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1 United Nations Intellectual History Project ▪Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies ▪The CUNY Graduate Center ▪www.UNhistory.o

The UN’s Role in Global Governance

There is no government for the world. Yet, onany given day, mail is delivered across borders;people travel from one country to another;goods and services are freighted across land, air,sea, and cyberspace; and a whole range of othercross-border activities take place in reasonableexpectation of safety and security for the people,groups, firms, and governments involved.Disruptions and threats are rare—indeed, inmany instances less frequent in the internationaldomain than in many sovereign countries thatshould have effective and functioninggovernments. That is to say, internationaltransactions are typically characterized by order,

stability, and predictability. This immediatelyraises a puzzle: How is the world governed evenin the absence of a world government? Whataccounts for the formal and informal norms,codes of conduct, and regulatory, surveillance,and compliance instruments?

The answer, Thomas G. Weiss and RameshThakur argue in Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey (2010), lies in a conceptthat has gained greater acceptance over the last

decade and a half—global governance.While in many ways theUN’s work has alwaysbeen devoted toimproving the way thatinternational societyoperates, the birth ofthe term can be tracedto the 1992 publicationof James Rosenau andErnst-Otto Czempiel’stheoretical collection ofessays Governancewithout Government . In

1995 the policy-oriented Commission on GlobalGovernance’s report Our Global Neighbourhoodwas published, the same year as the first issueof the journal Global Governance appeared.

This volume in the UNIHP series examinesnot only the theory of global governance but thepractice and more especially the UN’s intellectualand operational contributions. In accordancewith one of the project’s main conclusions—namely, that a host of different actors cometogether in predictable and unpredictable ways

in international attempts to address trans-boundary problems—our analysis not onlyhighlights the role of UN member states (the “First UN”) and the world body’s professionalsecretariats (the “Second UN”) but also of whatUNIHP has identified as the “Third UN.” TheThird UN is comprised of such nonstate actors asnongovernmental organizations (NGOs),academics, consultants, experts, independentcommissions, and other groups of individualswho routinely engage with the First and theSecond UNs and thereby influence the worldbody’s thinking, policies, priorities, and actions(see Briefing Note #3).

Weiss and Thakur explore the contributionby all three UNs in addressing collectivechallenges through the analytical lens of five “gaps” in global governance. Before identifyingthese gaps, however, it is necessary to firstdefine the concept of global governance.

Global Governance

Traditionally governance has been associatedwith “governing,” or with political authority,institutions, and, ultimately, control. Governance

in this sense denotes formal political institutionsthat both aim to coordinate and controlinterdependent social relations and that alsopossess the capacity to enforce decisions. Inrecent years, however, scholars have used “governance” to denote the regulation ofinterdependent relations in the absence ofoverarching political authority, such as in theinternational system. These may be visible butquite informal (e.g., practices or guidelines) ortemporary units (e.g., coalitions). But they mayalso be far more formal, taking the shape ofrules (laws, norms, codes of behavior) as well asconstituted institutions and practices (formal and

informal) to manage collective affairs by avariety of actors (state authorities,intergovernmental organizations, civil societyorganizations, and private sector entities).Through such mechanisms and arrangements,collective interests are articulated, rights andobligations are established, and differences aremediated.

Global governance can thus be defined asthe sum of laws, norms, policies, and institutions

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that define, constitute, and mediate trans-borderrelations between states, cultures, citizens,intergovernmental and nongovernmental

organizations, and the market. It embraces thetotality of institutions, policies, rules, practices,norms, procedures, and initiatives by whichstates and their citizens (indeed, humanity as awhole) try to bring more predictability, stability,and order to their responses to transnationalchallenges—such as climate change andenvironmental degradation, nuclear proliferation,and terrorism—which go beyond the capacity ofa single state to solve.

