1 sören salomo kai teichmann institute for business administration christian-albrechts-universität

8/14/2019 1 Sren Salomo Kai Teichmann Institute for Business Administration Christian-Albrechts-Universitt

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Sren SalomoKai Teichmann

Institute for Business AdministrationChristian-Albrechts-Universitt zu Kiel

Olshausenstr. 40

24098 KielGermany

Tel: +49 (431) 880-1466+49 (431) 880-4696

Email: [email protected]@bwl.uni-kiel.de

The relationship of performance and managerial succession

in the German Premier Soccer League

Introduction

Managerial succession and organizational performance has been subject to a wide

range of empirical studies in the area of sport management. To asses the relationship

between team performance and managerial succession we examine two main

research questions dealing with the determinants and effects of management

change. We employ a multivariate analysis of time series data on all German premier

soccer league teams between 1979 and 1998. As expected poor performance is

identified as the main factor influencing the dismissal of the manager. Additionally

two intervening variables modify this relationship. The probability of a management

turnover increases in case of organizational turbulence due to turnover in the board

of directors as well as in case of an intensive local media coverage. Examining the

effects of managerial succession the analysis indicates a negative performance effect

even after controlling for prior performance. This effect seems to be enforced in case

of an outside successor.
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]



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Prior research and research question

The relationship between management turnover and organizational performance

remains, even after three decades of empirical research in this area, an importantquestion in organizational sociology as well as in sport management. Allen et al.

(1979) observe that given the crucial importance of this problem, there is a clear

need for an empirical analysis that can elucidate, in a rigorous and systematic

manner, the relationship between managerial succession and organizational

performance. With succession being the focal point of analysis two research

questions need to be addressed: (1) Is performance a central predictor of managerial

succession and (2) does succession have any impact on the following performance?

Focussing on sport teams as subject of investigation provides the researcher with a

highly comparable group of organizations. Sport teams show a very similar

organizational structure and are exposed to an almost identical set of environmental

factors. They pursue similar goals which considerably eases the measurement of

performance. Being in the center of public interest and subject to intensive coverage

in the media, sport teams and especially the German premier soccer league offer the

possibility of collecting a large sample with a detailed history of information.

Additionally sport teams as organizations are sufficiently small enough to allow a test

of the direct relationship between the succession of team managers and team

performance.

Prior research and common sense suggest that team performance is negatively

related to management turnover (Allen et. al., 1979 / Eitzen/Yetman, 1972). The

directors of the board intend to maximize team performance. Aspiration level theory

suggests that the current performance of a team is compared to a reference

performance (Greve, 1998 / Lant, 1992)). The reference performance is established

e.g. by the performance record of the nearest competitors or in relation to previously

set goals dependent on e.g. past performance history. Managers coaching teams

which experience a period of realized performance below the aspiration level should

be in danger of being dismissed. This turnover of the current team manager or coach

is seen as a measure to improve the team standing in such a period of dissatisfying

performance (Pfeffer/Davis-Blake, 1986).



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Apart from team performance several other intervening variables should be

considered additionally. Brown (1982) e.g. suggests that the rate of personnel

turnover is another important variable influencing management turnover. With the

board having the power to dismiss and select the team manager it might be

hypothesized that different types of boards exert different policies towards the

question of management turnover (Scully, 1992). Especially a newly established

board can be expected to be more willing to change the current manager in case of a

performance decrease since personal ties to the incumbent manager should be of

lesser importance. Not only board types but as well characteristics of the incumbent

manager should determine the performance succession relationship. A manager who

has build up a very good reputation during previous seasons should have more credit

or good will than a not so well accepted team manager. Consequently a better

reputation should weaken the relationship between performance and turnover. An

additional variable of potentially high importance to sports organizations might be

the intensity of media coverage. In case of a highly active local media at least the

visibility of the team performance and especially of the person in charge the team

manager or coach increases. The chance of being dismissed in times of poor

performance should increase as well under these circumstances.

In total, we expect team performance to be the major determinant of manager or

coach turnover. Additionally the probability of succession in times of poor

performance should increase with a relatively bad reputation of the manager or

coach, with a supervising board assuming office recently, with a high rate of

personnel turnover, and with a highly intensive local media coverage of the team.

The investigation of the process of managerial succession should not only focus on

the reason for turnover but as well discuss the effects of management turnover.

Although the change of the management obviously is intended as a measure of

performance improvement, succession does not necessarily fulfill these expectations.

