinquent person. ~ ' ·' '

: 1lle MCOA ~eld as a matter of ~tatutory construction that: ' ' ' ' I ) ' : "[W here there is an apparent conflict between two statutes,

a: fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that the specific statute control over the general and that the specific statute be viewed as an exception ·to the· general rule.· See Findling v. T.P. ~ati~ Co., 139 Mich App 30, 38; 36~ N.W.2d 376 (1984). This rule of statutory interpretation applies ever. where the general act is enacted subsequent to the specific act since a general act Will not normally be construed as an implicit repeal of a formerly• enacted, more specific act where to do so .iould disturb a 10ng-st8tlding practice or. system of law. See Mayor of Port. Huron v. ~ty of Treasurer of Port Huron, 328 Mich ~. 111-112; 43 N.W.2d 77 (1950), and Attorney General, ex rel Owen v. Joyce, 233 Mi,ch 619; 207 N.w. 863 (1926). [In re Johnson Estate, 152 Mich App 200, 205; 394 N.W.2d 136 (1986). )" i '

'Ihi~ Honorable Court has requested of the parties involved to address three

; question~: (1) whether MCL J50.335a(2)Qc) requires the mandatory imposition of ' ! !

"imprisonment for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which is 1 day and the i \

. i · maximum of which is life" for a person who coonnits the offense of indecent

' j . : .•

• exposure iby a sexually delinquent person, or whether the sentencing court may : :

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., '• .]

' j

1 '

; impose

' ' i ' I

a: sentence i

within the applicable guidelines range, see MCL 777.16q; (2) !

'whether the answer to this 'question is affected by this . ! Court 1 s decision in

: Lockridg~,' which rendered the sentencing· guidelines advisory; and · (3) whether. l ; 1

Campbelli was correctly decid¢d. ' . ' The ~truth of the matter: is that this appeal is before this 'Honorable Court

i I, (

; ! : . ; . \based on' a history. of incredible facts pertaining to the sexually delinquent 't : : i . ' . ' . i person s~tencing scheme, apd respectfully stated, manipulati?O of law .. The I - . I . I . ' I . l prosecutor against ; defendant' Lonnie James Arnold, as the pros-ecutors against I I I I . .

i Mm:gosl.mj, supra; ; Bywater, l supra; Fnglish, supra; and ~. supra,' all

i stategiJlly c:ompelled their l respective sentencing judges to re~y on what they ~ i ~ i , ! I i have be9me accustcined to inj the majority of their cases - judiCial discretion. : l . : 'i '

! This chofce in s~tencing rvior . was believed to be justiyed based ~on a

1 bequeathal of "law from the MOOA. But, that law was. erroneouSlY: decided, i.e., ~ f t • :

: • I I • · · ·People v~' Buehler (Buehler II~, 271 Mich App 653, 658-6~9; 723 N.W.2d 578 (2006), . I · 1 . · . , Which held that the sentenci.rlg guidelines control over the manaatory sentenCe of

i l . . 1 day to 1life, MCL 750.335a(2:)1)e). It is here where this appeal truly stems fran,

~ . )

i ~ I ~ as defendant Arnold was sentenced to a minimum term of 25 years' imprisonment (if . ' . .

; .

he was sentenced to 1 day to life, MCL 750.335a(2)(c), the prosecutor could not ' ; .

:appeal as the sentence would be valid, and in that scenario, would this matter \ ; ' ! :

even exist?). So, now comes before this. Honorable Court defendant Arnold who was l . sentenced to 25 to 70 years' imprisonment for indecent exposure by a sexually

' : . . . I , . delinquent person. This Writer states that this sentence is nothing short of

l I barbaric 'for this offense. And, as ,n,n be further discussed at infra, displays

! \ . . : j •

I ' only a sentence over punishment and is devoid of rehabilitation. Defendant I ! , , • ., ·' j J

. Arnold 1 s 1sentence was fashioned, as was the other selective prosecutiOns against I \ . l '

: Mm:gosiml, supra; Bywater, sUpra.; Fnglish, supra; and Maier, supra, where these ! ; ' • I

· prosecutqrs have pressed their sentencing judges to sentence the above selected ~ . . i '

accused pursuant to judicial discretion - a confounding stance where one case • l i .

