151d3-

151d3-155d5

Main Topic Resumes

151d3-

KNOWLEDGE IS PERCEPTION

Socrates explains what the thesis entails in a way ostensibly friendly to the thesis.

151d3-151e1

Socrates returns to what now becomes the central question of the dialogue: what is knowledge. He prohibits Theaetetus from pleading inability to answer, because if god wills it and gives Theaetetus courage, Theaetetus will be able. The καί joining god's will and god's giving Theaetetus courage may be epexegetic "i.e." In other words, giving Theaetetus courage is likely to be the form which god's will can take to make him able to answer the questions. At 148c9, Socrates himself en-couraged Theaetetus too, but without mention of any god. On the other hand, the καί could be linking two unrelated things: the god could, for instance, “be willing” in the form of inspiring ideas in Theaetetus’ mind, and Theaetetus for his part could pluck up his own courage.

Theaetetus rises to the occasion: he says it would be a shame for him not to give whatever answer he has, since Socrates is encouraging him thus. That brings to mind Socrates' statement to the jury that he will not agree to cease his philosophical activities, which consist in urging Athenians to care for their souls: he will continue to encourage Athenians to care for their souls. Theaetetus is an eager recipient of that advice.

Theaetetus present Socrates, not a god, as the one encouraging him with σοῦ γε οὕτω παρακελευομένου, but that does not exclude a god’s actions.

The suggestion of renewing their inquiry πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς marks the begin of a major structural element of the dialogue, the section on knowledge defined as perception. The same phrase, πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, occurs also at 187a9-b1 and 200d5, which mark the beginnings of two further major structural elements of the dialogue, namely the other two definitions of knowledge. Compare Euthyphro 11b2, where πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς marks a new turning point, Socrates' renewed request for a definition of piety, and Euthyphro 15c11, where Socrates' suggestion that they must begin yet again marks the end of the dialogue.

(151d3) πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὦ

Θεαίτητε, ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν· ὡς δ’ οὐχ

οἷός τ’ εἶ, μηδέποτ’ εἴπῃς. ἐὰν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλῃ καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, (5)

οἷός τ’ ἔσῃ.

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὕτω παρα-

κελευομένου αἰσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμεῖσθαι ὅτι

(e.) τις ἔχει λέγειν.

151d3 δὴ οὖν : GP 470.

151d5 μηδέποτ’: "don't even."

Platonic use of οὐ/μή + -ποτε is generally in middle and late dialogues: μηδέποτε (72 X) and μήποτε (22X), neither frequent in the earlier Socratic dialogues (μηδέποτε occurs Hi.Mi. 1X, Lys. 1X, and 2X apiece in Prot., Grg., and Euthd.: μήποτε 1X in Grg.); ουδέποτε (70 X total: 1X apiece in Ap., Chrm., Euthphr., Cri., Ly., Hi. Mi.; 7X in Grg., 2X in Clit.); οὔποτε (11 X: 1X in early dialogues (Ap.); οὐδεπώποτε (6X, including 1X in Ap. and Prot.); and μηδεπώποτε 1X (Phd.). Phd. has 27 of all 182 instances of οὐ/μή + -ποτε.

151d5 ἐὰν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλῃ καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ: καὶ = I.E.? Typical pairing of more general with more specific (find THeagic reference).

LSJ addendum entry lists this passage for ανδρίζω and translates "endow with moral strength."

151d7 Ἀλλὰ μέντοι: GP411.

151d8 αἰσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμεῖσθαι: αἰσχρὸν has a negative sense (moral repugnance) and so can take redundant μὴ οὐ. Cf. 181b6-7, R. 427e, Prt. 352d (αἰσχρόν ἐστι . . . μὴ οὐχὶ . . . φάναι) Sm. 2746 and especially 2748, KG 2.211-13 (citing this passage and 181b6-7).

151e1-152a9

Theaetetus suggests that knowledge is perception and claims to base this on his impression that someone who knows something perceives it. It is not at all clear at this point that Theaetetus is claiming that every instance of knowledge is an instance of perception or even what sort of perception Theaetetus means.

Discussion of αἴσθησις goes here: this is the first time used in philosophical way.

Socrates says that Protagoras too held that position and asks if Theaetetus has read Protagoras. Theaetetus says he has, many times. Once again, as happened at 148e1-5, we find that Theaetetus is young, but not inexperienced in these matters.

Theaetetus’ own opinion either expressly agrees with Protagoras, or he may not be fully aware that his current claim is equivalent to what Protagoras says. On the face of it, in spite of Socrates' claim, Protagoras' doctrine and Theaetetus' thesis are not equivalent.

If Theaetetus’ answer is something he has heard and adopted, how is it his offspring? It is, of course, perfectly plausible to say that anything I learn or read somewhere is my idea especially if I not only believe it, but can state it clearly and precisely, can prove it, and can reliably apply it, but claiming it as my offspring is rather strong. To extend the analogy, it seems that Socrates is midwiving Protagoras’ idea and Theaetetus is merely a surrogate parent or maybe wetnurse, and later on, as if to drive home the point that this is NOT Theaetetus’ idea, Socrates himself will revive Protagoras more than once to have him defend his offspring.

Right off the bat, Socrates formulates the Protagorean doctrine twice: first as the claim that individual humans are the measures of being and not being, and second as the claim not only that knowing a thing involves perceiving it, but that each thing is to the perceiver as it appears to the perceiver.

Socrates says that the Protagorean measure doctrine is equivalent to Theaetetus' definition (152a1-2). In order for them to be fully equivalent, they must hold over the same range and must imply each other. ἕκαστα 152a6 and πάντων χρημάτων 152a2-3 must have the same scope of reference.

The use of forms of εἶναι is striking. These may be existential uses or predicative uses with omitted predicates. That is, εἶναι may mean "exist" or "be (something or other)."

μέτρον investigate use of it.

The datives ἐμοί and σοί in 152a6-8 render 152a6-8 easily acceptable, for there surely are things which depend on who is perceiving. There were no datives in the Protagorean measure formula just prior at 152a2-4, however. If λέγει at 152a6 and 9 means "means," Socrates is reinterpreting the measure doctrine in a plausible way. If it means "says," then Protagoras himself formulated his measure doctrine at least once so that it applies to easily acceptable, plausible cases. Perhaps he did, but that does not really determine whether he also expanded it to include less plausible cases (i.e. Dapple honestly says "it seems to me that there are two apples on the table" whereas Dawl says "it seems to me that there is one apple on the table" in a case where there is verifiably only one apple on the table). Socrates will go on to interpret Protagoras' doctrine in the expanded, less plausible, way. Socrates will also interpret him as rejecting the idea that there are observer-independent facts (e.g. what the wind is like in itself).

When Socrates says κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα at 151e5, he is describing the inquiry as a common one. The midwife analogy leads us to expect that Socrates will possess expertise at examining, and it seems that he does insofar as he asks almost all the questions and provides almost all the content for the exploration, but that very fact seems to undermine the claim that it is Theaetetus’ offspring. It also seems to undermine the idea that it is a common inquiry: at the very least, the common-ality is an asymmetrical one.

(151e1) δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστάμενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι

τοῦτο ὃ ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὥς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί

ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις.

  {ΣΩ.} Εὖ γε καὶ γενναίως, ὦ παῖ· χρὴ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποφαι-

νόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα, (5)

γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαῖον τυγχάνει ὄν. αἴσθησις, φῄς, ἐπιστήμη;

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ναί.

  {ΣΩ.} Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι περὶ

152.

(a.) ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ’ ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα

ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ που “πάντων

χρημάτων μέτρον” ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, “τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι,

τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.” ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που;

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις. (5)

  {ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ

φαίνεται τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ

σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ;

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτω.

151e2 νυνὶ: -ί is demonstrative, and so νυνὶ more strongly indicates actual present than νῦν and occurs mostly with primary sequence. νυνὶ also at 158c.

151e3 αἴσθησις: Discussion here and above. Verb first used in dialogue at 144a3.

151e4 γε: GP 127. Cf. 154d3, 151e, 163c?.

151e4-5 ἀποφαινόμενον: short for ἀποφαίνομαι γνώμην περί τινος: Socrates just said at 150c5-6 αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποφαίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν. Cf. 170d4 for similar formulation.

151e6 γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαῖον τυγχάνει ὄν: indirect question? without introductory particle?

151e8 μέντοι: GP 400.

