SUPREME HiSP JK UAR TSRS A LLÏ'ËD POWERS EURQ PARIS, FRANCE

5 May 1955

MEMORANDUM TOi

SUBJECT

Intelligence Division Organization and Training Division Logistics Division Personnel and Administration Signal Division

Study on the German Rearmament

1. Attached is a memorandum prepared by FPANDO for distribution within the division. I t is a summary of the problems which may arise as a result of German integration into MlD and future German rearmament. Its purpose is to familiarize PPANDO personnel with the background of the recent Agree-ments and Accords and their possible impact on planning.

2# A number of the problems raised in this paper are currently under study by PPANDO. Some of the comments, discussed in the future tense, have already transpired since the basic document was prepared in April .

3» Although this paper is for internal PPANDO use only and does not purport to establish any SHAPE policies or positions, i t would be appreciated i f your division would review the paper for content and completeness and submit any comments you may have ' to FPANDO by May 20th.

/ ; ê! : i 'B. L. AUSTIN Ry'.DM, ÜSN Acting Assistant Chief of Staff Plans, Policy & Operations Division

Encl : Memo for.Chiefs, PP&O Div, 2£ Apr 55 w/study on German Rearmament.

Copies:CofS DSA CEUR DNAV DAIR DtfPO DCIA

V

|3

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

NATÔ i i . ,

Capt Guerii /jit/4755

7 April 1955

I . THE PROBLEM

1. To revise SACEURfs functions with respoct to the German rearmament under the Paris Agreements and SACEURts term of reference, and to provide to SHAPE staff information and/or guidance as to the initial actions to "be undertaken or continued at SHAPE, under above functions.

II. BACKGROUND HIFORmTIQN

2. The "basic documents used for this study are:

a. C-M(St)84y 22 October 1954: Protocols to the Brussels Treaty

> b. C-M(54)85, 25 October 1954: Resolution to Implement Section IV of the Pinal Act of the London Conference,

c. C-M(54)96, 26 October 1954: Special Agreement Aimexod to the EDC Treaty, 27 May 1952.

d. MDM-I5-54, l6 December 1954. SACEUR1 s terms of reference and associated Directives.

a. b. and c. are part of the Paris Agreements. d. includes SACEUR I S revised tenus of reference and the Military Committeo directives to SACEUR regarding integration of forces and military relationships with the Western European Union-

3m Other documents included in the Paris Agreements may have some indirect bearing on the Gorman rearmament itself, or may be "referred to when developing further detailed studies on the subject matter. These documents generally fa l l under three headings - "Occupation Regime," "Brussels Treaty" and "KATO." Most important arc the following:

CM(54)89 Resolution on the Production and Standardisation of Armaments

CM(54)91 Protocol for the Termination of the Occupation Regime in Western Germany.

CM(54)92 Convention on the presence of Foreign Troops in Western Germany

4» a. From a juridical point of view, the Gorman rearmament is subordinate to:

(1) he ratification of the Paris Agreements by NATO nations

(2) The deposit by the nations of the instruments of ratification

(3) The official invitation addressed by the USA to1 Germany to join N/.TO

(4) The deposit by Germany of the instruments of ratification and accession.

"b* The access of Germany to NATO will probably bc tied to the termination of the occupation regime in Germany for political and financial reasons, and it may bo expected that the two events will bc simultaneous.

c. It appears that after the access of Germany to N A T O , some more actions are required before the initiation of the Gciroan rearmament:

( I ) Organisation of the Western European Unicn Council and Agency.

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

NATO SECRET (2) Decisions "by the Western European Union ^ouncil and the NATO Council on practical measures and procedures fcr the development of the rearmament; these decisions might "be subordinate to the sub-mission by Germany of i t s Init ial report # and i ts f i r s t Annual Review report.

(3) Amendment of the Geman "Constitution'1 by the German Parlia-ment and action by the German Parliament in order to provide the German Government with the necessary powers arid funds for in i t iat -

' ing the rearmament.

