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Journal of Global Analysis Vol.6 | No.2 | July 2016

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107 IMS-Growth Triangle, SADC and APEC: A Brief Analysis of Regional Integration and Transborder Relations from Critical Geopolitical Perspectives By Dr. Iqbal Shailo Debating State Capacity and Intrastate Wars in South Asia By Azhar Ali A Review of Public and Private Investment in South Africa By Garikai Makuyana & Prof. Nicholas M. Odhiambo The Role of Contesting Ideologies: Civil-Military Relations in Turkey By Assist. Prof. Dr. Rahman Dag

Freedom of Speech, Controversies and Muslims: A Review Essay By Prof. Mohammad Haron

Domestic Norms and Foreign Policy: A Research Note By Assist. Prof. Dr. Husrev Tabak

Karine Tournier-Sol & Chris Gifford (Eds) The UK Challenge to Europeanization: The Persistence of British Euroscepticism By Assist. Prof. Dr. Seven Erdogan Andy Green and Jan German Janmaat Regimes of Social Cohesion: societies and the crisis of globalization By Dr. Rizal G. Buendia Dale C. Copeland Economic Interdependence and War By Hakan Mehmetcik Diego Gambetta & Steffen Herzog Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education By Prof. William Shepard Ellen Anne McLarney Soft Force, Women in Egypt’s Islamic Awakening By Dr. Katherine Ranharter Finn Mackay Radical Feminist: Feminist Activism in Movement By Assoc. Prof. Dr. Meltem İnce Yenilmez Hamed El-Said New Approaches to Countering Terrorism: Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programs By Dr. Huseyin Cicek

Book Reviews

Journal of Global Analysis Vol.6 | No.2 | July 2016

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Review Essay

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IMS-Growth Triangle, SADC and APEC: A Brief Analysis of Regional Integration and Transborder Relations from Critical Geopolitical Perspectives

By Dr. Iqbal Shailo*

Journal of Global Analysis

Vol. 6 | No. 2

July 2016

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Abstract

This study briefly discusses three case studies of regional integration, namely the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT), the South African Development Community (SADC) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), to critically examine contemporary integration project as a phenomenon in which sovereignty, identity and boundary/territory are constructed and confirmed. Poststructuralist approaches reconsider regional communities as pre-given institutes, practices and actors, and inspire to focus on how these categories are constructed and implemented. I am concerned with two important questions: what are the central theoretical dilemmas concerning the concept of regional integration; and how can critical geopolitics employ the integration project and constructive discourses to form a broader view of regional integration?

Keywords: Regional Integration, Power Relation, Globalization, Identity, Critical Geopolitics, Transborder, Discourse Analysis

* Dr. Iqbal Shailo is a researcher, policy analyst and social media strategist based in Ottawa, Canada. Dr. Shailo received a Ph.D. in Critical Geopolitics (Political Geography) and an MA in Public Policy and Public Administration from Carleton University, Ottawa and Concordia University, Montreal respectively. He also obtained a Post-Graduate Diploma in Journalism from Concordia University and earned his second MA in English Literature. His research interests are broadly in transnational security, regional integration, radicalization, countering violent extremism, environmental management, grassroots empowerment and public policy development. He has practical experience working with national and international NGOs addressing issues relating to the disadvantaged societies in North America and countries of the South Asian region. He has presented papers at various academic and policy forums and has numerous publications to his credit. He can be reached at iqbalshailo@gmail.com.

Introduction: Focus of Study

The article explores the implications of postmodern thought and criticism for the study of regional integration. Regional integration has become a part of the postmodern geopolitical discourse and narratives, emphasizing how meanings and power are produced and activated through language, perception and ritual (performance). It briefly examines three case studies of regionalism,1 namely the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT), the South African Development Community (SADC) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), to build an argument to explain contemporary regionalism as a phenomenon in which sovereignty, identity and boundary/territory are constructed and confirmed. The study is concerned with two important questions: what are the central theoretical dilemmas concerning the concept of regional integration; and how can critical geopolitics employ the integration project and constructive discourses to form a broader view of regional integration? The paper addresses these concerns regarding regional integration or interstate relationship from three different perspectives: first, in terms of how geopoliticians understand and explain the concept of regionalism within the context of contemporary international relations; second, in terms of how integration scholars might best study regionalism; and third, in terms of the possible ways in which regionalism has contributed, or might contribute to, critical geopolitics and international order more broadly.

This paper is organized into six sections. The first section presents a short literature review of the discourse analysis and power-knowledge nexus in order to better understand regional integration approaches within the framework of critical geopolitics. The second section demonstrates the significance of the analytical aspects of discourse theory with regard to the discursive constitution of geopolitical identities and imagination. The third section discusses a brief comparative analysis of the case studies within a framework of postmodernism and critical geopolitics. The fourth section is devoted to three different regional case studies, analyzing the trajectory of regional associations in a comparatively recent historical formulation. The fifth and sixth sections lay out a brief genealogical interpretation of regionalism, and provide a comparative study of three regional integration projects. They touch upon some issues pertinent to global and national geopolitics, as well as the power-knowledge nexus, and develop a theoretical approach to regional integration. The concluding section argues for further research on the integration debate.

Critical Geopolitics, Power-Knowledge Nexus and Integration

Geopolitical scholars who are involved with the discourse of critical geopolitics belong to a broad school of post-modern social sciences, pioneered by Gerald Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby.2 Ó Tuathail and Dalby have identified various approaches to critical geopolitics that have influenced our understanding of global structures and societal environments such as: a) popular geopolitics as reflected in different mass media and communication (cinema, novels, cartoons and documentary); b) practical geopolitics, which control foreign policy, political institutions and different layers of bureaucracy and statehood; and c) formal geopolitics,

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which deal with strategic and scholarly institutes, think tanks, academia and intelligentsia. These three approaches of critical geopolitics contribute to the geopolitical map of the world, geopolitical imagination, and representations of ‘we’ and ‘they’.3

Many geopolitical scholars invoke the work of Michel Foucault in support of a poststructuralist conceptualization of discourse, and his analysis represents an important contribution into the dynamic relationships between power, knowledge and discourse. Müller asserts that “theory-building in critical geopolitics has frequently employed Foucauldian ideas” by “taking up his idea of discourse as formative of social practice and of its being intricately tied up with power/knowledge nexus.”4 Foucault offers a conceptual framework for understanding power, claiming that power and knowledge are mutually supportive in that they directly imply one another.5 As Dreyfus and Rainbow state: “Foucault’s account of power is not intended as a theory…Rather Foucault is proposing what he calls an analytic of power, which he opposes to theory.”6 In this context, regional integration may be viewed as a mode of theorizing or site of engagement rather than a definitive narrative or explanatory framework.

Foucauldian power is not defined as one party wielding power over another, but is more like a web or matrix in which we all circulate and exercise our powers. Foucault affirms that “power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised, and that it only exists in action.”7 Thus power is a constantly circulating exhibition and it emphasizes performance (i.e. power is performative). In this sense, in the field of integration, sovereignty represents power, and the sovereign power of a country depends mainly on the performative activities of a state’s head or its representatives, for example, diplomacy, negotiation, treaties and summits. It is also concerned with social practice and institutions which act as symbols and/or representations. Thus, the state, community, culture and economy are expressions of power “whose meaning is itself constructed through nexus.”8 The case study of the SADC illustrates these thoughts concerning sovereignty as “socially constructed practices of political authority.”9

Foucault’s interpretation of power is multidirectional and multidimensional such that it operates “from the top down and also from the bottom up,” and can also be understood as a “web of unequal relationships set by political technologies.”10 In this context, a comprehensive understanding of contemporary borderlands or transborder regionalism requires a combination of top-down and bottom up approaches. The influence of globalization and free-market economy plays a role in regional integration and provides an overarching framework where “local practice, and processes influence how the larger-scale processes affect everyday life.”11 Thus a satisfactory explanation of border dynamics, inter-state relations, transborder regionalism, and growth triangles requires an “analysis of how the recursive interactions between the global, national and local processes produce similarities and differences from one border area to another”12 necessarily affecting land, labour and capital.13 Foucault also employs genealogy to analyze the power relations of the state. According to Foucault, “critical and genealogical descriptions are to alternate, support and compete with each other” where a genealogical approach affirms the idea that “all knowledge is situated in particular time and place and issues from a particular perspective. The subject of knowledge is situated in, and conditioned by, a political and historical context.”14 In this context, identity is crucial to an analysis of integration studies, and the case study of Asian identity in APEC constitutes “neither religious nor cultural essentialism but a politico ideological project that calls for regional solidarity.”15

When analyzing power, Agnew link his ideas to those of Foucault, suggesting the concept of political power or power relations “can serve to account for the emergence of collectivized and high-order systems of authority (e.g. regimes), governance (e.g., international institutions), and nonstate transnationalism (e.g., transnational firms, epistemic communities, and issue-networks) that regulate or provide the rules for the relations between the unit-

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actors in the system of structural power.”16 I suggest Agnew’s two fundamental types of power are closely related with the study of regional integration. They are: a) instrumental, which “involves the capacity to make others do our will’ in relation to access to and control over goods, and b) associational, which ‘involves the power to do things by acting in concert or using institutional mediation.”17 Agnew’s ‘negative’ power, on one hand, has the ability to control, dominate, co-opt, seduce, and resent. On the other hand, his ‘positive’ power reflects the capacity to act, resist, cooperate and assent.18 Thus, the power-knowledge nexus is a key dimension in understanding regional integration.

Three Case Studies of Regional Integration: IMS-Growth Triangle, SADC and APEC

This paper employs two frameworks to study regional integration: case study and comparative analysis. According to Oga, there are some specific functions of case studies: a) some case studies highlight a specific and particularly dramatic observation, such as the case of South Africa’s diplomacy and hegemonic behaviour in the SADC; the ‘accumulation by dispossession’ in IMS-GT; and Asianness or Asian values in APEC; b) some case studies demonstrate or disprove theoretical hypotheses.19 Thus, I have selected these case studies in an attempt to better understand the evolution, growth and functioning of regionalism; and c) some case studies analyze, anticipate or look forward to variation, such as intergovernmental discourse (governance and sovereignty in the SADC), discourse of exclusion and enclosure (in IMS- Growth Triangle) and cultural discourse or orientalism (Asianness in the APEC). These three case studies have different dimensions: political or politico-economic trends (in SADC), socio-economic and political-social (in the IMS-Growth Triangle) and economical-social (in the APEC). Another dimension of my analysis is comparative, which deals with “descriptive interpretations of numerous empirical phenomena [to] show the significant similarities and differences among a group of selected cases.”20

In this section, I explain three different trends of integration—political, economic and cultural— in order to explore the impact of recent methodological debates on our understanding of regional integration in critical geopolitics. These studies are different in nature, focusing on three dimensions of regionalism i.e., the IMS-Growth Triangle as transborder regionalism, the SADC as inter-state regionalism, and APEC as inter-continental regionalism. This paper is mostly concerned with economic regionalism and mercantile clusters of transborder regions.

Now, the question arises: what is the driving force behind regionalism— capitalism or geopolitics, transnational trade or globalization, regional economic consumption or competition? In developing such areas of inquiry, this paper will show that a legacy of colonial practices continues to structure the discourse of integration, while Postcolonialism remains overwhelmingly textual, cultural or historical. Thus, the process of integration constitutes dominant political-economic forms of practice and governance, which are “haunted by national and colonial patterns of enframing.”21

IMS-Growth Triangle: A Brief Sketch

I analyze various dimensions of the IMS-Growth Triangle, which was established in ‘postcolonial speculations on neocolonial enframing’ (a phrase borrowed from Matthew Sparke, 2003), to understand the different issues concerning discourse and the power-knowledge nexus, and interrelationships between land and people to frame geographical imaginations and the performance of governance in the study of regionalism. As a global city Singapore, which Taylor (2004) terms a ‘regional command centre’, fosters deeper economic cooperation with its regional neighbours, incorporating proximate areas of Johor (Malaysia) and the Riau Islands of (Indonesia) for relatively cheap land and labour.22 The Growth Triangle not only consolidates mutual benefits and economic growth but it “rests upon and bolsters a

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number of power asymmetries: between capital and labour, states and subjects and citizens and migrants.”23

In order to study the IMS-GT, it needs to focus our attention to the effects of power-knowledge nexus by which states, institutions, firms and other powerful actors affect our trans-local interconnectivity. But how does knowledge work, who produces it, and who gets to define it? These are questions that concern issues of identity and representation in the context of regional integration. Here, an analysis of “maps is particularly useful to unravel the dynamics of power, both political and economic.” Maps are “also helpful in understanding the non-material ‘interest’ involved in political action to include the issue of meaning or imagination in politics.”24 Significantly, the ancestral homes of the Orang Petalangan and the Orang Suku Laut of Indonesia, along with other indigenous and nomadic communities across the straits of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are mostly affected.25 The cadastral maps of the Indonesian growth triangle initiators (administrators, policy makers and investors) ignore the centuries old traditional community maps (Dutch colonial cartographic knowledge) of local Riau inhabitants. Here, the administrative maps versus the community maps reflect differing spatial conceptualizations of Riau. The politics of mapping reproduces a particular order of knowledge, legitimizing territorial rule and control over resource management and resource access rights.

Following the Dutch colonial cartographic knowledge, the remapping of Riau epitomizes ‘the colonial present’ (borrowed from Derek Gregory, 2004) to design the triangle project to create a controlled environment for resource management, property registration, revenue generation, legal ownership documentation, and foreign investment and taxation. Foucault notes that the connective imperative between power and knowledge is historically constituted and intrinsically spatial.26 Such trends in mapping show a pattern of relations between local knowledge and administrative and capitalistic knowledge, specifically relating to geometries of power, knowledge and discourse. Here, the local maps contrast with the complex intricacies of the investment interests of the state, multinational corporations and agencies.

The discourse of mobility and enclosure in the Growth Triangle reminds us of Timothy Mitchel’s (1988) colonial analysis of Egyptian ‘enframing’ where “the acts of confinement, regulation, and supervision of the population dawned suddenly.”27 The triangle demarcated population from space, land and capital (Figure 1). The discourse of mapping and land use policy has been used by successive colonial and postcolonial regimes as a strategy of power ‘exercised via species control and territory’.28 The discourse of exclusion erected an imaginative border within the multiple internal boundaries within the border zone, where the islanders of Bintan were excluded by the economic boundaries of the triangle, and from the tourist resort of Lagoi for example.29 The cost disparities discourse also affects the population, especially the working class of Indonesia and Malaysia, as the disparity between high costs of living in Singapore, the cheaper costs in Johor and extremely cheap costs in Batam. Sparke et al. mention that one unskilled worker in Singapore can make US$ 350 per month, whereas one unskilled worker can make US$150 and US$90 in Johor and Batam respectively, and in addition, one skilled worker in Singapore can make US$600 US per month while in Johor and Batam US$ 400 and US$200 respectively.30 Such severe exploitation of population and production, control and restriction over territory, land and movement, epitomizes the consequence of global financial flow as hundreds and thousands of indigenous and nomadic people across the straits of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have certainly been dispossessed of their land and waterways though this internal “enframing”. The populations of Bintan and Batam have found their presence and especially their access to resources increasingly marginalized and overwritten by new forms of land-use policy discourse propelled by the Indonesian state and bolstered by forms of globalization, i.e. the giant Growth Triangle.

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SADC: A Brief Analysis

This section examines the discourses of sovereignty, identity, and political or imagined community in the SADC to develop an understanding of its role as an example of a postcolonial interstate African entity, specifically to look at the ways in which the power-knowledge relation is concerned with the discourses of sovereignty, identity and territorial integrity. Established in 1980, the SADC was formed as a loose alliance of nine majority-ruled states in Southern Africa known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). A later transformation occurred in 1992, shifting its role from coordination to community. The name was shortened to SADC (South African Development Community), and South Africa joined the community in 1994.31

The SADC’s transition from development, coordination and conference to development community was an attempt to readjust the trend and nature of performance within the context of ‘changing ‘geopolitical’ and ‘geoeconomic’ power relations’.32 South Africa within the SADC, as Sidaway notes, plays a hegemonic role in the group over the other member states in terms of its constitution and exercise of power and influence.33 Unlike the EU (where borders are open for its member-citizens), South Africa wants to erect electrified fences along the border to prevent illegal immigration from member states, and to stop the continued flow of low-tech and some high-tech weapons across the region.34 In this sense, the organization is trying to construct a politics of modernity from the conjoined enterprises of colonialism and capitalism.

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The discourses of sovereignty in the SADC reflect that the real business of negotiation occurs at summits and conferences behind closed doors, and consultation, negotiation or mediation are key functions of “summitry, something it shares with the wider practice of diplomacy to which it (at least in part) belongs as a social practice.”35 Summits, conferences and negotiation in the SADC construct sovereignty, and demonstrate how power and authority ultimately lead to the creation of global networks.36 The summits or conferences reflect the performance of the head of state, which also symbolizes Foucauldian power and authority. According to Foucault, “power is not simply a relationship between partners, individuals or collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others…”37

The SADC has produced certain political ontologies of state, society and community through discourse. Sovereignty is an issue in the African model of integration, as African countries are more familiar with formal and state-centric notions of regionalism, and this new kind of regionalism or new regionalism (NR), which is manufactured in Europe, confuses the newly independent countries of Africa. The growth of the SADC reflects the realist notion of regional communities, and member states are concerned primarily with the issue of a neo-realist view of sovereignty. In this context, sovereignty is regarded as a foundational concept for their survival and it can become an obstacle to regional integration, as the process of integration, as Sidaway notes, “requires that sovereignty be given up or pooled.”38 Here, Roxanne Lynn Doty’s words are worth mentioning: “the crisis in Africa is thus also a crisis of representation, of how to represent the fundamental means of sovereignty.”39

The Foucauldian discourse of resistance from the bottom-up is apparent in the SADC. An interesting case is Zambia, which opposed resistance to regionalism at the very beginning of the SADC’s inception, and their leaders’ deep and moral commitment to national sovereignty stood in the way of regional groupings. However, it has been observed that “cold war geopolitics and its aftermath, regional shifts in power including those concerning racial or identity issues, and domestic political economy concerns propelled Zambians into several formal regional organizations.”40

APEC: A Brief Glimpse

The APEC region, since its debut in1989, “has consistently been the most economically dynamic part of the world.”41 It has declared non-discriminatory and open regionalism to promote an open trade principle to other regions of the world. This section will highlight the shape and content of APEC’s Asia Pacific regionalism in order to indicate some of the trajectories and contradictions of transnational regionalism in and across Asia and the Pacific. The Asia Pacific “integration impulses are less fuelled by objectives to open up markets or to promote political liberalization” as the organization promotes “domestic political legitimization…through culturally-determined codes of conduct.”42 Differences within APEC’s policies are widened and it has failed to construct a unitary hegemony of liberalization; as such it can be regarded as a transregional or transcontinental bloc rather than a regional body.43 The discourse on both open regionalism and identity crises began with tensions between Asian values and Western ideals, where “the invocation of Asian values played a significant role in increasing this antagonism, because these values constituted a direct challenge to open regionalism; Asian values radically endorse the differences between Asian and Asia-Pacific identities.”44 Poon believes that “as in Europe, regional identity has formed around the notion of ‘otherness’ in the Asia Pacific,”45 and still there are rival camps who oppose the integration of Western liberal economic ideals and western modernity in the APEC. The group suffers from a clash between two core constituencies, its Asian members (Orientalism) and Anglo-Saxon members (Occidentalism) - the Anglo-Saxon bloc prefers economic liberalization while the East Asian camp concentrates on economic and technical cooperation.46 In this case, two contrasting powers are reigning and both are in conflict as Foucault posits: “Every power relationship implies, at least in potentia, a strategy of struggle,

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in which the two forces are not superimposed, do not lose their specific nature, or do not finally become confused.”47

This section has briefly developed the notion of antagonism and articulation i.e. inside and outside, ‘they’ and ‘we’, and hegemony and subjugation in three separate case studies. In this context, the IMS-Growth Triangle stands for exclusion versus inclusion, dispossession versus ownership and insiders versus outsiders while the SADC stands for hegemony versus subjugation and domination, versus abuse and authority, versus inferiority. APEC embodies Orientalism versus Occidentalism, Asian versus Anglo-Saxon, and Asian values versus western ideology.

Comparative Study: Postcolonialism, Globalization and Regionalism

The section presents a comparative study of these three case studies within the framework of postmodernism and critical geopolitics. Integration discourses exhibit a pattern of political goals and visions from a certain section of actors in international relations. Thus, the transborder/transnational or regional integration of the IMS-Growth Triangle epitomizes Bhabha’s trauma and “hazardous bridge between colonialism and the question of identity.”48

The older colonial and postcolonial borders between Malaysia and Singapore have caused tensions in the post-national re-scaling of governance and reterritorialization of resources across the border.49 “Today’s Triangle is superimposed on top of these colonial and postcolonial connections... As such, it is also superimposed on top of the social, cultural and ecological relations that were part of what united and divided the region historically.”50

SADC’s case is not so different from that of the IMS-GT as “regional integration in Southern Africa contains and expresses certain contradictions, vulnerabilities and ‘hauntings’.”51

Sidaway’s ‘hauntings’ and Bhabha’s ‘remembering’ shed light on Foucault’s idea that thought remains in the fabrics of systems and structure of discourse which is often hidden but visible in everyday behaviour.52 As such postcolonial discourses dominate as a source of power, patronage, and advancement of the state, around the power-knowledge nexus. “The political identity of the coloniser and that of the colonized are therefore locked into an unequal, but mutual relationship” and “this particular colonial legacy has been carried over to haunt the SADC since South African adhesion.”53 South Africa’s domination in the SADC, along with its hegemonic role in the bloc, “embodies a broad and complex ambivalence, related to the transformation from declared enmity to new alliance.”54 South Africa in the organization holds a higher profile or status in the region, and being a hegemonic country in the group it also faces hidden Foucauldian ‘resistance’ (at margins), as protests or dissents from the member-countries. SADC’s functionings, as Sidaway explains, reflect “inherited inequalities and the complex ambivalences of the colonial legacy.”55

APEC’s regionalism56 is something different in that it has rejected ‘Western’ bargaining methods.57 APEC’s character, as Poon emphasizes, is a bottom-up approach to regional institution building, which is a positive force for greater international stability. APEC’s ‘inclusive regionalism’ incorporates social forces such as business groups or nongovernmental organizations as important sources of regional cooperation (environment, technology transfer, human rights, etc.), thereby encouraging a more emancipatory form of multilateralism.58 It has adopted a form of regional diplomacy with a code of conduct based on the consultation and decision-making process of Asian actors as opposed to the EU or NAFTA.59 APEC focuses mainly on common economic and regional prosperity, but its ‘resistance at margins’ will likely affect its collective regional consciousness and united goals. Rumley explains that “Malaysia’s reluctance to attend some of the APEC summit meetings and Japan’s concern over the protection of its food market could be interpreted as negative signs in this regard.”60 Globalization or the free trade economy is also a factor in regional integration. Now the question arises: how does globalization work in regionalism or

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alternately how does regionalism work in globalization? Rumley has differentiated the role and nature of both globalization and regionalism, and according to him, globalization represents the following: top down, rigid/authoritarian, alienation/exclusion, insecurity/legitimacy and competitiveness while regionalism stands for bottom up, flexible/voluntaristic, community/inclusion, confidence building, combined authority and human. Regionalism has a multifaceted relationship with globalization which manifests in the free market economy and forms of hegemony.61 For at least couple of decades, the speed of global markets has been exceeded the capacity of states and regional organizations to respond, and it is visible that the direction of the world has changed.

Critical Geopolitics, Identity and Regional Integration

The process of identity formation is one of the major themes in critical geopolitics, and identity is also an integral part of boundary studies as well as regional integration projects. It has an interrelationship with state, territory, nation and violence. David Campbell’s poststructuralist view (National Deconstruction, 1998) on the Bosnian War perfectly reflects a combination of identity, territory, state and nation to form a political community.62 Thus, identities ‘involve the drawing of boundaries between ‘insiders’ and outsiders’, and require the constitution of ‘others or ‘scapegoats’.”63 This is the central concept of what Laclau and Mouffe (1985) call the construction of antagonistic relations.64 Howarth and Stavrakais have rightly explained that “social antagonisms introduce an irreconcilable negativity in social relations. This is because they reveal the limit points in society in which social meaning is contested and can not be stabilised. Antagonisms are thus evidence of the frontiers of a social formation.”65 Simon Dalby’s ‘Self’ and ‘Others’ explains how geopolitical reasoning defines security in terms of spatial exclusion and the threatening other. He asserts that “geopolitical discourse constructs worlds in terms of Self and Others, in terms of cartographically specifiable sections of political space, and in terms of military threats.”66

Thus, Dalby suggests that an external ‘other’ (force) plays an integral part in the creation of a political identity, whether it is within a state or beyond the state. To summarize, identity “is an effect forged, on the one hand…giving it a sense of unity and, on the other, by exclusionary practices which attempt to secure the domestic identity through processes of spatial differentiations, and various diplomatic, military and defence practices.”67

Social antagonisms, in Laclau and Mouffe’s viewpoint, insist that an antagonism takes place in the presence of ‘the other’ which prevents one from being ‘total’ i.e. social agents are unable to attain their full identity.68 Thus the blockage of identity is constructed in antagonistic terms by social agents. The above mentioned three case studies provide examples of an identity crisis concerning the concepts of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, ‘self’ and ‘other’ and ‘friend’ and ‘foe’ that outline different ways of thinking and systematising different relations to the concept of ‘the other’. Social antagonism, as Houtum et al., argue, “arises because of the inability of differently located social agents to achieve their respective identities.”69 This exemplifies the clash between the local residents and beneficiaries of the IMS-Growth Triangle across the borders of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore over erecting a map of ‘enclosure’ and an ‘imaginative wall’ to block free movement. Also, in the SADC, the member states are afraid of South Africa’s authority and control. They are virtually divided in their opposition of various antagonistic behaviours of South Africa. Even the exclusion of non-whites in all areas of governance in regional entities such as the South African Union and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland are examples of how the regional organizations are divided and segregated under the shadow of minority-rule based on colour, race and skin. The hegemonic behaviour of South Africa prevails everywhere, ranging from summits and diplomacy, to development and governance. In addition, a trio of distinct actor types, which includes different non-state actors, notably private firms and civil societies, has been playing a divisive role within the SADC. In the APEC, Asian identity and values have increased

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antagonism and the member-states are in conflict over the issue of Anglo-American hegemony and Asian culture.

Laclau and Mouffe’s logic of equivalence and difference in discourse analysis “seeks to divide social space by condensing meanings around two antagonistic poles” while the logic of difference “attempts to weaken and displace a sharp antagonistic polarity, endeavouring to relegate that division to the margins of society.”70 In terms of the operation of the logics of equivalence and difference, Laclau and Mouffe follow the Gramscian idea of transformism in specifying that “a transformist project consists of efforts to expand the systems of difference defining the dominant bloc.”71 If it fails, then transformism “may lead to the expansion of the logic of equivalence, the construction of clear-cut political frontiers and a proliferation of antagonistic relations.”72 If the logic of equivalence dominates, social space will be divided into two opposing camps, and accordingly, should the logic of difference deploy, a more complex issue will appear. Thus a plethora of questions with respect to these logics may arise in the discursive analysis of integration: Does one of these logics i.e., the logic of equivalence have further influence for the types of politics prevalent in a particular society/region? Does the logic of difference guide the construction of different types of political identity or platform in the region?

Let us respond to these questions concerning the relations and roles between member states and regional actors in the aforementioned case studies, especially in the APEC and the SADC. Mouffe argues that “political discourse attempts to create specific forms of unity among different interests by relating them to a common project and by establishing a frontier to define the forces to be opposed, ‘the enemy’.”73 Mouffe further elaborates that “in contrast to this, where the logic of difference predominates, they hold that the multiplicity of articulations between subject positions make it more difficult to construct such ‘an enemy’.”74 As such the APEC was established to create a pacific community with open regionalism. The United States increasingly used its influence with the APEC to dominate the region and prevent the growth of anti-American sentiment in the region. As a result, the US has taken over leadership to maintain its power and to “embrace the exclusionary East Asian identity within an inclusionary ‘Asia-Pacific’ identity, thereby preventing the creation of a regional identity centering on East Asian capitalist values—i.e., EAEC [East Asian Economic Community].”75 A growing antagonism between the US and Asian members of APEC is increasing. Countries such as China, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand strongly oppose the dominance of the US on the path of rapid liberalization. Mahathir’s (former Malaysian Prime Minister/in office from1981-2003) proposal for the EAEC to be an exclusionary Asian regional bloc created tension in the USA administration, leading former US Secretary of State, James Baker, to state in an antagonistic way that “APEC was trans-Pacific and it was inclusive, but EAEG [EAEC] is exclusive and draws a line down the Pacific. For those reasons, we are very much opposed to it.”76 Asian values and cultural sentiment originally developed in Singapore and Malaysia and have penetrated and influenced the whole region, where Asian values have been defined principally in opposition to what is commonly referred to as Western liberalism.77 Here the logic of equivalence transformed some individuals into a collective entity, leading to the organization of a regional east Asian entity despite the Asia-Pacific, and therefore making them the supreme beholders of values and identity. The SADC also reflects the logic of differences. However, instead of an expansion of the logic of difference, a dissolution of differences has taken place. The SADC was established as a political response to South African threats to dominate the region. It was designed as a balance against South Africa’s intended hegemony in the region, and it “was structured so that politically no state yielded any of its sovereignty over the regional secretariat.”78

Conclusion

This paper has analyzed regional integration/transboundary regionalism and sought to

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contribute to further theoretical approaches to the concept of regional integration in critical geopolitics. It has examined three case studies of regional integration through the tenets of poststructuralism. The study has drawn on Foucault and both Laclau and Mouffe to move away from textual analysis towards the inclusion of social practices in the discourse analysis of regional integration. Laclau and Mouffe stress the practice of articulation to link various meta-narratives in order to fix meaning.79 The integration discourse needs to engage with more varied forms of social production beyond texts and to concentrate on the everyday life of ordinary people. As such televisions, newspapers, films, novels, cartoons, etc. shape our everyday life and construct our political, cultural and social attitudes. Following the Derridarean move, discourses are different from traditionally conceptualized structures in that they can be used to rethink structure and agency in order to look at linguistic elements and the processes of their constitution. This paper has primarily discussed a variety of regional integration processes and works as a foundation to conduct further research with a goal of formulating a comprehensive argument on regional integration. It is worthy to analyze the power-knowledge nexus in regional integration projects to inquire as to whether the inclusion of geopolitical discourses on boundary, identity and sovereignty are essential to garnering a more comprehensive understanding of the creation of political/imaginative regional communities.

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Notes

1. The Cold War period experienced different kinds of regionalism ranging from supranational, security, environment to multilateralism, and “most regions were either political, or mercantile clusters of neighbouring countries that had a place in the larger international system” (Väyrynen, 2003:26). Examples of such groupings are the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which were established for political and military motives. However, since the late 1980s, subregional and microregional organizations, for example, the Baltic Council of Ministers, the Visegrad Group, the Shanghai Group, and Mercosur were founded in ‘a response to the fragmentation of great power blocks, especially in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but it also reflects the need to react to pressures created by economic globalization through local means’ (Väyrynen, 2003:26). For more see: Raimo Väyrynen, “Regionalism: Old and New,” International Studies Review, Vol. (5), 2003, p.25-51.

2. V.D. Mamadouh, “Geopolitics in the nineties: one flag, many meanings,” GeoJournal, 46, 1998, p.244. See Joe Painter, “Geographies of Space and power,” in Cox, Kevin R., Low, Murray and Robinson, Jennifer (eds.) The Sage Handbook of Political Geography, Sage Publications, 2008, p.65.

3. Ibid. [Joe Painter]

4. Martin Müller, “Reconsidering the concept of discourse for the field of critical geopolitics: towards discourse as language and practice,” ‘Political Geography, Vol. 27, 2008, p.322-38.

5. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Harmondsworth, 1977, p. 22.

6. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rainbow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, The University of Chicago Press, 1983, p.184.

7. Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in C. Gordon (ed.) Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977, 1980, p.89.

8. James D Sidaway, Imagined Regional Communities: Integration and sovereignty in the Global South, Routledge, 2002, p.42.

9. John Agnew, “Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 95, No.2, 2005a, p.441.

10. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rainbow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, The University of Chicago Press, 1983, p.184.

11. Barbara J. Morehouse, Vera Pavlakovoch-Kochi & Doris Wastl-Walter, “Introduction: Perspectives on Borderlands,” in Pavlakovoch-Kochi, Vera, Morehouse, Barbara J., & Wastl-Walter, Doris (eds.) Challenge Borderlands: Transcending Political and Cultural Boundaries, Ashgate, 2004, p.4.

12. Ibid.

13. Mathew Sparke, James D Sidaway and Tim Grundy Carl Bunnell, “Triangulating the borderless world: geographies of power in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 29, No.4, 2004, p.485-498.

14. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rainbow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, The University of Chicago Press, 1983, p.105. Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism,” in Burchill et al. (eds) Theories of International Relations, Palgrave, 2005, p.163.

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15. Toru Oga, “Rediscovering Asianness: the role of institutional discourses in APEC, 1989-1997,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 4, 2004, p.302.

16. John Agnew, Hegemony: The New shape of Global Power, Temple University Press: Philadelphia, 2005b, p. 47.

17. Ibid., p.38.

18. Ibid.

19. Toru Oga, “Rediscovering Asianness: the role of institutional discourses in APEC, 1989-1997,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 4, 2004, p.295.

20. Ibid. p.296.

21. Matthew Sparke, “Between Post-colonialism and cross-border Regionalism,” Space and Polity, Vol. 6, No.2, 2002, p. 203; Matthew Sparke, “American Empire and Globalisation: Postcolonial Speculation on Neocolonial Enframing,” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, Vol. 24(3): 373-389.

22. P.J. Taylor, World city network: a global urban analysis: Routledge, 2004.

23. Tim Bunnell, Hamza Muzani & James Sidaway, “Global City Frontiers: Singapore’s Hinterland and the Contested Social Political Geographies of Bintan, Indonesia,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 30, No.1, 2006, p.235.

24. Cynthia Chou, “Multiple realities of the Growth Triangle: Mapping knowledge and the politics of mapping,” Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2006, p. 241.

25. Ibid.

26. Derek Gregory, “Discourse” in R.J. Johnston et al. (eds.) The Dictionary of Human Geography, 4th Edition, Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2000, p.111.

27. Timothy Mitchell, 1988. Colonising Egypt, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.34.

28. F M Cooke, “Maps and counter maps: globalised imaginings and local realities of Sawak’s plantation agriculture,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2003, p. 268.

29. Michel Ford and Lenore Lyons, “The borders within: Mobility and enclosure in the Riau Islands,” Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 47, No.2, 2006, p. 266.

30. Mathew Sparke, James D Sidaway and Tim Grundy Carl Bunnell, “Triangulating the borderless world: geographies of power in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2004, p.488.

31. http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/52: Accessed: August 02, 2015.

32. James D Sidaway, Imagined Regional Communities: Integration and sovereignty in the Global South, Routledge, 2002, p.73.

33. Using an example from a 1996 annual conference held in South Africa, Sidaway explains that the national anthems were not played in Johannesburg on the arrival of its leader, which is an example of ignoring the existence or sovereignty of its member-states. Sidaway further elaborates that “South Africa’s relative disregard for accustomed procedures has much to do with its differential position in relation to global power, and hence a different understanding of the performance of sovereignty”. Cf. James D Sidaway, Imagined Regional Communities: Integration and sovereignty in the Global South, Routledge, 2002, p.73.

34. James D Sidaway, “The (geo)politics of regional integration: the example of the Southern

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African Development Community,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Vol.16, 1998, p.556.

35. James D Sidaway, Imagined Regional Communities: Integration and sovereignty in the Global South, Routledge, 2002, p.72.

36. Ibid.

37. Michel Foucault, “After: The Subject and Power” in H. Dreyfus and P. Rainbow (eds.) Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983, p. 219.

38. James D. Sidaway, “The (geo)politics of regional integration: the example of the Southern African Development Community,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 16, 1999, p.570.

39. Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations, Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 1996, p.148.

40. Eve Sandberg and Naomi Sabel, “Cold War Regional Hangovers in Southern Africa: Zambian Development Strategies, SADC and the New Regionalism,” in J. Andrew Grant and Fredrik Soderbaum (eds.) The New Regionalism in Africa, Ashgate, 2003, p.159-160.

41. http://www.apec.org/: Accessed: August 30, 2015.

42. Jessie P H Poon, “Regionalism in the Asia Pacific: is Geography destiny?,” Area, 33, No. 3, 2001, p.252.

43. Toru Oga, “Rediscovering Asianness: the role of institutional discourses in APEC, 1989-1997,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 4, 2004, p.298.

44. Ibid., 299.

45. Jessie P H Poon, “Regionalism in the Asia Pacific: is Geography destiny?,” Area, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2001, p.256.

46. Toru Oga, “Rediscovering Asianness: the role of institutional discourses in APEC, 1989-1997.”International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 4, 2004, p. 298.

47. Michel Foucault, “After: The Subject and Power” in H. Dreyfus and P. Rainbow (eds.) Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983, p.225.

48. Leela Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction, Columbia University Press: NY, 1998, p.9.

49. The initiatives of Singapore to establish desalination plants (as Singapore was dependent on Johor, Malaysia for water supply since the colonial era) and to execute land reclamation project for housing along the east coast (Singapore has grown from 580 square kilometers in 1962 to 680 square kilometers today) have raised fears in Malaysia that Singapore gains and Johor losses (Sparke et al. 2004: 493-94). “The tensions involved in the recent retriangulations in post-colonial development’, as Sparke et al. (2004:494) argue, ‘are still more painful evident in the landscape of labour in the triangle.”

50. Mathew Sparke, James D Sidaway and Tim Grundy Carl Bunnell, “Triangulating the borderless world: geographies of power in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2004, p.493.

51. James D Sidaway, Imagined Regional Communities: Integration and sovereignty in the Global South, Routledge, 2002, p.86.

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52. Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, Routledge, 1994; Michel Foucault, Materialism and Education edited by Mark Olssen, 1999.

53. James D. Sidaway, “The (geo)politics of regional integration: the example of the Southern African Development Community,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Vol. 16, 1998, 568.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Jessie Poon’s study on the APEC mentions some important issues, including the formulation of Asian institutions, commitment to open dialogue and consensus, equal respect for all partners, understanding cultural, economic and political diversity that play a great role for economic growth and regional stability. Poon, on the other hand, did not project the contrasting values of ‘East’ versus ‘West’ concerning Francis Fukuyama’s ‘The End of History’ (1989) or Samuel Huntington’s ‘The Clash of Civilization’ (1993).

57. Jessie P H Poon, “Regionalism in the Asia Pacific: is Geography destiny?,” Area, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2001, p.254.

58. Ibid. p.253; Amitav Acharya, “Realism, institutionalism and the Asian economic crisis,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, 1999, p.1-29.

59. Jessie P H Poon, “Regionalism in the Asia Pacific: is Geography destiny?,” Area, Vol.33, No. 3, 2001, p.254.

60. Dennis Rumley, “Geopolitical change and the Asia-Pacific: The Future of New Regionalism,” in Nurit Kliot and David Newman (eds.) Geopolitics At The End of The Twentieth Century: The Changing World political Map, Frank Cass: London, 2000, p.86.

61. Grant Andrew and Söderbaum J Fredrik, “Introduction” in Grant, J Andrew & Söderbaum, Fredrik (eds.) The New Regionalism in Africa, Ashgate, 2003, p.8.

62. Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism,” in Burchill et al. (eds) Theories of International Relations, Palgrave, 2005, p.177.

63. Steven Griggs & David Howarth, “New Environmental movements and direct action protest: the campaign against Manchester Airport’s second runway,” in David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval & Yannis Stavrakis (eds.) Discourse theory and political analysis, Manchester University Press, 2000, p.55-6.

64. David Howarth & Yannis Stavrakakis, “Introducing discourse theory and political analysis,” in David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval & Yannis Stavrakis (eds.) Discourse theory and political analysis, Manchester University Press, 2004, p.4.

65. Ibid.

66. Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics, London, 1993, p.29.

67. Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism,” in Burchill et al. (eds) Theories of International Relations, Palgrave, 2005, p.178.

68. Henk Van Houtum, Oliver Kramsch & Wolfang Zierhoffer, “Prologue: B/ordering Space,” in Henk Van Houtum, Oliver Kramsch and Wolfgang Zierhofer, (eds.) B/ordering Space, Ashgate, 2005, p.10.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Aletta J Norval, “Trajectories of furure research in discourse theory,” in David Howarth,

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Aletta J. Norval & Yannis Stavrakis (eds.) Discourse theory and political analysis, Manchester University Press, 2000, p.220.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., p.221

74. Ibid.

75. Glen D Hook, “Japan and the construction of the Asia-Pacific,” in A. Gamble and A. Payne (eds.) Regionalism and World Order, London: Macmillan, 2000, p.193.

76. Toru Oga, “Rediscovering Asianness: the role of institutional discourses in APEC, 1989-1997,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 4, 2004, p.297.

77. Ibid., p. 299, 302.

78. Eve Sandberg and Naomi Sabel, “Cold War Regional Hangovers in Southern Africa: Zambian Development Strategies, SADC and the New Regionalism,” in J. Andrew Grant and Fredrik Soderbaum (eds.) The New Regionalism in Africa, Ashgate, 2003, p.162.

79. E. Laclau, E. & C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: towards a radical democratic politics, London: Verso, 1985, p.109.

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Foucault, Michel. “After: The Subject and Power” in H. Dreyfus and P. Rainbow (eds.) Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.

Foucault, Michel. Materialism and Education edited by Mark Olssen, 1999.

Foucault, Michel. “Society Must be Defended”: Lectures at the College de France, New York, 1975-1976, 2003.

Gandhi, Leela. Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction, Columbia University Press: NY, 1998.

Gregory, Derek. “Discourse” in R.J. Johnston et al. (eds.) The Dictionary of Human Geography, 4th Edition, Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2000.

Gregory, Derek. The colonial present, Blackwell, Oxford, 2004.

Griggs, Steven & Howarth, David. “New Environmental movements and direct action protest: the campaign against Manchester Airport’s second runway,” in David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval & Yannis Stavrakis (eds.) Discourse theory and political analysis, Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 52-69.

Houtum, Henk Van, Kramsch, Oliver & Zierhoffer, Wolfang. “Prologue: B/ordering Space,” in

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Howarth, David & Stavrakakis, Yannis. “Introducing discourse theory and political analysis,” in David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval & Yannis Stavrakis (eds.) Discourse theory and political analysis, Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 1-23.

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Mitchell, Timothy. Colonising Egypt, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Morehouse, Barbara J., Pavlakovoch-Kochi, Vera & Wastl-Walter, Doris. “Introduction: Perspectives on Borderlands,” in Pavlakovoch-Kochi, Vera, Morehouse, Barbara J., & Wastl-Walter, Doris (eds.) Challenge Borderlands: Transcending Political and Cultural Boundaries, Ashgate, 2004.

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Vol. 6 | No. 2 | July 2016

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Debating State Capacity and Intrastate Wars in South Asia

By Azhar Ali*

Abstract

In South Asia the notion of intrastate wars are prevalent and prolonged. Most of the countries in the region have faced or are still struggling with such wars. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebellion movement in Sri Lanka, till very recently, violent Nexal movement and Maoist insurgency in India and sectarian violence in Pakistan, Taliban and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan have all been the part of intra-state wars. These wars challenge the authority and the integrity of the state. The state’s monopoly over the means of violence seems eroded in South Asia due to certain developments in the international system. The issue of intra-state war has become major problem for the states in South Asia to deal with. This paper argues that these intra-state wars challenge and influence the power of the state particularly in South Asia. It further analyses the state capacity and tries to look that how state finds itself constrained to in dealing with such intrastate wars. In a precise manner this paper also attempts to understand the changing conceptions of security due to the changed nature of modern warfare.

Keywords: Intrastate Wars, State Capacity, Regimes, Globalisation, Information Communications Technology.

Journal of Global Analysis

Vol. 6| No. 2

July 2016

www.cesran.org

* Azhar Ali is a Research Associate at the MMAJ Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia New Delhi, India. His area of interest in research is Third World politics and security.

Introduction

In the years immediately following the Cold War there were evidences that war within the states, rather than between states have become more prevalent. As the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) reported that the most marked security phenomenon since the end of the Cold War has been the proliferation of armed conflicts within states. It is argued that transformational changes within the international system have altered the nature of war. It is broadly accepted that the political and economic forces, reshaping international relations, are causing equally profound changes in the nature and conduct of war.1 It is also argued that externally isolated by mutual claims of absolute sovereignty; the modern state is internally based on its monopoly of physical force.2 Also regarding state capacity it is often described as “The ability of a state to develop and implement policies in order to provide collective goods such as security, order and welfare to citizens in a legitimate and effective manner untrammelled by internal or external actors.”3

In addition, violent civil conflict is generally linked with a social environment that implicates a range of non-state as well as state actors. The weakening or undermining of the state is central to this environment, seen in the context of neo-liberal economic forces and globalisation that erode state capacity, authority and public goods.4

In South Asia the notion of intrastate wars are prevalent and prolonged. Most of the countries in the region have faced or still struggle with such wars. LTTE rebellion movement in Sri Lanka, till till it ended, violent naxal movement in India and sectarian violence in Pakistan and Taliban in Afghanistan have all been the part of intrastate wars. Quite often, these wars challenge the authority and the integrity of the state. These wars can be contrasted with earlier wars in terms of their goals, the method of warfare and how they are financed. The external linkages have made these wars complex and prolonged. The second characteristics of these wars is the changed mode of warfare,­­­ the means through which these wars are fought. The strategies of new warfare draw on experiences of both guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, yet they are quite distinctive. The third way in which these wars can be contrasted with earlier wars is what Mary Kaldor calls the new ‘globalised’ war economy.

In today’s context the political economy of these wars has gone beyond its traditional understanding. Though these wars are fought on one particular place but can be financed and directed globally. For instance, in 2009 the Sri Lankan Cricket team was attacked in Pakistan. Later reports came that it was an attack that had been financed and coordinated by LTTE. The attack signifies transnational linkages of different rebel groups. The contemporary period does not only signifies the alliance between or among the states and several kind of civil and economic institutions but it also enables to form alliance or undeclared hidden pacts among or between various violent non-state actors. For instance, there have reports that the Pakistan based terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Communist Party of India (CPI) (Maoist) have established a relationship. Even the Chief Minister and Director General of Police of Chhattisgarh on record, have expressed the possibility of such an alliance. “Two LeT

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operatives attended a CPI-Maoist central committee meeting as observers held sometime in April-May 2013. They met in a jungle inside Orissa, close to Bastar.”5 In March 2012 the then State Minister of Home Affairs Jitendra Singh said “The CPI (Maoist) has close links with foreign Maoist organisations in Philippines, Turkey, etc.6

Thus, it has been experienced that the state very often finds itself in a dilemma while it comes to use their monopoly over the means of violence in order to contain these intrastate wars. International regimes in terms of human rights and other institutions play role of safeguard some time. Therefore the issue of intrastate war has become major problem for the states in South Asia to deal with.

Changing Nature of Warfare within the State

In current intrastate wars, we do not observe an unrestricted elimination contest within formally established states, but rather an internationally restricted process of ongoing internal conflict. The “imported” modern state apparatus has not developed into the political representation of the nation, but has become a contested object for the appropriation of resources by competing social groups.7 Since the end of the Cold War, the literature focusing on strategic studies has highlighted a multiplicity of change affecting war as it enters a supposedly post-modern age. It has been argued that transformational changes within the international system have altered the very nature of war itself. In this new era, it is broadly accepted that the political and economic forces reshaping international relations, are causing equally profound changes in the nature and conduct of war. The decline of state legitimacy and power gives rise to rivalry among non-state actors within this context, violence effectively privatised, as the state’s control and monopoly over violence declines as an extension of the erosion of state capacity.8

In addition to the notion of legitimacy, this has become a contentious issue for states, particularly in the Third World. State is very often held accused when it uses its coercive capacity in order to wipe out threats to its territorial integrity. State is supposed to use its coercive capacity against violent non-state actors indiscriminately. For instance, in the final phase of the battle against LTTE, state of Sri Lanka had to use every means to defeat LTTE. Externally Sri Lanka was criticised for massive human rights violations and several other war crimes. The Government’s international legitimacy also continues to be compromised by a vicious, motivated and one-sided campaign of disinformation on the question of human rights violations during the terminal phases of the conflict with the LTTE. Various European interlocutors have threatened Sri Lanka with international prosecution for ‘war crimes’ and ‘human rights violations’, and have managed to orchestrate a feckless intervention by the United States resulting in a gratuitous resolution in the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) on March 22, 2012, demanding the ‘expeditious implementation’ of the LLRC’s recommendations.9 Thus, if a state attempt to contain intrastate war with its coercive capacity rather than other policy oriented measures then it is held responsible for several kinds of violations. And if it goes soft on such wars or unable to contain it then it is depicted as a weak state or failing state.

Furthermore regarding the Naxal movement in India which was essentially had started as an agrarian movement in the country now become a most violent movement. During the past years, the armed Naxalite groups have emerged as the main challenge to the government of India. These groups have largely expanded their influence zone and Naxal movement in India is now recognised as a part of the Maoist activism world over.10 Similarly disturbed by the rising graph of violence and the spectre of growing unity among terrorist groupings, Islamabad appears to have initiated some measures to confront domestically directed terrorism. On March 8, 2013, the National Assembly unanimously passed the National Counter Terrorism Authority Bill‚ 2013, creating an authority intended to coordinate counter terrorism and counter extremism efforts in view of the nature and magnitude of terrorists’

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threat; and to present strategic policy options to the government for consideration/implementation by the stakeholders after scientifically studying the phenomenon of extremism and terrorism in historic and professional perspective.11 The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NCTA) is to play a pivotal role in coordinating with all law enforcement agencies to take effective action against those who carry out acts of terrorism in the country. Meanwhile, January 2013 reports indicate that realizing home-grown terrorism as the ‘biggest threat’ to national security; Pakistan Army has changed its operational priorities. Accordingly, a new chapter, titled ‘Sub-Conventional Warfare’, has been added to the revised ‘Army Doctrine’. Commenting on the development, Defence analyst Lieutenant General (retired) Talat Masood told the BBC, “It's a fact that before the new army doctrine, India was Pakistan’s No 1 enemy. All military resources were focused on India. For the first time it has been realised that Pakistan faces the real threat from within…”12 the home grown terror groups now pose severe challenges before the state. It poses challenges to the territorial integrity of the state. The Taliban have systematically enlarged and consolidated their sanctuary in Pakistan due to the progress of the Pakistani Taliban. The deal giving the Pakistani Taliban control of the Swat Valley and the penetration of the Buner district, with the entire Malakand district under Sharia, marked the Pakistani Taliban’s most audacious success. The Taliban are systematically destroying the local administrations at the district level, with the objective of creating a situation where the administrations’ contact with the population is eliminated.13

Such a situation would prove to people that the state is unable to protect them or provide services, pushing them to instead accept the justice and order the Taliban provide.14 In such a way it reflects that intrastate wars are indeed becoming a threat not only to the territorial integrity but it also put question mark over the coercive capacity of the state. South Asia exhibits the stark reality of such prolonged wars. Hardly any state is immune of such prolonged intrastate wars.

However it is argued about the Third World states that having been released from the grip of superpower competition, old state elites, particularly in the Third World, struggle to cope with a plethora of challenges to their dominance over land, resources and people.15 The breakdown of state-based governance saw the emergence of alternative forms of exchange and control, most notably in Liberia and in Sierra Leone. In these failed states, warlords became dominant actors, as much concerned with their link to global market place where they could sell monopolies over scare resources, as they were over exercising hegemony a given sovereign space.16 What started essentially as an agrarian movement, Naxal movement today has entered in to an era where the Corporate-Maoist nexus has imparted huge impetus to the extortion industry and financial and political muscle of the Maoists. Maoists are often alleged of collecting ransom and protection money from business houses. This nexus has resulted in a stunning parallel economy which in turn is enhancing the armed might and internal and external clout of the Maoists. Due to this, the Maoists have acquired huge financial and political stake in illegal mining. There is a dilemma for the corporate houses; if they do not heed to the extortion demands of the Maoists, their personnel, property and the unit itself would be attacked. On the other hand, if the police detect their payments they can be booked. This nexus has malicious security implications for India, both internal as well as external.17 This kind of practices by the non-state actors has led to the emergence of new theories about war-making.

New Wars: Analysing War-Making and State-Making Thesis in South Asia

While the new theories about wars are diverse, its primary claim is that modern conflict differs from its historical antecedents in three major ways: (i) Structure; (ii) Method; (iii) Motives, each element interpenetrates the other. Though the term ‘new wars’ was coined by Mary Kaldor but there are other scholars who have defined it in their own terminology.

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Scholars like William S. Lind has described this changed warfare as ‘fourth generation wars’. He argues that fourth generation warfare uses all available networks political, economic, social and military to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefits. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, fourth generation warfare makes use of society’s networks to carry on its fight, fourth generation warfare is lengthy- measured in decades rather than months or years.18 Intrastate wars in South Asia exhibit it well. Analytical assessments of intrastate wars in South Asia show that these wars are deeply influenced with certain ideologies along with grievances and have firm faith in their violent movements against state. Greed has not been a major factor in the prolongness of intrastate wars in South Asia.

However unlike Lind, Mary Kaldor argues that the ‘new wars’ have to be understood in the context of the process known as globalisation. This process intensifying interconnectedness is a contradictory process involving integration and fragmentation, homogenisation and diversification, globalisation and localisation.19 It is often argued that the “new wars” are consequences of the end of the Cold War; they reflect power vacuum which is typical of transition periods in world affairs. In response Kaldor agreed and says that it is undoubtedly true that the consequences of the end of the Cold War availability of surplus arms, the discrediting of socialist ideologies, the disintegration of totalitarian empires, and the withdrawal of superpower support to client regimes contributed in important ways to the new wars.20

The impact of globalisation is visible in many of the ‘new wars’. The wars epitomise a new kind of global/local divide between those members of a global class who can speak English, have access to faxes, email and satellite television, who use dollars or credit cards and who can travel freely and those who are excluded from global processes, who live off, who can sell or barter or what they receive in humanitarian aid, whose movement is restricted by roadblocks, visas and cost of travel, and who are prey to siege, forced famines, landmines etc. In order to show that how developments in information, communication and technology (ICT) also helps certain forces, since 2006 the Taliban have been using field radios and cell phones to coordinate groups of fighters. They are able to coordinate complex attacks, are mobile, and are improving their use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Their intelligence is good.21 Taliban have also used internet websites to chronicle the advance of the jihad (with obvious exaggerations). Propaganda material in the form of preachers calling for jihad against the International Coalition (IC) is often distributed through cell phones. In addition, the Taliban regularly monitor Afghan media and, less systematically, foreign outlets as well. Mullah Dadullah, a key Taliban commander, had invited Al-Jazeera to meet him on several different occasions, allowing the Taliban to successfully create a hero like persona from clips (his death in 2007 gave him the status of martyr). In this context, the conventional wisdom that the Taliban, being fundamentalists, are not open to new technologies has also been debunked by their sophisticated use of modern media for propaganda purposes.22

However, the ‘new war’ can be contrasted with earlier wars in terms of their goals, the method of warfare and how they are financed. The goals of the ‘new wars’ are about identity politics in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of the earlier wars. The second characteristics of the ‘new wars’ are the changed mode of warfare­­­ the means through which these wars are fought. The strategies of new warfare draw on experiences of both guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, yet they are quite distinctive. The third way in which the ‘new wars’ can be contrasted with earlier wars is what Kaldor calls the new ‘globalised’ war economy. These economies are heavily dependent on external resources. In these wars domestic production declines dramatically because of global competition, physical destruction or interruptions to normal trade as does normal tax revenue. For instance, during the most volatile period of Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the state experienced that like

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education, the nation’s already poor economy is almost on the verge of collapse. According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) report issued in April 2002, the growth rate declined to 3.5 per cent in 2002 compared to 5 per cent in 2001. Agricultural growth had fallen from 4 to 3 per cent, and in the service sector from 7 to 3.5 per cent.23 Violence disrupted the growth of each sector and caused massive loss.

In such circumstances, the fighting units finance themselves through plunder and the black market or through external assistance. The later can take the following forms: remittances from the Diaspora, ‘taxation’ of humanitarian assistance, support from the neighbouring governments or illegal trade in arms, drugs or valuable commodities such as oil and diamonds.24 Thus, according to the argument of the ‘new war’ thesis process of globalisation is tearing up the previously stable state system a system which for many has provided a starting point for understanding war and its role in international relations.25

Therefore, considerably the thesis ‘war made the state and state made the war’, given by the noted scholar Charles Tilly, is considered as a significant approach in state-building process. But its application beyond Europe remains debatable. Scholars extending the ‘War-Making and State-Making’ logic to the developing countries have come to diametrically opposed conclusion about whether the process is occurring in a similar fashion to that of modern Europe. Some contend that connection is roughly the same, suggesting that violent conflict helps to build states in the Third World. Others counter that the international political and economic systems has changed radically in the last half-century and, therefore, conclude that the ‘war-making and state-making’ connection does not work in the contemporary world.26 The later contending view is that ‘war-making and state-making’ thesis is now, to a large extent, irrelevant to the Third World states. Earlier it was discussed how the emergence of new wars or transformed nature, structure and motives of war has changed its meaning and applicability. Instead of strengthening and extending state capacity, current warfare rather weakens the state. Today scholars strongly contend that external aggression is almost non-existent, instead the domestic threat in terms of intra-state war does pose the main threat to states and to its territorial integrity. The enduring and violent nature of these wars significantly influences the process of state-building, particularly in the Third World.

Thus, the war-making approach and its changed face has created or led to the emergence of multiple dimensions of security. Since war can be waged by groups other than the state, it has also diluted the traditional understanding of security. Indeed it will be wrong to emphasise that contemporary war or new wars has changed its meaning. But globalisation, to a large extent, has also led to an understanding of the changing conceptions of security. The development or transformation in the traditional understanding of security is another important area which challenges the process of state-building in the Third World.

Changing Conception of Security: Rise of New Dimensions

The traditional concept of security is almost exclusively around the state and its survival as a political community. The ultimate goal of state behaviour and its core value is assumed to be the securing of the state itself against anything that may threaten its existence or integrity. Security is therefore linked to military defence of the state and its sovereignty against external threats.27 The realist approach is the most dominant approach to the study of security. It has influenced greatly policy makers and scholars and has had a great impact on security studies. It identifies the state as the key rational actor in the international system. Accordingly the concept of security was dominated largely by the idea of national security. Many policy-makers and analyst tend to take a one-dimensional approach to security i.e. state and military. But there has been a great paradigm shift in security studies in the aftermath of the Cold War. There was a strong consensus for a broader approach to security rather than a confined and limited traditional approach which was considered as narrow and inadequate in understanding contemporary issue and challenges.28

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In the Third World context, the problem of security presents a conceptual challenge when compared to the First World.29 Similarly, other scholars also argue that the Third World security is dominantly a search for internal security.30 These states face numerous problems ranging from, political social, economic, cultural and environmental issue. Today environmental security is one of the concerns that fall within that broader security agenda. The environmental issue has now received much attention than any other domain in the broader security concept. The most widespread call to ‘redefine security’ has emerged from the claim that environmental degradation poses a threat to the ecosystem or to human well-being that transcends particular states and the conception of national security. The United Nations held a conference on ‘Human Environment’ in Stockholm 1972, and this event can be seen as having began a process that has resulted in the piecemeal construction of number of environmental institutions, the steady expansion of the security agenda and increasing acceptance by states of international monitoring of environmental standards.31

Human security is another face of the current state of affairs. Today state has, also, to ensure the security of its citizens, economically, socially, and politically. Now states are legally bound to take all the measures in order to satisfy the basic needs of its citizens. The idea of human security can be traced back to the growing dissatisfaction of the prevailing notion of development and security in the 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s. Human security by its meaning is about the ability to protect people as well as to safeguard the state.32 Human security holds that a people-centred view of security is necessary for national, regional and global stability. The main idea behind the development of this concept was to address new kind of threats which are faced by the people in their everyday lives. In South Asia countries like India has taken several measures in order to deal with such situations or issues. There are several policy initiatives which correspond to human security for instance, Sarve Siksha Abhiyan (SSA), National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Gureentee Act(MGNREGA), Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS), Right To Free Education, Food Security Bill etc. These are some of the core legislations operational at national level. Besides this, there are number of other such programmes initiated and implemented by state governments at their state levels. Such kind of mechanisms to deal with issues such as poverty, underdevelopment, unemployment, malnutrition and the like seem effective.

In addition another such vibrant example in this regard one can also sight in South Asia is from Bangladesh. Grameen Bank or micro credit was a flagship programme which improved millions of lives in Bangladesh. The system of this bank is based on the idea that the poor have skills that are under-utilized. A group-based credit approach is applied which utilizes the peer-pressure within the group to ensure the borrowers follow through and use caution in conducting their financial affairs with strict discipline, ensuring repayment eventually and allowing the borrowers to develop good credit standing. These types of innovative policy measures in South Asia reflects state’s ability or will to address the concerns which may lead to conflict which often get transformed into violence later. Addressing issues or concerns which lead to conflict can help states not only in South Asia but the Third World as whole from falling in violence ridden situation. Given the fact the states in South Asia do not differ much in terms of their socio-economic conditions from other developing states. The region can be categorised as the most volatile place. It has experienced or still experiencing some of the long enduring and bloody intrastate wars.

Conclusion

This article tries to conclude that though intrastate wars exhibit a propensity of challenging the territorial integrity of the state, but in South Asia intrastate wars have been dealt with coercive capacity of the state. One can see the example of Sri Lanka where decades long war against the state finally defeated by military power. Sri Lanka in the post-war period also

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demonstrates a successful way of rebuilding the state by accommodating former LTTE members within the state structure. On January 13, 2013, Sri Lanka Minister of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms, Chandrasiri Gajadeera, disclosed that, of 11,500 LTTE cadres who were arrested or surrendered at the end of the war in 2009, and who were sent to rehabilitation camps thereafter, a total of 11,375 cadres had been ‘reintegrated’ into society. This left just 125 ‘un-integrated; LTTE cadres in the camps or under detention. These claims have been validated by international agencies.

On the contrary, countries such as India, Pakistan and Afghanistan still face internal chaos of conflicts and war like situation. India to certain extent seems able to contain the Naxal and Maoist insurgency in recent years but there are other new phenomenon like Indian Mujahedeen (IM) which carries out terror attacks across the countries. The coverts attacks of IM have been a serious challenge for security agencies to crack down. Evidently, it shows the characteristics of new wars. Similarly, Pakistan due to the number terror acts against state by home grown terror outfits has been now seen as a weak state. Another stark fact about the intrastate war in Pakistan, which claims number of life every now and then, is its sectarian violence in the society. The terror groups such as Taliban and Al-Qaeda have become global in their approach and operations. It has become indeed very difficult for a state to wipe them out as these groups have developed an ideology which influences people at the targeted places. With regard to Afghanistan one can see that despite the engagement of superpower with its best military strategy and ultra-modern logistics of warfare and a period of more than a decade it does not seem wining war there. Taliban still a potent challenge in Afghanistan for the state.