151e8 λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι: a negative use of φαυλ-. Cf. 147a1 (φαυλ- "ordinary," "easy," or "trivial") and 147c3-5 (φαυλ- "admirably simple"), 162b3 (φαυλ- used of bodies of Spartans, "not much to look at" (Levett and Burnyeat)), 173c7 (φαυλ- "inferior"), 179d4 and 6, 181b3, 194a3, 197a4. Is οὐ φαῦλον used in only some senses of φαῦλ? Cf. 152d2.

152a1-2 τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον: Stern, 89, says this preserves a distinction between appearances and being. Ironic.

152a3 ἄνθρωπον: without article, referring to the general concept with no individualization: so KG 1.590. Or could it be "A human" (i.e. any given one: individual but not specified? is that the same as KG????).

152a5 Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις: Stern, 89, asks why, if knowledge is immediate, could reading a book many times make someone understand it. Ironic.

152a6 οὕτω πως: Plato uses this locution 19X: it does not seem to be used of direct quotations, although nothing rules that out, but rather of things remembered (perhaps imperfectly: cf. Grg. 484b9), summarized, or paraphrased from something preceding. It underlines that the the current formulation will suffice for current purposes. Cf. 182a4.

152a6 and a9 λέγει: McDowell translates "means," but suggests that, given the similar wording at Cra. 386a1-3, it may be a quotation, and so "says" may be more correct. Given 1) οὕτω πως (see previous note), and 2) ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ, which balances out the μέν clause, it looks more like an interpretative application of the theory than Protagoras’ words. The similar wording of Cratylus is just that, similar (οἷα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνηται τὰ πράγματα [εἶναι], τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί· οἷα δ’ ἂν σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ σοί), but not exactly, and so again this seems to be a paraphrase rather than a fragment.

152a9 γὰρ: the γὰρ clause justifies the omitted affirmative answer What if

γὰρ οὖν has lost the inferential force of gar? It seems to have when it is negative ou gar oun.

152b1-152c7

Socrates indicates that the authority of a reputed wise person must be taken seriously. Parallels for arguments from authority? At 15dc8-9, after constructing an argument, Socrates reaffirms the claim that Protagoras was a wise person.

Socrates' first tack is to suggest a concrete example to which the measure doctrine applies well. Wind can appear cold to one person, but not cold to another, slightly so to one, greatly so to another. Which leads Socrates to the question: should we say that the wind itself is cold or not cold or believe Protagoras, who says it is cold to the cold-perceiving person and not cold to the not cold-perceiving person? Socrates' first option is nonsense: cold and hot are relative and cannot be applied to a thing in itself without some standard of comparison, perhaps implicit. Thus Socrates has given Theaetetus only one option, really.

There is, of course, a third option, which is that the wind itself has a certain temperature (compatible with the claim that it is cold/hot to one, not to another). That may be what Socrates intended by his first option, but it is not clearly what he said. The idea that the wind is a certain temperature independent of observers is simply ignored here. DID Plato/Soc. know iof temperature?

The questions from 152a6-c7 appear to have the form of premise and conclusion:

1. Protagoras’ doctrine: each person is the measure of what is for that person: whatever appears to a person is for that person (152a6-8)

2. With the wind blowing, one person shivers, another does not, one very much so, another slightly (152b2-3)

3. So, it appears φαίνεται cold to one, not to another (152b9)

4. Thus, by Protagoras' doctrine, the wind is cold to one, not cold to another (152b6-7)

5. The "appears" (of step 3) is perceiving (152b11)

6. Accordingly (ἄρα), appearing and perceiving are the same thing in the case of hot things and other such things (152c1-2)

7. Because the things which each perceives apparently are for each (152c2-3): a restatement of Protagoras’ doctrine.

8. Thus perception is in every case of being and is unerring, inasmuch as it is knowledge (152c5-6) OR could it be "Thus perception of being is in every case also unerring, since/as if it is knowledge."??

In step 2, "one very much so, another slightly" links the feeling of cold to measurement (more or less cold), calling to mind the “measure” in the measure doctrine. Step 3 offers more on the link: being the measure of something could plausibly consist in a thing's appearing such-and-such to someone. The Οὐκοῦν καὶ 152b9 of step 3 confirms this interpretation, since it is used "inviting assent to an inference, or to an addition to what has already received assent" (LSJ s.v.). Step 5 provides a crucial link from appearance (Protagorean doctrine) to perception (Theaetetus' definition). It must be meant to be uncontroversial and is presented as a new item continuing on from the last (δέ γε 152b11). Step 6 is the logical application of step 5 to the case of things like hot and cold. McDowell ad 152b1-c7 points out that "because" in step 6 does not fit: it would be better as "thus." McDowell suggests this presumably because Socrates is trying to show that Theaetetus' definition is equivalent to the Protagorean doctrine. Step 6 appears to be a generalization from a particular. Step 7 would provide an important step as a conclusion, but it makes little sense as a reason. As a conclusion, it would use the Protagorean doctrine (see step 1, 3, and 4) and step 5 to link being to perception. It is possible that γὰρ in step 7 should be δ’ ἄρ’, which would provide a "thus" instead of a "because." See 152c1n. and 152c2n. Step 8 generalizes step 7 to apply to all cases of perception. McDowell interprets ἀψευδὲς ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὖσα as "unerring, as if it is knowledge," claiming that the force of the words is, "This is what one would expect, if it were correct that perception is knowledge." Thus McDowell thinks that unerringness is derived from the Protagorean doctrine and constitutes an argument in favor of Theaetetus' definition of knowledge as perception.

Note that Plato equates word stems (φαίν-/φαν- and αἰσθ-) that occur in verbal and nominal forms. Other instances? Usage of ληρ-?

Saying that perception and appearance are the same "in such cases" (καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις 152c2) leaves open the question of the range over which "such cases" is valid. Perhaps the range intended here is simply cases where an authoritative answer depends on the observer's senses.

The verb "appear" φαίνεσθαι, as well as "perceive" αἰσθάνεσθαι, applies not only to sense perception, however. The Greek verbs work the same way as the English ones: they can also apply to things that are not sensible, as in "She appears virtuous." Thus both Theaetetus' definition and Plato's second explication of Protagoras' doctrine have two interpretations at this point, one restricted to sense perception, and one that applies to any predicate that can "appear" or "seem" to someone or that one can "perceive" more generally. The first is rather tame compared to the second.

Next, Socrates gets Theaetetus to agree that since perception is knowledge, it is always of what is and is ἀψευδὲς, "unerring" (Burnyeat/Levett), "free from falsehood" (McDowell). Socrates himself has injected into the discussion two important assumed qualities of knowledge, namely that it is ἀψευδὲς and always of what is. These assumptions are presumably not meant to undermine Socrates' claim that he himself does not know what knowledge is. Perhaps they are merely part of the everyday Greek understanding of ἐπιστήμη (has anyone investigated that?).

The status of Socrates' questions is interesting. He is ostensibly applying his midwifery and so not himself giving birth to his own ideas. And yet, he supplied the Protagorean doctrine and his questions form careful arguments, as seen above. And the questions come with little contribution from Theaetetus, aside from assent and occasional requests for more information. Theaetetus' role here is to react to Socrates' questions/suggestions. Socrates seems to be doing much more than eliciting ideas from Theaetetus and testing them. Find where Plato/Soc discusses explicitly who "owns" the arguments (Alcibiades I).

There is much to note for those who have read the dialogue through to the end prior to reading this section again. For example, Socrates' characterization of Protagoras as σοφὸν at 152b1 is ironic in light of Socrates' later contention that this theory of knowledge does not allow for ὁ σοφός or any expertise; reference to "the same" wind at 152b2 is nonsense in light of the radical Heraclitean flux model which renders sufficient stability for anything to ever be "the same" an impossibility; reference to the wind "itself" at 152b5 is meaningless according to a theory which has nothing but relatives and nothing "in itself"; and Theaetetus' reply, "it seems," Φαίνεται, at 152c7, is ironic in light of the fact that whatever seems to Theaetetus is the case and knowledge according to the theory, and there can be no independent verification of whether it is right or wrong within the theory. Thus the alert reader and translator is immediately faced with problems of expressing such a theory in Greek or any language. But Plato steadfastly ignores these concerns for the moment, all the while unavoidably arousing them.

(152b1)

(b.)   {ΣΩ.} Εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν· ἐπακολουθή-

σωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἆρ’ οὐκ ἐνίοτε πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ

ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγῷ, ὁ δ’ οὔ; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἠρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα;

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Καὶ μάλα.