Management turnover can result both in functional as well as in dysfunctional effects.

Dependent on the relative strength of each of these effects succession implies

positive, negative or even indifferent effects on performance. Apart from this rational,

succession might exert no influence at all on team performance. If the team manageris completely irrelevant in determining organizational results a change in his position



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should not cause any performance variation at all. His change in times of poor team

performance can thus be interpreted as a mere scapegoating process

(Gamson/Scotch, 1964).

Empirical results based on sport teams do not give a clear hint which succession

effect dominates (Brown, 1982). While e.g. Allen et al. (1979) in an empirical

examination of management turnover in baseball teams found a negative relationship

between during season turnover and performance, Scully (1992) reports a positive

turnover effect. But indifferent effects of turnover are reported as well. Both

Eitzen/Yetman (1972) and Pfeffer/Davis-Blake (1986) can not detect any positive or

negative effects at all. Obviously these conflicting results of empirical research need

some further attention (Allen et al., 1979). The relationship between succession and

following performance might be moderated by further variables (Pfeffer/Davis-Blake,

1986). Different turnover situations might result in a different performance

development following the turnover event. Again different types of managers might

be considered, as e.g. an internal successor could have a different impact on

performance than an outsider (Allen et al., 1979 / Guthrie/Datta, 1998). Coming from

inside the organization a successor is already informed in detail about strength and

weaknesses of a team and is able to draw on a wide range of previously established

personal ties. His knowledge of the organization should ease the process of

succession and reduce dysfunctional effects critical to the performance. On the other

hand an insider might be committed to much to past decisions and thereby causing

organizational rigidities in times were change and disruption is called for. Apart from

the knowledge about the organization successors can differ additionally in their

reputation and competency. This might as well contribute to a different evolution of

the performance following a change in the management position.

Both Eitzen/Yetman (1972) and Pfeffer/Davis-Blake (1986) point out, that previous

performance is a strong predictor of current performance. How far this relationship is

characterized by a so called regression to the mean effect or by a generally positive

relation, still remains to be investigated. The latter (positive) relationship could point

towards certain turnover-independent effects which determine performance in the

sense of structural stability, i. e. a team with a good reputation and a sound financial



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basis will always come up with rather good results more or less independent of the

managerial succession.

Again different factors based in the external or internal environment might have some

influence on the central turnover performance relationship. At least the influence of

these variables like intensity of media coverage, board experience and rate of

personnel turnover should be controlled for.

With the exception of only few prior empirical studies (Allen et al., 1979 / Audas et al.,

1997) most empirical research employed rather limited data sets in terms of size and

periods of investigation. Although sport teams provide the researcher with highly

comparable and possibly complex measures of organizational performance, most

prior studies limited their research to rather simple performance measures. As an

example, Allan et al. (1979) measure team performance as a dichotomous variable

separating high performing teams from teams having losing seasons by using a

team-winning percentage. Teams with a percentage over 0.5 are considered as

winning teams in this study. Moderating variables influencing the hypothesized

relationship between performance and turnover were only to a limited extend subject

of investigation. Keeping this in mind our analysis is both a replication and an

extension of the prior research on the performance turnover relationship among

professional sport teams. By using a relatively large data set over a period of 19

years we are able to perform a detailed investigation of the determinants and effects

of managerial succession in team sports.

In order to test the hypothesized relationships it is crucial to asses which kind of

measure is used to evaluate team performance. Those measures can be

characterized by the underlying time frame and the measure of reference. Team

management dismissal could be explained by actual or past performance. Whether

the manager is dismissed or not, depends on either team performance in relation to

other teams (objective performance) or on team performance in relation to intended

performance at the beginning of the season (subjective performance).



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Sample and measures

Sample

In order to examine the different research questions we use time series data on allGerman premier soccer league (Bundesliga) teams between 1979 and 1998.

During this period 5.888 matches took place.

As mentioned above we have to distinguish between different types of managerial

succession for professional sport teams. Figure 1 presents different types of

managerial succession and their frequency of occurrence within the period under

investigation.

Figure 1: Types of managerial succession and their frequency

regular, expected

n = 27

between two seasons

n = 31

during a season

n = 136

irregular

n = 167

change of team manager

(without interim managers)

n = 194

(F igure 1)

Due to the exceptional organizational turbulence caused by an irregularmanagement

change during a season this type of succession should display the highest

performance variance during the process of succession and thereby be the most

interesting one to investigate. Our empirical analysis is consequently focused on this

type of management change. In order to isolate determinants and effects of

management change we use a parallel design of analysis. Corresponding to each

turnover team we select a control team which is characterized by similar goals at the



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beginning of each season and similar ranking at the time of management change

(accumulated points from game one to the game of the management change).