In addition to interdependence and agrowing recognition of the need for collectiveaction to face what former UN Secretary-General

Kofi Annan aptly called “problems withoutpassports,” the other explanation for theemergence of global governance stems from thesheer growth in numbers and importance ofnonstate entities, which also are conductingthemselves in new ways. Civil society actorsparticipate as advocates, activists, and also aspolicymakers in many instances. They playincreasingly active roles in shaping norms, laws,and policies at all levels of governance. Theircritiques and policy prescriptions havedemonstrable consequences in the governmentaland intergovernmental allocation of resourcesand the exercise of political, military, and

economic power.

State-centered structures (especially thoseof the UN system) that help ensure internationalorder now find themselves sharing more andmore of the governance stage. Depending onthe issue-area, geographic location, and timing,there are vast disparities in power and influenceamong states, intergovernmental organizations(IGOs), TNCs, and international NGOs.Consequently, today’s world is governed by anindistinct patchwork of authority that is asdiffuse as it is contingent. In particular, the IGOsthat collectively underpin global governance arenot only insufficient in number but areinadequately resourced, lack the requisite policyauthority and resource-mobilization capacity,and sometimes are incoherent in their separatepolicies and philosophies.

Despite its shortcomings, however, theUnited Nations is the most universal andlegitimate organization with the greatestpotential for expansion. Although the world

body cannot displace the responsibility of local,state, and national governments, it can andshould be the locus of multilateral diplomacy and

collective action to solve problems shared bymany countries. “Good” global governanceimplies, not exclusive policy jurisdiction, but anoptimal partnership between diverse types ofactors operating at the local, national, regional,and global levels.

Five Global Governance Gaps

In Global Governance and the UN , Weiss andThakur identify five gaps between the nature ofmany current global challenges and availableinadequate solutions. These gaps pertain to

knowledge, norms, policy, institutions, andcompliance. The extent of the UN’s success infilling these gaps has varied both within andbetween issue areas. In general, the world bodyhas been more effective in filling gaps inknowledge and norms than in making decisionswith teeth and acting upon them.

Knowledge Gaps

The first is the “knowledge gap.” With or withoutinstitutions and resources, there often is little orno consensus about the nature, causes, gravity,and magnitude of a problem, either about the

empirical information or the theoreticalexplanation. And there is often disagreementover the best remedies and solutions to theseproblems. Good examples are global warmingand nuclear weapons.

The United Nations has played a role infilling two knowledge gaps that are important forcontemporary notions of global governance. Formany global issues, there are well-definedideological stances, and empirical data may ormay not be sufficiently powerful to call intoquestion positions that often have been formedand hardened long before information has been

gathered and experiences registered. The roleof the state sector in the development processand in controlling market forces is a goodexample.

There are also issues like population in the1970s or global warming in the 1990s thatappear on the agenda because of a previouslyunknown or undervalued threat, and aboutwhich we do not have sufficient information—orwe have conflicting information—in order to

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make informed decisions. This constitutes adifferent type of knowledge gap for decisionmakers, but presumably one for which new

information can more easily have an impact thanin the face of rigid ideologies.

At least partially filling the knowledge gap isessential for dealing with the other gaps inglobal governance. If we can recognize thatthere is a problem and agree on its approximatedimensions, then we can take steps to solve it.While in a few cases the UN has generated newknowledge, more often it has provided an arenawhere existing information can be collated andcollected, a host of interpretations can be vetted,and differing interpretations of competing datadebated. Depending on the strength of political

coalitions and entrenched ideologies, there maybe more or less room for the actual increase inknowledge to make a difference in terms ofpolicy recommendations.

In the past, the First and Second UNs playeda relatively more important role both ingenerating data and in creating anddisseminating theoretical explanations than didcivil society. This is not to say that they do notcontinue to play these roles; but civil societyactors—such as universities, research institutes,scientific experts, think tanks, and NGOs—currently are playing a growing role in filling

knowledge gaps.

Normative Gaps

The second is the “normative gap.” A norm canbe defined statistically to mean the pattern ofbehavior that is most common or usual—or the “normal curve,” a widely prevalent pattern ofbehavior. Alternatively, it can be definedethically, to mean a pattern of behavior thatshould be followed in accordance with a givenvalue system—or the moral code of a society, agenerally accepted standard of proper behavior.

