1 george mason school of law contracts ii relational contracts iv f.h. buckley [email protected]

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1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley [email protected]

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Page 1: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

1

George Mason School of Law

Contracts II

Relational Contracts IV

F.H. Buckley

[email protected]

Page 2: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Next day…

Up to and including Implied Conditions

2

Page 3: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

The Agency Cost Problem

Agency costs are the costs resulting from:1. Underperformance by agent retained by

principal

3

Page 4: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

The Agency Cost Problem

Agency costs are the costs resulting from:2. Passed-up opportunities

(underinvestment)

4

Page 5: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

The Agency Cost Problem

What kind of agent misbehavior? Observable?

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Page 6: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

The Agency Cost Problem

What kind of agent misbehavior? Or unobservable?

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Page 7: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

The Agency Cost Problem

What kind of agent misbehavior? The misbehavior must be unobservable

Otherwise the principal could specify the agent’s duties

7

Page 8: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

The Agency Cost Problem

What kind of agent misbehavior? The misbehavior must be unobservable So that monitoring for misbehavior can

reduce agency costs

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Page 9: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

The Agency Cost Problem

Agency Costs as the sum of Underperformance by agents Underinvestment by principals Monitoring costs

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Page 10: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

The Agency Cost Problem

What kind of agent misbehavior? The misbehavior must be unobservable So that monitoring for misbehavior can

reduce agency costs Coupled with termination rights

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Page 11: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Employees as agents:Note the two-way play

The employer has a free hand to dismiss the employee under the at-will standard

The employee can resign any time

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Page 12: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Note the two-way play

The employee can resign any time Might the employer be unhappy with

this?

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Page 13: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Note the two-way play

The employee can resign any time Might the employer be unhappy with

this? Labor shortages Firm-specific assets

Training Proprietary info)

13

Page 14: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Note the two-way play

The employee can resign any time Can you think of some way in which the

parties might bargain around this?

14

Page 15: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Well, there are Constitutional issues…

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Page 16: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Note the two-way play

The employee can resign any time Can you think of some way in which the

parties might bargain around this? Compensation schemes

16

Page 17: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Note the two-way play

The employee can resign any time Can you think of some way in which the

parties might bargain around this? Compensation schemes Non-competes

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Page 18: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

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Page 19: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

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The trade secrets?

Page 20: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

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The trade secrets Beef formula Slicing machine Packaging Marketing research

Page 21: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

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Scope of the non-compete: a one-year ban: Controlled meat business Employment within 100 miles of West

Chester with similar business

Page 22: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

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Legal restrictions on non-competes Must be ancillary to an employment

contract made at hiring or on a change of status

Page 23: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

23

Legal restrictions on non-competes?

Page 24: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

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Legal restrictions on non-competes Must be ancillary to an employment

contract How would you justify this restriction?

Page 25: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

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Was there a change in status here? Cf. Marine Contractors at 373

Page 26: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

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Was there a change in status here? Cf. Marine Contractors at 373 Cf. Leatherman at 373

Page 27: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

27

Legal restrictions on non-competes Reasonably limited in time and

geographic scope Not excessive for the protection of the

employer

Page 28: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

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Legal restrictions on non-competes Reasonably limited in time and

geographic scope Not excessive for the protection of the

employer

How would you justify these restrictions?

Page 29: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

29

Can you explain why employers have a free hand in termination decisions but not with non-competes?

Page 30: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

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Were the restrictions excessive here?

Page 31: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

31

Were the restrictions excessive here? Caputo was the controller What about reverse engineering?

Page 32: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

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Relevance of the occupation Garage mechanic?

Page 33: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

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Relevance of the occupation Garage mechanic? Doctor?

Page 34: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

34

Relevance of the occupation Garage mechanic? Doctor Lawyer

Page 35: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Non-competes: Gagliardi

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Relevance of the occupation Garage mechanic? Doctor Lawyer

Maltby at 374

Page 36: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Contract Modification

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As relational contracts are long term, conditions may change and prompt a modification of the agreement Should there be any restrictions on this?

Page 37: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Contract ModificationAustin v. Loral p. 397

Why did Loral agree to the contract modification?

3737

Page 38: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

38

Pyramid Harbor AK

Page 39: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

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Will a promise to perform that which the promisor was already bound to do under a prior contract satisfy the consideration requirement?

Page 40: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

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Will a promise to perform that which the promisor was already bound to do under a prior contract satisfy the consideration requirement? Restatement § 73 Illustration 4 Restatement § 175 Illustration 5 Restatement § 176

Page 41: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

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Will a promise to perform that which the promisor was already bound to do under a prior contract satisfy the consideration requirement? Restatement § 89

Fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties

Illustrations 1, 3, 4

Page 42: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

42

UCC § 2-209 Good faith Comment 2 UCC § 1-304. Every contract or duty within [the

Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.

Page 43: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

43

How would you decide Alaska Packers

under these standards?

Page 44: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

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How would you decide Alaska Packers

under these standards? The finding of fact at p. 377

Page 45: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

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Qu. the changed circumstances under Angel v. Murray p. 380

Page 46: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

46

Qu. the changed circumstances under Angel v. Murray p. 380

Brian v. Brighenti p. 381

Page 47: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

47

How might a party protect himself against an extortionate modification?

Page 48: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

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How might a party protect himself against an extortionate modification? No modification clauses?

Is UCC § 2-209(2) a safe harbor?

Page 49: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

49

How might a party protect himself against an extortionate modification? No modification clauses?

Restatement § 311, Comment a Can you offer a justification for this?

Page 50: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

50

No modification clauses The parties to a joint venture decide that

it’s not profitable and write a termination agreement. Problems?

Page 51: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

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No modification clauses The parties to a joint venture decide that

it’s not profitable and write a termination agreement. Problems? El Paso Natural Gas p. 383

Page 52: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

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No modification clauses The parties to a joint venture decide that

it’s not profitable and write a termination agreement. Problems? El Paso Natural Gas p. 383 Alexi Yashin p. 382

Page 53: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

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No modification clauses The parties to a joint venture decide that

it’s not profitable and write a termination agreement. Problems? Is there a possibility of strategic behavior

here?

Page 54: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Alaska Packers

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No modification clauses The parties to a joint venture discover

that one party’s duties are much more onerous than was contemplated and write an amending agreement. Problems?

Page 55: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Was this Austin v. Loral?

5555

Page 56: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Underinvestment if no-modification clauses are banned?

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Page 57: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Unless one trusts the courts to get it right

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Page 58: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Relational Contracts IV F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

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George Mason School of Law

Contracts II

Terms

F.H. Buckley

[email protected]