5. Under the new Francc-Germany agreement on the future status of Saar, 23 October 1954, i t is proposed that SACEUR wi l l eoordinate his actions in a l l problems related to SaarTS contribution to NATO, with the Saar European Commissioner

I I I , ASSUMPTIONS

6. The Paris Agreements wi l l be rati f ied.

7. The revised terms of reference for SACEUR and the Directives to SACEUR on integration of forces and military relationships with V-1EU vd.ll bc approved without significant changes.

8. The termination of the occupation regime in Germany and the Saar contri-buting to MTO wi l l not of feet the planning and the initiation of the German rearmament»

IV. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

9. a, SACEURfS MTO and V11EU responsibilities with respect to the German Armed Forces are based on the policies and objectives set out by the Brussels Treaty powers, (CM(54)84), and by the MTO Council, (CM(54)85). These policies and objectives have been integrated in the revised terms of reference of SACEUR and in the Directives to SACEUR on integration of forces and military relationships with the WEU (IEM-I5-54). SACEUR's NATO responsibilities generally f a l l into one of the following categories:

- Assignment of forccs

- Missions and tasks

- Requirement and composition of forces

- Organisation, equipment and training

- Location and deployment >

- Command and integration

- Logistic Support and infrastructure

- Inspection and reports

- Ml i tary relationships with 1VEU

b. The peacetime povrers that SACEUR wi l l reçoive to f u l f i l his peacetime responsibilities with respect to the German forces wi l l become effective only after these forces have been placed under the authority of SACEUR by the appropriate WEU and/or MTO authority.

• Rof A.45, C-M(54)84. 25 Oct 1954

M Ä X O - S B C R B f Ä .

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

NATO 10. The Federal Republic of Germany wil l contribute to NATO, the same Land,

Naval and Air forces as envisaged under the EBC Treaty, "but brought up to date and «adapted-as neccssary to make them suitable for NATO, Land and Air forcos wil l "be

y assigned to SACEUR, Naval forcos to an "appropriate" NATO Command. The level, * compositon and quality of the Gcmian contribution to NATO will bc knowft each year

through the Annual Review machinery. Tho strength of the forces, i f any; which Germany plan to maintain under national command, will JboJaiown through the Initial^.

^RcporjL, and thereafter through the Annual Review, "which wil l bc subject to NATO Council action as to whether these forces are suitable to remain under national command. The internal defense and police forces which Gemany will maintain on its territory, with the agreement of the WEU, shall be notified to the FATO Council. Division of responsibilities between German national territorial commanders and SACEUR, wil l be as defined in MVJ6 in wartime. In peacetime, relationships netween NATO Subordinate Commanders and German National Authorities will be governed by SHAPE AG/2205/PP0 dated 11 December 1953.

11. With respect to the German rearmament, various studies have been initiated in SHAPE. So far, the following final documents have been published:

AG 1281 EE5O, 2 Majrch 1955: "Guidance on the German Arroed Forces."

AG 1281 PrPO, 7 December 1954: "Machinery for the Relations with the Gennans prior to their entry into NATO. "

LOG. 1281/P896/54: "Logistic Plan for the Accession of Germany to NATO and for Implementing SACEUR 1S new terms of reference."

AG O9O5.23 OT, 23 March 19.55: "Problems affecting the Raising of the German Naval Forces."

[ 12. The responsibilities and the increased powers placed upon SACEUR by the re-1 vised te JLiiiS qjl reference and associated documents, may be delegated as appropriate L by SACEUR, but only to his major subordinate Commanders.

13. Certain command structure problems related to the German rearmament, such as Schleswig-Holstein defense responsibility and naval command in the Baltic, havo been under study at SHAPE and in subordinate headquarters. They have also been con-sidered by the Special Ccanmittcc on Command Structure established by SACEUR (AG 2202 CS, 28 December 1954).

14« Prior to the accession of Germany to NATO, SACEUR has been authorised by the Standing Group to advise German authorities on a need-to-know basis in reply to specific questions. Informal liaison on matters affecting the raising and training of Gorman forces can bo maintained through the SpeideI Group in Paris, al l contacts being clcared through the COS office.

