165th Infantry

HEADQUARERS RCT I65 A*P*0* 27

Record of Opération FORAGER

1 ïï D E X

I: FORAGER Oporational Report*

Ils S~1 Oporational Report and. Comand and Staff Rostcr*

III: S-2 Oporational Report*

IVs S- 3 Oporational Report and Situation Lïapt

Vs S0J4. Oporational Report,

Vis Roginontal Surgeon1 g Report*

VII: TQI.I Report,

VIIIs Unit Journal*

IX: Ovcrlays to Acconpany Unit Journal*

• wHEADqUAËTERS 165TH IOTMTEY

ipo 27

5 October I9UU.

SUBJECT: EORAGEB Operational Report.

TO : The Commanding General, 2Jth Infantry Division, iiPO 27.

In compliance with instructions containeà in letter, AG 319«1> Hq, 2|th Infantry Division, 17 May I9UU, the following report is submitted on the EORAGEE opération.

1. Plans,

a, The landing force opération plans and annexes were consideredadcqu-r te .

2. Opérations and Training.

' a. The practice landings and rehearsal exercises held on the island of Maui were satisfactory with the following exceptions,

(1) One of our BLT*s after conducting ail of its practice land— ings with one ship, was embarked for the actual opération on an entiroly différent ship and with boat crews with whomtbey had never worked,

(2) LVT*s were not available during the practice landings,

b,- It was found that bazookas and the 75nm and 105®û self—propelled guns were effective against fortified installations,

c, The nimber of hand carried flame-throwers supplied this organi— zation were suffi ci ont, howev.er we were not equipp ed with any flâne-thrower tanks. It is reconnended that one trnk in each platoon be equipped with a flâne thrower.

'3. Air,

a. Air liaison parties perforned ail their 'duties satisfactorily, however in raany instances air support was not available when called for,

U, Naval Gun Eirc,

'd, The shore fire control parties were adeçuate and sufficier.t fires were delivorod exooditiously,

b. Eires were adjis ted quickly and prop-ûrly,

c. Called fires in nost instances had the desired effect.

~ 1 ».

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t’ic f"ces of these watches be of tho luninous type, and that a cover be prc— vided for the faces of the watches4

k, The nunber of nachine-gun platoons in heavy weapons conpanies be increased fron two to three in order that one such platoon be available to support each rifle company when ail three are connitted,

1. A study be nade of the advisability of forning a unit vdthin the Division equipned with the 4,2 nortar,

n, The following changes be nade in the types of annunition indi*-cated:

(1) glnn nortar---«WP no change. îEE heavy to be increased. HElight to be decreased.

(2) 6onn nortar-—— 80$ HE and 20$ WP.

(3) Rifle Grenades---50$ A-T and 50$ fragmentation.

n. The Very pistol be replr.ced by a snaller projector of sinilar sizo to that used by the ETavy.

6. Transportation.

It is reconnended thatî

a. Shipt)ing facilities be increased in order that the nunber of ve— hicles taken into combat nay be increased to the following:

(1) Two ^ ton weapons cp.rriers with t rai 1er s for each rifle coo- pany.

(2) Eight i ton weapons carriers with trailers for each heavy weapons conpany.

(3) Two % ton weapons carriers with trailers for each battalion médical section.

(4) Ail T M 2^ ton trucks and 1 ton trailers for each Service• Conpany.

b. A study be marie to provide a nore varied ration than is now pos— siblc with the présent K and C rations. The inprovcd type C rations should be secured or sufficient 10 in 1 rations provided to insure a nore balanced and palatable ration, This study should include the feasibility of providing a variety of canned fruit.juicos and soups.

c. The nunber of snuad cookers be increased fron one to two per squad,

d. While in actual contact with the eneny, rations be issued in the ratio of tv/o C rations to one K ration.

— -

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u yicai situation, nevertheless adequate reconnaissance by Battalion commaiidors, company commandors, and pïx toon leaders is essential to the suocess of any combat opération, This defoct occurred much more ofton when this ilegiment was a part of Marine Divisions#

b* Sufficient shipping should be provided to permit ail of our units to go into combat at full TO strength* Ail of our units landed undor strength and as casualties devolopod from day to day this impo -ed a severo strain on units roquirod to cover extonded frontages# A sufficicnt nunber of additional troops should be brought on each opération to provide combat replacements#

c# In assigning frontages considération should be given to the ter- tain involved as well as the strength of the unit at the timo#

d* Coordination botwoon adjacent larger units must be more closely controlled* On sevoral occasions it was found that the jump-off timo givon to this rogimont differod as much as tv/o or three hours from. the time given to .adjacent units# This caused considérable confusion because of preparatory firos falling in front of units that were attonpting to comply with the junp~ off timo givon to thon# This dofect occurred much more ofton when this rogi*- ment was a part of Marine Divisions.

o# Information as to the location of adjacent friondly troops should bo more carofully checkod beforo being passed down the line# On too many oc­casions it was found that units were not whore thoy roportod thomsolves to be# On many othor occasions when this organization was sont in to roliove othor organisations we found it necossary to fight our way to linos of departuro that woro supposodly already in tho hands of friendly troops* This defoct oc- currod much more ofton when this régiment was a part of Marine Divisions#

f# 8ufficio3.it additional ammunition should be provided to permit ail mon to firc a more oxtensivo course with the bazooka and rifle grenade*

g. A groat doal more Inf antry-tûûiktruintfE'g. is iMicated#** Tho p r o WIon of communication between tho Infantry and the tanks is far from solved# Complote additional study should bo givon to this problcn*

h# It very dofinitoly must bo 30P that the tank unit with which we train is tho one that wo go into combat with* This was not true in tho recont opération#

i# The practice of recalling the tanks to the tank parle each day for ro-sorvicing bofore dark must bo discontinuod* Wo sorvicod our 8FM*s in tho front linos and thorc is no ro vson at ail why tho sano practice should not be followed by tho tanks*

j# 2ach xiCT should bo assignod a 4.2 Chemical Mortar Company as a permanent part of tho combat team#

/ . / /

/ / JOSEPH T. HAiïT, f / Lt Col, 165th Inf#

Coranand ing c

- 5 -

/

HjSADCjUAiiîEas 165TII IHFAHÏUY A.P.O. #27

S-l REFOüT OF OPÜÜtTIOiJ FOHAGJSàv

Casualty Reports

Throughout the opération there appeared to be a nésà for greater coordi­nation between the agencies concerned with casualty information so that the variou.s types of reports './euId more accurately complément each other, It was found frequently that the casualty figures submitted by battalions and com- panies, when checked against I edical Forms Cit-5, were incomplète, The dif- erence was almost always accounted for by those cases of wounds, injuries and illness so slight that the individuals returned to duty immediately after treat ent in the field or at aid stations. In the rush and confusion of bat- tle their cases were either unknown to company headquarters or were unrecorded becausa of the vagueness of the information. Of course, this would not affect the unit»s present effective strength figures, but it would seem that since these case3 are a rnatter of médical record and are reported to Personnel Sec­tion by Médical Detachment, it vrould be apv ropriate for the companies concerned to have an immédiats accounting.

It is recalled that during the Suipan battle there were soveral instances where officers were VIA and remained on duty without those facts being reported by the companies, The news of those casualties was obtained by this Headquar­ters from the CR-5 form. This was also true concerning a large number of ea- listed men. This situation became apparent at the outset of the action, and theroafter 3-1, thi3 Headquarters, in order to have as complété a story of the casualties as possible endeavored to compile its Consolidated report not only from figures submitted by battalions and companies but also from the CR-5 forms, which were forwarded through Regimental Headquarters to Personnel Section.Since the direct reports to 3-1 are statistical whereas the CR-5 deals with na.es, it is difficult to correlate the two reports. Àbout ail the cou be done under the present procédure is to note the discrepancies between the figures on the one report and the number of nomes on the other and use this as a basis for chocking with the battalions and companies. This involves considérable woric raid inconvenience, and, even though its object is to piclc up information unaccountod for by the companies, does not wholly eliminate the danger of dup­lication. of information.

In view of the above it is recommended that some system be devised whereby ail casualties, including those returned to duty without ever having been dropped from the Present Effective Strength column, are reported on a tag that goes di- rectly from tha aid station or the aid mon in the lines to the casualties* res­pective companies. This not only would account for ail casualties but would also insure agroement between the company and médical reports in classifying the casualty. For exemple, it would preclude a mon*s being listed on one re­cord as YflA and on another as IIA,

Also recommended is a procédure for maintaining a doser check on men evacuatcd to the re r after treatraent at aid stations in other battalions with- in the Régiment, or at aid stations in some other Regiment, In this connection,

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uROSTER OF REGIMENTAL AND BATTALION STAFFS

AND COMPANY CCM1ANOERS

SAIPM OPERATION

REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS

DUTY RANK NAME REMARKS

CO Colonel Gérard W Kelley WIA on 28 June.

CO Lt Col Joseph T Hart Àssuraed comd 28 Juné.

Exec 0 Lt Col Jos-sph T Hart Until assumption of comd 28 June.

Exec 0 Major William F MoCahill Asgd in addition to other duties on 28 June.