From the above discussion, one can conclude that the state itself is losing its salience in a globalizing world. State is increasingly under threat by linked global forces. Global economic forces and growing assertiveness of individuals, groups, clans, tribe and other such actors are eroding its power and authority.33 The end of Cold War which intensified globalisation and neo-liberalism has complicated the notion of security and security of people has also been seriously threatened. The rise of violent crime, terrorism/drug trade, disease, environmental degradation coupled with growing internal armed conflicts makes people more insecure.34

It is often argued that postcolonial states have been, from the beginning, defective states. In many of them a legitimate monopoly of physical force has not yet developed and the so-called new wars are therefore less an expression of state-decay than an indication that state-building processes have become increasingly derailed.35 In an intra-state war the administration of violence is no longer controlled by the state. Instead, the main organisations in charge of the domestic control of violence – police forces and the judiciary – are prone to dissolution. To them a general truth applies: intrastate wars have devastating effects on institutions because under the “preponderance of short-term thinking,” investments in institutions do not pay.36 Therefore, the effects of contemporary wars on statehood are ambivalent. There is no single, unambiguous causal relation between states and wars. States are not simple war machines and warfare does not automatically lead to a strengthening or weakening of the state. Instead, the contradictions of war seemingly apply also to the state. So it depends on concrete contexts whether the events and changes that occur during and after a war foster or weaken a form of political domination in which authority comes close to the ‘image’ of the state.37

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Notes

1. Colin M. Fleming, “New or Old War? Debating a Clausewitizian Future,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, (April-2009), p. 227.

2. Dietrich Jung, Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars; A Political Economy of Intra-state War (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 12.

3. T.V. Paul, Weak States and South Asia’s Perennial Insecurity, Working Paper, WISC Conference, Porto, Portugalm, August 17-20, 2011.

4. Edward Newman, “The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 2, (June- 2004), p. 175.

5. Rajat Kujur, Contemporary Naxal Movement in India: New Trends, State Responses and Recommendations, IPCS Research Paper, 27 May 2013.

6. Ibid.

7. Dietrich Jung, Op. cit., p. 22.

8. Edward Newman, Op. cit., p. 176.

9. S. Binodkumar Singh, “Troubled Normalcy” South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR), (online source accessed on 19/01/2014, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/Archives_ed.htm).

10. Dr. Harsh Kumar Sinha and Ashwini Kumar Pandey, “Naxalism: A Threat to India’s Internal Security”, Scholar’s Voice: A New Way of Thinking, Vol. 1, No. 1, (January- 2009), p. 103.

11. Pakistan Assessment 2013, South Asia Terrorism Portal (online source Accessed on 19/01/2014, http:// www.satp.org /satporgtp / countries/pakistan/index.htm).

12. Ibid.

13. Gilles Dorronsoro, “The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009, Washington DC., p. 22.

14. Ibid, p. 25.

15. Alice Hills and Clive Jones, “Revisiting Civil War,” Civil Wars, Vol. 8, No. I, (March-2006), p. 1.

16. Ibid.

17. Rajat Kujur, Op. cit.,

18. William S. Lind, cited in Colin M. Fleming, “New or Old War? Debating a Clausewitizian Future,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, (April-2009), p. 217.

19. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 3.

20. Ibid, pp. 3-4.

21. Gilles Dorronsoro, Op. cit., p. 10.

22. Ibid, p. 11.

23. Anindita Dasgupta, The ‘People’s War’ in Nepal, RCSS Policy Studies 38, p. 42.

24. Ibid, p. 9.

25. Kaldor, Op. cit., p. 34.

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26. Brian D. Taylor and Roxana Botea, “Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World,” International Studies Review, Vol. 10, 2008, p. 27.

27. Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State-Making, Regional Conflict and International System (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1995), p. 6.

28. Michael Sheehan, International Security: An Analytical Survey (New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), pp. 2-3.

29. Ayoob, Op. cit., p. 27.

30. Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, Inc., 1987), p. 1.

31. Sheehan, Op. cit., p. 40.

32. Thomas, Op. cit., p. 6.

33. Ajay Darshan Behera, Violence, Terrorism and Human Security in South Asia (Dhaka: University Press Ltd, 2008), pp. 17-19.

34. Ibid, p. 26.

35. Dietrich Jung, Op. cit., p. 22.

36. Klaus Schlichte “State Formation and the Economy of Intrastate Wars” in Dietrich Jung, Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars; A Political Economy of Intra-state War (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 33.

37. Ibid. p. 38.

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Bibliography

Ayoob, Mohammed, The Third World Security Predicament: State-Making, Regional Conflict and International System, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1995.

Ballentine, Karen and Jake Sherman (eds.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, New Delhi, Viva Books Pvt. Ltd., 2005.

Behera, Ajay Darshan, Violence, Terrorism and Human Security in South Asia, Dhaka, University Press Ltd, 2008.

Berdal, Mats and Malone D. (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder, Lynne Reinner, 2000.

Brown, David, “Why is the Nation-State So Vulnerable to Ethnic Nationalism,” Nation and Nationalism, Vol. 4, No 1, 1998, pp. 1-15.

Colin M. Fleming, “New or Old War? Debating a Clausewitizian Future,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 32, No 2, April, 2009, pp. 213-241.

Collier, P., On the Economic Consequences of Civil War, Oxford, Oxford Economic Papers, 1992.

Crevid, M. Van, The Transformation of War, New York, The Free Press, 1991.

Dasgupta, Anindita, “The ‘People’s War’ in Nepal”, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (Colombo) Policy Studies, No 38, 2006, pp. 09-53.

Dorronsoro, Gilles, “The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2009, pp. 12-32.

Duyvesteyn, Isaballe, “Contemporary War: Ethnic Conflict, Resource Conflict or Something Else,” Civil Wars, Vol. 3, No 1, 2000, pp. 92-116.

Edward, Newman, “The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No 2, 2004, pp. 173-189.

Fitz-Gerald, Ann, “Understanding Local Dynamics in Civil Wars,” Civil Wars, Vol. 3, No 1, 2002, pp. 1-16.

Fleming, Colin M., “New or Old Wars? Debating a Clausewitzian Future,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 32, No 2, 2009, pp. 213-241.

Hills, Alice and Clive Jones, “Revisiting Civil War,” Civil Wars, Vol. 8, No 1, 2006, pp. 1-5.

Jones, Clive, “A Framework for Analysis,” Civil Wars, Vol. 6, No 3, 2003, pp. 1-8.

Jung, Dietrich, Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars; A Political Economy of Intra-state War, London, Routledge, 2003.

Kaldor, Mary, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999.

Kujur, Rajat, Contemporary Naxal Movement in India: New Trends, State Responses and Recommendations, IPCS Research Paper, 27 May 2013, pp. 01-23.

Muner, Herfried, The New Wars, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005.

Napoleoni, Loretta, Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind Terror Networks, London, Pluto Press, 2003.

Newman, Edward, “The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No 2, June, 2004, pp. 173-189.

Pakistan Assessment 2013, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/index.htm (Accessed 19 May 2014).

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Paul, T.V. Weak States and South Asia’s Perennial Insecurity, Working Paper, WISC Conference, Porto, Portugalm, August 17-20, 2011.

Sheehan, Michael, International Security: An Analytical Survey, New York, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006.

Singh, S. Binodkumar, “Troubled Normalcy” South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR), South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/Archives_ed.htm (Accessed 19 January 2014).

Sinha, Dr. Harsh Kumar and Ashwini Kumar Pandey, “Naxalism: A Threat to India’s Internal Security”, Scholar’s Voice: A New Way of Thinking, Vol. 1, No 1, January, 2009, pp. 101-108.

Taulbee, James Larry, “The Privatization of Security: Modern Conflict, Globalization and Weak States,” Civil Wars, Vol. 5, No 2, 2002, pp. 1-24.

Taylor, Brian D. and Roxana Botea, “Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World,” International Studies Review, Vol. 10, No 1, 2008, pp. 27-56.

Thomas, Caroline, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, Inc., 1987.

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www.cesran.org

Vol. 6| No. 2 | July 2016

Journal of

Global Analysis

A Review of Public and Private Investment in South Africa

By Garikai Makuyana* & Prof. Nicholas M. Odhiambo**

Abstract

The paper aims to put the limelight on the growth dynamics of public and private investment in South Africa from the apartheid period through to 2012. With the adopted inward-looking growth policy during the apartheid, massive economic infrastructure public investment stimulated private investment. Growth buoyancy of private investment continued with the implementation of the market system in 1994, complemented by the core infrastructure growth. While the South African investment climate is considered to be competitive, at least in comparison to other African economies, there are areas that still need further improvement to unlock higher investment growth potential that includes non-all-inclusive infrastructure.

Keywords: South Africa; Apartheid; Public Investment; Private Investment; State Owned Enterprises; Market System; Economic Growth

* Garikai Makuyana (Corresponding Author) PhD(Economics) Candidate, Department of Economics, University of South Africa, Pretoria Email: grkmakuyana@gmail.com.

** Prof Nicholas M. Odhiambo, Department of Economics, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa, Email: odhianm@unisa.ac.za.

Journal of Global Analysis

Vol. 6 | No. 2

July 2016

www.cesran.org

Introduction

The debate in the policy and academic circles on the relative roles of public and private investment in the economic growth process particularly of developing economies is still ongoing. The focus of the debate is centred on two main areas, namely: (i) whether growth in public investment stimulates or retards private investment; and (ii) whether public investment promotes long-run economic growth more than an equivalent amount of private investment does.

However, there seems to be a general consensus that, firstly, public investment crowds in private investment when it is confined to economic and social infrastructure that guarantee the full functioning of the market system such as in health, education, energy and transport and communications.1 This underscores the need for high public sector investment in developing economies where it is believed to be in short supply. Secondly, it crowds out private investment when it is debt-financed in the presence of scarce resources and when it produces goods and services that pose direct competition with the private sector output.2

Given the influence of these different channels of public investment on private investment, the resultant effect on economic growth depends on which channel dominates, and it is an empirical issue. If the positive effect of a public investment increase dominates the negative effect of reduced private investment, the economic growth rate will accelerate. However, if the opposite arises, economic growth will retard. Thus, for policy makers in developing countries concerned with sustained high economic growth rates, it is not only growing the aggregate level of investment that matters, but also how it is split between public and private component.3

In the South African economy scenario, the relationship between public and private investment and their relative effect on economic growth can be noted from the apartheid period (1948-1994). Adopting the inward-looking growth strategy, public investment rose sharply during the period through State enterprises in energy, transport, communication and defence. This provided an impetus to private investment growth which was high, as were the economic growth rates during the 1960s and 1970s.4 However, the intensification of international economic sanctions during the 1980s against the apartheid regime marked the end of a high State economic presence. Public capital formation decelerated and further reduced with the adoption of the market reforms at the end of 1980.5

On the attainment of independence in 1994, the new government continued to implement the market reforms that were initiated by its predecessor. This resulted in the privatisation of the commercial activities of State enterprises and the restructuring of the core infrastructure entities to reflect the private sector’s commercial spirit. The economic growth rates that followed were higher relative to the low levels in the 1980s.6

To build a base for the creation of the developmental State agenda, the period 2004 to 2012 was marked by the re-emergence of the State in economic activities, which were mainly in economic infrastructure that complement private investment growth.7 Whilst the resulting public investment growth was high, overly so, private investment maintained dominance in

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all economic activities. This arrangement has been credited for the high and accelerating economic growth in South Africa.

Despite the crucial roles played by both public and private investment in shaping the economic growth process in South Africa, research work on their growth evolution and the link that may exist between them is somewhat sparse.8 This paper, therefore, aims to put the South African economy in the limelight by documenting the growth dynamics of public and private investment from the 1950s through to 2012.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 covers the evolution of public investment in South Africa, while section 3 discusses the emergence and growth of private investment. Section 4 tracks the growth trends of both public and private investment in response to economic reforms, which is followed by the concluding section.

The Evolution of Public Investment in South Africa

The volution of public investment in South Africa can be traced back to the apartheid era. During this period, State investment in core infrastructural activities was taken as a catalyst to the development of an economy that was based on resources (mining and agriculture), and later on resource processing. The construction of ports and railways became one of the first key infrastructure investments that were important to sustain the developing industrial process. This resulted in the State formation of the South African Rail and Harbours (SAR&H), in 1916.9

Initially, the discovery of diamonds in 1867 in Kimberley and later, gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 played important role in the genesis of public investment in South Africa which was predominantly centred on railway line construction.10

Between 1860 and 1867, the colonial government, using proceeds from the diamond mines, invested in railway lines which linked Cape Town and Durban. Public investment in railway lines continued after this, linking different parts of South Africa. It grew at an average rate of 5.7% between 1885 and 1910.11

Prior to the 1916 formation of SAR&H, the State invested in core communications facilities in 1910, which were overseen by the Department of Ports and Telegraphs. The State, through this department, formed enterprises that were responsible for the development of telephony, broadcasting, postal and other related infrastructure.12

Moreover, to provide a solid foundation for the enhancement of the processing of the national resources, a number of State-owned enterprises were formed in the 1920s. This included the formation of Eskom in 1923 to undertake the business of electricity generation, and later Iscor 1928 in the steel manufacturing industry. The establishment of Sasol followed in 1950 to value add on the coal resources through the production of fuel. Fuel production from coal was also necessitated by the need to reduce the dependence on imported petrol in the wake of the international economic sanctions against the apartheid regime.13

The period 1950 to 1994 was marked by a sustained growth of State-owned industries established to intensively process the energy resources. Public investment in these industries was ideal as the huge capital outlay required to achieve the necessary economies of scale was beyond the reach of the private sector. However, these industries were built through Eskom as it aimed to value-add on the country’s coal reserves, which also provided an impetus to the enhancement of industrialisation process. Iscor was also a catalyst in the economic growth process, especially as it supported the development of the manufacturing sector.

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The Restructuring of State-Owned Enterprises in South Africa during the Period 1994 to 2004

After attaining independence from the apartheid regime in 1994, the South African government inherited over 300 State enterprises. These State enterprises controlled over 50% of the fixed capital assets in the economy, a state of affairs which reflected the strong State economic management system.14 However, because of the growing inefficiencies of these State enterprises, which had already started during the apartheid system, the new government set out to privatise some portfolios of the parastatal sector.

Thus, in 1994 the department of public enterprises was renamed the ‘Office of Privatisation’. Under the economic philosophy that the government would not take an active commercial role in the economy, the mandate of the new department was to dispose of some State-owned enterprises. To reflect on the immediate economic needs of the society, the privatisation programme was modified into the State enterprise-restructuring policy. The restructuring which was adopted later after some initial effort to dispose of some State enterprises to the private sector, aimed to introduce the private sector commercial spirit within the strategic areas of the public enterprises’ value chain without necessarily selling them off.15

The State enterprise-restructuring strategy – which got endorsements from the adopted Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in 1994, Growth with Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) in 1996, the National Framework Agreement (NFA) in 1996 and later the Inter-ministerial Cabinet Committee on restructuring of State assets (IMCC) in 1999 – was an instrument through which the new South African government sought to address some of the economic, social and political imbalances inherited from the apartheid regime.16

In 1999, this restructuring strategy was narrowed down to the four largest State enterprises: Telkom (telecommunication), Transnet (transport), Denel (defence production) and Eskom (electricity production and distribution) – since they collectively commanded a strategic importance in the entire economy. Of the top 30 South African State-owned enterprises, the four controlled a cumulative 90% of the economic assets; 86% of the turnover and 94% of the net income of the combined top 30 South African State enterprises. Their economic dominance was far-reaching, which indicated their potential to boost the industrial policies.17

The Resurfacing of the State in Economic Activities

From the year 2004, there was a deliberate policy by the South Africa government to stall the then ongoing restructuring of the State-owned enterprises. Instead, State enterprises were incorporated in the agenda to create a developmental state. The restructuring and privatisation programme of the State-owned enterprises were made subordinate to the strategy of using the public enterprises to enhance the important national goals which were the provision of national goods and services, creation of sustainable employment and economic black empowerment. This was supposed to be achieved in parallel to fostering State enterprises’ productivity, profitability and competitiveness.18

In line with the developmental State agenda, the Department of Public Enterprises in the strategic plan for 2009-2012 was given mandate to direct public enterprises to contribute more to economic growth and employment creation. In the strategic plan, State-owned enterprises were positioned to provide infrastructure, address market failure, absorb labour, offer procurement and form strategic partnerships with domestic and foreign private sector equity holders in projects that required huge capital outlays.19

Both Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), which was launched in 2003/2004, and later the New Growth Path (NGP) economic strategies provided the institutional backing for the dependence on public enterprises to grow the economy.20 In line with this economic philosophy, the South African government increased its allocation of

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funds to public enterprises for the investment in various economic infrastructures. Public investment was, therefore, expected to grow to R370 billion in line with the Medium-term Budget Policy statement released in October 2005 for the period April 2005 to March 2008.Public infrastructure that received a boost in investment allocation included power generation and distribution, harbours, oil pipeline and rail transport.21

The New Growth Path Framework in 2010 also underscored the importance of high public infrastructure investment growth as the backbone for high and sustained economic growth. The framework focused on five key public investment areas, namely: communication, transport, water, energy and housing. In these areas, it was believed the much-needed high employment and economic growth rates could be achieved. New capital formation and the expanded maintenance programme of the existing infrastructure in the identified areas were the forms in which new value would be unlocked in employment and hence growth.22

Private Investment in South Africa

The origin and growth dynamics of private investment in South Africa, which largely was influenced by the public investment growth policies, can also be traced from the apartheid period (1948-1994). During the period, the adopted public investment-led growth strategy overshadowed the growth prospects of the private enterprises. Nevertheless, private investment growth benefited immensely from the adopted inward-looking strategy that was aimed to substitute imports and grow domestic absorption. This resulted in the creation of a vibrant mixed economic system, although the State had dominance in economic activities.23

Private investment in South Africa during the apartheid period was driven largely by the mining activities. There was rapid expansion in the private mining business, particularly in gold in the 1950s and 1960s. Its growth was furthered when mining groups vertically diversified their investment in the 1960s following the restriction on the exportation of capital from South Africa in 1961. Thus, taking advantage of the high core infrastructure growth in the 1960s and 1970s combined with the adopted import substitution policies, the mining houses invested in supplier industries such as production of specialist drilling equipment and in their market industries such as the steel value-adding production.24

Thus, total private investment in South Africa experienced growth buoyancy in the 1960s and 70s largely from the growing domestic aggregate demand which was stimulated by the inward-looking economic policy. However, the limit to this growth was reached in the 1980s during the height of the country’s international economic isolation triggered by apartheid. Private investment growth slowed down and this also coincided with the building up of inefficiencies in the State-owned enterprises.25

Partly because of these economic developments, the apartheid government embraced the neoclassical policies centred on privatisation of State-owned enterprises, prior to 1994. This set the tone for the promotion of the private sector to lead in the economic growth process. This was also believed to be a panacea to the high losses and low efficiency characteristic of State enterprises during the early 1980s.

The rationale for privatisation was also partly derived from the international (especially the Western developed economies) general belief that increasing share of government investments as a ratio to GDP implies an increasingly declining proportion of the resources allocated to the dictates of the market and price mechanism. This development was believed to promote economic inefficiency and retards economic growth rates.26

Privatisation of State enterprises in South Africa was also based on the world-wide trend which was firmly grounded on the fact that economies with the highest economic growth rates had kept the State economic participation to the basic low levels – implying that a growing share of the national resources were allocated to the competitive private sector.27

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The State and the private sector during the period embraced privatisation as a good strategy to stimulate high economic growth rates through the elimination of the State in commercial economic activities, promotion of competition by enhancing private capital ownership and embracing the ideologies of the free market system in economic management.28

Hence, privatisation during the end of the 1980s proceeded by first commercialising the targeted State enterprise to enhance its efficiency and profitability before its final disposal. Though the privatisation spirit lost some momentum in the early 1990s due to the constitution negotiations, few State enterprises were disposed and this included Sasol and Iscor.29

Trends in Public Investment, Private Investment and Economic Growth in South Africa from 1965 to 2012

Economic growth rates had generally been high in the 1960s and 1970s, which averaged about 4.5%. As can be observed in Figure 1, growth rates during the period were oscillating around 4%. Initially, these growth rates were propelled by higher private sector capital formation that was in dominance over its counterpart (public corporation and general government) during the 1960s to the early 1970s. The pre-dominant economic activities were private enterprises in mining and manufacturing. Later in the 1970s, the high economic growth rates were associated with a combined higher capital formation by public corporation and the general public dominating over the private sector. The growth trend benefited from the adopted inward-looking economic policy that set to replace imports and position State enterprises as an engine for economic growth. The State enterprises in energy, transport, communication and defence were the major drivers of this dominating new capital formation.

Figure 1: South Africa Economic Growth Rates from 1965 to 2012

Source: SARB

The limit to this public sector capital formation domination was reached in the 1980s when the international economic sanctions against the apartheid regime started to intensify. The economic isolation of the South African economy dried up funds for new State projects, resulting in a slowdown of the public investments. As a result, private investment overtook public investment in new capital formation, especially when it benefited from the market economic policies that were in the initial phases of adoption in the 1980s. Economic growth rates during the period were moderate, spiking around 2% up to 1994. It can, however, be

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argued that the contribution of private capital leadership to economic growth was overshadowed by the negative intensifying international economic sanctions during the period.

Private sector capital formation continued with its domination from 1994, when the new South African government adopted the privatisation programme which was to last until 2004. The cutting back of State enterprises inefficiency and the flourishing private business were associated with the upward economic growth trend that started from 1994 to 2007 (see Figure 1). Higher private fixed-investment expenditure in sectors such as real estate, tourism, manufacturing, mining (notably platinum) and automotive were behind this growth trend.30 The economic growth trend also benefited from the increased State new investment projects expenditure, especially in electricity (Eskom) and Transport (Transnet).

The growth trend of private investment from 1966 to 2013 can also be seen in the growth of domestic credit extended to the private sector for investment over the same period. As is illustrated by Figure 2, domestic credit to the private sector for the period from 1966 to the early 1990s remained suppressed. The greater part of this period corresponds to the era of high public investment growth which was largely financed by the domestic resources since the State could not easily secure cheap foreign credit because of the international sanctions levelled against the country. This may suggest that private investments were crowded out in domestic resource allocation by its public investment counterpart. However, higher economic growth rates experienced in the 1960s and 1970s may also suggest that the crowding in effect of the high public capital formation outweighed the private sector investment crowding out.

Figure 2: Domestic Credit Extended to the Private Sector Investment from 1966 to 2013 (in R Million)

Source: South African Reserve Bank Database

The sharp growth in domestic resources allocated to the private sector for investment (see Figure 2) from 1994 to 2013 can be explained by the pro private sector economic leadership policies implemented during the period. These were the privatisation programme of the period 1994 to 2004, the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic programme in 1996, the Accelerated Shared And Growth Initiative-South Africa (ASGISA) in 2006, the New Growth Path (NGP) in 2010 and the National Development Plan vision 2030 in 2011, which all promoted private sector economic leadership.

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The economic growth rates, however, reached the bottom low of -1.7% in 2009 from a peak of 5.7% in 2006. This was against a background of slowing private enterprise new capital formation starting in 2008, which plummeted to -16% in 2009. Higher growth in public corporation capital formation of 77% in 2008 and 16% in 2009 could not reverse the sharp drop in economic growth rates from 2007 to 2009. There are, however, other negative forces that can partly explain this negative growth, for example the weakening global economy during the period.31

As illustrated in Figure 1, recovery in economic growth started in 2010, when it rose sharply before it eased down in 2012. The recovery was associated with the increasing new capital formation in which the private sector was dominating. The increasing economic growth trend was expected to continue beyond 2012, underpinned by the private sector dominance in economic activities, with further growth in public sector investment expected to crowd in growth in private businesses.

Disaggregation of Total Investment by Economic Sectors

The analysis of capital formation by sector in South Africa since the 1950s confirm that private investment had been the driving force behind its economic growth process. As is illustrated in Table 1, the financial services sector had the highest share of the gross capital formation in the South African economy followed by manufacturing from 1950 to 2012. Ironically, these are the sectors which were dominated by the private sector enterprises, which imply the central importance of private investment in the South African economic growth process.

Table 1: Percentage Sectorial Contribution to Gross Investment from 1950 to 2012

Source:www.reservebank.co.za

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Sector

1950s

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000 to 2012

Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 16.72 9.89 7.08 5.04 3.82 2.56

Mining and Quarrying 12.15 7.45 6.42 11.36 9.92 9.50

Manufacturing 10.83 15.02 16.47 17.02 21.62 19.65

Electrical, Gas and Water 7.12 7.46 8.65 12.41 7.22 7.47

Construction 0.43 0.97 1.54 1.33 1.09 1.76

Wholesale and Retail Trade 5.49 6.48 6.45 5.67 6.22 7.01

Transport, Storage and Communication 13.62 13.79 15.03 10.82 10.95 15.29

Financial Services 20.03 19.43 19.31 22.46 23.40 20.35

Community, Social and Personal Services 13.60 19.50 19.06 13.89 15.75 16.37

Figure 3: Public Investment in South Africa form 1969 to 2012 (in million rands at 2000 constant prices)

Source: South African Reserve Bank Data

Figure 4 : Disaggregation of Public Investment into its Various Components in South Africa from 1960 to 2012 (in million rands at 2005 constant prices).

Source: South African Reserve Bank Data

The sectors that have been consistently losing their shares in total capital formation were agriculture, mining and electricity since the 1980s. On the positive side, construction, community, social and personal services sectors recovered their shares during the period from the 1990s to 2012. The overall growth trend of investment was such that private investment was higher in sectors where it had comparatively higher efficiency than its counterpart and public investment was high in sectors where it was expected to stimulate higher gross capital formation.

The consistent withdrawal of public investment from commercial activities can be affirmed from the South African disaggregated total public investment data from 1969 to 2012 (see

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Figure 3). Until the end of the 1980s, business public investment has been higher than its non-business counterpart. This signified the participation of the State in commercial activities that were predominantly in power generation, transport and telecommunication, which by their nature crowded in private investment. The reversal to this trend was from the 1990s when the share of non-business investment from total public investment exceeded business investment. The sectors in which this new trend was manifesting itself in the South African economy are shown in Figure 4.

The feature that stands out from Figure 4 is that construction work consistently occupied the greatest share of public investment even though for a while, machinery and other equipment were the highest from the end of the 1980s to the end of 1990s. This was in line with the inward-looking growth strategy as supported by public works which was implemented by the apartheid regime and even later by the new unity government.

The share of residential housing public investment showed an upturn soon after the transition from the apartheid era. The increase in this kind of investment was in line with the new government policy to provide decent shelter for the previously disadvantaged community. The decline in public investment in machinery and transport equipment after the transition to the new government in 1994 distinctly shows the disengagement of the State from the commercial economic activities.

The overal analysis from the disaggregated public investment in South Africa indicates that it is increasingly not competing with the private sector enterprises. A growing share of public investment resources has been allocated to the private sector complementary activities. However, the reducing public investment in transport, telecommunication and electricity in South Africa is a call for increased new capital formation in the basic infrastructure that catalyses higher private capital formation.

Challenges Facing Private and Public Investment in South Africa

Relative to other African economies, the South African investment climate is considered to be more competitive – with affordable and high-quality infrastructure and excellent property rights. This has resulted in South African private and public investment growing tremendously over time. However, sustained higher growth in investment and hence the economy can be possible if the South African government addresses the problems of the low levels of product market competition, inadequate infrastructure, and costly transport logistics and communication networks.32

Low levels of product market competition have also been holding back full investment growth in South Africa. As proxied by the mark-ups, the growing empirical body of literature for South Africa suggests that in comparison to industries worldwide, the manufacturing mark-ups are higher and are not falling.33

The high mark-ups and the resultant depressed product market competition in South Africa denies business operations static and dynamic gains that are consistent with increased competition.34 These arise due to resource reallocation resulting in higher productivity and the better use of technology in response to high competition. As has been suggested by Faulkner and Makrelov (2008), completely eliminating the manufacturing sector mark-ups would unlock the economic growth potential by 1.2 percentage points.35

Non-all-inclusive infrastructure in South Africa has also been slowing economic growth. Though several parts of South Africa have world-standard infrastructure in information technology, transport network, energy and education, there are some parts that suffer from extreme deprivation and exclusion from this infrastructure.36

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Intrinsically related to the problem of non-all-inclusive infrastructure in South Africa are the inefficient and costly transport logistics and communication networks. The absence of competition in the network industries has been blamed for not realising higher economic growth potential in South Africa.37

Lastly, difficulties in accessing affordable finance have been hampering growth in small and medium enterprises. The growth in these small enterprises has recently been deemed an important driver of further high investment growth and the economy of South Africa.

Conclusion

This paper discussed the evolution of public and private investment and the resultant economic growth rates from 1965 to 2012 for South Africa. From the analysis, three broad economic reform periods that shaped the two components of investment and economic growth stand out. These are: (i) the rise of public investment under the auspices of the inward-looking growth strategy during the apartheid era; (ii) the privatisation and restructuring of the State-owned enterprises during the period 1994 to 2004; and (iii) the re-emergence of the State in economic activities paralleled with the enhanced private enterprises growth promotion (2004-2012).

Under pressure from the high international economic sanctions, the apartheid government adopted the inward-looking economic growth policy. This gave rise to massive growth in core infrastructure public investment that crowded in private investment in various sectors of the economy. Initially the economic growth strategy was credited for the impressive economic growth rates that followed, but as the international economic sanctions intensified, it was abandoned for the neo-liberal policies.

To cut back on the growing inefficiencies in the parastatal sector, the new South African government at the dawn of independence in 1994 perpetuated the market policies that were initiated by its predecessor. Pivotal to these policies were the commercialisation of the State enterprises and the disposal of their non-core economic activities to revamp their efficiency. By 2004, not as much was achieved on the privatisation front, implying the continued high State presence in economic activities.

Necessitated by the objective to achieve high and all inclusive economic growth, the State re-emerged more strongly in economic activities during the 2004 to 2012 economic reform period. Massive growth in core infrastructure public investment, notably in electricity generation and communication, was rolled out as catalyst for sustained private investment growth.

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Notes

1. Aschauer, “Is public expenditure productive?”, 177-200; Aschauer, “Does public capital crowd out private capital?”, 171-188; Munnell, “Why has Productivity Growth Declined? Productivity and Public Investment”, 3-22; Odedokun, “Relative Effects of Public versus Private Investment Spending on Economic Efficiency and Growth in Developing Countries”, 1325-1336; Pereira, “On the Effects of Public Investment on Private Investment: What Crowds in What?”, 3-25.; Pereira and Andraz, “On the Impact of Public Investment on the Perfomance of US Industries”, 66-90; Afonso and Aubyn, , “Macroeconomic Rates of Return of Public and Private Investment: Crowding In and Crowding Out Effects” .

2. Rossiter, “Structural Cointegration Analysis of Private and Public Investment”, 59-67; Erden and Holcombe, “The Linkage Between Public and Private Investment: A Co-Integration Analysis of a Panel of Developing Countries”, 479-492; Graham, , “Public and Private Investment in United States and Canada”, 641-64; Narayan, “Do Public Investment Crowds Out Private Investment? Fresh Evidence from Fiji”, 747-753.

3. Khan and Kumar, “Public and Private Investment and the Growth Process in Developing Countries”, 69-88.

4. DPE, “Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises in South Africa”

5. Perkins et al., “An Analysis of Economic Infrastructure Investment in South Africa”, 211-228.

6. DPE, “Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises in South Africa”

7. Pitcher, “Was Privatisation Necessary and Did it Work? The Case of South Africa”, 243-260.

8. Reddy and Moodley, “Privatisation of Public Corporations in South Africa: The issue Re- Examined, Africanus”, 72-79; Mostert, “Reflections on South Africa’s Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises”, ; Perkins et al., “An Analysis of Economic Infrastructure Investment in South Africa”, 211-228.

9. DPE, “Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises in South Africa”

10. Perkins et al., “An Analysis of Economic Infrastructure Investment in South Africa”, 211-228.

11. Ibid.

12. DPE, “Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises in South Africa”

13. Clark, “Manufacturing Apartheid: State Corporations in South Africa”

14. Jerome, Privatisation and Regulation in South Africa - An Evaluation, 2004

15. DPE, “An Accelerated Agenda Towards the Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises”

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Pitcher, Pitcher, “Was Privatisation Necessary and Did it Work? The Case of South Africa”, 243-260.