Measures

The central measure of this analysis is concerned with the performance of the teams.

Generally two types of team performance can be distinguished: (a) Performance in

the regular national league, and (b) Performance in the national and European cup

competitions. We choose to focus on performance in the regular national league

because it is the most important competition, and more data points being dispersed

equally during the season are available. The measures of national league

performance can be characterized by the underlying time frameand the measure of

reference. Time frame refers to the evaluation of performance which is either

performance of the entire season or the performance of the last matches preceding

or following a change of the management. Differing between measures of reference

the performance of a soccer team can be expressed in relation to other teams

(objective performance) or in relation to intended performance at the beginning of the

season (subjective performance). Combining these two measures we can consider

four possibilities to express the team performance in the league matches of the

current season (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Performance in the league of the current season

m easure of reference

object ive performance subjective performance

timeframe

last

matches

entire

seasonppga

ppgak parik

pari

(Figure 2)



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Based on the convention that a team gets two points for a victory, one point for a tie

and zero points for a defeat we can compute a performance measure for each team

and each match (variable pag).i The average points of a team at any time of the

season is defined as:

(1)n

pag

ppga

n

1i

i== with n as the number of matches played in the current season.

The variable ppga represents the objective performance of the entire season. The

variable ppgak represents the objective performance of the last k matches:

(2)

k

pag

ppga

n

1kn

i

k

+= with k as an indicator how many matches are considered.

To define the subjective team performance we have to consider the different goals of

each team proclaimed before the season starts. Generally we can differentiate

between four goals measured on an ordinal scale: (1) the German championship, (2)

the qualifying for a European cup competition, (3) a place in the midfield of the

ranking, and (4) the avoiding of relegation. In order to identify individual goals at the

beginning of a season the German sport press was screened for interviews and

analysis containing information on this subject. A total of 349 articles made aclassification of individual goals possible. Since each of these goals depend on the

final ranking in the national league, the relationship between the ranking and the

aims can be presented as in figure 3.

Figure 3: Ranking and season goals

G o a l s

p r o c l a im e d

11 8 1 7 1 6 1 5 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

F i n a l

r a n k i n g

i n n a t io n a ll e a g u e

Avoiding

of

relegation

M

idfie

ld

Qualif

ying

for

aEuropean

cupco

m

petition

Cham

pionship

( F i g u r e 3 )



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Based on the results historically needed to reach each of the proclaimed goals it is

possible to determine the average number points to be reached in order to realize

each goal (variable ppgi). The subjective performance of the entire season is then

measured as:

(3)ppgi

ppgapari =

The subjective performance of the last k matches is:

(4)ppgi

ppgapari

kk = with k as an indicator how many matches are considered.

Performance may not only be measured as the performance of the current season

but as well as performance of the prior season. Consequently an additional

performance variable pps can be introduced which measures prior season

performance by average points per match.

Apart from measuring performance as an output variable directly related to results

obtained in the league competition, relevant performance has a financial dimension

as well. Because German soccer clubs are not obliged to disclose their financial

statements we have to use a proxy-variable in order to measure financial

performance. The number of visitors is potentially highly correlated with financial

performance of the clubs and therefore chosen as an additional performance

measure. The variable vis indicates the development of the number of visitors. It is

defined by the relationship between the average number of visitors of the last three

home matches to the average number of visitors of the 17 home matches before.

These 17 home matches correspond to one season.

The management change can be defined by a dichotomous variable (mc) with 0 as

no management change and 1 as management change. Furthermore, we

consider different personal characteristics of the manager. The variables former

experience and former success (fexp/fsuc) of a manager are generated from a

factor analysis incorporating variables like age, number of matches as a coach,

number of different coach positions in the German premier soccer league, average

points per match, number of previous titles, number of previous relegations or

previous dismissals. The variable ios expresses the type of succession: In case of


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an inside successor it is coded with the value 1, in case of an outside successor with

the value 2. Data on this variable is only available for teams changing their manager.

The turnover of the president of the board is expressed by a dichotomous variable

(board) with 0 as no turnover of the president of the board during the last twelve

months and 1 as turnover of the president of the board during the last twelve

months.

