050601 hse vertaling vrom guidance on the duty of accountability for societal risk vp gr...

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Guidance on the Duty of Accountability for Societal Risk (Draft)

Internet version August 2004

Page 1 of 92 Advies- en Ingenieursbureau Oranjewoud B.V.

Publication details Published by Ministry for Home Affairs Ministry for Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment Project coordination Societal Risk Accountability Guidance Project Team Chair: drs. Berend Temme (Ministry of Home Affairs) Secretary: drs. Dennis Holtrop (VROM) Project Group Member: drs. Mathilda Buijtendijk (Ministry of Home Affairs) Project support See appendix 5 (in preparation) Societal Risk Accountability Guidance drafted by Advies- en Ingenieursbureau Oranjewoud B.V./SAVE Authors ir. Jaap van der Schaaf (SAVE) ing. Robbert Wolf (Oranjewoud) ir. Pieter Schalk (Oranjewoud) ir. Gert Hoftijzer (SAVE) mr. Roel Eerden (Oranjewoud) ing. Hub Francot (Oranjewoud) drs. Wim Evers (Oranjewoud) ing. Jeroen Eskens (Oranjewoud)



Contents Page

Introduction 5

PART I: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SOCIETAL RISK

1 What is societal risk? 8 2 Why accountability for societal risk? 10 2.1 Responsibility and accountability 10 2.2 A standard for societal risk? 11 3 Legal basis for accountability 12 4 Status of the duty of accountability for societal risk 15 4.1 Status with reference to other legislation and planning mechanisms 15 4.2 Working with a structural vision of external safety 16 5 Collaboration and communication 19 5.1 Communication 19 5.2 Division of roles 21 5.2.1 Coordination between the various roles 21 5.2.2 Formulation of assumptions 21 5.2.3 Core team organisational structure, schedule of requirements 22 5.2.4 What should the requirements be? 23 6 Context for the assessment of societal risk 24 6.1 Step 1: Rationale 24 6.2 Step 2: Detailed investigation 24 6.3 Step 3: Accountability 26 7 Details of the duty of accountability 27 7.1 Differences in approach, the existing and new situation 27 7.2 Pitfalls of collaboration 28 8 Checklist 29

PART II: FUNDAMENTALS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

9 Environmental licensing and accountability 31 9.1 Initial discussions 31 9.1.1 Alternatives to reduce risk 33 9.2 Assessment of permissibility 33 9.3 The requirements 34 9.4 Considerations 35 9.5 The province as competent authority 36 10 The zoning plan and the duty of accountability 37 10.1 External safety and the zoning plan: the traditional approach 37 10.2 Management of societal risk by means of the zoning plan 37 10.3 Basis of population densities 38 10.3.1 Indirect basis 38 10.3.2 Direct basis 39 10.4 Building in flexibility 39 10.5 Previous more general zoning plans 40 10.6 Residence time correction 40 10.7 Management of personal densities 41



11 Physical safety and the duty of accountability 43 11.1 Indicative scenarios 43 11.2 Scenarios 44 11.3 Self-reliance 45 11.3.1 Opportunities for self-reliance on the basis of the indicative scenarios 45 11.3.2 Opportunities for optimalisation 47 11.4 Controllability 49 11.4.1 Can the disaster scenario be controlled? 49 11.4.2 The assessment 50 11.4.3 Opportunities for optimalisation 52

PART III: BACKGROUND

12 What is societal risk? 54 12.1 Effects of various factors 56 12.2 Setting standards for societal risk 58 12.3 The non-normative approach to societal risk 59 13 Accidents and consequences 61 13.1 Societal risk is a measure of societal disruption 61 13.2 Distinction between risk and effect 62 13.2.1 Interplay of effect and risk 62 13.2.2 Casualties and fatalities 62 13.3 Model for description of accidents 13.3.1 The bow-tie fault and event tree model as a context for assessment 65 13.4 Opportunities to intervene in the safety process 66 13.5 Acceptable danger 67 14 Cumulation of multiple sources of risk 68 14.1 Concepts: cumulation and domino effects 68 14.2 Establishing cumulation 68 14.3 Approach to cumulation 69 15 Residence time correction 70 15.1 Personal residence times and societal risk 70 15.2 Categorical and no-categorical premises 70 15.3 Application of residence time correction in a societal risk calculation 71 16 Baseline figures for personal densities 73 17 Personal densities in categorical premises 74 17.1 LPG filling stations 74 17.2 Installations storing packaged hazardous substances,

hazardous waste or pesticides (CPR 15 installations) 75 17.3 Cooling and freezing installations using ammonia 78 18 A structural vision of external safety 80 18.1 Thread 1: Preventing a fragmented approach 80 18.2 Thread 2: Timely agreements with all parties 81 18.3 Thread 3: Harmonisation with parallel developments

in legislation on industrial accidents and incidents 81 18.4 Integrating the three threads 83 19 The duty of accountability in practice 85 19.1 A practical example: LPG filling stations and residential development 85



Appendix 1 Definitions Appendix 2 Other guidance Key to text in illustrations



Introduction The Decree on External Safety of Installations (Besluit externe veiligheid inrichtingen (BEVI)) constitutes a milestone in the development of policy on external safety in two different respects. Firstly, the Decree standardises the approach to localised risk, allowing greater clarity over the safety distances between the source of risk and the vulnerable "targets" which are to be taken into account in spatial planning. This "clarity" also applies to a lesser degree in the area of societal risk. The legislators have consciously adopted a non-normative approach to societal risk, while providing a holdfast in the form of the so-called "orientational value", but the main weight of expectation is placed upon the duty of accountability for societal risk, as set out in articles 12 and 13 of the Decree. The Decree indicates when responses are required, inter alia upon approval of a zoning plan and during decision-making on the granting of environmental licences, and also identifies the elements that should play a role in forming such responses. Taking all elements into account, a broad assessment of the societal risk is what is called for. It is self-evident that the level of societal risk has a role to play, but the capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident and the controllability of incidents are also components of the duty of accountability. Potentially the greatest benefit from the new duty of accountability for societal risk will be the opportunity to intervene at the earliest possible stages in the safety (decision-making) process. The likelihood of good solutions increases and the probability of (what turn out to be) unsatisfactory decisions decreases when incident control aspects play a role in the design of an installation and the environment within which it exists. A broader consideration may also allow optimalisation with regard to societal risk in existing situations. This Guidance on the duty of accountability for societal risk is intended for those involved with the discharge of this duty. That will include both the decision-makers (the competent authority) and those who advise them. In view of the scope of application and the wide range of factors with a role to play, this accountability is by definition a multidisciplinary responsibility. In practice this will call for "reinvestment" in the interrelationships between professional disciplines, in the distribution of responsibilities and in collaboration. The management of the process as a whole also requires attention. The dominant disciplines are spatial planning, environmental and physical safety, but other disciplines such as traffic management have a contribution to make. The challenge is to utilise the discussions around societal risk to promote integral safety. This first draft of the Guidance has been prepared in close collaboration with the future users. Together we are agreed that this version of the Guidance includes a great deal of useful explanation, advice and recommendations. At the same time we realise that the task is not yet complete. A number of matters are still to be worked through, and in a sense we feel fortunate that "practice" will shortly be of assistance to us in that. Good practice developed by a range of parties in the context of the "External safety finance programme" will be made available. A committee charged with dealing with this last point will be constituted in September, with the task of maintaining this Guidance on the duty of accountability for societal risk. The address for the committee is: [not provided] Follow-up During September and October this Guidance will be briefly unavailable until the new "tidied up" and approved version is issued at the end of October. In the interim the guidance will be presented to various sector groups. The local authorities in the IJmond group have a management session on their agenda. The editing committee will start work on September 1.



Notes for the reader The Guidance is in three parts. Part 1 is the core, and in principle should provide all the answers to the most common questions about accountability for societal risk. Part two describes the most significant elements, such as the relationship of the duty of accountability to zoning plans, environmental licensing and physical safety. Part 3 is referred to as the background section. The title probably says enough. Here you will find a reasonably large collection of detailed information on a variety of topics. Take good note of the references! Outstanding issues This version of the Guidance is to be used, but it is not yet official, that will happen only following its discussion in the Government-IPO-VNG context, and after presentation to the Liaison Directors in the relevant Ministries. A supplement for managers will be added to this Guidance in due course. The fact that the Decree imposes the duty of accountability for societal risk exclusively in the context of installations may prove difficult in practice where combinations of transport and installations are involved. The optimal solution would be to integrate this into a single accountability. The Decree on external safety of installations is expected to come into force at the end of September2004. We wish you success in discharging the duty of accountability! Societal Risk Accountability Guidance Project Team July 2004



PART I: Accountability for societal risk Part I of this Guidance looks at all the factors that go together in the practical discharge of the duty of accountability for societal risk, including: what is societal risk? why should there be a duty of accountability for societal risk? legal foundations for the duty of accountability, structural vision, division of roles the context of assessment, practical advice. Each section within PART I makes reference to sources of more detailed information elsewhere in the Guidance document.

1 What is societal risk? This chapter briefly outlines the concept of societal risk and the role played by a variety of factors [For further information see chapter 12]. Societal risk is a measure representing the probability that an incident with fatal results will occur. The boundaries of a region within which the localised risk is excessive can be clearly depicted by means of risk contours around the source of risk. Such contours cannot be drawn in the case of societal risk, which cannot be represented in spatial terms. This makes societal risk a more difficult concept to grasp. Working with societal risk is also more complicated because the spatial effects of the societal risk often greatly exceed the distances involved in the localised risk contours1. An insight into the workings of societal risk is nevertheless indispensable if the duty of accountability is to be properly discharged.

Societal risk is defined as: The cumulative annual probability that at least 10, 100 or 1000 persons will die as a direct consequence of their presence within the area of influence of an installation, together with an unusual occurrence within the installation involving a hazardous substance. (Article 1 Section 1 of the Decree) This implies that a pair of factors (directly) influence the level of the societal risk: The annual probability that an accident involving hazardous substances will occur. This

variable is in turn dependant upon: ° the nature and quantity of the hazardous substances, ° the processes involving them, ° the manner in which the installation deals with the total safety process from design to commissioning, together with maintenance and inspection.

The number of potential victims in the vicinity of the activities. This depends upon: ° The composition (quantity and distribution) of the population, ° the effects of substances in the event of an accident,

1 the contours connect locations with the same probability of fatality.

Example: The limit value (10-6) for localised risk at LPG stations is at 45 or 110 metres, depending on the annual turnover. Residential developments planned within a distance of 150 metres may sometimes give rise to a relevant increase in the societal risk. How is this to be dealt with?



° the capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident, and the measures available to control the consequences.2

Taken together these factors therefore produce an annual probability that groups of persons of a particular size will become victims of an accident. Both should therefore be included in the determination of societal risk. A proper inventory of the population (the personal densities) is at least as significant in this as the determination of the probability of an accident. Societal risk can not be shown by means of contours, but is displayed in a graph. The graph shows the group size of numbers of victims on the x axis.

2 Strictly speaking, the capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident is not a parameter in the calculation of societal risk. This factor can however significantly reduce the number of victims.



Annual risk

Number of victims (N) - - - Orientational value ___ Societal risk curve Figure 1 Example of a societal risk curve against the cumulative probability that such a group will become victims of an accident. An example of a graph of this type is shown here. The probability that a group will become casualties is represented by a curve, known as the fN curve. The form of this curve provides a representation of the group risk. The concept of an orientational value is investigated further in chapter 12.



2 Why accountability for societal risk? The chapter dealing with "the renewal of external safety policy" in the National Environmental Policy Plan 4 opens with the following central question:

That this question appears in the National Environmental Plan might suggest that this topic has some overlap with the environmental field. In fact nothing could be further from the truth: the National Environmental Plan is an integral policy document, and divergent factors must be taken into consideration in political decision-making on issues where risks to safety play a role. 2.1 Responsibility and accountability The development of safety policy, the determination of risk in public decisions and the maintenance of the emergency services are examples of tasks where "the government" takes primary responsibility. This public responsibility is anchored in law. Safety however is a task where everyone has responsibilities. This duty is enshrined in Article 1.1a of the Environmental Management Act. The Substances Hazardous to the Environment Act includes a similar duty of care.

The Environmental Management Act sets down clearly that anyone who causes or might cause environmental damage through an activity must limit such consequences to a minimum, using all reasonable measures. It is for the competent authority to give a dimension to an appropriate level of protection, tailored to the local situation. In the case of societal risk this is regulated by means of the duty of accountability.

The question of what risks we accept in relation to major incidents has once more become pressing due to the recent disaster in Enschede. There is a need for review. Are the risks not too high? Are they still in proportion to societal benefit? Ultimately such questions are part of political considerations.

Article 1.1a of the Environmental Management Act 1. "All persons shall take adequate care for the environment" 2. The "care" mentioned in the first Section implies in any event that anyone who knows or might reasonably suspect that negative consequences for the environment might result from his actions or omissions is required to cease such actions to the extent that this can reasonably be required in order to avoid those consequences or, to the extent that those consequences cannot be avoided, to limit or reverse them to the greatest extent possible.

In the past it appears that safety was involved in spatial planning at too late a stage, allowing hazardous situations to arise. In some cases this lack of safety has been rectified at high cost, has been accepted or has been concealed. The crucial question is whether safety is still being involved at too late a stage. An enquiry involving 21 professionals in the area of safety and spatial planning in this region showed that this question can mostly be answered in the affirmative. (Source: Guidance on Proactive Integral Safety)



2.2 A standard for societal risk? The inclusion in the Decree of a duty of accountability for societal risk means that a non-normative approach has been adopted to dealing with societal risk3.This approach does appear to create certain conflicts in practice. The orientational value is often seen as a standard that has to be exactly met. Any transgression of the orientational value is ruled out in advance, without considering the possibilities. There is a fear that any transgression at all will be "dealt with". Against this, a steep rise in societal risk to just below the orientational value is sometimes seen as acceptable without further ado.

3 No orientational value for societal risk was yet included in the 1989 report "Dealing with Risk". A Maximum Permissible Risk (MPR) and a Negligible Level of Risk (NR) were however defined. The MPR was identical to the present orientational value for installations. The NR was a factor of 100 lower than the MPR. The area between the former NR and the MPR left room for policy considerations. The NR and MPR system was later abandoned. In 1993 the Minister for Public Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment defined an orientational value and gave the competent authorities discretionary powers to depart from this orientational value where justified (proceedings of the Second Chamber 1993-1994, 22.666, no 3)

Fixation on the orientational value sometimes seems more important than a discussion about the safety of the source, interactions with the environment and the capacities of the emergency services or the capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident. These are precisely the factors dealt with by the duty of accountability.

"In assessing risk one question that arises is what size of accident is acceptable, given the probability of its occurring. This ultimately involves a political consideration of the risks and the other costs of a risky activity against the societal benefits. If the societal benefits of an activity are large, the associated risks may be more readily accepted than when they are slight. There is a significant distinction here with the limit value for localised risk which, as well as its regulatory function in spatial planning, also guarantees a uniform level of protection for citizens personally, separate from the societal benefits of an activity.



3 Legal basis for accountability External safety policy for installations is legislatively anchored in the Decree on the External Safety of Installations (Statute 250, 27 May 2004). This decree implemented the policies of NMP4 with regard to external safety policy. The Decree, based as it is on Chapter 5 of the Environmental Management Act, includes standards in relation to external safety of installations, dealing with the granting of licences and spatial planning. The decree also seeks to promote the integrated nature of external safety policy. This is done inter alia by involving the possibilities for incident control and the capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident in decision-making in the fields of the environment and spatial planning with respect to installations. The Decree ordains that the standards for localised risk are to be adopted by installations in relation to: granting of licences in the context of the Environmental Management Act; spatial planning (The Spatial Planning Act) Articles 12 and 13 of the Decree set down the legislative requirements with regard to the duty of accountability for the competent authority with reference to the acceptance of societal risk (and any transgressions).

Accountability for societal risk Article 12 of the Decree 1. Where the competent authority take a decision as mentioned in article 4, sections 1 to 4, the rationale for the decision in question shall in all cases include: a. the personal density in the area affected by the installation in question at the time at which the decision was set down;

b. the societal risk presented by the installation to which the decision relates, and, in the case specified in Article 4, Section 3, also the contribution made by the alteration of the installation towards the total societal risk from the installation, compared with the probability of an accident with 10 or more fatal victims of at most 10-5 per year, with the probability of an accident with 100 or more fatal victims of at most 10-7 per year and with the probability of an accident with 1000 or more fatal victims of at most 10-9 per year; c. the possibilities and the measures proposed to reduce the societal risk in the near future; d. the possibilities with regard to preparation for the control and limitation of the effects of a disaster or major accident as defined in Article 1 of the Disasters and Major Incidents Act, in the installation to which the decision relates, and e. the possibilities for persons located in the area of influence of the installation to which the decision relates to remain safe in the event of a disaster or serious accident in the installation. 2. Before reaching a decision as specified in the first Section, the competent authority shall liaise with the Officers of all Local Authorities within which any part of the area of the relevant installation lies. 3. Prior to any decision as specified in the first Section, the competent authority specified in the first Section shall provide the regional fire authorities in whose area the installation to which the decision relates lies with an opportunity to make recommendations in relation to the societal risk and the possibilities with regard to preparation for the control and limitation of the effects of a disaster or major accident.



Article 13 of the Decree 1. Where the competent authority reach a decision as specified in Article 5, Section 1 or 2 the explanation shall state (without prejudice to Section 4): a. the existing personal density in the area of influence of the installation(s) giving rise to the risk(s), as well as that to be expected following the decision, to the extent that the area of influence lies within the region to which the decision relates, at the time when the decision was made; b. the societal risk for each installation at the time of the decision, and the contribution made by what are referred to as "vulnerable and partly vulnerable objects" to the level of societal risk, compared with the probability of an accident with 10 or more fatal victims of at most 10-5 per year, with the probability of an accident with 100 or more fatal victims of at most 10-7 per year and with the probability of an accident with 1000 or more fatal victims of at most 10-9 per year; c. where possible, the measures taken by those operating the installation which contributes to the societal risk to limit that risk, and, where applicable, the conditions attached to the licence for the installation as specified in Article 8.1 of the Act; and, where possible, the measures to limit societal risk as included in the decision; e. the conditions, intended to limit societal risk, which the competent authority propose to attach to a licence (as specified in Article 8.1 of the Act) for an installation belonging to a category of installations to which the decision specified in Article 5, Section 1 or 2 applies; f. the benefits and disadvantages of other possibilities for spatial development, with a lower societal risk; g. the possibilities and measures proposed to limit societal risk in the near future; h. the possibilities for preparations for the control and limitation of the effects of a disaster or major accident as specified in Article 1 of the Disasters and Major Incidents Act, in the installation giving rise to a societal risk whose consequences extend beyond the installation, and i. the possibilities for persons located in the area of influence of the installation to remain safe in the event of a disaster or serious accident in the installation. 2. Before the competent authority take any decision as specified in the first Section, the authority shall liaise with the authority authorised to grant a licence as specified in Article 8.1, Section 1 of the Act to an installation responsible in part for the level of societal risk in the area to which the decision relates. 3. Prior to a decision as specified in the first Section, the competent authority specified in the first Section shall provide the regional fire authorities in whose area the installation to which the decision relates lies with an opportunity to make recommendations in relation to the societal risk and the possibilities with regard to preparation for the control and limitation of the effects of a disaster or major accident. 4. In deviation from the requirements of the first Section, the competent authority may, in the explanatory section of a decision as specified in Article 5, Sections 1 or 2, make reference to a Local Authority or Regional Structural Plan as specified in the Spatial Planning Act, where a coherent vision is included in that plan in relation to the desired planning development of a broader region, in relation to the prevention or control of disasters, and where as a minimum attention is paid in the plan to the topics specified in the first Section under points f to i. 5. This article is not applicable to an approval decision as specified in Article 11 Section 2 and Article 28 of the Spatial Planning Act, to a decision in relation to a declaration of "no objection" as specified in Article 19, Section 1 of the Act and to a decision as specified in Article 37 of the Act.



