1 critical mission support through energy security susan van scoyoc concurrent technologies...
TRANSCRIPT
1
Critical Mission Support Through Critical Mission Support Through Energy SecurityEnergy Security
Susan Van ScoyocSusan Van ScoyocConcurrent Technologies CorporationConcurrent Technologies Corporation
16 August 201216 August 2012
Energy Huntsville MeetingHuntsville, AL
22
BLUF on Energy Security
DoD Installations are moving towards
microgrids as an energy security solution…
the Triple Bottom Line
33
What is the State of your Energy Security?• Are the critical missions and corresponding
critical facilities identified?
• Are all the mission critical equipment connected to the auxiliary generators?
• Are your auxiliary generators capable of long-term continuous operation?
• Can the generation be grid connected and operate in parallel?
• Do you have large prime power generators on site? Are they connected to the distribution system?
• Can the installation distribution system be operated independently from the commercial electric utility supply?
44
ESA Methodology for the Army – Three Phases
Phase I
Phase II
Phase III
55
Summarized Results from Phase IPrioritized Critical Energy Needs
Phase I ESA #1
ESA #2
ESA #3
ESA #4
ESA #5
Number of Missions 12 20 6 13 16
Critical Tasks 13 19 6 19 18
Facilities 50 63 41 131 137
Facility Functions 64 146 123 146 172
SPFs 128 83 107 120 110
The decomposition of critical missions at each facility resulted in identifying SPFs, making site personnel aware of their energy dependencies to accomplish missions.
66
Summarized Results from Phase IIRisk and Vulnerability Analysis
Phase II ESA #1
ESA #2
ESA #3
ESA #4
ESA #5
Threats Analyzed 6 16 16 15 23
Total Risks 456 415 645 236 983
Vulnerability 31 52 13 2 74
Concern 105 0 24 4 47
Observation 104 38 12 41 210
Findings 216 325 596 189 652
Unconventional Concerns 29 2 10 9 12
Phase II mathematically analyzes and uncovers plausible threats and their consequential risks to the mission. The qualitative/quantitative prioritization can be used as mitigation justification.
77
Summarized Results from Phase IIIPotential Mitigation Solutions
Phase III ESA #1
ESA #2
ESA #3
ESA #4
ESA #5
Mitigation SolutionsIdentified 121 405 645 236 983
Through prioritization and mission owner input, the ESA identified weaknesses in the existing energy security posture and provided actionable solutions for leadership to implement.
— Determined multiple solutions with varying complexity and ROI
— Provided solutions in a format that can be easily migrated to a form or template for recommended funding channels
— Provided a decision point for installation leadership
88
Mission Critical Utility Infrastructure Methodology Planning as a Mitigation Solution• High Reliability Generation and Distribution System
– Intelligent Distribution System (Smart Grid)– Self Sustaining Electric Infrastructure– Onsite Electric Generation– Demand Response Control
Develop Standard Operating Procedure
Determine Monitoring/
Control Strategy
Establish Distribution
Configuration
Identify Generation
Resource and Location
Determine Energy
Requirements
Define Critical Facilities
99
• Missions are constantly changing
– Island concept can enable real-time changes to critical facilities supported based on mission cycles
• Allows flexibility to provide service for Non-Critical Facilities
– Critical Missions not always dependant on energy
– Some facilities could be supported before critical operations depending on event
• Identify the Critical Facilities that Everything Relies On– Helps to prioritize and look at emergency with a “utility restoration priority perspective
Conceptual Design Results
Conceptual Design Estimates Site #1 Site #2 Site #3
Load (MW) 12.8 10.4 10.3
Installed Generation1 (MW) 27 222 303
Available Generation1 (MW) 18 13.52 183
Critical Buildings (#) 44 39 30
Total ROM Cost ($M) 52.9 50.2 53.6
- Distribution Upgrades ($M) 1.7 1.5 3.0
- Engineering ($M) 8.8 10.0 5.0
- Generation Equipment ($M) 42.4 38.7 45.6
Recommended Storage (days) 7 7 91 UFC mandates two backup generators (N+2) for prime power generating plants2 Does not include existing 5 MW gas turbine3 Does not include existing distributed generation
1010
Lessons Learned• Open source interoperability between components and systems for optimal operation
and redundancy• Specifications for systems must be developed and integrated for Resilient Energy
System operation• Periodic review of the system needed due to changing installation and mission
priorities • Auxiliary generators and/or circuit connectivity may be lacking for key
mission critical support equipment • Generation equipment largest contributor
to project cost; decrease demand in critical facilities can lower generation requirements
• Automated control strategies decrease downtime and increase operational stability
1111
Technology Gaps
• Standard communication structure for both monitoring and command/control of distributed resources being implemented outside of a utility infrastructure
• User-accessible, documented power interface design approach - how to choose components such as inductors/capacitors for solid application
• Multimode inverters that can operate grid connected and switch to grid independent
– Bi-directional DC to DC– Bi-directional AC to DC and DC to AC
• Cyber security standards/protocols to mitigate threats• Small scale nuclear plants for military installations