V. DISCUSSION

I 15. As the German units will not bc assigned to SACI7JR until they arc combat I ready, -unless otherwise arranged, there is now some uncertainty as to the initial responsibilities and authority of SACEUR with respect to German rearmament. How-over, this uncertainty does not affect those SACEUR responsibilities which result from the future assignment of the German forces tn his command, nor SACEURt s res- ' ponsibilities to WEU.

a. Therefore i t has b^en fe l t that the appropriate procedure for the analysis of SACEUR1 s NATO and "7EU functions with respect to the Geiman rearmament, was to review his NATO and -TEU responsibilities with respect to the German armed forces, as indicated in paragraph 9 a. above, keeping in mind the objectives and policios established by the Protocols to the Brussels Treaty and the NilTO Council resolution to implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference, and also the operational requirements resulting from the current defense plans and from the Capabilities Plan ACE 57*

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

b, îhe problems involved in or related to the Geraian rearmament being num-erous and complex, it has been felt necessary to use, for their exploration, some guide lines. The guide lines used have been as follows:

(1) The Gorman contribution to NATO should be an up-to-date military outfit adapted to and suitable for ACS strategy, within the limitations laid down on the Geiman Armed Forces,

(2) German units should be made available to SACEUR for peacetime plann-ing, and in case of emergency for operations, as soon as they have a sufficient military capability for the implementation of the current war plans,

(3) S AJC E U R ' s responsibility for controlling the German rearmament should not jeopardise his Supreme Commander authority.

(4) SACElTRf s basic positions as to the ways and means for carrying out his responsibilities in relation with the German rearmament should bc determined at SHAPE, and proper guidance thereon provided to the subord-inate headquarters, prior to the initiation of the German build-up,

16, Based on the analysis of-SACEUR's functions with respect to the German re-armament, the actions to be initiated or continued in SHAPE, within these, functions, have been reviewed. This review has been generally limited to the initial actions and to those actions which come v/ithin PPA-DO Division area of responsibility or concern.

Summaries of the analysis of SAGSURfs functions and the review of SHAES actions are attached to the present study as AMtEX A.

An analysis of PPANDO initial actions within these functions is attached as A I l G X B .

17» ^ie above analysis and review have led to the following general considerations

18, SACEUR ' s responsibility will generally bc enlarged by the entry of Germany into NATO. SAGEUR's authority, however, has not been increased accordingly. Further-more, SACEUR IS authority on the German forces is subjoct to the assignment of those forces to SACEUR and will bc non-axis tant prior to this assignnent. Therefore ' àn interim period will develop between the initiation of the German rearmament and the pssignmant of German units to SACElTi. During this period, with no official authority, but extensive responsibilities, to include responsibilities towards T7EU, SACEUR will have to deal with German military and civilian authorities freshly empowered with ful l national sovereignity and rights. SACZTJRFS main assets under such circumstances will bo the German requirements for advice and assistance and also the ACE positions on the GcnTUUi rearmament problems established at SHAPE in close coordination with the sub-ordinate H5's.

19, Although SiiCEUR is not directly responsible for the control of the German rearmament, he must provide to the r jEU Council and Agency tho information re ired for establishing that the limitations on German forces and armaments are observ

20, The German rearmament embraces a very wide field of problems which have only boon lightly explored for this study. Ttoso problems will therefore require an in-creased effort from practicably all SriAPE divisions. Tliis effort should bo closcly coordinated and kept under control.; all the divisions should be kept informed of those elements of the high level discussions with the Germans which are necessary for their own tasks, for instance; information on the German intentions, views and requirements.