In some instances, the two meanings mayconverge in practice; in most cases, they willcomplement each other; but in some cases, theymay diverge.

Norms matter because people—ordinarycitizens as well as politicians and officials—careabout what others think of them. This is whyapprobation, and its logical corollary shaming, isoften effective in regulating social behavior. It isalso why the United Nations and especially its

Secretaries-General have often relied upon thebully pulpit.

The UN is an essential arena in which statesactually codify norms in the form of resolutionsand declarations (soft law) as well asconventions and treaties (hard law). As auniversal organization, it is an exceptional forumto seek consensus about normative approachesto address global challenges. Problems rangingfrom reducing acid rain to impeding moneylaundering, from halting pandemics toanathematizing terrorism are clear instances forwhich universal norms and approaches areemerging.

At the same time, the UN is a maddening

forum because dissent by powerful states ormischief by large coalitions of even less powerfulones means either no action occurs, oragreement is possible only on a lowest-common-denominator. The main source of ideas to fillnormative gaps is therefore quite likely to becivil society, the Third UN whose members oftenaffect change by working both with and throughthe other two United Nations, member statesand secretariats.

Policy Gaps

The third is the “policy gap.” By “policy” wemean the interlinked set of governing principlesand goals, and the agreed programs of action toimplement those principles and achieve thosegoals. “UN policy” documents may consist ofresolutions or international treaties andconventions.

UN policymakers are actually the worldbody’s principal political organs, the SecurityCouncil and the General Assembly. In theseintergovernmental forums the people makingpolicy decisions do so as delegates of nationalgovernments. And they make these choices

within the governing framework of their nationalforeign policies, under instructions, on allimportant policy issues, from their homegovernments. Or member states may make thepolicy choices directly themselves, for exampleat summit conferences.

It is worth noting a major disconnect inglobal governance. While the source and scale ofmost of today’s pressing challenges are global,and any effective solution to them must also be

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global, the policy authority for tackling themremains vested in states. The implementation ofmost “UN policy” (as determined by the First UN)

does not rest primarily with the United NationsSecretariat itself (the Second UN) but is kickedback upwards to member states.

Institutional Gaps

The fourth is the “institutional gap.” Institutionsare normally thought of as formal, organizationsbut they may also be informal entities. If policyis to escape the trap of being ad hoc, episodic, judgmental, and idiosyncratic, it must be housedwithin an institution with resources andautonomy.

There are international institutions that dealreasonably well with a problem area, and thosethat are most effective often deal with specificissues and have well-embedded norms andconsensus among member states. Manyinstitutions actually do make a difference toglobal governance: the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA), the UN Children’s Fund(better known by its acronym, UNICEF), theInternational Telecommunication Union, and theWorld Health Organization, to name but four.Positive examples thus should figure incontemporary discussions along with laments

about those that fall short, for example the lateCommission on Human Rights that was replacedby the Human Rights Council.

Institutional gaps often exist even whenknowledge, norms, and policies are in evidence.They can refer to the fact that there may be nooverarching global institution, in which casemany international aspects of problem-solvingmay be ignored—for example, the control ofnuclear weapons. Or it may be impossible toaddress a problem because of missing keymember states—e.g., the World TradeOrganization (WTO) before China’s entry. One

of the most obvious explanations for institutionalshortcomings, or gaps, is simply because theresources allocated are incommensurate withthe magnitude of a problem.

A second major disconnect in globalgovernance is that the coercive capacity tomobilize the resources necessary to tackle globalproblems remains vested in states, therebyeffectively incapacitating many internationalinstitutions. The institutional gap is especially

striking within the UN system because there areneither powerful, global institutions withoverarching authority over members nor even

flimsy ones whose resources are commensuratewith the size of the trans-border problems thatthey are supposed to address. Even the most “powerful” institutions such as the SecurityCouncil, the World Bank, and the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) often lack eitherappropriate resources or authority or both.

Although states establish institutions andpay the bills (sometimes), networks of expertspushed by activists in civil society usuallyexplain the impetus behind their emergence.Consensus among experts has been central torestructuring the UN system and to the creation

of new institutions to meet newly recognizedneeds.