Central requirements of Articles 12 and 13 in the "Decree on external safety of installations" with regard to decision-making procedures in connection with the Environmental Management Act or the Spatial Planning Act The competent authority shall provide a justification for: ° the number of persons in the area of influence, ° the societal risk, ° the possibilities for risk reduction, ° the alternatives, ° the possibilities to limit the scope of the disaster, ° the capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident. The competent authority will involve the regional fire authorities



4 Status of the duty of accountability for societal risk 4.1 Status in relation to other legislation and planning mechanisms The diagram below shows the duty of accountability for societal risk in relation to all relevant enforcement authorities and their planning mechanisms. The (potential) connective function of the duty of accountability is striking. Factors included at the top of the figure are those most distant from the duty of accountability in concrete cases (such as in the case of a zoning plan or an environmental licence). These mechanisms are expected to offer a context for the assessment in such concrete cases.

Decree on external safety of installations(Bevi)

Disasters and Major Incidents Act (WRZO)

Quality promotion (Incident Control) Act (WKR)

Zoning plan

§ Prevention in thesurrounding environment

§ Legislative basis

Spatial Planning Act (WRO)

Environmental licensing§ Prevention at source§ Legislative basis

Environmental Management Act(Wm)

Regional Management Plan/Major Incident Plan

Structural vision of external safety

§ Inventory of problem areas§ Analysis of interests

Risk register

Risk communication

Major incident control plan

Duty of accountability for societalrisk

Figure 4.1 The duty of accountability in the context of existing planning and legislation



4.2 Working with a structural vision of external safety The law sets down standards for localised risk. Control of societal risk is based on responsible decentralised decisions. In order to obtain the maximum benefit from this it is strongly recommended that a structural vision of external safety should first be established, with the detailed workings of the duty of accountability worked out o the basis of that vision, if necessary on the basis of individual circumstances. This approach is supported by Article 13 Section 4 of the Decree, which states that:

The decisions and policy statements referred to in the Decree have until now often not included the required information. The explanatory section of the Decree proposed to introduce coherency here with the production of a structural vision for external safety. The anticipated interaction with this structural vision is represented in figure 4.2. The Structural vision of external safety is here the connecting axis between the various governmental disciplines.

Structural vision of external safetyintegral strategic policylevel

§ Regional characteristics§ Strategic integral context§ Practical considerations

Environmental

andspatial

planningR.O.

FireAuthoriti

esTraffic E.Z.Environ

mentsector plan level

§ Sectoral quality charts§ Sectoral objectives§ Internal coherency

(practical)§ Relationship with other

policies§ (no consideration or

preconditions)

Environmental

Implementation

Plan

Zoningplan

TrafficCirculatio

n Plan

Disaster(control)

plan

Projects, orders, environmental licences, operating licencesintegral nature

operational plan level

operational decision-making

§ Concrete decisions§ Procedural integration/

coherence§ Testing for integration

Figure 4.2The position of the structural vision of external safety There are many important reasons to approach the duty of accountability for societal risk via a Structural vision of external safety [for further information see chapter 18] Three diverse threads are distinguished in this guidance. 1. Prevention of a fragmented approach; 2. Timely agreements with all parties, 3. Harmonisation with (parallel) developments in incident control legislation.

"In deviation from the first Section the competent authority may in the explanatory section of a decision as specified in Article 5, Section 1 or 2, make reference to a Local Authority or Regional Structural Plan as specified in the Spatial Planning Act, where a coherent vision is included in that plan in relation to the desired planning development of a broader region, in relation to the prevention or control of disasters, and where as a minimum attention is paid in the plan to the topics specified in the first Section under points f to i.”


of 92 Advies- en Ingenieursbureau Oranjewoud B.V.

Thread 1: Preventing a fragmented approach The requirement to discharge the duty of accountability often arises from specific, small-scale situations, such as decision-making on an environmental licence or the drafting of a zoning plan. This may mask the danger that the duty of accountability is always considered in this small-scale context, and that the benefits of coherence are lost through fragmentation. Opportunities for timely interventions in spatial developments will then be missed.

A Structural vision of external safety makes it possible to examine the safety process at Local Authority or Regional level, and to place safety issues in relation to: residential developments, allocation or revitalisation of commercial zones (selection of high-risk sites), the traffic circulation plan (evacuation and accessibility for emergency services) cumulative effect of combination with other risks (e.g. transport risks), exposure to other environmental aspects, distribution/planning questions (how many LPG stations?), economic factors. Thread 2: Timely agreements with all parties Diagram 5.1 (see chapter 5) gives a (non-exhaustive) list of actors involved in the discharge of the duty of accountability. A Structural vision of external safety provides the opportunity to carry out an analysis of actors and their interests, providing clarity at an early stage and avoiding hitches in decision-making. Thread 3: Harmonisation with (parallel) developments in Major Incident Legislation. The introduction of the Incident Control, Promotion of Quality Act, provides a structure for a number of different forms of planning relating to incident control. Initiatives to be taken, primarily by the Local Authority but also at Provincial level, in the context of the Incident Control, Promotion of Quality Act display parallels with the desired content of the Structural vision of external safety. Strategic policy contexts for incident control are developed in these plans, and in particular in the Regional Management Plan. These plans must therefore also form part of the structural vision.

We strongly recommend investment in the Structural vision of external safety, and that it should be connected in policy terms to planning in the context of preparation for incident control (Regional Management Plan/Major Incident Plan). It is only in way that case by case rationalisations, without consideration of the connection to societal risks in a larger context, can be avoided.

Oranjestad have drawn up a master plan for town planning developments. This plan envisages an increase in density in housing stock around the railway zone. An emplacement is located within this zone where wagons containing hazardous substances are dealt with. When considering the application for an environmental licence the duty of accountability played a major role. The emplacement is also surrounded by a rail line carrying a large quantity of hazardous substances. The parallel road alongside the railway also has significant role to play in the transport of hazardous substances by road. Oranjestad have opted for an initial integrated approach to the interplay between residential development and external safety, and regard the safety paragraph in the Environmental Management Act as a derivative (within the context of the Environmental Management Act).



The major industrial area "Docks" has long been occupied by a number of chemical companies, with societal risk problems due to the high personal densities in the surrounding companies. The industrial area is intersected by a harbour basin (dealing inter alia with the distribution of hazardous substances). All roads in the industrial site discharge via a single tangent. The traffic capacity of the tangent is normally adequate. In the event of an incident however, both the deployment of the emergency services and evacuation must be carried out using this tangent If a gas cloud were to block the tangent, there would be no exit. The solution in this situation goes beyond the level of individual environmental licences.



5 Collaboration and communication Intensive collaboration and communications will be required in discharging the duty of accountability. The degree of harmonisation in the actions of the various players strongly influences the level of safety eventually achieved.

External safety is an area where changes in apparently minor details can occasionally have major consequences for the (level of safety of an) environment. A "responsible" balance between the different interests can only be achieved through a far-reaching integration of and involvement in the professional worlds of all the parties involved. Managers have an important directive task here. 5.1 Communication The integration of spatial planning, the environment and physical safety calls for a good deal of internal communication at government level in particular. But the playing field is wider than just this. Communications with neighbours, businesses and other government agencies are essential. The "Guidance on communications on risk"4 offers mechanisms to determine the involvement of persons and agencies and the level of participation within the "social arena". An approach to communications is proposed for each thread.

4 Guidance on communications on risk, December 2003. The Home Affairs Ministry, in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment and the Association of Dutch Local Authorities.

Many variants are found: The "Three Rivers" Local Authority receive construction plans for a conference centre close to a logistics/distribution centre. No zoning plan applies to the site (it is what in the Netherlands is called a "black area" in planning terms). The plan is therefore assessed solely against the building regulations. The Fire Authority's advice is requested only on prevention matters. It later emerges that: • large quantities of hazardous substances are trans-shipped at the logistics/distribution

centre, and that such substances are also stored. The plan appears to fit partly within the contour for localised risk

• the plan would lead to such an elevation in societal risk that the environmental space for a new zoning plan may be lost (if no further increase in the societal risk is desired

• the fire brigade are unable to reach the conference centre on the side where the distribution centre is located

• there is uncertainty about whether the brigade would have adequate capacity in the event of a disaster

• the consequences for (and of) the distribution centre remain uninvestigated. The construction plans have run into all kinds of problems...



Table 5.1 Communications plan Shared

knowledge Shared Thoughts

Shared Actions

Shared Decisions

Internal

Directly involved

Local Authority Officials Environmental Department Spatial Planning Department Incident control, physical safety Traffic Department

X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X

X

Interested Parties

Building Department Communications and Information Department Local Council

X X X

X X X X

X X

X

Neutrals Remainder of the Administration Political Parties

X (X)

(X) X

External

X X X

Directly Involved

Contractor for the Hazardous Installation Residents within the area of influence Contractors and employees (as a vulnerable group) Miscellaneous (semi)permanent residents Regional emergency services

X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X X

(X) (X) (X)

Interested parties

Holiday Makers Miscellaneous (temporary) residents Neighbouring Local Authorities (sometimes directly involved) Media

X X X X

(X)

(X)

(X)

Neutrals Miscellaneous residents

X (X)

Communications Plan Internal External

Intranet Lunchtime presentations Internet Local Authority Newsletter Press policy Newsletter Information Evenings

Brainstorming sessions Open days Questionnaire Suggestions box Local debates Open Forum Evenings

Project Team Working Group Design Studies

Steering Group Referendum



5.2 Division of roles When working out the Structural vision of external safety, an analysis of interests may be carried out in order to arrive at an early understanding of all factors and actors (see section 18.2) This section looks into: coordination between the various roles, formulation of a schedule of requirements, working agreements. 5.2.1 Coordination between the various roles

Diagram 5.1 shows that a large number of parties may have a direct or indirect role to play in communications and decision-making relating to external safety. The diagram is therefore not exhaustive. Where for example the province grants environmental licences, the diagram would need to be modified to reflect this. The province as competent authority therefore takes on the role of discharging the duty of accountability in line with local circumstances. The manner in which the various roles are filled and the form of management is strongly dependent upon the local management model. It is important that the coordinator has a recognised position, taking the pivotal role as a sort of Director. The following pattern will generally emerge. Table 5.2.1 Division of roles Topic Directional role Remark

Drawing up a structural vision Management Many sub-coordinators, because of many subsidiary

contributions. External Safety Zoning plans etc. Planning

Department

Environmental licences Environmental Department

Agree either Local Authority or Provincial coordination in the case of provincial installations.

5.2.2 Formulation of assumptions Timely formulation of assumptions and peripheral requirements is a necessity to allow effective discharge of the duty of accountability at a later stage. A schedule of requirements drawn up prior to the development of a (zoning) plan or at the start of the pre-consultation phase of a licensing procedure can reap many benefits. The benefits may include: harmonisation is achieved in good time; any gaps in information become apparent earlier; consequences are more quickly identified; planning concepts are still open to influence The sticking point is that initiatives calling for planning procedures on the basis of Article 195and the submission of applications for environmental licences mostly arrive without any notice.

5 The duty of accountability is not applicable to Article 19 Section 1 situations, as a consequence of Article 13.5 of the Decree on the external safety of installations

Good collaboration is the cornerstone in discharging the duty of accountability. This is possible only when: all factors and actors are brought into play in good time; decisive factors are identified in good time.



If the schedule of requirements is to be effective, then it must be available as quickly as possible for these initiatives. The precondition for success is that the schedule includes all requirements required to manage the safety situation and that all specialisms are involved in drawing up the requirements, alongside the advisors specified in the legislation. These advisors include: those in control of the area within which the societal risk is situated (article 12.2), the competent authority granting the environmental licence for an installation involved in determining the societal risk (article 12.2); the regional fire authorities (article 12.3 and 13.3). It is recommended that a schedule of requirements be drawn up in advance for every decision on the duty of accountability. It is not possible to state a threshold below which the drafting of such a schedule would be superfluous, as the local situation is such a strong determining factor. 5.2.3 Core team organisational structure, schedule of requirements It is advisable to draw up a core team to draft the schedule of requirements. This core team should as a minimum include specialists in the following areas: Spatial planning the Environment, Physical safety, Traffic. In the interests of familiarity it is recommended that the customary organisational structure of the Local Authority, Fire Authority and or Provincial Authority6 should be adopted. It is nevertheless desirable that the core team should have its own identity. A central coordinator should be appointed within the core team. This may be a member of upper management, depending on the seriousness of the case. The coordinator will take responsibility for the harmonisation of the total decision-making process. The various representatives should on the one hand bring their professional expertise to the core team; on the other hand they should act as ambassadors from the team to their professional colleagues. It is recommended that working procedures be established so that these are comprehensible to third parties, and for example replacements can quickly be organised. Flexibility in setting the agenda is a necessity. As well as appearing as authors of the schedule of requirements the core team may also act as assessors of the (integrated) manner in which the requirements are worked through in practice. Decision-making however is emphatically a task for the director.

The drafting of the schedule of requirements is primarily a task for the (various members from) government agencies. This should not of course exclude the participation of the originators of the risk (see section 5.1).

6 The extent to which Provincial, Local and Fire Authorities are actively involved in procedures for environmental licences varies widely in practice. Active involvement is desirable, and agreements on this will be necessary.

Considerations Discussions on external safety always implicitly include discussion on "environmental space". Hazardous enterprises generally make an indirect use of space (the safety distance beyond the site footprint). These businesses thereby play a significant role in the spatial planning field.



5.2.4 What should the requirements be? The requirements to be formulated should be related to articles 12 and 13 of the Decree. As this Guidance shows, there are many possibilities here. It is for the core team to determine which factors should play a role in a specific situation. The schedule of requirements must include reasonably practicable objectives, or objectives whose feasibility is worthy of investigation. Should some initiative appear unachievable in advance, this should be clearly communicated. Requirements which constitute a concealed form of refusal must be avoided. The requirements must be formulated within the peripheral requirements of the applicable legislation7. There are also legislative contexts for the information to be provided. Sometimes these do not "join up". Depending on the situation the core team will have to choose here between what is compulsory, and where it will be reasonable to come to a considered recommendation later. Who pays? So far as the financial consequences of the introduction of the Decree are concerned, reference should be made to the wording of the legislation and the explanatory section of the Decree. Where spatial developments are concerned it is customary for the costs of risk assessments to be borne by the party taking the initiative. The assumption when it comes to the obtaining of environmental licences is that the costs enforcement of standards and decision-making will be borne by the competent authority. The costs of providing the necessary information in the application document will be met by the applicant.

7 In accordance with established legislative practice, no requirement may be included in an environmental licence whereby the collaboration of third parties is necessary for compliance with a condition. It can therefore not be required that neighbours provide additional escape routes.



6 Context for the assessment of societal risk This chapter provides guidelines for the assessment of societal risk. The context of assessment makes use of the building blocks in part 2, but also brings in such matters as economic and societal benefit.

The assessment consists of 3 main steps: 1. Rationale 2. Detailed investigation 3. Accountability Each main step includes a number of subsidiary steps. 6.1 Step 1: Rationale An orientational investigation is used to decide if it is necessary to go through all steps, or whether a direct judgement will suffice. Two questions will require an answer: 1. What is the effect distance/area of influence? 2. What is the distance to the source of risk? Possible indications for a decision that a detailed investigation is not necessary may include: the planned "vulnerable objects" lie outside the area of influence; a single vulnerable object only is involved, in a more or less virgin environment/ a single vulnerable object only is involved in an already crowded environment, such that the effect on societal risk is marginal. An environment where a previous decision on accountability has indicated that the situation is permissible. In this case it will still be necessary to give attention to the capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident, the emergency services, controllability etc. Naturally the conclusion must be well-supported. Where no conclusion can be drawn on the basis of step 1, then step 2 must be gone through. 6.2 Step 2: Detailed investigation The detailed investigation must look into the societal risk situation in all its facets. This step consists of 6 subsidiary steps: a. assessment of societal risk: the null situation and the starting situation, b. acceptability of the starting situation, c. opportunities for optimalisation, d. effect on the fN-curve, e. effect on acceptability, f. interaction between fN-curve and acceptability criteria a. Assessment of societal risk: null situation and starting situation This subsidiary step is used to determine if the scope of the fN-curve increases. The distinction between the null situation and the starting situation is determined. The null situation is the current situation without the developments under consideration. The starting situation includes the developments to be assessed, but without the effect of any options for improvement. In the case of categorical installations (LPG filling stations, ammonia chilling installations or CPR 15 storage), the personal density tests from the Ministerial Order may be used (see chapter 17).

The context of assessment is summarised in a fold-out diagram provided in Appendix 4.



In the context of the duty of accountability it is permissible to calculate fN-curves if this will provide greater accuracy. b. Acceptability of the starting situation. The fN-curve is one of the assessment criteria. The total duty of accountability includes several other criteria. Subsidiary step b brings these into the picture. The reference point is the starting situation The mandatory points from the Decree must be assessed. The Decree does not however exclude other factors from the assessment. Mandatory factors: A. Societal risk in relation to the orientational value B. Increase in societal risk with reference to null situation C. The capability of the population involved to avoid the consequences of an incident D. The possibilities for emergency aid Indispensable: E. The need for and benefits of the development F. Time aspects Where relevant: Societal and economic disruption Maintainability Potential casualties Delayed victims8

The assessment is consciously qualitative rather than quantitative A separate assessment is carried out for each criterion. Intercomparisons between the assessments are not appropriate within this system, since the criteria are difficult or impossible to compare against one another. The assessment takes place by selecting "red" for a negative assessment, for "green" if the factor in question scores very positively, or proportionately between the two. The diagram below may be used to show conclusions. Mandatory and indispensable factors A Position of societal risk with respect to orientational value B Increase in societal risk with respect to null situation C The capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident D Capacity of the emergency services E The need for and benefits of the development F Timing matters c. Opportunities for optimalisation The feasible risk reduction measures must be established and used in forming further judgements. The choice of feasible and sensible measures depends inter alia on a cost/ benefit analysis, ALARA, etc. d. Effect on the fN-curve This subsidiary step involves calculation of the fN-curve, taking account of the reduction measures. The effect of the measures is determined by comparison with the starting situation9.