21« SHAPE action TTithin SACEUR's functions with respect to the German rearmament may be broken down into three periods:

a. Period 1: Tram now to the accession of Germany to K-TO

b. Period 2: rcan the accession of Gcimany to NATO to the actual initiation of the build up of tho German forces

o. Period 3: Thebuil<3-*y period

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

22, In view of the fact that the ratif ication procedures could well proceed at ä very fast speed in the near future, and also that many preparations for the German re-armament have already been initiated outside T7ATO, on a nation-to-nation basis, (a factor which wi l l probably accclerate the in i t ia l steps of the rearmament), i t appears that SHAPE should recognise a l l the problems related "to the German rearmament and determine at least outlined viciTs and policy on each of those problems during Period 1. During Period 2, as the relations with the Germans are established on a continuous and normalised basis, and as the exchange of information between SACEUR, subordinate commanders and the Germans rcceivcs i ts fu l l development, i t is aonsidcred that the statement of the problems, and the establishment of SACEUR 1S considered views and policy within each of SACEUR1 s functions, should be finalised.

23, Within SACEUR's functions with respect to German rearmament, actions required in SfIAPE should reçoive different priorities. I t appears that the highest priority should bc given in i t ia l ly to these actions which arc essential for establishing on a firm basis SACEUR's responsibilities and authorities with respect to the German re-armament, and SACET11R1S relationship T.âth the TfflJ, and also ACE considered views and policy on the German rearmament. Among these basic actions are the following:

a. The establishment of SACEUR as the only Supreme HATO Commander dealing with the in i t ia l raising and training of the German contribution to WLTO, to include the Naval contribution.

"b, The provision of some degree of authority for SACEUR, in order to permit SACEUR to meet Iiis responsibilities during the period preceding the assignment of Gorman units,

c, • The designation of one Allied Command Europe C-in-C, responsible to SACEUR for the direct assistance tc, and advice on, the Gerjnan rearmament«

d, The o f f i c i a l designation of the high ranking o f f icer responsible for transmitting information to tho "1ErJ,

VI C OIsICIlUS IONS

24, There is a requirement for establishing at an early date, on a firm basis, S A C E U R I S responsibility and authority with respect to the German rearmament, and in particular, for providing to SACTLTR some degree of authority to meet Iiis responsibility during this interim period preceding the assignment of German units,

25, There is a requirement for establishing at an early date, well defined ACE considered views and policy with respect to a l l the military problems involved in the C-erman rearmament end r/hich come within SACElrR1 s functions. Major subordinate HQ1S should be kept informed of above ACE views and policy tlirougn appropriate guidance*

26, There is a particular need for coordination, control and mutual information within SHAPE, with respect to the staff activities related to the German rearmament.

27, SHAPE in i t ia l actions in relation with the. German rearmament may be broken down into the following categories, listed by order of priority:

a. Definition of SACEUR®s responsibility and authority in the German rearmament.

b. Establishing AC7] considered views and policy for the implementation of SACEURFS responsibility and authority in the Gcrr.ian rearmament.

c. Establishing Ö "-CJtC 1S relations with the ~EU

A l l these actions should be achieved dur\ng Period 1 or Period 2, ( rc f , para 21)

28, EPANDO Division's in i t ia l actions have been outlined in AMfEX B. under the general headings laid down in paragraph 27 above.

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

NATO FRÖRET

V I I KSCOLIMEKD/LTIOIIS

29. It is rocommended:

a« That this, study "bo approved for use as a guidance by PPANDO Division.

b. That this study be circulatcd to other SHAPE Divisions for information and/or comments.

2 Enclss

- AILNEX A

- AHMEX B

6

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

I

NATO SECRSJ ANNEX A,

Summary of the Analysis of SA-CEfJRtS Functions with respect to the German Rearmament

I . ASSIGNMENT OF FORCES

1» In this f i e ld , SACEUR's functions are :

a) Tb recommend to the Standing Group for the yearly assignment of German forces to his Command.

b) To inform the German Authorities of his operational and personnel requirements for forces.

c) To determine and recommend the proper phasing for assignment to SACEUR of the Land, Air and Naval elements of the German contribution to NATO, in relation with the build-up program of the German rearmament.

d) To reallocate German forces to his subordinate commanders.