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, law, i.e , Buehler (Buehler II), 271 Ml.ch App, at 658-659, a wrongly decided case I :

·(that ha~ never ripened ,:Into a respeeted doctrine, but rather is only .used '

; selectiv~ly for some unbeknownst. reason), to be jurisdictional over the : ! ., ; Legislat'¥'es half a century long, clear and unambiguous instructions of 1 day to j l : ! J ! life, MeL 750.335a(2)(c). This Honorable Court has asked of the parties before it f ! ' ; ' ~ : tci addreys three· questions :. and has offered interested personk or groups an :, ,: I f ~ ! 1 I

; opportun~ty to part~cipate vi~ amicus curiae .. This Writer htmbly ~d respectfully 1 r t 1 :

i appreciates the opportunity that this Honorable Court has provid~ and conc~udes. I ~ ', ! , ; , j I ' : ,.

f tha~ the ~b~ly sente;ce a defrdant convicted of indecent exposuie by a sexually

i dell.nque~t: person can receil is the Legislatively enacted manda~ory sente~e of

1 1 day to! life that: has been! unequivocatingly pranulgated in Met 750.335a(2)t)c)

I l . ! ! ' : for half

1a · century. ; '

i , Furt~ermore, tlus Honcr~ble Court has asked of this. Writ~r if .the above I ! ,

'dispositron ·was. reasoned from this Honorable Court's ruling in Lockridge, supra. ' ! \ ' ' : This Wri~er answers that t'\ds Honorable Court's ruling in Lockridge has no ' I l ' ·bearing 6n this disposition. 'For as explained herein throughout, the sentencing

· guidelines were riever enacted to be in pari materia to the language of MCL ; :

, 750.335a<2)tlc). Moreover, th~ application of Lockridge 1vould apply to sentences

fashioned by judicial discretion, not \\rere the statute calls for a mandatory !

' minimum. ! And lastly, this Honorable Court has asked of this .Writer whether

~Campbell,: supra, was co1:reci:ly decided. This Hriter respectfully answers the

:question :by stating that the decision in Campbell 1vas a solution to a problem I

· that should never have existed, because again, (Buehler II), 271. Mich App, at ;

: 658-659, :was wTongly decided, Additionally, the decision in Campbell appears to l j

do nothi.Og for the small select' group of defendants who were sentenced by i :

: judicial 'discretion who fall ' :In between the window of (Buehler II) and viho have : i

.misse~ ~bell and Lockridge because their direct appeals ended before making !

. these ca~es retroactive for $em. See People v. Gomez, 295 Mich App 411, 414; 820 i

-16-

! i

'N.W.2d 21)7 (2012)(where crlmi.tml cases becane final once the direct appeal period 1 i : .

! has expi~ed). 'Which means tha~ this select group of defendants have an Eighth ' I

Amendment claim, u.s.Const.AmEmd.VIII. See also Mich Canst 1963, art 1, § 16 ! l-' . . i . . . . I <

i (that their sentences are.cruel and tmusual in light .of every other defendant loho I .' I ( ' .

! : i I :. ! received ;a sentence ;of 1 day ~o life pursuant to m. 750.335a(2)(e). \lith this l . . . i : \" . . ' f.

I stated, lt is the firm stan~; of this Writer that this Honorbale rurt should

I abridge ct abrogate;the decis~on in Campbel11vith·its ruling herelof Arnold.by

i promu~a~irig 'that (Buehl~ II~ was incorrectly decided and that those previously l . ·· I ' i .

[ sentenced. by judici~l discretion can now move the sentencing couri: for i I i · :· I . j . ; j t

i i:esent~cing pursuant lvith th~ correct sentence of 1 day to life,; MCL I 1. . l ' ' i 750.335a~2)(e). In light of this Honorable Court's ruling in Oetl:Oit v. Robinson, 1 . l . . : . J . ; ,;

I I i i I : j supra, ~ Court shciuld feel ~otivated to make such a ruling. (Holding in Detroit I j . ·, : ' . 1 v. RobinSon, that, ~-hen the woi:ds of a ststute are clear, "the actor shold be able I ; , . . i i ! I ' to expect, that is, rely, that they lvill be carried out by all in society,

i ·. . l including the courts. In facti, should a court confctmd those legitimate citizen

· expectat~ons by misreading or! misconstruing a statute, it is that court itself i !

that has ;disrupted the reli~e interest. When that happens, ·a subsequent court,

· rather trian holding to the dti;torted reading because of the doctrine of stare . ; i . decisis, 'should overrule the earlier court's misconstru.ction. The reason for this . i i is that t;he court in distorting the statute was engaged in a form of judicial

: i ; usurpation that rtms eotmter to the bedrock principle of American

' \ . i .

constitutionalism, i.e., that: the lawmaking power is reposed in the people as ' ' :

! reflected in the work of the Legislature, and, absent a constitutional violation,

I ;

the courts have no legitimacy; in overruling or nullifying the people's ~ !