8 In some scenarios it may be relevant that many persons exposed may only die after a period of illness. 9 It may sometimes be impossible to visualise the effects of risk reduction measures using a calculation model. It is recommended in such cases that a correction factor should be applied to the probability of an incident, in discussion with the Inspectors from the Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment and the Royal Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM).



e. Effect on acceptability This subsidiary step involves the assessment of the measures using the same method as subsidiary step b. Any difference with the result of the assessment in subsidiary step b must be justified. The time taken up with the implementation of the measures may be taken as another factor for assessment. Here again it is a qualitative total assessment that is produced. f. Interaction between fN-curve and acceptability criteria This subsidiary step involves an assessment of the acceptability of the increase in the societal risk. This means that the degree of increase is set off against the acceptability criteria as described in subsidiary steps b and e. 6.3 Step 3: Accountability Accountability is set out in the decision, be it in respect of a zoning plan or an environmental licence. The checklist in chapter 8 will be of assistance here. As well as decisions on the basis of the Spatial Planning Act and the Environmental Management Act, support can also be sought in other legislation or planning machinery such as: agreements in Civil Law, a permit for use of premises, a building permit, an APV workplace assessment. It is important however that the selected combination of legal measures has its effect at the desired time, and that it is enforceable10.

10 See for example the Council of State declaration of 11 February 2004, 200301673/1



7 Details of the duty of accountability Many variations are possible within the process of discharging the duty of accountability. This chapter places the emphasis on: the distinction between new and existing situations pitfalls of collaboration. 7.1 Differences in approach, in the existing and new situations Several situations are conceivable where the accountability for societal risk plays a quite unique role. It is important to recognise such situations in good time since the legal effects may be considerable. In broad terms three situations can be distinguished. 1. an existing situation, where the equilibrium has been disturbed only by the introduction of the Decree: the situation has not changed, only the perceptions; 2. the arrival or possible arrival of a new hazardous installation, to which two different procedures may apply:

2a. Zoning plan; the installation(s) may be permitted by virtue of a zoning plan - it is not yet clear which installations will move in; 2b. Environmental Management Act the installation is moving into a particular location and requests an Environmental Management Act permit.

3. the installation of new, limited vulnerable and vulnerable objects by means of a zoning plan.

Existing New Source Situation 1 Situation 2a Situation 2b (Limited) vulnerable object Situation 3 Figure 7.1 Schematic representation of possible situations The situations described above are explained further below. 1. Existing situations In this situation there are no physical changes; both source and environment remain unchanged. The Decree will have only limited effect in these situations. Some effects may be seen where: Some remedial arises directly from the Decree. The local risk separation distances may have some remedial work as a consequence, where it will be the hazardous activity that will be involved. This will have no (direct) consequences for the duty of accountability for societal risk, since the societal risk situation will generally also improve. A decision will need to be taken to update the (spatial planning) situation. This may come into play if a zoning plan older than 10 years is updated. The situation is unchanged, but the level of societal risk must be justified. The fact that this is an existing situation must be brought out in the justification: this will argue for a more generous decision than when a new situation is involved. Α permit to alter an existing element of premises, with no effect on group risk.



2. New Hazardous Installation Societal risk can have an affect at two different stages as a consequence of the (possible) arrival of a new Hazardous Installation: where the arrival of such an installation makes a new zoning plan possible((situation 2a); where an application for a permit is submitted for the establishment or modification11 of such an installation (situation 2b). 3. Zoning plan for (limited) vulnerable objects. When creating new (limited) vulnerable objects, the legal position of hazardous enterprises already present (or not excluded by the zoning plan) must emphatically be taken into account. A more stringent application of the duty of accountability than that applied to existing situations may be legitimate with reference to the new objects. Lastly, a combination of situations 2 and 3 may be possible, with a zoning decision permitting both vulnerable and hazardous objects. In that event the requirements of 2 and 3 above apply in full. 7.2 Pitfalls of collaboration Collaboration is necessary in order to properly discharge the duty of accountability. There are pitfalls here: it may be easier to talk "about" than to talk "with" Articles 12.2 and 13.2 require liaison with the competent authority granting the licence for the operation responsible for determining the societal risk. Discussions with the operator in question are not compulsory, but they are strongly recommended. What must be avoided is that the discussion starts in court! Cultural differences sometimes hamper efficient collaboration with Local Authority departments and/or the fire department. It is important to recognise this at an early stage and to appoint a liaising coordinator. It may be sensible to appoint an external specialist. Unless it is absolutely clear in advance that an initiative is unfeasible, then guidance to parties should be in the form of requirements, not vetoes. Safety is a complex matter. What must be aimed for is that requirements lead to unambiguous information detailing both the advantages and disadvantages, so that decisions can be made on the basis of the full picture. Prejudice towards a hazardous installation is a threat to the objective formulation of requirements, and may stand in the way of open communications leading to a solution.

11 A modification where the risk increases, the area of influence expands, etc.



8 Checklist This section of the Guidance looks in detail at the topics which should in all cases be included in the consideration of the duty of responsibility for societal risk. This section expands upon Articles 12 and 13 of the Decree, which regulates the discharge of the duty. Most of these subjects have been touched upon in the foregoing sections of the Guidance. This chapter is intended to provide a full summary of all matters related to that accountability. The following matters should form part of that accountability, by virtue of the Decree. An indication is provided of the decisions to which each element relates. Table 8 Legislative components of the duty of accountability. Element 1 2 1. The personal density in the area of influence of the installation in question. -Functional classification -Mean personal densities (total and for each function/location). -Residence time corrections -Distinction between existing and new situation.

X X

2. The scope of the societal risk. -Its scope prior to the coming into force of the decision; -Its scope after the coming into force of the decision; -Changes to the level of societal risk as a consequence of the decree. -The position of the societal risk curve with respect to the orientational value

X X

3. Possible and proposed measures to limit societal risk within the installation(s) in question

X X

4. The possible and proposed measures to limit societal risk in the spatial planning decision,

X

5. The possibilities for preparation for and control and limitation of the scope of a disaster or major accident -Proactive response -Prevention -Preparation -Control/self rescuing capacity

X X

6. The capability of those in the area of influence of the installation to avoid the consequences of an incident.

X X

7. The benefits and disadvantages of other possibilities for spatial development, with a lower societal risk. ,

X

8. The possibilities and measures proposed to limit societal risk in the near future.

X

9. The conditions proposed by the competent authority to be attached in the event of the issue of a permit for the installation, in the event that this has the effect of increasing societal risk in the area in question.

X

1 = A permit to set up an installation in accordance with Article 8.1.1esubsection a of the Environmental Management Act or a permit for modifications in accordance with subsection b of the same Article 2 = The establishment of a zoning plan or the granting of a waiver of the requirement for one



PART II: Fundamentals of the duty of accountability This part provides "building blocks" which can be used to provide a structure for the discharge of the duty of accountability. These elements are not new in themselves, wherever possible existing mechanisms have been utilised. However there are some novel combinations. The building blocks can be divided into three groups: Environmental licensing and accountability, The zoning plan and the duty of accountability, physical safety and the duty of accountability.



9 Environmental licensing and accountability An environmental licence is the main mechanism used by both the operator and the competent authority and advisors when it comes to implementation of the duty of accountability. An environmental licence is: a source of information for all on the environmental aspects of a business, the main means to influence the balancing of the possible environmental loading caused by an installation, with the environment, the legislative record of permitted activities and the associated emissions, risks etc., the basis for enforcement of environmental standards, the basis for the legal security of businesses. The granting of an environmental licence must therefore proceed with care. In discharging the duty of accountability it is not only important to look at what is laid down in the permit, but the way in which the content of the permit relates to the environment is also significant. Significant elements of the permit process are: initial discussions, assessment of permissibility, the conditions, the considerations.

9.1 Initial discussions The effective discharge of the duty of accountability calls for more than just a formal assessment It is important that all involved parties bring the relevant factors into play at the earliest possible stage. The prior discussion (discussion preceding the official procedure) allows the relevant factors to be sounded out with all parties, so that a dependable and above all a useable permit application is produced.

The (fictitious) company XYZ Products have submitted an environmental licence application accompanied by a risk assessment. The Local Authority are minded to grant a permit for a contour for localised risk. Regarding the societal risk the Local Authority are minded to permit the processes included in the application and the associated risk. The Local Authority indicate that this will adequately guarantee the appropriate rights and responsibilities. XYZ Products object to this on the grounds that there is now a likelihood that new developments in the environment will lead to modifications to the fN-curve, whereby they may be faced with additional rectification work in due course. The company want more certainty so that they do not need to fight every new proposal in future. How can this dilemma be resolved?



Table 9.1Example of pre-discussion and assessment steps Step and element Who 1. Initial discussion. Determine if External Safety has a role to play (see criteria in Decree). If so: reach agreements on the coming project, deadlines and the advisors to be involved; determine if this a new or existing situation; determine whether a categorical operation is involved, establish what requirements are made under other legislation (Health and Safety at Work, Major Incidents legislation) and how all this can be combined.

Applicant Coordinator Government

2. Information stage. Provide clarity on: processes and substances; environment (the personal density in the area of influence of the installation in question); the standards to be observed, the available environmental space; peripheral requirements on physical safety.

Applicant Spatial planning specialist Environment Fire authorities

3. Initial assessment. determine localised risk, societal risk, effect distances, determine differences with regard to existing situation (where applicable); Has the Alara principle been met? determine possible conflicts with regard to localised and societal risk, physical safety etc.


4. Generate solutions and alternatives where necessary, otherwise go to step 8.


5. Assess possibilities and proposed measures to limit societal risk in the installation in question.

Applicant Environment Fire authorities

6. Assess possibilities and proposed measures to limit societal risk in the spatial planning decision.

Spatial planning specialist Environment Fire authorities

7. The possibilities for preparation for and control and limitation of the scope of a disaster or major accident -Proactive response -Prevention -Preparation -Control/self rescuing capacity

Applicant Spatial planning specialist Construction Environment Fire authorities Traffic management

8. Describe the process gone through, and the outcome. Make it comprehensible to third parties (for example in the "considerations" section of the permit application).

Applicant Governmental Coordinator

9. Discuss the drafting of the requirements.

Applicant Environment Fire authorities

Notes to table 9.1 The table sketches out a possible course for the pre-discussions, prior to the final submission of the application. The players are identified in the right-hand column. This summary is not exhaustive: more or less disciplines may be called for, depending on the nature of the installation and the way in which knowledge is distributed around the competent authority The crucial issue is that all necessary knowledge is deployed at the right time.



In step 1 we pose the question whether external safety has a role to play. The criteria in the Decree will serve as a context of assessment here. It may be decided to regard external safety more broadly in cases where the criteria in the Decree are very close to being exceeded, or where cumulative effects involving other sources of risk are involved. Reference was also made in step 1 to the distinction between "categorical" and "non-categorical" businesses made in the Decree. This distinction is not considered further in what follows. The distinction is primarily in the method of determining risks (via standardised data, or a risk assessment). The need to justify the eventual level of risk is present for both approaches. It is important that all assessment criteria are presented in step 2. By identifying these at an early stage the options can be more carefully investigated. Reasonably predictable future developments as specified in Article 8.8.1c of the Environmental Management Act also belong amongst these assessment criteria, as does a statement of the (limited) vulnerable objects in the vicinity. An initial assessment is carried out in step 3. Does the situation described in the application fall within the available "environmental space" or can a further risk reduction be achieved. Step 8 allows the process gone through and the outcome to be recorded. The information is not only important for the eventual decision on the permit application, it also increases the comprehensibility of the outcome for third parties. Third parties can make their views known once the application has become official. The competent authority may demand further information to allow a valid application to be submitted, on the grounds of Article 5.6 of the Environmental Management, Installations and Permits Decree. The Decree also sets out requirements for the provision of information, where the advisory branch of the Regional Fire Authorities take a central role. 9.1.1 Alternatives to reduce risk A procedure under the Environmental Management Act is the ideal context for the investigation and assessment of risk reduction alternatives. The possibilities for the reduction of risk at source are highly diverse but at the same time highly restricted. The basic safety measures have usually already been taken in the past, and the discussion centres around achieving additional safety. "Off the shelf" measures must make way for "tailor-made" solutions. For a tailor-made solution to fit the intensive participation of the applicant will be called for, as well as expert direction from the environmental specialist. The pre-discussion phase is the platform used to provide a structure for this. 9.2 Assessment of permissibility When the pre-discussion is carried out well, a clear idea about the permissibility of the project will be provided in advance of the submission of the permit application. A finalised assessment can however only take place following recommendations and further considerations. The Environmental Management Act provides a context for these this assessment. The presence of a structural/policy vision for External Safety may provide a (supplementary) Regional or Municipal context. The application of the duty of accountability should remain within the context of assessment of the Environmental Management Act when dealing with an application for an environmental licence. It is for example not possible to further expand on the concept of "expanded



applicability" by also assessing the entire passage of a load of hazardous substances through a city centre. However it is not only the Environmental Management Act that may be used in working out the detail of the duty of accountability. The zoning plan may also include a decision involving that duty, and there are also links with local decision-making on routes for hazardous substances.

9.3 The requirements Conditions may be attached to Environmental licences in order to prevent negative consequences for the environment. In practice, permits are not granted without some conditions attached. The extent of the conditions included in a permit is strongly dependent upon the nature of the installation. Please refer to the various manuals and guidance documents available for the applicable technical requirements. In complex situations it will be necessary to involve specialists. Since the detailed implementation of the duty of accountability is location-specific, with several different legal agreements between parties, this section sets out what is permissible and what is not. Not permissible: requiring new installations to demonstrate that the standards can be met following the coming into force of the permit. This approach provides inadequate legal certainty. There is also the considerable problem that the impact of the requirements for the operation of the installation will only be clear after the granting of the permit. including requirements which relate only to quantities of hazardous substances and not to the processes carried out using those substances. It is often the case that hazardous substances only become hazardous when processes are carried out using them. The permit application must include information on the processes and the accident scenarios envisaged. inclusion of requirements demanding the collaboration of third parties outside the installation. For example, requirements calling for third parties to keep exit routes clear. permitting "risk space" without establishing personal densities in the vicinity. In order to allow flexible operation it is possible to grant a permit for "risk space" only (via an fN curve). Within such an area, the hazardous substances may be swapped around as long as the curve does not become any steeper. The fN-curve is however a combination of probability and the possible numbers of victims. If the application includes no listing of personal densities then the basis for setting limits is absent.

The Alara principle plays a significant role in assessing permissibility. Can an ideal yet reasonable level of protection be identified? In the context of the duty of accountability the question of necessity also arises. is it necessary for the source of risk to be present on the location, or would another location be better? what would be the (national) effect if the permit were refused? (for example, will one place be safer while several others thereby become less safe?). Is this then an argument to allow more risk locally? The "necessity" question will also need to be posed with some emphasis. It is essential that the assessment takes place within the context of the Environmental Management Act. An environmental licence may not require the relocation of an operation.



What is permissible: External safety is one topic in particular where no standard requirements can be provided. The subject matter is complex and a customised approach is essential. The following elements must be included in the permit as a minimum: quality requirements on installations etc; inspection requirements, organisational requirements administrative requirements, so that enforcement authorities and advisors can determine in a short timescale what the current situation is with regard to the hazardous substances stored or in use. foundations of the agreements associated with the duty of accountability; stimuli to ensure a continued search for optimalisation of the situation.

9.4 Considerations The "considerations" section states the matters taken into account in reaching a decision on the application. The information obtained in the preliminary stages is presented in relation to the context of assessment adopted. The drafting of the "considerations" section must be carried out with care and the outcome must be comprehensible to third parties. Once a permit is granted the combination of the considerations and requirements may be the first and sometimes the only source of information about the environmental situation within an installation. The certainly of the applicant's legal status and that of those in the vicinity will benefit from a clear description.

A railway emplacement is located in the fictitious town of Anystad. The societal risk exceeds the orientational value. This situation may be permitted against the background of the following agreements and measures. a. The scope of the transport activities is somewhat reduced. b. Research into safer alternatives is updated. c. A monitoring system is put in place providing a continual overview of the number of wagons with hazardous substances loads, and the operations carried out with them. d. Agreements on spatial planning and the personal densities to be observed in a (new) zoning plan are set out in a covenant. e. There is continuing dialogue on supplementary measures. The Local Authority have indicated that the permit will be updated as soon as possible. The dilemma sketched out at the start of this section is thereby resolved.



9.5 The province as competent authority The Order on the granting of Environmental Management permits includes a specification on the type of Provincial Authority authorised to take a decision. It is usual that frequent discussion with the Local Authority Environmental Department takes place during the award procedure. It is necessary to expand this dialogue in the context of the duty of accountability. The local Spatial Planning Department for example may be able to provide some clarity on zoning plans and the associated personal densities. This is indicated in diagram 9.512.

E n v i r o n m e n t ( in t e r n a la d v i s o r t o c o u n c i l o f f ic i a ls )

S p a t ia l P l a n n i n g ( a d v i s o r o nt h e l o c a l s p a t ia l s i t u a t i o n )

L o c a l F i r e a u t h o r i t ie s( i n t e r n a l a d v i s o r t o

c o u n c i l l o r s )L o c a l A u t h o r i t y S e r v ic e s

R e g io n a l F i r e A u t h o r i t i e s( a d v i s o r u n d e r l e g is l a t i o n O t h e r l e g i s la t i v e a d v i s o r s

P r o v i n c ia l E n v i r o n m e n t a lD e p a r t m e n t s

( i m p l e m e n t a t i o n )

P r o v i n c i a l S e r v i c e s ( in t e r n a la d v i s o r t o P r o v i n c i a l

A u t h o r i t i e s )

P r o v i n c i a l E n v i r o n m e n t a l D e p a r t m e n t s ( im p l e m e n t a t io n )

C o u n c i l l o r s ( d is c u s s i o n )

P r o v i n c e s ( C o m p e t e n t A u t h o r i t y )

Figure 9.5 Advisors involved with Provincial environmental licences.

