(1993) ramon j. aldag and sally riggs fuller , beyond fiasco a reappraisal of the groupthink...

8/10/2019 (1993) Ramon J. Aldag and Sally Riggs Fuller , Beyond Fiasco a Reappraisal of the Groupthink Phenomenon and a

1/20

Psychological Bul le t in

1993,Vol.

113, No.

3,533-552

C o p y r i g h t 1993by the Am e r i can Psychological Association Inc.

0033-2909/93/S3.00

BeyondFiasco:AReappraisal of the Groupthink Phenomenon

and a New

M odel

of

Group

Decision

Processes

Ramon

J. Aldag and

Sally

Riggs

Fuller

This article provides a comprehensive evaluation of the g roup think ph enom enon (I . L. Janis,1971,

1972,1982). Our evalua tion indicates that research does not provide convin cing support for the

validityof the

group think phenomenon

or for the

suggestion that groupthink characteristics lead

to ne gative outcomes. This review, coupled with evidence

from

other l i terature suggested by a

problem-solving perspectiveand adirect exam inationofgrou pthink implici t assumptions, guided

th e

development

of a

new, more general model term ed

t hegeneralgroup problem-solvingmodel .

This model incorporatesavarietyof antecedent conditions, emergent group characteristics, deci-

sion process characteristics, and grou p decision outcome s. Following the re view and m odel devel-

opmen t ,

we

discuss potential con cerns re lating

to our

model, address

t he

al lure

of

group think ,

an d

present implications

of our

analysis

fo r

group problem solving

as

well

as

directions

fo r

fu t ure

research.

In thepastt wodecades, the reha sbeenasubstantial increase

in emphasis on groups in organizations in general(e.g.,Leavitt,

1975;Ouchi,1981;Zander, 1982) and on group problem solving

in particular (e.g., Brandstatter, Davis, & Schuler, 1978;

Del-

becq,

V an de

V e n ,

&

Gustafson, 1975). However, surprisingly

little attention

ha s

been paid

to the

development

o f

comprehen-

sive models

of

grou p problem solving. Models

are

available

t o

suggest when groups, rather than individuals, should be used

for problem solving(Vroom

&

Yetton, 1973)

and the

appro-

priate composition

an d

functioning options

o f

problem-solving

groups (Stumpf, Zand,

&

Freedman,1979),

an d

severalspecific

group problem-solving techniques have been presented (e.g.,

Rohrbaugh, 1979;

Tu roff,

1971;

Van de V en &

Delbecq,

1971).

Furtherm ore, gen eric models of group fun ction ing are also

available bu t do not lend them selves to application

specifically

to grou p problem solving(e.g.,

Romans ,

1950).However, popu-

lar, comprehensive, general models of group problem solving

ar e

lacking.

The g roup think model (Janis,

197 1 ,197 2 ,198 2 )

is the most

prominen t a t tempt

to fill

this void.

In

recent years,

acceptance

of

t he

grou p th in k phe n om e n on

has

become almost un iversal,

and the term groupthink has entered the pop ular vocabulary. It

ha s

been blamed

for

such decision-making

fiascoes as the B ay

of Pigs invasion, the escalation of the Vietnam conflict, the

Watergate

cover-up,

and the Challenger

disaster,

as

well

as for

flawed grou p prob lem solving in bu siness and other organiza-

tions. Despite Longleya n d Pruitt 's (1980) warning that both

Ramon

J.

A ldag, Graduate School

of

Business Adm inistration, Un i-

versity of

WisconsinMadison; Sally Riggs Fuller, School

of Busi-

ness, Un iversity of W ashington .

We

would

like

to

t h a n k

t he

Graduate School

of the

University

of

WisconsinMadison fo r

prov iding

f unding to

support this article.

Ramon J .

Aldag

an d

Sally Riggs Fuller made e qual contributions

to

this article. Names

ar e

presented alphabetically.

Correspondence conce rning this ar ticle should be addressed to Ra-

mon J. Aldag , Gradu ate School of Business, University of Wisconsin,

1155

Observatory Drive, Madison, Wisconsin 53706.

th e

groupthink theory

an d

related research were problematic,

Janis's (1971) original conceptualization has not been altered,

an d groupthink cont inues to beviewedas adefectiveprocess

thatshouldbeguarded against. Articles discussingth edangers

ofgroup think and suggesting remedies have regularly appeared

in p eriodicals aimed at man agers, lawyers, medical profes-

sionals, and the general public (e.g., Cerami, 1972;

Cu lbertson,

1977;

Henderson, 1987; Ludwig, 1973; Rosenblum, 1982;

Sanders, 1980;V onB ergen&Kir k, 1978).Th e

Social Sciences

Citation

Index

showed more than 700 citations of Janis's work

from January1989throu gh J u n e1992.

Janis chose

t he

term

groupthink

because

of its

franklyOrwel-

lian connotation, similar to doublethink an d crimethink.

Janis(1982)wrote that the invidiousness

is

intentional

(p. 9).

This view of groupthink as an undesirable phenomenon con-

t inuesto beevidencedinJanis's most recen t wo rk.Fo rinstance,

Janis (1989) wrote that

wheneverapolicymakingor crisis manage men t group is

funct ion-

in g

as a compatible team

with

a fair or high degree of esprit de

corps, take steps

to

counteract tendencies toward concurrence-

seeking or groupthink. If a leaderdoes this, the decision-mak-

in g

processwill tend to be of higher

quality,

( p.

247)'

He the n presented a l is t ing of remedies for groupthin k.

The widespread acceptance of the groupthink model sug-

gests that it has had considerable he uris tic value. In this sense, it

ha s

served similar roles to models such as those presented by

Maslow

(1943)and Piaget

(1932,1972).

In eachcase,a

relatively

precise model stimulated

further

research that ultimately chal-

lenged its

validity.

For instance, Maslow's hypothesized need

hierarchy,based p rimarily on clinical studies of neu rotic indi-

viduals,met with widespread acceptance and research interest

bu t

failed

to gain substantial empirical support (e.g.,

Alderfer,

1

From Crucial Decisions: Leadership in

Policymaking

and Crisis

Management (p . 247 )b y

Irving

L. Janis, 1989, Ne w

York:

Th e Free

Press. Cop yright

1989by The

Free Press. Reprinted

by

permission

o f

The Free Press, a Division

of

Macm illan, Inc.

53 3


2/20

534

R A M O N

1

ALDAG

AND

SALLY R I G G S F U L L E R

1972; Hal l& Nou gaim, 1967; Wahba& Bridw ell, 1976). Simi-

larly,Piaget 's theory, originally based on an in-dep th stu dy of a

small

n um ber of children, served as a seminal s tage theory of

cognitive

development, bu t additional research has suggested

needed revisions

(T. G. R.

Bower,1976; Horn, 1976).

We

argue

that g rou pthin k has p layed a s imilar role to these theor ies . Like

the m, the g rou pth ink model (a) was based on a small and rela-

tively restricted sample

but has

been

widely

general ized;

( b)

posits a precise and de termin istic sequen ce of stages; (c) has had

substantial

intui t ive appeal ;

an d (d) has not

received consistent

empirical suppor t ,

as we

demon st rate .

Con cerns about the val idi ty of the m odels notwithstanding,

each has proved to be extremely valuable. Specifically, th e

grou p th i n k model has stimulated research on group dysfunc-

t i on s and encouraged

viewing

outcomes in problem-solving

t e rms ;

shown how decision processes m ay be relevant to a wide

range

of situations; provided links to other t ype s of literature,

such

as

stress

an d

vigilance;

and

identified potentially impor-

t an t

variables

in

gro up prob lem solving. Also, like

the

Maslow

(1943) an d Piaget (1932, 1972) models , it has provided a rich

base

fo r

fu r t h e r

development

an d

tes t ing.

However, two directions seem necessary to preserve the

model's continued

viability.

First,

th e

g r o up t h ink m o d e l

has a

relatively

nar r o w focus, p rima rily addressing major decision

fiascoes.

As such,

it

would appear

useful to

provide

an ex-

panded perspective applicable

to a

broader range

of

problem

types . Second, the groupthink model has not been revised to

incorporate the emerging literature and empirical findings. In

thisarticlew epresent a new, broader frameworkfo rexamina-

t ion of grou p problem solving, terme d thegeneral group prob-

lem-solving (GGPS)

model.

It captures and recasts some ele-

m ent s

of the gr oup think model . Addit ionally , theGGPSmodel

integrates findings of a

g r o u p t h in k li t e ra t u r e review, material

from

a variety of other lite ratu re suggested by a general

prob-

lem-solving perspect ive, and an e xaminat ion of group think as-

sumptions .

In this article, we first discuss the basic characteristics of the

grou p th i n k model . Next , we summarize and discuss the re-

search that

h as

exam ine d g r o up t h ink , ado p t

a

general problem-

solving perspective and discuss other relevant literature sug-

gested by that perspective, and question groupthink assump-

t ions . We then present the ne w model, note potent ial con cerns

relating to the model, address th e al lure of g r o up t h ink , an d

provide implication s of our literature re view and model devel-

opment for fu ture theory and research on group problem

solving.

Groupthink

Model

At the individual level , Janis and Man n (1977) argued that

th i n k i n g about vital, affect-laden issues generally results in

hot cogn itions, incontrast to the cold cognitionsofrout ine

problem solving,

an d

that such

ho t

cognitions

ca n

result

in

errors

in

scanning

of

alternatives. Such situations inducestress

that results

in

defensive avoidance, characterized

by

lack

of

vigilant search, distortion of the meanings of warning mes-

sages, selective inattention an d forgetting, an d

rationalizing.

Gr o up t h ink

is

seen

as the

group analogue

of

defensive avoid-

ance, or a collective pattern of defensive avoidance (Janis &

M a n n ,1977,

p .129).

According

t o

Janis (1972),

I

u se the te rm group think as aq u ickan d easyway to refer to a

mode of t h i n k i n g that people engage in when they ar e deeply

involved in a

cohesive in-group, when

th e

members ' s tr ivings

fo r

unan imi ty

override their motivationt orealistically appraise al -

ternat ive courses of ac t ion . . . . Group thinkrefersto a deteriora-

t ion of

men ta lefficiency, real i ty testing,

an d

moral judgmen t tha t

results from in -grouppressures ,

(p. 9)

Janis

(1982) explicitly

defined the context in which group-

t h i n k is thou ght to occur and divided these anteceden t condi-

tions into three categories. First,

a

moderate

to

high level

o f

group cohesion

is a

n ecessary

but not

sufficient condition

fo r

g r o up t h ink .

Secondary antecedents thata resaid topredict situ-

at ions in which groupthink is likely to occur are s t ructural

faults and a provocative situational context. In the structural

fault category are insu lation of the grou p, lack of tradition of

impartial leadership, lack of norms requiring methodical pro-

cedures, and hom ogen eity of memb ers' social backgroun ds and

ideology.The provocative situational contextantecedents focus

on

th e

role

o f

stress

as a

situational factor.

The first

stressfactor

ischaracterized

as

extern al threats

of

losses combined with

a

low hope

of finding a

bet ter solution than that

of the

leader.

The

intern al s tress antecedent s tems from temporary

lo wself-

esteem at t r ibutable

to

members' recent failures, perceptions

that the task is too difficult to accomplish, and the perception

that there is no alternative that is morally correct.

There

ar e

several supposed symptoms

of

groupthink (cf .

Janis & Mann, 1977, pp . 130-131), including an i l lusion of

invulnerabil i ty,rat ionalizat ion to discount warn ings and other

negative fee dback , belief in the inh ere nt morality of the grou p,

s tereotyped

views

of mem bers of opposing groups, pressure on

dissenters, self-cen sorship, illusion of un anim ity, and self-ap-

pointed mindguards acting to shield the g roup from adverse

information .

According to Janis

(1 9 71 , 1 9 72 , 1 9 82, 1 9 89 ) ,

g r o up t h ink r e -

sults in a n u m b e ro fconseque nces that inte rfere with

effective

group decision making. For instance, the group limits its dis-

cussion to

only

a few

alternatives.After

a

course

of

action

is

initially

selected, members ignore

n ew

informat ion conce rning

its risks and drawbacks. At the same time, the y avoid infor ma-

t ion con cerning the benefi ts.of rejected alternatives. Members

make l i t t le at tempt

to use

exper ts

to

obtain moreprecise

infor-

mation. In addi t ion, because t hey are so confidentthat things

willt u r n

o u t

well,group members

fail to

consider what

may go

wrong and,

as

such,

do not

develop contingency plans. These

defects

are

seen

as

leading

to

impaired performance

an d

other u ndesirable outcomes. This view

of the

causal sequence

relating to d e t e r m inan t s an d consequences of g r o up t h ink is

sum m ar iz ed in Figure 1 .

Janis

(1 9 71 , 1 9 72 , 1 9 82, 1 9 89 )

suggested methods

to

prevent

or m inimize the supposedly dysfunct ional consequences of

groupthink, including the following: The group leader should

encourage

al l

g r o up m em ber s

to air

their doubts

an d

objec-

tions; leaders should adopt

an

impartial stancerather thanini-

tially stating the ir preference s; mem bers should

be

encouraged

to

discuss

t he

group's delibe rations withtrusted associates

an d


3/20

B E Y O N D FIASCO

53 5

ANTECEDENTS

COHESIVENESS

STRUCTURAL FAULTS OF THE

ORGANIZATION:

INSULATION

LACK OF LEADER

IMPARTIALITY

LACK

O F

PROCEDURAL

NORMS

MEMBER HOMOGENEITY

PROVOCATIVE STTUATIONAL

CONTEXT:

HIGHSTRESS FROM

EXTERNALTHREATS WITH

LOW

HOPE

OF

BETTER

SOLUTION THANLEADER S

LOW

TEMPORARY

SELF-ESTEEMINDUCEDB Y:

RECENT FAILURES

DIFFICULTIES

IN

CURRENT

DECISION-MAKING

TASK

MORAL

DILEMMAS

SEEKING

TENDENCY

SYMPTOMS

ILLUSIONOFINVULNERABILITY

BELIEF

IN INHERENTGROUP

MORALITY

COLLECTIVE RATIONALIZATION

STEREOTYPES OF OUTSIDERS

SELF-CENSORSHIP

ILLUSION

OFUNANIMITY

PRESSUREON DISSENTERS

SELF-APPOINTED MINDGUARDS

DEFECTS

INCOMPLETE

SURVEY OF

ALTERNATIVES

INCOMPLETE

SURVEY OF

OBJECTIVES

FAILURE TO RE-EXAMINE

PREFERRED

CHOICE

FAILURE TO RE-EXAMINE

REJECTED ALTERNATIVES

POOR INFORMATION SEARCH

SELECTIVE BIAS

IN

PROCESSING

INFORMATION

FAILURETO DEVELOP

CONTINGENCY PLANS

v

,

LOW PROBAB ILITY OF

SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME

FigureI . Grou pthin k model . (FromDecis ion Making: A

Psychological

Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and

Co mmi t me n t[p 132 ] byIrvingL.JanisandLeon Man n, 1977,NewYork:Th eFree Press. Cop yright 1977

byT he Free Press. Adaptedbypermissionof TheFree Press,aDivisionof Macmillan, Inc.)

report their reactions backto thegrou p; outside expe rts should

be

invitedto meetingsa nd encouraged to challenge members'

views;when a competitor is involved, time should be devoted to

assessment of warnin g signals

from

the competitor and of alter-

native

scenariosof thecompetitor's intentions; when consider-

in g alternatives,t hegroup should split into subgroupst o meet

separately from timetot ime;th egroup should holda second-

chance

meetingafter

a

p re liminary consensus

is

reached

o n a

preferred

alternative;and thegrou p should consider using disso-

nance-inducing

group processes.

Underlying

Assumptions of Groupthink

At base, the prevailingviewof groupthink seems to rest on a

set of generally unstated assumptions: First, th e purpose of

usinga group for problem solving is prim arily to enh ance deci-

sion qu ality. The gro up thin k model is silent con cernin g other

outcomes such

a s

mem ber adherence

to the

solution, member

satisfaction w ith the leader, and

future

motivation of the leader,

to name just a

f e w .

Second, group problem solvingisessen tiallya rational pro-

cess,

with membersunifiedin their p ursuit of a goal and partici-

pating in the group process to facilitate achievement of that

goal. This ration al process involves the selection of thegoal-

maximizingalternative regardless ofwhich particular interests

within theorganizationfavor that alternative (Pfeffer, 1981, p.

22).Such rationalityisbotha description of the decision pro-

cess

and a

value d social ideal (Parsons

&

Smelser, 1956; Pfeffer,

1981). March (1976, p. 69) referred to the theory of rational

decision mak ing usin g term s such as faith and scripture.

Third,

benefits

associated

with

a problem-solving group that

function s wellare assumed to inclu de a wide variety of perspec-

tiveson a problem, more inform ation concerning proposed al-

ternatives, he ightened decision re liability, dam pe nin g of biases,

an d social presenceeffects (cf. Gu zzo, 1986; Maier, 1976).

Fourth, grou pthin k character ist ics are assumed to prevent

th e

actualization

of

these potential group benefits

by

causing

group members to respond passively to external pressures in

undesirable

ways.

Fifth,

it is

assumed that

b y

taking steps

to

prevent

th e

occur-

renceofgroupthink characteristics,amorerationaland effec-

tive group process

will

result, leading to enhanced decision

quality.

Sixth,

an illusionof

well-being

ispresumedto beinherent ly

dysfunctional.

Such

a

position

is

consistent with

the

view that

veridical

perceptions

are

critical

to effective

functioning (e.g.,

Jahoda, 1953; Maslow, 1959). In her review of the organiza-

tional implications of self-efficacy, Gist

(1987)

used the

g r o up t h ink model to argue that self-efficacy can be too high,

thus

producing overconfidence

an d

poor performance .

Al-

though notexplicitly stated, he r view was apparently that fo r

optimal performance ,

self-efficacy

should

reflect

objective

reality.

Finally,

it is

assumed that

th e

concurrence-seeking a t t i tudes

an d

behaviors ( symptoms

an d

defects ) resu ltfrom individ-


4/20

536

R A M O N J .

A LD A G

A ND SALLY R I G G S

F U L L E R

uals'

psychological agreeme nt-seeking drives

an d

group pres-

suresf orconsensus.

Review

of the Prior

G r o u p t h in k

Literature

We review

three typ es of literature relating to the group thin k

phe n om e n on :

case analyses, laboratory studies, and concep-

t ua l

articles.

C a se

Analyses

Early su ppor t fo rg r o u p t h i n kw as based almost entirely on

retrospective case studies. For instance, Janis(1971,1972,1982)

focused prima rily on five American foreign-policy crises: the

Marshall Plan,

th e

invasion

of

North Korea,

the Bay of

Pigs

invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the escalation of the

conflict

in V ietn am. Through case studies, he categorized

these

crises according to whether evidence of groupthink was

revealed. In his 1982

work, Janisalsodiscussed

th e

Watergate

cover-up

as an

example

of

how clever manipu lators

can get

caught

in an

avoidable quagmire

(p .

198).

Tetlock (1979)

examined the same five crises considered by

Janis (1971,

1972).

Content analyses were performed on the

publ icstatementsof keydecision make rs involvedin thecrises.

Consisten t

with

Janis's theory, grou pth ink decision makers

werefound

to be more simplistic in their perceptions of policy

issues

than n ongrou pthink decision makers and to make more

positivereferences to the UnitedStatesand its allies. Inconsis-

t en t

with Janis's theory, gro up thin k decision makers did n ot

make

significantly

m ore negative references to the Com mun ist

states and their allies. Tetlock

(1979)

concluded that the

current findings

converge impressively with

the

conclusions

of

Janis'sintensivecase studie s (p.1322).He attributed the lack of

uniform

support to methodological issues, arguing that content

analyses of pu blic statements may be insensitive to

differences

in evaluationsofopponents in grou p th in kan dn o n g r o u p t h in k

crises.

More recently, several other case studies providing support

for

grou pth ink have been pu blished. For instance , Manz and

Sims (1982) presented three cases to demonstrate groupthink

t endencies in autonomous work-group settings. Smith (1984)

presented case informa tion describing the attempt by the

UnitedStates to rescue its hostages in Tehran as an example of

g r o up t h ink

(this example was noted by Janis in his 1982 edi-

tion).

Hen sley and

Griffin

(1986) applied grou pthin k to a case

analysis of the

1977gym nasiu m controversy

at

Ken t State Uni-

versity, where trustees decided to bu ild an addition to the

school's gym nasiu m on part of the areaof the tragic 1970 con-

frontation

between students and Ohio National Guard

members. Hensley and Griffin (1986) concluded that each

major

condition of the theory was present in the conflict and

that the trustee s were indeed victims of grou pthin k (p. 497).

Esser and Lindoerfer(1989) conducte d a quantitative case

analysis

of the space shuttle Challengeracciden t. They coded

sta tements from th e Report of

th e

Presidential Com mission

on

th e Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Presidential Commis-

sion

on the

Space Shuttle Challen ger Accident,1986)

as

positive

or ne gative instances of the observable antecedents or conse-

quences of

groupthink. Positive instances

of

group think were

reported to be twice as

frequent

as negative instances. Fu rther-

more, du rin g the 24 hr p rior to lau nch, the ratio of positive to

negative instances increased

an d

then remained high. Esser

and Lindoerfer(1989) noted that it is possible that the many

instance s of decision-makin g defects would be consistent

with

any th eor y of poor decision m aking. W e have no comparison

group withwhich toe valuate this alternative (p .175). Use of

th e

te rminology

positivea nd negative instances

o f

groupthink

wa staken

to

im ply that

an y

sta tement

n ot

direc tly inconsistent

with gro up think was an instance of grou pthin k. The authors

failed

to f ind sta tements re la t ing to some groupthin k symp-

toms or consequences. A lthou gh they speculated that the deci-

sion

makers const i tu ted ahighlycohesive group, no statements

provided information concerning group cohesiveness. Finally,

the finding of a greater relative number of occurrences of in-

stances of grou pt hin k closer to the decision point was inter-

preted to be evidence of poor decision mak ing rather than as

simple

convergence on a solution.

Laboratory Studies

As

recently

as1982,Moorhead

wrote that since

t he

publica-

tion of Janis's book, th ere h as been no systematic research test-

ing any of itspropositions (p .436).Even now, there have been

only a l imited nu mber of studies empir ically examinin g

grou p th in k . W e discussed th e Esser an d Lindoerfer

(1989)

quantitative

case analysis earlier. We now review laboratory

studies of groupthink in chronological order.

Flowers (1977 ) hypothe sized that cohesiveness and leader-

ship style should interact in the decision process, so that

groupthink is

most

likely to

occur when group cohesiveness

is

higha nd

leadership style

is

closed

(i.e.,t he

leader presses

for his

or her own

decision

and a

unanimous decision). Flowers

as -

signed undergraduate students to experimental teams, with

leaders trained to take an open or closed style and cohesiveness

manipu lated by whe ther studen ts kne w each other (high cohe-

sive)

or did not (low cohesive). Teams we re

given

a

crisis

deci-

sion situation involvinga school person nel problem. Open lead-

ership style produced more suggested solutions and u se ofavail-

able

facts

th an did closed leade rship style, but that there was no

support

fo r

Janis's

(1971,1972)

assumption that cohesiveness

is

a

critical variable. Flowers(1977)argued that the results

of

this

experiment suggest that poor decision-making activities can

occur in a wide r variety of crisis situations than originally stud-

ied

by Janis (p. 888).

Cou rtright (1978) placed first-year undergraduates into

teams

an d

gave them

th e

problem , What

is the

best method

for recruiting

new

students

to the

University

of

Iowa? Hal f

were

told that they were chosen to be compatible (high cohe-

sive)and the other half that the y probably would not like each

other (low cohesive). In addition to cohesiveness, Courtright

manipulated decision-making parameters.

In the

freed

condi-

tion, group members were told that arguing is the best way to

solve a problem. In the limited condition, members were told

that cooperation is ne cessary and that time is limited. In the

no-instructions condition , membe rs were told only of the time

limit for discussion. Depen dent variables included the nu mber

of times each mem beroffered solutions, stated agreem ent, and

stated disagreement. The only significant finding was that


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B E Y O N D FIASCO

537

groups in the high-cohesive condition an d limited-parameters

condition (the groupthink condition) generated

significantly

less disagreemen t th an

did

groups

in the

low-cohesive

an d

lim-

ited-parameters conditions. However,

C ourtright

(1978)

stated

that

the theory

aspostulatedby Janis is essentiallycorrect

(p .229).

Moorhead an dM ontan ari (1982) developed measuresto tap

g r o up t h ink concepts, including group characteristics,

symptoms, an d defects an dpresented ap re liminary study

to assess the validity of the indexes. B usiness studen ts com-

peted as teams in a management simulation.

After

the competi-

tion, stude nts completed

th e

Moorhead

a n d

Montanari inst ru-

ments. Largely un supp ortive factor analyses led Moorhead and

M o nt anar i(1982)

to conclude that the measurement and vali-

dation

of

grou p th in k

may not be as

simple

as

Janis's clear

an d

allur ing

presentation would suggest (p. 382). They

further

noted that although

th e

group characteristics measures

ap -

peared adequate, the conceptual uniqueness

of the

variables

described under

th e

Symptoms

an d

Defects categories

can be

quest ioned,

based on

these

data

(Moorhead

&

Montanari ,

1982,

p .382). Furthermo re, the y

reported

on the basisof inter-

category correlations that the pre limin ary analysis indicated

that some of the relationships

proposed

by Janis appeared to

hold for the groups used in this study but

that

others do not

appear to be as strong for this data set (Moorhead & Montan-

ari, 1982,p.382).

Callaway

andEsser(1984),

using

undergraduate

psychology

studen ts, manipulated grou p cohesiveness and the adequacy of

decision procedures

in a factorial

design.

The

authors con-

cluded that their findings provided mixed support for the

g r o up t h ink

hypothesis on measures of decision quality and

group processes presumed

to

underlie

th e

groupthink deci-

sions.

In

the irstudy,cohesiveness categories w ere achievedpost

hoc,

and the

degree

o f

support

for

groupthink varied with

th e

group task (the lost-at-sea task was supportive and the horse-

trading task

wa s

not). Given

th e

differential

support across

tasks, the authors reasoned

that

the horse-trading task may be

inappropriate in a

test

of groupthink because it has a single

correct answer that becomes immediately obvious.

Leana(1985)used teams of college studen ts solving a hypo-

thetical business problem. She tested the effectsof group cohe-

sivenessand leader behavior (directive vs. participative) on de-

fective

decision making.

S he

found that teams with directive

leaders proposed and discussed

fewer

alternatives and dis-

cussed

fewer

alternative solutions than did te ams with partici-

pative leaders. However, contrary to Janis's

( 197 1 ,197 2 ,198 2 )

g r o up t h ink

model, members of noncohe sive groups engaged in

more

self-censorship

of

information

th an did membe rs of cohe-

sive groups.

These findings

were

interpreted to be partially

support ive of the group think model.

Gladstein

an d

R eilly (1985),u s in g

a

management simulation

called Tycoon, studied group decision making under threat.

They hypothesized that threat may result in restriction in infor-

mation

processing and a decrease in breadth of distribution of

influence

(termed

constriction

of

control).

Noting th e con-

g r uence

of these hypotheses with the groupthink model, they

stated that no one hasfully tested the groupthink model, al-

though several studies have shown partial support

for it

(Flowers, 197 7; Leana, 1985) (Gladstein &

Reilly,

1985, pp .

615-616).

Altho ugh the results indicated a restriction in

infor-

mation processing

an d

increased

stress

when threat increased,

th e

degree

of

threat m ade

n o

significant

differen ce

in

constric-

tion of control. They argued that group norms and task de-

mands might haveacted

to

moderate

the

relation

between

threat an dconstriction of control.

Callaway,

Marriott, and Esser(1985) reasoned that because

Janis(1972) proposed that gr ou pt hin k is essentially a stress-re-

duction

process,

it might be prevented in cohesive groups if the

stress could be

diffused

by other factors. They investigated the

effects

ofgrou p structure (decision-making procedures)and in-

dividualdo minance on symptoms of groupthink, anxie ty, and

the qu ality of group decision makin g. Students, formed into

groups on the basis of dominance scores, participated in the

lost-at-sea task(Nem iroff& Pasmore, 1975),which permits ob-

jective scoring of the

correctness

of the group decision. Deci-

sion-making procedures were found to

influence

the time re-

quired

to

reach

a

decision

but not

decision quality

or the

pro-

cess variables assumed

to

mediate groupthink.

Groups

composed of highly domin ant members m ade higher quality

decisions, exhibited lower

state

anxiety,

took more time to

reacha decision, tended tomake more statementsofdisagree-

ment and agreement, and reported more group influence on

the members.

Moorhead and Montanari(1986)argued that previous empir-

ical studies of grou pthin k were flawed both because they

failed

to

successfully

produce theantecedent conditions proposedby

Janis (1972,1982) and because they provided incomplete tests

of

the group think theore t ical

framework.

Moorhead and Mon-

tanari (1986) wrote that the most comprehensive empirical

test

to date (Courtright,1978)included measures ofonlytwo of

the seven antecedent conditions, none of the symptoms, three

of the seven decision-making defects, and outcomes measured

on a subjective produ ctivity rating instrum en t (p. 402). To pro-

vide a more complete test, the authors

formed

teams of busi-

ness policy students who completed a highly competitive man -

agement simulation exercise (Moorhead & Mon tanari, 1986,

p.

405).

Refined

versions of the Moorhead and Montanari

(1982)measures were administered, and path analysis was used

to

assess

th e

implied causal sequence.

The

authors concluded

that although several relationships supported the framework

proposed

by

Janis, the em pirically derived mode l suggests that

several

linkages wereopposite to those predicted by the Janis

framework (Moorhead & Montanari, 1986, p. 408). For in-

stance, cohesion had a negative impact on self-censorship, a

positive impact on dissent, and a negative impact on the defect,

few alternatives. Moorhead and Mon tanari

(1986)

noted that

these data do not

show

powerful support for Janis's group-

th in k

hypothesis (p .

408)

bu t

argued

that there

were enough

significant relations amon g variables

to

warrantfurtherinvesti-

gation.

Montanari and Moorhead

(1989)

developed and validated

scales to measure gro upth ink

variables.

2

They included three

2

Although

Moorhead and Montanari 's

(1982)

paper is nowhere

noted

in

Montanar i

a nd

Moorhead's (1989) article,

th e

papers

are es-

sentially

identical (i.e.,

the

latter

is

apparen t ly

a

journ al version

of the

former).


6/20

53 8

RA MON J .

A L D A G

A ND

SALLY

RIGGS

F U L L E R

antecedents (cohesion, insu lation, and promotional leadership)

and alleight symptomsan d seven defects. Factor an alyses were

used to reduce eight symptoms to five and seven defects to

three. The analyses were conducted only on variables with in

categories (i.e ., antecedent conditions, symptom s,

an d

defects),

presumably

because th e sample size(N=

61)

did not permita

full factor analysis.

Even with

this restricted approach, there

wa s

relatively little supp ort

for the

s t ru c tu re

proposed

by

Janis.

Montanari and Moorhead

(1989)

concluded that

Janis's

con-

ceptualization of the

grou pthin k variables, when operat ional-

ized via

subscale items, lacks

sufficient

stability

(p .217) .

Conceptual

Articles

In the firstcom prehen sive critical evaluationo fgrou p th in k ,

Longley

and Pr uitt (1980) raised several issues inclu din g the

lack

of

empirical support

an d

deficiencies

in the

the ory itself.

They

called

for a

clearer

definition of

gro upth ink, more r igor-

ou s

empirical research,

an d

increased attention

to

underlying

processes and the relations among variables. Despite these

warnings,

research ongrou p th in k c on t in u e din thesame vein ,

withoutsignificant changest o Janis's

(1972)

original theory.

Whyte(1989)argued that the decision fiascoes attributed to

groupthink may beexplained byprospect polarization, which

uses,inadditionto thepressuresfor

uniformity

ofgrou p th in k ,

th e concepts of

framing

effects

(Tversky

&

K ahneman, 1986)

and g rou p polarization (Myers & Lamm , 1976). Altho ugh

Whyte cited some groupthink research as being more consis-

ten t

with

prospect polarization than with groupthink, he did

not challenge

th e

general constellation

of

characteristics

saidt o

be associated with grou p th in k . Whyte(1989) suggested that

g r o up t h ink although relevant, is an incomplete explanation

for th eoccurrence ofdecision fiascoes (p.54).

Luechauer (1989) provided a brief overviewof grou p th in k

and the

critiques leveled against

it

(citing Longley

&

Pruit t ,

1980,

an d

Whyte ,

1989).

Lu echaue r (1989) then presented

a

revised model

of the

groupt hink phenom enon, which sug-

gests that

th e

self-monitoring propensity (Snyder, 1974)

of

grou p memb ers is a critical personality variable that should be

considered

in the

grou p th in k

formulation an d

that Fantasy

Them es may act as a possible mechan ism wh ichpropelsgroups

toward grou p th in k (p. 5).Luechauer argued that fantasiesen -

able

a grou p to draw a bou ndary aroun d i tse lf that resists in t ru -

sions. L u e c ha u e r (1989) then discussed ho w such additional

variables might act to p u l l th e fantasizing away

from

reality

an d toward gro up thin k (p. 10). He noted that our purpose in

present ing

th is model

is not to

d ebu nk Janis's work. Rather,

it is

to exp and the model by supp lying two e lements that Janis does

not consider in his treatment of the

topic

(Luechauer,

1989, p. 5).

McCauley (1989) used content analysis to review

Janis's

(1982)descriptions of historical

cases.

He sought to de te rmine

whethergrou pthin k concurrence seeking

i s

caused

by

compli-

ance

(public without pr ivate agreement)

or

internalization (pri-

vate acceptance

of

group consensus). McCauley interpreted

Janis

as

arguing

fo r

internalization

bu t

reasoned that compli-

ance migh t have also played a su bstantial role. For

each

of eight

decisions (six groupthink

and two

n ongrou pthink) , McCauley

determined whether compliance and e ight hypothesized

ante-

cedents we re present. The results showed evidence of compli-

ance in two of the six grou pthin k decisions and in neither of the

two decisions without groupthink. Because all eight

cases

re -

flected highdegrees of cohesion and e xternal thre at, these ante-

cedents weren ot useful indiscriminat ing be tween groupthin k

and no ng rou pthin k situations. The W atergate case was the only

example in whichall six of the

other

antecedents were

present .

Across the sixg rou pthin k decisions for the sixdiscriminat ing

antecedents,

21

antecedents were present

an d

15 were absent

(i.e.,

without Watergate, these hypothesized antecedents were

equally

present and absent) . In the two nongroupthink deci-

sions,

five antecede nts were present and seven were absent. In

only

three of the groupthink decisions were more discriminat-

in g

antecedents present than absent. McCauley concluded that

cohesion can lead to both compliance and internalization and

that

future

grou pth ink research should at tempt to distinguish

be tween them.

Park (1990) provided

a

critical evaluation

of

empirical

g r o up t h ink research. He questioned the model's completeness

and the methodologies used to assess it. Criticisms included

researchers'

failure

to test all of the model's variables and the

inappropria te useof

modesof

measuremen t. Park's recommen -

dation was to use structural equation modeling such as

LISREL to test g rou pth ink . Despite these criticisms, Park ap-

peared to accept the phen omen on as be ing valid without sug-

gesting

changes

to the

original

framework.

Hart

(1991)

provided

a

revie w essay

on

grou p th in k ,

focusing

on its relevance to the p olitical

arena.

Following a discussion of

the groupthink phenomenon, i ts theore t ical context , and a

brief review

of related research, he presen ted a v ariety of con-

clusions and recommendat ions. For example , he caut ioned

against

relianceo n a narrowset of

criteria

fo rdecision quality

and en couraged a more inte grative perspective, combin ing p sy-

chological with political and organizational paradigms. Fur-

thermore ,

he

called

fo r

greater precision

in

establishing

th e

anteceden ts and dy namics of grou pthin k and for arrival at bet-

te r grounded diagnost ics of when, how,and whygrou p th in k

occurs.

Discussion of Prior Group think Literature

In

this section,

we first

present some general comments

re -

gardingpast grou pth ink literature and the n discuss specific

lessons th at

may be

drawnfrom thatliterature.

General

Co mmen ts

As suggested by the earlier review, most support fo rgroup-

th in k ha s come from retrospective case studies that havefo -

cusedondecisionfiascoesrather than comparing th edecision-

making

processes

associated with good versus

b ad

decisions.

Experimental studies of groupthink have

considered

only a

small

portion

of the m odel,often without a cohesive group and

in situations inconsistent with Janis's ( 1 9 71 ,1 9 72,1 9 82,1 9 89 )

antecedents.Fu rthermore , they have relied exclusively on stu-

dent samples de aling with hypothetical or simulateddecisions,

with

potential

resultant problems fo rexte rnal validity. Military

strategists,

m anagers, politicians,

orother

real-world decision

makers

have never been used. In the laboratory, many real-


7/20

BEY OND

FIASCO

539

world

g rou p characteristics, including ongoing power relation-

ships

an d

political maneuverings, have been necessarily

ig-

nored. Although student samples in laboratory settings may be

valuable

to

address ma ny issues relating

to

grou p problem solv-

ing,

their

use to

examine

groupthinkis

problematic.

Empirical studies of groupthink have tended to use short-

term decision quality as the sole outcome measure and have

contained serious threats

to

internal validity.

On the

basis

o f a

cursory review

ofonly three laboratory studies of groupthink

(Cou rtright, 1978; Flowers,

1977;

Tetlock, 1979), Posner-Weber

(1987)concluded

that

in

the s tudy of group think, each experimenter has tended to

start

fromscratch, either arb itrarily or intuitively deciding what aspects

of

the group think phenomenon

will

be

studied..

. .Janis'stheory

is

largely based on intuition; he is well-informed, but his

state-

ments are not clearly

confirmed,

(p .124)

Interestingly, Janis apparently discounted these experiments.

For instance, Jan is (1989) cited n one of the exp erimen tal stud-

ie sof grou pthin k; his discussion of groupthin k referred only to

case stu dies and ane cdotal p ieces. However, Janis

(1985)

explic-

itly

recognized

the

dangers

of

reliance

on

anecdote

an d

sug-

gested the modus

operandi

approach (Scriven, 1976) as a

more

rigorou s approach to the an alysis of case studies. Stud ies

of

grou pthink that

use

this methodology have

notappeared.

3

Studies

of

groupthink

have focusedon

various combinations

of

Janis's (1972, 1982) original antece dents

an d

were rarely

faithful to the

original conceptualization,

in

which cohesion

wa s

a n ecessary condition. A lso, themajorityof studies did not

operationalize the m odel as Janis(1971,1972,1982)denned i t.

An othe rimpo rtant aspect of prior research conce rns the situa-

tions chosen for study. Th e group think conceptual ization is

restrictive, primarily because of the model's antecedents and

th ein ternation al policy contextforwhich group thinkwa sdevel-

oped. The narrow

focus

of the model's antecedents is not sur-

prising

given

th e

fact that Janis extracted them directly from

th e majorpolicy decisionfiascoes hee xamin ed. Early case evi-

dence

provided

in

support

of

groupthink

wa s

drawn

largely

from

these and similar hot decision situations. The ability to

generalize from

such situations

i s

questionable.

Fo r

ins tance,

th e

e xtreme ly high group cohesiveness

an d

clearly

un ified

goals

in

m a n y

major

military policy decisions

or in

groups facing

a

natural

disaster are unlikely to

often

be encountered in other

settings. Nevertheless, laboratory and survey research on

grou p thin k

ha s typically used settings considerably different

from Janis's conceptualization. Such issues call into question

the appropriateness of most past groupthink research.

Lessons

o f

Prior Groupthink

Research

Our discussion of prior research suggests that conclusions

should bedrawnfrom that re search only with caution. Never-

theless, the following lessons

appear

to emerge from th e

groupthink research.

Genera l Suppor t for the M o d e l

To

assess

th e levelof

overall supp ort

for

groupth i nk ,

it

would

be

tempting

to

conduct

a

meta-an alysis

of

prior research. How-

ever,the

relatively small nu mbe r

of

empirical studies,

t he

vari-

et yof

methodologies used,

an d

methodological

difficulties as-

sociated with many studies make this approach infeasible

(Camp bell, 1986; Park, 1990).

On the basis of our

review,

it seems clear that there is little

supportfor the full groupthink model. In fact, to our knowl-

edge, no study of grou pthink hasfullytestedthe model, and in

no stud y were all results consistent with the m odel. McCauley's

(1989)

review raised doubts abou t

Janis's

(1982)conclusions re-

garding

the prevalence of the antecedent conditions in his ini-

tial

scenarios.

Furthermore,

th e

cen tral variable

of

cohesiveness

has not been

found

to play a

consistent role.

Flowers (1977)

went

so far as to state tha t a revision of Janis's theory m ay be

justified,

on e w hich would eliminate cohesiveness as a critical

variable (p. 895). This suggestion is diame tricallyopposed to

Janis's

(1982)

view that high cohesiveness and an accompanying

concurrence-seeking tendency that interferes with critical

think ing are the central features of grou pthin k (p. 9).

Th e

variable that

ha s

received

th e

most consistent

supportis

the

directive leadership antecedent

(i.e.,

lack

of

tradition

of im-

partial leadership). However, almost by definition, leader be-

haviors that promote the

leader's

own views and do not allow

open exploration of alternatives

will

be associated with

grou p thin k

defects such

as

incomplete survey

of

alternatives

an d

failure

to reexamine preferred and rejected alternatives.

Such domain overlap calls into question research that shows

links

between impartial leadership and decision-making de-

fects.

Evidence

of

Grouping

of

Characteristics

Grou pthink's proposed causal chain is based on the premise

that sets of variables such as symptom s and de fects group to-

gether. However, support for the grou pin g of those characteris-

tics

derives from anecdote, casual observation, and intuitive

appeal rather than

from

rigorous research. Because there has

beenn ofull factor analysisofgrou pthin k variables,it isimpos-

sible

a t

this point

t o

determine whether

th e

groupth i nk

factor

s tructure

is as

hypothesized.

As

previously noted,

Moorhead

and Montanari 's

(1986)

restricted factor analyses

appeared

to

support a simpler model than that presented by Janis (1982).

Thus, sup por t for this aspect of the m odel is lacking.

Presumed

Negative

Outcomes

Grou pthin k has been overwhelmingly viewed as an unal-

layed

evil, leading to

uniformly

negative outcomes. Indeed,

such aviewis

universally implicit

in the

language

of

groupth i nk

(e.g., th e

common references

to

symptoms

of

groupthink,

3

This approach attempts tode te rminet he probable causeo funde-

sirable events w ith high certainty even th oug h the available

data

do not

come

from

control led experiments or quasi-experiments. It involves

formulating

al l of the know n causal sequences that might account for

an

observed outcome

an d

then attempting

to find

which

of

them

ap-

pears

to be

implicated. However, althou gh this

approachis

intriguing,

it

continues to

focus

only on sources of error. Also, because many

causal sequences

may

lead

to

similar consequences, expected causal

sequences may be confirmed when other unexamine d sequences are

actually p laying roles.


8/20

540

RA MON J . A LD A G A ND SA LLY

RIGGS

F U L L E R

victims of group think, and defects of grou pthink ) . When

used in groupthink research, such negative terminology can

invite

distortions in responses caused by scale-use tendencies

and related psychometric

difficulties

and can also result in

framing

effects.

Individuals

(whether subjects or researchers) presented with

negatively framed terminology may adopt the readily available

negative

frame

and respond accordingly (Bazerman, 1990;

Tversky

&

Ka hn e m a n ,

1986).

Therefore, even simple attempts

by

the subjects to give responses that are consistent with the

tone of the questions wou ld result in n egatively oriented re-

sponses. In man y cases, faileddecisions are examined and char-

acteristics of group thin k are the n sought. There is evidence that

when individuals are provided with knowledge of a negative

outcome, they

infer

a negative process (Guzzo, Wagner, Ma-

guire,Herr,

&

Hawley,

1986).

Furthermore ,

afocus

only

on the

conjunction of groupthink characteristics and negative out-

comes invites illusory correlation (cf. Ein horn ,

1980;

Hogarth,

1980; Kle inmu ntz ,1990).

On a more fundamental level, thisframing has resulted in a

focus

on error rather than on decision quality per se. Janis

(1982)

noted that he began studyin g fiascoes for the purposes

of

studyingsources of error inforeign policy decision-making

(p .9). However, there is more to the perform ance of a football

team than the absence offumbles and interceptions, and there

ismore

to

group decision quality than

th e

absence

of

error.

A

focus on negative outcomes of group processes may divert at-

ten t ion

from

group synergies.On eexampleis the assemblyef-

fect

bonus, which , as noted by Collins and Guetzkow(1964), is

productivity wh ich exceeds the p otential of the most capable

member and also exceeds the sum of the efforts of the group

m em ber s

workin g separately (p. 58). There is considerable evi-

dence

for

th is assembly

effect

bonus,

at

least

in

some contexts

(e.g.,

Bu rleson, Levine ,

&

Samter,

1984).

Thu s, researchers

ma y

learn lit tle about supe rior group pe rformance by a

focus

solely

on

fiascoes.Instead,a focus on decisions withabroad rangeof

outcomes, includ ing superior performance , isnecessary.

The consequences of the groupthink model's focus on fias-

coes are doubly ironic. First, the consideration only of fiascoes

precludes generalization to other decision situations used in

virtually

all attempts to assess the validity of group think . Sec-

on d, the focus on fiascoes makes it impossible to say any thin g

even

about

th e

de t e rm in a n t s

of fiascoes.

As

our discussion suggests, recent scale-development efforts

such as those of Mon tana ri and Moorhead (1989) are badly

needed. T hat is, Mon tanari and Moorhead have attempted to

develop

psychometrically adequate indexes while removing the

negative

labels associated wit h Janis's

(1972,1982)

variable cate-

goriesand the associated problems.We seethisas anencourag-

in g

a n d

critical development.

Group th ink Interpretation

Strong and weak interpretations of groupthink have

emerged.

The

strong interpretation, commonly

cited,

suggests

that groupthink

is an

integrated

set of

characteristicswith

d e-

termin istic linkages. That is, grou pthin k

characteristics

cluster

because

of

their commo n ties

to

specific anteceden t

conditions

and arelinkedin acausal chain

from

those antecedent condi-

t ionstosymptomstodefectstooutcomes.Th eweak interpreta-

tion is sometimes presented in response to the failureof empiri-

cal examination s to provide results wholly consistent with

groupthink. It suggests that groupthink may be evidenced by

th epresence

of some

subset of

these

characteristics and

that

th e

causal ordering posited by Janis(1972,1982)may be suggestive

rather than necessary.

When the weak in te rpre ta t ion is

presented,

it is crucial to ask

what

characteristics, if

any,

are unique to groupthink.

That

is,

some g rou pth ink characteristics, such as belief in the

Tightness

ofadecisiona n d pressurest oachieve consensus,ar e common

to many group processes and in fact may be beneficial. For

instance, Nemeth (1986)h as argued that convergence to the

majority viewpoint is desirable if the majority viewpoint is

correct. Oth er characteristics, such as mindgu ards and self-cen-

sorship, better discriminate between groupthink an d other

group processes. It isdifficult to accept the argument that the

presence

of

characteristics common

to

most problem-solving

group s is supportive of the existence of gro up thin k.

Janis

(1989)

apparently did not accept this weak

form

of

group think. To the contrary, he wrote that

it

does not suffice merelyto see if a few of the eight te ll ta le symp-

toms

o f

g r o u p t h i n k

can bedetected.

Rather ,

it is

ne cessary

to see

if

practically all the symptoms were man ifes ted and alsoto see if

th e antecedent condit ions and the expected immediate conse-

quencesthe symptoms of defective decis ionmakingare also

present. (Janis, 1989,p. 60)

4

Comprehensiveness

Several researchers and theorists have suggested that the

groupthink model isincomplete as amodel of group problem

solving. Some have proposed specific additions, as we discuss

later, whereas othe rs have noted that other un explore d variables

may

be playing roles (Courtwright, 1978; Moorhead & Monta-

nari, 1986). Amo ng the proposed additions are norms, leader

power, task characteristics,

an d

stage

of

grou p

development.

5

The importance of these factors is evidenced both in the

groupthink research and in the more general literature on

group problem solving.

Norms. Moorhead (1982)noted after a brief review of the

research relating cohesivenesstogroup pe rformance ,an d con-

sistent with the prior arguments of Seashore (1954)and others,

that group normswill moderate the influence of cohesiveness

on performance . Wh en the normsfavorhigh pe rformance, co-

hesiveness should enhance performance. When the norms fa-

vo rlow pe rforman ce, cohesiveness should lower performan ce.

This suggests that examination only of cohesiveness per se,

4

From

Crucial Decisions: Leadership

in

Policymaking

an d

Crisis

Management (p. 60) byI r v ingL.Janis,1989, New\brk:Th eFree Press.

Copyright 1989 by The Free Press. Reprinted bype rmission of The

Free Press,adivisiono fMacMillan Inc .

' A l t h o u g h

others (e.g., Luechauer, 1989; Whyte, 1989) have sug-

gested

additional variables, those variables were

presenteda s

alterna-

tive

explanations fo r g r o upth ink r a th e r th a n as supplements to the

model.

Fo r

instance, Luechauer argued that self-monitoringpropen-

sity

may be

important ,whereas Whyte emphasized

th e potent ial

role

ofprospect

polarization.


9/20

BEYOND FIASCO

541

rather than asking

Cohesiveness

to what? , may be misleading.

Furthermore, Gladstein and Reilly

(1985)

reasoned that the

natu re of group norm s might have prevented the constrictionof

control they had hypothesized. They noted that working as a

team was astrong n orm in theschool inwhicht hestudywa s

performed

an dthatthegroupsin thestudy appeared toadhere

to that norm, making decisions as a group and striving for

consensus.

The

need

t o

consider norm s

ha s

also bee n widely recognized

an d

evidenced

in the

more gen eral group problem-solving liter-

ature. For instance, Bazerman, Magliozzi, and

Neale

(1985)

noted how norms

influence

group members' interpretation of

problems

an d

the ir subsequent attention

to

distributive

o r

inte-

grative

solutions. Similarly, Bazerman (1990) discussed

how

norms influence

the choice of third-party interven tionproce-

dure s in grou p decision con flict as well as memb er risk

prefer-

ences. Furthermore, Howell and Frost (1989) demonstrated

ho w

norms and leadership style may interact to

influenceper-

formance

and othe r outcomes in group decision making. Thus,

norms mayplaypervasive roles in group problem solving and

should be explicitly considered.

Leaderpower . Flowers

(1977)

wrote that

on e

pote ntial ly important factor

n ot

dealt with

b y

Janis

was the

degree of power held by the leader over group members. Janis's

groups had

powerful

leaders who could exercise reward andpun-

ishmenta swella s

legitimate, expert,

an dperhaps

referent power

. . . over their m embers, whereasthe

leaders

in this experiment

held

on ly certain legi timate power. Add ing

the

variable

o f

power

to the operational defini tion of group think m ight create in highly

cohesive groups an increased thru st toward grou pthink (p.895).

Similarly,

McCauley (1989),

in his

review

of the Bay of

Pigs

decision, concluded that compliance with

a

group norm

pro-

mulgated by a

powerful

and attractive groupleader (p .

254)

contributed to

faulty

decision making.

The group problem-solving literature has regularly noted the

role of leader power. For example, Huber (1980) argued that a

powerful

leader

i s

needed

to

provide

th e

opportuni ty

forcon-

trol

if

problem-solving groups be gin

to

engage

indysfunctional

behaviors. Clearly, th e

degree

an d

locus

of

power

in a

group

setting

may have

important consequences

for

group decision

processes

a nd

outcomes.

Task

characteristics.

Callaway

a nd

Esser (1984) reasoned

that

the

nature

of the

task

may be

important .

In

particular, they

argued tha t a e ure ka-type task, in which a single correct answer

becomes immediately obvious once insight is achieved by any

group member, may be inappropriate in atestof groupthink.

This is because the grou p interaction necessary for groupthin k

characteristics to occur is circumven ted. Thus, whether the task

requires a pooling of inpu ts, or interaction atall,may be impor-

tan t. Fu rthermo re, Gladstein and Reilly (1985) noted that the

task the y used allowed for a high degree of specialization and

that

it was

t h u s difficult

for one

person

to

make

all of the

decisions. This suggests that characteristics such

as

distribu-

tion of

information

and task comple xity, aswell as specializa-

tion per se, may be relevant task characteristics.

Task

characteristics have

often

been examined

in

group

problem solving. For instance , researchers have considered how

group

influencesaffect

decision performance

in

additive, com -

pensatory,conjun ctive,a nd

disjun ctive tasks (e.g., Stein er,

1976;

Weldon

& Gargano, 1985). Similarly, the literature on such al-

ternatives to traditional interacting groups as the nominal

group technique and the Delphi process suggest that group

decision processes should be fitted to the task (e.g., Stumpf,

Freedman,

&Zand,1979).

Stage

of group development.

Lean a (1985) argued that

th e

stage of group development may be relevant because i t may

moderate the role of cohesiveness. She

noted,

bui lding on

Longley and Pru itt (1980), that ad hoc group s with no p revious

experience together may be highly susceptible to groupthink

symptoms because ofinsecurity concerning me mber rolesa nd

group norms. However, groups with a tradition of working to-

gether

ma y

exhibit

far

fewer symptoms

of

defective decision

makingbecause membersa resecure enou ghintheir rolesand

status

to challenge one another but have also developed ways of

reaching agreement. Thus,

th e

potential benefits

an dcostsof

alternative techniques

fo r

grou p problem solving, including dis-

sonance-induction procedures, may depend on the stage of

group development .

AGeneral Problem-Solving Perspective

In

the p revious section, we highlighted several importa nt fac-

tors emergingfromresearch on group think that merit incorpo-

ration in a general model of group problem solving. In each

case,

we also noted exp licit lin ks to the problem-solving litera-

ture. In this section, we suggest how a problem-solving perspec-

tive

may be

fur ther

used to guide the development of such a

general model. In so doing, we first indicate how the frame-

work

of the p roblem-solving process may be used to recast an d

expand on the grou pthin k model. We then discuss additional

sets of variables suggested by the literature related to problem

solving

and question certain assumptions of the groupthink

model.

ProcessOrientation

The

large literature relating

to the

problem-solvingprocess

suggests that m any group think variables

are

relevant

bu t

that

a

recasting and expan sion is appropriate. Problem solving may

be

viewed

as a

m ultistage process that includes problem identi-

fication, alternative generation, alternative evaluation and

choice, decision implementation, an d decision control (Bass,

1983;

Elbing , 1978). Explicit recognition of these stages is im-

portant for several reasons.

First, group think defects

can be

vie wed simply

as difficulties

occurring

through the stages of the problem-solving

process.

That is, the incomplete su rvey of objectives represen ts a

fail-

ure

at the

problem identification stage,

th e

incomplete survey

of alternatives is a failureat the alternative generation stage,

the failure to examin e risks of preferred choice is afailureat

the evaluation and choice stage, and so on.

Second, other variables not explicitly noted by Janis are

knownto be

important

in the

problem-solving

process.

These

include explicit problem

definition,

qu al i ty

of

alternatives gen-

erated, source of the solution, group decision rule, gathering of

control-related information,

an d

t i mi ng

of

solution conver-

gence. Conce rning

th e

last variable,

t he

decision stages

differ in

th e

degree

t o

which they rely

on

divergent

or

convergent think-


10/20

542

RAMON J. ALDAG AND SALLY

RIGGS

FULLER

ing.

For instance , the a l terna t ive genera t ion s tage i s p r im ari ly

divergent, whereas the evaluation and choice stage is

largely

convergent.

A s

such, premature convergence, ra ther than con-

vergence per se, isun desi rable .

Th i r d ,

t he

va r i o us

stagesof the

proble m-solving process

m ay

requi re

different

social arrangements,

an d

those appropriate

at

on e

stage

may be

troublesome

at

another .

Fo r

instance,

al -

though interac t ion may be

facilitative

a t the a l tern a t ive evalua-

tion an d choice stage, i t is often dysfu nct iona l at the al ternative

generation

stage

(D. WTaylor, B erry,&B lock,

1958;

V a n de Ve n

&

Delbecq,

1971;

Vroom, Grant , & Cot ton, 1969).

Four th , i t becomes apparent tha t groupthink defec ts focus

primari ly on the first

three stages

of the

problem-solving pro-

cess, en ding with evaluation

an d

choice. Janis

(1972,1982)

gave

less em phasist o implementa t ion an d control . Onlythe failure-

to-work-out-contingency-plans symptom relates

to the

imple-

menta t ion s tage,

an d

control

is not

exp lici tly considered. This

focus

is restrictive. For instance, in the event of a

faulty

deci-

sion,

if

i mp l emen ta t io n

has not

been considered,

it

w o ul d

be

impossible

to sort ou t the relative roles of

faulty

decision mak-

in g

an d

faulty

implementation.

As an

example, Janis (1985)

cited the

ill-fated

a t tempt by President C ar ter to use mi l i ta r y

force

to rescue the Ame rican hostages in I r an as an e xamp le of

th e

u n s q u e a k y

wheeltrap (p .

81).

That is, Janis reasoned that

th e

decision makers neglected

to

consider

th e

possibility

of

early abortion of the rescue mission because the squeaky

wheel on which a t tent ion was focused was the obvious dange r

once

t he

m ission reached Tehran.

Infact, it is not

c lear whethe r

t h i sreflectsfaultye valua t ion, lack of a t tent ion to impleme nta-

t i o n ,

or

bo th .

Finally,a n

explici t

focus on the

full

problem-solving process

emphasizes

the

importance

of multiple-decisionoutcomes.For

instan ce, alon g with decision qu ali ty, the problem-solving l i tera-

t u r e

stresses

t he

need

t o

consider decision

acceptability,

satisfac-

t ion with

th e

decision process,

and so on

(e.g., Huber, 1980).

T he

l i tera ture

fur the r

indicates that

the

degree

of

g r o up member s '

i n p u t s to

problem solving,

a n d

w h e th er

t he

member s

feel

tha t

the ul t imate dec ision reflects th e i r i np u t s ,

influences

these ad-

dition al outcome s (e.g., V room & Y etton , 1973).

Lessons

From

Related

Literature

The

problem-solving literature

suggests

other

elements that

should be recognized in developing an d interpret ing a more

general model . Those elements include organizational power

an d

poli tics, group

cohesiveness,

social control,

an d

directive

leadership.

Organizational

Power

and Politics

The l i tera ture concerning organiza tional poweran d

politics

isan

integral part

of the

study

of

organizational decision mak-

ing. Organizations have been described

as

political

coalitions

(March, 1962),

an d

Pfeffer

(1981)

stated

that

power,

influence,

an d political activityare all inevitablea n d important e lements

of admin istrative activi ty. Ofte n, th e development and use of

powera reevidenced not byovert confronta t ionsbut by exhibi-

tions

of acquiescence. One

type

of political

alignment

is the

politics

of

patronage,

in

which l i t tle

or no

conflict

is

manifest

becau se of the ab il i ty of powerful forces to smooth over

differ-

ences and ga in consen sus (Lawler & Bacharach,

1983).

Viewed

in

this l ight , cer ta in grou pthin k charac ter is t ics

may

reflect

n ot

passive

a n d

maladapt ive responses

to

stressful antecedent con-

ditions but active, conscious

efforts

to a t ta in personal out-

comes. Thus,a broader problem-solving perspective would in -

clude considera t ion

o f

such proactive poli tical

action.

G roup

Cohesiveness

Group cohesiveness isseen as a primary antecedent condi-

t ion for grou pthin k and i s know n to resul t in dysfunc t ion al

forms

of

conformity

behavior. However, there

is

also consider-

able evidence that h igher levels

of

cohesiveness

may

have

a

vari-

e ty

of desi rable consequences. These potent ia l bene f its inc lude

enh a n c ed c o mmun i c a ti o n a mo ng member s, h i g h er

m e m b e r

sat-

isfaction,

decreased member tension

an d

anxiety,

an d

higher

levels of

group task accompl ishment (Shaw,

1981).

Fur ther-

more, i t wou ld appe ar th at si tuation al, task, and goal character-

istics may

modera te

th e

desirabil i ty

of

cohesiveness

in

g r o up

problem

solving

and

that positive effects

should not be

ignored.

Social

Control

Social con trol hasbeen d ef i neda s social a r r a ng ementse m-

ployed

to

keep

the

behavior

of

some people

in

l ine wi th

th e

exp ectation s of others (He witt & Hewitt, 1986, p.

155). Infor-

mal

social controls

a re

unofficial , subtle pressures

to

c o nf o r m

to

no r ms . Nemeth

an d

Staw (1989) identified

five

ways

in

which

social control is exercised to achieve

uniformity.

Several

of

these mechanisms

are

p ar t icular ly relevant

to thediscussion

of

groupthink

and

group problem

solving.

First,

conformity

in

ag r o upm ay

reflect

a g r eementon the solution that most closely

a l igns

with

establ i shed norms. Second,

powerful

individuals

often have the abi l i ty to achieve conform i ty to the i r posit ions.

Finally,

u n i f o r m i t y

can be the

result

of a

more

tacit form of

in f luence , tha t of agreement wi th majori ty viewpoints .These

th r ee

forms

of social control can serve as al ternative explana-

t ions for the occurren ce of groupthink's symptoms and defec ts.

Nemeth and Staw

(1989)

also noted that con formit y has

both necessary and desi rable elements , par t icular ly wi th regard

to

a t t a inme nt

of

goals

a n d

h a r mo ny

(p .

175).

W h e n

th e

no r m

of

the

organization

or the

wishes

ofthosein

power

isadopted,

th e r e

is

less strain

on individuals as

well

as

greater efficiency

becauseth eg r o u pca nmove toward it sgoals. Howe ver, Nem eth

and Staw also noted that al though conformity may serve

useful

funct ions ,

it may

also

stifledissent.

They wrote

that there

is

evidence tha t d issent , even when erroneous, con tr ibutes

to the

detection

of

t r u t h

and to the

i mp r o vemen t

of

both perform ance

and decision m akin g (Ne me th & Staw, 1989, p.

196).

Thus, th is

l i terature suggests that th e d e t e r mi na n t s an d roles of confor-

mi ty

in

group problem solving

a re

more complex than

is

sug-

gested by the g r o up th i nk mo d el .

Directive

Leadership

Directive leadership

is

viewed

as an

antecedent condition

of

groupthink

and

thus

of

negative

decision outcomes.

The

possi-

ble effectsof directive leadership have been widely examine d in


11/20

BEY OND FIASCO

543

the problem -solving literatu re, perhap s most notably by Vroom

an d

Yetton (1973).

Th e

model presented

by

those

authors, as

wella srelated resear ch (e.g., Field, 1982; Vro om&Jago, 1978),

indicates that autocratic styles sometimes result

in

effective

de -

cision making. Furthermore, situational theories of leadership,

especiallypath-goal theory (House &Mitchell, 1974), argue

that directive leader behaviors may in some instances result in

enhanced group performance and member satisfaction.There

is

considerable empirical support

for

such views (e.g., Schrie-

sheim & Von Glinow,1977).Thus,itshouldnot beassumed that

directive leadership isin heren tly dysfunctional.

The ben efits of leader impartiality are also challenge d by the

literatureontransformational leadership(e.g.,Bass,1990).That

literatureargues

that

successful leaders commu nicate theirvi-

sion

to followers and inspire and stimulate them toward the

accomplishment of

that vision.

Finally, itappe ars that Janis's lack oftradition of impartial

leadership antecedent ha sbeen used invarious,

distinctways

in gr oup think research, oftenconfoundi ng

th e

leader's pro mo-

tion of a correct decision process with promotion of a preferred

outcome. Althoughth eformerisoften espoused asdesirablefor

the p roper function ing of a decision group (e.g., Huber, 1980),

th e

latter

m ay

inhibit member inputs.

Examining Past Assumptions

Earlier,

we

presented several implicit assumptions

of

groupthink. Our review of the groupthink research and the

problem-solving literature poses several theoretical challenges

to those assumptions.

First, although grou pt hin k assumes that groups are used p ri-

marilytoenhanceth equalityofdecisions,group decision m ak-

ing isoften

used specifically

to

increase

th e

acceptance

of a

decision P f e f f e r , 1981). Also, organizational members ma y

choose

to use

groups

for

other

reasons,

including

socioemo-

tional benefitsan d accomplishment ofmembers' ow nsecond-

ary goals

(e.g.,

hidden agendas).

Second, the assumption that the group process is a rational

pursuit

of a

unified goal

is

inconsistent with

the

known com-

plexities of grou p processes. Such processes are characte rized

by interplays

of

covert

an d

overt motivations, concern

not

jus t

about the current problem but also with residues of past prob-

lems and the

anticipation

of

future problem-related interac-

tions,an d man y other subtleties outsideof the typical

focus

of

th e

rational mode l. Processes

a nd

outcomes that app ear irratio-

nal to objective observersmay in

fact

be fun ctional from th e

viewpoint

o findividual membersa n devenof theentire group.

For instance, such processes an d ou tcomes may serve to m ain-

tain the motivation of the group leader, help ensu re the contin-

ued use of group processes, prevent th e defection of certain

group members, serveas a means formembers to show alle-

giance to coalitions, an d min imize the likelihood of the use of

still other p olitical acts. Organizations are inher ent ly political,

with

shifting

coalitionsan dinte rest groups,adiversityofgoals,

an d

active

use of

power (cf. Hardy,

1985;

Lawler

&

Bacharach,

1983;Pfeffer,

1981).According

to

thisview,political activity

is

not

(1993) ramon j. aldag and sally riggs fuller , beyond fiasco a reappraisal of the groupthink...

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