However, the source of ideas about fillinginstitutional gaps is still more likely to begovernments and IGOs than nonstate actors.The absence of international political will meansthat many of these organizations are onlypartially constructed or remain largely ondrawing boards with only a small prototype toaddress gargantuan threats.

Compliance Gaps

The fifth and final is the “compliance gap,” whichhas three facets: implementation, monitoring,and enforcement. Recalcitrant or fragile actorsmay be unwilling or unable to implement agreedelements of international policy. Even if aninstitution exists, or a treaty is in effect, ormany elements of a working regime are in place,there is often a lack of political will to rely uponor even provide resources for the previouslyestablished institutions or processes. Second,who has the authority, responsibility, andcapacity to monitor that commitments made andobligations accepted are being implemented and

honored? Third, confronted with clear evidenceof non-compliance by one or more membersamidst them, the collective group may lack thestrength of conviction or commonality ofinterests to enforce the community norm.

The source of ideas to fill enforcement gapsis mixed: it is just as likely to be governmentsand intergovernmental organizations as it is civilsociety. The source of monitoring is as likely tobe civil society actors, for example Human

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Rights Watch, and states, for example theUnited States vis-à-vis Iran’s and North Korea’scompliance with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT) obligations, as it is to be internationalorganizations, for example the IAEA. The sourceof implementation is also likely to be mixed. Thepast six-and-a-half decades of UN history arethe story of the never-ending search for bettercompliance mechanisms within the constraints ofno overriding central authority.

One of the main institutional tactics withinsuch constraints has been “embarrassment,”which can result when either UN secretariats orNGOs, generate information and data aboutnon-compliance. With the exception of theSecurity Council, UN bodies can only make

“recommendations.” Hence, monitoring and thenpublicizing information about non-compliancemixed with the use of the bully pulpit has been acentral dynamic in efforts to secure compliance.

The cumulative challenge—some might saythe fatal shortcoming—of filling globalgovernance gaps is demonstrated by theextreme difficulty in ensuring actual compliance.Indeed, this last gap often appears as acomplete void because no ways exist to enforcedecisions, certainly not to compel them.Depending on a country’s relative power, thisgeneralization may vary because influential

organizations (especially the WTO, IMF, andWorld Bank) can make offers to developingcountries that they dare not refuse. The morerelevant and typical examples, however, are inthe area of international peace and security.Even though the UN Charter calls for them,there are no standing UN military forces andnever have been. The UN has to beg and borrowtroops, which are always on loan, and there isno functioning Military Staff Committee.

In the area of human rights, whether it ishard or soft law, there is often no enforcementcapability. Ad hoc tribunals and the InternationalCriminal Court are institutional steps that haveled to some indictments and convictions, whileassiduous efforts to monitor and publicize massatrocities have, on occasion at least, secured anenforcement response from the Security Councilin the form of collective sanctions, international judicial pursuit, and even military force.

In the area of international trade and finance,the WTO is considered a relatively effective

enforcement mechanism although it is amongthe youngest of IGOs. While it undoubtedly is animprovement from its predecessor, the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—that is,the WTO has some teeth—international tradedisputes are still largely regulated bilaterally.Monitoring by the Second and the Third UNs hasled to changes in policy and implementation bysome governments and corporations—that is,voluntary compliance by good citizens.

And finally, in the area of environment andsustainability, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol createdbinding emission targets for developed countries,a system whereby developed countries couldobtain credit toward their emission targets byfinancing energy-efficient projects and clean-

development mechanisms in less-developedcountries, and emissions trading (trading the “right to pollute”). Back-tracking, however,began almost before the ink was dry on thesignatures. As the world hurtles toward anirreversible tipping point on climate change,there is no way to ensure that even the largelyinadequate agreements on the books arerespected.

Each of these cases illustrates hesitant butinsufficient progress toward ensuring compliancewith agreed objectives. This progress has beeneasier to see in the areas of human rights and

trade. In the areas of security and theenvironment, regimes are in flux, and progressis more difficult to ascertain. The planet willremain hard pressed to respond to current andfuture challenges without more robustintergovernmental institutions.

The UN’s Ideational Role inGlobal Governance

The United Nations plays four essential roles asan intellectual actor. These are managingknowledge, developing norms, promulgating

recommendations, and institutionalizing ideas.

Basic research is done in universities, not inthe United Nations. Yet the UN is a knowledge-based and knowledge-managementorganization. Flagging issues and keeping themin front of reluctant governments arequintessential UN tasks. The vehicles throughwhich idea-mongering occurs include expertgroups, organizing eminent persons into panels

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and study groups, and of course the global adhoc conferences that were especially prominentin the 1970s and 1990s.

One under-appreciated comparativeadvantage of the United Nations is its conveningcapacity and mobilizing power to help funnelknowledge from outside and to ensure itsdiscussion and dissemination amonggovernments. UN-sponsored world conferences,heads of government summits, and blue-ribboncommissions and panels have been used forframing issues, outlining choices, makingdecisions; for setting, even anticipating, theagenda; for framing the rules, including fordispute settlement; for pledging and mobilizingresources; for implementing collective decisions;

and for monitoring progress and recommendingmid-term corrections and adjustments.

Once information has been collected andknowledge gained that a problem is seriousenough to warrant attention by the internationalpolicy community, new norms need to bearticulated, disseminated, and institutionalized.In spite of the obvious problems ofaccommodating the perspectives of 192countries, the First UN is an essential way topermit the expression and eventual coagulationof official views from around the planet oninternational norms. Similarly, despite the

obvious problems of running a secretariat with amultitude of nationalities, cultures, languages,and administrative norms, the Second UN is alsoan ongoing bureaucratic experiment in openingup the range of inputs to include a wide range ofviews.

After norms begin to change and becomewidespread, a next step is to formulate a rangeof possibilities about how governments and theircitizens and IGOs can change behavior. When anemerging norm comes close to becoming auniversal norm, it is time to address specificapproaches to problem-solving, to fill the policygap. The policy stage refers to the statement ofprinciples and actions that an organization islikely to take in the event of particularcontingencies. The UN’s ability to consult widelyplays a large part in its ability to formulateoperational ideas. This is a function that isquintessentially in the job descriptions not onlyof member states but also of the Second UN, thestaff of international secretariats, who are oftencomplemented by trusted consultants, NGOs,

and expert groups from the Third UN. Policyideas are often discussed, disseminated, andagreed upon in public forums and global

conferences.

Once knowledge has been acquired, normsarticulated, and policies formulated, an existinginstitution can oversee their implementation andmonitoring. But if they are sufficiently distinctivefrom other problems, cohesive in their owncluster of attributes, and of sufficient gravity andscale, then the international community of statesmight well consider creating a new IGO (orhiving off part of an existing one) dedicated toaddressing this problem area.

Institutions embody ideas but can also

provide a platform from which to challengeexisting norms and received wisdom about thebest approaches to problem solving. For instance,the generalized system of preferences for lessindustrialized countries—which was hardly anitem on the conventional free-trade agenda—grew from both the UN Conference on Trade andDevelopment (UNCTAD) and GATT.

Conclusion

The story of global governance remains anunfinished journey because we are struggling to

find our way and are nowhere near finding asatisfactory destination. It is messy, untidy, andincoherent, with many different actors and theseparate parts often moving at different pacesand in different directions. Global governance iswhat the French would call a “faute de mieux,” akind of replacement or surrogate for authorityand enforcement for the contemporary world.Try as we might, the sum of many governanceinstruments, inadequately resourced andinsufficiently empowered to enforce collectivepolicies as they are, cannot replace the functionsof a global government.

The essential challenge in contemporaryglobal problem-solving remains a world withoutcentral authority for making policy choices andmobilizing the required resources to implementthem; and consequently, only second- or eventhird-best solutions are feasible at present.Generating ideas about how to attenuate all fivekinds of gaps is an essential task of the UnitedNations at the dawn of the new millennium.

Thomas G. Weiss

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