12 Diagram: Janine Mesters, Regional Fire Authority, South Limburg



10 The zoning plan and the duty of accountability As observed above societal risk is a phenomenon which cannot be represented spatially by means of contours. The level of societal risk, and, more importantly, responsibility for it, will in particular feature in the explanatory section. Has sufficient consideration been given to the acceptability of this increase in societal risk? 10.1 External safety and the zoning plan: the traditional approach External safety has in fact been a criterion in zoning plans for many years. It was always necessary to include this aspect in the zoning plan so that the "spatial" aspects were properly supported. Discussions on whether or not to include environmental standards in the zoning plan13

have led to the development of an "installation list", a list of operators showing environmental loadings by sector. The objective of this list is to locate installations with a heavier environmental loading at a greater distance from vulnerable objects. The list of installations can be traced back to the zonings set out in the published guidance "Bedrijven en mileuzonering"14

(Businesses and environmental zoning") In the interests of increasing knowledge it should be observed that the principle of the "installation list" is inadequate to provide a spatial planning basis for the implementation of the duty of accountability. The reasons for this include: The list of installations provides no mechanism for the expression of the interaction with personal densities or for the proper management of societal risk. Recent experiences have shown that the distances provided in the ‘Bedrijven en milieuzonering’ document are sometimes to short to reflect the actual risk distances15. It must be observed that the inclusion of environmental standards for sources of risk is not permissible, but that the inclusion of standards regarded as necessary in planning terms is. Taking this criterion into account it is possible in a zoning plan to: Include contours for localised risk. Set down personal densities. 10.2 Management of societal risk by means of the zoning plan Once a particular level of societal risk has been accepted, it will then need to be "managed"; developments in the environment must not become a reason to increase the societal risk without further justification. The environment of a source of risk - the persons present or the personal densities - have a major impact on the scope of the societal risk, and may be the determining factor. How can one prevent the societal risk rising through unforeseen (irreversible) developments in the zoning plan? External safety is not solely an item for zoning plans permitting new developments. External safety must also be assessed in plans that are "conservational" in nature. There may also be redevelopment within such a planning area. Possible improvements to the existing safety situation must also be investigated.

13 There is much case law on this topic with the Hefshuizen Decree (17 December 1987, AB 1988, 388) being the best known. The November 2003 report "Milieu Bestemd" ("Tuned to the environment"), pages 20 and 21, drafted by BRO on behalf of the VROM, also signalled a change in this position. 14

Bedrijven en milieuzonering, tweede druk VNG 1999-2001 (Businesses and environmental zoning, Second Impression, VNG 1999-2001) 15 The difference between the distances provided by VNG and the localised risk contours or effect areas can be very large.



10.3 Basis of population densities From a judicial standpoint the best way of ensuring the manageability of societal risk lies in the basis of the personal densities in the zoning plan. This can be done in either of two ways: 1. Direct linkage of personal densities to locations 2. Indirect linkage using construction densities and areas The second method is the one currently in use in the Netherlands. This method can be applied wherever the persons present remain primarily within houses or business premises. This method can be applied wherever the persons present remain primarily within houses or business premises. The first method is indicated when many activities involving persons take place out of doors. The basis of the societal risk situation must be justified in the explanatory section of the plan. 10.3.1 Indirect basis Where it emerges during the investigation of the extent of the societal risk that persons remaining indoors appear to determine the risk, calculation of personal densities by means of built areas and heights will suffice. Since this has been done in reverse as part of the investigation into the societal risk, the values are probably already known and can be immediately incorporated in the zoning plan16. The investigation of the level of the societal risk must take into account the existing authorisations for future change, which might lead to an increase in the potential personal densities. CPR16 and CPR18 The most standardised baseline figures adopted to determine figures for the number of persons present in different roles are specified in the so-called Green Book (CPR16) and the Purple Book (CPR18). The most significant of these are: Function Number of persons per unit Residential 2.4 per home Industry 1 employee per 100 m2 of floor area. Offices 1 employee per 30 m2 floor area. Retail 1 employee per 30 m2 floor area. Schools 1.1 person per pupil A supplementary summary is provided in chapter 16.

16 There is a major practical advantage in maintaining a register of personal densities (see section 10.7).



10.3.2 Direct basis In some types of business there may be relatively high number of persons at work out of doors, for example in logistics functions. A societal risk based upon the persons present within buildings does not then provide a good representation of the actual distribution of personal densities. It is possible to include a requirement for each location stating the maximal personal density. Modification of these personal densities for each location can smooth out their influence on the extent of the societal risk In residential areas the occupation levels are always quite different to those for areas with many office buildings; these differences are represented in the societal risk curve. It is assumed here that there is little variation in the actual level of density within the same location. The requirements must make it clear that the density applies (as an average) to the areas with the same category of use in the zoning plan. A residence time correction is to be applied in determining personal densities. see chapter 15.

10.4 Building in flexibility Changes in the risk situation, for example modifications to the production process within the business may result in an improvement in the societal risk level. In such cases the competent authority may decide that an increase in personal densities may be justified on the basis of a new risk assessment17. The legal footing for this should be included in an authorisation for modifications. Such an increase is naturally only permissible if a similar increase in personal density has not taken place within the remainder of the area of influence such that the "risk area" created has already been used up.

17 Agreement with the business in question will of course be required.

Example Alongside a storage depot for chemical products the Anystad Local Authority wish to develop a residential development plan and a trading estate with many outdoor activities. A zoning plan will need to be drafted. Research indicates that the societal risk is acceptable when all factors are taken into account. The presence of residents could be limited by including houses in the plan, such that sufficient clarity exists over the numbers present (indirect basis). However, the Local Authority adopt instead the following conditions in line with the operational objectives (direct basis): Operational objectives: "Only those premises where work is carried out and where the mean personal density is restricted to 15 persons per hectare will be permitted in this area".



10.5 Previous more general zoning plans Many zoning plans in the Netherlands have a more general character; these include both plans consciously kept general and old plans which had only a summary description of the uses to which sites could be put. These plans are not of practical use in determining group risk, since in theory there may be so many different developments. Nevertheless the intention is that the societal risk should be calculated using the legally permitted personal density. When inventorying personal densities within older plans the current personal densities may be used by way of an exception. Often these plans are pretty well complete, and no further major modifications will occur in the area. However the number of plans more than 10 years old will steadily decrease, particularly when the new Spatial Planning Act comes into force. The circumstances are different in the case of general plans. Two variant situations may occur: 1. general plans which have been at least partly drafted but not implemented; 2. general plans which have yet to be drafted. In both cases there is a likelihood that the personal densities can only be determined in the most general terms, so that the societal risk is also difficult to determine18. This can affect the level of accountability delivered. It follows that the drafting of a general zoning plan can have far-reaching consequences. Actual developments may deviate considerably from what appears in the general plan, which has been taken account of in considering accountability for societal risk. It is a distinct possibility that the societal risk will "run over" unnoticed, leading to: underestimates of the possible effects by emergency services and incident control; the emergency services and incident control being inadequately equipped for the area. In order to ensure that the duty of accountability is properly discharged, it is not recommended in situations where societal risk plays a serious role that the environmental position should be set down permanently in a general zoning plan. Where a general plan is nevertheless opted for, it will be necessary to include as many locations as possible within which the personal densities are restricted. 10.6 Residence time correction Occupation levels for each user function may fluctuate considerably over time. In residential properties the residents are present both day and night, but offices are generally occupied only during the day. There may also be seasonal variations, during school holidays and in recreational areas closed for the winter. This lower residence time reduces the probability that the persons in question will be involved in an incident19. Such reduced residence times can be taken into account using the "residence time correction". This calculation may then generate a lower outcome. Differences between day and night. It is preferable to regard day and night separately in societal risk assessments. The most significant differences are to be found here:

18 General plans create problems of legal security in the implementation of any new planning. Since personal densities cannot be properly established within the general plan, uncertainties may arise as to the available environmental space for an adjacent new plan. 19 An accident as a result of an incident at an adjacent source of risk.



Presence Function Day Night (19.00 - 07.00) Residence 70% 100% Education 100% 0% if no evening teaching Businesses/offices 100% 0% if no shift work. Cafes, discos etc. 0% 100% Table 10.6Day/night presence, most significant functions A summary can be found in chapter 15. It is emphatically not the intention to calculate the mean residence time using the number of persons present, since this will not accurately reflect the societal risk. The societal risk provides information on the probability that groups of persons of a specified size will become fatalities. Discounting residence time in calculating personal density ignores large groups of people so that the probability of smaller groups becoming fatalities increases. In other words the societal risk curve is distorted, such that it no longer accurately reflects the actual situation. For a further discussion of residence time correction please see chapter 15. Recording personal densities Any use of residence time corrections should be recorded. In the case of "standard" functions the functional description will provide adequate security; the function "residential" gives adequate security that the occupation is a mean 70% during the day, and 100% at night. Residence time may vary considerably in the case of some functions. For example, a recreational site may be open throughout the year, or only for a couple of months. If it is wished to make the opening times enforceable then a requirement in the zoning plan may be the way forward. The distinction between residence time and degree of occupation Some user functions show a varying degree of occupation as well as a shorter residence time. Many schools are closed during vacations, which can be incorporated in the residence time correction. Depending on the type of school the number of pupils may vary considerably. Because of this variability it is unwise to correct the personal density for this. The degree of occupation must be based upon the actual capacity of the user function in question. 10.7 Management of personal densities The correct input of personal density figures, the interpretation of zoning plans(and Article 19 situations) and the processing of residence time corrections is time-consuming and therefore expensive. Inaccuracies in the inventory of personal densities can lead to undesirable errors. Correct treatment of this parameter is of crucial importance. This is an important checking task for the competent authority.



Register of personal densities In order to promote replicability of outcomes, the Local Authority are recommended to draw up a register of personal densities for the areas of influence for societal risk. This register should include both the possible personal densities based on the zoning plan and also the residence time correction. Such a system has no legal value, in the sense that it cannot be linked to the zoning plan. The system may form part of Local Authority environmental policy and as such may be used as a context for the consideration of environmental licences. Providing this data for use in risk calculations will create clarity in the findings, and the difficulty of checks afterwards will be significantly reduced. A recording system has been devised for the so-called City and Environment Project in Almelo. The illustration above shows a summary. This map is based on the register.



11 Physical safety and the duty of accountability This chapter looks at the physical safety factors to be taken into account in discharging the duty of accountability. In contrast to the previous chapters the objective of this chapter is not only to provide information but also to provide a context for assessment. The recommendations may be fleshed out with the use of this context of assessment. The assessment of physical safety in the context of the duty of accountability relates to the following factors: the capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident: §11.3, controllability: §11.4. The assessment as to whether physical safety is guaranteed may be carried out using the diagram below, considered in relation to the total assessment scheme (see chapter 6). The figure puts across the particular message that more is expected of the parties mainly responsible for providing information on self rescuing capacity and controllability than simply an assessment followed by a (black and white) conclusion "yes, this is acceptable" or "no, this is not". We expect instead a recommendation, based on a rationale involving both elements, from which will flow feasible proposals for optimalisation. The starting points in this are not limited to the emergency services' own domain. Measures in the context of spatial planning and traffic management, preventive measures in relation to the source and measures specifically directed towards increasing the capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident, all belong within the scope of the recommendations to be provided.

Where are the limits ofthe possible?

§ Feasibility§ Urgency

Which scenarios are indicative?

How do these score on the following factors:

self rescuing capacity controllability

Physical installation; optimalisation

Final recommendations

§ Prevention§ Installation environment§ Incident control

Recommendation

Information base

Figure 11 Stages in the assessment of physical safety 11.1 Indicative scenarios The possible and necessary measures to optimalise the reduction in the number of victims on the basis of self rescuing capacity and controllability are strongly dependent upon the indicative scenario. There are a variety of different scenarios that might be adopted:



Scenario type Description 1 QRA scenarios. Scenarios for use in carrying out a QRA.

Effects (fatalities) and the probability of prevention are the most significant parameters.

2 Operational Scenarios in connection with safety at work; internal.

3 Incident control Scenarios for the purpose of preparation for incident control. Effect is primary; credibility is important

The most significant distinction between types of scenarios is the effect distance. A clear overlap may exist. For physical safety in the context of accountability for societal risk it is strongly recommended that QRA scenarios are employed, so that proper comparisons can be made on this point between the societal risk and the possibilities for controllability and self rescuing capacity. It may also be sensible to involve incident control scenarios in the analysis so that insight is gained into the maximal effects to be taken into account. The residual risk, the risk of effects that are too great to allow control, should also have a place in the assessment. 11.2 Scenarios Four general scenarios can be distinguished. 1. Heat effects from fire, 2. Pressure effects from an explosion, 3. pressure and heat effects from a BLEVE, 4. toxic effects from gases or vapours. Several scenarios may naturally affect a business, but in the majority of installations it will be one or at most two scenarios. It may be proposed that in general the scenario of heat effects through fire will put little pressure on the capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident (people will generally go the right way of their own accord), and controllability can also be ensured. The assessment of both aspects can therefore in other words focus on the other three scenarios.

Information requirements Information from a QRA is inadequate to allow a reliable finding on self rescuing capacity and controllability. Also required may be: The affected area, in connection with incident control and casualties (effect distance of 1% fatalities is often insufficient); Number of hospitalised casualties; Delayed fatalities; Delayed injuries. There are various models for the calculation of the number of casualties. This information will also be relatively simple to obtain from the model risk chart. Delayed fatalities and casualties will often involve a qualitative assessment.



Effect distance In accordance with the Decree and Ministerial Order on external safety of installations, the effect distance for the determination of societal risk is the 1% fatality boundary, the distance at which 1% of the population will die. The effect distance in the recommendation on physical safety may extend much further. The alarm boundary value may be adopted. 11.3 Self rescuing capacity Self rescuing capacity is the ability to escape from a threatening danger, without the assistance of the emergency services. This may involve taking refuge, or escape from the threatened area. The capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident must be assessed in the context of the duty of accountability. There is no generic context of assessment for this purpose; location-specific factors have a considerable effect. The self-rescuing capacity of persons in the vicinity of a source of risk is an important pre-condition in preventing major effects from an incident. The degree of success in self rescue depends on two factors: 1. what are the possibilities for self rescuing to prevent casualties, in view of the indicative scenarios? 2. is the area properly equipped to facilitate self rescue? It is therefore not enough merely to investigate whether an area is properly equipped for self rescue. Both the above-mentioned factors must be assessed in order to reach a conclusion as to whether self rescuing capacity has been adequately guaranteed. Division of roles When it comes to the division of roles with regard to the capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident, it is possible that the Decree may set those involved off on the wrong foot. The element "self rescuing capacity" is not included in the list in the Decree showing topics on which the regional fire authorities may issue recommendations. This must be regarded as an omission which will be rectified in the next version of the Decree. The general assumption will be that, in view of the relationship between the self rescuing capacity and incident control aspects, the discipline "physical safety" will make the major contribution to the data on the capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident. 11.3.1 Opportunities for self-rescue on the basis of the indicative scenarios In the context of the duty of accountability it will need to be considered whether, in the event of a disaster, self rescue using alarms, evacuation etc will lead to a reduction in casualties. The effectiveness of the self rescuing capacity depends on two factors in particular: a. urgency; need further measures be considered? b. feasibility; in there sufficient time, equipment etc for effective measures to be taken?

The mean wind speed in the Netherlands is 5 metres per second. A cloud of toxic gas will then be 1500 metres from the location of the incident within 5 minutes The toxicity, the quantity of gas, the concentration and the exposure period determine the distance over which the gas will result in fatalities and casualties. Several minutes will be required even in favourable circumstances for a warning of those in the vicinity by means of sirens. Warnings using local communications will also take some minutes.



With regard to point a. Urgency If the expectation is that a minimum effect threshold may be exceeded, further measures will need to be considered. In the case of releases of toxic substances, that will be for example a minimum concentration. This generally leads to the delineation of the effected area, the area within which self-rescue is a significant parameter for the acceptability of a development. There will be a wish to take the most effective measure if casualties are possible within this area, that is, evacuation. This is only possible if the circumstances allow. With regard to point b. Feasibility This involves an assessment of the scope of the operational action required in the event of an accident. The minimal time required to carry out measures (alarms, evacuation etc) must in principle be less than the available time. The available time depends on: timely detection of a threatened incident: the development of the scenario once an incident has taken place. The time required depends inter alia on: the extent of the area to be evacuated; the mobility of the persons involved. The availability of resources, such as the size of the fire brigade and the audibility of alarm sirens (indoors and outdoors) may play a part in this assessment. The extent of knowledge among those present about the behaviour expected of them in this situation should also be considered as an element of feasibility. A four-way distinction may be made: Good Those making use of the environment can be adequately informed; frequent

evacuation drills; relatively infrequent arrivals of uninformed persons. Targeted The area includes facilities to allow targeted information to be provided. This is

then actually provided. Basic General information is provided with some regularity. None No specific preparations. Both parameters together determine whether a measure can or must be implemented, and if so, what measure is preferred. Six different situations can be identified on the basis of the considerations above, and are set out in the table below. The necessary measures for each scenario are explored in more detail in Table 11.3.1.

feas

ibilit

y

u rg e n c y

im p le m e n t

d o n o tim p le m e n t

feas

ibilit

y

u rg e n c y

1 2

3

4

5

6

Figure 11.3.1a Decision tree, implement measures or not Figure 11.3.1b Distinction between situations



Table 11.3.1 Distinct situations Situation Characterisation Recommended measure Predicted casualties 1 Certain no effect No measure None 2 Certainty of no effect Advise to remain indoors None

or possible irritation or similar.

3 No certainty of no effect Evacuate None sufficient time available for evacuation

4 Time available for Rapid evacuation Possible evacuation short; considerable likelihood of victims if remain indoors

5 Time available for Alarm remain indoors Possible evacuation is short; remaining indoors expected to be sufficient protection

6 Time available too Alarm remain indoors Possible/probable brief for evacuation; no certainty of effect

Generic assessment of self rescuing capacity The situations above reduce the likelihood of good self rescuing capacity. An assessment of the feasibility of self rescue within the area can be made on the basis of the table. Principle: Situations 5 and 6 in particular relate to the building regulations. However, where situation 3 or 4 apply to a specified indicative scenario, the layout of the (public) space is of great importance in promoting self rescue. The following section investigates this further. 11.3.2 Opportunities for optimalisation Apart from the question whether self-rescue is possible in view of the effect scenario, we can also ask whether the physical properties of buildings and the environment will allow the self-rescue to take place optimally. The building regulations include requirements for measures to be taken so that (public) building works can be safely evacuated on a self rescue basis, for example through the provision of at least two exit routes on the site. This requirement applies at all times, regardless of the circumstances.

The building regulations impose concrete obligations with regard to evacuation provisions. The ability to withdraw independently from danger is regarded as a fundamental safety provision These obligations do not apply in the case of the use of public spaces. Evacuation provisions are nevertheless a significant design aspect. Providing evacuation provisions from a disaster area can significantly improve self rescuing capacity. In residential areas it is required that escape is always possible from two sides (must this always also be possible by car?). An area with a single exit and a threat to that exit can no longer be evacuated. A shift in the wind can then be sufficient to subject those present to a toxic hazard.