'represent'a.tives. Moreoever, not only does such a compromising by a court of the ' . l i

·citizen's ability to rely on !l statute have no constitutional warrant, it can ! I .

: gain no l)igher pedigree as later courts repeat the error).

1'llR'l:siHm' AND REHABTI.ITATICM

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j i

.

. It sho~ld be understood in our American justice system what role our prisons ! 1

!·play' in ~ur jurisprudence. ~t role is not solely based ori punishment alone. I '

i Rather, .t.\ere. ar~ two separat~ ~spects of the American prison system.· Obviously, ' '

) first is fto isolate ,offenckirs; fran society, to·~eli.nquish them Of· the comforts· i. . . ; . . . '· \the law ~biding cittzen enjoy!; this in essence is the punishnent rase, a staple

!of·any ptison world~de. But,;where our American prison system differs from a · ' ' I . I great deJ:i of 'other !rdson sy~tems arourid the world is, .our prisoners are given : I· · . , I 1

i the "oppc(rtunity" ~9 reruibilffate themselws~ This indeed is the second half of t . !

American :Prisons . · '

ThiJ Writer safe! "opporthnity" because there are in fact i:ec6r,,T.endations I ' I ; .

. I I •. .; 1 i -·

that the parole pla6es on off~nders before parole may be eligible: Specifically,-! : j '

for Micr11lgari prisoners, thesej recorrmendations vary based on the pfisoner' s . I . ! , . ! . , crime(s) -~·The sa reC.orm;endations are given· to each prisoner sho:::tly after entering I ~. ! . . ' ' ! "quarantilie"' the old \valled r· rison in Jackson' !1ichigan, to which every prisoner

I ' I . .

·sentenced, to the Nichigan DePfOCtment of Corrections filters through before being f ! '

: sent off ;and placed at their tespe-~tive prison. Each prisoner at quat:antine meets ' ! '

with a counselor to review that prisoner's strengths .3nd weaknesses and prgram i

recorrrnendations. In regards to those convicted of sexually based crimes, the

·specific 'parole rec.omnendation to complete is the Sex Offender Program (SOP)

. before ()l\role can be eligible." SOP is a lengthy course taught by a professional

· coimselo~, usually one with a Ph.D. The course is comprised over several months . . '

and is designed specifically to rehabilitate sex offende:::s mentally and ; )

; psychologically. This program. is irideed a prerequisite and a must for thotle '

convicted of sexually based c~i.'lles before oarole is attainable. As if this . . l ~

' • Honorable Court wishes to exa!nine the· records of the parole board regarding

! i 'parole granted to sex offenders, it will conclude that over 95% of all sex ' I '

offender~ who have not canple~ed sop· prior to thier mini'llum sentences received '

. extensio~s to their sentEmtes, by the parole board for failing to complete the !

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. ; . ·;

'

i ·program. iTraversely, however; once the program is completed, the prisoner will

'become erigible for release •. , r ; ; ' ' ' \ I

This clearly illustrates; how important 't.h.e completion of SOP plays for those ' ' ' .