  {ΣΩ.} Πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα (5)

ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ

ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγῶντι ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὔ;

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἔοικεν.

  {ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτω ἑκατέρῳ;

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ναί. (10)

  {ΣΩ.} Τὸ δέ γε “φαίνεται” αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν;

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἔστιν γάρ.

(c.)   {ΣΩ.} Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἔν τε θερμοῖς

καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος,

τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι.  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἔοικεν.

  {ΣΩ.} Αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεί ἐστιν καὶ ἀψευδὲς ὡς (5)

ἐπιστήμη οὖσα.

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Φαίνεται.

152b1 μέντοι: GP 400.

152b1 ληρεῖν: see 151c7 n.

152b3 ἠρέμα: LSJ 2 lists this as example of "slightly."

152b4 Καὶ μάλα: GP318. "ibidem saepe"

152b9 Οὐκοῦν καὶ: WOrk this up in a way that ties in with interpretation of argument structure above.

152b11 Τὸ δέ γε “φαίνεται” αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν: OTHER CASES WITH INFINITIVE as predicate?

Interpret δέ γε in a way that ties in with interpretation of argument structure above.

152c1, c2?, c5 ἄρα: precedent for three in a row?

152c2 γὰρ: see app. crit.

152c3: κινδυνεύει: Stern, 89, claims that with κινδυνεύει, Socrates preserves the possibility of one's being mistaken: the word itself does not seem sufficient to do so: if anything does so, it is the context. This particular use of κινδυνεύει means something more like, "the logic of the current argument leads one to conclude/think that," with a strong implication that the addressee will agree (as with "surely"), as at Crat. 394e9 and in countless other Platonic passages. There are other uses of it which appeal less to logic than to a vague sense of probability/likelihood or are closer to "seem," but they seem inappropriate here. WORK TO BE DONE HERE.

152c5 τοῦ ὄντος: sc. "the way one perceives it as being" (McDowell). Could it be existential?

152c5 καὶ ἀψευδὲς: McDowell's interpretation ad 152b1-c7 would be supported if this καὶ were epexegetical "i.e."

152c5-6 ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὖσα: what kind of ὡς and what kind of participle? McDowell ad 152b1-c7 translates "as if," saying that if it were causal "since it is knowledge," that would assume that perception is knowledge and derive unerringness from it, which would just be analytical of knowledge. Thus he says we should understand it as saying, "This is what one would expect, if it were correct that perception is knowledge."

152c8-153a5

Socrates claims that Protagoras spoke in riddles to the many and spoke the truth to his students. A surprised Theaetetus asks for more information, which shows that it seems like a leap to him. Socrates replies with what has come to be called the "Secret Doctrine," ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν 152c10. The use of ἀλήθεια is ironic given that Protagoras had written a work, which both Socrates and Theaetetus had presumably read, called Ἀλήθεια (we know the title only from 161c4). No one takes seriously the idea that Protagoras actually taught this secret doctrine any more than they do Socrates' claim that Homer held the doctrine too. McDowell ad 152c8-10 suggests that Plato labels it "the truth told in secret" because Protagoras' explicit doctrine has it as an implication. "Implication," however, seems too strong a word: perhaps Plato thought it was the best background explanation or just a good plausible one for the explicit doctrine. That explanation can only apply at greater remove to Heraclitus, Empedocles, Epicharmus, and Homer, and "all the wise men one after the other" (πάντες ἑξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ 152e2) as well as "the best of the poets," none of whom plausibly explicitly propounded the secret doctrine.

Socrates first explains that nothing is one itself in itself ἓν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν 156d2-3. μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιουοῦν 152d6-7 is a recapitulation of this idea but leaving off "itself in itself" αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ. Between the two statements, it becomes clearer that the doctrine is meant to deny unity, identity, and quality to every thing. "Itself in itself" apparently adds that these things are denied to every thing when each thing is considered apart from all other things, i.e., objectively.

The explanation continues: you could not correctly call it any thing or a thing of any sort (οὐδ’ ἄν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ’ ὁποιονοῦν τι 152d3-4), which indicates it would be a mistake to predicate an adjective (or noun) of anything. Including nouns seems an easier reading, but only adjectives feature in the immediately following examples. Socrates is clearly speaking about language, but the mistake is surely not linguistic: he means to comment on what language refers to.

There are two possibilities here:

a) Socrates is speaking about language (nouns and adjectives) and means to indicate that they are linguistically different, but the things to which they refer are not.

e.g. in "That is a cat" or "That is feline.” adjective and noun both refer to the natural kind.

b) Socrates is thinking about a difference underlying the linguistic distinction, perhaps that between kinds and qualities.

e.g. in "that is red" and "that is a cat,” "red" and "cat" refer to different sorts of entities, only one of which can be a proper name/kind.

For Plato on proper names/kinds, McDowell ad 152d2-e1 points to Cra. 423c9-424b3 and Sph. 261c6-262e2 and examples at 263a.

Next, Socrates gives an explanatory contrast (ἀλλ’ 152d4): if you call it large, it will also appear small (152d4-5), which must be the reason why it is incorrect to call it large. The example of the wind above at 152b5-7 makes it easy to interpret this as claiming that if one person says that x is large, another will say it is small. But that may not be right: it may include the possibility that the same thing will appear to the same person both small and large (cf. R. 479a-b, Phd. XXX, …).

Socrates' example qualities are large and small as well as heavy and lightweight (152d4-5). These terms refer to relative positions on two continua (size and weight). If the claim were confined to such predicates, it would be plausible, understandable, and relatively uncontroversial. The theory, however, denies unity, identity, and quality to every thing. Thus, the examples must be standing in for a much more varied set of things. How do we determine the scope of this set? "And thus all," (σύμπαντά τε οὕτως 152d5-6) trivially confirms that we are meant to expand the set, but does not indicate how: at the maximal end, it is restricted to things that can be predicated of other things (and so does not apply to the meaning of "and," for example). But it does not provide a criterion for determining how far to expand and where to stop.

Socrates wraps up with ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιουοῦν (152d6): no thing is one, no thing is any thing, and no thing is any sort of thing. This apparently splits "one itself in itself" into three categories.

i) every thing is either more than one in number OR just not one in number,

ii) even when (falsely) considered as a unity, that unity is more than one thing OR just not any given thing, and

iii) that thing is not qualifiable as this sort of thing without also being qualifiable as some incompatible sort of thing OR the incompatibles make the qualifications nonsense and so that thing is not qualifiable at all.

Next, Socrates says that all the things we mistakenly say "are" rather come to be from movement, change, and mixture in relation to one another (152d7-e1). The immediately following explanatory (γάρ) claim that nothing ever is (ἔστι), but in every case it comes to be (γίγνεται) confirms that the mistake consists in ἔστι instead of the correct γίγνεται.

"Movement, change, and mixture in relation to one another" (φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα 152d7) calls to mind the radical flux theory soon to come (τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν 156a5) and is the first hint of that theory in the dialogue. Nothing is clear about how movement, change, and mixture can account for what precedes (which itself is ambiguous still).

But perhaps more importantly, this new suggestion is based on the assumption that movement, change, and mixture do not belong to the things that are on whatever meaning of “to be” is operational before this point.

While it may seem plausible that being and becoming are distinct, it is not. It would be good to find a meaning of “to be” and “to become” that makes the two distinct in a way that reflects the usage in the dialogue. One might think that after something comes to be (γίγνεται), it is (ἔστι), but that would make Socrates' point ridiculous: after a thing comes to be heavy, it is heavy. That cannot be what Socrates means by γίγνεται. McDowell ad 152d7 compares Ti. 38a1. Instead, γίγνεται combined with ἀεί of 152e1 must refer to a process that does not ever cease and so causes things to never be any thing (for more than a moment?). Even on this interpretation, however, we may think we can say that at moment t in a process, a thing is (or is x). Problems with the status of "moments"? If there is no such thing, really, then Protagoras may be OK? Ancient understanding of velocity etc. might be telling here: arrow paradox. Possible confusion of things? Perhaps Plato did not have the conceptual apparatus and analysis to speak about this sort of thing.

Perhaps "coming to be" refers to the act of observation by an observer: a thing comes to be a thing and/or comes to be x when an observer observes it. In that case, it is not x simpliciter. It only is and only is x in relation to that observer. A problem with that idea is that "movement, change, and mixture," the cause or source of coming to be, is a decidedly cryptic way to refer to observation of a thing by an observer. What is more, the observer could be said to "be," which might be a problem, and the very mixtures, movements, and changes could be and they have to be mixtures, movements, and changes of something.