2. Based on the analysis of above functions, i t i s considered that -Uie following actions are required at SHAPE s

a) The early exploration of the German views as to the forces they plan to maintain under national command (forces for common defense of Europe and forces for internal defense) .

b) A decision for the assignment to SACEUR of the German naval contribution to NATO should be requested from German and NATO authorities.

c) The related problems of Schleswig-Holstein defense responsibility and Naval Command in the Baltic, should recf.-iv^ final solutions, to include the choice of the pdeouate time for passing the Schlesweig-Kolstein defense responsibility from North to Centre and for establishing the new Baltic Command set-up.

d) A study should be initiated on the proper timing for assigning to SiCEUR German units.

e) Should this assignment be delayed t i l l German units are ful ly organized, equipped and trained, another study should be initiated on the \ i possibility of temporarily earmarking to SACEUR, prior to their ultimate assignment, German units s t i l l under organization and training, which might, be employed in case of emergency for participating in the implementation of SACEUR I S current plans.

3. Actions b) and c) would permit 5ACEUR to allocate for planning to the Northern and Central Commands, as rppropriate, the German forces placed under SACEUR's authority.

Actions d) and e) would eventually dcvelopo a scheme for giving to SA.CEUR some dogreo of authority for advising and assisting in the German rearm-ament and for collecting information for the WEU prior to the assignment of ths German units. Such authority could bc delegated, as appropriate, by SACEUft to Subordinate C-in-Cs. Taoy could also provide SACEUR and his subordinate Commanders in the North and in the Centre with the possibility of integrating in their plans Gorman units as soon as they have S O B ® acceptable military effectiveness; such possibility could improve Allied Command Europe defensive capabilities during th<j German build-up.

7

NATO SECRET

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

TfêATQ S E C R E T

II s MISSIONS AND TASKS,

5« In the field of missions and tasks SLiCEUR' s functions are s

a) To assign missions and tasks to the LAND, NAVAL and AIR components of the German forces assigned to his command, based on current NATO strategy for the conmon defense of Europe,

b) Bie preparation of the plans for the execution of the above missions, and their coordination with adjacent NATO Allied and national Commands,

6a Initial NATO Missions and tasks to be assigned to the German Army, Navy and Air Forces, under tho Capability Study ACE 1957 concept, have been outlined in the SHAPE Guidance (AG 1281 PPO, 2 Mrrch 1955)-

7, Further acti0n is required at SHAPE on the following :

a) Bie exploration of German views and requirements with respect to the integration of their national defense capabilities in the common defense of Europe » - ••

b) A statement of SACEUR*s new responsibility for the defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, full partner in NATO and WEU, to include an ex-ploration of the problem of division of responsibilities between SACEUR, his subordinate commanders, and the German national territorial authorities,

c) A review of the missions and tasks to be assigned to the German forces as laid down in SHAPE guidance on the Gorman armed forces, in relation with above German views and requirements and above SACEUR responsibilities, to include, if appropriate, a corresponding revision of SACEUR1 s and subordinate commanders current planse

d) A preliminary study of the interim tasks which could be assigned to German units during the build-up period^ to in elude an outline of the adjustments to plans thus made possible,

o) A continuous review of the missions and tasks assigned to the German forces in relation with the development of capabilities and requirements studies, such as Crystal Studies, based on the Capabilities Plan Allied Commaid Europe 1957,

I I I , REQUIÎŒMENTS AND COMPOSITION OF FOCES,

8- In the field of requirements and composition of forces, SACEURTs functions are :

a) Tb prepare force requirements basod on the NATO missions to be assigned to the forces contributed tn NATO by the Federal Republic of Germany.

b) lPo inform the German authorities of these force requirements,

c) To address comments to the Standing Group and to the Federal Republic of Germany, as to the adequacy of the German contribution to NATO, within the limits laid down on these forces, «

d) To reccrrcnend, when necessary, to the Federal RDpublic of Germany and to the WEU, modifications to the limitations placed on the German forces and armaments,

e) To advise and to assist in bringing up to date and adapting as necessary the EDC German contribution in order to make it suitable for NATO,

f ) . To advise the NATO Military Council on th' suitability of the German forces retained under national command, i f any.