There are many ways to build self rescuing capacity into a new zoning plan with new spatial planning developments. On balance this may lead to an optimalisation in the situation. Spatial planning can contribute to self rescuing capacity in several ways20: Functional classification; is high-rise building possible, will there be a decline in the numbers of self-rescuers? infrastructure; where evacuation takes place, is the infrastructure suitable? requirements on buildings: air-tight sealing is a possibility Functional classification High or low degree of self rescuing capacity Locations housing persons with a low degree of self rescuing capacity (for example hospitals) should be avoided as far as possible within the effect area for the indicative scenario. Information on this can be obtained simply from the risk map. High and low-rise building High buildings are more difficult to evacuate than low ones. Permitting high-rise building therefore has a negative effect on people's self rescuing capacity. As a general rule it is also the case that, in the context of self rescuing capacity, high-rise building should not be proposed close to the source of risk. Infrastructure Sufficient escape routes There must be sufficient exit routes out of the area A single exit route may be closed off by a toxic cloud, for example. Exit route capacities The exit routes must have sufficient capacity on the one hand to allow evacuation of the entire population from the area (even if the exit route is closed), and also to allow the emergency services to enter the area. Direction of evacuation The orientation of the exit routes must be correct in all possible scenarios. So in the case of a threatened BLEVE the exit route should lead out of the area, via the quickest route. For a toxic cloud scenario however it is important that the exit routes are oriented in the direction of the prevailing wind. Construction The Building Regulations Construction work must meet the requirements of the Building Regulations. Direction of evacuation The direction of evacuation out of the building should be to the greatest extent possible away from the source of risk, as should any assembly points. An exit route must be quickly and easily identifiable. Air tight sealing In the event of a toxic cloud the buildings in the affected area must be capable of airtight sealing. Ventilation openings and systems must be capable of sealing. Alarms To what extent can the preparations for a disaster be scaled up towards the "good" level (see categorisation under §11.3.1)?

20 Requirements by virtue of the Building Regulations are left out of consideration here; It will be assumed that these have been implemented.



11.4 Controllability Controllability must be assessed against two criteria: 1. Can this disaster scenario be controlled? 2. Is the area properly equipped to facilitate control? §11.1 should be taken into account with regard to the indicative scenarios. 11.4.1 Can the disaster scenario be controlled? Control of a disaster may relate to several different levels in the safety process (see figure 11.4.1). Assessment of the possibility of control will therefore also have to take place at different levels.

Source

Exposed environment

Casualties Safeenvironment

control at source

control of effects

dose reduction

casualty reduction reduction in numbersexposed

boundary of the installation

Figure 11.1.1 Treating a disaster as a system The system consists of: A source The place where undesired effects for the environment are created. The exposed environment The place where vulnerable persons and objects are located (the effect

area). Safe environment A location wherein persons are no longer threatened by the incident or its

consequences. People can and must be able to escape or be evacuated to a safe location wherever possible.

Casualties Persons injured as the result of the effects of an incident and requiring medical assistance to reduce or stabilise damage to health. Casualties occur in the exposed environment (casualties may also require assistance within the boundaries of the installation).

The question will need to be posed, whether a particular incident scenario can be controlled, given all the circumstances. There is nothing in the Dutch legislation that indicates what outcome the control must achieve; the duty is more to make certain efforts than to achieve certain results. However there are other assumptions and guidelines, also set out in the legislation, which relate to incident and disaster control21.

21

See appendix §18.3 for the relationship between different plans.



In order to reduce damage to the environment, the number of casualties and the severity of injuries, the incident control organisation may intervene in five different areas during the acute phase: control at source The scale of the source or the probability of the continued

generation of hazardous materials is limited. control of effects The extent (concentration) of the quantity of hazardous

substances dispersed to the environment is limited. dose reduction The dose (combination of concentration and duration of

exposure) is reduced by protective measures (going indoors, shutting doors and windows, stopping ventilation).

reduction in numbers exposed The quantity of (potentially) exposed persons in the threatened environment will be reduced where possible by facilitating evacuation.

reduction of effects on This refers to medical assistance, directed towards the reduction casualties of damage to health. For the place of these within the system, see figure 11.4.1. Dose reduction and reduction in numbers exposed are regarded in this guidance as elements of self rescuing capacity. These are dealt with in §11.3. 11.4.2 The assessment In order to reach a judgement it is necessary to answer the question of which control elements can effectively be carried out. This should be considered in the context of the entire system, for example if control of the source, or of its effects is 100% effective, then reduction in casualty numbers is no longer required. The final assessment depends upon: the extent of the potential incident; the physical possibilities to influence developments; the dynamics of the development of the incident, set against the dynamic of the deployment of the controlling organisation or the incident control equipment (capacity)22. What constitutes effective control will differ from one scenario to another. Table 11.4.2 shows the desired measures and their effectiveness, against the individual system elements. If these measures are not (completely) feasible, then the assessment will be negative. In making the assessment the effectiveness of the measure must be taken into account. This is shown by means of +, +/- or -.++. ++,+ effective +/- possibly effective, depending on the circumstances -, -- probably not effective

22 The required capacity for the emergency services can be calculated using the document Leidraad Operationele Prestaties (Guidance on Operational Performance).



Table 11.4.2Classification of incidents and the significance of immediate control actions on the outcome in terms of casualties. Control at source Control of effects Dose reduction Reduction in

numbers exposed

Reduction in casualty numbers

1 Toxic pool + + + + + (+evaporation

+spread) Less evaporation reduce quantity of

vapour close windows/doors

cordon off treat toxic effects

(process measures) lower concentration move people indoors

evacuate (if sufficient time)

2 Toxic cloud +/- + + + + (+spread) (process measures) reduce quantity

vapour close windows/doors

cordon off treat toxic effects

lower concentration move people indoors

evacuate (if sufficient time)

3 Pool fire + + +/- + +/- management,

extinguishing cooling environment especially within operation

with toxic fumes and no plume: doors/windows closed

with toxic fumes and no plume:cordon off, doors/windows closed; people indoors

casualties mostly restricted to operation

people indoors evacuation (where extended duration)

4 Gas fire + + +/-- +/-- +/- (process measures) cooling environment

particularly within operation; gas fire do not extinguish

no predicted effects off site, fire relatively clean

no predicted effects off site, fire relatively clean

casualties mostly restricted to operation

5 Blast wave

Physical explosion

+/- - +/- +/-- +

(prevention by means of process measures)

no effective control (too rapid)

if rapid: windows, doors open: take refuge

cordon off; evacuate where sufficient warning

physical injuries

BLEVE + +/- + + + cool, if started early no effective control

immediate effect (too rapid)

windows, doors open; take refuge


lung damage, burns, physical injuries

control of secondary fires

Gas cloud explosion

+ +/- + + +

process measures; reduce evaporation (pool); reduce flow (fl. gas); reduce ignition sources

no effective control immediate effect (too rapid); do not extinguish gas fires

windows, doors open; take refuge


lung damage, burns, physical injuries

control of secondary fires

6 Fragmentation +/- +/-- + + + prevent explosion

(firefighting, cooling); hazardous working environment

no effective control immediate effect (too rapid)

take refuge, cordon off evacuate

burns victims, physical injured

control of second.fires 7 Fire in

hazardous materials storage

+ +/-- +/- + +/-

control, extinguish where environment is threatened

possible precip. toxic smoke (not v. effective)

with toxic fumes and no plume: doors/windows closed

with toxic fumes and no plume: doors/windows closed; people indoors

treat toxic effects (less acute effects)

people indoors evacuation (if long duration)



After going through the table above it is known what is to be taken into account when preparing for control activities. It is possible to reach an estimated qualitative general judgement on the degree of controllability for each scenario. The (optimalisation) measures in the following section must tie in with this. 11.4.3 Opportunities for optimalisation The preceding section posed the question to what extent a specified scenario (in its generality) can be controlled. The layout of the area can however affect this control in a positive or negative sense. Where the fire brigade are for example unable to reach the source as the result of shortcomings in the infrastructure in the surrounding area, this will in the end have a negative effect on the physical safety of the whole area. Also significant in spatial planning terms are: accessibility; are the source and the affected area accessible? storage facilities; is there sufficient space around the source and in the affected area for the storage of materials? deployability of resources; is sufficient (firefighting) equipment available? exposed persons; can the emergency services meet the demand? Accessibility Direct accessibility of the source by the fire brigade. There is a standard of 10 minutes for reaching the site of an incident (with deployment within 12 minutes) but naturally it is always the sooner the better. There should be as little as possible or no distance between the storage place and the incident location. The location must be accessible from two sides as a minimum, since one route could be closed by for example a toxic cloud. Good accessibility for the emergency services of the area where persons are exposed to the effects of an incident. The fewest possible speed restrictions on the exit routes. Storage facilities Sufficient storage facilities for the emergency services. This will apply in the first instance close to the source, but it must also be ensured for the surroundings. Deployability of resources Ensure that a high pressure hose can be deployed. Ensure sufficient extinguishers are available. Ensure adequate supply of fire water. The natural occurrence of water in an area is a prerequisite (see also the Guidelines on Fire Water Provision). First aid and stretcher evacuation of casualties is a possibility, in particular from the incident site to a storage location. Reduction in the number of exposed persons Can the pressure on the emergency services be reduced through a different arrangement of buildings and functions? For example, moving from a situation where the demand for assistance cannot be met to one where it can.



PART III: Background This third section of the Guidance looks in greater detail at some of the topics mentioned in parts 1 and 2. This section is intended for readers who need further (background) information after reading the first two sections. In general terms, the sections within part 3 cover four elements: A. A technical discussion of a number of concepts and working methods. Sections 12 to 17 not only look in more depth at the concept of societal risk, but also explore the societal import of the concept. The possibilities of influencing societal risk are investigated, using the safety process as the starting point. An explanation is then provided of the correct action where several sources of risk play a role. It is also indicated how the societal risk is to be corrected where variant residence times are involved, while baseline figures for personal densities are also discussed. B. Implementation of the "Structural Vision" tool. Chapter 18 is entirely devoted to the structural vision as a tool for Local Authorities, allowing them to achieve an integration of external safety and other policy areas by following our three "threads". C. A practical example of the duty of accountability. The practical implications of the duty of accountability are discussed using a case-history involving an LPG station in the vicinity of planned new housing. This section will be supplemented as practical experience with the duty of accountability builds up. D. Definitions, abbreviations and literature. Part 3 concludes with a number of appendices. This section will be supplemented in the course of time.



12 What is societal risk? This section briefly outlines the concept of societal risk and the role played by a variety of factors. Societal risk is a measure representing the probability that an incident with fatal results will occur. The boundaries of a region within which the localised risk is excessive can be clearly depicted by means of risk contours around the source of risk. Such contours cannot be drawn in the case of societal risk, which cannot be represented in spatial terms. This makes societal risk a more difficult concept to grasp. Working with societal risk is also more complicated because the spatial effects of the societal risk often greatly exceed the distances involved in the localised risk contours23. An insight into the workings of societal risk is nevertheless indispensable if the duty of accountability is to be properly discharged.

Societal risk is defined as: The cumulative annual probability that at least 10, 100 or 1000 persons will die as a direct consequence of their presence within the area of influence of an installation, together with an unusual occurrence within the installation involving a hazardous substance. (Article 1 Section 1 of the Decree). This implies that a pair of factors (directly) influencing the level of the societal risk: The annual probability that an accident involving hazardous substances will occur. This variable is in turn dependant upon:

° the nature and quantity of the hazardous substances, ° the processes involving them, ° the manner in which the installation deals with the total safety process from design to commissioning, together with maintenance and inspection.

The number of potential victims in the vicinity of the activities. This depends upon:

° The composition (quantity and distribution) of the population, ° the effects of substances in the event of an accident, ° the capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident, and the measures available to control the consequences24

Taken together these factors therefore produce an annual probability that groups of persons of a particular size will become victims of an accident. Both should therefore be included in the determination of societal risk. A proper inventory of the population (the personal densities) is at least as significant in this as the determination of the probability of an accident.

23 The contours connect locations with the same probability of fatality. 24 Strictly speaking, the capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident is not a parameter in the calculation of societal risk. This factor can however significantly reduce the number of victims.

Example: The limit value (45-110) for localised risk at LPG stations is at 45 or 110 metres, depending on the annual turnover. Residential developments planned within a distance of 150 metres may sometimes give rise to a relevant increase in the societal risk. How is this to be dealt with?



1 10 100 1000

1.0E-10

1.0E-9

1.0E-8

1.0E-7

1.0E-6

1.0E-5

1.0E-4

Orientational valueSocietal risk curve

Risk / year

number of casualties

Figure 12Example of a group risk curve

Societal risk can not be shown by means of contours, but is displayed in a graph. The graph shows the group size of numbers of victims on the x axis against the cumulative probability that a similar group will fall victim to an accident (y axis). An example of a graph of this kind is provided above. The probability that a group will be casualties is represented by the so-called fN curve. The form of this curve provides a representation of the group risk. The societal risk curve as a management tool. As has been explained in this guidance, the assessment of the permissibility of the societal risk curve is not an end in itself, rather the curve should be seen as a management tool aimed at optimal coordination of the entire safety process. Some comparisons can be drawn with the environmental field of noise. In dealing with noise we consider the following in turn: the source, the transmission path, the recipient. A similar tripartite approach can also be discerned in risk policy. the approach to the source of risk (prevention etc), the approach to the transmission area (planning etc), the approach to the recipient (self rescuing capacity etc).



The same principle also applies in risk policy: the source of the risk is to be addressed first. However the major difference in comparison with noise policy is the intensive interaction between the three approaches. An increase in the number of persons in the vicinity of the source of risk may for example completely negate the societal risk reduction effects of measures taken at source. In order to properly discharge the duty of accountability it is therefore important to recognise the influence of the determining factors.

Differences in time-of-day categorisations between noise and external safety: In the case of noise we make use of day, evening and night periods. In the case of external safety we distinguish only the day and night periods. The day period runs from 07.00 to 19.00 hours.



12.1 Effects of various factors Figure 12 shows the societal risk curve. How is this made up? In order to clarify this we will repeat here the definition of the term "societal risk" in the context of installations: The cumulative annual probability that at least 10, 100 or 1000 persons will die as a direct consequence of their presence within the area of influence of an installation, together with an unusual occurrence within the installation involving a hazardous substance. What is involved is therefore the combination of the probability of an unusual occurrence with the probability of a number of persons dying as a consequence of that occurrence. Where the localised risk relates only to the risk from the source, then the personal density in the vicinity of the source of risk will also be considered. A reduction in the risk at source will always lead to a shrinkage in the contour for localised risk. Whether this effect is detectable in the case of societal risk also depends on the personal density in the vicinity of the source of risk. The example below shows in greatly simplified terms how the personal densities are expressed in the societal risk curve. A fictitious situation in the Netherlands is depicted below. The red dot indicates the location of operations with hazardous substances25. The location is in the centre of a medium-sized city. For the purpose of determining societal risk the city is first divided into sections of a specified size, depending on the substance involved. Different numbers of persons are present within these sections.

Section A contains 200 persons, situated close to the source. A risk model is now used to calculate the probability that a group of 2, 5, 10 (etc) persons will be casualties as a consequence of an accident at this location. Section B contains 500 persons. These persons are somewhat further from the source, but still affect the societal risk curve because of the greater number involved. The probability of groups of a specified size will become casualties is also calculated for this section. Section C is relatively distant from the source, but with 750 people is a larger group still, and therefore also affects the curve.

25 For the purposes of the example it is assumed that all the risk is concentrated at the red dot. In reality the situation is far more complicated and the risk arises at several different locations within the installation.



Risk/year (F)

Casualties (n) The model also calculates the additional probability that a group of 100 persons will be casualties due to two sections being located adjacent to one another. The group of 100 casualties may also be made up of persons from several sections. All probabilities calculated for groups are cumulative, making it clear for the whole area what the probability is that a group will become casualties. The entire graph is drawn up using this method. The example shows that apart from the characteristics of the hazardous activity, the population in the area has a very strong influence on the level of societal risk. It is not only the number of persons (the density) that is significant, but also the distribution and location of blocks with respect to one another.

The example shows that as well as the choice of location and the characteristics of businesses working with hazardous substances, the composition of the environment is at the least a major influence on the level of societal risk. It is not only the number of persons per hectare in the area, but also their location with respect to the source, and to one another. This means that the same number of persons at the same distance can have very different effects on the societal risk curve if they are arranged differently with respect to one another. This is clarified by means of an example below26.

In the left hand figure both residential areas are equidistant from the installation. The distance between both residential areas is relatively large however. In the right hand figure both residential areas are equidistant from the installation. However they lie adjacent to one another.

26 The example involves several subtle points; Societal risk is a technical issue where a number of factors play their part in a quite idiosyncratic way.

Collaboration between the Local Authority environmental and spatial planning departments is essential in order to correctly determine the scale of the societal risk. How is this to be dealt with?



The eventual environmental consequences of a disaster depend on many factors, such as wind direction, the substances released (toxic or flammable gas) etc. In the right hand example there may be casualties in both residential areas, increasing the potential group size. This shifts the societal risk curve to the right, since larger groups may become casualties of an accident. 12.2 Setting standards for societal risk The Decree consciously opts against the setting of a boundary value. This approach matches the developments in policy on the handling of societal risk in recent decades27. The Decree does provide an orientational value: see figure 12.228. The orientational value provides a calibration point in a system which seeks to identify socially acceptable limits.

Area beloworientation value

Area aboveorientation value

1 10 100 1,000 10,000

1.0E-03

1.0E-08

1.0E-07

1.0E-06

1.0E-05

1.0E-04

1.0E-09

1.0E-10

Orientational value for transport riskOrientation value risk for installations

risk/year (F)

number of victims

Figure 12.2 Position of orientational value The objectives of the system are: to promote the search for safer sources of risk; to have a regulatory effect on the concentration of populations in the vicinity of sources of risk; to provide indicators for societal disruption, numbers of casualties or the societal costs caused by a disaster; to provide indicators as to the capacity of the emergency services etc; to allow the comparison of alternatives.

27 No orientational value for societal risk was yet included in the 1989 report "Dealing with Risk". A Maximum Permissible Risk (MPR) and a Negligible Level of Risk (NR) were however defined. The MPR was identical to the present orientational value for installations. The NR was a factor of 100 lower than the MPR. The area between the former NR and the MPR left room for policy considerations. The NR and MPR system was later abandoned. In 1993 the Minister for Public Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment defined an orientational value and gave the competent authorities discretionary powers to depart from this orientational value where justified (proceedings of the Second Chamber 1993-1994, 22.666, no 3) 28 Graph 12.2 includes two orientational values. The value for installations and the value for transport risks. Apparently the orientational value for transport installations is less stringent. The distinction arises from the fact that the transport risk is defined in terms of linear kilometres.



The system and the principle of the duty of accountability is also regarded as a valuable contributor to further policy developments with respect to the handling of societal risk.

12.3 The non-normative approach to societal risk The inclusion in the Decree of a duty of accountability for societal risk means that a non-normative approach has been adopted to dealing with societal risk.

This approach does appear to create certain conflicts in practice. The orientational value is often seen as a standard that has to be exactly met. Any transgression of the orientational value is ruled out in advance, without considering the possibilities. There is a fear that any transgression at all will be "dealt with". Against this, a steep rise in societal risk to just below the orientational value is sometimes seen as acceptable without further ado. Fixation on the orientational value sometimes seems more important than a discussion about the safety of the source, interactions with the environment and the capacities of the emergency services or the capability of those involved to avoid the consequences of an incident. These are precisely the factors dealt with by the duty of accountability. The idea that societal risk is not susceptible to a normative approach, and even more so the condition that every increase in societal risk (above or below the orientational value) must be justified, flows inter alia from the role of the actors tasked with physical safety. The concept of societal risk is based upon risk policy; the concept indicates what level of risk(probability times effect) is deemed acceptable and unacceptable in the Netherlands. This is a logical train of thought in a society where risk is regarded as part of life. The attention of the OFV is less on the degree of risk however, and more on the possible effects of certain events and the possibilities of controlling and managing them. The foregoing is clarified in figure 12.3. Figure 12.3 shows two (greatly simplified) societal risk curves.