To measure the personal turnover of the players we use the variable turno which

expresses the relation between the number of active players of the own team to the

number of active players of all teams at any time of the season. To examine the

intensity of local media coverage we sent a questionnaire to 60 prominent soccer

sport journalists in Germany. Their perception of local media intensity was

aggregated to the variable media, which rates each club individually on a three

point ordinal scale.

Analysis and results

In order to test the above stated research questions we employ both bivariate and

multivariate statistical analysis. To investigate the determinants of management

change the dependent variable is dichotomous while the potentially important

independent variables show all different kinds of scales. Consequently a logistic

regression is an appropriate tool for a multivariate analysis in order to evaluate the

probability of management turnover contingent on different covariates. The second

main research question deals with the effects of management change on team

performance. In this case the dependent variable changes from being a dichotomous

to a cardinal scaled variable. Consequently a multivariate regression analysis is

employed.

Following our argumentation management change should mainly be determined by

team performance: poorly performing teams should be more prone to dismiss their

managers than their better performing counterparts.



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Figure 4: Performance differences prior to management change

m easure of reference

ob ject ive pe rformance sub jec tive pe rfo rmance

t

imefram

e

last

matches

entire

season

n m ean s.e .

change 112 0,5759* 0,3353

no

change112 0,9040* 0,4141

n m ean s.e.

change 112 0,5593* 0,3294

no

change112 0,8932* 0,4011

n m ean s.e.

change 116 0,7505 0,2545

no

change116 0,8260 0,2092

n m ean s.e.

change 116 0,7295 0,2229

no

change116 0,8170 0,1757

(Figure 4)

As figure 4 shows, teams changing their manager differ significantly from the control-

teams in two of four performance measures. Only short term performance seems to

influence managerial succession. We chose to employ a parallel design of analysis

determining a control team as a team without a management change but on a similar

ranking position as the changing team. Consequently the long term performance can

not vary between the two groups of change and no change teams. In this sense the

insignificant results in the long term performance validates our selection of control

teams. All performance differences are of the expected direction. In order to control

for other possibly intervening variables apart from the performance effect the

results of a logistic regression analysis (the covariates, their regression coefficientsand the level of significance along with the Wald statistic) are presented in the

following table 1. Since the different performance measures are highly correlated only

one of these measures (points achieved in relation to points intended last four

matches) is introduced into the regression in order to avoid problems of

multicollinearity.



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Table 1: Determinants of management change

variable b s.e. wald df sig r

points achieved in relation to

points intended last 4 games-3,1666 0,5766 30,1555 1 0,0000 -0,3288

turnover of the president of the board 1,7603 0,7375 5,6969 1 0,0170 0,1191

personell turnover of the players -0,4169 1,9037 0,0480 1 0,8267 0,0000

intensity of media coverage 1,0252 0,3039 11,3822 1 0,0007 0,1898

former experience of the

incumbent manager-0,1310 0,2042 0,4116 1 0,5211 0,0000

former success of the

incumbent manager-0,3702 0,2510 2,1757 1 0,1402 -0,0260

development of visitors -1,0432 0,6772 2,3732 1 0,1234 -0,0379

constant 2,5020 2,1738 1,3248 1 0,2497

Before the relevance of each covariate can be interpreted the models goodness of fit

needs to be assessed. With a chi-square of 69.06 (7 df) the model is highly

significant. Using all covariates 76.06% of all cases can be classified correctly. This

sufficient goodness of fit allows to interpret each coefficient of the regression.

Three out of the seven analyzed independent variables show a significant influence

on management change. The performance variable measuring the subjective

average performance within the four matches preceding the change shows a

negative coefficient which is highly significant. Teams with a managerial succession

performed worse before changing, in general, than the corresponding teams

experiencing no change in their top position. The two other variables with a

significant influence on managerial succession concern recent fluctuation within the

board and intensity of local media coverage. Both coefficients show a positive

relation to management change: the probability of management change increases

significantly in case a new president of the board has been appointed recently and in

case the whole team is exposed to intensive monitoring by the local press media.

Neither personnel turnover, other characteristics of the dismissed manager (former

success or experience) nor the development of the number of visitors show any

significant effect on managerial succession.

The second issue under investigation is the impact of management turnover on team

performance. This research question is adequately assessed by employing a



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multivariate regression analysis.ii Again, before discussing each independent variable

an assessment of the models fit is needed. As displayed in table 2 the relevant

model 1 is highly significant (F = 6,758) and explains nearly 18% of the total variance

of performance.