i - * NATO SSGRgjT

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

NATO RECfäSF 9. So far, SHAPE has provided guidance on the broad composition

of the German LAND, NAVAL and AIR contribution to NATO* OANDT Division is currently developing detailed force requirements based on above guidance«

10 Immediate action is required at SHAPE on the following :

a) To develope, in close coordination with Northern and Central Commands, and to keep up to date detailed force requirements for the German LAND, NAVAL and AIR contribution to NATO, based on the NATO Missions and tasks to be assigned i to them. ,

b) To carry on a continuous survey for measuring the above force re-quirements against the Paris Agreements limitations.

11. When Germany enters NATO, further action will be necessary as follows:

a) To make proper recommendations through the adeouate machinery and channels (WF.U and NATO) for amending the limitations on forces and armaments, i f indicated by the result of the above survey (25 b refers).

b) To make proper recommendations on the size and characteristies of the German forces retained under national command, if any.

IV. ORGZliNISATIOM, EQUIPMENT, TRAINING

12. In the field of organization, equipment and training, SACEURt s functions are :

a) To advise and assist in bringing up to date and adapting as necessary the EDC German contribution, in order to make i t suitable for NATO.

b) To advise and assist in organizing, equipping and training the German contribution to NATO into effective integrated forces, as requested by the German authorities.

c) To make recommendations to the Standing Group"and to Germany on training standards, priorities for the organization of forces, construction of facilities for training.

d) To exercise direct control over the higher training of German forces assigned to his Command and inspection of training of these fer ces.

e) To ins;.ect the training of the German cadre and forces earmarked for his command, if any.

13» The organization and equipment problems hve been approached in the SHA E Guidance, but only within their "composition of faces" aspect. OANDT Division has initiated studies on organization, equipment and training and" has . provided preliminary guidance thereon.

Further studies are n ces^ary at SHAPE, in close coordination with the Subordinate Commanders concerncd, in ordter to cover the other aspects of the organization, equipment and training problems. These studies should take into account such factors as :

a) The detailed SACEUR force requirements, referred to in above paragraph 10 a.

b) The recognized necessity of a contrailsed NATO authority for advising on,aasieving pho German National Authorities.

c) SACELR's interest in an early availability of forces.

9 NATO BSQKST

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

KSFTTO* FJ3GRBT

• •

BLANK

*

V. LO CATION AND DEPLOYAIENT, i

15« In this field, SACEURt s functions aro :

a) To determine the peacetime location of German forces in accordance with NATO operational plans after consultation and agreement with German authoritiesa

b) To insure that all wartime deployments are in accordance with NATO strategy,

c) To determine that German forces assigned or earmarked for assignment, and located within the area of Allied Command Europe, shall not be re-deployed or used operationally within Ivhat area without his consent, subject to political guidance furnished by tho North Atlantic Council, when appropriate, through normal Channels0

16« -Action is required at cHAPE on the following :

a) Exploration of German views regarding deployment and location of forces, . »

b) Development of an interim plan covering location of German forces during the organization and tho training poriods,

c) Ievelopment of an Emergency évacuation plan covering the evacuation elements of the German forces from forward areas if war appears likely before these forces have attained a sufficient measure, of combat readiness to permit their employnent,

d) Cbtain political guidance from NATO Council on redeployment and operational i;se as necessary«,

. e) Establish SACEURTS policy regarding redeployment and operational use, extent of movement permitted during manoeuvres, etc,5 without his express consent,

f ) Development of a final deoloymcnt plan, tc include final location of HQTs,

17« PPANDC is currently studying a final deployment plan developed by CINCEftT,

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

NATO SFTOHFET VI . COMi-IAND AND INTEGRATION »

318. In the J. ( i l do f Oorannnd. SACEUR's functions are s

a) To propose to the Standing Group such changes in the command structure of All ied Coirunand Europe as he may consider necessary in view of the integration of German Armed Forces into NATO.