19. Molefe, “Director general’s report”, 3; DPE, “Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises in South Africa, Ministry of Public Enterprises”

20. The Presidency, “Accelerated And Shared Growth Initiative- South Africa (ASGISA): A Summary”; Republic of South Africa, “The New Growth Path: The Framework”

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21. The Presidency, “Accelerated And Shared Growth Initiative- South Africa (ASGISA): A Summary”;

22. Republic of South of Africa, “The New Growth Path: The Framework”

23. Mostert, “Reflections on South Africa’s Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises”

24. Innes, “Anglo American and the rise of modern South Africa”

25. Faulkner and Loewald, “Policy Change and Economic Growth: A Case Study of South Africa”

26. Department of Public Enterprises, “White Paper on Privatisation and Restructuring”

27. Ibid.

28. Reddy and Moodley, “Privatisation of Public Corporations in South Africa: The issue Re- Examined”

29. DPE, “Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises in South Africa”

30. National Treasury, “South Africa’s Growth and Development: Overview”

31. African Economic Outlook, “South Africa 2010”

32. NPC, “National Development Plan 2030”; USAID/SA, “Country Development Cooperation Strategy Public Version, Fiscal Year 2013-2017”; South African Government and European Commission, “Joint Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Cooperation Between the European Union and South Africa”; SARB, “Achieving Higher Growth and Employment: Policy Options for South Africa”

33. Fedderke et al., “Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry”, 28-69; Aghion et al. “Competition and Productivity Growth in South Africa” ,

34. Nickell, “Competition and Cooperation Performance”, 724-746.

35. Faulkner and Makrelov, “Productivity-Raising Interventions for the South African Economy: a CGE Analysis”

36. NPC, “National Development Plan 2030”

37. OECD, 2008

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Afonso, A and Aubyn, M.S, “Macroeconomic Rates of Return of Public and Private Investment: Crowding In and Crowding Out Effects”, Working Paper, No. 06/2008/DE/UECE, Department of Economics, Technical University of Lisbon, 2008.

African Economic Outlook. South Africa 2010, African Development Bank, 2010.

Aghion, P; Braum, M and Fedderke, J, “Competition and Productivity Growth in South Africa”, CID Working Paper, No. 132, Center for International Development, Harvard University, 2008.

Aschauer, D, “Is public expenditure productive?”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1989a, p 177-200.

Aschauer, D, “Does public capital crowd out private capital?”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1989b, p 171-188.

Clark, N. Manufacturing Apartheid: State Corporations in South Africa, Yale University Press, 1994.

Department of Public Enterprises, Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises in South Africa, Presidential Review Committee, Ministry of Public Enterprises, Republic of South Africa, 2012a.

Department of Public Enterprises, Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises in South Africa, Ministry of Public Enterprises, Republic of South Africa, 2012b.

Department of Public Enterprises, An Accelerated Agenda Towards the Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises, Ministry of Public Enterprises, Republic of South Africa, 2000.

Department of Public Enterprises, White Paper on Privatisation and Restructuring, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1987.

Erden, L and Holcombe, R.G, “The Linkage Between Public and Private Investment: A Co-Integration Analysis of a Panel of Developing Countries”, Eastern Economic Journal, Vol. 32, No.3, 2006, p 479-492.

Faulkner, D and Loewald, C, “Policy Change and Economic Growth: A Case Study of South Africa”, Policy Paper, No. 14, National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa, 2008.

Faulkner, J and Makrelov, K, “Productivity-Raising Interventions for the South African Economy: a CGE Analysis”, Paper Presented at the Eco Mod 2009 Conference, Ottawa Canada, 2009.

Fedderke, J.W; Kularatne, C and Mariotti M, “Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry”, Journal of African Economics, Vol.16, No. 1, 2007, p 28-69.

Graham, M.V, “Public and Private Investment in United States and Canada”, Economic Modelling, Vol. 29, No.4, 2002, p 641-64.

Innes, D. Anglo American and the rise of modern South Africa, Heinemann, 1984.

Jerome, A, “Privatisation and Regulation in South Africa - An Evaluation”, 3rd International Conference on Pro-Poor Regulation and Competition: Issues, Policies and Practices, Cape Town- South Africa, 2004.

Khan, M.S and Kumar, M.S, “Public and Private Investment and the Growth Process in Developing Countries”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 59, No.1, 1997, p 69-88.

Molefe, P, “Director general’s report”, , In: Department of Public Enterprises, Strategic Plan, 2009-2012, p. 3, 2009.

Mostert, C, “Reflections on South Africa’s Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises”,

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Munnell, A.H, “Why has Productivity Growth Declined? Productivity and Public Investment”, New England Economic Review, January/ February, 1990, pp 3-22.

Narayan, P.K, “Do Public Investment Crowds Out Private Investment? Fresh Evidence from Fiji”, Journal of Policy Modelling, Vol. 26, No.6, 2004, pp 747-753.

National Treasury, “South Africa’s Growth and Development: Overview”, National Treasury Growth Diagnostics Workshop, 2005.

Nickell, S, “Competition and Cooperation Performance”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 104, 1996, p 724-746.

NPC (National Planning Commission), “National Development Plan 2030”; Our Future –Make it Work, South African Government, 2012.

Odedokun, M.O, “Relative Effects of Public versus Private Investment Spending on Economic Efficiency and Growth in Developing Countries”, Applied Economics, Vol. 29 No.10, 1997, p 1325-1336.

OECD, South African Economic Assessment, 2008.

Pereira, A.M and Andraz, J.M, “On the Impact of Public Investment on the Perfomance of US Industries”, Public Finance Review, Vol. 31, No.1, 2003, p 66-90.

Pereira, A.M, “On the Effects of Public Investment on Private Investment: What Crowds in What?”, Public Finance Review, Vol. 29, No.1, 2001, p 3-25.

Perkins, P; Fedderke, J and Luiz, J, “An Analysis of Economic Infrastructure Investment in South Africa”, South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 73, No.2, 2005, p 211-228.

Pitcher, A, “Was Privatisation Necessary and Did it Work? The Case of South Africa”, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 39, No.132, 2012, p 243-260.

Reddy, P.S and Moodley, D, “Privatisation of Public Corporations in South Africa: The issue Re- Examined, Africanus”, Journal of Development Alternatives, Vol. 23, No.1 and 2, 1993, p 72-79.

Republic of South Africa, The New Growth Path: The Framework, South African Government, 2010.

Rossiter, R, “Structural Cointegration Analysis of Private and Public Investment, International Journal of Business and Economics, Vol. 1, No.1, 2002, p 59-67.

SARB, “Achieving Higher Growth and Employment: Policy Options for South Africa”, Working Paper, No. 13/03, South African Reserve Bank, 2013.

South African Reserve Bank, Online Historical Macroeconomic Time Series Information, Various Issues.

South African Government and European Commission, Joint Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Cooperation Between the European Union and South Africa, South African Government, European Commission and European Union member States, 2006.

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www.cesran.org

Vol. 6| No. 2 | July 2016

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The Role of Contesting Ideologies: Civil-Military Relations in Turkey By Assist. Prof. Dr. Rahman Dag*

Abstract

Civil-military relationship is generally examined through the use of an institutional approach or theories (concordance) that emphasise the salience of power struggles and social cohesion. These contributions are important but often exclude the role of contesting ideologies. To address this gap, this paper takes an ideological approach to address civil-military relations in Turkey. The analyses commence with the military reforms of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century and the Republican period. The paper argues that modernization projects of the Empire paved the way for military superiority which turned into being saviour and founders of the Republic. It then moves to consider the ideological parameters that coloured the military establishment, arguing that the target of modernization was itself systemized and internalized into Kemalist ideology and the duty to preserve this remains inculcated in the contemporary military establishment.

Key Words: Civil-Military Relations, Turkey, Kemalism, Military Coup d’état

* He obtained his BA from Istanbul Yeditepe University and then MA degree from the SOAS (School of Orient and African Studies) in London. He was awarded with the Philosophy of doctorate degree from Exeter University, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies. The core point of his thesis is the ideological roots of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamist political movements determining the perceptions between them. In addition, he is now acting as head of CESRAN International (Centre for Strategic and Research Analysis) Turkey Focus Programme and also working as assistant professor at Adıyaman University/ Turkey.

Journal of Global Analysis

Vol. 6 | No. 2

July 2016

www.cesran.org

Introduction

Civil-military relations have generated interest among researchers of authoritarianism and democratization throughout the 20th century due to the various power struggles between civil and military authorities in Latin American, African and various Middle Eastern states. The debates over this issue, from a theoretical perspective, have largely focused upon where states are located on the authoritarian-democratic continuum,1 and whether they are dictatorships or not. The range of views is broad, but largely has an institutional focus. While studying coups and military regimes in African countries, for example, Decalo argues that armies intervene into civil politics fundamentally because of decay amongst the military hierarchy rather than due to their organizational strength.2 From a society-centred approach, Finer3 and Huntington4 suggest that the political culture of society and the politicization in social forces and state agencies respectively are the driving force behind armies’ intrusions into civilian political life. From Nordlinger’s point of view5, the corporate interests of the armed forces and their advancement or possible threats stemming from civilian politics stand as the core motives directing where and when military power intervenes. He further argues that failures of incumbent civil governments in establishing economic stability or addressing social disorder and the concomitant polarization of society and corruption can consolidate a military’s coup initiative and even legitimize it in the eyes of society. Building upon this idea, Sakallıoğlu bases her theoretical framework on David Pion-Berlin’s institutional approach to South American civil-military relations for her examination of civil-military relations6 in Turkey with “index variables measuring the military’s political effectiveness vis-a-vis civilian institutions”7 in the period since the 1980 coup. Last but not least, Demirel’s analytical framework8 might also be categorized as an institutional approach as he analyses civil military relations in Turkey through power relations.

These institutional-type analyses are valuable contributions, yet none of the examples that address developments in Turkey have examined civil-military relations from an ideological perspective, despite the fact that in each military intervention, military rulers legitimized and justified their actions with arguments centred on the idea that they were doing so to protect and restore Kemalist principles. In this regard, the institutional approach to civil-military relations in Turkey fall short in fully comprehending the rationale behind coup d’états. This is in line with arguments made by prominent Turkish observers, in particular Metin Heper and Tanel Demirel, who argue that the military intervened in Turkey because it was afraid of losing power to a democratic system and of the possible social and political ‘disorder’ that democracy could cause. Such arguments have partial credibility but they fail to take into account the fact that the type of democratic regime the military sought and supports is not the one that the people necessarily demanded, but rather, the Kemalist-inspired system that is increasingly challenged by civilian political initiatives. It is surprising that despite repeated explicit announcements from the military establishment regarding its intent to protect the ideals of Kemalism, there have been very few studies addressing this, and especially the question of why the military considered this of greater significance than the other demands being made by political parties.

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Concordance theory might be exempted from the institutional approach as it recognizes cultural differences and gives importance to understanding of each political unit. The founder of this theory, Rebecca L. Schiff, argues that concordance among the military, political elites, and the citizenry is a fundamental determinant of not having a coup, regardless of which political regime is in use.9 Relying on this theory, each coup d’état must be examined to grasp which of the determinants discord the concordance. This is what Nilufer Gole did in her article taking each military intervention since the 1980 coup one by one under scrutiny.10 Despite the fact that she comprehensively uses the cover guardianship model including wide range of interventions forms11 it still fails to show from where the military in Turkey gained the guardianship position.

Before moving on, it is important to mention what this paper purposes, that is, a way of analysing the coups in Turkey away from the institutional approach and concordance theory to civil-military relations. As will become explicitly clearer later, the military in Turkey, which is one of the key institutions of state agency that has been driven by Kemalist ideology, almost always employed state institutions to maintain its dominancy over civilian politics. The striking point the paper indicates is that any institution (judiciary, legislation, special councillor groups consisted of experts, media) involved in coup d’états justified its stance by arguing that it was necessary to keep Kemalism alive because it was the only way of modernizing the state and catching up with the western world. The paper will argue that institutions here are just instruments, though the driving force has always been ideas which are considered to be the best way for modernization and which the military has spearheaded and guarded throughout its history. Therefore, the most striking point of the paper will be to examine thoroughly how the military obtained such a position historically and used this ideologically-oriented attitude to take ‘institutional’ precautions to justify its dominance over civilian politics.

In practical terms, based on recent developments within the last decade compare to a century-long military dominancy, civil-military relations in Turkey have dramatically evolved in favour of dominance of civil politics. Despite this, it seems impossible to determine to what degree military tutelage is still hovering above the state apparatus (judiciary, bureaucracy, media, and economy) as it depends on how deep military-driven Kemalism has been inserted into the institutions and the mind-sets constituting these. The most striking point of civil-military relations in Turkey is that the country seems to be more or less a democratic regime; however, civilian control decision-making processes has not generally occurred throughout its history unless the civilian politicians have come from a military background. For instance, relying on an unofficial arrangement, for a considerable period, there has been an understanding that the position of the presidency of Turkey should be occupied by an ex- high-ranking military officer. The paper, in this respect, would give a solid historical and practical explanation on the fundamental reason why the military interrupted democracy and only withdrew to its barracks once politics rearranged itself so that the military had remained the overseeing factor in the state politics.

This paper attempts to address these questions by firstly examining how, why, and when the modernizing role of the military in society emerged and was consolidated. In doing so, it will be argued that this process is actually almost two centuries old, as the military establishment firstly became a centre for modernization, before projecting agency as a modernizing force in its own right. The next section will argue that based on this history the military self-perceived, and has been perceived by the people of Turkey, as the ultimate guardian of the ideologically Kemalist-oriented state to such an extent that whenever they felt that this was threatened they intervened in civilian politics to restore the core principles of Kemalism. Lastly, whether this ‘guardian’ position of the military has been eliminated will also be discussed.

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Origins of the Position of the Military in Turkey’s History

The military’s position in the eyes of Ottoman society remained largely the same as it had been from the Republican era up to the present. Relying on Wittek’s work,12 Heper mentions that the “ruling institution in the Ottoman Empire was called Askeriye (the military).”13 The head of every institution, including the military, had become the Sultan, which lasted for as long as military expansion continued. However, from the late eighteenth century to the end of the Empire, the Sultan’s absolute power gradually decreased. As a result, components of Ottoman society emerged as separate interest groups, and a power struggle commenced. One of these groups was the army, which was also one of the first areas to be subjected to reformation and modernization in order to compete with its European counterparts. Although the reformation and modernization process was similarly applied to the administration of other structures of state, the military had always been the leading and most prominent modernized component of the Ottoman state structure.14 In other words, “the military emerged as the prime Westernizing force in modern Turkish history.”15 As a consequence of experiencing a century-long modernization process, the Ottoman Empire created its own modernized elites who distanced themselves from everyday people. Those elites, especially military officers, had become much more familiar with Western values and modernization and did not restrict themselves to military-related issues.16 In this sense, by considering themselves as the most developed modernizing force of society, military officers thus also committed themselves to be the leading advocates for modernization within society.

In regards to the first initiative of the process, by the early eighteenth century, the Nizami Cedid Ordusu (New Order Army), which was established by Sultan Selim III, was pursued but then abandoned due to the reaction of the embedded Janissary corps. The second initiative to form a modern army was then undertaken by Sultan Mahmud II with the establishment of the Asakir-i Manzume-i Muhammediyye (Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad) towards the end of the first quarter of 19th century, immediately after the abolishment of the Janissaries.17 These modernized military elites18 together with the modernized bureaucrats of the newly restructured administration initially constituted the “Young Ottomans” who were in favour of modernization and later became the “Young Turks”19 who felt that a constitutional monarchy was the only means of enabling the Ottoman Empire to overcome its inferiority when compared to European powers. Based on the common goal of being against Sultan Abdulhamid II’s regime, together with other modernized elites, military officers established a political party called İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress, henceforth CUP), which took power via a coup d’état in 1908.20 The CUP, at this time, believed that they were the only social power that could carry the Empire into the modern world.

After the demise of the Empire, Atatürk and his close associates who had been members of the CUP continued to believe that the only way to be free from European domination was to be like the European powers, not only in terms of military power but also in social, cultural, economic and political terms. Thanks to the use of Islamic rhetoric21 and their support for traditional values during the War of Independence during WW1, indispensable public support and legitimacy was gained by Atatürk and the military in the period following the end of the Empire. The (external) war to compel the Europeans to leave Anatolia and Istanbul ended in 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne, but an internal civil war against ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘separatism’ continued until the end of 1930. Between the end of the external and the internal war, despite the fact that those involved with politics were required to resign from their positions in the military, Atatürk was still proclaimed to be the “Prime Commander” and his close military elites associates, such as İsmet İnönü, Rauf Orbay, and Fevzi Çakmak, among others, were still affiliated with the Turkish army.22

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The means of enhancing the military’s position to a higher level in terms of leading the modernization process was done through ‘Kemalism’, an ideology that was systematized by Atatürk from the inception of the Republic until his death in 1938 and was interpreted and applied by his party, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, the RPP afterwards).

Kemalism23 is a political ideology whose aim has been to eliminate what was inherited from the Ottoman state, including social structures based on multi-ethnic and religious principles and to replace them with an ethnically homogeneous and secular model based on Western style nation states. These ideas were to be fully implemented in the country, on the ashes of what has remained from the Empire as the best path for modernization. These doctrines gained ultimate significance to the extent that they represented alternative ideals in society that had to almost worshipped and followed without question. This process is described by Küçükcan24 as the “sacralisation of the state and secular nationalism.” Another factor which enhances the military’s supreme role within Kemalist ideology is that Atatürk himself employed former military officers within his newly established administration and the Assembly of Turkey. For example, approximately, 20 percent of the Assembly as well as 30 percent of the administrative posts were filled by former military officers in the early republican period.

Suna Kili suggests that Kemalism is a product of the evolution of the ideas which followed during the independence war and underpinned the reforms implemented by Atatürk following the war. Indeed, it may be true that a combination of these ideas created the core of Kemalism. However, the abandoning of traditional Islamic discourses and the multi-ethnic characteristics which were used to mobilize the people, but later superseded with secular and ethnically single-nation centric (Turkish) principles, do not seem to support her argument. Because, the contradictories between these ideologies, or lifestyles in society have provided distinctive and somewhat contradictory ideals concerning the target of modernization (westernization).

This Kemalist ideology consisted of six ‘arrows’ (republicanism, statism, populism, laicism, revolutionalism and nationalism) and was inserted firstly into the party program of the RPP and then into the 1924 constitution.25 These principles were considered the only means of achieving a European level of modernization in every aspect of life and, since then their protection has been undertaken by the military elite.26 In addition, the defining feature of Western democracy (multi-party system and free election), particularly after WW2, has also been inserted in the politics in Turkey which are strictly affiliated with the secular nation-state structure embedded into western style modernization.27 An almost identical process was experienced during the late Ottoman Empire in the case of the emergence of the CUP, which consisted mostly of modernized military elites and bureaucrats seeking to constrain the absolute power of the Sultan. After the collapse of the Empire, the Republican Party generated the new civil bureaucracy and politicians, while the military refrained from engaging in politics, but was given the duty of protecting the established republic ideals based on Kemalist principles. To illustrate this, Atatürk himself presented the duty of guarding the Republic to the army in 1931 by arguing that,

... the Turkish nation has ... always looked to the military... as the leader of movements to achieve lofty national ideals... When speaking of the true owners of this country... The Turkish nation... considers its army the guardian of its ideals.28

But this solidification of the role of the military did not come into existence following the demise of the Empire. Rather, the process by which the military gained a higher status in society actually began as early as the late eighteenth century with efforts to modernize the military made by the Empire. These efforts helped the military to consolidate its power and influence in the late Ottoman Empire and meant that by the time of the establishment of the new Republic, due to the military background of many prominent figures, especially Atatürk

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and his close associates, the military was in a preeminent position to take power. Thanks to the modern Turkish republic, emerging modern bureaucratic and political elites with pasts in the military, and the military itself formed foundational ideals which were labelled as Kemalism.29 In this regard, Kuru provides a crucial insight when explaining that,

Ideological allies, particularly in the judiciary, political parties, and media, in addition to some segments of society, provided the Turkish military with the necessary political power and encouragement. These influential civilians embraced assertive secularist, Turkish nationalist, and anti-communist ideologies, which made them worried about “Islamic reactionary,” “Kurdish separatist,” and communist threats.30

Amongst these ideological allies,31 the military institution has been perceived as being the most influential due to its task of protecting against external and internal enemies.32 The statements of Chief of General Staff and President of Turkey after the 1980 coup d’état, General Kenan Evren, in an interview conducted by Demirel, are significant in this regard. When he was asked about how people react toward a probable military intervention, he replied:

It was the military which established the Republic and brought democracy. Whatever new [development] came to Turkey after the abolition of (the Ottoman) dynasty, and even before it, was brought through the channels of the army... for that reason people placed trust in the military...33

This response from General Kenan Evren, one of the most prominent figures and leader of the most extensive military coup d’état in the history of modern Turkey, offers a brief summary of the main argument for this part of the paper. Specifically, the military has always been seen as a modernizing force/agent from the early 19th century and this process has thus facilitated the perception of the military as the guardian of the state.

In the meantime, the Turkish Armed Forces was able to train and educate its own cadets through its military schooling system. In these schools, cadets would be inculcated with the idea of protecting the state against internal and external enemies and indoctrinated with Kemalist ideals.34 Military elites therefore ensured the reproduction of future elites who shared an identical understanding of the world. Additionally, the recruitment policy of the Turkish military for high-ranking posts has been conducted with attention paid to whether the individuals are the sons of existing military personnel or not, in order to ensure the preservation of Kemalist commitments. Indeed, as Brown explains, “The glue that binds these officers to the previous groups and to other societal elites is Kemalism, the philosophy that is inculcated in cadets and officers throughout their careers.”35 In so doing, the Turkish military has never cut its ties to domestic affairs by focusing solely on external defence of the country. Kemalist understandings have been imposed by Kemalist elites not only in the military but also in civil politics, the judiciary, and the economy and have been used to counter distinctive ways of life demanded by minority social groups. Indeed, the military can be considered as tied to domestic political developments as much as it is to the defence of the country from external threats.36

In summary, the Turkish Armed Forces have been perceived to continue its modernizing functions by following the footsteps of Kemalism. In the single party era from 1923 to 1946, because there was a consistency in ideological concordance amongst most of the state elites, intellectuals and military leaders, any sort of intrusion from the military to the civil politics, had not been an issue. In other words, “The military might be the most distinctive defender of the secular state, but it is not the only one. Indeed, it derives much of its political effectiveness from the fact that it works within the larger framework of institutions and ideas that underpin the established order.”37 However, whenever a social group attempted to soften Kemalist ideal in society, or to offer an alternate set of ideas, as seen for instance in debates about Islamism, Kurdish nationalism, and the open market economy versus a state-

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centric economy,38 the Turkish Armed Forces felt that they had a duty to intervene in civil politics to restore Kemalist principles. A Kemalist ideology-dominated democracy is thus regarded as the best and only way to maintain a modernized state. What we argue here is that, despite the fact that the majority of people in Turkey do not entirely adhere to “Atatürk fetishism”,39 they have respect for him and his ideals. The military, as the guardian of the state and Kemalist ideology, has taken this responsibility to protect the Kemalist state on its shoulders.

The Kemalism-oriented Military as the Guardian of the State

The dilemmas posed by democratic norms to military elites in contemporary Turkey are very important to this topic. Within the context of modernization, or ‘westernization’, democracy occupies an elevated position as an indication of an achieved level of progress.40 Thus, it is contradictory if the military is understood as being against democracy and is regarded as being a means of establishing military dictatorship or supporting authoritarianism. The difficult part of democracy, for the military guardians of Kemalism, is that it is always open to the potential of non-Kemalist ideas passing into civil political life. This however constitutes a threat to the dominant ideology, to such an extent that the Turkish military forces believed that “a fully fledged democratic regime might jeopardize the existence of the secular and unitary Turkish republic.”41 Because a democratic regime was a vital requirement of achieving western-style modernization level (one of the core targets of the Kemalist modernization project), military elites never directly remained in power for more than three years. Yet, during those times, they have sought to ensure that alternative powers would not have the chance to challenge the official state ideology of Kemalism. This issue will be touched upon further, but it is important to note here that recent attempts to offer alternatives to Kemalism have proven more successful than ever before and there is a considerable amount of public support for such a change.

Whether coups have been direct interventions, or through the forced resignation of incumbent governments (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007), military elites have justified their interventions by invoking the potential degeneration of the Kemalist order together with the potential for social disorder caused by failures of civil governments.42 Throughout the single party era, there was no requirement for the military to become involved in civil politics as almost all elements of the state structure, especially the RPP, the judiciary, parliament, government and presidency were already pursuing Kemalism as their guiding principle.43 However, once the transition from the single party to the multi-party era was accomplished, those who did not internalize or unconditionally approve of the Kemalist ideology rushed to join alternative political parties, even though most of the founders of the opposition Democrat Party (DP) were from the RPP and owed their parliamentarian seats from their time at the RPP. Regardless, they eventually achieved their goals of entering into civilian party politics and became influential in various parties. However, when the military realized that their dominant position in the state was eroding and that none-Kemalist demands from both leftists (including Kurds) and conservatives were gaining currency in society, they took steps to explicitly remind the population of their ideological position and reinstall Kemalism into its dominant position in politics via a coup d’état in 1960. In line with the core argument of this paper, Demirel has also noted that “indeed, compromising the principles of Atatürk to garner votes has been singled out by commanders as the chief reason for both the 1960 and 1971 military intervention.”44 Taking such a measure overtly illustrated the ideological orientation of the military in Turkey as they chose to halt an ongoing democratic process to restore their privileged ideology.

The 1960 coup d’état should actually be regarded as a turning point in the history of civil-military relations in Turkey as the military ruling elites began to establish a method through which they could watch and control civil politics by being regarded as a crucial part of the

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democratic apparatus. The vital institution that the military formed to control civilian politics was the National Security Council45 (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu- NSC afterwards). This was constitutionalized by the National Union Committee in the 1961 constitution. This constitutional institution and its General Secretariat (formed with an amendment to the constitution) aimed to define the national security agenda which would then be presented to the civil government and specifically the Council of Ministers (Bakanlar Kurulu-CoM afterwards). Its decisions were firstly aimed at assisting the government as indicated in the constitutional article. In practical terms, it actually meant that the NSC served as a higher institution than the CoM. Furthermore, there were two assembly systems, one of which was the senate assembly to which the military was constitutionally given the right to appoint a certain number of people for perpetuity.46 Indeed, the list of legal institutions, including “the presidency, organization of defence, military budgets, arms production, procurement, military modernization, internal security and intelligence gathering and senior promotions”,47 with which the military is involved and thus maintains as non-accountable to civilian authorities can be extended almost indefinitely.48 Due to the time it would take to address all of these violations it is better to end this section of the paper by focusing specifically on the establishment of the military courts.49 These courts were run by military judges and inspectors in 1963 and their decisions were not allowed to be challenged by civilian courts.50 This has changed only recently. In addition to article 35 of the internal service act of Turkish Armed Forces, after the 1980 coup d’état, another act further legitimizing future interventions was enacted in the form of article 85 which stated that Turkish Armed Forces shall defend the country against internal and external threats, if necessary by force.51

From the above analysis, the most important fact to note is that when the military encountered the possibility of a replacement or even reinterpretation of Kemalism that differed from their own, they took swift action to halt the democratic processes. Their justification for doing so was established during the reign of the Democrat Party (DP) from 1950-1960, when article 34 of the Internal Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces was regulated. It emphasises that “the military is responsible for defending both the Turkish Fatherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Constitution.” The phrase of the constitution has intentionally being used as it refers to the six pillars of Kemalism favoured by the DP and so the military gained constitutional legitimacy.

The peak of this agenda can be observed in the so-called ‘soft coup’ done against the Islamist Welfare Party in the 1990s as the military increasingly became involved in domestic affairs via the creation of sub-working groups watching over civilian governments. These included the “Western Study Group” (Batı Çalışma Grubu)52 that provided briefings to journalists53 and intellectuals, aimed to influence universities and business associations and eventually and the constitutional court itself – a body which had the power to shut down political parties.54 This sort of conspicuous involvement into all aspects of the state and society can be traced back to the prerogatives the military took in the pre and post-28th February Process in 1997 (another name for the soft coup).55 The argument made by military commanders, that they “could not be in good terms with those who acted against the Atatürkist principles”56 in response to Necmettin Erbakan’s statements that his party did not seek any conflict with the military, can be regarded as reflecting the inherent opposition felt by Kemalists towards any Islamist ideology in Turkey.

The fundamental indication of these regulations concerning oversight of civilian governments is that the military ruling elites do not trust civilian politicians to protect the core premises of the State. Indeed, the intentions of high-ranking military officers can be explicitly proven by examining their statements. Kenan Evren, the leader of the 1980 coup d’état, head of the NSC and President of Turkey from 1983 to 1990 once stated that, “We were afraid that if, following the military interventions, a political party leader we would not approve of comes to power everything that we had worked so hard to achieve may be done away.” In addition,

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Turkey’s Chief of General Staff from 1987 to 1990, Necip Torumtay, also argued that “we came to the conclusion that our liberty, independence, and progress towards contemporary civilization were dependent upon our safeguarding the secular and democratic Turkish republic and the Atatürkian principles” while Doğan Güreş, Chief of General Staff from 1990 to 1994 stated his goals as being the safeguarding the “modern and secular features of the Turkish republic ... [and] defending the country against its internal and external enemies.”57

Considering the four previous intrusions of the military and the precautions they established afterwards, it can be argued convincingly that the military has committed itself, before withdrawing back to the barracks, to ensuring that there is no possibility of powerful alternative political groups emerging who could challenge the core promises of Kemalism and the military’s supremacy as its guardian.58 The measures taken have created convenient conditions in cases where the military feels the need for another intrusion so as to eliminate anti-Kemalist or semi-Kemalist political foci, which cannot be achieved through a democratic means.59 By taking lessons from the DP case and as a practical precaution to prevent a strongly supported political party gaining power that allows for anti-Kemalist ideas to develop, a proportional representation system was brought in by the 1961 constitution, which was championed as the most democratic and liberal constitution in Turkey’s political history. However, contrary to what the military expected, the new election system60 paved the way for more liberal, socialist, Islamist and separatist groups gain seats in parliament. For instance, the Turkish Worker Party61 a leftist group, the Islamist National Order Party (later National Salvation Party), and radical Turkish nationalists (later the Nationalist Action Party) with fewer votes but effective public support caused social disorder as they fought to alter the state’s ideology to be in line with their ideals.62

The precautions taken by military rulers generated excuses for another military intervention into civil politics. Nonetheless, the intention of the military ruling elites to employ the Islamic tradition in the 1980s as a countermeasure against communist or socialist groups entailed enlarging the relevant social and political arenas they could operate freely in. It seems evident that there is a clear relationship between the rise of the relatively conservative Motherland Party and later the Welfare Party and this official policy of the military ruling elites. Despite this, the military again decided that they had to intervene in politics to halt the degeneration of the Kemalist secular principle of the state against the revival of Islamist politics. As such, the military officers sought to eliminate conservative or Islamist political groups from the political scene via a softer coup d’état, which forced Necmettin Erbakan, the prime minister and the head of Welfare Party to resign from his post in 1997. Even though they had taken efforts to establish a considerable amount of legal and social precautions to prevent the revival of a non-Kemalist party, they could not anticipate the rise of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, henceforth JDP) in the 2002 national election. In summary, from the analysis presented above, apart from the first coup in 1960, all future coups seem to have been carried out to try and alleviate the side effects or unintended results of precisely those precautions taken by the military to strengthen the Kemalist ideology in the country.

Has the guardianship position of the Turkish Military been eliminated?