Table 2: Performance effects of management change

model 1 model 2

variable b s.e. beta T sig b s.e. beta T sig

constant 0,475 0,249 1,908 0,058 -0,061 0,383 -0,160 0,873

points per game

achieved before

management

change

0,113 0,090 0,100 1,265 0,208 0,075 0,123 0,067 0,608 0,544

performance

prior season0,444 0,123 0,277 3,599 0,000 0,607 0,193 0,346 3,152 0,002

turnover of the

president of the

board

0,013 0,064 -0,014 -0,202 0,840 0,065 0,079 0,079 0,822 0,413

personell

turnover of the

players

0,036 0,202 0,012 0,179 0,858 0,283 0,340 0,083 0,832 0,407

intensity of media

coverage0,018 0,031 0,042 0,596 0,552 0,049 0,046 0,102 1,053 0,295

management

change-0,130 0,039 -0,241 -3,307 0,001

type of

succession-0,024 0,056 -0,040 -0,418 0,677

sum sq df meansq

F sig sumsq

df meansq

F sig

regression 2,507 6 0,418 6,758 0,000 1,541 6 0,257 3,474 0,004

residuals 11,499 186 0,062 6,950 94 0,074

total 14,006 192 8,490 100

R2

0,179 0,181

Adjusted R2

0,153 0,129



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Only two of the six variables show significant coefficients. Both the performance of the

prior season and the management change are significant factors determining team

performance. The performance of the prior season is positively related to current

performance, indicating that teams who experienced a poor performance in the previous

season continue to perform badly in the current season and vice versa. In this sense this

coefficient can be interpreted as an indicator of stability. Although this effect is controlled

for, the management change still influences performance negatively. Teams changing

their management during the season perform worse after the change, in general, than

teams who do not change. This negative effect on performance of management change

remains true even with control teams who exhibit a similar poor performance level before

the change.

To assess the effect of different types of succession model 2 in table 2 presents the

results of a multiple regression analysis which introduces the insider/outsider distinction as

another independent variable in order to explain the performance after the change. As

control teams do not experience a management change by definition, data on these

teams can not be used in model 2. Contrary to the negative effect of a management

change in general, the type of successor coming from inside or outside the organization

does not influence the performance development following the turnover significantly. The

only important variable is performance of the prior season which again determines

current performance. Both performance measures exhibit a positive relationship.

In order to asses whether teams with an insider or outsider successor differ significantly

from no change control teams an analysis of variance is employed. The following table 3

presents the results of this analysis.

Table 3: Performance differences of succession type

a) Means and Standard Deviations

type of succession n mean s.d. groups compared Mean difference sig#

inside succesion 44 0,9292 0,3109 inside - outside 0,0428 0,733

outside succession 72 0,8863 0,2770 inside - no change -0,0940 0,176

no change 116 1,0231 0,2774 outside - no change -0,1368 0,006*

b) ANOVA results for change groups

mean square 0,446

F 5,541sig 0,004

# probability levels refer to mean difference of groups compared



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It can be seen that there is a general performance difference between control teams,

insider-, and outsider teams. With an F-value of 5.541 this difference is highly

significant. A rather conservative Scheff-test is used as a post-hoc test to evaluate

which groups differ individually from each other. While there seems to be no

significant difference between teams with an insider succession and control teams

nor between insider and outsider teams, the performance following an outsider

succession is obviously worse than the performance of the control teams. This might

be interpreted as a weak signal that outsider succession is the alternative with the

worst performance consequences.

Conclusion

This analysis provides some important insights into the relationship of performance

and management turnover among sport teams. As for the first research question,

whether performance determines the dismissal of the manager we can conclude that

consistent with expectations past performance constitutes the central determinant of

managerial succession in team sport. Especially the performance development within

the short term in relation to goals set at the beginning of the season seems to

influence the decision to replace the manager. Although performance is a central

variable two other factors board turnover and media intensity contribute as well to

an increase of the turnover probability. Managers are more prone to be dismissed in

case the president of the board has recently assumed his position. A new board

president obviously introduces more organizational turbulence in the sense of

reduced commitment to the status quo which together with weakened personal ties

creates a situation of increased instability in other leading positions of the

organization. Managerial succession is additionally enforced by intensive interest of

the local media in the doing of the sport team. In times of poor performance intensive

local media coverage might create substantial pressure on the supervising board to

take appropriate measures in order to improve the performance situation. The

supervising board assumes that a change in the team management helps to improve

the team performance. Consequently the probability of management turnover

increases.