> b) To init iate tht integration of the German Armed Forces placed under

Ms authority, based on the North Atlantic Military Oommittee Directive.

c) To implement MC-36 and SIAFE 4G/2205/PP0, 11 December 1953, with respect to the division of responsibilities between the German authorities and SAGEUR and his Subordinate Commanders,

JL9« Action is required at SHAPE on the following :

a) Exploration of the German views and requirements as to "bhe future German National Command organization and the integration of German forces in the NATO organization

b) Solution of the Baltic Command problem prior to entry of Germany into NATO, in relation with above views and requirements.

c) The problem of division of responsibilities between SACEUR and ŒANOOM in the Gorman North Sea should be reconsidered in the l igl it of both the German naval rearmament and a forward strategy, and the current agreement adapted as necessary.

d) A SHAPE policy on the integration of German forces should be established, î to include the progressive integration of German Officers in ACE HQ1S. .

VII . LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND INFRASTRUCTURE.

20. In this f i e ld , SACEUR!s functions are :

!a) To establish, in consultation with the German authorities, requirements for the provision of logist ic resources.

b) To determine, in agreement- with 3eri.un authorities, the geographic distribution of these logist ic resources,

c) To establish, in agreement with German authorities, logist ic priorit ies in connexion with the raising, equipping, training and maintaining of these forces.

d) To direct the utilization, for meeting his retirements, of those portions of the logist ic support systems made available to him.

«

c) To coordinate and supervise the use, for logistical purposes, of NATO common infrastructure fac i l i t i es and of those national f ac i l i t i e s made available to him.

i *

21. Actions required in the f i e ld of logistic support and infrastructure are outlined in LOG 1281 PPO, 7 Decembor 1954*

v n i . i n s p e c t i o n s Aro r e p o r t s .

22« In this f i e ld , SACEURtS functions are :

a) To call for reports regarding the level and effectiveness of forces, including reserve formations, their logist ic support, and their armaments, equipment and supplies, as well as the organization and location of their logistic arrangementso

SJATO BSOFJST.

u

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

NATO SKCRgT b) To mako field inspections, as necessary, within the area of Allied

Command Europe, of the forces, including reserve formations, placed under him, and of those portions of logistic support systems made available to him.by appropriate authorities,

c) To exercise direct control over the higher training of all forces assigned to his command in peacetime and the inspection of training of all forces assigned to his command«

d) To inspect the training of those cadre and other forces within the area of Allied Comand Europe earmarked for his command»

23. Action is required at SIAPE on the following :

a) detailed organization of an inspection machinery. • b) Steps should be taken to insure that SACEUR will be provided with

authority to make field inspections of German forces from the time these faces are organized, as well as to make inspections of logistic facilities of those forces»

c) Steps must be taken to provide SACEUR with authority to request reports as needed on the level and effectiveness of forces, their armaments, equipment and supplies, organization and location and logistic arrangements,

IX. MILITAHT RELATIONSHIPS WITH IiJEU•

24. In this field SACEURtS functions are :

a) To provide information and advice on military matters, as required.

b) To release to Council of WEU, through a high-ranking officer, information on German forces obtained from reports and inspections,

25. Action is required at SHAPE on the following :

a) Positive steps must be taken to obtain for SACEUR the necessary authority to inspect German forces, and to request reports concerning those forces, prior to their assignment to NATO..

b) Action for the official appointment of high-ranking officer by the Standing Group for the purpose of transmitting information from SACEUR to the Council of WEU.

c) Terms of reference concerning officer appointed by the Standing Group must be clearly defined.

JSLATC S E C J E W

12.

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

HATO BJ^HET AMNEZ tBt

PfPAJlDO Division Initial Actions within SZxCEURt s Functions with respect to tho Gorman Rearmament-

1. Beised on Annex A, i t i s considered that in i t ia l actions required from PFAKDO Division, "with respect to the German rearmament arc the following:

a» Definition of SACEUR1 s responsibilities and authority in the German rearmament:

(1) Initiate action for the assignment of German naval forces to SACEUR,

(2) Initiate study on and action for providing SACEUR with the necessary authority for the fulfilment of his functions during the period v/herein German forces under raising and training Ydl l not be placed under his authority.