Curve 1

The inclusion of a duty of accountability in the decision means that more than just the breach of the orientational value needs to be justified. Any relevant growth of the fN-curve (even below the orientational value) and also the entire safety situation must be considered in the decision-making process, including guarantees for the future.



Curve 1 shows a situation where only a limited number of casualties can occur, but the probability of this is very high. In other words, only a limited number of persons are present in the area of an installation where there is considerable activity involving large quantities of hazardous substances (high risk). Curve 2 Curve 2 by contrast shows a situation where the maximal Number of victims is large, but the probability is small. This situation where the quantity and nature of substances and operations with them are limited, but many persons are present in the area. In the example above, the orientational value is exceeded by curve 1 and not by curve 2. Nevertheless there will be far more need for proper attention to the possibilities for self rescue and the emergency services in situation 2 than in situation 1. In any event, both situations (and all other conceivable situations) demand different approaches. This principle is emphasised through the absence of the number of potential casualties in societal risk curves, a more significant factor for the management of physical safety than the potential fatalities. A societal risk curve provides only a restricted insight into the possible effects of a disaster or major accident. Societal risk, as was said earlier, provides a reasonably adequate picture of the possibilities of controlling the risk to the greatest extent possible by proactive measures. The foregoing does however indicate that, despite the level of the societal risk, the question must always be posed whether physical safety is sufficiently guaranteed, even (or precisely!) when the societal risk curve does not exceed the orientational value. In order to answer this question some insight will be required into the effects and effect distances of substances used in an installation.



13 Accidents and consequences Whatever measures are taken to prevent an unusual occurrence with hazardous substances, there will always be a chance that such an incident will occur and will have undesirable consequences. When is this acceptable, and what are the consequences? In this chapter we investigate the various factors with a role to play in analyses and assessments of unusual occurrences with hazardous substances. 13.1 Societal risk is a measure of societal disruption

Societal risk is defined as the annual probability that groups (larger numbers) of persons will die as a consequence of an unusual occurrence involving hazardous substances (the concept of societal risk is further discussed in Chapter 12). The definition of localised risk also relates to the probability of death. However it refers to a single person in a specified place or at a specified distance from the activity. Societal risk is a way of providing additional information on the possible extent of an undesired occurrence. Societal risk is also seen as a significant indicator for the societal disruption created as a consequence of an unusual occurrence involving hazardous substances. For the assessment of the acceptability of societal risk, the full range of possible societal disruption must be considered.

Articles 12 and 13 of the Decree on External safety of installations states that the competent authority must justify any decision on the acceptability of societal risk. It must be indicated what level societal risk is acceptable and under what conditions.

Suppose: That a calculation of societal risk indicates a high probability of a large number of fatalities. This will then also generally mean: _a large number of casualties (including "delayed" casualties); _major material damage in the event of an explosion; _disruption of traffic infrastructure; _loss of employment positions; _possible loss of agricultural crops as the result of deposition of toxic substances; _major calls on aftercare. Societal risk provides an indication of the probability and scale of the consequences.



13.2 Distinction between risk and effect The terms risk and effect are both adopted in this Guidance. There is an important distinction between these concepts. Effect Effect or effects are the consequences which might follow an accident with hazardous substances. For hazardous substances handled within an installation, distances can be established within which the effects of an incident would manifest themselves; this is known as the effect distance29 Depending on the substances used an effect distance may in extreme situations extend to several kilometres. This effect-based approach is relevant for the emergency services and in combating the effects of an incident. The effect-based approach looks "only" at the consequences, and less at the probability that the effect will be realised. Risk In spatial planning and in the case of assessments of applications for environmental licences it is not so much the effect distances as the risk that is seen as relevant30. Risk is the probability that an effect will occur. Standards in the Decree are based upon risk. 13.2.1 Interplay of effect and risk Risk distances take up appreciably less space than effect distances. This brings about the interplay between the desire to prevent (fatal and injured) casualties and the desire for a multi-functional living environment. The duty of accountability aims to promote local management of this interplay. The decision to adopt the concept risk as the primary pillar in external safety policy does not mean that the effect-based approach should be jettisoned. The emergency services must always be prepared for major effects, and must have the opportunity to effectively control the effect, no matter how low the probability of such an effect may be. Exclusive adoption of the risk-based approach, for example through poorly thought out spatial planning, may make this difficult or even impossible. In order to bridge between these different approaches the policy on societal risk as expressed in the duty of accountability also includes a duty to make adequate preparations for the possible effects of a serious incident. In short the policy on societal risk combines the risk and effect-based approaches. 13.2.2 Casualties and fatalities Where the number of possible fatalities is used as an important gauge of seriousness in the standardisation of risk, in the case of physical safety the attention paid to possible injuries is greater than that devoted to possible fatalities. The Decree sets out by ministerial ruling the area of influence within which the societal risk analysis must be carried out. The starting point is the 1% lethality limit. Control actions in the context of physical safety aim to protect and assist casualties.

29

The Decree on the external safety of installations refers to areas of influence. An area of influence is bounded by the 1% lethality boundary (the distance within which 1% of the persons exposed in the area will die), unless otherwise specified in an order implementing the Decree. For definitions of "intervention values" please refer to the definitions section in Appendix 1. 30

An assessment based on effect distances is however required in the case of storage of fireworks.



This aims to prevent exacerbation of injuries. The relevant effect distances are sometimes (and particularly in the case of toxic loadings) appreciably greater than the distances in the case of the 1% lethality boundary. This interplay between the distances to be observed needs to be resolved in any decision in the context of the duty of accountability31. The nature of the models used to deal with casualties is the same as that for the approach to fatalities. The same models may often be used.

In judging acceptability it is important to assess the possibilities for control of disasters and serious incidents (including preparation for this control). It is also important to assess the likelihood that persons within the area of influence will be able to bring themselves to a place of safety in the event of a disaster or major accident. In order to get a handle on the discharge of the duty of accountability in the case of societal risk it is necessary to gain an understanding of the various factors that come together to ensure safety.

Pro-active Prevention Preparation Repression

Risk levelacceptable togovernment

Danger

Dem

and

for

emer

genc

y

aid

Safety Management Decision Model

Figure 13.2 Safety Management Decision Model

31

The sticking point here may be that information on "injury effect distances" and "vulnerability models for casualties" as well as details on level of occupation in the area within the effect distances for casualties may be absent from risk analyses produced following consideration solely of an estimate of fatalities.

Note A broad vision are essential if policy on risk and physical safety policy are to be integrated in the duty of accountability for societal risk. Why: The ultimate objective of incident control is the effective protection of human (and animal) life, and the prevention of damage in the event of an incident. There is no legislation to indicate the outcome to be achieved by this control. The duty is more to make certain efforts than to achieve certain results. There are several other assumptions and guidelines with regard to incident and disaster control, some set out in legislation. None of this sets out when control capabilities are "sufficient" in the cases under consideration. This means that a decision on accountability cannot be based on fixed standards, but must instead rest on a responsible integration of various factors that come together to offer effective



The duty of accountability involves a demonstration that all alternative approaches to ensuring safety have been adequately investigated and utilised. This should be looked at both in terms of individual professional disciplines and overall. The question that will continually emerge is what level of danger is acceptable.

Disturbance/incident 13.3 Model for description of accidents The so-called bow-tie fault and event tree model is used to describe the various responsibilities of government in the case of accidents32This bow-tie model didn't just appear from nowhere. There is often a relationship between phenomena occurring some time before the incident, and the incident itself. A variety of processes play themselves out following an incident, and together these determine the ultimate seriousness of the accident. The incident forms as it were a node between the causes and effects. The cause - incident (or disturbance) - effect chain can be depicted by means of the bow-tie fault and event tree (figure 13.3a).

Cause/incident

Figure 13.3a The bow-tie fault and event tree The incident takes central place in the model. This may be a disturbance, a hazardous situation and/or an unsafe environment - in any event, a situation that should be avoided. The causes of the incident, which separately or together can lead to the development of an incident, are shown on the left hand side. To the right are the effects of the incident (casualties and damage) including the sequelae or consequent accidents. There are various points both on the cause side and the effect side where interventions can be made to influence the development of the incident (prevention, control, protection on the basis of self rescuing capacity and via the emergency services). The categorisation as prevention/control/ self rescuing capacity and emergency services is rough, but is useable in: identification of processes; implementation of practical measures (controllability, self rescuing capacity); the allocation of tasks, authorisations and responsibilities; communications.

32The origins of this model are to be found in the chemical process industry; It has come to fruition inter alia in the AVRIM system used by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and the labour Inspectorate, and the MAVIT system adopted by the Ministries of Transport and Inland Waterways and Home Affairs.

The Decision Model is used to determine if a given hazardous activity is acceptable to the administration, given the safety measures in place. However, the first question is always, "is the hazardous activity necessary"? Only when this is answered do the effects of safety measures come into consideration.



13.3.1 The bow-tie fault and event tree model as a context for assessment The bow-tie fault and event tree may also be used as an aid in assessing the acceptability of a risk situation. What is significant there is that the various decision criteria are strongly locally determined, and that there is therefore no generally applicable quality level. The duty of accountability for societal risk implies a minimalisation of danger through optimalisation of the measures taken. If the conclusion is "there is a still an unusual level of residual danger" then the administration are faced with the following choice: accept(and explain decision to the population, including societal interests) or; reject proposing measures for the long and short term (and explain decision to the population, including societal interests).

P re v e n t/m a n a g e in c id e n t

P re v e n t s itu a t io n

P ro te c t

M a n a g e / lim itc o n s e q u e n c e s

R e s u lt o f e v a lu a tio n :s c e n a r io s , e f fe c ts ,

c o n s e q u e n c e sin d ic a t io n o f p ro b a b ilitys c e n a r io , m a n a g e m e n t,

c o n s e q u e n c e s )

A c c e p ta b le

N O

Y E S

P ro -a c t ive :

P re v e n t io n :

S e lf re s c u in g c a p a c ity :

A c t io n :

Figure 13.3.1 Risk situation assessment plan, in accordance with bow-tie fault and event tree model



13.4 Opportunities to intervene in the safety process The bow-tie fault and event tree model is used in particular to schematise the factors playing a role in physical safety. More factors than physical safety alone need to be considered in the context of the duty of accountability. Integration of the elements in Table 13.4 will allow broader application of the model. The summary in Table 13.4 is not exhaustive. The last element in Table 13.4 relates to "aftercare". This element is not included in the bow-tie fault and event tree. Where an accident regrettably does occur, aftercare calls for major societal efforts. Table 13.4Examples of opportunities to intervene in the safety process Pro-active: Prevention Preparation Repression from the perspective of self rescuing capacity: Prevention: Preparation Repression from the perspective of self rescuing capacity: Aftercare

Spatial planning (area plans, plans for special uses) can lead to a reduction in risk by for example: maintaining a policy of limiting permissions for hazardous installations and (restricted) vulnerable objects creation of safety distances (zoning) investigating the consequences of new situations in advance Environmental licences can be used to test in advance whether an operation is acceptable (in a particular environment).

Traffic management can make provision for evacuation and proper access for the emergency services. Routing of hazardous substances can achieve improvements in safety over large areas.

Working through businesses' safety and environmental management systems: the prevention of accidents, the control of accidents through careful (safe) design of installations, safety management and enforcement. The setting of requirements in the environmental licence and the enforcement of these licences, such that hazardous situations are avoided as far as possible.

The assessment of building permits for preventative measures.

Once an incident has occurred or the hazardous substance is in the environment, the consequences must be controlled.

The rapidest possible protection of population groups and neighbouring businesses against exposure, on the basis of (promoted) self rescuing capacity through e.g.: information on installations; information on the alarm procedure; information on actions to be taken; establish alarm procedure (role of Local Authority, role of company).

Acting repressively with a view to: control of the source (role of the Local Authority, role of the company/Fire Brigades Act Article 13); control of the effects (role of the Local Authority, role of the company/Fire Brigades Act Article 13); reduction of doses to those exposed (safer environment: taking refuge, closing windows and doors); reduce numbers exposed (evacuation), reduce casualties (assistance from medical agencies)

Once an incident has occurred, aftercare is necessary on the part of many societal agencies. Both material and immaterial factors as well as evaluation and rectification are necessary. Tasks are not allocated to any specific government agency in this table. This is because most of the elements call for an integrated approach.

Once an incident has occurred, aftercare is necessary on the part of many societal agencies. Both material and immaterial factors as well as evaluation and rectification are necessary. Tasks are not allocated to any specific government agency in this table. This is because most of the elements call for an integrated approach.



13.5 Acceptable danger A model for Safety Management is provided in Figure 13.2. This model also sketches out the safety dilemma. Optimal safety can be achieved by taking (a range of ) measures. The level of protection defined in the "Management Plan" However a residual chance of an accident or disaster whose scale is unmanageable will always remain, no matter how small the probability may be. This is the "societally (or administratively) acceptable risk" Chapters 6 and 8 of this Guidance discuss the legal criteria and provide a context for assessment.



14 Cumulation of multiple sources of risk 14.1 Concepts: cumulation and domino effects There are many situations where areas lie within the range of effects from several hazardous activities. Consider for example the effect of a railway emplacement and the rail, chemical industry and other transport routes passing through it. When considering the risk from a number of sources it is important to distinguish between cumulative and domino effects. We refer to domino effects for example if an explosion within one premises causes an explosion in another business33The possibility of domino effects is an argument that may be taken into account in considering the duty of accountability. We refer to cumulative effects for example if persons are located within the area of influence of several hazardous, whereby the probability of them becoming casualties is greater than in the case of a single activity. The policy on handling cumulative effects in the case of external safety is in development. It has been established that cumulation must play a part in the discharge of the duty of accountability. It is important that the method of dealing with cumulative effects is set out clearly in the explanatory section of the zoning plan34. 14.2 Establishing cumulative effects Cumulative effects come into play when a (limited) vulnerable object is situated within the area of influence of two or more sources of risk. Localised risk Article 14 of the Decree provides the opportunity to make the cumulative risk from hazardous enterprises testable, by establishing a cumulative risk contour around the industrial site where the hazardous enterprises are or will be located. The cumulative localised risk can be standardised in this way. This possibility was only introduced in the late drafts of the Decree and experience in this area is still very limited. Societal risk Where the societal risk of several businesses is assessed jointly, a conclusion may be reached on the cumulative effects35. In this case it should be borne in mind that: the number of possible accident scenarios will increase; the distances for exposed personal densities may differ from those found through individual assessment. A new fN-curve will therefore be generated. The method used to assess this curve is a matter to be justified by the local government agencies. Both for localised risk and societal risk the cumulation calculation often over-represents the effect of the dominant source(s) and partly camouflages sources with a relatively minor contribution. The tendency for this camouflaging to lead to omission of measures must be guarded against. This is very relevant where the "camouflaged" businesses may give rise to a domino effect.

33 For a more detailed consideration of the assessment of domino effects please refer to "Domino Effect Tools" (Instrument Domino Effecten) of April 2003 published by VROM, RIVM and AVIV. 34 For example to prevent a localised risk contour, which has been tested "individually" being suddenly tested cumulatively. This may result in the allocated safety space suddenly becoming too limited. 35 A clear decision is necessary here on how to deal with the personnel from the various businesses on the industrial estate which is to be handled "cumulatively".



Cumulative risk from static installations and transport systems A mathematical cumulation of static installations and transport of hazardous substances is not possible. This is partly due to the definition of the standards. The societal risk is defined in terms of individual installations, while the transport risk is per transport system kilometre. An assessment using the orientational value shows that this is a factor of 10 higher for transport. 14.3 Approach to cumulation The involvement of cumulation means that additional emphasis has to be placed on the duty of accountability. Both positive and negative factors need to be considered. For example: the selection of a location for vulnerable objects within the area of influence of several businesses means that these objects are exposed to additional risk, which increases the difficulty of the search for maximum safety; the location of several hazardous enterprises in one another's immediate vicinity will lead to less use of "risk space"36. This allows risk-free areas to be preserved; where there is a risk of domino effects with several sources of risk then the available capacity of the emergency services must be assessed against this; where several sources of risk are located in the same vicinity the safety provisions in the area will be achieved relatively cheaply. Splitting of sites Where elements of an operation are independent, larger businesses are sometimes divided into several smaller units. Assessment of the risks presented by these units separately often provides a smaller risk contour and a smaller contribution to societal risk. A strictly normative approach to this situation may lead to the conclusion that "environmental space" has been freed up beyond the boundaries of a site with such a collection of operations. However, any such conclusion would be due exclusively to the legal/mathematical approach taken, and not to any factual reduction in the risk. It is therefore recommended that the former risk situation should continue to be assumed in the case of this type of site. This prevents the later merger of businesses creating a shortage of environmental space.

36 The total area affected by restrictions based on risky activities is smaller in the case of a cluster of businesses than when they are spread out.



15 Residence time correction 15.1 Personal residence times and societal risk Persons who spend half their time in a risky area have half the probability of becoming the casualty of a permanently present risk. It is important to include this matter of timing in societal risk calculations, in order to prevent possible overestimates. Risk calculations are based on the annual probability of an undesired occurrence. If a group of persons is not present within the effect distance for the full year, the calculation may be corrected accordingly. This correction can be carried out in several different ways. Each method has certain (significant) limitations however, and it is important that these are recognised before the outcome of a societal risk calculation is interpreted. 15.2 Categorical and non-categorical premises The Decree specifies that no calculation of risk needs to be carried out for certain common and relatively straightforward risky operations. That is to say: In the case of localised risk, the distances in the table in the Implementation Order must be adopted. The results of a risk calculation based on the specific situation have no legal validity. In the case of societal risk, the tables may be used to determine whether the number of persons in the area of influence combined with the level of risk from the source exceeds the orientational value In the context of the duty of accountability it is permissible to specify the societal risk situation by means of calculations. In the case of "non-categorical" businesses a calculation of the localised risk and societal risk must always be carried out. The residence time correction is applied to the various calculations as follows: Chapter 17 provides the following information for each type of categorical business: The radius of the area of influence within which persons who may be present according to the zoning plan must be counted. The number of persons per hectare by which the orientational value for societal risk is exceeded. Table 15.137 also includes the residence time correction for persons in the area of influence. Example: 1. In the case of LPG stations the radius of the area of influence is set at 150 metres (Appendix2, Table 1 of the Implementation Order). This means that the area of influence is 7.07 ha (formula: 3.14 x radius2). 2. The second step is to determine the turnover for the station. For the purposes of this example it is assumed that this turnover is less than 1000 m3/year, and that this is set out in the environmental licence (see also appendix 1, Table 1 and footnote in the Implementation Order). 3. The position of the 10-5 and 10-6 contours must subsequently be determined, and whether (restricted) vulnerable locations are located between these contours. It is assumed for the purposes of this example that this is not the case. This means that the area of

37 the table is based on the Royal Institute for Public Health and the Environment's report 620100001/2003.



the area of influence must be reduced by the area within the 10-6 contour. Or 7.07 ha min (3.14*452) = 6.43 hectares. 4. It follows from the element "societal risk, personal density per hectare" in Table 1 of the Implementation Order that the personal density here may amount to 13 persons per hectare if the orientational value is not to be exceeded. This therefore equates to 6.4 * 13 = 83 persons. 5. The residence time correction is applied. Since it is assumed in this example that the personal density in the area of influence is uniform, the correction from the residence period table may be applied. For residential areas the factor is 1.1. This means that the orientational value is exceeded if more than 1.1 * 83, that is 91 persons are present in the area. As described elsewhere in the Guidance, the orientational value is a calibration value for use in assessing permissibility, and is emphatically not to be seen as a standard.