' specifi~lly convicted of ~decent exposure by a sexually delinquent person. 1 f : l

1 Because ~nee that ryrson is ~entencec. to the mandatory term of urprisomnent of 1

I day to iife, HCL 750.33Sa(2)(c), a parole hearing 11ill indeed be schwuled ! : ! I '·

J :imnediatcly. But that defer1ant '-Uuld obviously not have co~leted SOP.; And I ! ' ., , ' i 1 therefore, 3 denial or parole is practically inevitable until the p~isonar ' I ! ) . ;· I ~ · •. : r j completes; SOP. This: demonstrftes hov1 those convicted ~f indecen;t exposure >Y a l ; ; l i sexually fdelinquent.:person h"\ve a decision to t!'.ake. Do they want; to rehabilitate 1 i 1 1 ~- I

! themselves by partiCipating in SOP or do they want to s~y in prison? j I ~ ! I

i So, ;it then ~gs to ask, is there any rehabilitation in just sentencing a' l . l l t

i defendancl to a minimum term1\ of 20-25-30. years' imprisprunent foh an often; time

! . i I . ·I t .. .

s.'Lort liVed, careless, idioti~, persumably in most cases. an instantly regrettable I ! . '

·mistake ~uch as exposing one~elf · - or is this purely designed as punisl:unent ... . l l 1 I

as overkill? Can a 25 year:' minimtr.l. sentence honestly be considered a fair-! I

tipping· of the scales? It obviously is not ar1d the Legislature forelmew that. ~ j

' 1hat is why the sentence is to be a sentence ~!here "t..'-l.e mini'llll1l of "hlc.'1 is "1 day

and the njaxtnoo of \·.'hich is l~fe." MCL 750.335a(2)(c); MCL 76V.61a.

For t..'-\e lm,-makers kn~, as does any reasonable person of ordinary j

• intelligE:nce, that the bread~h of society does not have a proclivity to expose

oneself which truly makes indecent exposure by ·a sexually delinquent person i ' idiosynct;atic. Because in· order to be charged •.vith the enllancement of ·sexually !

: delinquent person the acts of the accused must have . become "repetitive or I : I .

·compulsiVe", see MCL !

750.10a; see also 3A Mi.c.higan Digest Constitutional law § ) )

225. And: importantly to reiterate, indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent !

: person '"l:ls established ·as a' crime against a person in· the Michlgan sent~cing ;

·guidelines, MCL 777 .16q, not a crime against public ordinance or safety, which ' i i i -19-1

t~. . i

:~ ; i ·; " ' '

!

: ~ ., ., ;

' ' i

can be d¢duced to mean that the offense is not a threat to the connrunity in the ; . l . l ' . . traditiorial way of thinking one would be with a high profile crime such as armed ~ : . - ' • ! • ' . I ! !

:robbery, !rape, or murder. Arid, in Graham v. Florida, 560 u.s. 48 (2010), the ; i . . United States Supreme· Court ejtPounded a profound, logical narratiye regarding the

I _ · -.. ; lroral obligation in sentencing violent crimes, serious violent crimes and. ! ! . ; !.

\nonviolent crimes 8nd concl~ that sentences of imprisonment\ for nonviolent I ' ' r i crimes tt\at are par:Sllel to sentences for serious violent crimes are unduly. In I f . ; ~ I I • • ' - ~

!9ther wo~s, ~t would be barparic indeed if defendant Arnold, a ;sentence of 25-i ! ' ' i ' i 70 years 1 imprisonmlmt (as ~ll as the other victims of judicia~ discretion) is ' l . . J ~ .. :

i not vacated and rananded for resentencing consistent with MCL 750•335a(2)(c). I , • ' I

i ~ . ! CXJNCLUDING TIIOUGHI' ,

i ' I . . i Incredible in 'its capacity . . . take the crime of knowingly releasing air I ' ' \ I , . I pollutant's intentionally caus~ death or serious bodily. injury, m_ 324.5531(6). I j ~ [-1 • . ' j

'lhis offense is high profile land in sane cases could arguably be- construed as an l ' -· I i _ ,

act of terrorism. It is a vio!l.ation of the public safety. All with all respects a I I ·

I j . ; heinous .,crime. But the MAXIMUM penalty for this crime is ONLY 15 years

' ' )

- imprisonnlent. Which means tha~ if the defendant in_ Arnold, and the other selected i . ' ' ' . .

·defendants of judicial discretion are not afforded resentencing consistent with

the laws 1 herein and more importantly, MCL 750.335a(2)(c), then they would have

received! more ·time imprisonment for an indecent eXpoSure, then someone who

' premeditates an attack on the community by placing deadly toxins in the air. And I •

what a horrible way of interpreting the clear and unambiguous statute of MCL \

: 7S0.335a(2)(c) that would be. •

:Respectfully submitted, '

' ' - '

l

r -tt - .;zo1c Dated:

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; ' i ;