The time when military tutelage over civilian politics was at its height can be said to have been during the February 28 process.63 This process ended with the replacement of the Welfare-True Path coalition government with another coalition government consisting of the Motherland Party, Democratic Left Party, and National Action Party. That one tacitly approved the NSC decision.64 As has been repeatedly mentioned above, this process was driven by the central argument that Islamic political activities had threatened the core ideals of secularism, which form a vital part of Kemalism.65

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However, the situation in the post February 28 process period showed the contradiction between military tutelage and western style modernization ideals. This was especially the case since the EU accession process had officially started in 1999.66 As such, the European states suggested that Turkey should strive to meet the Copenhagen Criteria and eliminating military tutelage over civilian politics and acting with more sensitivity on human rights issues, especially with regards to the Kurdish question.67 Indeed, despite hesitation since the inception of the republic, Atatürk had repeatedly stated that Turkey’s ultimate target was “muasır medeniyetler seviyesine çıkmak” (rising up to the level of contemporary civilizations). As such, it is not possible for even the military to oppose the steps needed to reach the ultimate target that was inherited from Atatürk i.e., EU membership.68

Since the 1960 coup d’état, the military had reshaped the state institutions by always maintaining its presence in strategic parts points of the state. The establishment of two assemblies; one for parliamentarians and another for the Senate in which a number of retired military officers are directly appointed, an alternative military judicial system in line with the civil judicial system, the National Security Council whose decisions had to be followed by civil ministries, and the tendency to elect a president with a military background, can all be listed as significant points from which the military has been able to interfere with civil politics. Since 1999, however, the situation began to change for the sake of the EU accession process.69 The military officers in the State Security Courts were withdrawn in 1999 and this was followed by increases to the number of civilian members of the NSC. Moreover, its ‘recommendations’ slowly began to exert less influence over the ministries. The General Secretariat position of the NSC was also replaced by a civilian officer instead of a retired or ex-military officer. Furthermore, the financial budget of military spending was opened to the Court of Accounts for audit.70 Later, legal changes also meant that appeals were allowed against decisions taken by the “Yüksek Askeri Şura” (Military High Council ‘YAS’) in terms of promotions and the discharging of military officers.71 In addition, the JDP’s rise to power and its fear of a possible military coupe (due to the Islamist roots of the party) were also effective in softening the impact of the military’s tutelage. During the last decade, the military attempted to intervene in civil politics with the so-called ‘E-memorandum’72 in April 2007 but this was bypassed by the government due to the fact that it had formed a single party government, had wide popular public support and also the pressure of the EU accession process and its stipulations regarding military tutelage.

A balance between secularly sensitive military officers and the religiously sensitive single party government has always been sought when confronted with controversial issues, such as that concerning the headscarf (başörtüsü) and the Prayer and Preacher Vocational High Schools (İmam Hatip Liseleri), both of which were likely to generate ideological and practical conflicts between the government and the military. This is because such issues at least theoretically represent a key battle site between Kemalist ideals of modernism and religious modernism and they remain, in practical terms, quiet relevant for civil-military relations.

As Heper73 conceptualizes Turkey in the “post-2002 process” period, it seems that the JDP’s electoral victories, the regulation changes for full member of the EU, and the reinterpretation of Atatürkism by General Hilmi Özkök, can illustrate a relatively more democratic civil-military relationship within the last decade. For instance, General Hilmi Özkök does not appear to be obsessed with the supposed ultimate duty of the military to guard the republic against internal and external enemies. Rather, he suggested that military officers should develop a new understanding of modernism by re-interpreting Atatürkism as indicating an openness to change. He also raised the possibility of changes in the curriculum of military schools to prevent military officers from developing a narrow-minded understanding of Atatürkism.74 However, despite the fact that the JDP has enacted several crucial laws reducing the military’s preferential position within state institutions, the core legal doctrine from which the military obtains its right to intervene into civil politics in cases of threat to national security remains intact.

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Thus, in case of political stalemates among political parties which might be interpreted as an inadequateness of civil-politics to solve the fundamental issues, the understanding of the guardianship of military over the state might be triggered and direct the military to interrupt civil politics. For instance, the relatively more Islamic policies of the JDP government, or any initiative for a total resolution to the country’s ‘Kurdish question’ might potentially challenge the core Kemalist ideology that relied on secularism and Turkish nationalism. It is not likely, but there remains a small chance that the military involves itself with the political process even today. The fundamental legal doctrine for any such action would be related to article 35 of the “Internal Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces”75 which, as explained earlier, states that “the military is responsible for defending and guarding Turkish Republic as defined by the constitution”. Moreover, article 85 states that the “Turkish Armed Forces shall defend the country against the internal as well as external threats if necessary by force.”76

These legal grounds are removed from related official documents, which began with the law permitting military officers to be tried in civil courts in case of offences committed against civilians. This act was approved through a referendum, as the political powers of the JDP was not sufficient to change it alone. This change paved the way for the filing of charges against coup plotters in the military. Cases have concerned coup plots in 1997 but also the actual coup in 1980. One of the most important was the Ergenekon case, which was alleged to be a secret deep structure involving many people ranging from journalists to military officers. The verdict77 was announced in August 2013 and many of the accused were given long prison sentences. Moreover, many more alleged coup attempts are currently being investigated by the courts thanks to the new changed legal regulations.78

Conclusion

This paper has argued that all military initiatives to interfere into civilian politics have a common element, which is their goal of guarding the Turkish republic against internal and external enemies and to restore the Kemalist principles, which are supposed to lie at the core of the Republic. The miltiary argues that such principles can be damaged or can degenerate thanks to civilian politicians who vie for their power. Theoretically, civil-military relations can be explained as a power struggle between civil and military elites over who has the ultimate decision power,79 or by looking at whether the regime is autocratic, militaristic or even by adopting an institutional approach.80 The case of Turkey represents a significant variation from other countries’ civil-military relations. Indeed, the Turkish Armed Forces have been perceived by the military itself and the people of Turkey as the founder of the modern republic for decades, and is something heavily promoted through symbolism and ideas associated to Atatürk. At its core, Kemalism is conceived as a blend of Turkish nationalism and secularism working to establish a radically new order on the ashes of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious state structure that characterised the Sunni Islamic Ottoman state.

As the paper indicates, the position of the military was elevated in the late Ottoman Empire as it was the first and foremost agent of modernization –something which created tremendous credibility for the military establishment. For those arguing that the Western style nation states system represents the height of modernisation and civilisation, then the military in Turkey has certainly brought about most of the radical reforms needed to bring Turkey to this level. Historical modernization developments beginning from the procurement of military equipment and changes to army structure in the last century of the Ottoman, together with the reforms in the republican single party era has consolidated the position of the military as a major force behind modernization in Turkey. Thus, the military has also come to regard itself as the sole guardian of any development coming via military. That is why, as is argued in the paper, Kemalism has prevailed in all state institutions as the only way for modernization to take place and as a necessary step to get rid of backwardness.

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At every point when anti-Kemalist social or political groups could potentially challenge these fundamental features of the state, the military felt an obligation to intervene and to reinstall fundamental Kemalist ideals through the appointment of Kemalist-minded elites, politicians or bureaucrats. On top of this, the placement of high-ranking military officers into state institutions as advisors or supervisors after every intervention has been another means through which the military has gained the ability to watch over state policies still mostly made up of civilians. Kemalist ideology has successfully proven itself of being able to reproduce its elites via officially sanctioned ideology-oriented education, administration and a set of norms. Yet, it could not stop people looking for alternate ideals and methods for modernization and development.

In every free election, comparably more conservative political parties have taken power and even via a single party, such as with the Democrat Party in 1950, the Motherland Party in 1983 and finally the Justice and Development Party in 2002. Despite the fact that all these parties have declared their respect for Atatürk or claimed that they are real ‘Atatürkists’, the military establishment continued to oppose them as they did not represent the type of modernity Kemalists believed in. Hence, the rise of leftist movements, which included communists and socialists, and rightist movements, which included conservatives and Islamists, has always been used as an excuse to legitimise military intervention. Therefore, even though the actual reasons for military interventions into civilian politics might have been different, ranging from economic failure, social disorder, political stalemate or the political polarization of society, the consistency and persistence of the ideological justification of these actions since the last century of the Ottoman Empire to the present reinforces the argument of the paper. Kemalist ideology has been the most significant driving forces of all intrusions by the military into civilian affairs.

In the last decade, however, the single-minded Atatürkism which excluded marginalized social groups has evolved into more pluralist version which is more tolerant towards different version of modernism. Therefore, the military, as the leading modernizing force of society (and its associated Kemalism) have been forced to soften their approach to many issues, due to the considerable amount of public support towards the JDP, which defines itself not as Islamist but ‘conservative democrats’.81 Moreover, the party’s record of financial and political successes, together with the requirements of the EU accession process subverted the single-minded modernism theory of Kemalism. As a consequence, the co-existence of Kemalist ideology (whose primary promoter is the Turkish Armed Forces) with conservative democracy (whose leading voice is the JDP82) is likely to continue in the future.

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Notes

1. Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relation”, 7-29.; Jacoby, “For the People, Of the People”, 669-85.; Jacoby, “Semi-Authoritarian Incorporation”, 641-65.

2. Decalo, Coups and Army Rule.

3. Finer, The Men on Horseback.

4. Huntington, The Soldier and the State.

5. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics.

6. Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy”, 83-102.

7. Sakallioglu, “The Anatomy of The Turkish Military's”, 151-66.

8. Demirel, “Soldiers and Civilians”, 127-50.

9. Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations: A Theory of Concordance”, 7-24.

10. Narli, “Concordance and Discordance”, 215-225.

11. Luckham, “A Comparative Typology”, 5-35.

12. Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire.

13. Heper, “The Ottoman Legacy”, 63-82.; Varoglu, & Bicaksiz, 'Volunteering for Risk”, 538-98.

14. Rustow, “The Army and the Founding”, 513-52.; Demirel, “Soldiers and Civilians”, 128.

15. Karaosmanoglu, “The Evolution of the National Security”, 199-216.

16. Karabelias, “The Evolution of Civil-Miliary”, 130-51.

17. Macfie, The End of the Ottoman Empire, 13-14.

18. Throughout the last century of the Empire, the military corps constituted the largest segment of the “modernization of knowledge and institutional innovations” Lerner, & Robinson, “Swords and Ploughshares”, 19-44.

19. Heper, “The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics”, 67.; Jenkins, Context and Circumstance, 10.; Arai, Turkish Nationalism. Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 13. See, Hanioglu, The Young Turks.

20. Turfan, Rise of the Young Turks.; Michaud-Emin, “The Restructuring of the Military”, 25-42.

21. Mardin, “Ideology and Religion”, 197-211.

22. Karaosmanoglu, “The Evolution of the National Security”, 204.; Rustow, “The Army and the Founding”, 549; Tachau and Heper, “The State, Politics and the Military”, 17-33.

23. For more details on Kemalism, see Dumont, “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology”, 25-44.; Okyar, “Ataturk's Quest for Modernism”, 45-53.; Tachau, “The Political Culture of Kemalist Turkey”, 57-76.; Giritli, “Kemalism as an Ideology”, 251-253.; Webster, “The Turkey of Atatürk”,; Kazancigil & Ozbudun, “Ataturk: Founder of A Modern State”.

24. Kucukcan, “Sacralization of the State”, 963-83.

25. Demirel, “The Turkish Military's Decision”, 253-80.; Kili, “Kemalism in Contemporary Turkey”, 381-404.

26. Michaud-Emin, “The Restructuring of the Military High Command”, 33.

27. It is generally argued that Atatürk’s fundamental achievement was to end the rule of the Ottoman dynasty and then restore the rule of the people. Thus, he was a promoter of

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democracy. This argument has been strengthened with Atatürk’s own speeches, such as when he argued “Hakimiyet bilâ kayd-u şart Milletindir,” which means “sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation” Roberts, and Şahin, “Construction of National Identities”, 507-31.; Atatürk, Atatürk'un Söylev ve Demeçleri.

28. Atatürk, Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 226 (Translation belongs to Tachau & Heper).

29. State elites of the time, such as those from the RPP, military officers and intellectuals, all believed that Turkish society was not totally ready for nationalist and secularist democracy; they thus thought that they needed further guidance, training and reforms. That is why I have called the reform movement a top-down one, which was not yet completely absorbed by society. This is highlighted by the fact that whenever an alternative political structure which was relatively conservative emerged in the political arena, the majority of people voted for that party, rather than the RPP.

30. Kuru, “The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage”, 38.

31. A composition of cultural identities which have emerged in modern Turkey has been analytically examined by Heper, Oncu, and Kramer, Turkey and the West.

32. Jenkins, Context and Circumstance, 33.

33. Demirel, “The Turkish Military's Decision”, 270.

34. Ibid, 255.; Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 81.

35. Brown, “The Military and Society”, 387-404.

36. Karabelias, “The Evolution of Civil-Miliary Relations”, 139.

37. Cooper, “The Legacy of Ataturk”, 115-28.

38. Ibid, 117.

39. Kemal, “Military Rule”.

40. Demirel, “The Turkish Military's Decision”, 256.

41. Demirel, “Soldiers and Civilians”, 128.

42. Harris, “The Causes of the 1960 Revolution”, 438-54.; Karpat, “The Military and Politics”, 1654-83.

43. Tachau and Heper, “The State, Politics and the Military”.; Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 312.

44. Demirel, “Soldiers and Civilians”, 129.; Nye, “Civil-Military Confrontation”, 209-28.

45. This consisted of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, Defence Minister, the ministers of Foreign and Internal Affairs, Minister of Finance, Minister of Transportation, and Minister of Labour from the civilian governments and the General Chief of Staff and the commanding officers of the land, air, sea and gendarmerie forces. It was presided over by the President, and in the case of his absence, by the Prime Minister. The General Secretary of the NSC was also allowed to attend the meetings but did not have the right to vote on decisions though the agendas of the council was determined by him, who also tended to be an ex-military officer.

46. Jenkins, Context and Circumstance, 42.

47. Sakallioglu, “The Anatomy of The Turkish Military's”, 151-66.

48. Apart from formal observing institutions, as an informal financial guarantee of military power, Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu (the Army Mutual Assistance Association, OYAK) was established together with “Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Güçlendirme Vakfı (Foundation for

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Strengthening of the Turkish Armed Forces, TSKGV). OYAK was totally exempt from taxation and it became the third biggest holding agency within three years of the return to democracy in 1961. Once it comes to the 1971 memorandum forcing out the incumbent Justice Party government led by Süleyman Demirel, the function of the NSC to assist to the MoC was transformed to provide recommendations for the ministries. Finally, following the 1980 coup d’état, its function was elevated to make suggestions, which had to be given priority to implement into civil politics by ministries. Together with the consolidated power of the NSC, in which military attendants outweighed the civilian attendants, a high ranking military officer was appointed to “Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu” (Higher Education Council) which supervises universities and also “Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu” (Radio and Television High Council) so as to take media propaganda under military control. Observing the civilian institutions via official connections has been one of the ways through which the military has been able to interfere in state policies.

49. http://www.msb.gov.tr/asad/AskeriMevzuat/Kanunlar/as_mah_k.html. Thanks to constitutional change approved by a national referendum in 2010, the extreme autonomy of military courts from the civilian judicial system has been reduced during the JDP government era. This change paved the way for the trial of military staff in civilian courts. That is why the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases on alleged military intervention plots to take were administered by civilian inspectors. See for further details in Balci, “Foreign Policy as Politicking”, 157-170.

50. Sakallıoğlu, “The Anatomy”, 151.

51. Heper and Guney, “The Military and the Consolidation”, 635-57.

52. Ibid. 643.

53. Wuthrich, “Factors Influencing Military-Media”, 253-72.

54. Erdogan, “Kemalist Non-Governmental Organizations”, 251-81.

55. On the contrary, Michaud-Emin argues that there has always a way to reduce the supreme authority of military as the final decision has to be signed by the president or prime minister. He argues that, because of that, the passiveness of civilian politicians is the main reason why for the military’s power over civilian politics in Turkey. In legal terms, she is correct yet the informal tendencies and fear of politicians of a military memorandum or direct intervention which is considered as a duty in case of national security matters has to be considered.

56. Heper and Guney, “The Military and the Consolidation”, 645.

57. Heper, “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey”, 241-52.

58. Karabelias, “The Evolution of Civil-Miliary Relations”, 132.; Karabelias, “The Military Institution, Ataturk's Prnciples”, 57-69.

59. Aydinli, et al, “The Military's March toward Europe”, 77-90.

60. A proportional representation system was brought into force with the 1961 Constitution replacing a majority system. Its basic principle is that the proportion of seats a party would get is allocated according to the same proportion of the votes that a party receives in the national election.

61. It was outlawed by the Constitutional Court due to accusations of separatist activities as the party mentioned the existence of ethnically Kurdish people in Turkey, while official state ideology based on Kemalism officially denies their existence.

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62. Ahmad, “Military Intervention and the Crisis”, 5-24.; Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy.

63. It is generally used for defining the period from 1996 national election where the Islamist Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan obtained the highest votes and 1997 when the Welfare Party-True Path Party coalition government resigned due to military pressure. Since this process has been affiliated with the National Security Council decision made on the 28 February 1997, the process was named after that date.

64. Heper, “The Justice and Development Party”, 215-31.; Demirel, “Soldiers and Civilians”, 135.

65. Heper and Guney, “The Military and the Consolidation”, 636.

66. Aydinli et al., “The Military's March toward Europe”, 85.

67. Michaud-Emin, “The Restructuring of the Military”, 26.

68. Sarigil, “Europeanization as Institutional Change”, 40.

69. Karaosmanoglu, “Transformation of Turkey's Civil-Military Relations”, 253-64.; Satana, “Civil-Military Relations in Europe”, 279-92.; Cizre, “Problems of Democratic Governance”, 107-125.

70. The Court of Accounts is the one of the higher judicial institutions of Turkey responsible for controlling the accounts of state institutions.

71. Kuru, “The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage”, 43.

72. The core reason behind this was the election to the presidency of JDP nominee Abdullah Gül who has an Islamist background dating back to the Welfare Party. The presidency office has always been affiliated with high-ranking ex-military officers because of the legacy of Atatürk and Inönü. Indeed, there has only been one civilian president since the inception of the republic to the election of Mr Turgut Özal in 1990, who was Celal Bayar. In addition, during the election process, the presidency was defined as “the last Castle” by Deniz Baykal, then-president of the RPP, which has regarded itself as Atatürk’s party. Moreover, Cumhuriyet meetings organized by the RPP all over Turkey against the election of Mr Gül made explicit invitations for the military to take over the civilian JDP government by accusing it of being the heart of “irticai faaliyetler” (religiously reactionary activities). Turkey’s politics has even witnessed a closure case in the constitution court against the JDP. These manoeuvres, in my opinion, can be regarded as reflections of embedded Kemalism-based state structure.

73. Heper, “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey”.

74. Heper, “The Justice and Development Party,” 217. ; Aydinli, “A Paradigmatic Shift”, 581-96.

75. The article was removed from the Act in July 2013 before the Ergenekon case verdicts were declared. Yet, article 85 of the internal regulations of the Military Forces is active on top of the constitutional right that the protection of state is the responsibility of the Turkish Armed Forces. http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/askerligin-tanimi-degisti-darbeye-dayanak-olan-35-madde-meclisten-gecti/haber-225443

76. Heper, “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey”, 248.

77. http://www.iha.com.tr/gundem/iste-ergenekon-davasi-kararlari/290948

78. http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/ergenekonda-karar-21-nisan-2016da

79. Sakallıoğlu, “Demythologyzing the National Security Concept”, 213-29.

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80. Stepan, Retihinking Military Politics; Sarigil, “Bargaining in Institutionalized Settings”, 463-83.

81. Tepe, “Turkey's AKP: A Model”, 69-82.

82. Öniş, “Political Islam at the Crossroads”, 281-98.

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www.cesran.org

Vol. 6| No. 2 | July 2016

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Global Analysis

Freedom of Speech, Controversies and Muslims: A Review Essay

By Prof. Mohammad Haron*

Abstract

Muslims remain as conspicuous minorities in the West where they encountered numerous challenges; one of the key ones is the maintenance of their religious identities amidst a predominantly secular society. Whilst some succeeded to overcome the challenges, others found themselves absorbed into the secular environment and as a result they abandoned their identities as Muslims. From among the latter group there are those such as Salman Rushdie and Hirsi Ali who not only rejected their identities but who began to write against the traditions within which they were nurtured and grew up. As they articulated their ideas in publications and through other means, they were countered by an array of Muslim representative organizations that touched upon the question of the ‘Freedom of Speech’ and the ‘Freedom of Religion.’ As expected these critical voices of Muslims and Islam were given full support by Islamphobic individuals such as Theo van Gogh and others. In this review essay the focus is Anshuman Mondal’s Islam and Controversy that critically evaluated the ideas of a few of these individuals and their works (i.e. novels, films and cartoons).

Key words: Free Speech, Controversy, Politics, Islam, Muslims

* Mohammad Haron is a Professor at University of Botswana. Email: haronm@mopipi.ub.bw

Journal of Global Analysis

Vol. 6 | No. 2

July 2016

www.cesran.org

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Mondal, Anshuman A.

Islam and Controversy: The Politics of Free Speech After Rushdie

(London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014, ISBN 978-1-137-46607-5, 248pp. £68.00 hb)

Introduction

Although the ‘Freedom of Speech’1 debate has occupied communities in different ways for ages, it was given greater attention during this modern democratic period. It is indeed an era in which Ayatollah Khomeini (d.1989) issued his legendary fatwa (1989) against Salman Rushdie’s (b.1947) infamous The Satanic Verses (1988)2. From that period onwards up – one that coincided with the post-Cold War era (c.1990-2015) - until this day this particular dispute deepened discussions and sparked several debates that surround the status of ‘freedom of speech’ as a fundamental human right; a right that has been enshrined in, among others, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention of Human Rights, and African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. Now the respective Khomeini and Rushdie texts (i.e. the legal edict and the creative novel) have time and again been studied and cited by many in the academic, legal, media and cultural circles; the reason for this may be attributed to the fact that these two texts along with other legal documents and media reports have brought into sharp focus, inter alia, (a) the threat of freedom, (b) the implementation of (self-)censorship, (c) the question of blasphemy, (d) the restrictions of hate speech, (e) the limits of religious hatred, and (f) the observation of ethics in democratically constructed environments.

Book’s Focus

As these issues began to clutter the agendas of academic dons and media pundits during the post-Cold War period that was also given added importance by Samuel Huntington’s seminal Clash of Civilization article (1993)3 that pitted the proverbial ‘West’ and against the rest, it appeared that much – if not all - of these were connected to Islam and Muslims. Taking into account the various developments that took place during the past twenty five years, it may thus be argued that the Rushdie and Khomeini texts have alongside a catalogue of other texts and items certainly caused scholars to intimately inspect the conjoined terms, namely ‘Islam and Controversy;’ this is the title that Anshuman Mondal, who is a Brunel University professor of English literature, consciously chose as the main theme for his text under review.4 On the note of the theme, one would prefer Mondal to have used the term ‘Muslim’ rather than ‘Islam’5; the basic reason for pushing for this replacement is based upon the fact that though Islam is the religious system that Muslims devoutedly follow, they are the ones who interpret it and as a consequence find themselves entangled and embroiled in disputes that eventually lead to lasting controversies such as the Rushdie affair.

The main theme was, however, further explored by its sub-title: ‘The Politics of Free Speech after Rushdie.’ Even though Mondal’s text tackled some aspects of Rushdie’s The Satanic

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Verses, he cautioned the reader that his book was not about the controversy that Rushdie’s novel generated but that it was about the application of the ‘Freedom of Speech’ act as a means to achieve a mutual understanding in multicultural environments that have been constructed in countries such as the UK and the USA. That aside, both Mondal’s title and sub-title underlined the fact that Muslims and Islam – besides being viewed by Muslims as a divinely inspired system - have overwhelmingly been associated with various types of controversies; whether it was related to the banning of the hijab in France6 or a set of Danish cartoons lampooning Prophet Muhammad7.

Question of ‘The Freedom of Speech’

When undertaking a careful reading of Mondal’s noteworthy densely written seven chapter text, one observed the author’s profound engagement with post-colonial theorical issues that came to the fore in the very first part of his text8. Mondal divided the text into three parts that essentially discoursed about the question of ‘Free Speech’ as related to Muslims but that may effortlessly be applied to any other religious community. In the text’s introduction Mondal emphatically pointed out that ‘Freedom of Speech’, which should be employed to accomplish common cause, should be dislodged from arguable ideas that are tied to the liberal discourse; he further stated that it should be reconceptualized in such a manner that ‘moral restraint’ and ‘legal restrictions’ should not be regarded as opposed to it but as constitutive of liberty (Mondal’s emphasis p.2). This revised understanding is thus inextricably linked to it as has been highlighted by scholars such as Amina Wadud (b.1952) the author of Qurʼan and woman rereading the sacred text from a woman's perspective.

Mondal argued that the liberal discourse of rights - as a ‘free speech’ instrument - ignored the question of ethics or ethic responsibility and as a result it fell short of being an adequate mechanism to deal with controversial cartoons such as those that appeared in Jyllands-Posten or notorious novels such as The Jewel of the Medina. Engaging intellectually with these, Mondal posed two simple questions that ‘revolve(d) around the ethics of representation’; the first was: ‘was the creative artist (e.g. the Jyllands-Posten cartoonist [2006]) - or for that matter the novelist (e.g. Salman Rushdie) - right to represent the individual/person (i.e. Prophet Muhammad in this case) in the way he did it?’9 And the second was: ‘were the Muslims who opposed film director Theo van Gogh’s Submission (2004) correct to have labelled it as sacrilegious and distasteful?’ As one browsed through Mondal’s text one had to have in the back of one’s mind these two questions as well as other related ones. Nevertheless, the first part of Mondal’s very discerning text consisted of three interrelated chapters; each of these provided perceptive commentaries and invaluable insights into crucial concepts and salient subjects that charted out a set of ideas that would assist in comprehending and appreciating the text’s overall objectives.

The Politics of Controversy

So in the first chapter titled ‘From Blasphemy to Offensiveness: the Politics of Controversy’ (pp. 13-31), Mondal unpacked his theoretical frame that assisted the reader in grasping a mixture of controversies that he dealt with in the subsequent chapters. In this chapter Mondal asserted that when evaluating each of these controversies then each indisputably illustrated that the controversy was extricably coupled with that of ‘politics;’ hence one encountered on all fronts what he termed ‘the politics of controversy.’ He explained that ‘giving and taking of offence is (basically) a performative gesture’ and that the pivotal relationship that joins the offender to the offendee is that of power. Towards the end of the chapter Mondal critiqued the manner in which Rushdie defined literature as it appeared in his 1990 Is Nothing Sacred? Herbert Read Memorial Lecture10. Mondal commented that not all art including literature, as Rushdie maintained, stand outside power and added that at times ‘works of art and literature are complicit with dominant regimes of

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representation’ (p.29). Unlike others, Mondal appropriately stated, Rushdie belonged to an elite set of artists that have been granted all the necessary support by the liberal minded groups such as Penguin publishers to such an extent that he possessed the ‘power to speak’ that has been flatly denied to others who countered their arguments.

Mondal moved on to the second chapter in which he posed an important question: ‘What is Freedom of Speech For? (pp.32-56). He could have reformulated the question by simply asking: ‘What is Freedom of Speech?’ and he could thereafter have explained the phrase; he avoided doing this because he wanted to provoke more debates regarding this critical issue. Though he correctly critiqued both the liberal and Muslim absolutists for essentially making similar arguments - albeit differently, he explored further the liberal absolutists’ stand and he demonstrated how disjointed they were in presenting their arguments. He, for example, showed up the contractualists for having fowarded flawed arguments and he listed three tangible objections against the liberal absolutists’ position. One wonders whether liberal minded scholars would approve of Mondal’s clearly articulated list of objections since they never factored religion into their equation and particularly within the multicultural arena. He wrapped up the chapter by posing the exact same question that he titled it with because it appeared that whilst the problem applied to almost everyone/everything it seemed that during this liberal age it did not apply to religion and its various religious groups!

When responding to this question in the third chapter titled ‘A Difficult Freedom: Towards Mutual Understanding and the Ethics of Propriety’ (pp.57-93), Mondal upheld the view that one has to factor in the multicultural and multireligious nature of societies; these are, in turn, characterized by qualities such as tolerance. So when one included these into one’s writings – whether fiction or fact – about individuals or communities then, Modal stressed, it is ‘a moral act’ and as a consequence it brought onto the discussion board the recognition of (maximalist and minimalist) ethics that is not a set of rules but ‘a moral performance’ or ‘a form of conduct/behaviour.’ Mondal made mention of Andrew Gibson’s constructive assessment and reading of The Satanic Verses; the latter described the novel as being ‘peculiarly ethical’ (p.88) and this was an issue that Mondal found very problematic.

Mondal’s judgment of Rushdie’s text reached the conclusion that it was ‘ethically troubling’ (p.89) and that it did not display or reveal an ‘ethic responsibility’. After having provided a fair insight into the theoretical frame with numerous examples that Mondal very judiciously applied in the first part, he went on to speak about the three different examples in the three chapters that followed. In each of the following chapters Mondal tied and weaved into his evaluation the question of the ‘ethics of propriety.’ This is a process that is dialogic and that differed markedly from the ‘ethical dynamics of controversy’ process that is a monologue; instead of it being in sync it is out of tune with the idea of mutual and shared responsibility towards one another.

Case Studies

In the fourth chapter Mondal investigated ‘The Self-Transgressions of Salman Rushdie: Re-Reading The Satanic Verses (pp.97-146), which also appeared in Textual Practice (27[3]: 419-437, 2013) with a differently worded title, namely ‘Representing the very ethic he battled: secular, Islam(ism), and self-transgression in The Satanic Verses11. Mondal was interested in the Muslim crtitics’ claim that Rushdie’s novel, which was apparently written ‘in good faith’ according to Rushdie himself, was penned as a very poor and ‘bad’ historical work; in addition, Mondal scrutinized Rushdie’s assertion that he probed Muslim belief from a purely secular perspective in the novel.

Apart from having arrived at the conclusion that the novel blatantly violated the historical record, Mondal underlined that Rushdie’s professed claims were not very different from those Islamists with whom he disputed; based upon Mondal’s careful review and close reading he considered Rushdie’s ‘in good faith’ defence highly questionable and ‘ethically

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problematic.’ Though the cartoons and film that Mondal addressed in the fifth chapter, ‘Visualism and Violence: On the Art and Ethics of Provocation in the Jyllands-Posten cartoons and Theo van Gogh’s Submission (pp 147-166) - as well as the sixth chapter in which he evaluated ‘Romancing the Other: The Jewel of the Medina and the Ethics of Genre’ (pp 167-182) - fall in different artistic genres the same argument applied against these provocative and challenging works.

At the core of these creative artistic endeavours the critical question of intention that Mondal ended with in very last line in the fifth chapter (p.166) needed to have been probed in detail. This was not done and if Mondal had done so then one is certain that his well-presented text would have further uncovered these writers, film makers and artists’ unethical principles that use ‘free speech’ as a convenient cover to produce and circulate works that drive a wedge between the western minded person and those belonging to other religio-cultural groups whose ideas are considered conservative and intellectually inferior. The notion of intention would not only have raised more questions with regards to ‘ethic responsibility’ but it would also have taken the reader back to the issue of ‘power relations’ that Mondal addressed in this book.

And having pursued a very incisive study of selected creative pieces, one would like Mondal to have widened his net and to perhaps have included the works of one or two Islamophobes such as Robert Spencer12 and Douglas Murray13; these are individuals who articulately and freely expressed their diatribes against Islam and Muslims without being faulted for their preposterous (mis)interpretations and (mis)readings. These two like others discussed by Mondal entered the arena of ‘politics of controversy’ through their deliberate misreadings - and of course under the guise of ‘free speech’ - in which they unashamedly displayed their writings as forms of ‘power relations that determine the ethics of free speech’ (p.9). Mondal’s samples of artistic/creative outputs and the online circulated texts by the mentioned Islamophobes who have contributed substantially towards the intensification of divisions that ‘developed into a stand-off between a putative ‘West’ defending freedom of expression’, and an ‘Islam’ seeking freedom from offense’ (p.15)14.