S-l Capt Edward. S McCabe

S-2 Major William F McCahill

s-5 Capt Charles E Coates, Jr Until asgd as 2nd Bn S-3 17 July.

s-3 Capt Maurice M Scheibner Asgd 17 July.

S-U Capt Herman M Lutz Âb sk 21-23 July.

S~l|. Capt Michael E Kenny Asgd fr 21-23 July in addition to other duties.

As st S-3 Capt Maurice M Scheibner Until asgd as S-3 17 July.

Ass'fc S-3 Capt John G Firsching Asgd 17 July.

Asst S-l WOJG Joseph A Conway

Surg Major Francis II Reynolds

Mtr 0 Capt William J Smith Until asgd CO of Co F 30 June.

Mtr 0 CWO James J Wynne Asgd 30 June.

Munitions 0 1 st Lt Francis H Tuohy

TQM Capt John J Molloy Until asgd as CO of Co E 30 June; resumed TQM dy 17 July.

Comrao 0 lst Lt Edward J Condon

I&R Plat 0 lst Lt Jsmes M O'Brien

Burial 0 lst Lt Thomas P Fleming

Ln 0 lst Lt Peter Donaghy

Ln 0 lst Lt Alfred J Carsola

Ln 0 lst Lt William R Orefice

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THIRD BATTALION Cont’d.

S-l Co.pt James P Cuffe

S-2 lst Lt John T Farley

s-3 Capt Martin E iïolan

S-U lst Lt Richard Funlc

COMPANY COMLÏANDERS

Regtl Hq Co Capt Joseph D Gattie

Sv Co Co.pt Hichael E Kenny

Cn Co Capt Robert B Marshall

A-T Co lst Lt Maurice P Prout

Med Det Major Francis H Reynolds

Hq Co lst Bn lst Lt Eugene D Cronin

Co A Capt Lawrence J O'Brien

Co B lst Lt José H Gil IIA on 20 June, resumed comd 23June; WIA 26 June, resumed comd16 July.

Co B lst Lt Audie G Barnett Fr 20-23 Juno and fr 26-29 Juno.

Co B lst Lt Myron L Brewer Asgd 29 June, trfd 16 July to Co C.

Co c Capt Paul E Ryan KIA 18 June.

Co C lst Lt Edward L Cloyd, Jr Fr 18 June to 5 July*

Co C Capt Joseph J Kennedy Fr 5 J^ly to 16 July*

Co C lst Lt Myron L Brewer Asgd 16 July.

Co D Capt Joseph J Kennedy Asgd to Co C 5 Julyj reasgd to Co D16 July.

Co D lst Lt Edward Gill Fr 5 July to 16 July.

Hq Co 2nd Bn Capt Andrew M Mursko

Co E Capt Bernard Ryan WIA 23 Junej ret to comd 17 July.

Co E lst Lt John J Raleigh Fr 23 June to 30 June.

Co E Capt John J Molloy Asgd 30 June, reld 17 July.

Co F Capt Francis P Léonard WIA 25 June.

Co F 2nd Lt Ralph L Laney Assumed temp corad 25 June.

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V ^S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS 165th INFANTRÏ APO # 27

S-2 INTELLIGENCE

GENERAL

From the Intelligence standpolnt, a wealth of information and material was obtained during the Saipan Campaign. Enemy tactics, equipment and the Japanese soldier were brought to light during the various phases of the opér­ation. 1 Saipan was our initial opération on island warfare, previously meeting the enemy on Makin Atoll. The lesson leamed during the Makin opér­ation were applied to this campaign and resulted in complété intelligence coverage. The following report covers the period 1 April 1944 to 6 August 1944.

PREPARATION AND PLANNING PHASE

The first information received conceming the opération Forager was obtained about the first part of April 1944. The regimental commander informed the Battalions and selected members of his staff of the général plan for the forthcoming opération. Ail members present at this meeting were s w o m to secreay and no iafc^catian- nas. totbe divulged until re- leased by the Regimental Commander*

Upon our'rctum from amphibious training various secret documents were made available to the selected officers for study. Regiment and each ÏÏattalion prepared plans and opération rooms which were kept under constant surveillance and appropiate security measures taken. After the actual opération plans were received a few key enlisted personnel were informed of the opération. This personnel assisted in the préparation of administration détails. Aerial photos, Maps and other intelligence data received from Division were prepared for distribution to the units that comprised the Regimental Combat Teams. Distribution of the packages were not effected until embarkation day.

About the 15th May 1944, ail unit commanders were informed of the opération and thoroughly oriented on the various plans formulated by Division.

The entire Regimental Combat Team embarked on the 31 May 1944.

TRAINING

When information was received that our Regiment was to be part of a Task Force intensive training was instituted. A weekly training schedule was submitted to include the Intelligence and Reconnaisance Platoons and each Battalion Intelligence sections* Two full days eachvweek were set aside for training of combined Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoons and Battalion S~2 section. In addition two enlisted men from each company headquarters were included in the two days training period.

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AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS

Aerial photographs of the island of Saipan, Tinian and Guam were issued to each Regiment. The vertical photographs, as issued, were not satisfactory as they contained a great many clouded areas, Oblique |photographs of the various landing beaches were veiy good. Sufficient copies were issued for distribution dora to Battalions, During the course of; the opération, aerial photographs of différent sections of the island were issued to this organization, The oblique photos of the island of Tinian were most satisfactory,

It is recommemded that initial distribution of aerial photographs for future opérations be made to include Battalions, One set of vertical photographs of ail three islands wa3 issued to Regiment and was not suf- „ ficient for complote study by each Battalion,

mm tactics

In ail phases of the opération iri our zone of action the enenjy tactics followed a similar pattorn, Initially the enemy had good observation and was able to lay accurate artilleiy and mortar fire on our lines, When it became apparent to the Jap that he could no longer hold his position, the ‘rosult of superior firepower, he would retire to a new deferisive position and would leave a small delaying force to harass our advan®», These small delaying forces were never organiaed and remained in their positions until annihilated, Throughout the opération our forces received sniper fire.Ail main installations, such as airfields, radio stations and AA guns were protectod chiefly by concrete and log emplacements. A' natural feature used eBtensively by the Japanese was the caves in the cliffs and mountainous areas of the island, In addition, the shoreline of the island contained thick jungle g r o % and large natural caves, Access to these shorelin* caves could only be made from the océan side, With a machine gun and a few snipers the enemy was able to hold out for a considérable time-in these œaves, Often inorder to dislodge the enemy from these caves, our forces had to traverse rugged terrain and many times it was necessary to sc%le these cliffs, In addition to infantry fire, démolitions, flame throwers and tanks were used to overcome this résistance, Each cave required sep- arate treatment, A great many of the caves were connected up with one another and formed an underground dwelling, Many of the caves were seal- ed up bofore a computation of the number of enemy killed could be obtained'.

Infiltration tactics were used at night and the early Corning,- The enemy would attack the perimeter in various strength, Some reported groups of four or five would attempt infiltration and others reported groups of seventy five to one hundred, The formation of k «ail coordin- ated perimeter enabled our forces to quickly expell any attempt at infil­tration, A system of booby traps along the outer edge of the perimeter wa3 used successfully.

In our zone of action enemy tanks attemped to penetrate our perimeter^, but were knocked out by anti-tank and bazooka fire, At one point the Japs *used a buried tank which was impregnable to small arms fire and required artillery and tank fire to knock it out,

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This headquarters was notified when and where these leaflets would be ' dropped during the period of the opération, A few POW interrogated on Tîfeother they had read the leaflet stated they did reâd them but believe they would not be lionored, Others stated they did not see the leaflet,

INTERPRETEES

For this opération, Division assignée! two interpreters to each Re- gimental Combat Team, 'One interpreter was assigncd to each assault BLT and upon the establishment of ths Rogimental Command Pont, they reverted to Segimental control. The services of these two enlisted men was most satxs>faetory. Without their assistance the interrogation and évolution oft‘ both civilian and military personnel, would have presented a difficult problem, Their interrogation of the prisonors of War and translation of material and documents was systematic and much valuable information was obtained, In order to establish uniformity -in the questioning of POWs a mimeographed form of about ft-fteen questions was compiled by Corps Head- quarters and issued to each interpreter, Each corapleted form was forwarded with the captured POW, Additional information was added in warranted cases, The interpreters were schooled in the method of handling P0?/s and the résulta were reflected in the information they obtained, The two inter— preters were on call to the front line-Battalions whenever their services were required, Prior to the opération, Division 0-2 conducted a language school for personne], in Regiments who had a knowledge of the Japanese and Chine se- laapagee/ Each Battalion sent four men and Reglmental two men to this sabool, Aithough the extent of their teaching was basic Japanese, nevorbheless it proved its worth in the fieIci for quick évaluation of captured documents,

There were several cases when civilians had hid in caves and interpre-. ters would attempt to have them surrender, Disregarding their own personal safety, they had climbed into the caves and succeeded in having the civilians surrender, At ail times a suitablw guard was fumished each interpreter,

The public address system was used several times to extricate POWs from the caves and cliffs, The success attained was pretty well ci.ivided.- On one uccassion one hundred and fifty civilians surrendered,, The PA system was mounted on a | ton vehicle and often the terrain would not permit the passageo x the vehicle and no success résultée!. Later, a smaller, portable PA system was provided which could bo carried and placed in convenient locations, The dialogue used by the interpreters was too long and it is felt by the undersigned that a short to-the-point dialogue be used,

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FROM ilIGKER ECHELON

Prior to embarkation ail available G-2 information was sent to Regiment, including a complété 0-2 Study of the Marianas Islands, late3t informâtinn on estimated enemy strength, composition ofï various -units believed to be on the islands and other intelligence data. Ail information received by Regiment was passée! on to Battalions, During the opération daily intelligence infor­mation wa3 forwarded by Division and,Corps, .Sometimes these reports were recëived late and could not be sent to Battalions in time to be of any value.

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sqoeaqsg; ’quaoiaoexdsxp ajojaq apetn sen St’d'O qi^ü J° aoxpod qSnojoqq V •sajnseaiu aouaSxxiaqur jaqunoo jo ooueqjodtnx aqq qqia passaadaix uxe3i2 a.iaa uoxqesixueSao sxqq jo s.ioqmaai xi13 dxqs pjeoqe uoxqeq.uax.xo aqq §ux.m(i

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•spoxjod Suxuxejq Sux.inp uoxssnosxp Xuuosaad Jxaqq joj quomxSay. aqq jo .Æuedmoo qoea oq paquqx.xqsxp aaaii uoxqi? •2oj.iaq.ux MOd jo saxdoo qde.iSoauixie ‘uoxqujado aqq. jo uo’pqaxdtuoo uod^• sqxun

XT8 ^iq^JOABj ÆteA paAxaoaj ajam saxdoo asaqj; ‘uoxsxaxŒ üq s.f.aqjr;nb -p-eaq Sfqq oq. ^XT^P popjBMjoj s va. uoxqe3oj.jaqui MOd qo^o jo /doc v

S E C R E T

Close coopération between the En and Regtl Aid Stations rnade possible the srnooth functioning in the évacuation of wounded POWs.

Recommendations: In f'utusye opérations one J ton médical truck be assigned to ea«h Bn médical section and cne J ton vehicle be assigned to Regtl Médical section for sole purpose of evaeuating wounded Japanese.

INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON

The intelligence and reconnaissance Platoon was assigned reconnaiss­ance missions for various Saipan operatin::plaas. Aboard sliip they were oriented and prepared to reconnoiter areas as called for on each par- ticular plan. ïïpjn landing the reconnaissance mission assigned cculd not be effected due to a change in the tactical plan.

In addition to small reconnaissance missions within our zone of action, the I & R Platoon was assigned to man Observation Posts and act as guides for the Battalions, Small groups were sent out to explore the natural caves used by the enemy for the purpose of collecting intelligence material, In the event the Regiment was called for the Tinian opération, two or three men were to follow up each assault battalion for the purpose of securing ener;.y unit indentification.

HAIIDLING OF NEWS RELEASES

Prior to the Saipan opération a public relations office had been set up under the supervision of the Regimental S-2. Personnel §onsisted of one enlisted man who had previous egperience in newspaper work. The chief function of this section wa s the publication of a weekly newspaper, huuan interest stories, and stories on awards and décorations of individ- uals for home town newspapers. During the opération this enlisted man worked with the correspondents in compiling stories of individual’s deeds.

One news correspondent, a staff sergeant, and one still photographer, a technical sergeant, was assigned to thi® Regiment to cover the opération. During the voyage numerous still pictures and stories were compiled. üpon landing the news correspondent and still photographer attached themselves to the assault Battalion and were able to acquire first hand news stories and pictures. Before the completion of the opération both men were re- called by higher headquartei's. They formed part of a pool of newspaper correspondent^ and photographcrs under the supervision of the Division Public Relations Officer.

At least two photographers and two correspondent, civilian or military, should be attached to the RCT for the entire opération. In this way complété news coverage can be obtained. Each Regiment is desirous of having a complété record of each campaign for i f s historical records.- This can only be accomplished by having at least two photographers assigned to the RCT. From the stândpoint of news releases, a great deal of copy was forwarded to higher headquarters and the araount actually re— leascd is not known, It is felt by the undersigned that better news coverage for the Arn$r should have been obtained.

-7-

S E C R E T

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SNQI&V OINflMOO

FORAŒER OPERATION

S*5 OPERAT IOBAL REPORT

It This regiment was first givon a warning about the lst of April that it would soon bo taking part in an amphibious opération* At tho time vory littlo infomat ion was available as to tho oxact naturo of this opération*

2. Following roceipt of this warning ordor, ail training was intonsifiod so as to proporly proparo tho organisation for what lay ahoad of it# Tho fol­lowing routine s’ubjects wore coverod:

a# Qualification and f omiliarization firing of ail wcapons# b # Swiriïming; Im attempt was made to teach evory membor of tho organ­

isation to swira at loast fifty (50) yards carrying full field oquipmont# Botter than ninoty (90) percent of tho organization were able to do this beforo leaving for this opération# .

c» Physical Conditioning: Ail mon were trainod with the objoct in view of proparing them to withstand tho rigors of a prolonged campaigp. ovor difficult terrain#

d# Scouting and patrolling and small unit tactics# e# ïïygicno, sanitation and first aid. f# Map and aerial photograph roading#

3# Spocializod training was institutod in subjocts îhat were bolieved ro- quired for tho type of opération erpoctcd# Somo of the subjects coverod were:

a# Movomont through burned cane fiolds*b# Attack of a fortifiod position#o# Combinod Tank-Infantry opérations#d# Communications Emphasis was placcd on tho spécial types o f . com­

munications peculiar to ixiphibious opérations and island warfarc# e; Perimeter defonse# * f. Combinod Infantry-Artillory opérations*

L},# Tho spocializod training period was followod by a period of advanced training in amphibious opérations# During this period tho RCT ’was takon out on ships for two poriods.of four and seven days each and made practice landings on tho Island of MAUI, The final practice landing was onc invol vin g tho on- tiro 27th Infantry Division#

5# Shortly prior to embarking for tho opération, this regiment received twenty-onc (21 ) plans from tho Commanding General $ 27 th Inf ont ry Division#Those plans coverod possible landings on tho différent beachos 011 the Islands of SAIPAIï, TINIAlï and GUAM. This regiment in tum, basod on the missions as- signed it in tho Division plans, wroto twonty-ono (21) sots of plans covering its possible canployment 011 any or ail throe islands# Prior to embarkation for the opération, those plans were disseminatod as far as battalion commanders, certain members of thoir staffs caïd oompany commandera# The battalion command­er s in turn prepared plans appropriato to thoir BLTs.

6. a# Eta.barka.tion: The RCT embarkod aboard • t-ransports in PEARL IIAE30R on the afternoon of May Jlst* Ail ships wcighod anchor and sailed out of tho harbor at 0555 011 tho lst of June# The convoy arrivod at on thoafternoon of June tyth, It loft there at 1650 on the llth of Juno#

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guide us into position for a d a m attack# ÏJhon Major Rock arrived at the shore party CP the roginont (loss BLT 165-3 vdiioh had not becn landod up to this time) was assonblod and narchcd south al ong tho shoro towards Ycllow Boach, Bocause of wrockago along tho shoro lino tho non worc ofton roquirod to walk in tho watcr# Tho Rogincntal Carxiandor net tho Rogixiont as it passed through tho i+th Marine Division CP in tho vicinity of Boach Ycllow One# Ho had roccivod orders for this roginont to reliove tho 2l|th Marine Roginont of its soctor and capture 0-2 lino within its zone of action. This soctor includcd ASLITO AIRFIELD* Tho troops narenod ail night and startod tho relief at just about daybreak# Ihilo going into position they worc shcllod by Jap artillory. The lst Battalion rolievod the 3rü Battalion, 2l|th Marine Roginont on tho right of tho rcgiaontal soctor and the 2nd Battalion roliovod tho right battalion of tho 25th Marine Régiment# lt was roquostod of tho Ijth Marino Division that tho 3ï*d Battalion of tho 2i;th Marine Roginont bo loft with us as a rcsorvo until our own 3**d Battalion arrived#

* This roquest was granted. In tho lst Battalion, Conpany A crossed tho LD at O9OO and Conpany B crossed at 07l|0# Thoy had to fight for tho LD against bypassed ëixeiagr 'groupe*. Tho 2nd'Battalion crossed tho LD' at->075Q*. Both battalions noved f orv/ard slowly# Tho lst Battalion ran into concreto onp lac orients on its right flcnlc and was slowcd down considorably, Tho loading elenents of tho Jrd Battal­ion canc ashoro at 0805* The renaindor of tho battalion had ail landod by 09 +5 • lt was placcd in Rogincntal rosorvo# By tho niddlo of tho afternoon the 2nd Bat­talion had advaneed to within two hundred (200) yards of ASLITO AIRFIELD, Tho lst Battalion was cxperioncing difficulty gotting on tho ridgo running south fron tho airfield* At lllj.0, Conpany I was rcloasod to the lst Battalion» At 1600 the lst Battalion succoodcd in capturing tho top of tho ridgo* : At 1715# Conpany K v/as ro-roloascd to tho 2nd Battalion# At I73O, tho cnony launchod a countcr- attack against the lst Battalion and drovo thon back# Orders- woro issuod to tho 3rd Battalion at 1815 to nove to tho vicinity of the lst Battalion and to bo pre- pared to attack with then tho following norning, Thoy arrivod at 21I4.5 ox** tonded tho loft of the lst Battalion lino for the nipht#.

18 June îgMi-8• At 0600, Conpanios I and K revortod to control of tho 3r- Battalion# King

Hour was set at 0730# The lst and 3rd Battalions worc orderod to capture tho ' ridgo to thoir front# This was tho sono ridgo fron -which tho lst Battalion had boen drivon during the Jap countcr-attack tho provioüs night. Tho formation for the attack viras Jrd Battalion on tho right, lst Battalion in tho conter, and tho 2nd Battalion on tho loft* Tho 2nd Battalion v/as ordered to hold its line until the lst and *>rà Battalions cône c.broast of thon* At 0800, tho 2nd Battalion was orderod to procoed across ASLITO AIRFIELD. At 0900, Conpany K was again attachod to tho 2nd Battalion# By 1000, tho lst and J>rd Battalions had capturod thoir ob­jectivas# Tho 2nd Battalion sccurod tho airfield by 1015# At-0900, the CG, 27th Infantry Division issuod a now ordor rovising boundarios# The new fon:ia.tion placod tho 105th Infantry on our right* Tho Division objective wo.s tho coast lino on tho cast sido of tho isiand. This Roginont continuod tho attack to tho- oast with tho lst and 2nd Battalions in tho lino, tho lst Battalion on tho loft* Tho 3rd Battalion was in Division rcsorvo* At 1730» a countcr-attack devolopod against tho Marine units on our loft# To guard against a possiblo broak-through on our loft tho lst Battalion noved to tho loft and tho Jrd Battalion fillod tho gap betwoon tho lst and -2nd Battalions# By nightfall our linos woro approxi- natcly cnc thousand (1,000) yards short of tho objective. Early in tho ovoning sovorol'oncoy aircraft ongagod in a dogfight with sono friondly planes directly over tho airfield. One onony piano was shot down in flancs ovor tho Î'TA'FUTAN PEHIIÏSULA and 'anothur landod in flancs on tho airfield, ran off: tho runway and crashod in tho canofields beyond# Tho pilot v/as capturod by tho 2nd Battalion#

* Soo ond of report, Page 11#

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V vinto a position from which they could support the attack with direct fire into these caves* By nightfall the attack had advanced to within five hundred (500) yards of the 0-1 line#

22 June 19144-*The relief of this regiment by the 105th Infantry was started at 0925»

It was completed at about 'ÎIJO, The last elements of this regiment closed in the assembly area at 1510. Late in the evening orders were received from the CG, 27th Infantry Division for this regiment to relieve elements of the l+th Marine DivjLsion tho following morning and continue the attack to tho north.

23 June I9J4I4.8 SBC PHD PHASE!

• At 0530 the regimont began tho movemcnt to pass through oloments of the X;.th Marine Division* Relief was offoctod at 1000, The formation for the attack v/as lst Battalion on tho right, 2nd Battalion on the left and Jrd Bat­talion in reserve. The objective was the 0-5 line, The lst Battalion, in con­tact with tho 2jrd Marine Regiment on thoir right, made good progress against light enemy résistance, The 2nd Battalion ran into heavy enemy mortar, rifle and machine gun fire coming from strongly fortifiod positions to thoir front in Death Valley and tho high ground to their loft. Tho 106th Infantry oh'thoir loft were unablo to capture this high ground at that timo. The enemy fire coming from that direction hold up tho advanco of tho 2nd Battalion and causod heavy casualties, it advanced about four hundrod (l).00) yards beforo nightfall, Tliroughout the day tho regimental command post was under snipôr fire. At abQut I83O. enemy tanks attackod the loft flank of tho 2nd Battalion, Botwoen our 2nd Battalion and tho 3**d Battalion, lOôth Infantry, five of these tanks were knockod out of action by bazooka and 37rim AT guns* One tank got away but it is bolieved it was tho some 0110 that our lst Battalion reported knocking out a. short timo lator. At I9J+O a Jap amrno dump exploded in tho vicinity of the 2nd Battalion CP causing sovoral casualties.

2lj. June I9ljli.: ' • *

At 0800, following a ton minute artillcry préparation, our lst ..and 2nd Battalions, with tho 106th Infantry on thoir left, attackod toward tho 0-5 line, By Ô9I5 they had advanced about two hundred (200) yards against onemy rifle, machine gun and mortar fire, The terrain was hocoming rugged, The Jap s held str.ong points in tho sidos of cliffs with porfoct concoalmont and excellent fields of fire, The lst and 2nd Battalions worc hit ail along;1tho front with heavy oriomy small aras and mortar firo, The loft of the 2nd Bat- talion was hit tho hardost. At 1000 the lst Battalion executod a flankipg movemcnt with Company B holding, Company A moving around thoir.,left through tho 2nd Battalions zone of action and Company C moving around Company B's right,At IO3O the 3rd Battalion was ordorod to attack through Company C and mako con­tact vâth tho 2nd Battalion at I87 K, During this day wc lost one modium tank and knockod out four enemy tanks, Wo made vory little gain during the day,Tho onemy were offering heavy résistance, At this point tho terrain was in their favor, At about 0800 tho 2nd Battalion CP was hit by hoavy mortar and sniper fire, At I5OO tho lst Battalion CP was hit by onemy mortar fire and sufforod heavy casuaitias.

25 Juno 19^: ‘

At Û63O the 3^d Br.tto.lion was ordorod to by-pass tho onemy in the vicinity of TA 1G6 T and move up in position on tho right of tho 2nd Battalion, Pro- cceded by a fifteen minute artillçry préparation tho 2nd and >rd Battalionse.ttackod toward tho 0-5 line, The lst Battalion followod up bohind* mopping up in the regimental zone of action, Tho a.ctivity throughout tho day coneisted

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0cffoct that tho lst Battalion would bo rolieved of its fltml: protection nis- sion by tho 2nd Battalion, 2l+th Marines tho following norning, Tho lst Bat­talion, lOÇth Infantry was ordorod relieved of attachnont to this rogiraent and ordorod back to 27th Division control. The roliof of our lst Battalion by tho Marines vas conplctcd by 0710 on July lst» Thoy in turn relieved tho lst Battalion, 105th Infantry of their seotor by 0800. During tho afternoon, thoy attackod tho pas s at PJ 5^7* Thoy capturod it-by nightfall. Tho 3rd Battalion continued patrolling and tho delivering of long rango nachino gun, nortar end artillory firo against tho oneny withdrawing to our front» Tho 2nd Battalion who had boon relieved of attachnont to tho 106th Infantry and at- tachod to the 105th Infantry were now placod in Corps rosorve in tho vicinity of TA I87 A» At 2200 tho loÇth Infantry received tho 27th Division attack order for tho noxt day rolioving thon of attachaient with the J+th Marino Div and roturning thon to 27th Infantry Div control. The 2nd Battalion was ordorod to romain in their présent aroa as Corps Resorvo.

2 July 19ljl|.i

■ • Tho rogiüont attackod at O85O on July 2nd in colunn of battalions, 3rd Battalion loading, lst Battalion Çloss Cor.ipany C) following, Conpany C was left in tho vicinity of RJ 5^7 nopping up, Our advanco was very rapid, so nuch so that contact botwoen our left flank and tho right of tho lOÇth Infantry becane extronoly difficult, In view of thi3 tho CG, 27th Inf Div ordorod us to hait our advanco at II4I4.5 until furthor orders» Our advanco had boon aidod by a 30 ninute concentration laid on the aroa of our exposod flank by the at- tachod Chemical Mortar Platoon during tho norning» During tho day two SPMs woro lost, 0110 fron oneny action and one f rca an accident, Tho lattor ono was lator repairod and put back into action, By nightfall contact with tho lst Battalion, lOÇth Infantry on our loft was roestablishod.

3 July lÿLfo-i

■ King Eour had bcon sot at 0800, Tho 3rd Battalion was in position and roady to juivip off at that tino but booause of 011 air striko on the front of tho Marines on our right, and ropoated enfilade autonatic fire fron thoir soctor, wo could not advanco, Tho attack finally junpod off at 1100 with tho Marino s and our Jrd Battalion noving off togothor. The Division phaso lino was roaohod at 1735 after an advanco through oneny nortar and nachino gun firo which was cspocially heavy on our loft flank, At 1515 the lst Battalion novod to a point four hundred (Ï+OO) yards behind the Jrd Battalion, The 2nd Bat­talion was still in Corps Rosorve#

I;. July 19UU*

Early in the norning a large group of oneny attonpted to infiltrato north through tho regimental connand post, Twonty-soven of thon were killod in- cluding a. nuabor of officors.and warrant officors, one of whon proved to bo Colonel Ogawa, Sonnanding Officer of the 136th Japanoso Infantry Reginont, At O73O tho lst Battalion passod through tho 3rd Battalion and atte„ckod in tho reginont al zone of action. Originally King Hour was set for 0700 but vra.s dclay- od until 0730 on Division order, Progross was stoady against light opposition until 1030 when tho lst Battalion rcachod the high ground overlooking FLORES POHT. Horo the advanco was hold up becausc ef the delay in noving up of tho 105th Infantry on our loft flank, but was rosuned at 1115* During tho oarly afternoon tho advanco was rapid age.inst wcalc oneny opposition, Lator in the afternoon it slowod up becausc of heavy oneny autonatic weapon fire, At 1530 tho CG, 27th Inf Div ordorod tho Rogincnt to. rolieve and take over tho seotor end zone of advanco of two batte.lions of tho l;th Marine Division on our right.

m 7 -

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ucontinue tho attack toward MAKüNSHA. At O855 tho 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry, attaefeed within thoir zone of o.dvonco. They woro followcd by Conpaniog E and G, 165-bh Infantry, Thosc tv/o conponios woro connandod by tho executive officor of tho 2nd Battalion, l65th Infantry, i/o 0900 our lst Battalion junpod off on tho ri dit of tho 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry, The advanco proceodcd slowly duo to stoep terrain and ficrco rosistance fron tho onony ontronchcd in caves, spider holcs and pill boxes» Ail forward novoncnt coased at II4.5O on Division order, During tho day tho ranainder cf tho 2nd Battalion end tho 3rd Battalion supportod tho attack with long range nachine gun nnd nortar firo fron tho high ground on tho right of our zone of action, Tho ronaindor of th o 2nd Battalion via s in position botweon tho lst and 3rd Battalions, Word •vjus rocoivod t h a t a Marine battalion would rol-icvo t h o 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry t h o following norning, Mconwhilo RCT 165 plus tho 3rd Battalion,106th Infantry woro attachod to tho 2nd Marine Division, üpon relief of tho , 3rd Battalion 106th Infantry tho noxt norning, that battalion wa.s to revert to 27'bh Division control,

8 July 19144.:Tho attack. was schodulod ori -inally for 06j0 fron tho Marine lino and 0800

fron our line but ovring to tho dolay of tho Marines to cono up on trac, it did not bogin until 1130» At that tine tho Roginont novod off toward tho 09“A lino,, with tho lst Battalion on tho loft, tho 2nd Battalion on tho right and tho 3rd Battalion, in roginontal roservo, following tho 2nd Battalion, The lst Battalion net strong rosistance vory carly, but woro ablo to contain tho ca.ves fron which it cane with a platoon fron oach conpany and it continucd to nove ahoad slowly, Tho 2nd Battalion neoting light rosistance, roachcd thoir objective by llii+5» Tho 3rd Battalion assistod tho lst Battalion in clcaning tho onony out of tho cavos, During thij. aftornoon Conpany I foreed thoir way through tho Valley of Holl noeting stiff rosistanco fron tho cavos in the sidos of tho valley, Enony attacks and attcnpts to infiltrate through our linos were unsuccossful and cost hin soventy-fivo killod with 110 ca.sua.ltios to our troops..

9 July 19l{i4.tTho lst Battalion novod off at daybreeJc toward thoir objoctivo. At I2I4.5

assistod by Conpany L thoy roachcd tho shoro, Conpany K again wont through tho Valley of Holl cloaning out ail cavos as thoy wont along, Ail othor units carriod on nopping up opora.tions* At 1615 it v;as reportod by HT&LP that tho Island of SAIP/JI was considorod sccurod* Tho roginont v/as diroctod to organizo tho high ground facing tho soa within its soctor, protcct tho right flank of tho 2nd Marine Division and provent infiltration fron tho north, During tho nigjit tho onony again attonptod to infiltrato through our linos unsuccossfully, loaving ono hundrod and fifty doad in front of our positions.

10 July l l;j

Ail battalions woro engaged in nopping up opérations and patrolling activitios# Ono hundrod onony woro killod during daylight hours ani anothor oiglrby diod trying to infiltrato through our linos during tho night,

11 July 19 Ijij-îMopping up activitios continucd rcsulting in tho killing of sovonty-fivc

Japs during daylight hours, Tho roginont was officially returnod to tho 27th Infantry Division control, relief to talco place noxt day by tho 6th Marine Roginont of tho 2nd Marine Division* That night anothor ono hundrod and ton Japs woro killod#

- 9 -

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I P S f i

Lucivilians were captured, Several casualties were sustained by the recon­naissance ïroop during the days activities. At 1430 ail battalions were ordered to withdraw to the base of MT. luuiPI to dig in for the night.

At 0600 the Regiment began to shuttle back to LiAGICIEKilE BAY area by motor, Two provisional companies were left back in TA 286 and anothor in tho vicinity of the 27th Infantry Division forward CP at TA 238 Y, to compléta mopping up opérations, These opérations woro concluded by 1630 and ail units roturnod to K&GICIjj2ÏÏÏE DAY area, Twolvo onemy soldiers and one civilian were killod and ono civilian was captured, During tho Pourth Phaso of tho SAIPAN Opération tho regiment killed ono hundrod and fifty-sovcn onomy, mostly military porsonnel and captured sixty-two, mostly civilians.

"'Note---Tho timo o f C r o s s i n g tho LD o n 17 Juno f o r Companies A and E show n i n

this report diffors from that shown in tho organization*s Unit Journal, This discropancy w.s discovorod during a combat critique hoid on tho scaao ground o.ftor tho cessation of hostilitios. An effort was mado to ascortain the origin of the timo shown in tho Unit Journal, but tho records are incomploto becauso of tho fact that during tho poriod of this action tho CP porsonnel and communi­cation equipmont had not boon complotely l a n d e d .

6 August 1944;

Capt, 165th InfS-3

11 -

S E C R E T

lO^am How, Shell, HE, Ml w/f MiiS 250I05rm How, Slioll, HE, ïvll w/f M5I4. 25I4.105mm How, Shell, HE, A.T., ’dÙJ 70lOJr.r.i How, Shell, YJP, w/f 1157 20105mm Hov.r, Shell, Cannistor 75Ground Signais, Ass’t .117-1122 250Ground Signais, ass’t 1.D.7A1-M22A1 75Gronade, îland, Frag, Mkll 1|Û00Grenade, Hond, Off., lüklll IjOOGrenade, Rifle, HE, A,T., M9A1 300Grenado, Rifle, Frag, 1U7T2 800Rocket, HE, A.T,, 2.36", il6Al 100Smoke, rod L&QSmoke, violât I4.OOSmoke, yollow hO0Saoko, YJP 200

The majority of enemy vroapons were turned over direct to Division Ordnance Contact parties by front lino units. The following quantitios of onemy woapons were salvaged thru RCT S-L].:

Type and Caliber ___ Quantity _______

Rifle, Cal. ,30 L$Light machine gun, Cal, ,30 10Rifle, autonatic ij.Heavy machine gun, Cal. »30 7AA Gun, 20mm 2ICneo mortar s 17Pistols 8Rifle, Cal. .25 6

During this opération tho following woapons woro lost or damagcd boyond repair:

Typo and Caliber __ __ Quantity

Shotgun, 12 gaugo 1Rifle, US, Cal. .30, 111 1(0Rifle, Brovming Automatic, Cal. .30, M1918A2 8Carbino, Cal. .50, Ml 28Gun, Machine, Browning, Cal, ,30, MI9I9M- 3Pistol, automatic, 1.1911 and M1911A1 28Launcher, rocket, A.T., 2.36!', I.H 11Mortar, 60mm, 112 2

Enemy ammunition dumps wore reported by units to Regimental Ammunition Officor by target areas. This information was immcdiately transmitted to Div­ision Ordnanco Officor wiio mado arrangements for proper disposition, The only enemy acmunition salvaged directly by this organization vvas 81mm Mortar, Shell HE and Fuzos for Sholl HE, Slnm. Tho lattor was employed in our own Simm llortars vdion ammunition supply for that weapon bccomo critical.

- 5 -

S E C R E T

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ÏÏEADQUARTERS I.65TII IUFANTRY A.P.Ô. 2?

S-U REPORT OF OPERATION FORAGER

rSnpply- and Transportation

Eléments of the supply group landod on Blue Beach 2 in the following order:

D plus 2 (17 June at 0020s RCT S-l^ Regimental Motor Qfficer,Assft Regimental Supply Sergeant, ter* clerks.

D plus 2 at O9CO, CWO Maintenance Qfficer, détail of EM from Service Company*

D plus 2 at lljjOOî. Ass!t limitions Qfficer* Regimental Supply Sergeant, détail of 12 EH from Service Companyi

The remainder of the Supply group were assigned the following duties as S~l{. Représentatives:

Service Company Commander; Oïl transport,Regimental Munitions Officer: On control vessel*Ass*t Regimental S-ia On LST*Last elements of this group landed on D plus 7*

Battalion Supply Officers and their enlisted assistants landed on D plus 1 and D plus 2f

The RCT S-Ii, at daybreak, immediately made a reconnaissance of beaches, and contacted Sngineer Shore Party Commander to ascertain status of supplies#A small quantity of supplies were landod on D plus 2 and approximately twenty (20) I/I4. ton vehicles* Although two (2) canteens of water were carriod by each individual, it was necessary to provide an imnediate supply for emergency use.Tho l/lj. ton vehiclos were required by front line units to carry weapons and ammimition, leaving the S— s without transportation and necessitating bor~ rowing vehicles from other organizations* This rosulted in delaying the move~ ment of supplies and the establishing of dumps* Inasmuch as the Service Com- pany 2|* ton trucks (four cargo trucks and one maintenance truck) wero not landod until D plus 7 a id D plus 8* it was necessary to function with only the available l/L\. ton trucks; two trucks borrowed from the Seabees for throe days; two LVTs borrowed from the Marines» The LVTs were available for only approxi­mately six hours and recalled by tho Marines* Supplies were not available from tho 27th TransDiv until D plus hr, During this period supplies were procured from Marine Dumpsi froan the beachos, ai\d, from any other available source. The shortage of supplies was the resuit of supply ships leaving during an air raid and not returning for throe days (about 1200 D plus !{.)• Regular dumps were not established until D plus 6 and thon only limited supplies were available in the quantities and type required»

Palletized supplies proved satisfactory* The only serious damage to pal- letized supplies was clothing and individual equipment. It is suggested that cases of clothing and equipment bo waterproofed \vhero practicable.

- 1 -

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M A P of S A I P A N

SCALE: 1.40,000

HEADQUARTERS 165 INFANTRY REGIMENT

OPERATIONS 17 JUNE TO 9 JULY 1944

REPRODUCED* BY ENG INEER, SOPACBACOU 2104

O i*S E C R E T

The quantity of “'B” rations put ashoro woro sufficiont, The breaà eompon- ent issue in.tho ”B" ration was not found adéquate. It is suggosted that tho first ton day issuo of "B” rations» irnmediatcly following combat, bo increasod approximatoly 20fy theroafter tho présent issue will suffice. It is furthor suggested that appropriate changes be nade in Tropical Menu so that a greater varicty be mado available. The post exchange componoftts were furnished with the ”B!Î ration and were adéquate. Eowover, when ''C11 and "K” rations were issued, cigarottos were not available in sufficient quantity* It is recommended that additional cigarettes be issued with ‘*Ct! and uKf' rations.

Vchicles:

This orgcxnization embarkod with two 1 ton trailers, forty-eight 1/1+ ton trailers, ninoty-one 1/% ton truolcs* five 2g- ton trucks, four üg- ton trucks, three 3/I4. ton trucksi .111 crjtiij.o Tehicles were not available until D plus 11.It is suggested that an additional l / h ton truck and l / h ton trailor be issued to cach Rifle Company. The prosont l/h, ton truck and trailer is inudequate.

Du.ring this opération five 21;- ton trucks woro available as followss One maintenance truck, ono 2g- ton trûck to each Battalion S-I4., and one 2j ton truck for RCT S-lj.,

_ To overcome transportation difficultios encountered on this opération, sixteen 2g ton trucks are requirod. These would be employed as follows: ono maintenance truck, two 2|- ton trucks to each Battalion S-U (total 6), and nine 2^ ton trucks to be used by RCT S—L;.. It is also advisable to assign six Dukws to RCT to deliver initial supplies to Battalion dumps. These Dukws to revert to G-*i|. control after dumps are established.

Communie at ions :

The RCT S-ij. vas assigned six SCR 510 radios for the G-Ij. - S-I4. Supply Net. In addition, tho Service Company Commander was assigned one SCR 281+ radio. It was found that tho SCR 510 radios were impractical. Difficulty was en- counterod in contacting tho Control Vossel and LST carrying the cross-section of supplies. Although tho 510’s were originally planned for only shipto-shoro communications, it was found essentiel to have communications between Bat­talion and Regimontal dumps. Téléphoné communications vrere not available and were impractical. SCR 28ij. radios woro procured to replace the 5^0’s and proved very satisfactory botween Batto.lion and Rogimental S-lj.s.

SCR 281,. radios should bo provided for futur© opérations. During tho fiftoen day s of tho opération tho SCR 281; radio v/c. s employed, the minimum of maintenance and repair was requirod. At no timo vrere communications seriously affectod. It is folt by the RCT S-l;. that without the aid of the 28I4. radio, difficulty may have been experienced at times in moving essential supplies to the front linos.

It is highly recommcndod that an SCR 28hr radio be installed in the Rogimental S-ii. vehiclo. In many instances the Regimontal S-ij. '.vas in a position to transmit vital supply information to Regimental Dump but was unable to do so because means of communications were not iramodiately available. The importance of a complote communications system as an aid in moving supplies forward to as­sault units with a minimum loss of timo cannot bo strossed to greatly. Sim- iliarly, SCR 28jLj.* s should bo furnished tho supply of higher echolon to insuro that urgent supply matters aro innodiately transmitted to or from RCT S-I4..

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MEDICAL DifiTACHLJSiîT .I65th Infantry

APO 27

IffiGBufliiTAL StQGi&ï-î > S Æ'POtiT OF OPjjiiATIOK FOiUGSR

The following comraents are on the functioning of the entire liegisnental Méd­ical De tac lurent du ring the opérations on Saipan Island# It is a surmaation of the ooauents of the Battalion Surgeons plus the comment s of the xiegjoaerital Surgeon*

Sanitarv Conditions on Shipboard

Sanitary conditions on shipboard were generally adequate. The following could be improved:

Ventilation in the living quarters on the transport was inadéquate»

Diot on several of the ships lacked fresh vegetables, salads, etc,, and dairy products* In view of the diet which combat soldiers m i l be ’forced to eat after landing, chose items should be abundant*

As the landing of the Regiment was on an established beach head no consent can be :<v-ade regarding debarkation of médical troops* The plan contemplated was to land aid men with companies, litter squad or an agent for litter squad with assault companies, and the aid station divided into 2 or 3 sections, in the 4th and 5th wave*

Location and Protection of Aid Stations

In this theater, expérience lias dictated that the Battalion Aid Stations be established in the immédiate vicinity of the Battalion Comnand Post, and that it be within the périméter of the Battalion Conciand Post at night* This is done for the protection of the aid station and is nocessary especially at night. It pro­vides adéquate protection without the need of delogating extra personnel for aid . station personnel for their own protection. In addition, riflernen were assigned either regularly or on call to the aid station for protection of litter bearers or T^ton ambulances when the se were procecding through sniper infestod territory*If the aid station was isolated, rifleu. en were provided*

This procédure of keoping the aid station with the GP.had défini te disadvan- tages in that the site of a OP does not necessarily have the qualities désirable for an aid station* Therefore sonetiiD.es the aid station had to nove too frequently, and De established in exposed areas, too far forward, and even under machine gun firo* however, as the Battalion Commanders were cognizant of this situation, they usually established the CP in a location where an adequately defiladed and covered aid s cation could be established* r/hen the CP was noving too far forward, the aid station was able to remain back with a rear ec lie Ion of the CP or with assigned guards,

lui aid station far forward— that is, 50 to 100 yards fron the front line se­llas both advantage s and di s ad van tag es* The advantâge s are that it provides aid station treataont early and nalces the litter hauls short. Tho se are both life-

- 1 -

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be landed with theso vehicles. This was donc by the 3rd Battalion with one ve- hicle* By loading ail the supplies on the trailers. the vehicle is at ail times available for use as an ambulance* As it was, the -^tons were at tiries tied up transporting the aid station when urgently needed for the évacuation of patients *

Adequacy, Training and Functioning of the Aid Station Personnel

The functioning of the médical personnel of this Regiment was excellent* Throughout the opération they displayed courage, initiative and ability* The method in which dressings were donc, plasma given, and the patient handled showed excellent training and natural ability. Aid non were able to give plasma while undor fire and even at night undor a shelter half* It appears a proven fact that with médical personnel, solected for their intelligence and starnina and well trained, nany lives are saved and sufforing prevented*

Bumcrically the supply of trained médical personnel was border-line. Had combat been continued nuch longer the supply would have been inadéquate* Ail Battalion Surgeons feel that tho T/0 allotmcnt of litter bearers is inadéquate*On this opération we were able to supplément the nunber of litter bearers as follows: Company B, 102nc! kodical Battalion, Collecting Company for this Régi- ment, regularly suppliod two litter bearer te cm s for each battalion in action*They were able to do so becauso in this opération litter bearers were not needed in their Chain of évacuation* Company B, 102nd Médical Battalion deserves the praise and gratitude of this Regiment for supplying theso litter bearers and for the excellent mariner in which those litter bearers performed*

ÏThen a Battalion Section encor.ntered a large number of casualties additional ... litter bearers and vehicles were dispatched by the Regimental Surgeon to remain only so long as the enorgency existed. In emergencies the Battalion Commanders were able to delegate line personnel to assist in the évacuation of patients* By theso moans évacuation was never long delayed and as many as 50 or 40 casualties were processed in 45 minutes* However, if the évacuation chain had been such that the Collecting Company was not able to supply litter bearers, the problem would have been critical*

Replacements of médical puîsonne1 is necessary. The loss of a company aid man must be immédiately replaced* The loss of one litter bearer knocks out a litter squad* Replacements for médical personnel in the battalion sections was furnished by the Regimental médical section from available personnel, to such ail extent that by the end of comb-.t thoro was no personnel available for further replacements* To supplément the Regimental médical section personnel, 8 bands- men were furnished foi’ two days and thon 6 bandsmen for about 10 days until the end of the opération. The s e bandsmen did excellent work as litter bearers, In future opérations, it would be advantageous for higher echelons to, have trained médical personnel ready for immédiate replacement*

Ca suai tic s Arnong kodical Personnel

Tho Médical Detachnont of this Régiment sustained a total of 31 casualties including 2 repeat cases. These cases niay be grouped as follows: Killed in action, 5; died of wounds, 1; wounded in action, 19 (Of these, 9 were able to ruturn immediately to duty, and 3 were back to duty in a few days); injured in action, 2 (both of these returned to duty after sevoral days hospitalization); sick, 6 (ail soon returned to duty). Of tho 25 battle casualties, 21 were act- ing as company aid men at the time wounds were received, 3 were litter bearers

- 3 -

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Location of our dead was rcportod to Battalion S-4, 'ïïhon practicable they were moved near roads. In so far as possible they were tagged by aid men, Each day tho Regimental Burial Officor, with truck and enlisted assistants, picked up ail dead located as above and ail other dead he could locate, and removed them to the Arrny Cernetery, In général this was satisfactory. The removal of our dead who were inaccessible because of enemy fire was of course delayod somotimes for sevoral days. Disposai of enemy dead vr s made the responsibility of the Commander in whose area they were. They were buriod in the immédiate vicinity where found by burio.1 détails of combat troops, by bulldozer and on occasion by prisoner dé­tail.

Collecting Company - The work of Company B, 102nd Médical Battalion, merits the highest praise* This company perfomed normal duties, the normal function of évacuation from the aid station in a most satisfactory manner. At ail times they maintained contact with Battalion Aid stations. They evacuated promptly both day and night. ;it times their vehicles travelled under sniper fire, They were always alcrt as to the bcst routes of évacuation. In addition* the company gave immeasurable help to this Regiment by furnishing littor bearers to the Bat­talion Aid stations. This was a voluntary function on their part. These litter bearers evacuated patients from the front line regularly under fire. They did this in a most meritorious manner. Without their help, évacuation would have been much more difficult. The Clearing Company of the I02nd Médical Battalion func- tioned through much of the opération merely as a rolay post. Even critical chest cases going through the Clearing Company at these times received only Tetanus and occasionally one unit of plasma. Five critically wounded cases reaching the Clearing Station late one night were immediately transferred to another -|-ton ambulance, and sent on to the Field Hospital some distance away.

In général, hospital facilities were not adequate, as a resuit it was nec- essary for many exhaustion cases and slightly wounded cases to be evacuated from the Island. Thus the Regiment was deprivcd of considérable personnel that could have soon been returned to duty.

Evacuation by Higher Echelons

FRAiTCIS H. REYNOLDS, Major, Médical Corps, Regimental Surgeon,

#HEADQUARTERS I65TH INFANTRY

APO #27

TRANSPORT QUARTEEviASTER REPORT

Th8 following Transport Quartemaster report is submitted on the FORAGER Opération. This.report is the Consolidated statements of the six Transport Quartemaster s fron this organization who were part of the Regimental Combat Team

Planning (Initial) of Babarkation of Supplies

Tho plan-of loading was- constantly being upset, due to changes being pro- mulgated in the assignment of unit personnel to the différent ships being re- placed, changes were nade in the types and omounts of the various vehicles and supplies, and in one instance, altérations were accomplished on one AP up to loading time.

Although the encounter of some difficulties of the above mentioned are to be anticipated in the initial planning stages, it is the belief that they can be minimized considerably by proper foresight and by the application of a "Freezing.Date" on the switching of units, TBA and TE equipment and supplies.

The planning phase in itself would not be difficult, were it not necessary to include so many items in the loading plan. These excessive items are not only included, but are repeated over and over again to emphasize their unim- portance. An example of this is the loading sumnary which lists each item by weight, square and cube. It is rçiy opinion that no one had time enough to digest this summary even if it contained important information. By reducing the ex­cessive material in the plan itself, a conoise understandable manuscript -would be the resuit. At the same time the TQLI could use his time to improve upon the necessary items.

The value of obtaining correct information as to load is beyond estimation. A great deal more importance should be attached to this point. It is not an easy task to incorporate last minute changes into a loading plan. Furthemore the'.time will come when changes are so great in number that the TQJI will make a mistake in his calculations as a direct resuit. This could be very serions, and in no way improbable.

At a meeting, the TQlIs were notified that we were to préparé loading plans for combat lôading of BLT and attached units. We were assigned the character- istics of a sister ship as characteristics of the Herald of liorning were not available. Although the général outlines were similar, the demensions of holds, the number of holds available, the capacity of booms, and the.troop capacity were so différent as to render negligible any advantage gained by a study of a sister ship characteristics. Upon the arrivai of the ship in port, I reported aboard to the ship’s First Lieutenant who was also tho ship*s Cargo Officer.The ship had been commissioned less than a month before her arrivai at the port of embarkation. It had been ordored.out of the conversion-yard three weeks before it was scheduled to be comploted. The First Lieutenant had been ordered aboard the day it was to sail and reported two (2) hours before it did sail.The ship had been loaded and hatches battened, so he had no opportunity to becorne acquainted with the ship on the way across.

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V 0Loading

Initially the difficultios oncountcrod in the loading of the ships were nore or less in the following order:

a* Lack of hi-lifts: There were available, at tho start of the loading, only three (3 ) hi-lifts per ship. This nunber is inadéquat^. The happÿ ncdiun would be six (6) hi-lifts per ship, Thoso hi-lifts should bo dividod botwoon the pior, and tho holds of tho ship. As the loading advances through i f s various stages, sone of these hi-lifts could bo disponsod with at tho direction of tho TQJ.1, For exemple: ACtcr tho TBA oquipncnt and the najority of tho slods had boon loadcd, tho renaining cargo consistcd nainly of rolling stock,

b. Tho a m y pior dotc.il of tho Harris, Frenont and Custcr woro not well organizod at tho connonconont of tho loading of tho ships. Eowevcr, this difficulty was evontually straightonod out and ail wont well, with tho ex­ception of tho Fronont, whcro constant intorforoncc by tho ship ’b' TQII, a Lt. Egan, US1IC, whosc lack of exporicnco and constant gotting undorfoot, causod the A m y TQLÎ no end of trouble. The Wavy officors aboard tho ship possossed littlo or no knowlodgo of "Conbat Loading" a vos sol, and ovidontly roliod grcatly on tho adviso and rccouncndation of Lt. Egan. In addition, Lt. Egan, who was supposcd to serve in an advisory capacity to tho A m y ’ s TQIi, took upon hinsolf on a nunber of occasions authority that ho did not possoss. This con- sistod of continuai harassing and agitating of tho non. As ho was part of tho ship * s staff and rosponsible only to tho ship, his only eonccrn was to * koep tho good vri.ll of the Navy, with no regard for the Amy. His knowledge of coribat loading was not of such a nature that ho was any holp to tho A m y TQII, but a dofinite detrinont,

During tho onbarkation of troops there was no difficulty oncountcrod,Tho ship’s borthing officer, Lt, Schnidt, employed ïïavy onlistod non as guides who took various units to their berthing spacos, Tho only suggestion tho TQII can nako, in tho présent nethod of onbarkation, is that tho non leavo thoir barrackbags on tho pior until thoy havo boon shov/n thoir borths and disposod of thoir oquipncnt,

»

Tho nunber of tons of troops cargo loadcd on tho USS Frcmont was sovon hundrod and fifty tons, This consistcd of three hundrod and ton pallcts and sevonty nico vohiclos» Tho porsonnol on board consistcd of sixty fivo of­ficors and six hundrod and for-ty fivo onlistod non.

During tho initial drafting of tho loading plan changes occurcd quitc frequcntly but as thoso changes woro brouglit to the attention of the TQII in sufficiont tino to altor the loading plan. Ho difficulty was encountored in this respect»

Tho Havy oncountcrod a bit of difficulty in bringing tho ship to an even kocl, as thoro was a dccidod list to port, The addition of ballast to nunbor throe holl to correct tho list changcd tho loading plan of this particular hold* As the TQII was notified in sufficiont tinc, this change was nade in the loading plan of this hold without difficulty, but tho second tinc tho hold was altcrcd, the ship* s TQII, Lt, Egan, failcd to notify tho A m y TOJI until tho norning of tho day loading was to bogin, though ho had knowlodge of this change at least 21; hours boforc, This nocescitatcd a last ninute change in the loading plan.

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w 0The idca of attonpting to loacl tho supplies of a nunbor of BLTrs acrcss tho

sexio beach, at the sono tine, or even within a couple of days of oach othor, is not feasible duo to tho following:

a* Gcnorally tho boachcs aro too linited in both dopth and width, and cannot acconodate the shore parties nor the vast quantity of supplies#

b. Approaches for beats to these beachos are very linited*

Both tho above resuits in tho bottlo nocking cf beats and supplies, con­fusion and loss of tine. Supplies cannot be cleared fron the beach to advanco duups rapidly enough to condone this type of unloading.

If it is contenplated that norc than one BLT is to be landed on tho s one beach, I boliove a connand docision should bo nade as to: (l) Miether or not oach BLT is to be conpletoly unloaded prior to unloading the succeeding .BLT or; (2) To the linit of the omount of supplies that each BLT will bo pomittod to unload initially*

In arriving at the décision in roferonce to tho above, due considération nust be given to the supplying of tho troops who have already landod across the beach in question* If troops of two BLT1 s have landed and supplies cf one of theso BLTs aro to be ccnplotely unloaded before the supplies of tho second BLT, thon tho troops of the second BLT would nocessarily havo to be supplied by the first BLT landing its cargo*

On 16 Junc lÇi-lii-* when the Division was ordered to mako the landing on Saipan, I was given orders by the Commander of Troops, that RCT I65 was not going to land, and that ail that was needed was FA units and their anmunition.The FA vehicles wero top priority, so on tho night of tho l6th, we dischargcd ail of therw On the I7th we used LCMs and LCVPs to talce FA anmunition to the boachhead* I had no further orders as to landing RCT 165* On that day I could have disonbarlced and put ashoro tho entire Cannon Company of this reginent sinco it was second in priority, however since I had orders on FA annunition and none on RCT 165, this was not done* As a resuit, what vrero to have been assault troops wero taken bo.clç to soa and not landod for another seven days#YJhen we returned to the transport aro a thore were still no orders* Communication should bo established between higher echelon and the TQtl* Naval communication is inoxVequato silice they fail v/ith rogularity, to appreciate tho situation ashorc#

Barges provod to be slov/er in taking on cargo than any other type of craft* Tho men v/ho nanned thon refusod to handle cargo, so I was forced to use Ship1 s Party which was totally inadéquate to do both jobs*

* Tliore was altogether too nuch delay on the part of the Navy* It v/as a général pro.ctice for a boat to corne alongside, tho crew announce that they hadnft eaten, and thon they would be taken aboard and fod* During this tine (Ko loss than two hours) their boat would be tied up aft* Since an order had been given by the Navy to do this, and since the boat crows knew it, thore was 110 renedy* K Rations should bo issued to the boat crows in the norning#

For discharging cargo, I had no Ship1 s Party Officer, consequently I as- sunod that duty as well as ny o jn*

The tine required to dobark troops would, in the TQJïT s estimation, have been in tho neighborhood of thirty five minutes, providing that debarking would have been in a continuous nanner at ail nets of the ship*

Unloading required oighteon hours into LVTs and LCMs with twenty two hours required for unloading into an LST and thirty six hours required to drag pallots ashore fron LST by use of the LVTs*

- 5 -

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at which timo tho balance of tho BLT, under the direction of the Battalion Executive Officcr, dobarked and set out for the bcach. Up to this tinc no oquipncnt other than hand c&rriod equipmont had been unloaded. As soon as LCHs becano available, the Tank Platoon and several tractors woro sent to tho bcach. Vcry few boats reported to the ship this day dospitc repeatod efforts to tho flagship that our unloading was delayed due to the lack of boats. Tho troops conmcncod unloading cargo* at about 2130, 16 June 19 -1-• At 1300, VJ June 19li4, 8% of the cargo had boen unloaded. That night as tho Transport Group loft tho transport area they woro subject to an eneny air attack.

The group roturned to tho transport area on the 25th of June and con- nenced unloading at 0900. Conditions this day were sinilar to that of tho 17th in that vory few boats reported to the ship to assist in the unloading. Again fréquent requosts woro no.de to tho flagship for nore boats. Unloading ceascd at 1700 with the porcentage of 26/2 unloaded. Tho ship returnod to tho transport area tho following norning and I acconpanied the ship's Captain to a nccting on tho flagship at 1700. The purposo of this ncoting was to find neans of assisting us to spood up the unloading. Tflfo requested a LST and a large supply of LCUs and LCVPs. Unloading conncnccd at 0700 and tho ship was reported 100% unloaded at 17U0, 26 June. The LST was tiod alongsido tho starboard sidc of the ship. =§£. hold aft was unlooxlcd through the olevator hatch - tho boon could not bo topped down to plunb tho hold duo to tho lifo raft tubs alongsido tho A Franc. A détail of non with a line and block pullod tho pallots ovor tho hatch opening to be loworod. The LST was equippod with tv/o fingor lifts - onc was loft on tho tank dock to novo and stack pallots.It was also equippcd with a cherry piclccr on tho upper dock and placod along­sido tho aft'hatch opening. The othor fingor lift novod tho pallots to the sido of the hatch, whorc the cherry piclccr was ablo to lowcr then into the tank dcclc. At the sono tinc a nunber of non woro rccruitcd fron the ship* s personnel, and augnented by 30 nen fron other ships. Thoy wore put to work carrying barrack bags above deck, and over tho side to tho LST dock, where they staclced thon on the upper deck* The LST connencod unloading tho following norning by LVT along the reef to tho bcach. I obsorvod the LVT crews attemp- ting to drag pallots in tandun, howevor tho "S11 hook provided on the pallots would not work and 75% °f tho time it was nocossary to stop tho LVT at the botton of the ranp and adjust the tow. 75/° of the pallets were towed ashore singly. I stayed aboard the LST until ail barrack bags and organization property had been unloaded. Upoh my arrivai on tho beach I found that the bcach party had made no attompt to set up the dumps for organization property but moved it off the beach and dumped everything off at the discrétion of tho Anptract operator. It was necessary for unit représentatives to search bcaches to locate thoir property. It was obsorved that the Amptraclc crcw segrogatod the cquipment as it was boing loaded, top loading such items as night be of use to themselves. One item in particular being a crato containing portable chairs and table for a CP. Thoso items have never been rocovcred.

There woro no sorious casualties onong the arrny and I'Tavy personnel on board the ship during the unloading. One or two men sufferod bruises and sprains. During the unloading of tho LST an accident occurcd aboard tho LST. The elevator while raising a hoavy chain to the upper dock, through somo un- dotemined cause fcll out of control, killing one Navy nan and injuring several A m y and llavy nen. On the norning of June 17th, an LCVP approaching the beach, loaded with a quo.rter ton truck and trailer and ton nen was hit by what ap- pearod to bo a Japanese mortar sholl when about 75 yards from the, bcach» Ono man was killed, three wounded, ono of whom died later after hospital treatment. Seven returned to ship, ono sufforing from a severo pschyoneurosis. The others were returned to duty aftor treatnent for shock.

- 7 -

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last, but not least, the selection of the respective TQtis play an impor­tant rôle in the oxiphibious type of opération, At the risk of répétition, I •write that while a thorough knowledge of tho basic principals of combat loading is essential, tho officer chosen for this type of work, aside fron being consciontious, nust possess the ability for excorising diplonacy and tact. Ho must bo courteous yet forceful, and have tho cap ability of nalcing a quick décision in respect to changes in tho loading of his ship,

The Commander of Troops on ail RCT ships should be a menber of the RCT and this should bo true even if there is an officer of greator rank aboard.If this is deencd unnocessary then it should follow that it is unnecessary for Infantry units to furnish ail tho TQJls, I draw this conclusion after handling cargo that bclongod, to a great oxtont, to the FA and after having a FA officor for Commander of Troops, It would have been botter for him. to have had one of his own officors for a TQL1, Tho compromiso was, like nost compromises, ineffective,

Re-rigging tho booms was a bottloneck in most casos, To switch tho yard and stay from port to starboard roquirod 30 minutes. To switch from Jumbo to yard and stay or vice-vorsa took one hour.

It took olevon days to complété tho unloading. Reo.sons for delay can bo tracod to the Navy. We spcnt seven days at soa after unloading of tho cargo, ïïpon rcturn we unloaded for twelvo hours and then ran out to sea for another twclve hours. Lack of boats returning fron tho beach was anothor fac- tor causing delay. Finally, wc had so nany GQfs that delay on this account nountod to another six te ten hours.

It is my personal opinion that sonoono other than conbat officors should load and unload these ships. Infantry units have the greatest noed for officors on these opérations and can thus loast afford to leave some of thoir officors to do a job that requires far less slcill than the one thoy aro trainod for.

The Troop Commander designated certain units and officers that would serve as pior deto.il, ship’s party, pier bosses and ship's party commander.As these détails woro drawn fron a number of units, control at first was difficult, due to tho fact that sone of tho men seened a bit reluctant to accept ordors fron strange NCOs and officers. I would suggest that in the future those détails be drawn fron only one unit with the officers fron the samo unit accompanying the détail.

The shoring détails should be mo.de to be known to the TQÎ.î in sufficient tino so that they can be orientod as to how the shoring is to be donc. The détail used on the USS Frenont had very little lcnowledgo of how the work was to be done and didn't have sufficient ,tools to accomplish the work without the loanding of tools fron one group to another in the various holds.

The TQjl suggest s that one third of the boats carried by a trojisport be of the LCLI type. There was considérable delay occasioned by the lack of this type of boat» In one instance one SPM-8 was unloaded while the other re- nained 011 tho ship for a considérable length of tine due to the lack of an LCH type boat, TJsually one third of the vehicles carried for an opération are of the type that they have to be unloaded into an LCM type boat. Tho number of this type boat should be increased.

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