15.3 Application of residence time correction in a societal risk calculation Table 15.3 Correction factors Residence time table: Correction factors for the calculation of societal risk in cases where that

risk is caused by an installation as specified in Article 4, section 5a to 5d of the Decree

Object Correction Factors Residential 1.1 Educational establishments 2.5 Healthcare premises 1.3 Nurseries, kindergartens 1.9 Prisons 1.3 Offices, businesses and installations, no residential use 2.2 Sports and recreational facilities 2.2 Stadia 1.4 Marinas and pleasure craft moorings 4.2 Allotment gardens 2.9 Camp sites 2.4 Day time recreational areas 6.1 Shops 1.5 Hotels, restaurants, cafes 1.4 Car parks 1.0 Stations 1.2 Churches 6.5 Theatres, cinemas, conference centres, community centres 1.6 Crematoria and mortuaries 2.4 Fire stations 2.0 Objects of high infrastructural value -

The correction tables have been drawn up on the assumption that there is a uniform personal density within the area of influence. That therefore assumes exclusively residential properties with a uniform density or exclusively offices with a uniform density, and not a combination of densities, or a mixture of residential property and offices or residential property and installations. In view of the possible area of the effect region this kind of combination will frequently arise in practice. Only a specific calculation can offer clarity on the actual extent of the societal risk. This matter is a relevant consideration in discharging the duty of accountability.



Example: Immediately adjacent to a hazardous installation or a railway line carrying hazardous substances is a football stadium. The stadium has a capacity of 50,000. If this capacity is taken into account in the risk calculations, with no correction for the time during which these persons are present, then the stadium will determine the eventual result of the societal risk calculation. After all, there is a very large number of people in a small area, close to a source of risk. What is the best way to correct the calculation? Determine the day and night periods during which the stadium is occupied. Calculate the occupation level over the year on this basis: x% per annum during the day, and x% per annum during the night. Apply the correction to the probability of failure of the source of risk. The calculation is as follows: Calculate the contribution to the societal risk of the environment during the day, during the time when the stadium is not in use. Calculate the contribution to the societal risk of the environment during the night, during the time when the stadium is not in use. Calculate the contribution to the societal risk of the total area (environment +stadium) during the time when the stadium is in use. Calculate the contribution to the societal risk of the total area (environment +stadium) at night, during the time when the stadium is in use. Accumulate these figures to provide a 24 hour value. The tables in the Implementation Order are unsuitable for this purpose as they assume a uniform personal density. This is not likely in an area of influence extending over many hectares. The only correct correction method would use a time correction on the probability of failure, rather than a correction based on the number of persons present.



16 Baseline figures for personal densities

The determination of the number of persons using each planning location for each purpose is carried out using planning baseline figures or other methods. These personal densities are subsequently represented graphically using a grid projected on a map of the vicinity of the source of risk. The following baseline figures from the Purple Book (CPR 18) are often adopted: Level of occupation: residential 2.4 persons per house. Office locations The assumption is 30m2 built area. per employee. For use with the grid this would be rounded off, for example to 20 persons per section per storey. Company premises The area occupied per employee is strongly dependent on the type of business. A mean 100m2floor area per employee may be used. For the translation to the grid this is rounded off to 6 persons per section per storey. Retail locations 30 m2 floor area per employee, rounded off to 20 persons per section per storey for use in the grid. Educational establishments 10% is added to the number of students in a secondary or tertiary educational establishment to represent the number of employees (teachers and others). Churches As the result of the very occasional nature of the occupation of these buildings, they are mostly not included in the inventory. Mosques/Salvation Army premises/hostels Highly dependent on location. Day and night situation The presence of persons depends upon the period examined, in part because people may leave the area to go to school or to work. A distinction is therefore made between the day and night situation for risk calculations. The following assumptions are adopted: Houses A 70% level of daytime occupation is assumed for the presence of persons in houses. During the night it is assumed that 100% of the population are present in the houses. Office locations In the case of office locations and industrial sites the assumption is 100% presence during the day and no presence during the night. If shift work is carried out then an occupation level of 20% is assumed for the night period. Educational establishments In the case of educational establishments the assumption is for 100% occupation during the day and 0% at night.



17 Personal densities in categorical premises In the case of categorical installations the societal risk does not need to be calculated using a QRA(although it may be) and the use of tables showing the population densities per hectare within the area of influence of the categorical installation in question. In order to determine the extent of the societal risk it is necessary to gain some understanding of the maximal permissible personal densities. The tables in this chapter state the density of persons per hectare which would just comply with the orientational value. These densities must be taken into account in justifying societal risk (Articles 12 and 13 of the Decree). The densities are determined for the area of influence of the installation in question. The size of the area of influence is dependant on the nature of the source of risk. In determining whether the orientational value is complied with around a categorical installation, correction factors must be applied as the result of residence times of persons within vulnerable and restricted vulnerable objects (see section 15.3 of this guidance). Those vulnerable and restricted vulnerable objects which, at the time of the calculation of or investigation into the societal risk, may be constructed or installed in the area by virtue of the existing zoning plan, must also be included in the calculation of societal risk and the determination of the personal densities per hectare in the area between the 10-5 and the 10-6 contour for localised risk, alongside those vulnerable and restricted vulnerable objects which are already in place. This chapter contains the following tables: Table 1: LPG filling stations with a turnover of less than 1500 m3 of LPG per annum. Tables 2a to 2c: Installations where hazardous substances, hazardous waste or pesticides in packaging are stored (CPR 15 installations) (see Article 4, Section 5b of the Decree) Table 3: Cooling and freezing installations using ammonia with a capacity of less than10,000 kg ammonia. <<< THE DISTANCES HAVE NOT YET BEEN INCLUDED IN THE TABLES. THEY WILL BE INCLUDED WHEN FINALISED>>> 17.1 LPG filling stations Densities of persons per hectare between the contours PR=10-5 and PR=10-6 and the boundary of the area of influence.

distance [m] number of persons per ha

Table 17.1 Installation type

to 10-5 to 10-6 to boundary of area of influence

from 10-5 to boundary of area of influence

from 10-6 to boundary of area of influence1

LPG filling station with turnover less than 500m3/year

13 8


9 13


9 13

1The densities included in this table are based upon the supposition that the zone between the 10-

5 and 10-6 risk contour is not built over. Where that is the case, the densities stated in the preceding column (from 10-5 to the boundary of the area of influence) apply.



17.2 Installations storing packaged hazardous substances, hazardous waste or pesticides (CPR 15 installations) Storage capacity up to 300m2

Personal densities per hectare from the contours PPR=10-5 and PR=10-6 to the boundary of the area of influence, in cases where the risk originates in an installation with a storage capacity of 300m2, depending on the level of protection applied Table 17.2a System1 distance [m] number of persons per hectare to

10-5 to 10-6

to boundary of area of influence

from 10-5 to boundary area of influence


Protection level 1 automatic sprinkler installation automatic deluge installation automatic gas blanket installation hi-ex installation inside air

societal risk is irrelevant

hi-ex installation with smoke hatches

300 300

local fire brigade; dry system company fire brigade cat. 1 or 2; dry system company fire brigade cat. 1 or 2; manually operated deluge

societal risk is irrelevant

company fire brigade cat. 1;local extinguishers

110 300

Protection level 2 company fire brigade cat. 1 or 2 or national fire service deployable < 6 min.

110 300

Company fire brigade or national fire service deployable <15 min.

75 300

Protection level 3 Preventative measures in accordance with CPR 15-2 or 15-3

145 275

1For pesticide storage with a storage capacity over 10 tonnes, only those firefighting systems specified under level of protection 1 are suitable. 2The densities included in this table are based upon the supposition that the zone between the 10-5 and 10-6 risk contour is not built over. Where that is the case, the densities stated in the preceding column (from 10-5 to the boundary of the area of influence) apply.



Storage capacity up to 600m2

Personal densities per hectare from the contours PPR=10-5 and PR=10-6 to the boundary of the area of influence, in cases where the risk originates in an installation with a storage capacity of 600m2, depending on the level of protection applied. Table 17.2b System1

distance [m] number of persons per hectare

to 10-5

to 10-6




Protection level 1 automatic sprinkler installation

300 300

automatic deluge installation

300 300

automatic gas blanket installation

300** 300**

hi-ex installation inside air

300 300


300 300

local fire brigade; dry system

300* 300*

company fire brigade cat. 1 or 2; dry system

300 300

company fire brigade cat. 1 or 2; manually operated deluge

300 300


110 300

Protection level 2

company fire brigade cat. 1 or 2 or national fire service deployable < 6 min.

110 300


75 300


110 230

1 For pesticide storage with a storage capacity over 10 tonnes, only those firefighting systems specified under level of protection 1 are suitable. 2This distance is calculated on the basis of the spread of fire. *The specified firefighting system is suitable for a storage location with an area for storage of at most 500m2

** An automatic gas blanket system is suitable for a storage location with an area for storage of at most 600m2



page 77 of 95 Advies- en Ingenieursbureau Oranjewoud B.V. Storage capacity up to 2500m2

Personal densities per hectare from the contours PPR=10-5 and PR=10-6 to the boundary of the area of influence, in cases where the risk originates in an installation with a storage capacity of 2500m2, depending on the level of protection applied. Table 17.2c System1

distance [m] number of persons per hectare

to 10-5

to 10-6




Protection level 1 automatic sprinkler installation

300 300

automatic deluge installation

300 300

automatic gas blanket installation

n/a** n/a**

hi-ex installation inside air

300 300


300 300

local fire brigade; dry system

n/a* n/a*

company fire brigade cat. 1 or 2; dry system

300 300

company fire brigade cat. 1 or 2; manually operated deluge

300 300


110** 300**

Protection level 2

company fire brigade cat. 1 or 2 or national fire service deployable < 6 min.

35** 70**


35** 70**


70 95

1For pesticide storage with a storage capacity over 10 tonnes, only those firefighting systems specified under level of protection 1 are suitable. 2This distance is calculated on the basis of the spread of fire. *The specified firefighting system is suitable for a storage location with an area for storage of at most 500m2

** The specified firefighting system is suitable for a storage location with an area for storage of at most 1500m2

*** An automatic gas blanket system is suitable for a storage location with an area for storage of at most 600m2



17.3 Cooling and freezing installations using ammonia Densities of persons per hectare between the contours PR=10-5 and PR=10-6 and the boundary of the area of influence. Table 17.3 Table in preparation Refrigeration installation with ammonia *) Assessing societal risk**)

Installation type

Quantity ammonia

Protection level +)

Effect distance societal risk

Maximal population density in numbers of persons per ha

1 n/a n/a 2 n/a n/a

400 to 1500 kg 3 n/a n/a

1 n/a n/a 2 n/a n/a

1500 to 4000 kg 3 n/a n/a

1 n/a n/a 2 n/a n/a

4000 to 7000 kg 3 n/a n/a

1 n/a n/a 2 n/a n/a

Ammonia temperature temperature lower than - 25 ‘C "Deep freeze installation" or similar 7000 to

10,000 kg 3 310m 210

1 n/a n/a 2 n/a n/a

400 to 1500 kg 3 n/a n/a

1 n/a n/a 2 n/a n/a

1500 to 4000 kg 3 n/a n/a

1 n/a n/a 2 n/a n/a

4000 to 7000 kg 3 260 m 180 (160)

1 n/a n/a 2 200 m 260

Ammonia temperature temperature lower than 10 ‘C "Freezer installation" or comparable

7000 to 10,000 kg 3 300 m 85 (70)

1 n/a n/a 2 n/a n/a

400 to 1500 kg 3 n/a n/a

1 n/a n/a 2 n/a n/a

1500 to 4000 kg 3 n/a n/a

1 n/a n/a 2 n/a n/a

4000 to 7000 kg 3 360 m 180 (160)

1 n/a n/a 2 200 m 120

Ammonia temperature temperature lower than 10 ‘C "Freezer installation" or comparable

7000 to 10,000 kg 3 400 m 85 (70)

*) N.B. This Table is suitable only for installations which meet the requirements of CPR 13, which contain no more than 10,000 kg of ammonia, and which have no external ammonia lines with a pump flow higher than 2.0 kg per sec. **) population density applies from the 10-6 distance, figures in brackets apply from the installation



+) Levels of protection: 1 Installation entirely indoors; 2 Liquid lines outside; 3 Liquid vessel and lines outside; MR = machine room; EL = evaporator line outdoors: distances apply only where the pump flow is no greater than 2 kg/sec. Above that a risk analysis will be required.



18 A structural vision of external safety 18.1 Thread 1: Preventing a fragmented approach Many activities have been undertaken to map out sources of risk following the Enschede disaster. This has greatly increased our understanding of hazardous situations. Risk maps are often very suitable as a basis for further inventories. These listings have as their objective: The creation of a full summary of sources of risk (also including risks from the transport of hazardous substances). Detection of problem areas The formulation of points for action or attention Step plan for inventory The drawing up of a structural vision is a task for the Local Authority. The structural vision will vary between Local Authorities, depending on the local situation and priorities. The preparation of the structural vision can be driven by map images. The level of detail in the maps will vary in different situations. It is recommended that a broad approach be taken initially, and that detail should then be applied to the map. These map images will acquire more form as the following steps are passed through: A. Preparation of a "spotter" map 1. Determine the areas where the residential developments and other (restricted) vulnerable objects are concentrated. 2. Determine the areas with non-concentrated location of (restricted)vulnerable objects. 3. Determine the areas where residential development is projected. 4. Determine the hazardous installations on the basis of the risk map and other sources of information. Show the effect distances around these objects, the localised risk contour38(where present) and the area of influence for societal risk. 5. Determine the hazardous transport routes. Show the effect distances around these objects, the localised risk contour (where present) and the area of influence for societal risk. 6. Determine the potential locations for business premises. 7. Determine the main routes for the emergency services. 8. Determine the main evacuation routes. B. Objectification of problem areas The map image created by going through these steps may include several potential areas of conflict. The following step is the objectification of these conflict areas. Areas that lie within the sphere of influence of several sources of risk. Areas within the sphere of influence of a single source of risk. Areas outside any sphere of influence. For areas within the sphere of influence the extent of the problem areas can be determined on an indicative basis. The higher the personal densities, and the closer these lie to the source of risk, the greater the probability of a problem area. Determine the areas with personal densities > 25 persons/hectare39

Determine the areas with personal densities > 75 persons/hectare Determine the areas with personal densities > 120 persons/hectare

38 Use the 10-6/year contour. 39 The intention is not to average across large areas, but rather to envisage densities in relationship to their positions with reference to the source of risk. Major differences in density must remain visible.



C. Description of problem areas Describe the problem areas in qualitative terms. Determine the situations where no detailed societal risk information is available. Determine the actions required to fill in these gaps in knowledge. D. Establishing relationships with the other threads and drafting of a memo. The degree to which self rescuing capacity or prevention of casualties can be prevented may play a significant role in identification of problem areas (see also chapter 11 of this Guidance). There is also an important connection with thread 3 of the Structural vision of external safety. 18.2 Thread 2: Timely agreements with all parties At the same time as the inventory in Thread 1, which is concerned with space, we can also list the players inside and outside government who: are linked to the hazardous activity (residents, neighbourhood councils, housing associations, project developers, government agencies, the Fire Authorities, healthcare agencies etc); involved in the protection of (limited) vulnerable objects, have a coordinating role (government agencies regional Fire Authorities); play a role in risk communications (government agencies etc). It is not only the type of player that needs to be listed, but also the interests they represent and their role. Thread 2 can be used to structure risk communications within the Local Authority. 18.3 Thread 3: Harmonisation with (parallel) developments in legislation on industrial accidents and incidents This section describes the core issues in the Incident Control, Promotion of Quality Act and its relationship to the structural vision. The Incident Control, Promotion of Quality Act came into force on 1 July 2004. This is framework legislation which modifies a number of other Acts (the Fire Brigades Act 1985, Disasters and Major Incidents Act, Medical Assistance at Disasters Act, Ambulance Act) to improve the quality of incident control. This is achieved through a planned approach and a sharpening up of Provincial oversight. There are five plans contained in the Disasters and Major Incidents Act and the Fire Brigades Act of 1985 which together are to determine the quality of incident control. They must all be regularly updated and also tested. The Incident Control, Promotion of Quality Act has several overlaps with the Structural vision of external safety, but goes rather further. Responses to disasters such as floods also fall within the context of this act. Local Authority preparations Incident Plan (Disasters and Major Incidents Act, article 3) The Council Officers will draw up an Incident Plan at least once every four years. The Incident Plan includes a summary of the hazardous situations within the Local Authority with the possible consequences (a risk inventory). It further sets down the policy with regard to incident control plans (a summary of hazardous situations for which an incident control plan is to be drawn up, and within what deadline). The organisation, responsibilities, tasks and authorisations in the context of incident control are described. The Incident Plan must be harmonised with the plans of the Inland Waterways Authority.



Incident Control Plan (Disasters and Major Incidents Act, article. 4) At least once every four years the Mayor will draw up an Incident Control Plan for incidents and major accidents whose location, nature and consequences are predictable. This is a development of the Incident Plan for a specific situation. General governmental requirements set down an obligation for the drafting of Incident Control Plans for certain categories of installation. This plan must also be harmonised with the Inland Waterways Authority disaster plans. Operational baseline figures can be used in drawing up an Incident Control Plan. This data will allow measures to be taken more speedily. Contributions from planning and environmental specialists are important in the input of this data. The operational baseline data may include:

Provincial preparations Provincial Coordination Plan (Disasters and Major Incidents Act, Article 6) At least once a year the Royal Commissioners set out a Provincial Coordination Plan. This includes a plan relating to the management and coordination of control of a disaster or major accident at Provincial level. Data on requesting and providing of assistance is also set out here. Multidisciplinary Management Plan (Disasters and Major Incidents Act Article 5, Fire Brigade Act Article 4) This Management Plan sets out policy with respect to multidisciplinary preparations for incident control, guarantees of the required capacity and the quality of the incident control organisation. This plan too is drawn up at least once in four years. This will be carried out by the management of the regional Fire Authorities. The central question is: what can and can't we control? The Management Plan sets out the target capacity level for (multidisciplinary) assistance, based on the risk inventory. The (coordinated) operational capacities of the multidisciplinary services are subsequently recorded. The " therefore provides significant information on the level at which multidisciplinary assistance can be provided, in the event of an unforeseen dangerous occurrence with hazardous substances. Clarity on this is essential when discharging the duty of accountability for societal risk.

Information on personal densities and (vulnerable) structures; An overview of the rail, water and road routes. Data on risks (both transport sources and installations); Refuge locations; Alphabetical telephone listing of those involved in incident control. and so on.

The accuracy and currency of the operational baseline figures may directly affect decision-making on spatial planning and environmental licences. The fleshing out of this information is not associated with legislative requirements and can therefore be carried out with some flexibility. It offers a good basis for the exchange of information on safety in public spaces with spatial planning and environmental specialists.



Monodisciplinary Organisational Plan (Fire Brigade Act 1985, Article 4) The organisational plan includes the operational performance of regional fire brigades which is necessary to implement the Management Plan. The matters considered include the tasks, methodology, manning and equipment levels, standards of training and preparedness of the fire brigade. This plan is also to be drafted at least once every four years by the management of the regional Fire Authorities. Supervision The Disasters and Major Incidents Act (as modified by the Disasters and Major Incidents Act) sets out the arrangements for the testing of the Incident Plan, Incident Control Plans and Management Plan. There are also a number of management reports to be drawn up annually. The regional fire brigade are to report annually to the Provincial Authorities and the Royal Commissioners, who subsequently report to the Minister for Home Affairs once per year. The Minister in turn reports once every four years to the second chamber. Once every four years the Public Order and Safety Inspectorate and other government inspection agencies review incident control as a whole. 18.4 Integrating the three threads The aim in drafting the structural vision is to structure the relationship between external safety and other policy contexts within the Local Authority, opening these matters to discussion. The three threads we have identified are brought together in the structural vision. The structural vision consists inter alia of: the policy elements of external safety; the relationship with other policy areas and the associated organisation; the approach to existing problem areas; the method by which future problems will be detected and avoided; concrete actions; priorities; (proposals in relation to) risk communication. In drawing up the structural vision it is wise to maintain a clear separation between the different levels of scale.

_________________________________________ 1For further coordination with area-oriented environmental quality considerations, see the Guidance in "Handreiking

milieukwaliteit in de leefomgeving" [Environmental Quality in the Living Environment] (published by MILO, 28 January 2004)

"Dancing through the levels of scale"1

Distinctions between structures, locations and installations may be helpful in getting to grips with the relationships between various levels of scale in the field of spatial planning. At the structural level we are concerned with the assessment of the relationship between sources of risk, activities requiring protection and the capacities of the emergency services. The relationship with other policy fields also plays a role. The time perspective must certainly be involved at the structural level. At the location level we are interested in the place, the location, and its relationship to the structures above. At the installation level we are dealing with the question of best way to develop or manage an area. In the case of businesses the question relates to the details of safety provisions. There are significant interactions between the various levels of scale.



It is recommended that the Structural vision of external safety be set down by the Local Authority. Relationship to localised risk The scope of the Structural vision of external safety need not be limited to societal risk. Where the "spotter" map shows that (limited) vulnerable objects lie within the 10-6 year contour, the handling of localised risk must also be determined. One relevant distinction here is that localised risk mainly concerns limit values, while a non-normative approach is taken to societal risk.



19 The duty of accountability in practice 19.1 A practical example: LPG filling stations and residential development This section is in preparation.

Appendix 1 Definitions Plan of attack This refers to the Fire Authority's plan of attack. The most important information is

immediately to hand in the event of an accident or fire. A plan of attack gives information about the location of hazardous substances and installations, exit routes and access points, fire separation distances etc. Most plans of attack use maps. A simple "accessibility map" may sometimes suffice. The Arbowet (Health and Safety at Work Act) requires that certain companies themselves also have a company emergency plan. In some cases these plans of attack and company emergency plans are insufficient, and the Disasters and Major Incidents Act requires an Incident Control Plan.

Competent Authority The Competent Authority is the government agency responsible for ensuring compliance

with particular legislation. As a rule the competent authority is the Provincial or Local Authority, but an Inland Waterway Authority or a government department may also take this role. This responsibility may consist of issuing licences, but enforcement and the setting down of a zoning plan may also be included. In other words, ensuring that the rules are adhered to. The managers of roads and waterways, pipeline concession holders and companies are however responsible in the first instance for safety and the observation of the rules.

BLEVE Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion. For example the explosion of a gas liquefied by compression, such as an LPG tank.

Exposed Exposed persons are those located in a place where they might come into contact with the effects of an incident involving a source of risk.

Fire Fire introduces a range of hazards. A fire may spread rapidly through sparks and radiation of heat. In the open air radiation of heat is a direct hazard, and burns may result if persons are too close. The smoke is also hazardous.

BRZO installation The Besluit Risico's Zware Ongevallen (the Major Incident Risk Order, BRZO 1999) sets

out criteria to indicate which businesses present a risk of serious incidents. This is associated with the presence of hazardous substances. More stringent rules than usual apply to such businesses. A further distinction is made in the group of BRZO businesses, between those with the most serious and less serious risks. The less serious category are also referred to as PBZO (Serious Incident Prevention Policy) companies, as they are required to have a prevention policy and a Safety Management System. This also applies to the most serious category, and these companies must also complete a risk analysis and draw up a Safety Report. They are therefore sometimes called "(Mandatory) Safety Report Companies".

Pipelines Transport of hazardous substances may also be carried out using pipelines. Examples include: high and medium pressure natural gas pipelines (regional, national and international natural gas pipelines) and pipelines used to transport (sometimes toxic) chemicals in liquid or gaseous form. These are generally underground lines, but some are above ground.

Categorical installations Installations, as identified in the BEVI Decree, for which the localised risk is determined in

accordance with distances set down by Ministerial Order. The personal densities indicated in the Ministerial Order may be used in order to determine societal risk, but this may also be determined by means of a QRA (Quantified Risk Analysis).

Coordination Plan A Coordination Plan governs the collaboration of different agencies and government

departments in the control of incidents.In complex situations a Coordination Plan may be a useful addition to the plans of individual Local Authorities or agencies.



CPR CPR is the abbreviation for the Committee for the Prevention of Incidents Involving Hazardous Substances. This committee is currently composed by four government departments (SZW, BZK, VROM and V&W) who provide recommendations on measures to prevent incidents and accidents involving hazardous substances. The CPR has issued various guidelines. One of these is "CPR 15" on storage containers and storage rooms for hazardous substances. Effect The effects of:

explosion: the creation of a pressure wave and/or radiation of heat. fire. toxic: risk of poisoning by toxic gas or vapour.

Effect area The Effect Area of a source of risk indicates the distance within which direct health effects may arise in the event of a serious accident at the source of risk. The probability of an accident occurring is not included in the concept "Effect Area". This is the most significant distinction between Effect Areas and risk contours. The "areas of influence" identified in the Decree have the same extent as the effect areas, unless the area of influence for a specific substance is defined differently in the implementation orders.

Explosion An explosion generates a brief but powerful pressure wave and a brief but fierce radiation of heat. These are the most significant causes of injury to persons in the vicinity of an explosion. Fragments of glass for example, flying around as the result of the pressure wave may also cause life-threatening injuries. Explosions may occur with:

flammable gas: for example natural gas, propane, butane or LPG; certain volatile liquids; cartridges and other munitions; professional and consumer fireworks; certain products, such as concentrated artificial fertilisers; dust, for example in foodstuffs, grain or wood dust.

Physical safety The probability of physical injury as a consequence of outside influences arising from accidents (other than physical violence). In this Guidance it refers to bodily injury as a consequence of an incident or disaster involving hazardous substances.

User licence The Local Authority may require businesses and installations to apply for a User Licence where it is important for safety that additional rules are set down for the use of their premises. A User Licence may set requirements for firefighting equipment, alarm installations and other safety provisions. Use may also be restricted to a specified number of persons, or limits may be set for quantities of flammable materials in storage. The Local Authorities determine themselves what types of premises are subject to User Licensing. The highest priority is given to premises where occupants are unable to rescue themselves, or where large groups of people are present.

Victims Victims are persons affected in a material or immaterial sense by an accident or disaster, for example because they require evacuation or there is damage to their property.

Projected object An object, not yet present, which is permitted by a current zoning plan. Hazardous substances Hazardous substances are substances whose use, transport or storage involves risk. The

risk may be of explosion, fire, toxicity or radioactivity. These hazards are often the downside of the useful properties of the substance. They are often fuels, or raw materials for useful products like medicines, plastics or artificial fertilisers, or agents used for numerous purposes, for example cooling, cleaning, preservation.

Limit value Limit value as specified in Article 5.1 of the Environmental Management Act. A limit value

may not be deviated from. Societal risk Societal risk states the probability that a group of persons will die as a result of an

accident involving a hazardous activity. Societal risk takes account of the number of persons present in the vicinity of an accident.

Installation The term Installation is used inter alia in the Environmental Management Act. It relates to businesses falling within the General Policy Measure requirement in Article 8.40 of the Environmental Management Act, or installations requiring an environmental licence.

Area of influence Area within which persons are to be included in the calculation of societal risk, by virtue of

rules to be established by Ministerial Order. The boundary of the area of influence is the same as the boundary of the effect area, unless the area of influence for a specific substance is defined differently in the implementation orders forming part of the Decree.



Installation Establishments with hazardous substances use or produce these substances in installations.

Intervention value There are a number of definitions of "intervention value". The following are in common

use: Information threshold value The concentration of a substance at which it is highly probable that the majority of the exposed population will experience negative effects, or above which mild and quickly reversible health effects are possible following exposure of one hour. This is often the concentration at which those exposed begin to complain, noticing their exposure. Alarm threshold value The concentration of a substance above which irreversible or other serious damage to health may occur through direct toxic effects from an exposure of one hour. Life-threatening value The concentration of a substance above which death or a life-threatening situation may arise through toxic effects within a few days of exposure for a single hour.

Probability The probability that a person will die through an accident with such substances (if that person remained permanently for a year in the same location). See also localised risk and risk contour.

Vulnerable object houses (more than 2 per hectare)

buildings intended to be occupied, whether only for part of the day or not, by minors, the elderly, sick or disabled people, such as:

1. hospitals, care and nursing homes; 2. schools; 3. buildings or parts thereof intended for day care of minors;

buildings where large numbers of persons will be present for a large part of the day, such as:

1. office buildings and hotels with a gross floor area exceeding 1500 m2 per building; 2. complexes including more than 5 shops and where the combined gross floor area is more than 1000 m2, also shops with a total floor area of more than 2000 m2 per building, where a supermarket, hypermarket or cash and carry is located within the complex or among the shops;

camping and other recreational areas intended for the occupation of more than 50 persons for several consecutive days during the year.

Lethal Fatal Non-categorical installation Installations where a risk assessment is required in order to determine the localised risk

and societal risk. Evacuation Plan An Evacuation Plan indicates how a building or site is to be carried out. In certain cases

the government agencies require businesses to draft an Evacuation Plan. Their concern is naturally the safety of groups of persons who might be present.

Public physical safety Physical safety in public spaces. The complement of physical safety of structures. Orientational value One of the criteria involved in implementing the duty of accountability. Personal densities The density of persons in an area. The method of determining this density is set out in a

ministerial order. In the case of flammable gas a grid of 25 metres by 25 is used for inventory purposes. In the case of toxic substances, a grid of 100 metres by 100 is used. The zoning plan serves as the starting point for a legally correct determination of personal density.

PBZO company The Besluit Risico's Zware Ongevallen (the Major Incident Risk Order, BRZO 1999) includes criteria to determine which businesses may carry a risk of major incidents. A distinction is made between a serious and less serious category of BRZO companies. The less serious category are also referred to as PBZO companies. Businesses in the less serious category must have a Serious Incident Prevention Policy and a Safety Management System.



Localised Risk Localised risk is the calculated annual probability of a person dying as a direct

consequence of an accident at a source of risk, assuming that he remains permanently and unprotected at that location. Briefly, the localised risk incorporates two different probabilities:

the probability that an incident, such as the escape of a hazardous substance will take place; the probability that a person will actually die as a consequence of this.

Disaster According to law, a disaster is a serious disturbance of general safety, where the life and health of many persons or substantial material interests are seriously threatened or damaged. A second characteristic of disasters is that a coordinated deployment of various agencies and organisations is necessary to remove the threat or limit the consequences.

Major incident control plan In the Incident Control Plan the Local Authority set out the preparations taken to control a

specific disaster or a specify type of disaster. The Local Authority must have a policy in place to determine the various situations in which an Incident Control Plan is to be drawn up. The position is that an Incident Control Plan is prepared for disasters and serious incidents whose location, nature and consequences are predictable. For some risk situations an Incident Control Plan is directly required by law. Coordination with neighbouring Local Authorities and regions in adjacent countries must be ensured by means of the Incident Control Plan.

Incident Plan Every Local Authority must have an Incident Plan. The Incident Plan sums up the Local Authority's general arrangements for incident control. It is the master plan for Local Authority incident control.

Incident types Every incident is different. In order to make the preparations as concrete as possible, eighteen different incident types are distinguished in incident control. It is conceivable that several incident types may be involved in one disaster.

Hazardous substances risk situation register The hazardous substances risk situation register is a central national register with data on

risk situations in the Netherlands involving the use, storage and transport of hazardous substances. This data is managed by the Royal Institute for Public Health and the Environment and presented on the internet on a risk map. This information is additionally used in local risk maps which also display other risk situations.

Guideline value Guideline value as specified in Article 5.1 of the Environmental Management Act with respect to the level of localised risk. A guideline value may only be exceeded if a good reason is provided.

Risk The risk of a hazardous activity can be analysed into two elements, namely probability and effects: probability: the calculated likelihood that a specified accident or disaster will occur. This probability is combined with the probability that persons will die as a result of the incident. Such probabilities may be represented on a risk map in the form of risk contours. effect: when an accident or disaster occurs, this has effects in a specific area. This effect region may be indicated on the risk map.

Source of risk The places where risks may emanate are referred to as sources of risk. These include: businesses where hazardous substances are made, used or stored; routes and pipelines carrying hazardous substances.

Risk contours A risk contour indicates the level of the probability of death in the surroundings in the event of an accident with a source of risk. These contour lines may be compared with the elevation contours on a normal map: Within the contour the risk is greater, outside it the risk is smaller.

Risk map The risk map shows the location of sources of risk. These are sources of risk which might cause direct injury to persons. For example, hazardous substances or other relevant risks such as flooding. In total the risks of 13 different incident types can be shown on the map. However there are also risk maps which show only those risk situations involving hazardous substances.

Hazardous substance route Local Authorities are empowered to establish routes for the transport of hazardous

substances.



Scenario When a serious incident occurs, the outcome often depends on varying circumstances. So, an incident may proceed according to various different scenarios. A variety of scenarios are therefore considered when investigating localised and societal risk. Account is also taken of weather effects which might have an influence, for example wind.

Casualty Casualties are persons injured or killed as a consequence of an incident or disaster. Toxic Poisonous Transport route Transport of hazardous substances primarily takes place by road, water, rail and through

pipelines. Safety distance In the case of categorical installations: the distance providing the 10-6-contour. Safety report The most hazardous businesses covered by the Major Incident Risk Order must draft a

safety report. The safety report must demonstrate inter alia that: a prevention policy and a safety management system are in place hazards have been identified and effective measures taken the installation and its operation are sufficiently safe and reliable.

Residence time correction A time-related correction to the probability calculation, based upon a shorter residence

time for persons than the annual accident probability. Transport- related installation There are a variety of businesses and installations where hazardous substances are

transferred or "left standing" as part of a transport process. These are referred to as transport-related installations. Examples include: a transfer point for containers and an installation where tankers make a stop, or where tanker contents are transferred to other means of transport.

Appendix 2 Other guidance Guidance on the Decree on external safety of installations, Infomil 2004. Guidance on the Decree on external safety of installations, with particular emphasis on localised risk. On the approach to societal risk, please see Guidance on the duty of accountability for societal risk. Manual "Restructuring Risk Situations" In preparation. Safety suggestions, Manual on External Safety, VNG 2003. This guidance offers Local Authorities an understanding of relevant developments and their own responsibilities, tasks and powers in the field of external safety. It also provides an overview of the more significant strands of Local Authority external safety policy: risk identification, active policy discussions, integrated planning, integrated implementation and evaluation, risk communications and collaboration with societal partners. Guidelines on risk situations The Province of Overijssel, in collaboration with Gelderland, the VNG and the Spatial Planning Inspectorate have devised guidance on Local Authority external safety policy "Dealing with Risk Situations", with the aim of facilitating a systematic approach to hazardous locations within their areas and, if necessary, their improvement. Guidance on communications on risk The Risk Communication manual has been developed to assist Local Authorities with risk communication in their own areas. Manual on Preparations for Incident Control The Manual on Preparations for Incident Control aims to provide a current, coherent and user-friendly view of the state of knowledge on policy and practice in preparations for incident control. The Manual is also intended as a guide to the large amount of documentation which has



appeared in recent years. This Manual replaces the Incident Control Handbook of 1990. It is entirely based upon existing documentation such as manuals, guidance notes, models, reference works, policy statements, legislation and circulars. http://www.minbzk.nl/veiligheid Association of Dutch Local Authorities Guidance Association of Dutch Local Authorities Guidance, 1998, to assist authorities in working with risk standards in the transportation of hazardous substances. This Guidance is no longer published. A print-out may be obtained from the Department of the Environment and Spatial Planning. Contact Urmie Pherai ([email protected]) or Ineke Westerbeek ([email protected]). CHAMP method, Province of Zuid-Holland A methodology devised by the province of Zuid-Holland to allow provinces to assess situations where there is a threat of the orientational value for societal risk being exceeded. CHAMP stands for communication/information, horizons, anticipation, motivation and preparation. Download the CHAMP methodology (pdf, 36 KB) Drechtsteden Context for Safety Assessments Towns in the Drechtsteden group in liaison with KIEV (an interdepartmental group focusing on external safety) have developed an assessment framework for situations where there is a threat of the orientational value for societal risk being exceeded. This may serve as a model for Local Authorities. It will probably be published in autumn 2004. External Safety. Interdepartmental Training Course 2003 (September 2003) At the start of 2003 officers from various government departments who deal with external safety as part of their work attended a course in External Safety. The presentations given during the course were brought together in the External Safety Course Folder. This covers the following topics: the roles and tasks of the Departments involved; new developments in policy; approaches to risk, and risk standards; legislation on the transport of hazardous substances; External Safety policy and the Environmental Management Act, implementation and enforcement communications, records and information; The course included handy information for officers from all government agencies working in the field of external safety, spatial planning, environmental licensing and enforcement.

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