In what follows, consider chopping out MacDowell, or relegating his objections to serving my own interpretation rather than leading the way.

Further problems arise (cf. McDowell ad 152d2-e1). The secret doctrine mandates "come to be" instead of "be" not just for qualities but for statements of what things are. And yet, we might say that, for example, that cat over there is only a cat from one perspective. From another, it's fuel, or whatever its chemical makeup is (mostly water), or a time-slice of a larger spatio-temporal process (perhaps including just that cat, perhaps all its ancestors and descendents, perhaps all of life on earth, perhaps the food chain it is at the top of, perhaps the things that have occupied that box it is in), or perhaps it is really an instance of calico-ness that is qualified by felinity (if we, through some metaphysically weird but perhaps possible view, take color/pattern to be the fundamental basis of reality or at least just as fundamental as anything else), etc. Thus we might say that the perspective determines what it is: unless we find some reason why Protagoras et al. would reject these perspectival shifts, the secret doctrine is free to both focus on perceptual qualities and include "come to be" applied to what things are in addition to their qualities.

The doctrine implies radical instability of perceptibles: why should perceiver-object relations be so unstable, MacDowell asks? A reply might be that even if there are somewhat stable perceiver-object relations, not all of them are so stable, and given that we cannot specify some reliable way to differentiate the stable from the unstable ones, all are suspect. Moreover, it's not just perceiver-object relations that are unstable according to the theory. One or more stable perceiver-object relations do not vitiate the claim that there will always be other (unstable) perceiver-object relations to what those stable perceivers say is the same object, by different perceivers and those other perceive-object relations are incompatible with the stable one(s).

The third problem McDowell sees is that at this point in the dialogue, the detailed description of perception is yet to occur, and the things in the present passage that recommend this interpretation are amenable to other interpretations. This, however, is not a difficult problem: there is enough in the present passage to raise the possibility of a focus on perceptual qualities, and Theaetetus' definition is, after all, focussed on perception, so the focus on perceptual qualities has been prepared and motivated. That it would have been more fully motivated by prior discussion of the details of perception does not mean it is not the right interpretation.

The fourth problem McDowell sees is that there is a parallelism between the Timaeus and the Theaetetus with which this interpretation does not mesh well. Namely, Timaeus 27d5-28a4 and 37e5-38b5 suggest there are two sorts of subject matter, one unchanging (forms), the other changing (perceptibles). The verb "be" works with the first. The verb "come to be" works with the second. This connection of perceptibles with "coming to be" parallels the Theaetetus and is not likely accidental, but the interpretation of the secret doctrine which stresses perceiver-object relations does not sit well with the Timaeus. WOrk on Timaeus here, also find what other dialogues McDowell refers to). Whether or not McDowell's claim is true, there are obvious ways around it (stressing the fact that not all of the ideas in all of Plato's dialogues sit well with each other being the first one that comes to mind).

Because of McDowell's objections to an interpretation of the secret doctrine which lays the focus on relational perceptual qualities, he suggests another interpretation. Starting from an observation that 152d4-6 (if you call a thing small it will also appear large, etc.) is reminiscent of R. 478e7-480a13, where there is an argument with a conclusion that looks like the secret doctrine (McDowell refers to "a number of passages in earlier dialogues," but does not identify them: Phaedo has one), McDowell suggests that this passage should be interpreted as another version of that position. NEED FURTHER WORK HERE ON MCDOWELL'S SUGGESTION (McDowell p. 124-128). cf. Sph. 259d.

A further alternative interpretation would consist in expanding the scope of the secret doctrine to include all sorts of relationships, not just observer-observed. "x comes to be (y)" might refer to the isolating of any x-y relation at all out from an infinite number of possible relations between an infinite number of possible things. The relations are not only infinite but always changing as things move, change, and are juxtaposed differently (and even in a static instantaneous moment’s time slice, every “thing” always has infinite relations to other “things” including infinite aspects of itself). Of course, from any given observer's viewpoint, things might seem stable, and even reliably so. In this more expansive version of the secret doctrine, note that we have to add to the formulation above. Namely, we have to change it to "any thing treated as one thing is related in infinite ways to an infinite number of other things treated as single things." The reason is that the theory denies that any thing is one thing, and so in order for there to be any relationship, things that are not unitary must be treated as unitary. The theory apparently holds that the relationships are all always already out there to be isolated, perceived, known rather than suggesting that they are created with each new observation. There is no apparent need for radical flux.

Why does Socrates add all the philosophers and poets?McDowell ad 152e2-9 suggests that Parmenides is conspicuously absent and would indeed oppose the secret doctrine. McDowell ad 152e2-9 is sceptical that the secret doctrine is Heraclitean in any real sense (he thinks the secret doctrine is thoroughly Platonic, as his argument about the similarity to R. 478e7-481a13 shows).

Then Socrates asks "Or doesn't it seem so to you?" It is not clear what the "it" is to which Theaetetus assents: all of what Socrates has just said? or the immediately preceding interpretation of Homer? This lack of clarity highlights the appearance that Theaetetus is somewhat extraneous and not contributing anything at this point.

Next Socrates says that no one resisting such an army, with Homer as its general, could avoid being ridiculous. Theaetetus' reply, that it would not be easy, could be anything from emphatically (but litotically) negative to evasive. Ridicule does not always stop Platonic characters (examples?).

(152c8)

  {ΣΩ.} Ἆρ’ οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ Πρω-

ταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ᾐνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ,

τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν; (10)

(d.)   {ΘΕΑΙ.} Πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις;

  {ΣΩ.} Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλ’ οὐ φαῦλον λόγον, ὡς ἄρα ἓν

μὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ’ ἄν τι προσείποις

ὀρθῶς οὐδ’ ὁποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς,

καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κοῦφον, σύμπαντά τε (5)

οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιουοῦν·

ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα

γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δή φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγο-

(e.) ρεύοντες· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ’ οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται.

καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἑξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου

συμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπε-

δοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας,

κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος, <ὃς> (5)

εἰπών—

      Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν (6)

πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ (7)

τοῦτο λέγειν;

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἔμοιγε.

153.

(a.)   {ΣΩ.} Τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρός γε τοσοῦτον στρατόπεδον καὶ

στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον δύναιτο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ οὐ κατα-

γέλαστος γενέσθαι;

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

  {ΣΩ.} Οὐ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε.

152c8 πρὸς Χαρίτων: why the Charites?

152c8 πάσσοφός τις: note here.

152c9 τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ: note here about use of the many in Plato. also this particular word.

152d2 καὶ μάλ’: GP317.

152d4 ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς: Is the hos normal? Investigate usage.

152d6 ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιουοῦν:

1) ὡς indicates that the gen. abs. is causal (Sm.§2086).

2)The participle with ὡς usually has οὐ (Sm. §2732) in contradistinction to the conditional μή + particle. Sm.§2689 says μή is used "when a person or thing is to be characterized as conceived of rather than real," which presumably applies to all compounds of μή (cf. Sm. §2736).

3) In prose, Greek gen. abs. does not omit ὤν (Sm.§2074.3).

152d7-8 ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δή φαμεν εἶναι: This idea is restated several times.

· 152e8 πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως

· 153a6-7 τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει (153a5-d5 contains specific examples of movement’s generative effects)

· 156a4-b1 ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἔκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δέ

· 156c7-d3 ταῦτα πάντα μὲν ὥσπερ λέγομεν κινεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτὴς ἔνι τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω δὴ γεννᾷ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ θάττω ἐστίν. φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν.

· 157a1-3 ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως

· 160d7-8 οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα

· 168b4-5 κινεῖσθαί τε ἀποφαινόμενοι τὰ πάντα

· 180d7 πάντα κινεῖται

· 181c1 τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι (the account which follows, which contains a Socratic analysis of what movement could mean in this idea, has further versions of parts of the idea).

152e1 γίγνεται: this Greek verb can be used sans predicate, as in "there comes to be x" or “x comes to be” or with a predicate (often merely understood), as in "x comes to be y." Here, for reasons discussed above, it is unlikely to be the sans-predicate use. McDowell ad 152d2-e1 fin. suggests that at 153e7 and 154a2, Plato uses it in the complete sans predicate use. Cf. 153e7 and 154a2n.

152e3 συμφερέσθων : why dual? See Stallbaum (KG 1.72 refers to "Stallbaum-Wohlrab" (who take the dual as referring to Heraclitus and Protagoras as one and Empedocles as the other) and "Dissen ad Pind. P 39 ed. Goth." (who takes the dual as referring to philosophers and poets))

Clearly there are multiple people as the subject. If it is dual, there must be a reason, mustn't there? What is it? app. crit. shows some disagreement (Stobaeus read συμφέρονται).

153a1-3 Τίς οὖν ἂν . . . δύναιτο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι: μὴ οὐ is the normal construction after both positive and negated verbs of negative sense (this sentence has "negative sense" as a question): so KG 2.211(§5), who, however, claim this passage as an exception at 2.216 (they read just μὴ without οὐ with β,T, Eusebius, and Stobaeus).

153a5-153d7

McDowell has absolutely no comment on this section, but is puzzled by the introduction of spatial motion just a bit earlier.

Socrates suggests that there is sufficient evidence for the claim that motion and change cause seeming to be and becoming, while rest causes not being and destruction. Socrates produces four pieces of evidence, none of which is worth much, WHICH MAKES ONE WONDER WHY PLATO INCLUDED THEM.

But before considering them, it is worth remembering that the very statement of this theory has become problematic, by Socrates’ own account. For speaking of x as though it is and is stably in relation to some y is, on Socrates’ account, not correct. That is either because of or in addition to the fact that every claim q about x will have some counterclaim r about x that is incompatible with q. Socrates plunges on, ignoring the impossibility of coherently continuing to speak if the speaker takes the secret doctrine seriously.

The four pieces of evidence:

1. Heat and fire generate and control everything and are themselves generated by movement and friction, which are motions.

2. Living beings’ bodies are preserved by the same things (motion and change) and destroyed by the same things (rest and inaction): their souls acquire and preserve learnings and become better by learning and practice, which are motions, but don't learn anything by rest, which is lack of practice and ignorance, and forget what they have learned.

a. So motion is the good whereas rest is bad in both soul and body: Socrates introduces value judgement, presumably based on the assumption that learning is good, while forgetting and not learning are bad, which is based on the claim that learning is motion.

3. Calms at sea and on land putrefy and destroy, whereas other things preserve.

4. If the motion of the heavens should stop, every thing would be destroyed and become topsy-turvy.

The evidence of 1, 3, and 4 consist of things easily described as physical movement and rest. Parts of the second example, living beings, seem a bit different. Learning and caring about something do not seem so obviously to be movements. Given that the relation between perceiving by the senses and perceiving with the mind is an issue in the Theaetetus, it bears noticing here that Socrates simply assimilates learning and caring about things, which are mental happenings, to obviously physical movements which are external to what we woud call the mind.

All of these are underexplained and at best insufficient evidence for the claim that motion and change cause seeming to be and becoming, while rest causes not being and destruction. We could easily construct equally plausible counterclaims and find many exeptions, all while restricting ourselves to things which ancient Greeks believed, but that is uncalled for. In any case, the evidence raises more questions than it answers. Theaetetus, however, in the face of the obvious worthlessness of the examples, agrees that they make clear what Socrates is saying, thereby furthering the impression that he has become but a cipher.

Within the drama of the dialogue, we might defend Theaetetus by saying that he does not object because he is giving Socrates the benefit of the doubt and allowing him to lay out his theory. That would, however, underscore the impression that the midwifery metaphor is inapposite: this is no longer Theaetetus’ baby. If Socrates is still midwifing someone else’s offspring, he has shifted patients to Protagoras and made Theaetetus his assistant.

From the outside of the dialogue looking in, as readers, we are silent (how could we address Socrates, after all?), but these examples cannot help but provoke. It is not just that in our age, we find the evidence unconvincing: Socrates’ contemporaries would surely have raised objections to the claims given here. But more than that, we are first told a theory that appears to deny every single is, then we are told that fire is and processes are and creations are. If they are not, then the doctrine is speaking of something that is not, whether that is is an is of existence, verity, or just a copulative: no is exists, is true, or is qualifiable in any way any longer. Thus the purported evidence for the theory immediately dissolves into nonsense, and quite obviously so.

Plato spends a good deal of time on these preposterous examples: surely he realized that they could serve to fire up objections, build up desire to see solutions, as well as suspicion that eventually, he will return to point out the incoherence of the theory, the impossibility of coherently believing or stating it.

At this point, assertive readers could be fairly desperate for a glimpse of coherence in any continued discussion of this utterly corrosive theory.

Bringing in evaluative assessments (good and bad at 153c3-4) only serves to aggravate the situation. But words, like thought, need not be stopped by incoherence.

We get no hint of Theatetus’ fictional state of mind: he hardly betrays any reaction. Thus Socrates and Theaetetus continue.

(153a5) ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ λόγῳ (5)

σημεῖα ἱκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι

κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία· τὸ

γὰρ θερμόν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τἆλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτρο-

πεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως· τούτω δὲ

κινήσεις. ἢ οὐχ αὗται γενέσεις πυρός; (10)

(b.)   {ΘΕΑΙ.} Αὗται μὲν οὖν.

  {ΣΩ.} Καὶ μὴν τό γε τῶν ζῴων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν

τούτων φύεται.

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Πῶς δ’ οὔ;

  {ΣΩ.} Τί δέ; ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν (5)

καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεως ἐπὶ

πολὺ σῴζεται;

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ναί.

  {ΣΩ.} Ἡ δ’ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως μὲν καὶ

μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων, κτᾶταί τε μαθήματα καὶ σῴζεται (10)

καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ’ ἡσυχίας, ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ

(c.) ἀμαθίας οὔσης, οὔτε τι μανθάνει ἅ τε ἂν μάθῃ ἐπιλανθάνεται;

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Καὶ μάλα.

  {ΣΩ.} Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθὸν κίνησις κατά τε ψυχὴν καὶ

κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοὐναντίον;

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἔοικεν. (5)

  {ΣΩ.} Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ

ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι,

τὰ δ’ ἕτερα σῴζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, [ἀναγκάζω]

προσβιβάζω τὴν χρυσῆν σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον

(d.) Ὅμηρος λέγει, καὶ δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ᾖ

κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, πάντα ἔστι καὶ σῴζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς

τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις, εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθέν, πάντα

χρήματ’ ἂν διαφθαρείη καὶ γένοιτ’ ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω

κάτω πάντα; (5)

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀλλ’ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα δηλοῦν

ἅπερ λέγεις.

153a5 ἐπεὶ καὶ: GP 297.

153a6 σημεῖα ἱκανά: explore use of this to label logical status.

153a6-7 τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία: this sort of thought might easily have led to taking processes as the fundamental basis of reality rather than statuses.

153a7-8 τὸ γὰρ θερμόν τε καὶ πῦρ: article common to two nouns.

153a8 ἐπιτροπεύει: explore this verb and its metaphorical use. What could it mean here?

153b1 μὲν οὖν : GP 477.

153b2: Καὶ μὴν: καὶ μήν progressive introducing a new point: GP καὶ μήν 1.

153b5 μὲν: GP 373n.

153c1 οὔτε τι μανθάνει ἅ τε ἂν μάθῃ ἐπιλανθάνεται: for οὔτε . . . τε . . ., see KG 2.292, who refer to Stallbaum ad Ap. 26c. Sm. 2945 notes that the " τε clause often denotes the contrary of that set forth in the οὔτε clause (so far from).

153c2 Καὶ μάλα: : GP318.

153c3 κατά τε ψυχὴν: τε usually comes immediately after the word which is the most relevant item being joined with another item. When that word is so tightly bound to another that they form a unit, τε can come between the two, as in this prepositional phrase: so KG 2.245, citing this passage, and Sm. 2983a. IS the preposition more commonly repeated or not (Sm. Phil. 24b example where it is not (the prep. is en). See Stallbaum ad Menex 240 a and KG fn. 2 at 2.245.

153c8 τὰ δ’ ἕτερα: frequently used for "the opposite"?

153c8 τὸν κολοφῶνα: Riddell §11 claims that this is in apposition to the sentence, must be accusative, and thus shows that other cases of apposition to the sentence must be accusative. He further claims (§13) that "not the internal force but merely the rhetorical or logical form of the sentence is in view. It might be said that they are predicates, while the sentence itself is the subject."

153c8 [ἀναγκάζω]: Stallbaum approved of this word, citing Heindorf's note: "ἀναγκάζω probandi hoc loco et evincendi vim habet, ut saepe. Sic p. 196b τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἠναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδῆ δόξαν."

153c9 τὴν χρυσῆν σειρὰν: Iliad VII 17ff.

153c9 ὡς: apparently introducing indirect speech, but dependent on what?

153c9-d1 οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον Ὅμηρος λέγει: other Homeric analysis in Plato and elsewhere.

153d2 κινουμένη: an adjectivized participle, somewhat like English present progressive "is being moved": cf. Smyth §1857, 1961.

153d6 Ἀλλ’: GP 19.

153d4-5 τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα: search and make note

153d8-154d7

Soc. explores some unexpected (by Theaet.?) aspects of the theory: radical instability and that nothing is. Contradiction of theory and intuition results.

153d8-154a9

As a case of perception, color perception connects back to the definition of knowledge as perception. Nonetheless, this section is not clearly tied to what immediately precedes it. It begins with an argument about the color white and the eyes (153d8-12). It is not clear why we are talking about that nor why Socrates next offers a somewhat mechanical explanation of visual perception nor why from there he jumps to talking about the privacy of visual perception, nor why from there he jumps to talking about the possibility that humans visually perceive the same colors as dogs nor why from there he jumps to talking about the possibility of any thing at all appearing the same to Theaetetus as to another man, nor why from there he jumps to the impossibility that any thing appears the same to Theaetetus himself, who does not remain the same. The leaps are not huge, but there are gaps and no time or effort is spent making the connections clear.

Seeing White: where white is not

Socrates does not say that white is or that eyes are: he says “what you call the color white” and “in the case of/in relation to the eyes.” 4 claims are made:

1. The color white is not outside of the eyes.

2. The color white is not in the eyes.

3. It would/could not be assigned to any place.

4. If it were, it would already be in its place and stable and would not be coming to be.

We might fill in some gaps by supposing that 1 and 2 are exhaustive: there is nowhere else for it to be. Thus 3 could be a conclusion based on 1 and 2. 4 starts with a γὰρ and assumes the contrary of 3, draws consequences from that assumption, and implicitly concludes that the assumption results in a contradiction and so 3 must be true. Thus it is an argumentum ad absurdum.

The problem with this interpretation is that later on, at 154a2, color is said to be a thing “between,” and it is hard to see how to take “between” if it is not spatial (between the eye and the object). Furthermore, at 156e5, the thing observed is said to become filled with color when it is observed. In that case, the color is in the thing observed. The puzzle can be solved, however, if we see this argument not as claiming that color is nowhere, full stop, but rather that color is nowhere outside of and independent of the eyes, waiting there to be observed. When it comes to be, it is only as part of a process in which it is produced.

Following the argument

After suggesting color as an example, and arguing that it is nowhere, Socrates suggests following the “recent account” (τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ 153e4), the account positing that no thing is one thing itself in itself (which harks back to 152d2-6). Thus Socrates sets up an expectation that what follows will apply that account to something. On a charitable reading, in what follows, Socrates should be applying the account, but how or that it does so is not so clear. Questions arise immediately in what follows: are the eyes, the movement, or the thing between them (or the trio of these things) unities? do they (or does their combination) exist? are they (or their combination) things in themselves? the answers to all of these questions must be “no” if we are to follow the account, but how does that make sense?

Seeing colors:

Next occurs a series of claims generalized to all colors and eyes: clearly, the example of white was meant to be illustrative and Socrates feels entitled now to generalize from it to all colors. But in the same breath as the generalization come other moves that are less well prepared. Namely, the claim that any given color has come to be from the contact or application of the eyes to the appropriate movement (τὴν προσήκουσαν φοράν 153e6-7). It is not clear what this “movement” is (although it does seem to be treated as one thing itself in itself, as are the eyes). It is “appropriate” presumably because it is such as to play the appropriate role in the coming to be and account of color: thus it seems to be some thing itself in itself (unless there is some good account of what that means and explains that it does not apply in this case). The color itself is neither the contactor nor the contacted, and it is not really fully clarified what plays which role (153e6-7 seems to say contactor =eyes, contacted=φορά, and so this interpretation follows that line).

Three things?

Next we are told that color is “a thing having come to be between private to each.” “Between” appears to mean between the contactor and the contacted: they are the two things mentioned so far and so color must be between them. Color is a third thing, a μεταξύ τι. Being a μεταξύ τι may not exclude the possibility that it is but the contact between the two things, not some third thing in addition to them. But then why use the perfect “having come to be” (γεγονός 154a2), which picks up on γεγενημένον from earlier in the sentence? The perfect seems to introduce not only a possible permanence by implying that this coming-to-be happened and so is now a thing-having-happened but also to make this a thing in itself. We already have some seemingly unified things-in-themselves, namely eyes and a motion for each color: why can’t the unity of eyes+object+thing-in-between be a thing in itself? That we have no name for this observational process as a whole means nothing as to whether it is a thing in itself.

Privacy concerns

ἑκάστῳ depends on ἴδιον. The wind example of 152b1-3 probably hangs in the background making the claim of privacy more plausible. But as an adjective, what does ἑκάστῳ modify? It could be τὸ προσβάλλον or τὸ προσβαλλόμενον, or both separately, but it is probably χρῶμα: ἕκαστον (χρῶμα) of 153e7 makes it likely that this ἑκάστῳ modifies an understood χρώματι. And the sentences following contain a further ἕκαστον χρῶμα (154a3) and can easily be read as conforming to the current claim that ἑκάστῳ modifies an understood χρώματι (i.e. the whole trio of προσβάλλον or τὸ προσβαλλόμενον and the “private thing between” which is also called χρῶμα). ἑκάστῳ could, however, also modify the perceived alone (i.e. the φορά) or the perceiver alone (i.e. the eyes). That ἑκάστῳ modify the perceiver alone would make immediate easy sense given the sentences following about dogs, other animals, multiple humans, and the same human (154a2-8), because those instances concern perceivers who differ in different ways and the possibility of different perceivers having identical perceptions.

Although ἑκάστῳ can modify more than one thing, if it does so, problems may arise. If it modifies more than one thing, it could be different things to each one. But there is no way to know whether it is different for each, particularly if knowledge is perception, for one has no access to it except via perception, and each perception is itself a private thing: the private things would plethorize if we have to observe each of them separately and so set up a situation involving yet further private things, which in turn must be observed separately and involve yet further private things, etc. Perhaps, however, there is some way to access it. Even so, problems arise, for then why call each of these “color.” It seems most likely that it modifies χρῶμα alone, for that raises fewest problems: “Color is a private intermediate thing for each color.”

Going to the dogs

Next, Socrates brings a dog and some other animals into the conversation and asks a loaded (διισχυρίσαιο) question that amounts to a claim that dogs, humans, and other animals do not perceive colors the same as each other. Keep modern findings about these sorts of things out of this: the ancients could not have known about rods, cones, neurons, etc. Without any particular reason to think that animals perceive differently, Socrates and Theaetetus could be privileging humans as especially different from all other animals (a common phenomenon), or they could be making apparently baseless assumptions about something they know little to nothing about, namely, differences in perception between species, or both. In any case, the way Socrates loads the question and Theaetetus’ vehement reaction show that both characters think the situation is clear: a given color does not appear the same to dogs and other animals as it does to a human like Theaetetus.

Anything at all

Socrates now switches to a question about the appearance of anything at all (ὁτιοῦν 154a7). Evidently, Socrates thinks that his description of color perception applies, ceteris paribus, to all perception: τὸ προσβάλλον and τὸ προσβαλλόμενον and μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός do appear generic enough to apply to any perception.

Fellow Humans and one’s self

In additon to generalizing from colors to all objects of perception, he generalizes from himself and Theaetetus (ἡμῖν153e5) to not just all humans, but even to the same person, probably at different times, but perhaps even at the same time. Namely, no perception is the same as any other, because one of the three components (τὸ προσβάλλον and τὸ προσβαλλόμενον and μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός) is always different.

As for the proposed tripartite account of perception (τὸ προσβάλλον and τὸ προσβαλλόμενον and μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός), assuming that his explanation is meant to be self-consistent, it should work to turn this generic account of perception back on itself: if all knowledge is perception, he must know that it is from perceiving it. In order to do that, he must perceive the eyes, the movement, and the thing that comes to be between them as three objects of perception. But then in perceiving each of them, there must be the eyes, the movement (of the eyes, the thing perceived, and the thing between) and yet another between them. And to perceive each of those things between, ... , etc. Thus, it seems that the private things and movements between perceiver and perceived multiply ad infinitum. One could not use sight to perceive all of these, for it is hard to imagine that any beyond the first movement have visible characteristics (cf. Chrm. 168d10f. or Phlb. 12e3f.)

Socrates suggests that an individual person is never the same as him- or herself at 154a6-8. Perhaps this is an indication that the same human sees the object back at 152d2-6 as both heavy and light, both small and large rather than that one human perceives a given object as heavy while another perceives it as light.There is no particular reason given to believe the claim here. A question arise: does it apply from moment to moment, or at any given moment? The argument acquires an a fortiori structure with πολὺ μᾶλλον of 154a7: if the same thing does not appear to a given individual because that individual is never the same as him- or herself, then surely a fortiori the same thing does not appear to two individual humans, and certainly ab etiam fortiori the same thing does not appear to two individuals of different species. The principle that drives the argument must be that an individual is most likely to be like itself, somewhat less likely to be like another individual of the same species, and least likely to be like an individual of a different species.

There is a mechanism of perception at 156a7-157c. McDowell ad 153e5-154a2 suggests that although there are incompatibilities between the current three-part mechanism and the later one, it is pointless to reconcile the two: the details are not of concern. The main point is that perception is a relation between sense organs and sensible objects.

Why introduce mechanical models at all? McDowell ad 153e5-154a2 suggests that Plato is trying to emphasize and implement two requirements about perception. The first is that perceptual qualities belong to things only via the relation to perceivers. The second is that perceptual qualities are unstable. McDowell further thinks that because these, the most plausible mechanisms for perception Plato can think of, involve movement, they explain the introduction of movement above at 152d7 (but so far, there has been no use of the concepts of movement at 152d7, only the bare word φορά to tie this account to 152d7).

Vis-à-vis the midwife metaphor, the dialogue is looking even more like an examination of Socrates’ own ideas, but it is also looking like it may be begging questions, because assumptions are made that will lead to the impossibility of communication, self-identity, or any identity and so will render the offspring self-refuting. If it is an offspring, then a suitable metaphor may be that Socrates has fed it a poison, and so it will soon die, and Socrates will declare it inviable as a result.

As is usual with Theaetetus' first definition of knowledge, the language Plato uses does not match the ideas in important ways. For example, "any color will manifestly have come to be, and each color will be something private having come to be for each" ὁτιοῦν … χρῶμα … φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ (ἕκαστον χρῶμα) … ἔσται … τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός (153e5-154a2). The perfects are out of place in a theory purporting to abolish all states of being. Another example is the talk of one individual never being the same as him- or herself. If that is the case, even referring to an individual will fail, for that is the point: there is no one individual. As Aristotle will conclude later: it’s not possible to refute someone claiming to hold this view, because it makes no sense from the start and renders communication itself, upon which refutation depends, impossible.

At this point, however, the absurdness of the secret doctrine, the perceptual mechanism, and their interpretation and application by Socrates is only latently obvious. It obviously makes meaningful communication between humans or even thought within oneself impossible, since perceptions are radically private, and not only is it the case that even within a single person two things never have the same appearance, but also that any single person is not the same at one time as at another. It also makes continuous memories of one thing impossible. Socrates, however, does not point that out yet. Rather, he takes another tack in the next section.

(153d8)  {ΣΩ.} Ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὑτωσί· κατὰ τὰ

ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ

ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων μηδ’ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι μηδέ (10)

(e.) τιν’ αὐτῷ χώραν ἀποτάξῃς· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν εἴη τε δήπου ἐν

τάξει καὶ μένον καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο.

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀλλὰ πῶς;

  {ΣΩ.} Ἑπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἓν

ὂν τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὁτιοῦν (5)

ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν

προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον

154.

(a.) εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλ-

λόμενον ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός· ἢ

σὺ διισχυρίσαιο ἂν ὡς οἷον σοὶ φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα,

τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ζῴῳ;

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Μὰ Δί’ οὐκ ἔγωγε. (5)

  {ΣΩ.} Τί δέ; ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἆρ’ ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται

ὁτιοῦν; ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι οὐδὲ σοὶ

αὐτῷ ταὐτὸν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν;

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Τοῦτο μᾶλλόν μοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐκεῖνο.

153d9 καλεῖς: used to set off ignorant or careless speech from more precise and accurate description to follow. Only 81 instances of καλεῖς in Plato: worth searching thru (but add kalw/kalwmen/kaleite?). There are two kinds at first glance: for confirmation of interlocutor’s thought or normal usage, and for innovative usage.

153d9 ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν:

Search for χρῶμα in Plato yields 95 instances, but only the following instances modified by a color adjective (other adjectives are not infrequent): Ti. 59b3 στίλβοντι καὶ ξανθῷ χρώματι, 60d4 γίγνεται τὸ μέλαν χρῶμα ἔχον λίθος, 68b4 χρῶμα ἔναιμον (not really a color adj.), and 68c6 κυανοῦν χρῶμα (perhaps not a color adj.: material?), 74d4 ξανθῷ χρώματι προσχρώμενος, 83b3 τὸ μέλαν χρῶμα, 83b4 χρῶμα ἔσχεν ἐρυθρώτερον, 83b6 ξανθὸν χρῶμα, 83d4 χρῶμα ἐχουσῶν διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀφροῦ γένεσιν ἰδεῖν λευκόν, Lg. 956a6 χρώματα δὲ λευκὰ, Epin. 987c7 οὗτος ἐρυθρώτατον ἔχει χρῶμα.WHY ONLY Ti. + one Lg. (+Epin.)?

R. 617a3 τρίτον δὲ λευκότατον χρῶμα ἔχειν is probably not an instance of χρῶμα modified by a color adjective, but rather χρῶμα as an accusative of respect.

153d9-11 μὴ εἶναι ... μηδ’ ... μηδέ ... ἀποτάξῃς: why μὴ εἶναι? It would be οὐ if it were indirect speech dependent on Ὑπόλαβε. ἀποτάξῃς is prohibitive aorist subjunctive.

153e1 ἤδη: "logical proximity" (LSJ s.v. 4). cf. "201e."

153e1-2: ἂν εἴη ... καὶ οὐκ ἂν ... γίγνοιτο: why optative? Not unreals.

153e4 τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ : refers to 152d2-e9. ἄρτι occasionally used with nouns (cf. X. HG 5.4.25, I Ep.Cor.4.11, PMagLond. I.121.373 (from LSJ).

153e4 μηδὲν: Cf. 152d6n. Cf. Smyth §2689 μή is used "when a person or thing is to be characterized as conceived of rather than real. –μή is used not merely when the above notions are apparent but also when they are latent."

153e4 αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ: where else used?

153e7 φορὰν: this makes little sense except as a cryptic prefiguration of the account of color which starts with the introduction of two sorts of motion at 156c3.

153e7-a1 ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα: omitted antecedent. ἕκαστον modifies χρῶμα and together they are the subject of εἶναι.

153e7 and 154a2 γεγενημένον and γεγονός: McDowell ad 152d2-e1 suggests this must be the complete sans predicate use, "come into being". Cf. 152e1, where it must be the use with a predicate.

154a2 μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός: predicate nominative phrase. μεταξύ τι is philosophical (Aristotle will pick it up later).

Search for μεταξύ τι >4thc.:

R. 477a9-b1 Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνῶσις ἦν, ἀγνωσία δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ μὴ ὄντι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ μεταξὺ τούτῳ μεταξύ τι καὶ ζητητέον ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, R. 511d4-5 ὡς μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὖσαν, 544d2 μεταξύ τι τούτων, Lg. 822d7 μεταξύ τι νουθετήσεώς τε πεφυκὸς ἅμα καὶ νόμων, Arist. Metaph. 1056a36, 1069a14, Phys. 219a26.

Search for τι μεταξὺ >4thc.:

Symp. 202a3 ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι ἔστιν τι μεταξὺ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας, 202b5 τι μεταξύ, ἔφη, τούτοιν, and 11X in Arist.

154a3 διισχυρίσαιο: used of insistent or confident affirmation of a proposition, Theaetetus would have not only to reject Socrates’ idea, but do so with insistance if he were to answer no here. In keeping with his character so far, he agrees with Socrates’ strongly.

154a4 καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ζῴῳ: cf. Hi.Mi. 375a6 Οὐκοῦν καὶ κυνὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων πάντων; (a progression from animal souls as examples to archers’ souls to slaves’ souls to one’s own soul), R. 375a12 εἴτε ἵππος εἴτε κύων ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν ζῷον (parallel between animal and human souls for guardian’s qualities).

154a4 ὁτῳοῦν: sometimes only the second element of ὅστις, ἥτις, ὅτι is inflected. (ANYTHING TO SAY ABOUT IT IN PLATO?)

154a9 Τοῦτο μᾶλλόν μοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐκεῖνο: Τοῦτο refers to the nearer proposition (that no thing seems the same to Theaetetus himself because he is not like himself), and ἐκεῖνο to the farther (that no thing appears similar to Theaetetus and another human).

154b1-d7

This section starts out with two claims, set in unreal conditional sentences, both in need of clarification:

if the thing we measure or grasp were big or white or hot, it would not ever have become different by meeting up with another since it itself did not change:

and again, if the thing measuring or grasping each of these (the white, the hot, or the big) were big or white or hot, again, since it itself suffered nothing, would not have become different when another approached it or suffered something.

1)"Measuring or grasping" and "measured or grasped" must stand for the "measuring" in the measure doctrine, the action by which we perceive, know, and say what a thing is or what quality a thing has. The ἢ in each case is not offering distinct alternatives, but rather alternative descriptions of the same thing.

2)"Big or white or hot" are instances of qualities perceived like those earlier at 152b6-8 (hot/cold), 152d4-6 (large/small, heavyweight/lightweight), and 153d8ff. (color). They are meant to stand in for a much larger range of qualities, as the knucklebones immediately following show (otherwise they could not be a παράδειγμα of what this means).

3)"Different" ἄλλο must mean "different from big” if the thing started out big (μέγα ἦν), or “different from white” if the thing started out white (λευκὸν ἦν), or “different from hot” if the thing started out hot (θερμὸν ἦν): i.e. different from any quality among those within the range intended.

4) In "by meeting up with another” (ἄλλῳ προσπεσὸν 154b2), ἄλλῳ makes easiest sense if it refers to another observer, although that is not specified.

5) προσπεσὸν “meeting up with” presumably refers to something analogous to the act referred to by προσβάλλω in the previous section (154a1 for example). This makes ready sense if ἄλλῳ is an observer (and so, “meeting up with another” = “being observed by another”). Remember, however, that this is an unreal, and whereas προσβάλλω referred to the account in the Protagorean version, this refers to the analogous act in an account to be rejected by Protagoreans.

6) αὐτό γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον is a circumstantial participle with conditional force (μηδὲν ensures that) that also expresses cause (cf. 154b3 μηδὲν note), which makes “since” a good translation: the clause modifies the subject of ἐγεγόνει. The same analysis applies to αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὸν, which modifies the subject of ἐγένετο. The grammar of μη- + a circumstantial participle makes it impossible for the participle to have an adversative or concessive meaning as it would have to for it to mean “it could not have become something else in spite of the fact that it did not change.”

5) "each of these" ἕκαστον ... τούτων 154b4 likely refers to "big or white or hot." McDowell ad 154b1-6 has a distinction here that I cannot understand: the problem has to do with his use of the phrase "taking up" as if it were a grammatically specific term.

6) In the previous section, speaking from within the Protagorean viewpoint, Socrates said that color is not separate from the eyes nor again in the eyes nor indeed in any place. The two conditionals here, however, take up the idea that the quality (hot, white, big, etc.) belongs to the observed object or to the observer. The viewpoint of the Protagorean is maintained: hence these are unreals. The first conditional takes up the idea that maybe the things we call white, hot, or big are themselves white, hot, or big. Then, in case someone claims that the colors are in the observers, the second conditional takes up the idea that maybe colors are in observers.

After the two conditionals, Socrates says that now the Protagoreans have backed those who reject the measure doctrine into a corner: the rejectors have to say ridiculous things. For example, since there is no way for something to grow (or shrink) except by being increased (or decreased), it is ridiculous to say that 6 knucklebones are now half as many, now one and a half times as many just because there are now 12, now 4 knucklebones put beside them.

The uncharitable would point out that there are qualities that are relative (something that is “half” is only “half” of something else) and qualities that are not (something that is 6-sided is just that 6-sided thing: it is not of something else). Socrates’ presentation of Protagoreanism has never given us any reason whatsoever to expand the set of things to which it applies beyond things that are evidently relatives, and we are not forced to say anything ridiculous at all. To be sure, he includes color (and is not using comparatives of color), but he never shows that there is a similar puzzle about color.

Continuing with the uncharitable viewpoint, if we take the knucklebone example and transpose it over the cold and hot wind of 152b2-3, we find the following. The wind has a certain temperature (on the Celsius, Fahrenheit, or Kelvin scale) just as there are 6 knucklebones. One person finds the wind cold, just as 12 knucklebones makes 6 “half” or “fewer”: another person finds the wind hot, just as 4 knucklebones makes 6 “1.5 X” or “more.” There is no great puzzle here: by itself, there is a certain amount of kinetic energy in the wind, just as by themselves there is a certain precise number of knucklebones. Removing the rest of the universe would not change either fact. But the rest of the universe makes it possible to juxtapose something with the wind or the knucklebones: we call the descriptors of these juxtapositions “relatives,” because they describe the relation(s) between two or more things. There is nothing mysterious or puzzling about it.

From the above, we conclude our uncharitable analysis with the result that Socrates and Theaetetus and Protagoras simply need a lesson. If it’s simply a matter of pointing out something like the distinction between relative qualities and other qualities, it seems these Greeks are being very slow, or more charitably, could benefit from a modern pre-school education.

A more charitable reading can point out that we are always and unavoidably stuck with mediated access to the world (and we don’t even know what unmediated access would be like). Every thing that we think we know or believe is in some plausible way separate from our belief or thought about it. Thus all our access to ourselves or the world consists in relatives, a relation between us and it. Unfortunately, Socrates does not directly explore that or any very closely similar claim in constructing these puzzles. They seem inadequate to generate a truly philosophical puzzle.

πρὸς τὴν νῦν (10)

(d.) ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὴν

προτέραν,

To what do τὴν νῦν and τὴν προτέραν refer?

Sophist 259d has lots of parallels to this part of Tht.

One way to take it (McDowell's) is that it consists of an argument against being. Thus ἦν at 154b2 is emphatic.

(154b.)   {ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ᾧ παραμετρούμεθα ἢ οὗ ἐφαπτόμεθα

μέγα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλῳ προσπεσὸν

ἄλλο ἂν ἐγεγόνει, αὐτό γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον· εἰ δὲ αὖ τὸ

παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον ἕκαστον ἦν τούτων, οὐκ

ἂν αὖ ἄλλου προσελθόντος ἤ τι παθόντος αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὸν(5)

ἄλλο ἂν ἐγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ὦ φίλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ

γελοῖα εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ὡς φαίη ἂν

Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν.

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῖα λέγεις;

(c.)   {ΣΩ.} Σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἴσῃ ἃ βού-

λομαι. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἕξ, ἂν μὲν τέτταρας αὐτοῖς

προσενέγκῃς, πλείους φαμὲν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιο-

λίους, ἐὰν δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις, καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν

ἄλλως λέγειν· ἢ σὺ ἀνέξῃ; (5)

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

  {ΣΩ.} Τί οὖν; ἄν σε Πρωταγόρας ἔρηται ἤ τις ἄλλος·

“Ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔσθ’ ὅπως τι μεῖζον ἢ πλέον γίγνεται ἄλλως

ἢ αὐξηθέν;” τί ἀποκρινῇ;

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἐὰν μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν νῦν (10)

(d.) ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὴν

προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν.

  {ΣΩ.} Εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ φίλε, καὶ θείως. ἀτάρ, ὡς

ἔοικεν, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνῃ ὅτι ἔστιν, Εὐριπίδειόν τι συμβήσεται·

ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὐκ (5)

ἀνέλεγκτος.

  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀληθῆ.

154b1-6 Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν … ἂν ἐγένετο: this is a carefully constructed parallel sentence consisting of two conditionals marked off by μὲν … δὲ, each with 1) an explicit protasis, 2) a second participial protasis (αὐτό γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον and αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὸν), and 3) an explicit apodosis, within which is 4) a participial modifier (a nominative modifying the subject, and a genitive absolute). In the first conditional, the hypothesis entertained is that the object of perception itself is large or white or hot. In the second half, the hypothesis entertained is that the one sensing the object is large or white or hot. μέγα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν in the first conditional structure is ref