(3) Study SACEURtS responsibility for the defence of the Federal Republic of Germany and provide guidance as required.

(4) Initiate study of, sind action as appropriate on the division of responsibilities:

- in Germany, between SACEUR, his Subordinate Commanders and the German authorities in peacetime, and in wartime,

- in the Forth Sea, "between SACEUR and Channel Command

and bo ready to provide guidance as required.

b, Establishing ACE considered views and policy for the implementation of SilCEURt s responsibility in the Gorman rearmament.

(1) Continuously adjust the missions and tasks to be assigned to the Gorman forces to the current and future ACE concept of operations,

(2) Continue action, in coordination with QU-OT, for the establishment of detailed force requirements based on missions and tasks, and for the continuous measuring of these requirements against the limitations placed on the Gorman forces.

(3) Be ready to provlc'c guidance in view of preparing appropriate r c o-Iime nda t i on s for :

( i ) The size and characteristics of the German forces kept ^undcr national command, i f any.

( i i ) The eventual increase of Gorman forces and armaments beyond the limitations.

(4) Continue action for the establishment of an ACE policy on the integration of German forces and for i t s application.

(5) Continue action for reaching decisions on the passing of 3 chle swig-Hols te in defense responsibility from CIirKOPTH to C TiCSIT? and on the organ-isation of naval command in the Baltic.

(6) Initiate study on the delegation of authority by SACEUR to one ipprqpriate C-in-C for advising on anrs. assisting in the Gorman rearmament: PPANDO should bo ready to provide guidance, as required.

(7) Initiate study for the establishment of detailed plans for the ïarly earmarking of Gorman units to SACEUR and for the related allocation of tasks to ;hose forces. PPATDO should be ready to provide guidance as required,

(8) Continue action for tho establishment of a build-up period location •lan, an emergency evacuation plan, and a final deployment plan for the Gorman forces,

(9) Continue action for the definition of an ACE policy with rcspect o redeployment of Goman forces for manoeuvres and training,

33 .. NATO BF3CHET

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

NATO &F,E&M \

c. Establishing SACEURfS relations with the ÏÏHJ.

(1) Initiate study on and action for providing SACEUR -vdth the necessary authority for inspecting and obtaining reports from the German units under raising and training, in view of the information required by '"tEU.

(2) Rccommcnd the designation of a high-ranking officer for trans-mitting information to the WEU.

NATO

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

NATO BEGRET

GRAND QUARTIER GSNBRi-L DES PUISSANCES ALLIEES SN EUROPE PARIS, PRANCE

PPO 1281 28 Avril 1955

M3K0RANDUM POURs le chef de la Brauche Etudes Générales le chef de la Branche "Special projects" le chef de la Section Plans le chef de la Section Nord-Europe le chef de la Section Centre-Europe le chef de la Section Sud-Europe-Méditerranée

OBJET s Etude sur le réarmement' allemand

!• Ci- jo int pour votre information une étude sur les fgnctions de SACSUR en ce qui concerne le réarmement allemand.

2# I l convient de remarquer que cette étude est datée du 7 avr i l 1955 et que depuis cette date certains développe-ments se sont produits dans Ie domaine du réarmement allemand. Cas développements concernent en particuliers

a. la ra t i f i ca t ion des accords de Paris

b. les contacts o f f i c ieux avec le groupe Speidel,

3*Ces développements toutefois ne modifient pas le fond et l ' ob j e t de cet'ce étude.

B.C. 20IIÏTELLY.. r Général de~Brigade, • Armée de l ' A i r des Ïïtatè-Uni& , Chef de la Branche Plans & Opérations

P.J.s Division Plans & Opérations Une étude sur le Réarmement allemand

Copies; ACOS FP&O 1 Adjoint à AC03 PP&O 1 PPaO Fi les 1

NATO GEGRET

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

CLY

DIS

CLO

SED

- P

DN

(201

2)00

08 -

DÉ

CLA

SSIF

IÉ -

MIS

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE