188126125 political-law-cases

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

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CASESArticle III of the 1987 Constitution

Bill of Rights

DUE PROCESS

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION V. CITY OF MANILA

20 SCRA 849

Facts: The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. Of the City of Manila is violating of due process clause. It was alleged that Sec. 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violate of due process insofar as it would impose P6T fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500 for second class motels, that Sec. 2, prohibiting a person less than 18 years from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours runs counter to due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is violative of the due process clause?

Held: A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging houses is a police measure specifically aimed to safeguards public morals. As such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would

be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the less limitable of powers extending as it does to all great public needs.

Mush discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of police power.

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportions as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abduction of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals.

The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern or common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.

PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERETILIZER CORP. VS TORRES

231 SCRA 335

Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc (PMPI) filed with the DOLE a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of PHILPHOS. The said petition was not opposed by PHILPHOS. In fact it submitted a position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Later, PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory employees of PHILPHOS but also its professional/technical and confidential employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents. The Mediator-Arbiter issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification election. PHILPHOS appealed said order to the Sec. Of Labor, which appeal was denied.

PHILPHOS alleged that it was denied due process in the proceedings before the Mediator-Arbiter.

Issue: Whether or not PHILPHOS was denied due process?

Held: The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Where, as in the instant case, PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as PHILPHOS was afforded reasonable opportunity to

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS Ó 2003.

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present its side. Moreover, PHILPHOS could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not, instead, it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, PHILPHOS had all opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Sec. Of Labor.

JAVIER VS COMELEC144 SCRA 194

Facts: The petitioner and private were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambamnsa in the May 1984 elections. On the eve of the elections several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed allegedly by the private respondent’s men. This heightened the tension in the province. It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held.

Petitioner went to the Comelec to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaint was dismissed and private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the body. Said decision was signed by among others. Commissioner Opinion who was previously asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was a former law partner of private respondent Pacificador. Opinion had refused. The decision of said division is being contested by petitioner.

Issue: Was there a due process observed by the COMELEC in proclaiming private respondent?

Held: No. Given the general attitude of the COMELEC toward the party in power at the time and particular relationship between Opinion and private respondent, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not certain, that the decision of the body would be adverse to petitioner. Opinion’s refusal to inhibit himself cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety.

This court has repeatedly demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all.

The relationship of the judge at one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a just decision. Where this is probable or even possible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza. For refusing to do so, he divested the second division of the necessary vote for the questioned decision, assuming it could act and rendered proceeding null and void.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

DUMLAO VS COMELEC96 SCRA 392

Facts: BP 52 was enacted in connection with January 30, 1980 Local Elections. The petitioners question Sec. 4 of the said law on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause and the constitutional presumption of innocence. The first paragraph of Sec. 4 reads “… any retired elective provincial city, municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 yrs. of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective office from which he retired.” On the other hand, par. 2 of Sec. 4 provides:

“Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insureccion, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein… and the

filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court of military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such facts.”

Issue: Whether or not the aforecited provisions of Sec. 4 of BP 52 are violative of the constitutional principles of equal protection and presumption of innocence.Held: Par. 1, Sec 4 of BP 52 does not transgress the constitutional guarantee mentioned the first par. Of Sec 4 is VALID. As adverted to in many decisions, the equal protection clauses does not prohibit classification, provided it complies with the requisites what is prohibited is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. The distinction here is substantial. The 2nd par. of Sec 4 however, violates the constitutional guaranty of presumption of innocence. This is so, since a candidate is disqualified from running for a public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him. In this wise, it is as if he is placed in the same category as a person who has already been convicted of a crime whose penalty carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold public office.

ALMONTE VS VASQUEZG.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring the chief accountant and record custodian of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce “all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers for the whole plantilla of EIIN for 1988” and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB has been illegally disbursed, petitioners move to quash the subpoena duces tecum on the following issues:1. whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents

relating to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are “classified”,

2. whether petitioner’s right to the equal protection of laws have been violated. Petitioners complain that in all forum and tribunal the aggrieved parties can only hale respondents via their verified complaints and sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed, while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation;

3. that the subpoena duces tecum is violative of the petitioners right against self-incrimination.

Issue: Were petitioners correct in forwarding the aforementioned issues?

Held: Where the claim of confidentiality does not vest on the need to protect military, diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversation, courts have declined to find it in the constitution an absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that the military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB’s function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding illegal activities affecting the national economy. Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets, it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling


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production, no similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on other consideration. Likewise, no law or regulation was shown which considers personnel records of EIIB as classified information.

The Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint file in any form or manner concerning official acts or omissions (Sec. 12, Art. XI). Rather than referring to the form of complaints, the phrase “ in an appropriate case in Art XI Sec 12 means any case concerning official act or omission which is alleged to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient”. The phrase “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law” refers to such limitations as may be provided by Congress or in the absence thereof to such limitations as may be imposed by the courts. There is a violation of petitioners right to equal protection of laws since in the first place the procedure for the proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman is provided for in the Constitution itself. Second, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints “in any form and in any manner” the framers of the Constitution took into account the well known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoing. The Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who through official pressure and influence can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.

The issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would not violate petitioners right against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in whose possession or custody the documents are.

ART.III, SEC. 2SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

TAMBASEN VS PEOPLE

Facts: On August 31, 1988 P Sgt. Natal applied for the issuance of a search warrant from the MTCC, alleging that he received information that petitioner had in his possession at his course “M-16 armalite rifle, hand grenades, .45 pistol, dynamite sticks and subversive documents”, which articles were used or intended to be used for illegal purposes. On the same day, the application was granted by the MTCC which allowed the seizure of the items specified in the application.

At around 6:30pm of September 9, 1988, a police team searched the house of petitioner and seized the following articles: a) 2 envelopes containing cash in the total amount of P14,000; b) 1 hand set c) handset with antenna …Petitioners prays that the search warrant and the seizure of his personal effects be declared illegal.

Issue: Whether or not the search warrant was legal.

Held: The search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Art. III requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the thing to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those, particularly described in the search warrant to leave the officers of the law no discretion regarding what articles they should seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and abuses may not be committed. Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, has been illegally seized from petitioners. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing subversives is not a valid

excuse for the illegal seizure. The same constitutional provision is also aimed at preventing violations of security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, and giving remedy against such usurpation when attempted.

VEROY VS LAYAGUE210 SCRA 97

Facts: Spouses Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy owned 2 houses, one in Quezon City, where they are presently residing and another in Davao City. The house in Davao City was entrusted to caretakers. However, the keys to the Master’s and children’s bedroom were retained by the Veroy so the caretaker could not enter those rooms.

On April 12, 1990 Capt. Obrero called the telephone from Davao City, Mrs. Veroy to ask permission from the latter if he could enter and search the house in Davao City as there was information that the said house was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. Mrs. Veroy gave her permission on the condition that Major Macasaet, a long time friend of the Veroys, be present during the search. Thereafter, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet conducted the search. When they were already inside the house, they opened the padlock of the door leading to the children’s room. Inside the children’s room, they recovered a .45 caliber handgun with a magazine fully loaded, printed materials of RAM-SFP and a book entitled “Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation”. As a consequence of which, the Veeroy spouses were charged under PD 1866.

Issue: Is the search valid? Whether or not the materials taken are admissible in evidence.

Held: No. The search is not valid. The permission given by Mrs. Veroy to break open the door of their residence was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged rebel soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The items taken, were, therefore products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in evidence.

PEOPLE VS DEL ROSARIO234 SCRA 246

Facts: Private respondent was charged and convicted of the Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions and illegal sale of regulated Drugs in 2 separate criminal cases filed against him with the RTC of Cavite.

There appears to be certain irregularities in the procedure of the buy-bust operations and in the implementation of the search warrant. As to the buy-bust operations, the alleged poseur-buyer had to return to the police station and inform the raiding team that he had already bought the shabu from the accused to implement the search warrant. Thereupon, the raiding team proceeded to the house of the accused to implement the search warrant. The usual procedure in a buy-bust operation is for the police officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at the very moment he hands over the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. As to the implementation of the search warrant, the search warrant specifically authorized only the search and seizure of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalia but the raiding team also seized certain firearms.

Issue: Whether or not the firearm seized though not specifically included in the search warrant is admissible as evidence against the accused.


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Held: No. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence articles relating to the crime. The Constitution itself (sec. 2, art.III) and the Rules of Court (Sec. 3, Rule 126) specifically mandate that the search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in the search warrant. Neither, may it be maintained that the gun was seized in the course of the arrest, for as earlier observed, accused’s arrest was far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seized is not admissible in evidence.

PEOPLE VS TANGLIBEN184 SCRA 220

Facts: Patrolmen Quenedo and Punzalan were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanor at said place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers. At 9:30 pm, they noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him. The person was requested to open the bag but he refused only to accede later on when the petitioner identified themselves. Found inside the bag were marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken the police headquarters for further investigation.

Issue: Was the marijuana inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it was the product of an unlawful search without a warrant.

Held: No. One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12 Rule 126). Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying a marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.

This case also presented urgency. The transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused as carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officer had to act quickly. There was no enough time to secure a search warrant.

PEOPLE VS GALVEZGR. NO. 136790 MARCH 26, 2001

Facts: The incident happened one evening at a local fair which was illuminated by fluorescent lights. Playing games at that time in one of the stalls throwing 25 centavo coins were Larry, Romy and Al while their companion Danny was about three meters away playing bingo. After a while five men arrived. Two of them approached Romy while the two others served as the lookout. Then the fifth man went directly to Romy and stabbed him at the back with a knife. Afterwards the assailant threw the knife away and then fled with his companions. Larry saw Romy fall to the ground seriously wounded. Al was around three arms length away and saw the entire incident. Larry and Danny brought Romy to the hospital where he was declared dead on arrival. Then they informed Romy’s relatives of his death.

Initial police investigation showed that there were six suspects but they could not be found in their respective residences. Inside the bus terminal bystanders informed SPO1 Lazaro, the police investigator, that Manny stabbed the victim. So the policeman fetched Manny and told him to go to the house of the victim. But when they arrived people just looked at manny and did not point to him as the assailant. In fact the victims brother Rey told the police that Manny was not the one

who stabbed his brother and should be released. So the police released Manny.

But as soon as they had left, the people inside the house particularly Danny, Larry and Al told Rey that it was Manny who stabbed his brother as they were him and saw the entire incident. So at the instance of Rey, the Barangay Tanod apprehended Manny and took the latter to the police headquarters. The tanod had no warrant of arrest when he took Manny into custody.

At the police station, the statements of the witnesses were prepared pointing to Manny as the assailant. Manny was charged with murder and was denied bail. At the trial, after pleading not guilty, the eyewitnesses pointed to Manny as the culprit. So Manny was found guilty as charged and sentence to reclusion perpetua despite his alibi and despite the fact that the knife was not found.

On appeal, among the points raised by Manny was the legality of his arrest. He alleged that he was arrested not because of the positive identification of the eyewitnesses but on the basis of the hearsay testimony of Rey. Besides, he was arrested without warrant.

Issue: Was Manny’s arrest legal?

Held: NO. Manny’s arrest was illegal. The Barangay Tanod arrested Manny on the basis solely of what Rey told him and not because he saw Manny commit the crime charged against him. Indeed there was no warrant issued against Manny when the latter was taken into custody by the tanod. Considering that Manny was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating that Manny committed a crime, his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified.

By entering a plea of not guilty and participating at the trial however, Manny waived his right to raise the issue of the illegality of arrest. Objection to a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters a plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. The fact that the arrest was illegal does not render the subsequent proceedings void and derive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts point to culpability of the accused.

And in the case all the facts point to the culpability of Manny. He was positively identified as the assailant by the eyewitnesses who were found by the court to be credible. The failure to present as evidence of the murder weapon is not fatal because the positive identification of the eyewitnesses is sufficient to prove the culpability of Manny.

ART. III, SEC. 3PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

GAANAN VS IAC145 SCRA 112

Facts: Petitioner Edgardo Gaanan was requested by his client Atty. Leonardo Laconico to secretly listen to the telephone conversation with Atty. Tito Pintor through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed condition without complainant’s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act (RA No. 4200).

After trial on the merits, the lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of Violating Sec. 1 of RA No. 4200, which provides:

“Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arraignment to secretly overhear, intercept or record such communication or spoken word by using a device


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commonly known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or detecphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or otherwise decribed”.

The petitioner appealed to the appellate court. The Intermediate Appellate Court now the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trila court holding that the communication between the complainant and the accused Laconico was private in nature and therefore covered by RA No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation is covered in the term “device” as provided in the RA No. 4200.

Issue: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of the Act such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute lawful interception of communications between the 2 parties using the telephone line.

Held: The unlawful refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept or recorded the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be place in the same category as a Dictaphone, dictagraph or other devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislative, the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.

Hence, the phrase “device or arrangement” in Sec 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should not b e construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instrument the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of telephone. It refers to instrument whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

PEOPLE VS ALBOFERA152 SCRA 123

Facts: Albofera and Lawi-an were convicted in the RTC of Davao del Sur for the murder of a forester and were sentenced to capital punishment. There was no direct evidence linking both accused to the crime charged, their alleged participation therein having been found by the trial court to have proved by circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution. On appeal, the accused assails the trial court’s decision on the ground of among others, a letter written in the Visayan dialect by accused Albofera, while under detention, to witness Rodrigo Esma, a friend of Albofera, asking Esma to testify in favor of Albofera. Albofera contends that the admissibility thereof was specifically excluded under Sec. 4, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution on the Privacy of Communication and Correspondence.

Issue: Whether or not the admission of such letter as evidence was valid.

Held: Yes, Albofera’s contention is untenable. The production of the letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter to Esma, and Esma produced such letter in the course of his testimony before the trial court. Besides, there was

nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his affidavit and testify in Albofera’s favor. Nothing Albofera stated in this letter was taken against him in assiving at a determination of his culpability.(NOTE: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgement of conviction of the trial court based on circumstantial evidence of which Esma’s testimony was much noted for its worthiness, even if Albofera’s extra-judicial confession was disregarded as invalid.)

ART. III, SEC. 4FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS COMELEC207 SCRA 1

Facts: Petitioner in these cases are questioning the validity of Sec. 11 (6) of RA 6646 which prohibits the selling or donating space and time for political advertisements except to the COMELEC as provided under Sec. 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner’s argue that the provision violates and invades the constitutional guarantees comprising Freedom of Expression; that it amounts to censorship, that the prohibition is in derogation of media’s role and function to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues.

Held: No infringement of the Freedom of Expression.1. The constitution itself, has expressly authorized the

COMELEC to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information. (Art IX-C, 4). The fundamental purpose of that is to ensure equal opportunity, time and space and the right to reply, as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the used of such media facilities, in connection with “public information campaigns and forums among candidates”.

2. The technical effect of Art IX-C,4 of the Constitution may be seen to be that no presumption of invalidity arise in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the COMELEC for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. For supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely inconceivable without accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the general time honored one- that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving that assertion.

3. The assailed provision is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability in time to election period.

4. It is limited in scope of application. It applied only to sale and purchase, and donation of print space or airtime for campaign and other report or commentary or other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates advertisements of particular candidates.

5. It does not limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference.

AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. VS CAPULONG160 SCRA 861


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Facts: Petitioner Ayer Production Pty. Ltd. For Philippines and International release, the historic struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA entitled “The Four Day Revolution”. During the filming of said motion picture, private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile, who played a major role in the events proposed to be filmed, filed a complaint with application for Temporary Restraining Order and a writ of Preliminary Injunction with RTC of Makati seeking to stop movie production alleging that petitioners production of said movie is without his consent and over his objections constitutes a violation of his right of privacy. Petitioner, on the other hand maintained that the film would not involve the private life of the Enrile nor that of his family and that a Preliminary Injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free expression. The lower court then issued a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner company. The latter then filed a petition for certiorari with an urgent prayer or preliminary injunction. The Court then granted a limited temporary restraint order partially enjoining the implementation of respondent’s judge order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein, and allowing the petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions of the movie which do not make any reference to private respondent Enrile or of his family or to any fictitious character based on bearing substantial resemblance or similarity to or identifiable with Enrile.

Issue: Whether the “balancing of interest test” or the “clear and present danger test” be applied.

Held: The court believes that a different conclusion must be reached. The production and filming by petitioner of the projected motion picture does not in the circumstances of this case constitute as unlawful intrusion upon private respondents “right of privacy”. The subject matter of the movie is one of public interest and concern and does not relate to the individual life. Unlike in the Lagunzad case which concerned the lifestory of Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his immediate family. What we have here is not a film biography, more or less fictionalized, of private respondent Enrile. The film is not principally about nor is it focused upon, the man Enrile, but is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Enrile in the precipitating and constituent events of the change of government in February 1986. The respondent judge should have his hand, instead of issuing an ex parte TRO, for the projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither Enrile nor the respondent judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was in other words, no “clear and present danger” or any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert.

EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP. (DYRE) VS HON. DANS, JR

137 SCRA 628

Facts: The petition was filed to compel the respondents to re-open the radio station DYRE which had been summarily closed on the ground of national security. The petitioner contends that it was denied due process when the radio station was closed based on the mere allegation that it was used to incite people to sedition. No hearing and action were taken on the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The petition also raises the issue of freedom of speech. Before the court could promulgate a decision, the petitioner withdraw his petition since the radio station had already been sold.

Held: Considering that the case has become moot and academic, the petitioners motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition is GRANTED. The following guidelines were issued by the Supreme Court for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions, to wit:

1. The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down in Ang Tibay V C.A. should have followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed.

2. All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule- that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.

3. The clear and present danger test however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.

4. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.

5. The transistor radio is found everywhere, the television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set.

6. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze and reject the utterance.

7. The clear and present danger test must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.

There is a simple, extremely narrow class of cases in which the First Amendment’s ban on prior restraint may be. When the nation is at war, But the government has failed to even allege an emergency that could be tantamount to an undeniable and extreme danger so as to justify the restraint. Mere conclusions are insufficient. In the area of national defense and foreign affairs, the executive is endowed with enormous power unchecked by the other branches of government. The only restraint to this power would be an enlightened citizenry. For this reason, the press must be kept alert, aware and so as to inform and enlighten the people. Secrecy is the best maintained through credibility. An effective internal security is premised on disclosure. There is no proof that the publication of the study would lead to immediate and irreparable damage to our nation and people. Should the government fail to proceed with its grievance, it may do so in other ways but not through restraint by constitutional entitlement.

ART. III, SEC. 4ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

Primicias VS Fugoso80 Phil 71

Facts: The resondent Mayor sought to defend his refusal to allow the nacionalista party to hold meeting at the PLAZA MIRANDA by what he called “a reasonable ground to believe basing upon previous and upon the fact that passions, especially on the part of the losing groups, remain bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly peace constituted authorities which


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might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order.”

Issue: Whether or not the mayor has the discretion to allow holding of a meeting in a public place.

Held: The Philippine Legislature has delegated the exercise of police power to the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, which according to Sec. 2444 of the Administrative Code has the following powers, among others, is to regulate the use of streets, avenues, parks, cemeteries and other public places and to enact ordinances it may deem necessary.

The Supreme Court rejected the Mayor’s argument noting that the condition of Manila at that time did not justify the mayor’s fears. The power of local officials is only one of regulation and not prohibition. The said provision odes not confer the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion in issuing the permit to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held. They cannot bar the use of public places for lawful assemblies.

NON VS DAMES II185 SCRA 523

Facts: Petitioner urge the Court en Banc to review and reverse the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz V PSBA 161 SCRA 7, to the effect that a college student, once admitted by the school, is considered enrolled only for one semester and hence, may be refused readmission after the semester is over, as the contract between the student and the school is deemed terminated.

Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enrol by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protest is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.

Upholding the primacy of freedom of expression because the students do not shed their constitutionally protected right at the schoolgate.

Held: The Court in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the “termination of contract” theory. But it must be repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to educate and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions (See Art. XIV, Sec. 1-2, 4(1)

Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Par. 137 of the manual of regulations for private schools, which provides that “when a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling… for the entire semester for collegiate courses,” which the Court in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired.

The “termination of contract” theory does not even find support in the Manual par. 137 merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on a installment basis. Thus, even if a student does not complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for more than two weeks, he may required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is given his credentials for transfer.

On the other hand, it does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the manner expressed in Guzman, before they were refused re –enrollment. In fact, it would appear from the pleadings that the decision to refuse

them re –enrollment because of failing grades was a mere after thought. It is not denied that what incurred the fire of the school authorities was the student mass actions conducted in February 1988 and which were led and/or participated in by petitioners. Certainly, excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play.

NOTE: The Supreme Court pointed out that this is not a simple case of a school refusing readmission or re –enrollment or returning students. Undisputed is the fact that the refusal to readmit or re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school authorities as a reaction to student mass actions directed against the school. Petitioners are students of respondent school who, after leading and participating in student protests were denied readmission and re-enrollment for the next semester. This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by students vis-à-vis the right of school officials to discipline pronouncements in the cases of Malabanan V Ramento and Villar V TIP.

ART.III, SEC. 5FREEDOM OF RELIGION

GARCES VS ESTENZO104 SCRA 510

Facts: On March 23, 1976, the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City adopted several resolutions regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebrations of his annual feats day and the construction of waiting shed. Funds for the two projects would be obtained through the “selling of tickets and cash donations”. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image was acquired.

The image was temporarily places in the altar of the Catholic Church of Barangay Valencia. A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest refused to return the image to the barangay council.

A replivin case was filed against the priest. In his answer to the complaint, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions.

Issue: Whether or not the resolutions violated the constitutional provision prohibiting the use of public funds for religious purpose.

Held: No. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any religious sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of awaiting shed is entirely a secular matter.

The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio first honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass, consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass celebrated.

The barangay council, as owner of the image has the right to determine who should have custody thereof.

EBRALINAG VS DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU

219 SCRA 526


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Facts: About 68 students (grade school and highschool) were expelled by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the National Anthem and recite the Patriotic Pledge as required by RA 1265 and by the Department Order No. 8 of the DECS making the flag ceremony in all educational institutions. These students were members of the “Jehovah’s Witnesses” which teaches their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are acts of worship or religious devotion.

Issue: Whether or not the children may be expelled from school (public and private) for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs to take part in the flag ceremony.

Held: Jehovah’s Witnesses are accorded exemption to the observance of flag ceremony in deference to their religious beliefs but said right not to participate does not give them the right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.

Their expulsion will violate their right as Phil. Citizens under the 1987 Constitution, to receive education, for it is the duty to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education accessible to all. (Sec. 1, Art. XIV)

Compulsion to observe the flag salute law on pain of dismissal from one’s job or expulsion from school is alien to the conscience of present generation of Filipinos, being violative of their constitutional right to free speech and free exercise of religious profession and worship.

PAMIL VS TELERON86 SCRA 413

Facts: Private Respondent Father Margarito R. Gonzaga was elected as municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol in 1971. He was duly proclaimed. Petitioner filed a suit for quo warranto for responsdent’s disqualification based on sec. 2175 of Administrative Code of 1917 which reads: “In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiatics…” The court a quo sustained the right of the private respondent to the office holding that the above quoted provision was already impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971.

Held: There is no clear cut answer. To render the challenged provision ineffective, 8 votes are required to be attained. In this case however, only 7 Justices are of the view that the lower court’s judgment should be affirmed because the challenged provision is no longer operative either because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution or it was repealed. Five members however believe that no repeal was made, the provisions of the prohibition being unequivocal in terms. Procedurally, the required number of votes not having been attained, the validity of Sec. 2175 is upheld and Father Gonzaga is ordered to vacate his position.

NOTE: As to the constitutional dimension of the case, Justice Fernando, with six other Justices are of the view that the Constitution (both 1973 and 1935) prohibits religious test as a requirement for the exercise of Civil or Political rights. Justice Teehankee notes that the provision declaring ecclesiastics ineligible for election or appointment to a municipal office is inconsistent with and violative of the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution because to do so bar them is to impose a religious test in violation of the Constitution.

On the other hand, Justice Barredo opines that there is no repugnancy as between the challenged provision and the freedom of religion protected by the Constitution. The “no religious test” means that no public office may denuded to any person any reason of his religious belief. But when he becomes an ecclesiastic, he becomes the official minister of his church with distinct duties and responsibilities which may not always be compatible with the posture of absolute indifference and

impartiality to all religious beliefs which the government must maintain at all times Justice Makasiar notes that to allow an ecclesiastic to head the executive department of a municipality is to permit the erosion of the principle of church and state because there can be no assurance that the decision of such ecclesiastic in the exercise of his powers vested in him by reason of his local position will be clothed with impartiality.

ART.III, SEC. 6LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS177 SCRA 568

Facts: Deposed Pres. Marcos exiled in Hawaii wishes to return to the Philippine, however, Pres. Aquino rendered a decision to bar their return to the Philippines considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at the time when the stability of the government is threatened. Mr. Marcos filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition to compel the Sec. Foreign Affairs to issue travel documents to him and his family, alleging that his right to return to the Philippine is guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, and questions Pres. Aquino’s power to impair their right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect.

Issue: May the Pres. prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?

Held: YES. The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the Liberty of Abode and the right to travel, but it is well considered view that the right to return may be considered as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under the Constitution, is part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel.

The constitutional guarantees they invoked are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of such freedoms admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interest.

The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exemptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the president which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.

The president did not act arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.

SILVERIO VS C.A195 SCRA 760

Facts: Petitioner Silverio was charged with the violation of the Revised Securities Act in a criminal case filed with the RTC. He posted a bail for his provisional liberty. Two years after the filing of the information, respondent People of the Philippines filed a Motion to Cancel the passport of and to issue a hold departure order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in the postponements of the arraignment and schedules hearings. The RTC granted the Motion. Petitioner questioned the RTC’s Order contending that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court only on grounds


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in the “interest of national security, public safety or public health” as was previously stated in the 1973 Constitution.

Issue: May the right to travel be impaired?

Held: YES. Art. III, Sec 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court order the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of “national security, public safety or public health” and “as may be provided by law”, a limited phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text.

Article III, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them.

The conditions of bail imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel. An accused on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of the warrants if he attempts to depart from the Philippine without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending.

Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippine must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may dealt with in accordance with law.

SANTIAGO VS VASQUEZ217 SCRA 633

Facts: An information docketed as criminal case No. 16698 was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. An order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner with bail for the release of the accused fixed at P15000. Petitioner filed an “Urgent ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor Santiago”. Meanwhile, in a resolution of Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner by reason of the announcement made by petitioner, which was publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the United States to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy school of government at Harvard University, hence, this “Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from enforcing its Hold Departure Order with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/of Preliminary Injunction”.

Issues:1. WON the hold departure order violates her right to due

process, right to travel and freedom of speech.2. WON under the 1987 Constitution, courts can impair the

right to travel only on grounds of “national security, public safety or public health”.

HELD: 1. No. It is averred that the hold departure order was issued

without notice and hearing because of the fact that there was no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure order was filed by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.

Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. A court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction. Such being the case, with more reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive measure where he disobeys a proper order. Petitioner does not deny and even made a public statement that she in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner’s plan to go abroad and in issuing sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court’s

inherent power to preserve and maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

2. No. In the more recent case of Silverio V C.A, it was held that Art. III, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of “national security. Public safety and public health” and “as may be provided by law”. Art III, Sec.6 should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the courts to use all means necessary to carry their power of the effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or Judicial Officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.

ART. III, SEC 7RIGHT TO INFORMATION

VALMONTE VS BELMONTE170 SCRA 256

Facts: Petitioner in this case of special action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoked their right to information and pray that respondent be directed:

a. to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasan Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-LABAN who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession on/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos, and

b. to furnish petitioners with certified true copy of the documents evidencing their respective loans, and/or

c. to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject’s information

Held: The right to information is an essential premise meaningful to the right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedom of speech and of the press. Far from it, the right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosures and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision making as well in checking abuse in government. Yet like all constitutional guarantee, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in the case of Legaspi, the people’s right to information is limited to matters of public concern, and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Hence, before mandamus may issue, it may clear that the information sought is of public interest or public concern, and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrower make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

On the alleged relationship of confidential nature between the GSIS and its borrowers, respondent failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on consideration of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issue. The court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. On the issue of privacy there can be no doubt that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and


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governmental agencies like the GSIS. A corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an inquiry to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and the corporation would not have such ground on relief.

Neither can the GSIS, through its General Manager, the respondent invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated, which cannot, however be invoked in the instant case considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS subjects to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodians of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the record may be insured.

ART. III, SEC 8RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION

CENECO VS SECRETARRY OF DOLE201 SCRA 584

Facts: Petitioner Central Negros Electric Cooperative seeks to annul the order issued by then Acting Secretary Laques declaring the project certification election unnecessary and declaring petitioner to continue recognizing private respondent CENECO UNION of RATIONAL EMPLOYEES (CURE) as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of petitioner’s electric cooperative for purposes of collective bargaining. CENECO entered into a CBA with CURE providing for a term of three years up to March 31, 1990. CURE wrote CENECO proposing that negotiation be conducted for a new CBA but CENECO denied on the ground that employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join a union. Prior to the proposed CBS negotiation, CURE members in a general assembly approved Resolution No. 35 whereby it was agreed that all union members shall withdraw, retract or recall the union members’ membership from CENECO to avail of the full benefit under the existing CBA entered into by and between CENECO and CURE. However, the withdrawal from membership was denied by CENECO by reason of CENECO’s refusal to negotiate a new CBA, CURE filed a petition for direct recognition or for certification election. CENECO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join union for purposes of CBA for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. Med-arbiter issued an order granting petition for certification election. CENECO appealed to the DOLE which issued the questioned order. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON employees of CENECO who withdrew their membership from the cooperative are entitled to form or join CURE for purposes of CBA.

Held: The articles of Incorporation of CENECO do not provide any ground for withdrawal from membership which gives rise to the presumption that the same may be done anytime and for whatever reason. Moreover, membership is on a voluntary basis. The right to join an organization necessarily the equivalent right not to join the same.

VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION59 SCRA 54

Facts: Benjamin Victoriano, a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the respondent union, which had with the company, a closed-shop provision, pursuant to RA 875 (Industrial Peace Act). Later, RA 3350 was enacted amending RA 875, among others, it provided that the agreement on closed shop “shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization”. Victoriano resigned from the union. Thereupon, the Union recommended to the company his termination.

Issue: The constitutionality of RA 3350 which allows members of religious sect to disassociate from the labor union despite the presence of closed shop agreement between employer and bargaining union.

Held: The SC upheld the validity of RA 3350, allowing workers to disassociate from or not to join a labor union despite a closed shop agreement, if they were members of any religious sect which prohibits affiliation of their members in any such labor organization.

The constitutional guarantees the “right” to form or join associations. A right comprehends at least two broad nations, namely: first, liberty or freedom (whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law), and second, power (whereby an employee may as he pleases join or refrain from joining an association). It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not to join, he himself make up his mind as to which association he would join, and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organizations at any time. It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union.

However, the legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only the members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Exception: To the all embracing coverage of the closed shop agreement, RA 3350 introduced an exception… “but such agreement shall not covers members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization”. RA 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that inspite of any closed shop agreement members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union.

ART. III, SEC 10 NON –IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE

ORTIGAS & CO., LTD. VS FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO. 91 SCRA 533

Facts: Ortigas & Co., plaintiff, sold two parcels of land on installments to Padilla who later on transferred their rights and interest to Chavez. The agreements of sale contained stipulation, among others that the parcel of land “shall be used by the buyer exclusively for residential purposes…” Such stipulation was annotated in the TCTs. The parcels of land were eventually sold to FEATI Bank, who began constructing of the commercial building. The latter refused to comply with the


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demand, contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the Municipal Resolution No. 27, zoning regulations which declared the area a commercial and industrial zone. Plaintiff filed complaint seeking for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction praying, among others, that the defendant observe and comply with the building restrictions annotated in the TCT. Trial court dismissed the complaint.

Issue: WON the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring the parcels of land, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by the plaintiff on the lots in question?

Held: With regard to the contention that the said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligation assumed by the defendant- referring to the restriction incorporated in the deed of sale and later in the corresponding TCT issued to defendant it should be stressed that, while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. Such power is superior to contractual stipulations between parties on the use of lands sold by subdivisions even if said conditions are annotated in the Torrens Title.

ART. III, SEC 12 CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

PEOPLE V JUDGE AYSON 175 SCRA 216

Facts: Felipe Ramos, a freight ticket clerk of PAL, was invited for investigation on February 9, 1986 by the Management, in accordance with PAL’s Code of Conduct and Discipline on allegations of irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. On Feb. 8, 1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten note or admission. At the investigation before the Branch Manager and in the presence of the station agent, ticket freight clerk and PALEA’s shop steward was informed of the charge before him. Thereafter, his answers to the questions by the Branch Manager were taken down in writing.

After two months, Ramos was charged for estafa. Trial on the merits ensued. At the close of the people’s case, the private prosecutors made an offer of evidence to 1) the handwritten note or admission and 2) to the written question and answer before the Branch Manager. The defense objected to the offered evidence on the ground that the admission or confession was taken without the accused represented by counsel. Judge Ayson ruled in favor of the defense declared that the written admission or confession and record of the investigation was inadmissible because the accused was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have counsel. Hence this petition.

Issue: Is the constitutional right of a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charge with its commission violated in this case?

Held: No. One of the rights specified exist only in custodial investigation. And as this court has already stated, a custodial investigation is “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, which is not in the case at bar. It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial investigation. But unquestionably, the accused in court possesses rights against self-incrimination. Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled 1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself and 2) to testify as witness in his own behalf, but 3) if he offers himself as a

witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however 4) his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudiced or be used against him. In fine a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the following Rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit: 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to have counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be suspected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates free will, and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and 2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT a) to refuse to be a witness; b) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution; c) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal; d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.

PEOPLE VS MAQUEDA GR. NO. 112983: MARCH 22,1995

Facts: Hector Maqueda was convicted by the RTC of Benguet with the crime of robbery with homicide and various physical injuries. The trial court based its conviction on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti. The extra-judicial confession referred to is the “Sinumpaang Salaysay” of Maqueda taken by the police immediately after he was arrested. The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the acccused although it was taken filed in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court, the SS was not therefore taken during custodial investigation and hence Sec. 12 (1) Art.III of the Constitution is not applicable, i.e.., the police investigation was no longer within the ambit of a custodial investigation. The trial court even stated at the time of the confession that the accused was already facing charges in court, thus he no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to be prejudiced whatsoever resulting from such refusal.

Issue: Does an accused lose his right to remain silent and to counsel after a criminal complaint or information has been filed against him?

Held: No. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Sec. 12(1) Art III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information, but are available at that stage when a person is under the investigation for the commission of an offense. It was wrong for the trial court to say that Sec. 12(1) Art.III of the Constitution is strictly limited to custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or information has already been filed because after its filing he loses the right to remain counsel and to counsel. If we follow the theory of the trial court, then the police authorities and other law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from the accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel. The accused in this case was not even told of any of his constitutional rights. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled SS is wholly inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 12 (3) Art III of the Constitution.


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PEOPLE VS AGUSTIN GR. NO. 110290 JANUARY 25, 1996

Facts: On September 6, 1986, a shooting incident occurred in Baguio City, which cause the death of two people and the wounding of three others. On Feb. 10, 1987, appellant was picked up in Pangasinan by military personnel and brought to Baguio City. In the afternoon of the same day he was brought to the City Fiscal’s Office where he was investigated in connection with the crime. Appellant alleged that although he was given a lawyer and that the lawyer who assisted him interviewed him only for two minutes in Englsh and Tagalog nut not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. Appellant also contends that the lawyer who assisted him was not of his own choice but was foisted upon him by the City Fiscal and the former is a law partner of the private prosecutor. Moreover, he alleged that while he was giving his statements at the Fiscal’s office the armed men stayed with him and their presence deferred him from telling the investigating fiscal that he was being threatened.

Issues:

1. Was his extra-judicial admissions taken in violation of his rights under Art III, sec. 12 of the Constitution?

2. Was the arrest of the appellant valid?

Held:

1. Yes. Sec. 12 Art III of the Constitution applies both to confessions and admissions. Moreover, it was observed by the court that the appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have a competent and independent counsel of his own choice. He was not categorically informed that he could waive his right to remain silent and to counsel and that hi waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in fact waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated, yet no written waiver of such rights appears in the transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to prove its existence. It is doubtful for a suspect to have understood his constitutional rights if he was informed of the same in English and Tagalog when he could only understand Ilocano. Also, where the fiscal immediately suggested the availability of a particular counsel without first asking the suspect if he had a counsel of own choice and if he had one, whether he could hires such counsel or whether he would agree to have one provided for him then such counsel provided was foisted upon the suspect ant not one who was voluntarily and intelligently “accepted” by the suspect. A counsel appointed to assist a suspect must be an independent counsel, and he could not be one who is an associate of the private prosecutor in the same case. Furthermore, the presence during the custodial investigation before the fiscal of the military officer who had earlier threatened the suspect with death vitiated the latter’s free will.

2. No. No arrest without a warrant could have been legally and validly effected 5 months after the commission of the crime. A warrantless arrest should comply with the conditions prescribed in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

PEOPLE VS ALICANDO DECEMBER 12, 1995

Facts: In the morning of June 13, 1994, the lifeless body of Khaye Mae 4 years old, was discovered. The autopsy report

revealed that she was raped and that the proximate cause of her death was asphyxia by strangulation.

A neighbor pointed appellant as the offender. Forthwith, he was arrested and interrogated by the police. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of this follow up interrogation, the police recovered from his house the victim’s slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt, all of which were later presented as evidence for the prosecution. The appellant was arraigned with the assistance of counsel. He pleaded guilty. The trial court found him guilty of the crime of rape with homicide.

Issue: Is the confession of the accused admissible against him?

Held: No. it is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible evidence any uncounselled confession or admission.

In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing shown that appellant waived his right to silent and to have competent and independent counsel. Despite the blatant violation of appellant’s constitutional right, the trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to flow into the records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death.

It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from the appellant.

The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession under custodial investigation rests with the prosecution. The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Sec. 12 Art III of the Constitution provides that the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, the records show that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge this burden. It matters not that in the course of the hearing, the appellant failed to make a timely objection to the introduction of these constitutionally prescribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof that rested on the prosecution.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7438

AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND PROVIDING OPENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF

Be it enacted by the Senate and house of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled.

Section 1. Statement of Policy – It is the policy of the state to value the dignity of every human being and guarantee full respect for human rights.


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Section 2. Rights of persons arrested, detained or under custodial investigation; Duties of public Officers

a. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be at all times be assisted by counsel.

b. Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer private with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.

c. The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer, provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect know to such arrested or detained person or otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

d. Any extra-judicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter’s absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him, otherwise, such extra-judicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.

e. Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel, otherwise such waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.

f. Any person arrested or detained under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights or by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person’s “immediate family” shall include his or her spouse, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece and guardian or ward.

As used in this ACT, “custodial investigation” shall include the practice of issuing an “invitation” to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the “inviting” officer for any violation of law.

Section 3. Assisting Counsel –Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes.

The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees:

a. The amount of One Hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with light felonies;

b. The amount of Two Hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with less grave or grave felonies;

c. The amount of Three Hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspect is chargeable with a capital offense.

The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial investigation is conducted, provided if the municipality or city cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, that the Municipal or City Treasure must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the province pay said fees.

In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance with the provision of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Section 4. Penalty Clause –a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six Thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty or imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.

The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.

b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the right shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years and a fine of Four Thousand pesos (P4,000.00)

The provisions of the above section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.

Section 5. Repealing Clause –Republic Act No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed. Other laws, presidential decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provision of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 6. Effectivity –This Act shall take effect (15) fifteen days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any daily newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

Approved. April 27,1992.


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ART. III, SEC 13 RIGHT TO BAIL

PEOPLE VS JUDGE DONATO 198 SCRA 130

Facts: Rodolfo Salas (Commander Bilog) and his co-accused were charged for the crime of rebellion. Sales filed a petition for bail which was opposed by herein petitioner on the ground that since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 943 and 1834 which amended Article 135 of the RPC, by imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote, maintain or head a rebellion, the accused is no longer entitled to bail as evidence of guilt is strong. Subsequently however, the President issue EO 187 restoring to fulll force and effect Article 135 RPC. Accordingly Salas was granted bail.

Petitioner contends that it would be dangerous to grant bail to Salas considering the nature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy, whose ultimate overriding goals is to wipe out all vestiges of democracy and to replace it with their ideology, and that his release would allow his return to this organization to direct its armed struggle to topple the government before whose courts he invokes the constitutional right to bail. Petitioner argues that while he is entitled to bail as a matter of right, yet when the interest of the State conflicts with that of an individual, that of the former shall prevail for the “the right of the State to self-preservation is paramount to any of the rights of an individual enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

Issue: Whether or not rebellion is a bailable offense.

Held: YES. Bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.

Accordingly, the prosecution does have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present within reasonable time all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail.

CALLANTA VS VILLANUEVA 77 SCRA 377

Facts: The validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest by respondent City Judge Felipe Villanueva based on the two complaints for grave oral defamation against petitioner is being contested on the ground that it should have been the City Fiscal who should have conducted the preliminary examination. There was then, in the opinion of petitioner’s counsel a jurisdictional infirmity. From the very petition itself, however, it was shown that after such issuance of the warrants of arrest with the bail fixed in the amount of P600.00, petitioner posted such required bail bonds, thus obtaining her provisional liberty.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can still questioned the defect, if any, in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.

Held: No. With the express admission by petitioner that she had posted the required bail to obtain her provisional liberty, it becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest. In the case of Zacarias Vs Cruz, it was held that “posting of a bail of a person, stops him from discussing the validity of his arrest”. In the case of Luna Vs Plaza, it was held that “where petitioner has filed an application for bail and waived

the preliminary investigation proper, he waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary investigation conducted prior to thr issuance of the warrant of arrest”.

At any rate, it cannot be denied that the City fiscal of Dagupan City had been quite active in the investigation and thereafter in the prosecution of petitioner. The matter was referred to his office. It was he who appeared at the hearing and manifested his readiness to proceed with the trial. It would be then to pay an undue premium to technicalities to assert that under such circumstances the procedural requisite, assuming that the contention of petitioner is correct, of such official conducting the preliminary examination was not in fact complied with.

ART. III, SEC 14 CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS

GALMAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN 144 SCRA 43

Facts: Petitioners filed an action alleging that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused. The court resolved to dismiss the petition and lift the TRO issued earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The court required the respondents to comment on the MR but issued no restraining order. On Dec. 2, 1985, Sandiganbayan acquitted all the accused of the crime charged and absolved them of civil liability. The petitioners filed their second motion for reconsideration on the ground that the President ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan and the prosecution panel to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents. The SC thus created a fact finding commission to determine the allegations of the petitioners.

Issue: WON the interference and pressure of the President violative of due process and prevented a fair and impartial trial.

Held: The fact of the secrete Malacanang conference of Jan. 10, 1985 at which the authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal charges against all 26 accuses (as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have been confirmed by him to the then President’s “Coordinator” Manuel Lazaro on the proceeding day) is not denied. This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court healed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the commission noted: “The very acts of being summoned to Malacanang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified.” Verily, it can be said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on Jan. 10, 1985.

No court whose presiding justice has received “orders or suggestions” from the President who by an amendatory decree made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of law. Jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of


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predetermining the outcome of individual cases. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacanang conference (and revealed only after 15 months by Justice Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

PEOPLE VS DRAMAYO 42 SCRA 59

Facts: The accused-appellants, Dramayo and Carbin were charged and convicted by the crime of murder. In their appeal, accused appellants claim that there is an absence of evidence sufficient to convict and that there is a reasonable doubt to be implied from the fact that while conspiracy was alleged, only two of the seven accused were held culpable.

Issue: WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed to overcome presumption of innocence.

Held: Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate the culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard this court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should be sentence be one of conviction. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged, that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it mounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainly. In the case at bar, the presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was by the prosecution.

RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL

PEOPLE VS ELOY MAGSI 124 SCRA 64

Facts: Magsi, del Rosario and other co-accused were charged with the murder of Jesus Gallardo with several aggravating circumstances attendant to the crime. They were convicted but Del Rosario appealed the said decision on the ground, among others, that the trial court erred in appointing as attorney de officio, a lawyer who is the compadre of the person killed by the accused, and who, because of special relationship with the deceased, reluctantly discharged his duties as attorney de officio, after the court had denied his repeated petition to be relieved of his appointment as such.

Issue: Whether or not the conviction was valid.

Held: No. It is established the de officio counsel Atty. Rivera and del Rosario were hardly afforded by the trial court any opportunity to discuss the case together, and the qualified plea of guilty resulted from the court’s prodding rather than from the spontaneous violation of the accused. Where defendants are charged with capital offenses, mere pro forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interest of the accused, resulting of hearing by the court for alleged

reception of evidence when such fact was not conducted, perfunctory queries to the accused, whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient with the Supreme Court’s injunction.

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION

SORIANO VS SANDIGANBAYAN 131 SCRA 187

Facts: In the course of an investigation for qualified theft alleged to have been committed by Thomas Tan, herein petitioner demanded from the latter an amount of P4,000.00 as consideration for dismissing the case. The same was reported to the NBI thus an entrapment was made. A complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against petitioner with the public respondent. Petitioner contends that an “investigation cannot be regarded as a contract of transaction” within the purview of the said Act hence cannot be convicted of violation thereof. Public respondent then convicted him for Direct Bribery. Petitioner now raises the defense of violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him considering that he was charged of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Issue: Was there a violation of petitioner’s above mentioned right?

Held: It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was if a transaction because this term is analogous to the former term. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration, like a credit transaction, and this element is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner, thus he cannot be liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He however could be liable for Direct Bribery. A reading of the information filed against him clearly shows that the same is a case of Direct Bribery, thus he cannot claim that he was deprived of his right to be informed. It is not the title of the information that counts but the contents thereof.

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

MANUEL MATEO JR. VS HON. VILLALUZ 50 SCRA 18

Facts: Petitioners were charged with robbery in band with homicide. They filed motions to dismiss the criminal cases which were not immediately resolved by the respondent Judge. In the meantime, another suspect, one Rolando Reyes was arrested. He executed an extra-judicial statement and signed and swore to its truth before the respondent Judge wherein he implicated the petitioners. On this basis, the respondent Judge deferred action on the petitioner’s motion to dismiss until after the prosecution had presented and rested its case against Reyes. Reyes was tried separately and in the absence of petitioners. During the petitioner’s trial, Reyes was called as an additional witness where he repudiated his extra-judicial statement contending that the same was procured through threats by a government agent. As a consequence, he petitioners filed a motion to disqualify the respondent Judge on the ground that Reyes had repudiated the extra-judicial statement which the latter sworn to before the former and that the latter would have


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to pass upon the repudiation. The motion to disqualify was denied by the respondent Judge.

Issue: Whether the respondent Judge should disqualify was denied by the respondent Judge.

Held: Petition is granted. The restraining order issued is made permanent.

It is beyond that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Petitioners can assert then that this court has the power to set aside the order denying the motion for disqualification. While the discretion in the first instance belongs to the respondent Judge, its exercise is subject to this court’s corrective authority. There can be no question as to its being considered abused if it can be shown that to refuse disqualification is to cast valid doubts as to court’s impartiality. In this case, the respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was asserted before him in such extra-judicial statement. It is unlikely that he was not in the slightest bit offended by the affiant’s turn about which his later declaration that there was intimidation by considering that the respondent Judge would have to pass judgment on a question that by implication had already been answered by him (having already given his opinion on the matter).

TRIAL IN ABSENTIA

PEOPLE VS SALAS 143 SCRA 163

Facts: Marie Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced but while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release and so he escaped. The respondent Judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong’s re-arrest. But he was gone, nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances. The respondent Judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused.

Issue: Was the order of the Judge proper?

Held: No. The old case of People V Avancena has been modified by Sec. 19 of Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution which now allows trial in absentia. Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual provided only that: a) he has been arraigned b) he has been duly modified of the trial, and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which in the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of defendant’s escape. The old case of People V Avancena has been modified. The right to present at one’s trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. The defendant’s escape will be considered as a waiver of his right about the inability of the court to notify him of the

subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial he will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified.

Subject Matter: Party-list System

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELECG.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001

Facts:Petitioner challenged a resolution issued by the

COMELEC. Petitioner seeks the disqualification of certain major political parties in the 2001 party-list elections arguing that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented and not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or over represented.

Issues:

Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations

Held:Under the Constitution and RA 7941, major political

parties cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections merely on the ground that they are political parties. But while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.

Subject Matter: Article VI, Section 5 (3), (4)

Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELECG.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995

Facts:Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of

RA 7854, An Act Converting The Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional.

Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the return of every census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Issue:Whether or not the addition of another legislative

district in Makati is unconstitutional


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Held:Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made

through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.

Subject Matter: Article VI, Section 5(4)

Montejo vs. COMELECG.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995

Facts:

The province of Leyte is composed of 5 legislative districts. Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte, was made its sub-province by virtue of RA 2141. When Biliran was converted into a regular province, 8 municipalities of the third district composed the new province. As a consequence, the composition of the third district was reduced to 5 municipalities. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.

Issue:Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another legislative district

Held:The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to

the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment made. Consistent with the limit of its power to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district.

It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5

legislative districts of Leyte. But the issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner’s remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion. The Court held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated a resolution transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.

Subject Matter: Article VI, Section 6

Marcos vs. COMELECG.R. No.119976, September 18, 1995

Facts:Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her

Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution's one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution

Held:

For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained anew domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

Subject Matter: Article 6, Section 6

Aquino vs. COMELECG.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

Facts:


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Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution

Held:

In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioner’s intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile.

Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Subject Matter: Article 6, Section 6

Domino vs. COMELECG.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999

Facts:

Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voter’s

Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.

Issue:Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani

Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections

Held:

The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. “Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.

Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.

A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.

Further, Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.


Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay

G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966

Facts:Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting

Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.

The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is


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violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.Issue:

Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?

Held:In establishing what might be termed a waiting period

before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and the House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.


People vs. JalosjosG.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

Facts:

The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.

Issue:Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed

to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives

Held:Election is the expression of the sovereign power of

the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.

11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.


Jimenez vs. CabangbangG.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966

Facts:

Defendant Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. He wrote an open letter to the President and caused its publication in several newspapers of general circulation exposing the allegedly operational plans by some ambitious AFP officers regarding a massive political build-up of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, to prepare him to become a candidate for President in 1961.

Issue:

Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication

Held:

The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the publication falls within the purview of the phrase “speech or debate in Congress” as used in Art. VI, Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11). Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. It was an open letter to the President, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. In causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of the Congress or as officer of any committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.


Osmena, Jr. vs. PendatunG.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960

Facts:

Congressman Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before the House of Representatives, made serious imputations of bribery against President Garcia. Thereafter, a


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special committee of 15 members was created to investigate the truth of the charges made by Congressman Osmena against the President. Osmena refused to produce before the House Committee evidence to substantiate such imputations. For having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, Osmena was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of 15 months for serious disorderly behavior.

Issue:Whether or not there is an infringement of Osmena’s

parliamentary privilege of speech

Held:Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution

provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place.

The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the President constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmena’s conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the government.


Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr.G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982

Facts:After an election for the Directors of the International

Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could “appear as counsel before any administrative body,” and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.

Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership of the said 10 shares.

Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a

stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without

violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution

Held:Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention,

Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them “after the fact” that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body. In the opinion of the Court, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

Subject Matter: Article VI, Section 16(1), Article VIII, Section 1

Defensor-Santiago vs. GuingonaG.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

Facts:During the first regular session of the eleventh

Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues:Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the

petitionWhether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution

Held:Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject

matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is


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entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term “majority,” when referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that “each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court.


Arroyo vs. De VeneciaG.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts:A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA

8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held:Rules of each House of Congress are hardly

permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.


Astorga vs. VillegasG.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974

Facts:House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application filed in

the House of Representatives, was passed on third reading without amendments. But when the bill was discussed in the Senate, substantial amendments were introduced by Senator Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. There was also an amendment recommended by Senator Roxas but this does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of H.B.9266 containing the amendments recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The printed copies of the bill were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. Then the President affixed his signature thereto by way of approval. The bill became RA 4065.

Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of H.B. 9266 signed into law by the President was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence, the Senate President invalidated his signature on the bill. Thereafter, the President withdrew his signature on H.B. 9266.

Issue:Whether or not the enrolled bill doctrine should be

adhered to

Held:The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on the respect

due to coequal and independent departments, which requires


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the judicial department to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the right manner.

Petitioner’s argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. The Court declares that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.


Guerrero vs. COMELECG.R. No. 137004, July 26, 2000

Facts:Guillermo Ruiz sought to disqualify respondent

Farinas as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte. Ruiz alleged that Farinas had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to file a certificate of candidacy for said office. On May 8, 1998, Farinas filed his certificate of candidacy substituting candidate Chevylle Farinas who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 10, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz for lack of merit.

After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Thereafter, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farinas could not validly substitute for Chevylle Farinas, since the latter was not the official candidate of LAMMP, but was an independent candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an independent candidate. Ruiz claimed that Farinas’ certificate of candidacy was fatally defective. On June 3, 1988, Farinas took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives. The COMELEC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Farinas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

Held:There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of

the COMELEC when it held that its jurisdiction over the case had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Farinas as Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. while COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Farinas is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET. Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests

relating to his election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC’s decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRET’s own jurisdiction and functions.


Bondoc vs. PinedaG.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991

Facts:

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

Issue:Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the

request of the dominant political party therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein

Held:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s


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congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another


Guingona, Jr. vs. GonzalesG.R. No. 106971, March 1, 1993

Facts:The mathematical representation of each of the

political parties represented in the Senate for the Commission on Appointments (CA) is as follows: LDP—7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN--.5; NPC—2.5; LAKAS-NUCD—1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one Senator by adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the CA to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.

Issue:Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18

Ruling:The respondent’s claim to membership in the CA by

nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that 12 senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the CA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the CA by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. The provision of Sec. 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation.

The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 senators be elected to the membership in the CA before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 senators to the CA. The overriding directive of Art. VI, Sec. 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the CA and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations. Even if the composition of the CA is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum.


Bengzon, Jr. vs. The Senate Blue Ribbon CommitteeG.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991

Facts:

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil case against Benjamin Romualdez. The complaint alleged that Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with then President Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the latter spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Republic of the Philippines and the Filipino people.

Conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the Romualdez corporations were carried in various newspapers. Other newspapers declared that shortly after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the Romualdez companies were sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President’s brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firm.

In the Senate, Senator Enrile delivered a speech on the alleged take over by Lopa of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flagship of the First Manila Management of Companies owned by Romualdez. Senator Enrile also called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law, particularly with regard to RA 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The matter was referred by the Senate to the Blue Ribbon Committee.

Issue:

Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry has valid legislative purpose as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 21

Held:The Constitution expressly recognizes the power of

both Houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. But the power of both Houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. As provided under Art. VI, Sec. 21, the investigation must be “in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure” and that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one’s self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided in the Senate Rules of Procedure. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.

The speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The purpose of the inquiry was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Romualdez to the Lopa group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. This matter appears to be more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.

Subject Matter: Article VI, Sections 24, 26(2), 28(1,3)

Tolentino vs. Secretary of FinanceG.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994

Facts:


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The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

Issue:Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and

26(2) of the Constitution Held:

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Subject Matter: Article VI, Section 28(3), Article XIV, Section 4(3)

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CAG.R. No. 124043, October 14, 1998

Facts:

Private respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various programs and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable objectives. YMCA earned an income from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners and from parking fees collected from non-members. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment for deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. YMCA protested the assessment.

Issue:Whether or not the income of private respondent YMCA from rentals of small shops and parking fees is exempt from taxation

Held:

YMCA argues that Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution exempts charitable institutions from the payment not only of property taxes but also of income tax from any source. The Court is not persuaded. The debates, interpellations and expressions of opinion of the framers of the Constitution reveal their intent. Justice Hilario Davide Jr., a former constitutional commissioner, stressed during the Concom debate that what is exempted is not the institution itself; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, an eminent authority on the Constitution and also a member of the Concom, adhered to the same view that the exemption created by said provision pertained only to property taxes. In his treatise on taxation, Justice Jose Vitug concurs, stating that the tax exemption covers property taxes only. Indeed, the income tax exemption claimed by YMCA finds no basis in Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution.

YMCA also invokes Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution claiming that YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income. The Court reiterates that YMCA is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income tax on the rentals from its property. The bare allegation alone that it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax. Laws allowing tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris. Hence, for the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the aforecited provision, it must prove with substantial evidence that: 1. it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and 2. the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes. However, the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by YMCA to prove that it met the said requisites.

YMCA is not an educational institution within the purview of Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution. The term “educational institution,” when used in laws granting tax exemptions, refers to a school, seminary, college or educational establishment. Therefore, YMCA cannot be deemed one of the educational institutions covered by the said constitutional provision. Moreover, the Court notes that YMCA did not submit proof of the proportionate amount of the subject income that was actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.


Fabian vs. DesiertoG.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998

Facts:Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder

and President of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous


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relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against private respondent.

Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the private respondent’s new counsel had been his classmate and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid

Held:The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals

from quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.

Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.


Namuhe vs. OmbudsmanG.R. No. 124965, October 29, 1998

Facts:Petitioners were employed at the Mountain Province

Engineering District and Ifugao Engineering District of the DPWH. In connection with the purported public bidding held for the Bailey bridge components for use in Mainit, Mountain Province, they were charged with dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, violation of office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As a result, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed petitioners from the government service.

Issue:

Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over appeals of administrative disciplinary decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman

Held:In Fabian v. Desierto (G.R. No. 129742, September

16, 1998), the Court held that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In so holding, the Court en banc declared as unconstitutional Sec. 27 of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which provided that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the SC by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Such provision was held violative of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution, as it expanded the jurisdiction of the SC without its advice and consent.

Subject Matter: Article VII, Section 1, Article VIII, Section 1

Marcos vs. ManglapusG.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

Facts:

In 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent people power revolution and was forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic. This, did not however, stop bloody challenges to the government. The armed threats to the government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Marcos. The woes of the government are not purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated.

Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

Issues:

Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines

Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return

Held:

Although the Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of the specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the


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Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President’s residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is a power borne by the President’s duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order.

Another question to determine is whether or no there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, and the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.

Subject Matter: Article VII, Sections 8 and 11

Estrada vs. DesiertoG.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

Estrada vs. ArroyoG.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001

Facts:

In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the

same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioner resigned as PresidentWhether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to

act as President

Ruling:Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he

suffers from a permanent disability. Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a

valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress


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by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

Subject Matter: Article VII, Section 15

In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta

A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998

Facts:

Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Issue:Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII

Held:

During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban


De Rama vs. CAG.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001

Facts:

Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitoner Conrado De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees. Petitioner justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, done in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of merit. The CSC dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these were “midnight” appointments, pointing out that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner

prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the position.

Issue:Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are forbidden under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution

Held:

The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those made within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.


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Bermudez vs. TorresG.R. No. 131429, August 4, 1999

Facts:

Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-in-Charge of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec. of Justice Guingona for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Private respondent Atty. Conrado Quiaoit had the support of then Representative Yap of the Second District of Tarlac. Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. Ramos to the office. Quiaoit took his oath and assumed office. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the duties and functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “all provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres. upon the recommendation of the Secretary.”

Issue:Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of

the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit

Held:

An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective.

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.

When the Constitution or the law clothes the Pres. with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. The Pres. is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all “executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. The Pres. has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can therefore be inferred that the Pres. can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations.

The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary” found in Sec. 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code should be interpreted to be a mere advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The Pres., being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he

cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority.


Blaquera vs. AlcalaG.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998

Facts:

On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the employee’s one month basic salary but which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the Pres.

The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.

Issue:Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the executive departments

Held:

The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.

Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or offices under him.

When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,

enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his power of control over executive departments.

The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres.


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was only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources.

The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of executive departments.

Subject Matter: Article VII, Section 18, Article II, Section 3

IBP vs. ZamoraG.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:Whether or not the President’s factual determination

of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review

Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.


People vs. CasidoG.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997

Facts:In an effort to seek their release at the soonest

possible time, accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin applied for pardon before the Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC). The PCGBRP was constituted in line with the confidence-building measures of the government. Thereafter, accused-appellants were granted conditional pardon. But the Court ruled in resolution that the conditional pardon granted to accused-appellants is void for having been extended during the pendency of their appeal. Prior to the resolution, the NAC favorably acted on the applications for amnesty of accused-appellants.

Issue:Whether or not the release of accused-appellants is

valid

Held:The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on

the ground of the amnesty granted them and not by the pardon.Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such

it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by the Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion


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the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress.


People vs. Patriarca, Jr.G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000

Facts:Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., a member of

the NPA, was found guilty by the trial court of the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant appealed the decision of the RTC.

Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724. His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs.

Issue:What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-appellant?

Held:Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to

rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

Paragraph 3 of Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.

The grant of amnesty serves to put an end to the appeal. Accused-appellant is acquitted of the crime of murder.

Subject Matter: Article VIII, Section 1

Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of EnergyG.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997

Facts:The petitions assail the constitutionality of various

provisions of RA 8180 entitled the “Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.” Under the deregulated environment, any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.

Issues:

Whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy

Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the law

Whether or not Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 violates the one title one subject requirement of the Constitution

Whether or not Sec. 15 of RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power

Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition

Held:As to the first issue, judicial power includes not only

the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void.

The effort of respondents to question the legal standing of petitioners also failed. The Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner’s locus standing where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. In the case, petitioners pose issues which are significant to the people and which deserve the Court’s forthright resolution.

It is also contended that Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. The Court did not concur with this contention. The title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The Court held that Sec. 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

Petitioners also assail Sec. 15 of RA 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry for being violative of the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Congress expressly provided in RA 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products


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in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners also argued that some provisions of RA 8180 violate Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution. Section 19, Art. XII of the Constitution espouses competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution which cannot be violated by RA 8180. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. As the dominant players, they boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products therefore works to their immense benefit. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of RA 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost.

The most important question is whether the offending provisions can be individually struck down without invalidating the entire RA 8180. The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. RA 8180 contains a separability clause. The separability clause notwithstanding, the Court held that the offending provisions of RA 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of RA 8180. Congress could not have regulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market forces.


Echegaray vs. Secretary of JusticeG.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999

Facts:On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the

execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue:

Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them comformable to law and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.

Subject Matter: Legal Standing

Gonzales vs. NarvasaG.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000

Facts:Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a

citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.

The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the manner of implementing them.

Issue:Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file

the case

Held:In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner

asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish

that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to


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be addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised.

In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, payer’s action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayer’s interest in this particular issue.

Subject Matter: Legal Standing

Legaspi vs. CSCG.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987

Facts:The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin

Legaspi’s request for information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said information.

The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi’s actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.

Issue:Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to

bring the suit

Held:The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the

right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.

It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.

The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.

Subject Matter: Article VIII, Sec. 5 par. 2(d)

Garcia, et. al. vs. PeopleG.R. No. 106531, November 18, 1999

Facts:The Provincial Fiscal of Guimaras filed with the RTC

an information charging petitioners with murder for the killing of one Jose Estrella. After due trial, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting petitioners of the crime charged and sentencing each of them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioners did not interpose an appeal from the decision by the filing of a notice of appeal. Thus, the decision became final.

Issue:

Whether or not the SC must automatically review a trial court’s decision convicting an accused of a capital offense and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua

Held:It is only in cases where the penalty actually imposed

is death that the trial court must forward the records of the case to the SC for automatic review of the conviction.

As the petitioners did not file a notice of appeal or otherwise indicate their desire to appeal from the decision convicting them of murder and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua, the decision became final and unappealable.


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Maceda vs. VasquezG.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993

Facts:Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint

before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

Issue:

Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

Held:A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is

administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.


People vs. Gacott, Jr.G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995

Facts:For failure to check the citations of the prosecution,

the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to administratively discipline respondent judge

Held:To support the Court’s ruling, Justice Regalado relied

on his recollection of a conversation with former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional Commission of which Regalado was also a member.

The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that “the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,” is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein.” In this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.

Subject Matter: Article XVI, Section 3

USA vs. RuizG.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985

Facts:

The US had a naval base in Subic, Zambales which was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Phils. and the US. The US made an invitation for the submission of bids for the repair of wharves in said base. Private respondent Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the private respondent received from the US 2 telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The private respondent complied with the requests. Thereafter, private respondent received a letter which said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating. The private respondent sued the US and the members of the Engineering Command of the US Navy.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint may prosper

Held:

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the


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rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them—between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii.

A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In the present case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Phils., indisputably a function of the government of the highest order. They are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.


Department of Agriculture vs. NLRCG.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993

Facts:

Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case

Held:

The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be sued without its consent” reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.

But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary

capacity. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.

But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.


Calub and Valencia vs. CAG.R. No. 115634, April 27, 2000

Facts:

The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles loaded with illegally sourced lumber. The drivers of the vehicles failed to present proper documents. Thus, the apprehending team impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber. The impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by the drivers from the custody of DENR. Thereafter, one of the 2 vehicles was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENRO and Phil. Army elements. The vehicle was again loaded with forest products.

Private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the vehicle with an application for replevin against petitioners DENR and DENR Officer Calub.

Issue:Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State

Held:

Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption.

In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Secs. 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice or bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State’s consent.

Subject Matter: Article XVI, Section 3Republic vs. Sandoval

220 SCRA 124

Facts:


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Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers involved in the incident.

Issues:

Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity

Whether or not the State is liable for damages

Held:

The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State.

The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.


Lansang vs. CAG.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000

Facts:

Private respondents General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) and Jose Iglesias were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in 1970 to occupy a portion of Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged in the development of national parks. Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. Private respondent GABI was to remit to NPDC 40% of the profits derived from operating the kiosks. After the EDSA Revolution, petitioner Lansang, the new Chairman of the NPDC, sought to clean up Rizal Park. Petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction against petitioner.

Issue:Whether or not the complaint filed against the petitioner is in reality a complaint against the State, which could not prosper without the State’s consent

Held:

The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.

The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does its apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.

In the case, the petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. It is also evident the petitioner is sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.

The important question to consider is whether or not petitioner abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of GABI.

The Court found no evidence of such abuse of authority. Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of lease contract. That private respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of accommodation by the previous administrator. This being so, petitioner may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and do not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.


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