Towards Wrapping Up

In winding up his text, Mondal assessed various responses that included ‘Satire, Incitement and Self-Restraint: (and thereafter offered) Reflections on Freedom of Expression and Aesthetic Responsibility in Contemporary Britain’ in the seventh chapter (pp.185-211). The chapter discussed the discourses that dealt with the introduction of the ‘Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2006.’ Before the Act came into effect during 2007, it was extensively debated by various stakeholders and religious groups were among them. Mondal mentioned that some of these groups objected to the Bill because they argued that it would effectively prohibit them from proselythizing others to their tradition and others proferred the view that it would threaten one’s freedom to preach.

Mondal referred to scholars such as Nick Cohen (b.1961), The Spectator blogger and Observer columnist who expressed the opnion that when one is offended by an act then ‘one must learn to live with it;’ and in the same breath he opined that all incitement legislation should be abolished from the Act. Despite the harm that hate speech might inflict on a person, Cohen and others seem to disregard this and appear to support the view that this type of speech be given legal protection! Well this is exactly where liberalist (insensitive and tactless) thinking takes up a fundamentlist liberal position (my emphasis); something that they deny but that does exist. Leaving that aside, though Mondal returned to ‘Rushdie and (the question of) responsbility’ prior to offering an assessment of two satirical films, namely Monty Python’s Life of Brian (1979) and Chris Morris’ Four Lions (2010), he ended off by referring to scholars that stressed the ‘sense of responsibility’ that one should adopt when undertaking the task of writing humorous thoughts or drawing a cartoon for satirical purposes.

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Finally, he provided the reader with a well-presented publication that was logically structured with each chapter flowing seamlessly from the one into the other. He dealt with an important subject and injected fresh ideas as to, among others, how (a) one should understand the consequences of issues that involve religion and its adherents, (b) one should observe ethical principles at all times and in all instances, (c) the reader should critically and preceptively engage with a text, and how (d) the creative writer or artist should adopt a reasonably sensitive approach when writing or presenting a piece of art. On the whole, he adopted a clinical approach throughout the text and this is quite evident from the very first to the last chapter. Whilst scholars in literature would find his analyses informative, social scientists will also benefit from Mondal’s instructive insights.

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Notes

1. Volokh, E., “Freedom of Speech, Religious Harassment Law, and Religious Accomodation Law”, Loyola University Chicago Law Journal. Vol. 33, 2001, pp.57-69; Chelini-Pont, B., “Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Expression”, International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies, 2010, see this text online: http://www.iclars.org/media/pdf/abstract/Abstract_workshopsabato_mattina.pdf; Agnes Callamard.Freedom of Speech and Offense: Why Blasphemy Laws are not the appropriate response. Online: https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/blasphemy-hate-speech-article.pdf.

2. Ayatollah Khomeini issued his legendary fatwa (1989) against Salman Rushdie’s infamous The Satanic Verses (1988).

3. Huntington, S., “Clash of Civilization”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, No.3, 1993, pp.22-49, Summer.

4. See the review essay “Dangerous Controversies” by B. King that appeared in Journal of Postcolonial Writing 2016.

5. Consult Shahan Ahmad, What Is Islam?, The Importance of being Islamic, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2016.

6. Grillo, R., & Shah, P., Reasons to Ban? The Anti-Burqa Movement in Western Europe, Max Plank Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, MMG Working Paper 12-5, 2012; Dunlap, B., “Protecting the Space to be Unveiled: Why France’s Full Veil BanDoes not ViolateThe European Convention of Human Rights”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol.35, 2012, pp.968-1025; Winter, B., Hijab and the Republic: Uncovering the French Headscarf Debate, New York, Syracuse University Press, 2008.

7. Sturges, P., “Limits to Freedom of Expression? Considerations Arising from the Danish Cartoons Affair”, IFLA Journal, Vol.32, 2006, pp.181-188; Keane, D., “Cartoon Violence and Freedom of Expression”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.30 No.4, 2008, pp.845-875, November; Tonder, L., “Freedom of Expression in the age of Cartoon Wars”, Contemporary Political Theory, Vol.10 No.2, 2011, pp.255-272; an also Bleich, E., “Free Speech or Hate Speech? The Danish Cartoon Controversy in The Europen Legal Context”, Global Migrations: Challenges in the Twenty First Century, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, Ch. 5 pp.113-128, 2012.

8. See footnote 4; King seems to take a different position on this matter as well as the other works that he reviewed in his essay.

9. Danchin, P. “Defaming Muhammad: Dignity, Harm and Incitement to Religious Hatred”, Duke Forum for Law & Social Change. Vol.2, No.5, 2010, pp.5-38.

10. Rushdie, R. Is Nothing Sacred? Herbert Read Memorial Lecture, London, Penguin Books, 1990.

11. Mondal, A., “Representing the very ethic he battled: secular, Islam(ism), and self-transgression in The Satanic Verses, Textual Practice, Vol.27, No.3, 2013, pp.419-437.

12. Spencer, R., The Truth About Muhammad: Founder of the World’s Most Intolerant Religion, Lanham Maryland, Regnery Publishing Inc. 2006.

13. Murray, D., Islamophilia: A Very Metropolitan Malady, emBooks, 2013; and also see Murray. D., & Verwey, J.P., “Victims of Intimidation: Freedom of Speech within Europe’s Muslim Communities”, London, The Centre for Social Cohesion, 2008, and reprint Online: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/victims.pdf.

14. See Tinnes, J. “Bibliography: Muslims and the West”, Perspective on Terrorism, Vol.9, No.5, 2015, pp.73-108.

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Bibliography

Ahmad, S., What Is Islam? The Importance of being Islamic, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2016.

Bleich, E., “Free Speech or Hate Speech? The Danish Cartoon Controversy in The Europen Legal Context”, Global Migrations: Challenges in the Twenty First Century, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, Ch. 5, 2012, pp.113-128.

Callamard, A., “Freedom of Speech and Offense: Why Blasphemy Laws are not the appropriate response”, Equal Voices, Issue No. 18, 2006, June, and Online: https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/blasphemy-hate-speech-article.pdf.

Chelini-Pont, B., “Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Expression”, “International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies”, 2010, Online: http://www.iclars.org/media/pdf/abstract/Abstract_workshopsabato_mattina.pdf.

Danchin, P., “Defaming Muhammad: Dignity, Harm and Incitement to Religious Hatred”, Duke Forum for Law & Social Change. Vol.2 No. 5, 2010, pp.5-38.

Dunlap, B. “Protecting the Space to be Unveiled: Why France’s Full Veil BanDoes not ViolateThe European Convention of Human Rights”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol.35, 2012, pp.968-1025.

Grillo, R., & Shah, P., Reasons to Ban? The Anti-Burqa Movement in Western Europe. Max Plank Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, MMG Working Paper 12-5, 2012.

Huntington, S., “Clash of Civilization?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, No.3, 1993, pp.22-49, Summer.

Keane, D., “Cartoon Violence and Freedom of Expression”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.30, No.4, 2008, pp.845-875, November.

King, B., “DangerousControversies: Review Essay”, Journal of Postcolonial Writing, Vol.52, No.1, 2016, pp.114-121.

Mondal, A., “Representing the very ethic he battled: secular, Islam(ism), and self-transgression in The Satanic Verses”, Textual Practice, vol.27, No.3, 2013, pp.419-437.

Murray, D., Islamophilia: A Very Metropolitan Malady, emBooks, 2013.

Murray, D & Verwey J. P., “Victims of Intimidation: Freedom of Speech within Europe’s Muslim Communities”, London, The Centre for Social Cohesion, 2008, and reprint Online: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/victims.pdf.

Rushdie, S., Is Nothing Sacred? Herbert Read Memorial Lecture, London, Penguin Books, 1990.

Spencer, R., The Truth About Muhammad: Founder of the World’s Most Intolerant Religion, Lanham Maryland, Regnery Publishing Inc., 2006.

Sturges, P., “Limits to Freedom of Expression? Considerations Arising from the Danish Cartoons Affair”, IFLA Journal, Vol.32, 2006, pp.181-188.

Tinnes, J., “Bibliography: Muslims and the West”, Perspective on Terrorism, Vol. 9, No. 5, 2015, pp.73-108.

Tonder, L., “Freedom of Expression in the age of Cartoon Wars”, Contemporary Political Theory, Vol.10 No.2, 2011, pp.255-272.

Volokh, E., “Freedom of Speech, Religious Harassment Law, and Religious Accomodation Law”, Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Vol.33, 2001, pp.57-69.

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Winter, B., Hijab and the Republic: Uncovering the French Headscarf Debate, New York, Syracuse University Press, 2008.

Wadud, A., Qurʼan and woman rereading the sacred text from a woman's perspective, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999.

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Vol. 6| No. 2 | July 2016

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Domestic Norms and Foreign Policy: A Research Note By Assist. Prof. Dr. Husrev Tabak*

Abstract

The constructivist research agenda on norms has been dominated by international norms research with studies only rarely focusing on domestic norms. The research agenda on domestic norms, however, is dominated by the use of norms in explaining the domestic construction of foreign policies. Domestic norms’ internationalisation and functioning in an overseas setting has thus been a neglected research domain. This research note, based on the experience of the author in his doctoral research on domestic norms, has been written to shed some light on domestic norms research and to encourage more studies in the field. Accordingly, the paper, while reflexively visiting the relevant literature, brings about answers to the issues debated around the following questions: ‘How could an existent norm that is guiding a foreign policy practice be identified’? And ‘how can the overseas diffusion and implications of a domestic norm be traced and reported’? The responses to these questions will show the reader where to start a domestic norm-guided foreign policy enquiry and how to trace internationalisation of domestic norms thus the functioning of foreign policy-guiding domestic norms in an overseas setting.

Keywords: Domestic Norms, Foreign Policy Analysis, Norm-guided Foreign Policy, Overseas Norm Diffusion, Socialisation.

* Dr. Hüsrev Tabak is Assist. Prof. of International Relations at Recep Tayyip Erdoğan University in Turkey. He holds M.A. in Sociology and Politics from UCL (University College London) and Ph.D. in Politics from the University of Manchester. He is the author of the “Kosovar Turks and Post-Kemalist Turkey: Foreign Policy, Socialisation, and Resistance” (I.B.Tauris, 2016). His research interests include norms, ethnicity, ethno-politics, and foreign policy analysis.

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July 2016

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Domestic norms – a neglected research domain

In IR, the norm scholarship focuses its attention chiefly on international norms. Looking simply at the most recent literature reviews by Hoffman, Windmaier and Park, Wunderlich, and Hofferberth and Webber will reveal this self-evidently.1 Several reasons could be listed for this. The first and the foremost reason would be that international norms matter to more countries and localities and most of the time changes of an international norm affect several state and non-state actors. Domestic norms on the other hand emerge most of the time ‘isolated’ from the international environment. This, however, should not invoke the sense that norm emergence in general is confined to the domestic processes. International, transnational, or regional processes and mechanisms are also exemplified intensely in the literature as the creators or builders of norms2. Secondly, concomitant to the strengthening of global civil society and to the broadening of the agenda of international governmental organisations towards issues concerning depravities of humans in terms of rights and resources for survival, international norm dynamics have come to be challenged and restructured by multi-actor involvements. Therefore, along with governments, non-state actors including advocacy networks and governmental organisations alike have become overwhelmingly involved in norm construction and diffusion and have declaredly acted as teachers of norms.3 Domestic norms, at this juncture, have come to the scene mostly as the ones subject to be replaced by international norms as a result of international governmental and NGO entrepreneurship4. Thirdly, domestic norms have appeared to be less salient in the international arena than international norms. This might be because of the fact that domestic norms are often debated and challenged with reference to domestic cultures and values5, on the other hand, international norms are presented to be catering to the whole of humanity. In relation to this, fourthly, since norms are present in different forms in different societies, cultures, institutions, or states, the emergence of domestic norms has become contextual and dynamically variable. This has resulted in scholars qualifying norm emergence and the relevant processes differently.6

Yet, it should also be borne in mind that, as acknowledged in the literature, most of the time international norms first emerge domestically and become international ones as a result of norm cascade.7 In Finnemore and Sikkink`s words: “[m]any international norms began as domestic norms and become international through the efforts of entrepreneurs of various kinds”.8 Christine Ingebritsen exemplifies this in her study on the domestic construction of global norms such as the norms of eco-politics, conflict resolution, and aid provisions with reference to the unique domestic structures of Scandinavian states.9

Nevertheless, since the norm scholarship focuses its attention chiefly on international norms, the mechanisms and dynamics of domestic norms` functioning remains under-researched, particularly the dynamics of international mobilisation and overseas functioning. Accordingly, those who studied domestic norms have been mostly interested in explaining the domestic institutional and cultural sources of change or sustenance in foreign policies. Thus most of the studies are focused on the emergence and institutionalisation of domestic norms and the ability of norms to mould decision making in foreign policy and national interests.10 Domestic

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norms’ cross-border diffusion and functioning via the foreign policy mechanisms however have had relatively less attention. Among the rare studies conducted are those by Anne-Marie Burley11 and Robert Herman though even these are far from presenting a complete story of how domestic norms are functioning overseas. Burley, for example, studied the norms of the New Deal, which directed attention to liberal social welfare and institutional design programmes in the domestic realm and their role in US foreign policies in the post-WWII era. As she suggests, this shift in domestic politics had eventually led to the establishment of liberal international institutions at the international level at the behest of the United States. Consequently, the norms of New Deal became internationally consequential after gaining a high degree of validity in domestic politics.12 Robert G. Herman argues that during the Mikhail Gorbachev era “Soviet international policy was the product of cognitive evolution and policy entrepreneurship by networks of Western-oriented in-system reformers coincident with the coming to power of a leadership [refers to Gorbachev here] committed to change”.13 It was, therefore, the dominance of the norm of ‘New Thinking’ that promoted the cognitive evolution of intellectual and policy-making circles and eventual policy changes. Moreover, Herman argues that adherence to the norm of New Thinking in USSR meant that “Gorbachev actively encouraged Warsaw Pact governments to emulate Moscow in introducing greater liberalization in economic and political life”.14 The New Thinking therefore was diffused, thanks to governmental involvement, to other states.

Surprisingly, a serious contribution to the study of domestic norms came from the peace research literature. Despite the fact that most of the time the discussions were similarly focused on the socialisation of domestic politics into international norms and on domestic norm contestation, the literature managed to demonstrate accurately that the same norm has similar policy implications in both domestic and foreign policies – something that the norms literature in IR would do well to learn from.

Peter Trumbore and Mark A. Boyer, for instance, argue that “[t]he democratic peace literature essentially argues that the norms inherent in democratic societies, particularly those of peaceful dispute resolution, are transferred to the international arena, resulting in the peaceful resolution of international conflicts”.15 Here, the emphasis is on that “states duplicate patterns of domestic politics in the international arena, applying the same political norms in both their domestic and international affairs”.16 This process is called ‘normative transfer’17 suggesting that “the normative/cultural explanation for the democratic peace rests on the contention that states’ domestic political culture and norms are externalized as international behaviour”.18 Accordingly, for example, “states sharing peaceful norms are more peaceful in their interactions” or “internal norms supporting the subjugation or active dehumanization of domestic groups make the subjugation of other state actors likewise acceptable”.19 Caprioli and Trumbore explain this situation in their important work as follows “higher levels of discrimination against ethnic minorities increase the likelihood of violent state behavior when engaged in international disputes”.20 In another version of this thesis, for instance, Hayes Jarrod argues that “[d]emocratic states behave in the international system according to domestic norms” suggesting that democratic states’ projection of their domestic norms onto the international system “create a zone of shared norms that enables peaceful transactions” thus empower the arising of the democratic peace.21 In another example Edwards et al., argue that in the example of democratic peace and particularly at the regional level “states tend to externalize norms that characterize their domestic political environment”, which both increases the number of democracies in a region and the importance given to democratic norms in that specific region.22 Equally relevant to them, an opposite dynamic is also promoted as possible: “in regions with a larger percentage of autocracies, the importance of democratic norms will be slight. In these regions, autocratic norms like coercion and repression will dominate”.23 Accordingly, for Edwards et al., similar to democratic norms, authoritarian domestic norms have been externalized, particularly at the regional level.

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Though the extensive focus on democratic norms within the peace studies is partly obscuring a fuller understanding of domestic norms’ internalisation.24 Edwards and colleagues’ calling to attention the dissemination of authoritarian domestic norms at the regional level suggests that such theorizing would be applicable to other domestic norms too. Here a problem emerges because of the fact that democratic norms’ domestic character is contested; as they are in essence international norms, their transforming into domestic norms and later functioning in foreign policy is not theorized in peace studies. However, the link established among domestic norms, foreign policy and domestic norms’ externalization in the peace studies is indeed helpful for us to think about other domestic norms’ internationalisation and domestic norms’ having of similar policy implications on both domestic and foreign policies. This link is a guide also in studying other domestic norm contexts where domestic norms are not suggested to be diffusing outwards and impacting upon the ‘entire international system’. This is important because most studies of international/domestic norm interaction are much more focused on the big-picture – that is, they are focused on how a domestic norm of one or more powerful actors diffuse out and affect all or most other actors. The literature tends to neglect these smaller yet still-important processes taking place within more-discrete contexts, like within regions or between members of a single ethnic group which can be found in several different states.

With all these in mind, in order to contribute to a better understanding of domestic norms and foreign policy interaction, I conducted a doctoral-level research on domestic norms` internationalisation and overseas implications based on first-hand information I collected between 2012 and 2014 during my scoping and fieldwork visits to Kosovo (and partly Turkey).25 Within the scope of my domestic norm enquiry, I studied the emergence and subsequently diffusion of post-Kemalist norms from Turkey to the ethnic Turkish locality in Kosovo via foreign policy mechanisms, as well as the local responses to the functioning of these post-Kemalist norms in Kosovo. I thus had a chance to elaborate the domestic norm mechanisms during norm emergence, diffusion, and later functioning in an overseas setting, in the scope of which my data and findings led me to test, challenge, and confirm certain theoretical and methodological prepositions within the norm literature regarding domestic norm processes and foreign policy formation and conduct. I am writing this research note to share some of these findings, particularly the methodological and theoretical implications, with the reader. I believe that the way I dealt with the methodological and theoretical challenges pertaining to norms I came across throughout my foreign policy research will shed some light on future research on the issue of domestic norms and their internationalisation via foreign policy mechanisms. This research note, accordingly, reflexively visits the relevant literature and brings about answers to the issues debated around the following questions: (i) How can one be sure about the presence of a norm (how could an existent norm be identified)? (ii) How can the overseas diffusion and implications of a domestic norm be traced and reported? My response to the former question will show the reader where to start, while to the latter will facilitate tracing the internationalisation of foreign policy-guiding domestic norms and their functioning in an overseas setting.

Where to start a domestic norms research: methodological challenges

There exists a consensus among the norm scholarship that there is a general problem in the measurement of norms and that there are theoretical and methodological challenges the studies on norms encounter and have to be dealt with.

Kowert and Legro inform us about four of these. The first challenge is about “how one can be certain that a norm is present”, in other words, how can we know about norms?26 For them, there are two main positions in the literature: The first group places emphasis on ‘what actors do’ in order to figure out whether actor behaviour complies with the norms or not. In

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the second approach, scholars focus on what actors say and how they justify their actions. A third and alternative approach proposed by the authors is related to the necessity “to study both rhetoric and behaviour over time”.27 The second challenge, Kowert and Legro further argue, is that too many norms may be present simultaneously and “multiple norms can influence actors – with competing or even contradictory prescriptions… [therefore] it is difficult to predict which norms will be most influential”.28 To overcome this, they propose integrating different levels of analysis. However, as they observe, scholars more often prefer to stick to one level (either domestic or international) to transcend this problem. The third challenge is that norms account for both continuity and change. Holding a constructivist position may help here since such an approach studies the interaction among agency, structure, and action overtime and provides the relevant methodological tools to study both the change and the continuity. Finally, Kowert and Legro argue that “specifying the relationship between normative and material worlds” is difficult, meaning that measuring whether the norms or material factors are influencing the actor behaviour is hard.29 Here the relation of norms to material reality becomes important along with the material and normative environment of the actors.

There are other scholars dealing with the problem of measuring norms. Their propositions sometimes overlap with those of Kowert and Legro. Among them, Goertz and Diehl propose a norm measurement model. To measure the presence and functioning of norms, their model firstly identifies the “behaviours that are congruent with the norm as well as those that violate its prescriptions”; secondly they propose looking at the “political and de-ontological history of the norm”; thirdly, they take the meaning and character of norms as stable as possible because “although norms change, they do so usually quite slowly and the weight of the past is strong in determining the current status of the norm”; and, lastly, they consider that the “strength of the norm varies according to the actor it is supposed to influence”.30

One prominent scholar in the field, Peter Katzenstein, suggests that it is the institutionalisations of certain practices, in governmental and/or public sectors that reveal the norms.31 Böekle and colleagues similarly suggest interrogating and uncovering the tacit and hidden or even explicit political and institutional discourses to identify the norms those drive actor behaviour.32 Some of these indicators include the constitutional and legal order of a society, party programmes and election platforms, parliamentary debates, and survey data.

In a similar vein, Annika Björkdahl poses the question how it is empirically possible to recognize a norm?. She suggests that this question is necessary to raise because “there is only indirect evidence of the existence of a norm”.33 For her,

[t]he influence of norms can… be studied by analysing the norm-induced pattern of behaviour... [and] because norms by definition are shared and intersubjective and relate to shared moral assessments... evidence for the existence of norms can be found in the discourse addressing a particular behaviour, i.e. rhetoric. Because norms are held collectively, they are often discussed before a consensus is reached... The manner in which states talk about norms is often as important, if not more so, than how they act. Hence, an exclusive focus on action would recognise norms only after states decided to adhere to the norm in question or act upon it.34

She therefore offers two ways to measure norms: (i) Analysing the norm-induced patterns of behaviour (which is also and interchangeably called norm-guided behaviour or norm-driven foreign policy) and (ii) analysing the discourses addressing a particular behaviour. A similar position is taken by Finnemore and Sikkink; as they argue norms provide justifications for action and leave a trail of communication that can be studied.35 Nonetheless, in tandem with Goertz and Diehl, they favour conceptual precision in meaning and content that for them “is essential for both meaningful theoretical debate and defensive empirical work”.36 Differing from these, however, Björkdahl – in line with Kowert and Legro’s work – suggests that keeping the focus merely on action is not always feasible to conducting research on, since

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talking about a norm might be more important than acting upon it.37 Therefore, for Björkdahl, looking at the process of reaching a consensus would enable a researcher to begin such a research project.

Likewise, Audie Klotz suggests that norms could be identified “not solely through behavioural outcomes but also through communicative processes”.38 Hence “by analysing communication, we can identify norms nontautologically through both justifications and actions”.39 Therefore, to understand the communicative interaction “we need to analyse actors` words and intensions separately from their behaviour”.40 In other words, “examining discourse”, particularly in terms of finding out the prevailing discourse “is a key area” to trace the policy process and for “applying process-tracing methodologies”.41

To Ann Florini, in order to identify whether a behaviour is driven by a norm, one should firstly seek whether the action is a result of an “obligation”.42 Moreover, the researcher may seek whether the oughtness of the action is shared/recognized by both the actor and the external audience; because the source of legitimacy is both the internal and external audience. Therefore, whether a behaviour is considered as legitimate evokes the functioning of a norm. Identifying legitimate kind of behaviours thus may help to start an enquiry on the functioning of norms.43 Ann Florini’s position differs from Annika Björkdahl on two points. Firstly, Björkdahl considers only the internal audience (or those who have to reach a consensus to act) while Florini considers both the internal and external audience and their sense of legitimacy regarding the performance of behaviour. Secondly, while Björkdahl argues that action is not always necessary to be taken and that the discursive debates of action are enough; Florini, on the other hand, clearly states that norms are about behaviours and to be able to start an analysis the behaviour has to be performed.44 A ‘logic of action’ choice matters here.45

Related to this choice, Wiener shifts the focus to one of the logics, the logic of contestedness, in the scope of which norms are suggested as being contested by default; therefore, the meaning of norms and their validity cannot be assumed as stable in all cultural contexts.46 Wiener argues, accordingly, that “while norms may be considered as valid and just under conditions of interaction in one cultural context, that perception cannot be generalized”.47 In this logic, how then can one be sure about the presence of a norm? Having focused mostly on established and powerful norms such as human rights, democracy or rule-of-law, Wiener suggests that it is the contestation for the validity that invokes the norm; accordingly, they are the dynamics of formal validity, social recognition and cultural validation, in which the meaning-in-use of the norm is enacted and debated, that enable us to observe the functioning of norms.48 Such validity processes are necessary to observe because “norms entail an inherently contested quality and therefore acquire meaning in relation to the specific contexts in which they are enacted… [which also suggests that] norm contestation is a necessary component in raising the level of acceptance of norms”.49

Panke and Petersohn, on the other hand, having treated norms as rule-like self-evident procedures, remind us of the necessity of precision of meanings when explaining the degeneration of norms. This is because, to them, “precise norms have detailed procedures without complex undefined concepts, without overlapping regulations, and have precisely defined applicatory scopes since they do not grant exceptions”.50 In their approach both violation and the cascade of non-compliance are observable, therefore, discussions about those practices reveal the presence of norms. Norms, however, can no longer be traceable when new practices are “no longer framed as non-compliance”, which comes to mean that a norm is degenerated.51

Therefore, as the literature suggests there are several methodological problems, one of the key ones of which relates to measuring norms and being sure about the presence of a norm. The debate centres on treating norms as material settings or not. Treating norms as material

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settings – considering norms as rules making states obliged to act in certain ways – definitely makes them observable. This is because, such reasoning suggests that violating a norm will incite punishment and thus simply tracing the constraining and punishment mechanisms would reveal the norm.52 Such a position may overcome all of the above listed pitfalls. However, it comes with its own baggage of methodological dilemmas. This is because in such studies norms are depicted as the causes of certain types of behaviours “which can be ascertained analogously to that of Newtonian laws governing the collision of two bodies”.53 This means that if a norm is present, the foreign policy or behavioural outcome is predetermined; both interests and preferences are fixed. The norm in this sense loses its capacity to possess an independent explanatory power.

Approaching norms as ideational settings, on the other hand, reduces the methodological dilemmas, as well as providing tools to overcome measurement issues and to increase norms` explanatory capacities. Taking norms as contested by default, as Wiener does, however, further blurs any identification and measurement attempt. While ignoring the contested character of norms brings several other methodological handicaps, embracing it as the sole explanatory variable in measuring norms provides little help. The above-listed ways to transcend the methodological problems regarding identifying or measuring the norms – such as examining the discourses addressing a particular behaviour, analysing the norm-induced patterns of behaviour, studying the consensus reaching processes, and tracing the institutionalisations of certain practices – can thus lead us towards conducting more coherent studies on norms. To be sure, this is what I have seen in my own research.

Having admitted that there is no direct evidence for the presence of norms and that the meanings are nonetheless still contested54 and ambiguous55, I argue that assuming a certain level of precision in their meaning is necessary to identify norms.56 With this insight, one is able to attribute the same meanings to the practices and patterns of repetition. Moreover, I have drawn an important conclusion from my examination that diffusion of norms to an overseas setting and the following socialisation practices also function as the stage where norm presence could be validated and clearly observed. This is because the behavioural, discursive, and representative trails of practices (either in the form of compliance or resistance) left by the functioning of norms are evidently visible and recognizable during this stage. In this sense, I have seen that Björkdahl’s suggestions relating to tracing norms-induced foreign policy practices are certainly facilitative in identifying norms.

As an exemplification of this, accordingly, in my own research, I have identified four dominant post-Kemalist domestic norms relevant to Turkey’s imagining of the kin communities abroad; namely Ottomania, de-ethnicized nationhood, Turkish Islam, and Islamic Internationalism. I did so through interrelatedly examining communicative processes and prevailing discourses, and tracing the patterns of behaviour over time, which suggested to me the possible norm-induced patterns of behaviour. Accordingly, the first norm, Ottomania, suggests that over the course of the last two to three decades the Ottoman Empire and culture have become reference points for institutional, cultural, historical, political, and even in artistic expressions in Turkey. This has been reflected in popular culture, fashion, and architecture and to the very formulation of political solutions to on-going ethno-religious problems in the country. Indeed, the Ottomans became a point of reference and justification in managing inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations, in reimagining both the co-national and kin communities abroad, and in developing relevant policies towards these communities. Accordingly, both in domestic and foreign policy imaginations, the idea of ‘Ottomans’ (or Ottomania as anthropologist Jenny White57 calls it) has gradually become a prominent cognitive frame.

De-ethnicized nationhood, the second norm, suggests that, in the last two decades, the idea of ethnicity has lost its weight in policy-making as the main reference point in Turkey and that there emerged a de-ethnicized tendency in defining the broader Turkish nation. With this process, the Ottoman-Islamic sources of Turkish nationhood were revived and ethno-

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nationalist references were minimized. Turkishness is now used frequently devoid of ethnic connotation.

As the third norm, Turkish Islam refers to the post-Kemalist practices relating to the authenticity of the ‘Turkish practice of Islam’, which reveals that from the post-1980s onwards, state-bodies and religious groups have championed and promoted a certain way of performing Islam both within and outside of Turkey. This manifests itself, for instance, in the reaction of religious groups’, political parties’, and governments’ approach to the threat of ‘Wahhabism’. This is also related to the Ottoman and Turkish Islamic cultural heritage abroad. Turkey’s religious authority (Diyanet) and many religious groups thus share a concern for conveying a ‘Turkish way of practicing Islam’ abroad.

Finally, the Islamic Internationalism suggests that in post-1980 Turkey, cross-border concerns extended beyond a focus entirely on ethnic kinship and there slowly began to emerge a religiously-based and ummah-oriented sense of solidarity. State-level concerns for Bosnian and Albanian Muslims, Iraqi Kurds, and Palestinians, and the sense of Islamic solidarity shown by NGOs from Turkey and people during the humanitarian crises in Muslim countries of South East Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Africa indicate that the idea of ummah has been revitalized. This coincides with geographical rediscovery of the ummah. Accordingly, seeing that this internationalist concern for Muslim communities has been institutionalised, the source of solidarity between Turkey and ethnic Turks abroad has, to some extent, become focused more on a sense of Muslim identity and constituted by an Islamic internationalist concern.

In identifying these four norms, the behavioural, discursive, and representative practices have altogether been traced, yet it was particularly the discourses of legitimizing (justifying) or denouncing that left an ample trail of communication to be traced and which facilitated my examination. Accordingly, these post-Kemalist discourses, such as recognizing the ethnic and confessional diversity in Turkey, or as suggesting and envisioning a new multicultural form of state-society and inter-communal relations both inside and outside the country – the justifications of which have been based on denouncing the crises of Kemalism – have become common practice. Moreover, this new multiculturalism, for instance, has resulted in the lifting of restrictions on use of Kurdish and other minority languages and paved the ways for the restoration of the destruction wrought on inter-communal relations in the country by Kemalism. Indeed, this has replaced the suppressive Kemalist-inspired nation-building policies, with a bold emphasis on the sense of Islamic and Turkish/Ottoman civilisational responsibilities. This led me to conclude that while Kemalist norms suggests a nationalist, homogenous, societally and ideologically exclusive country and set of actions, post-Kemalist norms stimulate a multicultural, anti-nationalist, atavist (Ottoman nostalgia), diverse, and mostly Muslim identity-driven foreign policy actions.

