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1870õ1914 Classical gold standard period

April 1925 United Kingdom returns to gold standard

October 1929 United States stock market crashes

September 1931 United Kingdom abandons gold standard

July 1944 Bretton Woods conference

March 1947 International Monetary Fund comes into being

August 1971 United States suspends convertibility of dollar into gold

õ Bretton Woods system collapses

December 1971 Smithsonian Agreement

March 1972 European snake with 2.25% band of fluctuation allowed

March 1973 Managed float regime comes into being

April 1978 Jamaica Accords take effect

September 1985 Plaza accord

September 1992 United Kingdom and Italy abandon Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)

August 1993 European Monetary System allows ?15% fluctuation in exchange rates

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fixed exchange-rate system

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1870c§15%�I[æ^7� �§ù�'~1913c,�70%§

320­V20c�üg­.�Ô�m¡EÏ��90%§��1939c�

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The earliest establishment of a gold standard was in the United Kingdom

in 1821. McKinnon(1993) summarized the Gold Standard as followsµ

1 Fix an official gold price or mint parity and convert freely between

domestic money and gold at that price.

2 Do not restrict the export or import of gold by private citizens, nor

impose any other exchange restrictions on current or capital account

transacting.

3 Back national banknotes and coinage with earmarked gold reserves,

and condition long-run growth in deposit money on availability of

general gold reserves.

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 6 / 38

2. ü«�½®Ç� 2.1 7� �

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4 In short-run liquidity crisis from an international gold drain, have the

central bank lend freely to domestic banks at higher interest

rates(Bagehot’s Rule).

5 If Rule 1 is temporarily suspended, restore convertibility at traditional

mint parity as soon as practicable – if necessary by deflating the

domestic economy.

6 Allow the common price level (nominal anchor) to be endogenously

determined by the worldwide demand for, and supply of, gold.

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 7 / 38

2. ü«�½®Ç� 2.1 7� �

7� �µ©aÚÅÄ«m

y¢¥�7� ��)±eA«/ªµ

71� £gold specie standard¤Ú7^� £gold bullion

standard¤¶

7ÕE� �£bimetallic standard¤µ`:´�±~�duüÕ¦^

�«7á E¤�d�Y²�Ø­½5§~�X7� ��UÚu

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äk�½�7d��À1��;�"

y¢¥��7@|´k¤��§Ïd¢S�®Ç´3Ò1²dû½

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point¤�mÅÄ"

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United States fixed the price of gold at $20.67 per

ounce from 1834 to 1933, and Britain fixed the price

at £3 17s 10.5p per ounce from 1816 to 1914.

Therefore, the exchange rate between dollars and

pounds – the “par exchange rate” – necessarily

equaled $4.867 per pound.

Wikiwand: The pound sterling was equal to 4.87

United States dollars, 5.25 Canadian dollars, 12.10

Dutch guilders, 26.28 French francs (or equivalent

currencies in the Latin Monetary Union), 20.43

German marks or 24.02 Austro-Hungarian krone.

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2. ü«�½®Ç� 2.1 7� �

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In 1861, at the beginning of the

Civil War, the U.S. government paid

its soldiers with paper currency that

was convertible into gold. However,

in 1862 the government ran short of

gold and switched to fiat currency,

which is not convertible.

Convertibility was gradually

eliminated in the twentieth century,

and the last vestiges of convertibility

were dropped in 1971.

Source: Acemoglu et al.(2016).

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2. ü«�½®Ç� 2.1 7� �

7� ��`:

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� �e��I[�ISÂ|�ÏLISÔd�ÞáÚ�7�ÑÑÑ\g

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TB < 0 ⇒ Gold(M) ↓⇒ P ↓⇒ e ↑, TB ↑

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7� ��":

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1914*1918c1�g­.�ÔÏm§�Iªª*Ü�1u1�Ô�

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cËdA6��ÚÛ�Å(2010)µ7� ����^º

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To rebuild the international monetary system, 44 Allied nations signed The

Bretton Woods Agreement in July, 1944. The rules included:

1 Fix a foreign par value for the domestic currency by using gold, or a

currency tied to gold, as the numeraire; otherwise demonetize gold in

all private transacting.

2 In the short run, keep the exchange rate within 10% of its par value,

but leave its long-run par value unilaterally adjustable if the IMF

concurs.

3 Free currency convertibility for current account payments; use capital

controls to dampen currency speculation.

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 16 / 38

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4 Use national monies symmetrically in foreign transacting, including

dealings with the IMF.

5 Buffer short-run payments imbalances by drawing on official exchange

reserves and IMF credits; sterilize the domestic monetary impact of

exchange-market interventions.

6 National macroeconomic autonomy: each member government to

pursue its own price level and employment objectives unconstrained

by a common nominal anchor or price rule.

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 17 / 38

2. ü«�½®Ç� 2.2 ÙXîÜ�NX

ÙXîÜ�NXµPá��)

{I1960c���ÔÚ/���¬Oy0¦ISã�|Ñ:ìþ,§²~

�8G¹�:ì�z"

1967c.Ú1968cЧh<ÝÅöduýÏ�7d��Uþ, m©ïÈ

�7§3{é;Úî³�I�þ�È�7�§m©¢1/h<d�0Ú

/(�d�0��7d�V;�"ù´ÙXîÜ�NX���=ò:"

1970c{I²L?\Pò§½|ÊHýÏ{�ò�@�§��®½|þ

#�Ó�{��È"1971c8�15FZ�toÚ\Ù{IòØ2�I

1ÑÈ�7!�£{�§l äý{�Ú�7�m�éX"ù�¯��

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=�k+n�2Ä®Ç�"gdISÀ1NX?\��Ä��#��"

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Ap¥JKµÙXîÜ�NX�S3"�

1960c§{I²LÆ[ÛËA#Ap¥JÑ/du{���7!�§ Ù¦I[

�À1�{�!�§{��,��ISØ%À1�/ §�´�I�uÐI

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�D§é{I5`Ò¬u)�Ïn´_�¶ {���ISÀ1Ø%�cJ´7

L�±{�1�­½�jͧùq�¦{I7L´���Ïn´^�I"ùü�

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¥JK0 r��$"

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�Ñy�Å�§TÀ1NX�J±�U"

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2. ü«�½®Ç� 2.2 ÙXîÜ�NX

ÙXîÜ�NXµ�)��©z

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2. ü«�½®Ç� 2.2 ÙXîÜ�NX

ÙXîÜ�NX�7� ��'�

�,{IÌ��ÙXîÜ�NXÚ=IÌ��7� �Ñ´­.5��½

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´ÄkI[�3À1A�

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�ÀJ

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3. ®Ç�ü��£²LÆ 3.1 Y~µvá�xÕ2I�1X2�I�K

xÕ2I�7Õ'd

ã¡5 µoøͧ5ã`7K¤6§¥&Ñ��§2015

Source: Eichengreen, B. 2008, Globalizing Capital: A History of

the International Monetary System (Second Edition), Princeton

University Press

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 22 / 38

3. ®Ç�ü��£²LÆ 3.1 Y~µvá�xÕ2I�1X2�I�K

1X2�I�K

¥-ÆpkÉÓ§g��Ïû§F���§AXÛëV�çþ½Ù

§§-££{�ü"

�IU^71©uÛ�º7dFOÙ�S3ºÌ�öÛ<ºe¥I�±^

7º�$ã§[�ü"

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 23 / 38

3. ®Ç�ü��£²LÆ 3.2 Y~µ20­VÐ{Ié7� �ÀJ

Gold or Silver? It’s a Question.

Note: 1900 reelection poster celebrates McKinley

standing tall on the gold standard with support from

soldiers, sailors, businessmen, factory workers and

professionals, from Wikiwand.

Note: Bryan’s speech for Presidential campaign in

1896: “You shall not press down upon the brow of

labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify

mankind upon a cross of gold.”

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 24 / 38

3. ®Ç�ü��£²LÆ 3.2 Y~µ20­VÐ{Ié7� �ÀJ

Gold or Silver? It’s a Political Question.

Source: 1896 Electoral vote results, Wikiwand

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 25 / 38

3. ®Ç�ü��£²LÆ 3.2 Y~µ20­VÐ{Ié7� �ÀJ

Frieden(2015): Currency Politics

Like all policies, the choices available to currency policymakers involve

trade-offs. Currency policies have both benefits and costs, and create both

winners and losers. Those who make exchange rate policies must evaluate

the trade-offs, weigh the costs and benefits, and consider the winners and

losers of their actions.

Exchange rate policy requires a government to make a relatively simple

decision:

to fix the currency or allow it to float;

to try to keep the currency strong or weak

These simple decisions reflect extraordinarily complex structures, motives,

and pressures.

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 26 / 38

3. ®Ç�ü��£²LÆ 3.2 Y~µ20­VÐ{Ié7� �ÀJ

Policy Preference of the Interest Groups

Source: Frieden, J.A. 1994, “Exchange Rate Politics: Contemporary Lessons from American History”, Review of International

Political Economy, Vol.1(1), P81-103

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 27 / 38

3. ®Ç�ü��£²LÆ 3.2 Y~µ20­VÐ{Ié7� �ÀJ

Empirical Evidence

Source: Frieden, J.A. 1997, “Monetary Populism in Nineteenth-Century America: An Open Economy Interpretation”, Journal of

Economic History, Vol.57(2), P367-395

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 28 / 38

3. ®Ç�ü��£²LÆ 3.3 Y~µ{�Û���=�º

;�À1µ{�vs.=�

Source: Eichengreen, B. and M. Flandreau, 2009, “The rise and fall of the dollar (or when did the dollar replace sterling as the

leading reserve currency?”, European Review of Economic History, Vol.13(03), P377-411

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 29 / 38

3. ®Ç�ü��£²LÆ 3.3 Y~µ{�Û���=�º

;�À1µV Þ

Source: Eichengreen and Flandreau(2009).

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 30 / 38

3. ®Ç�ü��£²LÆ 3.3 Y~µ{�Û���=�º

;�À1µÄu«��£�ÀJ

Source: Eichengreen and Flandreau(2009).

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 31 / 38

3. ®Ç�ü��£²LÆ 3.3 Y~µ{�Û���=�º

ÅÖÀ1µ{�vs.=�

Note: Fig2. “Global foreign public debt (currency

breakdown in USD million; at current exchange rates)”

Note: Fig5. “Global foreign public debt(selected currency

shares as a % of total; at current exchange rates)”.

Source: Chitu, L., B. Eichengreen and A. Mehl, 2014, “When did the dollar overtake sterling as the leading international

currency? Evidence from the bond markets”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.111, P225-245

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 32 / 38

3. ®Ç�ü��£²LÆ 3.3 Y~µ{�Û���=�º

Ì�ÅÖÀ1µÄu«��£�ÀJ

Source: Chitu et al.(2014), Fig4 “Global foreign public

debt in sterling – Main debtors. (as a % of total, at

current exchange rates; in 1929)”.

Source: Chitu et al.(2014), Fig3 “Global foreign public

debt in US dollar – Main debtors (as a % of total; at

current exchange rates; in 1929)”.

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 33 / 38

4. ISÀ1NXU�

BIS(2015)µyG

The international monetary and financial system, then and now

Source: “Chapter 5 The international monetary and financial system”, in 85th Annual Report, BIS.

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4. ISÀ1NXU�

BIS(2015)µ{�«vs.î�«

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4. ISÀ1NXU�

BIS(2015)µ{�Ì��­.

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4. ISÀ1NXU�

Wikiwand: �À�Y

System Reserve Assets Leaders

Flexible exchange rates Dollar, Euro, Renminbi US, Eurozone, China

Special drawing rights standard SDR US, G-20, IMF

Gold standard Gold, Dollar US

Delhi Declaration Currency basket BRICS

�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 1lù �½®Ç��2Ä®Ç� II 37 / 38

4. ISÀ1NXU�

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A«�U5§�{�`²¦�*:"

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é¥I5`´|�u6�´6�u|º

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