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Although the dismissal of the manager is supposed to improve team performance this

effect does not seem to be supported by the data on the German premier soccer

league presented here. Dysfunctional effects obviously outweigh possible functional

consequences contributing to a deterioration of the performance following the

management change. This negative effect of succession is even true after controlling

for prior performance which shows a positive correlation with current performance.

The results presented here thereby not only support the early notion of Grusky

(1963), that managerial change has negative effects on team performance, but

enforces this result by controlling for several potentially important other intervening

variables. The distinction of different successor types helps additionally to support the

interpretation of increased dysfunctional effects of succession. Teams experiencing

an outsider succession especially compared to no change teams realize the

worst performance development following the turnover event. As an outsider can be

expected to have little or no knowledge of the organization nor to have well

developed personal ties to other members of the organization his succession

probably goes along with increased internal turbulence. Outsider succession can

consequently be characterized as mainly dysfunctional.

Although the analysis incorporates a wide range of potentially important variables

other factors could have an impact on team performance following the management

change. Time of succession in relation to different phases of a season might be an

influential factor, as e.g. a new manager assuming his position during the winter

break has more opportunity to establish a new strategy than a new manager who is

appointed during the active part of a season. The latter is forced to start with day to

day business which considerably reduces his possibilities to enforce a more long

term strategy. Moreover we did not check for different activities introduced by the

new managers. A more complex analysis in the sense of different successor types

might reveal a more detailed view on succession effects. This remains an interesting

field of empirical research in the area of sport management.



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References

Allen, M. P., Panian, S. K., Lotz, R. E.: Managerial Succession and OrganizationalPerformance - A Recalcitrant Problem Revisited, in: Administrative Science Quarterly

24 (1979), pp. 167-180.

Audas, R., Dobson, S., Goddard, J.: Team Performance and Managerial Change inthe English Football League, in: Economic Affairs, 17 (1997), pp. 30-36.

Brown, M. C.: Administrative Succession and Organizational Performance TheSuccession Effect, in: Administrative Science Quarterly 27 (1982), pp. 1-16.

Eitzen, D. S., Yetman, N. R.: Managerial Change, Longevity, and OrganizationalEffectiveness, in: Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (1972), pp. 110-116.

Gamson, W. A., Scotch, N. A.: Scapegoating in Baseball, in: American JournalSociology 70 (1964), pp. 69-72.

Greve, H. R.: Performance, Aspirations, and Risky Organizational Change, in:Administrative Science Quarterly 43 (1998), pp. 58-86.

Grusky, O.: Managerial Succession and Organizational Effectiveness, in: AmericanJournal of Sociology 69 (1963), pp. 21-31.

Guthrie, J. P., Datta, D. K.: Corporate Strategy, Executive Selection and FirmPerformance, in: Human Resource Management 37, 2 (1998), pp. 101-115.

Lant, T. K.: Aspiration Level Adaption: An Empirical Exploration, in: ManagementScience 38 (1992), pp. 623-644.

Pfeffer, J., Davis-Blake, A.: Administrative Succession and OrganizationalPerformance How Administrator Experience mediates the Succession Effect, in:Academy of Management Journal 29 (1986), pp. 72-83.

Scully, G. W.: Is Managerial Termination rational? Evidence from ProfessionalTeam Sports, in: Advances in the Economics of Sport 1 (1992), pp. 67-87.



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Appendix 1: List of variables

Abbreviation

Variable

mc management change

pag points actual game

ppga points per game achieved

ppgak points per game achieved last k games

ppgi points per game intended

pari points achieved in relation to points

intended

parik points achieved in relation to points

intended last k games

pps performance prior season

vis development of visitors (financial

performance)

board turnover of the president of the board

turno personnel turnover players

media intensity of media coverage

fexp former experience of the incumbent

manager

fsuc former success of the incumbent

manager

ios type of succession (insider/outsider)

i

Since 1995 the German premier soccer league awards a victory with three instead of two points. In order tomake the data comparable we re-coded these results to the former two-point rule.

iiThe assumptions of regression analysis especially linearity of the problem, no multicollinearity and normaldistribution of residuals are met by the data presented. Three influential outliers were eliminated beforestarting regression analysis.

1 sören salomo kai teichmann institute for business administration christian-albrechts-universität

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