Nevertheless, my tracing of the trails of the functioning of such norms in foreign policy was fruitful and made me further confident about the presence of post-Kemalist norms. This is because the behavioural, discursive, and representative trails left by the functioning of post-Kemalist norms are evidently visible and recognizable during this stage. Accordingly, (post-Kemalist) Turkey, in its relation to the ethnic Turkish community in Kosovo, framed the Ottomans as a model for the peaceful coexistence of different ethnicities and promoted it as a cure to the virulent nationalism, which had led to war in the Balkans in the 1990s. The idea of the Ottoman Empire was, accordingly, presented as the solution to the challenge of nation-building in post-war Kosovo. Moreover, Turkey did not show any concern for the ethnic Turkish community’s expectations for a bold ethno-politics, but rather acted upon anti-nationalism and championed the idea of going beyond ethnicity through the introduction of frames such as religious brotherhood, religious identity, and ummah to the ethnic Turkish community.

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As a final point, however, while all these patterns of practice were convincing enough to highlight the presence and functioning of post-Kemalist norms in both domestic and foreign policies, it was a methodological choice, which made my scrutiny conclusive. I thus argue that in order to be able to identify norms, a certain level of precision in their meaning is necessary; this is because only then can the same meanings be attained to practices and patterns of repetition. This argument, consequently, necessitates holding mostly a logic of appropriateness – at least in relation to the debates on the meaning of norms. Such position holds particular importance for domestic norms. This is because domestic norms – unlike international norms – tend to be more ambiguous and to be harder to identify. It is even harder to ‘name’ a domestic norm. Indeed, unlike the international norms, in a domestic norms scrutiny once the norm scholar starts observing patterns of meaningful practices, s/he may be required to name them, thus to ‘invent’ them, which brings several other methodological concerns in to existence. At this point, as a ‘writer’ of norms, it was me who ‘named’ the above listed repetitive patterns of practices as post-Kemalist norms (of Ottomania, de-ethnicized nationhood, Turkish Islam, and Islamic Internationalism). Therefore, and following Engelkamp and Glaab58, I shall admit that others might have written these norms differently. This would have been the case especially if morality and moral responsibility would have come to be attached to thinking about and writing of the norm, which I clearly abstained from. Morality has become an issue only in reporting how entrepreneurs justify their enacting of norms, other than as an intrinsic feature to norms.

Tracing domestic norms’ overseas mobilisation: theoretical challenges

Once the norm under scrutiny is identified or at least the trails of the functioning of it become clearer and traceable, for the researcher, an equally complex process begins; tracing the mobilisation of the domestic norms. Not every norm has implications in foreign policy, therefore, it is assumed that the IR researcher is intrinsically in search of norms concerning foreign policy and of diffusive actions making norms gain international mobilisation.

This process is mostly studied under the mechanism of norm diffusion or cascade. Having agreed that it is indeed such mechanisms which are functioning, they alone are incapable of explaining the translation of norms into practices of overseas socialisation. I argue that they are rather the inherit characteristics of norms and the norm-induced practices (as Björkhdahl calls them) that provide such mobilisation. Accordingly, in the literature the translation of norms into [foreign] policy practices has been explained mostly by addressing the role of norms in policy-making. Accordingly, several roles or functions have been attributed to norms in IR, which are grouped around the subscription to a logic of action. For instance, the followers of the logic of consequentialism (mostly the realists and liberals in IR) suggest that norms determine the behaviours of states in the international arena, they therefore embody the qualities and the relevant coercive mechanisms to mould the decisions of actors, which come to mean that the conclusions of actions of actors are predetermined.59 The translation of the dominant norms into foreign policy practice, in this view, is explained via the idea that norms function as rules that govern behaviour and that foreign policy is thus simply a rule-guided action. The logic of appropriateness (shared mostly by the mainstream constructivists in IR), on the other hand, suggests that norms have two core roles regarding the actor behaviour – they regulate the behaviour through setting standards or collective expectations for conduct and construct the identities and interests of the actors on which such expectations are built.60 In foreign policy, therefore, the translation of a norm to action comes to mean that a government will act based on its identity and on the collective expectations intrinsic to or inherent in the norm itself. Here identifying the collective expectations and the actor-identity may well reveal the norm. The logic of arguing, subscribed to by critical constructivists, thirdly, suggests that norms are the means by which actors “pursue goals, share meanings, communicate with each other, criticize assertions, and justify actions”.61

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Thus norms, as argumentative constructs, both give meaning to actions along with guiding behaviour. The meaningful actions in foreign policy for both the conductor and the addressee are the norm-driven ones, thus the meaning reveals the norm. The logic of contestedness (held by postmodern constructivists), finally, suggests that “norms may achieve a degree of appropriateness reflected by changing state behaviour”, yet, since they are contested, their role in the conduct of the behaviour becomes contextual and depends on cultural validation.62 Norms, accordingly, reveal the contestation, argumentation and negotiation in foreign policy making and vice versa.

These roles therefore are facilitative in understanding how norms are translated into policy practices.63 Studying the role of norms therefore gives clues about the functioning of norms and mostly explains the formation of norm-guided foreign policy. This however remains inconclusive in tracing and explaining the overseas mobilisation of the norms. Here, as I have seen in my own domestic norm enquiry, I must mention what is imperative and carry explanatory capacity for norm mobilisation, that is, to understand and identify the functions of norm-guided behaviours (policy conduct). Here, foreign policy is suggested to be composed of at least two intertwined processes: policy formation and policy conduct. The role of norms alone is mostly explanatory for domestic construction of foreign policy. To explain the norm-centred results and the constitutive ideational consequences of foreign policy conduct, the functions of norm-guided behaviours need to be identified and traced.

I have identified (and subsequently tested in my research) at least five functions of norm-guided behaviour: (i) norm-guided behaviour is a meaningful action and denotes the intentions of the conductor; (ii) norm-guided behaviour invokes the identity of the policy conductor; (iii) norm-guided behaviour conveys/transmits the norm; (iv) norm-guided behaviour urges the endorsement of the norm by the target actor/s; and (v) norm-guided behaviour leads target agents to internalise new roles, identities, and interests, therefore, it has a constitutive function. These functions therefore enable us to trace the ‘influences’ of domestic norms abroad and constitute a response to the question of how I traced and reported the internationalisation and mobilisation of the norms I studied in my own research.

According to the first function, a norm-driven foreign policy as a guided-action is a meaningful act for both the conductor and the receiver parties and even for the third parties.64 In relation to this, a norm-driven foreign policy, as the second function, becomes a representative of state/collective identity, which is invoked by the action and perceived by the receiver agent. Therefore, once a norm starts guiding behaviour, concomitantly, the attributed meaning and the constructed collective identity accompany the behaviour and become indicated and enacted by the conduct of the action.65 The third function of a norm-driven foreign policy is to convey a norm. Accordingly, for instance, Audie Klotz presents a self-evident example of norm conveyance by norm-guided behaviour. She explains that in South Africa it was both domestic and international pressures that ended the racist apartheid regime in 1994. As soon as the norm of racial equality became embraced globally, its teachings were translated into sanctions policies against South Africa. These policies forced South Africa to adhere to the norm of racial equality. This could be seen as a norm-guided behaviour whereby sanctions were working to force the target community to show endorsement to the norm of racial equality. It is seen here that a norm-guided behaviour conveys the norm and contains the qualities of convincing the target community to embrace the norm that guides it. In a similar vein, Robert Herman informs us that by adhering to the norm of ‘New Thinking’ in the USSR, “Gorbachev actively encouraged Warsaw Pact governments to emulate Moscow in introducing greater liberalization in economic and political life”.66 Here, again, norm-guided foreign policy was transmitting the norm to new realms and asking for the endorsement of these norms. Besides, there are also discursive practices within foreign policy (or as foreign policy) which also serve as mechanisms through which an international norm enters into a domestic arena.67 Thus discourses, as discursive

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practices and as norm-guided foreign policy practices, convey norms into new domestic fields and request validation and adherence.68

On a related note regarding the fourth function of norms, it can also be seen in the empirical studies produced by Burley, Klotz, and Herman that the transmission of a norm and the urging of its endorsement go hand in hand during the conduct of a norm-guided action. Socialisation of the target community/actor into a norm therefore stands as a self-evident proof of such functions, as it involves both the diffusion of a norm and the urging of endorsement to it.69 In a clearer example, Thomas Risse formulates the function of norm-guided behaviour as the translation of international norms into domestic practices in the target community. For Risse, norm-guided behaviour functions as a kind of transmission belt between the norm-setter community and the target community. Therefore, norm-guided behaviour both (i) conveys the norm and (ii) aims at increasing the endorsement to it.70 As for the final function of the norms, at this point, I can confidently argue that the functions of norm-guided behaviour exerts influence on the target actor because norm-guided behaviours lead target agents to internalise new roles, identities, and interests.71 In the literature, this character of norms has been valued as a constitutive quality. To Checkel, “‘norms’ coming down to a [new] domestic arena has constitutive effects” by which the norm-guided behaviour request adherence to the norm and the roles and identities attached to it.72 This quality of norm-guided behaviour results in the occurrence of a response by the target either in the form of adherence, rejection, or something in-between, which constitutes the impact generated by the conduct of the norm-guided behaviour. This constitutive character analytically facilitates the formulation of a measurement tool to disclose the influence a norm-guided foreign policy exerts.

These functions, taken together, thus enable the research to study both the international mobilisation of domestic norms and their functioning in an overseas setting; in particular, the last three functions of norm-induced actions carry particular importance as they also provide the mechanisms by which a domestic norm becomes internationalised and generate constitutive ideational consequences abroad.

Identifying such functions was extremely facilitative in my own research, too. This is because, only after taking these functions into consideration, did I become capable of explaining the transmission of post-Kemalist norms from Turkey to Kosovo via post-Kemalist norms-guided foreign policy practices and the target community’s socialisation into the teachings of these norms.73 To give more concrete examples, the post-Kemalist norm of Ottomania, for instance, was diffused to Kosovo via official promotion campaigns whereby Kosovo’s Ottoman cultural identity was mentioned, and the framing of the Ottoman as a model for peaceful coexistence of different ethnicities was promoted as a cure and solution to the challenges of nation-building in post-war Kosovo. The second post-Kemalist norm, that of de-ethnicized nationhood, on the other hand, was diffused to Kosovo through the constitutive involvement of norm entrepreneurs who did not show any concern for the ethnic Turkish community’s expectations for a bold ethno-politics. They rather, via diffusive acts, tried to act in anti-nationalist manners. The socialisation of the community into these norms has been done via a parallel process of championing going beyond ethnicity. The motto of these efforts has been championed by Turkey’s most famous politician, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and his direct call to the ethnic Turkish community for them not to bring their ‘Turkishness’ into the fore in building relations with majority Albanians.

Another post-Kemalist norm, that of ‘Turkish Islam’ and its diffusion, has mainly been done under the banner of preventing the spread of ‘Wahhabism’, which is thought to be gaining ground in Kosovo. In this respect, diplomatic bodies and religious groups have, for example, prevented so-called ‘Wahhabis’ from taking over Ottoman mosques in a bid to ‘defend’ Turkish/Ottoman culture, while religious groups from Turkey have also acted to ‘protect’ Ottoman religious legacy in the country, claiming that ‘Turks brought Islam to Kosovo and

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they will sustain it’. The socialisation of the community to Turkish Islam, however, was done through more constitutive acts, such as re-institutionalising Turkish Islamic practices or forming alliances against the so-called Wahhabi threat. The final post-Kemalist norm, that of ‘Islamic Internationalism’, and its diffusion to Kosovo was about the introduction of frames such as religious brotherhood, religious identity, and the idea of the universal Islamic ‘ummah’ (community) to the ethnic Turkish community in Kosovo. These frames were an attempt to redefine the inter-ethnic relationship among the Muslim communities in Kosovo. The socialisation of the ethnic Turkish community into such a norm is part of an effort to transform the ethnically-acting Turkish community into a religiously-thinking and acting one. Within this scope, notions of Muslim sensitivity, religious solidarity, the idea of empathy with fellow Muslims and Islamic consciousness were promoted discursively and representatively. Moreover, norm entrepreneurs preferred to treat ethnic Turks as a religious community rather than an ethnic one. Through visits of senior government officials during religious festivals, the Muslim Turkish identity was performed and promoted by these actors, and has functioned as one of the most constitutive socialising acts conducted by Turkey.

By way of confirmation, the conduct of the post-Kemalist acts – as a post-Kemalist norm driven foreign policy – functioned as a means for both norm diffusion and socialisation. Accordingly, a norm-induced act conveyed the norm that drives such act and the conveyed norm called for adherence. In short, this is a brief account of the internationalisation and the functioning of domestic norms in an overseas setting.

In lieu of a conclusion

In this research note, I introduced a few methodological and theoretical ways that a research may consider in order to overcome two core challenges in the study of domestic norms and foreign policy: the question of where to start a domestic norm-guided foreign policy enquiry (how to measure/identify norms guiding a foreign policy), and, second, the issue of domestic norms’ overseas mobilisation (how to trace the internationalisation of domestic norms thus the functioning of foreign policy-guiding domestic norms in an overseas setting) – a particularly neglected research puzzle.

After introducing the debates on measuring norms in the relevant literature, I argued that although there is no direct evidence for the presence of norms, examining the discourses surrounding a particular behaviour, analysing the norm-induced patterns of behaviour, studying the consensus reaching processes, and tracing the institutionalisations of certain practices is likely to reveal the presence of a norm. For further assurance in this matter, and to be able to identify norms, assuming a certain level of precision of meaning associated with the norm is necessary; this is because only then can the same meanings be attached to practices and patterns of repetition. I further argued that the diffusion of norms overseas and the socialisation practices also function at the stage where norm presence could be validated and clearly observed. This is because the behavioural, discursive, and representative trails of practices left by the overseas functioning of norms, in the form of compliance and resistance, are evidently visible and recognizable during this stage.

Related to this, I also argued that in order to understand domestic norms’ mobilisation, both the translation of norms into foreign policy practices and subsequently their conveyance (thus diffusion abroad) should be studied; this requires an analysis of the role of norms and the functions of norm-guided behaviours. However, relaying only on the role of norms mostly explain the foreign policy formation processes thus the building of norm-induced practices. Accordingly, tracing the functioning of norm-induced practices (thus the conduct of norm-driven foreign policies) enables us to better understand domestic norms’ mobilisation. Among the functions of norm-induced behaviours I identified, particularly, three functions that facilitated my understanding of the internalisation and the functioning of domestic

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norms in an overseas setting, as well as the ‘influences’ of domestic norms abroad. These functions are norm-guided behaviour conveys/transmits the norm, norm-guided behaviour urges the endorsement of the norm by the target actor/s and norm-guided behaviour leads target agents to internalise new roles, identities, and interests; therefore, it has a constitutive function. They accordingly constituted a response to the question of how to trace and report the internationalisation and mobilisation of norms.

Having taken into account all the domestic norm processes listed above, it may be pertinent to conclude, following Peter Katzenstein, that “what is true of domestic norms holds also for international norms”.74 In fact, as my own research may suggest, they mostly do. However, researchers may also want to consider that there exist differences between domestic norms and international norms regarding their contextual functions, negotiation dynamics, international salience, influence, and the organisational platforms through they are institutionalised, diffused, and internationally advocated. It was these dissimilarities in the first place which led to the differences in studying domestic and international norms in the literature. Moreover, in thinking of domestic/international norms interactions, one should have some concerns about whether domestic and international norms could be equally equipped to function in international arenas. Similarly, the power relations inherent in the dissemination of international norms, as the postmodern constructivists suggest, must also be taken into account. Indeed, since domestic norms’ internationalisation is mostly studied with reference to the norms of powerful actors, norm internalisations taking place within more discrete contexts should also be taken into account. My doctoral research constitutes such an example. Finally, following the literature on peace research which has demonstrated that ‘the same norm has similar policy implications in both domestic and foreign policies’, the literature on norms in IR should also direct more attention towards the study of the dynamics and the consequences of such process with cases focusing on norms other than democracy.

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Notes

1. Hoffmann, Matthew, “Norms and Social Constructivism in International Relations`, in Robert Denemark (ed) International Studies Encyclopaedia, London, Blackwell Publishing, 2010; Widmaier, W. and Park, S. “`Differences Beyond Theory: Structural, Strategic, and Sentimental Approaches to Normative Change”, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 13, No 2, 2012, p. 123–13; Wunderlich, Carmen “Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics”, in Muller H. and Wunderlich C. (eds) Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, and Justice, Athens and London, The University of Georgia Press, 2013. Hofferberth, Matthias and Weber, Christian “Lost in translation: a critique of constructivist norm research”, Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 18, 2015, pp. 75–103. This has been the case equally in both contemporary mainstream and postmodern constructivist writing; while they accept the presence of domestic norms, they are more interested in theorizing about the `story` about international norms.

2. see Finnemore, Martha “Humanitarian Intervention”, in Katzenstein, Peter (ed), The Culture of National Security-Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996a.

3. Finnemore, Martha “International Organizations as teachers of norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy”, International Organization, Vol. 47, No 4, 1993, p. 565-597; Clifford, Bob “The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012.

4. This has been the most common way of talking about domestic norms in the literature. Some of these wide range of studies would be listed as follows: Klotz, Audie, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1995; Risse T., Ropp S. and Sikkink K., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999; Cortell A. and Davis J. “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms”, International Studies Review, Vol. 2, No 1, 2000, p. 65-87; Checkel T. Jeffrey, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe”, International Study Quarterly, 43, 1999, p. 83-114; Checkel T. Jeffrey “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist – Constructivist Divide”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No 4, 1997, p. 473-495; Gurowitz, Amy “Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State”, World Politics, Vol. 51, No 3, p. 413-445; Acharya, Amita “How ideas spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism”, International Organization, Vol. 58, No 2, 2004, p. 239-275; Arase, David (ed) Japan`s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions, London, Routledge, 2005; Björkdahl, Annika “Norm-maker and Norm-taker: Exploring the Normative Influence of the EU in Macedonia”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 2, 2005, p. 257–278; Mackenzie M. and Sesay M. “No Amnesty From/For the International: The Production and Promotion of TRCs as an International Norm in Sierra Leone”, International Studies Perspective, Vol. 13, 2012, p. 146-163; Betts A. and Orchard P. “Introduction: The Normative Institutionalization-Implementation Gap”, in Betts A. and Orchard P. (eds) Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change Practice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 1-43.

5. While not every form of domestic norm has equal salience in international arena, the power of the norm-promoter actor in international politics matters in extend the salience of the norms. For a theory informed critique of this, see for instance Mackenzie M. and Sesay M. “No Amnesty From/For the International”; Inayatullah, Naeem and David L. Blaney “The dark heart of kindness: The social construction of

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deflection”, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 13, No 2, 2012, p. 164-175. Despite the critiques, in the literature, there is also an implicit acceptance that domestic and international norms are equally equipped to function.

6. For example, while Kier underscores the role of culture, more specifically the bureaucratic organisational culture, Johnson resorts to historically transmitted strategic culture, Berger draws attention to the historicity and cultural-institutional accounts, and Robert Herman, alternatively, places emphasis on the collective ideational constructs, cognitive evolution, and policy entrepreneurship. Katzenstein also adds to this debate by integrating institutionalisation and norm-compatible identity construction to the norm emergence process. See Kier, Elizabeth “Culture and French Military Doctrine”, in Katzenstein, Peter (ed) The Culture of National Security-Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996a, p. 204; Johnson I. Alastair, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China”, in Katzenstein, Peter (ed) The Culture of National Security, p. 257-60; Berger U. Thomas “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan`, in Katzenstein, Peter (ed) The Culture of National Security, p. 317–56; Herman G. Robert “Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War”, in Katzenstein, Peter (ed) The Culture of National Security, p. 273; Katzenstein, Peter, Cultural Norms and National Security, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996b.

7. Kier, Elizabeth “Culture and French Military Doctrine”, p. 204; Finnemore M. and Sikkink K. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, International Organization, Vol. 52, No 4, 1998, p. 887-917; Björkdahl, Annika “Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No 1, 2002, p. 9-23.

8. Finnemore M. and Sikkink K. “International Norm Dynamics”, p. 893.

9. Ingebritsen, Christine “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia`s Role in World Politics”, Journal of Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 37, No 1, 2002, p. 13.

10. Some of these studies are Katzenstein, Peter, Cultural Norms and National Security; Katzenstein, Peter, Tamed Power: Germany in Europe, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997; Kier, Elizabeth “Culture and French Military Doctrine”; Kier, Elizabeth, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997; Johnson I. Alastair, “Cultural Realism”, Berger U. Thomas “Norms, Identity, and National Security”; Kimie Hara, “Norms, Structures, and Japan`s ‘Northern Territories’ Policy”, in Sato Y. and Hirata K. (eds), Norms, Interests and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy, New York, Palgrave, 2008, p. 71-92; Tarte, Sandra “Norms and Japan`s Foreign Aid Policy in the South Pacific”, in Sato Y. and Hirata K. (eds), Norms, Interests and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 129-150; Hirata, Keiko “Japan`s Whaling Politics”, in Sato Y. and Hirata K. (eds) Norms, Interests and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 175-210; Cordell K. and Wolff S. “A Foreign Policy Analysis of the ‘German Question’: Ostpolitik Revisited’, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 3, No 3, 2007, p. 255–271; Miyagi, Yukiko “Foreign Policy Making Under Koizumi: Norms and Japan’s Role in the 2003 Iraq War”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2009, p. 349–366. It should be noted that most of the research studying domestic norms and foreign policy nexus are conducted on Japan and Germany.

11. Burley, Anne-Marie “Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State”, in Ruggie John (ed) Multilateralism Matters, the Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993.

12. Ibid.

13. Herman G. Robert “Identity, Norms, and National Security”, p. 273.

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14. Ibid. p. 305.

15. Trumbore P. and Boyer A. Mark “International Crisis Decision-making as a Two-Level Process”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No 6, 2000, p. 679-697. Also see Caprioli M. and Trumbore P. “Conflict and States: The Transfer of Domestic Norms to the International Arena”, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association-Northeast, Philadelphia, PA, 11–13 November (1999).

16. Trumbore P. and Boyer A. Mark “International Crisis Decision-making”, p. 681.

17. Peterson M. T. and Graham Leah “Shared Human Rights Norms and Military Conflict”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 55, No 2, 2011, p. 248-273.

18. Trumbore P. and Boyer A. Mark “International Crisis Decision-making”, p. 681.

19. Peterson M. T. and Graham Leah “Shared Human Rights Norms and Military Conflict”, p. 250.

20. Caprioli M. and Trumbore P. “Ethnic discrimination and interstate violence: Testing the international impact of domestic behaviour”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 4, No 1, 2003, p. 16.

21. Jarrod, Hayes “The democratic peace and the new evolution of an old idea”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 18, No 4, 2011, p. 774.

22. Edwards S. M., Scott M. K., Allen S.H., and Irvin K. “Sin of Commission: Understanding Membership Patterns on the United Nations Human Rights Commission”, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 61, No 3, 2008, p. 393.

23. Ibid. 395.

24. In a similar instance, the mainstream constructivist research agenda on normative change has been criticized for overwhelmingly focusing attention on “the actions, discourses, beliefs, and strategies used by liberal actors promoting liberal norms in international system” and taking liberalism as the only “possible ideological framework that can be used for framing actions”, which is suggested to be obscuring by Fiona Adamson (p. 547). Adamson, Fiona “Global Liberalism Versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics”, International Studies Review, Vol. 7, No 4, 2005, p. 547-569.

25. Tabak, Hüsrev “Turkey, Domestic Norms and Outside Turks: Kosovar Turks’ Quandary with Post-Kemalist Norms”, PhD Thesis, The University of Manchester, 2015. This thesis is later published as a monograph entitled ‘The Kosovar Turks and Post-Kemalist Turkey, Foreign Policy, Socialisation and Resistance’, London: I.B.Tauris, 2016.

26. Kowert A.P. and Legro W.J. “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise`, in Katzenstein, Peter (ed) The Culture of National Security-Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996a.

27. Ibid., p. 485, italic original.

28. Ibid., p. 486.

29. Ibid., p. 483.

30. Goertz G. and Diehl F.P. “Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some Conceptual and Measurement”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, No 4, 1992, p. 645-46.

31. Katzenstein, Peter, Cultural Norms and National Security, 1996b.

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32. Böekle H., Rittberger V. and Wagner W. “Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory”, in Rittberger, Volker (ed), German foreign policy since unification: theories and case studies, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2002, p. 128-132.

33. Björkdahl, Annika “Norms in International Relations”, 13.

34. Ibid.

35. Finnemore M. and Sikkink K. “International Norm Dynamics”, p. 892.

36. Ibid., p. 891.

37. Björkdahl, Annika “Norms in International Relations”.

38. Klotz, Audie, Norms in International Relations, p. 29.

39. Ibid., p. 30.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., p. 33.

42. Florini, Ann “The Evolution of International Norms”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, 1996, p. 364-5.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., p. 364.

45. Since norms are theorized with reference to agency and agents` actions, in the IR norms literature, all proposed definitions, in one way or another, subscribe to a logic of action. In other words, norms have been principally utilized to make sense of the actions of agency, therefore; the roles attributed to norms differ in each logic of action theorisation. In this sense, in IR norms literature there are four dominant `logics of action` considerations: namely, logic of consequentialism, logic of appropriateness, logic of arguing, or logic of contestedness. All these logics offer different roles for norms and suggest different definitions; they are also embraced by different schools of thought in IR. Realist, Neo-realist and Neo-liberal schools, for instance, subscribe to a logic of consequentialism, while the mainstream constructivist school to a logic of appropriateness. The logic of arguing and the logic of contestedness, on the other hand, are embraced by critical and post-modern constructivist schools respectively.

46. Wiener, Antje “The Dual Quality of Norms and Governance beyond the State: Sociological and Normative Approaches to ‘Interaction’”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 10, No 1, 2007a, p. 55; Wiener, Antje “The Contested Meanings of Norms”, Comparative European Politics, Vol. 5, 2007b, p. 6.

47. Wiener, Antje “The Dual Quality of Norms”, p. 55.

48. Wiener, Antje “Enacting meaning-in-use: qualitative research on norms and international relations”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, 2009, p. 177.

49. Wiener A. and Puetter U. “The Quality of Norms is What Actors Make of It: Critical Constructivist Research on Norms”, Journal of International Law and International Relations, Vol. 5, No 1, 2009, p. 7. For a relational/processual explanation of the change in the meaning of norms and the agency’s relation to it see Hofferberth and Weber “Lost in translation: a critique of constructivist norm research”, p. 85.

50. Panke D. and Petersohn U. “Why international norms disappear sometimes”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 18, No 4, 2011, p. 724.

51. Ibid., p. 723.

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52. see Krasner D. Stephen, `Introduction`, in Krasner D. Stephen (ed) International Regimes, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983; Axelrod, Robert “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No 4, 1986, p. 1097.

53. Kratochwil F. and Ruggie G.J. “International Organization: a state of art on an art of the state”, International Organization, Vol. 40, No 4, 1986, p. 768.

54. Other than Wiener there are others admitting the contested character of norms while not embracing the logic of contestedness, such as Katzenstein, Peter, Cultural Norms and National Security (1996b) and Risse, Thomas “Let`s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics”, International Organization, Vol. 54, No 1, 2000, p. 1–39.

55. I have seen in my norm enquiry that the meanings of and the teachings attached to norms could be ambiguous and norm entrepreneurs may take advantage of this during norm diffusion and socialisation processes. Also see Engelkamp S. and Katharina G. “Writing Norms: Constructivist Norm Research and the Politics of Ambiguity”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 40, N 3-4, 2015, p. 201-218.

56. Confirming Björkdahl, Annika “Norms in International Relations”. Even Wiener agrees with this through saying that “[a]s social constructs, norms may acquire stability over extended periods of time” while still holding that “they remain flexible by definition.” See Wiener, Antje “Enacting meaning-in-use”, p. 179-180.

57. White, Jenny, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2013.

58. Engelkamp S. and Katharina G. “Writing Norms”, p. 213.

59. Florini, Ann “The Evolution of International Norms”; Krasner D. Stephen, “Introduction”; Axelrod, Robert “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms”.

60. Klotz, Audie, Norms in International Relations; Katzenstein, Peter (ed) The Culture of National Security; Katzenstein, Peter, Cultural Norms and National Security; Finnemore M. and Sikkink K. “International Norm Dynamics”, p. 893.

61. Kratochwil, Fredrich, Rules, norms, and decisions: on the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.11. Also see Risse, Thomas, “Let`s Argue!”.

62. Wiener, Antje “Enacting meaning-in-use”, p. 179.

63. see also Park S. and Vetterlein A. Owning Development Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and the World Bank, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 5.

64. Hopf, Ted “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, International Security, Vol. 23, No 1, 1998, p. 171-200; Jepperson R., Wendt A. and Katzenstein P. “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security”, in Katzenstein, Peter (ed) The Culture of National Security, p. 33–75. Kratochwil, Fredrich, Rules, norms, and decisions.

65. Katzenstein, Peter (ed) The Culture of National Security; Katzenstein, Peter, Cultural Norms and National Security.

66. Herman G. Robert “Identity, Norms, and National Security”, p. 305.

67. Cortell A. and Davis J. “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms”, p. 76.

68. Ibid., p. 76-77.

69. Finnemore M. and Sikkink K. “International Norm Dynamics”.

70. Risse, Thomas, “Let`s Argue!”, p. 28. Also see Risse et al., The Power of Human Rights.

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71. Checkel T. Jeffrey, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework”, International Organization, Vol. 59, No 4, 2005, p. 801.

72. Checkel T. Jeffrey, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity”, p. 85.

73. Here both governmental bodies and non-state actors have functioned as both organisational platforms for the institutionalization of the norms and as the mechanisms to transmit the norms abroad. Therefore, they were both norm entrepreneurs and “operate[d] within the structure and constraints of state identity” see Gurowitz, Amy “The Diffusion of International Norms: Why Identity Matters”, International Politics, Vol. 43, 2006, p. 311.

74. Peter Katzenstein, “Coping with Terrorism: Norms and Internal Security in Germany and Japan” in Goldstein J. and Keohane O. R. (eds) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 269.

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www.cesran.org

Karine Tournier-Sol & Chris Gifford (Eds) The UK Challenge to Europeanization: The Persistence of British Euroscepticism Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 259 pages, $ 51.90

The UK was for the dominance of a free trade regime in Europe in the aftermath of World War II. Therefore, she approached the European Union integration hesitantly from the very beginning primarily because of her jealousy about sovereignty and she even tried to undermine the success of the project by forming her own alternative free trade model. Under the influence of external and internal factors, the UK changed her mind very quickly and sought for the EU membership in 1961. It takes more than a decade for the UK to achieve the EU membership due to her well-known previous sceptical positioning towards the EU project. The Euroscepticism of the UK wasn’t disappeared all of a sudden after the EU membership of the country in 1973. The UK has always paid effort in order to change the rules of the game or to block the further steps taken at the expense of the sovereignties of the EU member states. As a result, this high level of Euroscepticism forced other members of the EU to give some concessions to the UK in order to achieve a higher level of integration for the sake of policies such as common currency and Schengen visa-free regime.

The book titled “The UK Challenge to Europeanization: The Persistence of British Euroscepticism” deals with the unrest of the UK about her EU membership. The issue was elaborated by considering the Brexit debate and the withdrawal referendum in the horizon. The book is composed of twelve chapters approaching to the issue from different perspectives and these chapters were grouped under four main parts, namely “Nation and National Identity”, “Party Politics and Euroscepticism”, “Eurosceptic Civil Society” and “Eurosceptic interests”.

The Cameron government couldn’t stay aloof to the rising Eurosceptic tendencies in the British society and gave a promise for a referendum about the EU membership of the UK in case of an election victory of his party by 2015. This process was presented in the introduction part of the book as a part of a general unrest observed in all the EU member states in the aftermath of the Euro Crisis without denying the historical tendency of the UK to see Europe as a other.

The first chapter emphasizes the importance of the comparisons with Europe in the formation of UK’s national identity and identifies the EU membership as a first UK attempt for trying to be European. The tendency to focus on the differences from Europe is presented as a long-established tradition of the UK.

The second chapter defines the decision of the referendum as the end of UK’s awkward partnership status. It is also mentioned that the UK has changed a lot by integrating with Europe and the UK’s resistance has had an undeniable role in the formation of the current EU.

The third chapter looks at the existence of Euroscepticism at the sub-state level by considering Scottish, Irish and Welsh attitudes towards the withdrawal of the UK from the EU.

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The chapter highlights the positive correlation between the stronger English identity and stronger Euroscepticism.

The fourth chapter provides an account of the process through which the marginal Eurosceptic tendencies has gained central positions, as the EU lost its political reason for the UK.

The fifth chapter is about the Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party of the UK. The chapter stresses that the Euroscepticism has turned into official stance of the party towards the EU with the changing nature of the EU and changes in the organizational structure of the party. The chapter describes the rising Euroscepticism of the Conservative Party as a populist policy.

The sixth chapter is about the pro-EU parties in the UK, primarily the liberal democrats and labour. The opposition of the pro-EU parties to the withdrawal of the UK from the EU is labelled as weak and ambivalent in the chapter.

The seventh chapter deals with the election victories of the UK Independence Party, which is the most EU rejectionist party in the UK, in recent years by transforming itself from a single-issue party to a catch-all party. The chapter establishes a similarity between the electoral success of the UK Independence Party and the rise of the rightist parties in the other EU member states.

The eight chapter is about the dominant position of the hardliner Euroscepticism in the UK newspapers after the Euro Crisis. The chapter takes the coverage of the Cameron’s Bloomberg Speech in 2013 by the newspapers as an example.

The ninth chapter takes the attention of the reader to the non-party based Euroscepticism in the UK. The chapter mentioned the existence of 24 extra-parliamentary Eurosceptic groups in the UK, which have been carrying out activities in order to form an unfavourable public opinion about the EU in the UK and focused on four of them, namely Burges Group, Business for Sterling, Campaign for a Referendum and I Want a Referendum.

The tenth chapter is about the dilemma faced by the UK in conceptualizing the EU. The chapter puts forth that the EU has been seen in the UK both as a threat for national sovereignty and as a necessity for big power status and economic gains by underlining the UK’s ongoing choice for an intergovernmental EU.

The eleventh chapter touches upon the issue of the New EU Treaty (Fiscal Pact) as a factor that has made the disagreements between the UK and other EU member states visible. The chapter argues that as long as the divergences between the UK and other EU member states continue, the UK can lose its capacity to influence the design of Europe in future.

The last chapter is on the US attitude towards the UK’s withdrawal possibility from the EU. The chapter mentions that while the US has been for a stronger UK within the EU both for the UK’s and the EU’s success in the future, the UK has seen the EU as a threat for her special relations with the US.

The book is basing on the general assumption of that the Euroscepticism is very widespread in the UK and it tries to provide various insights about the root causes of this tendency. It is a very valuable source of information especially for those who want to have a detailed knowledge about the Euroscepticism in the UK.

Seven Erdogan, Ph.D. Assistant Professor of International Relations

Recep Tayyip Erdogan University, Turkey seven.erdogan@erdogan.edu.tr

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Andy Green and Jan German Janmaat Regimes of Social Cohesion: societies and the crisis of globalization Palgrave Macmillan 2014, ISBN: 978-1-137-45324-2, pp., 248, £24.99 pb.

The question of social cohesion is a classic concern. It is by no means a new theme among social scientists and policymakers who try to unravel the causes and consequences of social cohesion on the one hand, and antecedents as well as succedents of social erosion on the other hand. Andy Green’s and Jan German Janmaat’s Regimes of Social Cohesion is another good attempt to comprehend the complexities and ramifications of social cohesion as a concept and its use in policy discourses.

Divided into seven chapters, the book articulates a three-pronged analytical approach with the following objectives: (i) lay down “some necessary conceptual ground-clearing” on social cohesion; (ii) ascertain “how the term ‘social cohesion’ can be used in a more scientific way that advances theory and provide a basis for empirical analysis;” and (iii) strive to “provide a usable, non-normative and non-exclusive definition of social cohesion that can then be operationalized in research to analyze the different forms of social cohesion which may be identified in actual societies of the non-normative social types” (p.4).

Adopting a mixed-method and interdisciplinary approach, chapter 1 (“Defining Social Cohesion) builds up its arguments by examining the constituents of social cohesion. It defines a non-normative and non-exclusive social cohesion as one that “refers to the property by which whole societies, and the individuals within them, are bound together through the action of specific attitudes, behaviours, rules and institutions which rely on consensus rather than pure coercion” (p. 18). Analyzing Western academic and policy texts, three (3) distinctive types of discourse around which social cohesion emerged are identified: the liberal, republican, and social democratic discourses.

The main historical traditions of Western sociological thought and political philosophy on social cohesion and social order are subsequently revisited in chapter 2 (“Western Intellectual Traditions of Social Cohesion”). The intellectual traditions of liberalism, republicanism, and conservative romanticism, it argues, provide highly elaborated theoretical accounts on the nature of social cohesion.

Using longue durée historical evidence and trajectories of a number of countries and employment of “no-absolute” path dependency, chapter 3 (“The Social Origins and Development of Social Cohesion Traditions”) establishes the existence of three dominant “regimes of social cohesion” at different points of time in history, namely: liberalism (exemplified by the UK and the US), republicanism and romantic conservatism (France and mainland Europe), and social democracy (Nordic countries). The classification is founded on the configurations of social attitudes and behaviours that contribute to a society-wide social bonding underpinned by institutional arrangements defined by the dominant social and political thought construed to be the “ideal-type” (p. 64).

Drawing from the literature of “varieties of capitalism” and “welfare state regimes,” chapter 4 (“Contemporary Regimes of Social Cohesion and Their Institutional Foundations”) contends that while some regimes of social cohesion survived, others mutated, and few emerged over the past two centuries. It is theorized that contemporary regimes of social cohesion are the: liberal, social market, social democratic, and East Asian regimes. The theory is close to Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s (1990) “welfare regimes” and Michael Walzer’s (1997) “regimes of toleration.”

From the analysis of the literature, the sources of social cohesion are hypothesized in the following regimes: (1) under the liberal regime (English-speaking countries, primarily the US and the UK) social cohesion is grounded on individual freedom and choice, benefits of

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opportunity, and rewards based on merits; (2) in a social market, (North-West continental Europe) they are built on shared values and active participation on national political life, and in reliance on the state; (3) under the regime of social democracy (Nordic countries), they are centered on equality and trust; and (4) in East Asian (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), they established on Confucianism (supported by family and state), and shared culture.

These hypotheses are tested statistically in chapter 5 (“Quantitative Analysis of Regimes of Social Cohesion”) by using data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Labour Organisation, World Bank, and the United Nations in examining institutional characteristics, while data from the European Values Study/World Values Survey (EVS/WVS) and International Social Survey Program are availed of in appraising social behaviours and attitudes. In such tests (scatterplots, cluster analyses, indexes, factor analyses), three regimes (liberal, social market, and social democratic) are empirically proven to be valid. Southern European countries on the other hand are marginally related to the social market regime statistically, while East Asian countries in spite of their distinctiveness as a separate regime cannot be confirmed with statistical confidence due to the insufficiency of cases.

Statistical analyses continue in chapter 6 (“Value Diversity and Social Cohesion”) with the extensive use of WVS data in exploring the trends in value diversity across regimes of social cohesion. The chapter discloses that value diversity is a highly dynamic universal process which “responds to changes in contemporary conditions… an unpredictable phenomenon… interacting with local social and institutional configurations” across countries and regions. (p. 163).

Finally, chapter 7 (“Social Cohesion Regimes and the Global Economic Crisis”) comparatively examines the trends in key aspects of social cohesion (trust, tolerance, and perceptions of conflict) along several dimensions, and how regimes have been affected by the global financial crisis of 2008. Findings show that although the trends exhibit considerable divergence between regimes in terms of social cohesion, all face the uncertain future of the new millennium with significant vulnerabilities at their key points. It is assumed further that the state of social cohesion is not determined by the impact of global crisis but resolved by the way national governments respond to it.

The book is indeed a welcome addition in the literature of social cohesion. It demonstrates through a profound theoretical review and robust statistical analyses the modalities of regime of social cohesion, how they are affected by the financial crisis, and institutional and policy options that have been taken to address socio-economic and political conflict under the aegis of globalization.

It is surprising though that the book missed out to examine social cohesion in China, the most significant country not only in Asia but in the world. While the authors used data from EVS/WVS to assess trends in value diversity across regimes, the rich dataset from Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) was not utilized. The ABS gauges public opinion on issues such as political values, democracy, and governance across Asia and covers virtually all major political systems in the region, compiling reliable and comparable micro-level data on the issues of citizens' values and attitudes toward politics, power, reform, and democracy in Asia (13 East Asian states and 5 Southeast Asian countries). Apart from this, ABS is co-hosted by the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica and the Institute for the Advanced Studies of Humanities and Social Sciences of the National Taiwan University.

The argument that the distinctiveness of East Asian countries as a separate regime of social cohesion cannot be determined due to insufficiency of cases, is deemed ungrounded. Moreover, the fact that financial crisis of 2008 has been limited to Western countries rather than a “global” concern, is a clear manifestation that Asia, specifically China has some

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significant lessons which Western countries should learn from in terms of sustaining social cohesion in the face of deleterious effects of globalization.

Rizal G. Buendia, Ph.D. Teaching Fellow

SOAS, UK Rizal.buendia@gmail.com

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Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Walzer, M. (1997) On Toleration, Yale University Press, London.

Dale C. Copeland Economic Interdependence and War Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2014, 489 pp.

The relationship between economic interdependence and war is one of the titles that IR scholars have long been interested. What Copeland in this book does is not just a review of this vast literature and theories, but also add a significant contribution into the existing literature both on theoretical and empirical fronts. Theoretically Copeland brings a theory of trade expectation to overcome the problems with liberal and realist views on the dynamic between economic interdependence and war.1 In the literature, liberals tend to argue that economic interdependence eases the likelihood of war by increasing gains from trade. That is, the more trade interdependence, the less likelihood of war and conflicts. When it comes to realists, this dynamics works with the reversed order. In realist logic, states are more interested in continuation of access to materials and goods when they engage in trade with others. Therefore, in a realist world, higher interdependence increases the likelihood of war, rather than lowering it since interdependence generally means vulnerability and vulnerability in an anarchic international system facilitates as an incentive to initiate war. One of the achievements of Copeland’s work is not just to show this contradictory and unsatisfactory nature of realist and liberalist view on the economic interdependence and war, but also he offers a new theory to resolve these problems: namely, theory of trade expectations. Theory of trade expectations is an amalgam of liberal (commercial ties give actors large incentive to avoid war) and realist (the risks of being cut-off anytime push state making war to secure vital goods) insights and based on a wide empirical data.

In this sense, it can be classified as a middle range theory.2 Therefore, the theory of future trade expectation hypotheses, by introducing the expectations of future trade as a new causal variable, that interdependence can foster peace if only expected future trade level is high (as liberals argue) or when expected future trade level is low interdependence leads war rather than peace (as realist foresee). Thus, the theory links “the realms of international political economy to the question of security-driven preventive wars”3 by bridging the gap between liberal and realist insights. This innovative way of looking at the empirical data advances our understanding of the complex relationship between economic interdependence and likelihood of war.

The book consists of nine chapters yet, considering the relationships among them it can be divided roughly into three parts. In the first part including chapter 1 and 2, the author deals with theoretical and conceptual matters as well as methodological problems and insights. Here, he explains the existing approaches and their drawbacks, and how his new theory of future trade expectations fills the gap in this existing literature. Indeed, he provides one of the best literature reviews on the link between interdependence and war I have seen so far. He also brings insightful methodological discussions in this part. Moreover, in the methodological chapter (the third chapter) he provides one of the best literature reviews on large-N quantitative analysis in the study of interdependence and war. In the second part covering from the chapter 3 to 8, he deals with cases covering around 40 examples (the book chronologically covers great power conflicts between 1790- 1991). The main goal of the case studies is to test the logic of trade expectations theory directly against liberal and realist alternatives. The cases are indeed both interesting and detailed. The last part (chapter 9) is a warp-up section where Copeland provides a discussion on the implications of the book’s main argument. The practical implication, as he argues, can be the relationship between the USA and China. Overall, he predicts that optimistic economic expectations in both China and the US should outweigh the reasons for pessimistic expectation for years to come.4

Overall this book provides a systematic understanding of economic interdependence and war. I have two broad critics. First one is a practical (and may be respective) as a reader: the

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book is too hard to read with its single space, small font more than 450 pages. Sometimes discussion is vague and unnecessary with repeating and enduring rivalry of state Y and state X. Second critique is more conceptual. The level of analyses is problematic in Copeland’s work. At the face value, it seems working at the systemic level by not giving particular attention to the culture, nature and content of the decision-making level. Yet, time-to-time he argues that leader’s future trade expectations are key to understand trade security dilemmas.5

Overall, this landmark book makes bold arguments and parallel big achievements. On theoretical front, the book succeeds in presenting that as an amalgam of liberal and realist approaches, future trade expectation theory has a significant deductive and explanatory power.6 On empirical front, the book is one of the best case studies that go in depth based on the diplomatic-historical evidence among the existing large-N quantitative empirical studies.7

Hakan Mehmetcik Research Assistant

Marmara University, Turkey hakan.mehmetcik@marmara.edu.tr

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1. For a detailed overview of the two school of thoughts see: John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15, no. 1 (July 1, 1990): 5–56.

2. On Middle Range Theory see: Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 1968 enlarged ed edition., Free Press, 1968.

3. Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014, 2.

4. Ibid., 436–444. 5. Ibid., 13–182–214. 6. Ibid., 421. 7. Ibid., 51.

Diego Gambetta & Steffen Herzog Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016, ISBN 9780691145174, xv+192 pp., $29.95, £22.95 hb. Also available as eBook.

This book takes its point of departure from what the authors call “a surprising fact: engineers are overrepresented among violent Islamist extremists.” (viii) It undertakes a systematic investigation of this fact and its possible significance, using a wide range of available statistical and other information and appropriate statistical methods.

The first chapter undertakes to show that engineers are indeed overrepresented in violent Islamist groups in relation to their proportion in the male population of their countries of origin and to their proportion of university graduates, who are also overrepresented in violent Islamist groups. They also give reasons to discount the possibility that this is because recruiters from these groups prefer engineers.

The next chapter addresses the issue of “relative deprivation”. In many Muslim countries university graduates have suffered economically and engineers, additionally, have lost considerable prestige. This is a partial but not a full explanation since engineers are overrepresented also in countries that don’t have these problems and prominent individuals do not fit this profile. The third chapter further challenges the relative deprivation theory by showing that among Western based Muslim engineers are also overrepresented among university graduates who join violent Islamist groups. It further argues that for all Muslims engineers are more likely than other graduates to join violent as opposed to non-violent groups and religious rather than secular groups. They are also less likely to defect from their groups.

The fourth chapter presents historical connections and affinities between right-wing Westerners and Islamists and identifies fifteen characteristics of Islamist ideology, most of which are shared with Western right-wing extremists and few with left-wing extremists. The fifth chapter presents evidence that engineers are overrepresented among Western right-wing extremists, and somewhat more so among those with a religious orientation. In the sixth chapter the authors claim that European right-wingers are high on four specific psychological traits and use data from a major European study, among other sources, to show that engineers are also high on these. They also present evidence to show that in the West engineers generally have more conservative political views than others.

In relation to the original issue addressed by the book, the conclusion is that the key factor is not engineering as such but the underlying character traits that predispose both toward engineering and toward extreme (Western) right-wing views or, given the similarities, Islamism. Beyond this, it tends to “validate the core claim of political psychology that different ideologies attract different types because ideologies meet different [psyochological] needs.” (155-6)

This summary hardly does justice the scope of material presented or to the detail and nuance of the arguments. In general the authors seem successful in making their case to the extent this is possible with the evidence available, the adequacy of which varies. For example, their initial list of 497 members of violent Islamist groups, of which they have educational information on 335, is drawn from a wide range of countries over about 40 years but is not a random sample and underrepresents some geographical areas, as the authors admit (7). The list can be questioned but it is hard to imagine how one would get a better list under present circumstances. The European Social Survey, used for university graduates in Europe, is evidently much more robust, while other studies seem to vary. Anecdotal material can contribute much but may not be sufficiently representative. The authors discuss quite frankly the deficiencies of their material, seek ways to compensate for them and discuss alterative hypotheses that might fit the data.

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We should mention that the study excludes groups such Boko Haram, Shabab, ISIS and Taliban, in which many readers will be interested, since these operate differently from other groups in significant ways. The reader is advised of this in the introduction. (ix)

A weak link in the argument is that evidence for the four psychological traits discussed in chapter six is little beyond anecdotal for violent Islamists. They have to be inferred based other similarities with Western right-wing ideologies. It is a reasonable inference but hardly a water-tight one. The authors deal briefly with question of whether the traits in question are innate or acquired in the course of academic training and opt for the former on the basis of their evidence but they do not consider the possibility that these traits, even if innate, may be intensified by engineering training.

The authors discuss religiosity but only briefly. They discount it as an independent factor in the basis of several studies though admitting that the evidence is “mixed” (157). My faith in their judgement is not helped by their off hand statement that “Religiosity is typically a personal rather than a political value.” (158) Such a statement reflects Western secular assumptions but is problematic for the Muslim world. The subject needs more attention. Also, this is a very male oriented study, since the groups studied are heavily male. There is a short section on women, mainly to show that their political and psychological profiles are generally opposite to the groups studied, but there are some exceptions that could be further investigated.

An interesting point is made during the discussion of psychological traits that, unlike scientists, who are taught to ask questions, engineers tend to treat scientific results as given facts, much a like followers of “text-based religions” (148), and similar attitudes are found among Islamists. This point could be broadened to include all “fundamentalists”, Muslim and Christian, violent and non-violent, and discussed at greater length.

In fairness it must be said that the criticisms here point not so much to “weaknesses” in the book as to points worthy of further investigation. This relatively small book breaks significant new ground and should generate many more significant studies in this area. It should prove to be an important waystation on the path to better understanding not only of violent Islamism but of other political and politico-religious phenomena. It deserves a wide readership among those seriously interested in these subjects.

William Shepard Professor of Religious Studies, Retired

University of Canterbury, New Zealand

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Ellen Anne McLarney Soft Force, Women in Egypt’s Islamic Awakening Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2015

Ellen Anne McLarney’s Soft Force, Women in Egypt’s Islamic Awakening stands out as in depth study by a Western scholar, which places women and their contribution to Islamic revivalism centre stage. She thereby challenges conventional Western impressions of Muslim women in Islamic activism and gives voice to ideas well known in the Muslim world, but not often heard in other countries. Through her eloquent, sophisticated and careful analysis, McLarney offers a very important but somewhat overlooked contribution to the in depth understanding of the various roles of women in the historical and current developments within the Muslim world.

The book focusses on the soft force of women’s influence on the Islamic public sphere in the decades leading up to the 2011 revolution in Egypt. To support her analysis, McLarney primarily uses writings (ranging from fatwas to sermons; and from lectures, theses, essays and newspaper articles to social media) as well as visual actions, taken by a variety of influential women to support the advance of Islamic awareness and revivalism in Egypt. These include professors (Bint al-Shati’), preachers (Ni’mat Sidqi), journalists (Iman Mustafa), theatre critics (Safinaz Kazim), activists (Heba Raouf Ezzat), actresses (Shams al-Barudi) and television personalities (Kariman Hamza). The book thereby brings together the work of very different women, who, while working independently, contribute as an entity to social and cultural transformation.

The book is arranged in three parts and proceeds chronologically through sets of interlocking thematic analyses of the work of outstanding exponents of the relevant fields. Part I considers women’s liberation in Islam and focuses particularly on the world of letters (chapter1) and on Islamic and personal status law (chapter 2). Part II analyses the gendering of Islamic subjectivities by concentrating on the themes of motherhood and childbearing (chapter 3) and on veiling and the cultivation of the self (chapter 4). Finally, part III showcases the politics of the Islamic family by focusing on women and work (chapter 5) and the family as the political unit of the umma (chapter 6).

Each chapter follows a clear line of analysis, through which, the reader learns not only about the public figure and her writings, but also about Egypt’s history and politics as well as the surrounding academic discourse on women and Islam. McLarney adopted a holistic approach to each representative’s corpus of work, by detailing the progression of their ideas, the evolution of their private and public persona as well as the political and social issues they address. Further she explores how each author positions him or herself as an Islamic thinker.

As she explains in the introduction, McLarney provides a platform for each author and their work, placing it into the socio-political context of the time, which both produced them and which they helped to produce. She uses a literary analysis to explore the various writings by discussing not only what is said but also how it is said. Furthermore, she continuously sets the works and their influence on Egypt’s political and social development into context by relating them to other theoretical literature on Islamic revival.

Linking all of these topics and methods of analysis is the recurring subject of “family”, which runs through the book as a common theme.

When reading the book, it becomes clear that the author is passionate about her writing. The details provided in the text reflecting the enormous amount of background research are quite remarkable. Her analysis is very sound and McLarney has certainly achieved her aims as set out in the introduction. The work is outstanding and should be valued as a unique contribution to bringing together different Islamic voices and conveying information to the English speaking world which would otherwise not be widely available.

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However, by attempting to analyse and explore not only the different representatives’ personal and private lives, but also their work and the associated social and political situation surrounding Islamic revivalism over several decades, the book is arguably attempting to achieve too much within a limited format. While there is a unifying theme, the topics introduced along the way are so manifold that a lot of information gets lost trying to assimilate the various arguments presented. This applies also to the methodological approach. The author not only analyses her subjects’ lives, but also applies literary as well as political analyses to their texts. There is no clear boundary between the one or the other type of analysis. While they are all individually interesting, they provide so much detail that the bigger picture sometimes gets lost. Finally, the title of the book is likely to raise a variety of expectations, which might or might not be fulfilled in the book. The reviewer, who has a political science background, associated the use of the term “soft force” in the title with the notion that the book will primarily be based on the analysis of the various women’s influences on local and national politics through non-violent ways. This was only partially achieved.

Despite the points of criticism, the importance of the book should not be underestimated. While it might have been advantageous to create a series of books to cover all the topics and styles of analysis, the wealth of information in this volume makes it an important contribution to the study of Islamic revivalism, women and Islam within the context of 20th and 21st century developments in Egypt and the wider Middle East.

Katherine Ranharter, Ph.D. University of Exeter, UK k.ranhart@hotmail.com

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Finn Mackay Radical Feminist: Feminist Activism in Movement UK: Palgrave McMillan Publishers Limited, 2015, ISBN 978-1-137-36357-2, 324 pp., £ 14.68.

This book is a highly informative historical resource. Just as the title suggests, the book talks about the radical feminist movement in the UK from 1970’s to the present. Mackay presents the feminist movement in waves. The book is organized into two phases. The first phase presents he events that led to the first RTN (reclaim the night) protest in the U.K. In the second phase, Mackay talks about postmodern theories within the feminist movement. While many people may view violence against women as a new phenomenon, Mackay makes it clear that violence targeting women dates back to the dawn of humanity and ending it needs banding together of women. Overall, the book attempts to distinguish the second and third feminist movement waves. As such, the book is very relevant to historians and educators who would want to promote discourse about the differences between the second and third waves of the feminist movement.

The first portion of the book presents a very compelling argument regarding the movement, with the events leading to the first RTN in the U.K organized in a chronological order. According to Mackay, the second wave developed out of necessity. In the 1970’s, there was pronounced domestic, sexual, physical and even verbal violence against women and women could not hold it anymore. According to Mackay, this fight in U.K was directly inspired by fight for equality among white and Black Americans initiated and propagated by the Civil Rights Movement, which had stimulated the emergence of women activists in the U.S. According to the author, female activists in the United States is what inspired women in the U.K to start fighting against violence.

The second portion of the book presents personal views regarding inclusion of men and trans people on RTN. She holds that men are responsible for women’s plight and ought not to have been included in the feminist movement. She uses arguments embedded on various theories, which increase legibility of her opinions. For example, she refuses early activists that feminism is a social movement and men should never be included in this movement. Defending her thesis that men are responsible for women’s plight, Mackay argues that women’s plight is a patriarchal construct. According to this construct, men view women as men’s object and a natural object of sex. Based on this model, Mackay shows that men are to blame for women in prostitution, which is debatable.

The major strength of this book is featuring how leaders of the Women’s Liberation Movement inspired women in U.K to actively participate in the feminist movement. According to the text, the leaders used papers from the New Left of the U.S., which talked about the fight for equality without borders of race, gender, color, etc. The papers contradicted with the reality in the New Left; just as it is today that women’s anger won’t be taken serious, women who voiced their views regarding equality within the New Left were hushed and brushed off. Suppressing of women’s voice in the New Left led to the branching off of the women in the new left. Women took to organizing separately to obtain their own political autonomy. To inspire its members, the women began to publish their opinions about female equality. They protested, for example, beauty reagents and fought for their voices to be heard. Feminist movement texts from America began to be published in the U.K. Women in the U.K read the radical opinions and watched their counterparts on televisions as they protested in the American streets. This electrified women in the U.K to fight for their freedom too.

What makes this textbook compelling is its use of cases to link the feminist movement in the U.K with social context in the 1970s. For instance, Mackay features Sheila Rowbotham. According to the text, Sheila held that the WLM grew from working class women, sewing machinist particularly, who wanted equal working conditions as their male counterparts.

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These women matched in streets to reclaim the night (RTN) severally but the process was not easy. Many were killed, raped and beaten alongside other injustices from men. However, with the persistence of violence against them, women could not relent. Through cohesion and persistence, women in U.K succeeded in fighting violence against women. Though the author succeeds in proving that the feminist movement resulted from necessity, the book does not draw a clear line between the second and the third feminist movement waves. The author should have focused on the third wave, which would have made the argument in the first portion of the book more compelling.

Another weakness of this book is the reliance on theory to tackle very sensitive questions presented in the second half of the book. The main question, which all readers of this book would want be interested to answer is where is RTN matching heading to in the modern society when men are secluded from these movements? The author uses some interesting such as the post-modernism theory and others, which in my view drive her from addressing the underlying questions realistically. For example, her believe that violence to women is a patriarchal construct informs her decision that men should not be included in feminist movements. Though there may be traces of men dominance in some communities in the 21st century, Mackay’s basing her conclusions on male constructivism is a bias, which misinforms her argument about the way to address forms of violence to women in the present age. As a writer, she should overcome such bias. But all in all, the uses of theories make the textbook a useful resource for educators.

Meltem Ince Yenilmez Associate Professor

Yasar University, Turkey meltem.ince@yasar.edu.tr & meltemin79@gmail.com

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Hamed El-Said New Approaches to Countering Terrorism: Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programs Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 295 p.

Since the 1980s religious terrorism is on the top of many nations’ agenda. No doubt the phenomenon might be known to the world since humanity’s origins. Killing civilians for one’s political goals is not particularly typical of religious terrorism. Not only terrorist groups use, terroristic tactics States use them to achieve their goals too. Today Islamic terrorism dominates the political agenda. However, since the Arabic Spring, the political transformations and civil wars in the Middle East, many civilians from the region are fleeing to Europe. In Europe islamophobia and violence against refugees, especially in Germany, is on the rise. In short, political extremism is increasing not only in the Middle East but also in Europe. It is not only a challenge inside the Muslim community but also inside the Christian European societies.

In his book published in 2015 Hamel El-Said evaluates several “Counter Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programs” in several nation states or regions of the world. After an introduction the author sets the framework for his study (p.13-53). The chapters 3 and 4 focus on Australia and the De-radicalization program in this country (p.53-96). The 5th chapter takes a close look at Mauritania and its challenges with violent Islam (p.96-138). Counter radicalization in Singapore is analysed in chapter 6 (p.138-174). Sudan and Turkey are separately evaluated in the chapters 7 and 8 (p.174-254). Concluding remarks are found in chapter 9 (p.254).

This review will focus on chapters 2 and 8. The second chapter sets the framework of the study. El-Said develops a hypothesis and a theoretical framework to evaluate his study. For example, the first hypothesis on page 17 asserts that Violent-Extremists (VEs) are a greater threat to failed states or states which are at risk to lose their order. Somalia or Yemen serve as examples to support the assumption. Economic status of individuals or groups and their influence on VEs are also critically analysed. Socio-economically disadvantaged people might more easily join terrorist groups or become extremists. However, the author hesitates to use the socio-economic factor as an all-explanatory theory since some extremists are from wealthy families. With regard to some American Muslim VEs the economic factor plays a less important role. Additionally, the prison environment and some rehabilitation programs, global environment, civil society etc. are discussed in the second chapter. In short, the author is able to show that there are several ways in which radicalization can take place. Therefore, nation states embrace multidisciplinary counterterrorism measures to defeat radicalization.

Chapter 8 focuses on Turkey and its struggle with left-wing, right-wing, religious and nationalist terrorism. According to El-Said Turkey’s greatest challenge was and is Kurdish terrorism.Its roots can be traced to the time of Ottoman Empire, 1880 in particular. However, the late Ottoman Empire was generally confronted with (Muslim and non-Muslim) nationalist uprisings; they used terroristic tactics to achieve their political objectives. Kurdish minorities, likewise non-Muslim ones, also tried to involve the great powers of the 19th century into their independence struggle to gain more political attention and foreign support (p.221). Being aware of that, Abdülhamid II tried to reintegrate insurgent Kurdish groups into the Ottoman Empire by developing the politics of “Pan-Islamism”. Since the Kurdish majority was Muslim and were aware of the Islamic tradition and law Abdülhamids “Pan-Islamic” policy successfully integrated some parts of the Kurds back in the Sublime Ports society.

The Turkish Republic of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had more trouble to deal accurately with Kurdish radicalization. Since the new nation state cut all ties with the Islamic Empire and its multi-religious as well as multi-ethnic identity, the state had trouble to include those parts of society to its new identity policy reforms, that were not ready to accept Turkism (based on

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ancient Turkish history and ethnicity) as their new bond. However, Atatürk and his supporters knew that they would face those kinds of challenges and therefore they created the Department of Religious Affairs “Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı”. In short, Turkish laicism, which surprisingly is not mentioned by El-Said, has a vital interest to control religion and to dictate legal religious practice. Some parts of the Sunni majority and a big part of the Kurdish minority were against the “Diyanet”, because it was not an independent Institution; it was created to reduce religion influence and fit it into the Kemalistic modernization process. However, the author claims that the Kurdish insurgents were ignorant of modernization (p.223-225). Such a view on the Turkish-Kurdish question reduces the complexity of the conflict.

After a brief examination of the formative phase of the early republic, El-Said focuses on the beginning of the multiparty period till today. The author rightly emphasizes that Turkey was never colonized by foreign powers. It was its own rigid modernization policy (state-terrorism) combined with a racist Turkish nationalism, which caused radicalization inside the Kurdish minority (p.224). During the 1950s the Democratic Party (with strong ties to Islam) tried to loosen up the Republic’s politics towards Islam and to open a way for religious voters to participate in politics. During the 60s, 70s, 80s and 90s several political parties with strong ties to Islam tried to challenge the cultural as well as ethnical homogenization process of the republic. However, as El-Said rightly emphasized, since 2002 the Turkish government changed its strategy to deal with Kurdish terrorism. For example, “winning hearts and minds” was challenging the traditionally governmental assumption that only a military solution could save Turkey from Kurdish extremism. Economic developments in eastern Turkey as well as a closer relationship between state members and members of the Kurdish society created an atmosphere of trust and could better prevent extremism. El-Said convincingly shows that the government’s decision to challenge violent extremism with democratic instruments bear more fruit than merely military solutions.

In conclusion, El-Said continuously emphasizes that there are no “one size fits all” solutions to the challenge of extremism. However, the study is full of insights on how and why de-radicalization works and fails. It is a good and timely book.

Huseyin Cicek, Ph.D. University of Enlargen

huseyin.cicek@outlook.com

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