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CONTENTION ONE: NUCLEARPRESENCE

THE UNITED STATES TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYED IN TURKEY ARE A LEGACY OF

THE COLD WARINSEARCHOFANEWMISSIONANDTHATNEWMISSIONISPREEMPTION. TODAY,

IRANISTHENEWTARGETOFCHOICEFORNUCLEARWARFIGHTING

GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, MAY 200 6 [SECURING OUR SAFETY, ENSURING OUR SURVIVALWHY US NATO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE MUST GO,HTTP://WWW.GREENPEACE.ORG/RAW/CONTENT/ INTERNATIONAL/PRESS/REPORTS/SECURING-OUR-SAFETY.PDFP. 14-18]

Nuclear sharing is irresponsible

NATO policy allows for first use of nuclear weapons, which adds a newdimension of danger when coupled with a US security policy that arguesfor pre-emptive and preventive war. The US encourages developingnuclear weapons that provide more flexible options in times ofmilitary/political conflict or tension. This clearly increases the likelihoodof the use of nuclear weapons. The 2006 US National Security Strategy states we do not ruleout the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemysattack.13 The US has recently developed a Global Strike Plan whichdescribes the potential use of US/NATO nuclear bombs deployed inEurope in a pre-emptive strike.14 US nuclear policy includes argumentsand plans in support of sustaining and modernizing its nuclear forces inthis context, including a role for NATO nuclear weapons. NATO nucleardoctrine mirrors that of the US. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group is even chaired by the USAssistant Secretary of Defence, who is also responsible for drafting and implementing all US nuclear doctrine.

In April an article in the New Yorker by Seymour Hersh provided a real example of how NATOnuclear sharing countries are implicated in US Policy. Hersh exposed USmilitary plans considering the option of using tactical nuclear

weapons against Iran.15

These plans specifically mentioned the B61nuclear bomb, which may be housed at the US/NATO airbases. If theintention in such a scenario were to use land based aircraft, then thiswould probably involve the use of Incirlik airbase in Turkey ,16 whereUS weapons are currently stored. As such, European NATO nuclear sharingcountries are not only endorsing preemptive US nuclear weapons policythrough their passivity, but they also risk bases on their territories beingused to launch nuclear weapons in a US conflict.

No NATO member state has publicly criticized the new US policy on the use of nuclear weapons, even in a

conventional conflict or before a visible threat emerges. Through their silence, throughhosting these weapons and through supporting NATO policy, NATOmember states are accepting the use of US nuclear weapons by Alliance

aircraft and pilots in these scenarios. Eliminating nuclear weapons fromEurope will enable Europeans to disassociate themselves from the USnuclear doctrine , which is giving an increased role for nuclear weaponsand thereby increasing the likelihood of use .

Nuclear sharing sets a dangerous precedentNATO nuclear sharing sets a dangerous precedent for nuclear-armed states to deploy nuclear weapons outsidetheir territory and to share them with non-nuclear weapon states.

NATO nuclear sharing is a model that others could follow, using pre-existing relationships as a legal basis.Pakistan could cite NATO nuclear sharing to support sharing its nuclear weapons with another state in theMiddle East.What would stop it arguing, as the current NATO Strategic Concept does, that its nuclear forces are


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a significant factor in the maintenance of security and stability? The presence of nuclear weapons onEuropean soil is more likely to provoke than deter potential proliferation.

NATO nuclear weapons inhibit negotiations with RussiaNATO tactical nuclear weapons impede efforts to negotiate with Russia over reductions of of its nuclearweapons.The Russian Federation has

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NUCLEARPRESENCE 1AC(Continues)

been explicit about its unwillingness to negotiate reductions in tactical nuclear weapons as long as the UScontinues to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe.The thousands of tactical (nonstrategic) nuclear weapons thatRussia unilaterally declared in 1991 that it would destroy remain mostly intact. Nuclear sharing is looking for a

justification

Perhaps most alarmingly, NATO nuclear sharing seems to be seeking anew justification.

There is a well-founded concern that NATO is increasingly looking tothe Middle East as a reason for keeping US weapons in Europe.

Largely driven by US nuclear war planning this new rationale hasdeveloped outside of NATO and stands to influence evolving NATOpolicy.The war on terror and the axis of evil rhetoric has put a spotlighton the Middle East and past experience indicates that the US does notalways fully consult its allies when making nuclear war plans.In addition, efforts by some European countries to stop and reverse the nuclearshadow that is spreading over the Middle East today will be more credible

and successful if foreign deployments of nuclear weapons in Europeancountries cease. European states could actually do more to prevent escalation of a nuclear crisis in theMiddle East, but at the moment European efforts to negotiate with Iran are severelyundermined by the duality (and resulting perceptions of hypocrisy) in European statesnuclear policies. Attempting to negotiate the denuclearisation of Iranfrom this position is patently absurd.


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NUCLEARPRESENCE 1AC

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE BEING RETARGETED AGAINST STATES LIKE IRAN IN ORDER TO

SHIFT NUCLEAR POLICY FROM DETERRENCE TO WARFIGHTING AND PREEMPTIONTHIS MAKES

OFFENSIVENUCLEARWARINEVITABLE

CHOSSUDOVSKY, PROFESSOROF ECONOMICSATTHE UNIVERSITYOF OTTAWA, 200 6 [MICHAEL, ISTHE BUSH ADMINISTRATION PLANNING A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST? WILL THE US LAUNCH "MINI-

NUKES" AGAINST IRAN IN RETALIATION FOR TEHRAN'S "NON-COMPLIANCE"? GLOBAL RESEARCH,FEBRUARY 22, HTTP://WWW.GLOBALRESEARCH.CA/INDEX.PHP?CONTEXT=VA&AID=2032]

At no point since the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August6th, 1945, has humanity been closer to the unthinkable, a nuclear holocaustwhich could potentially spread, in terms of radioactive fallout, over a large part ofthe Middle East.All the safeguards of the Cold War era, which categorized the nuclear bomb as "a weapon of last resort" have been scrapped. "Offensive"

military actions using nuclear warheads are now described as acts of "self-defense".The distinction between tactical nuclear weapons and the

conventional battlefield arsenal has been blurred. America's newnuclear doctrine is based on "a mix of strike capabilities". The latter,which specifically applies to the Pentagon's planned aerial bombing ofIran, envisages the use of nukes in combination with conventional

weapons.

As in the case of the first atomic bomb , which in the words of President Harry Truman "wasdropped on Hiroshima, a military base", today's "mini-nukes" are heralded as "safe forthe surrounding civilian population".

Known in official Washington, as "Joint Publication 3-12", the new nuclear doctrine (Doctrine for Joint NuclearOperations , (DJNO) (March 2005)) calls for "integrating conventional and nuclear attacks" under a unified and"integrated" Command and Control (C2).

It largely describes war planning as a management decision-making process, where military and strategic objectives are to be achieved,through a mix of instruments, with little concern for the resulting loss ofhuman life.Military planning focuses on "the most efficient use of force" , -i.e. an optimalarrangement of different weapons systems to achieve stated military goals. In this context, nuclearand conventional weapons are considered to be "part of the tool box", fromwhich military commanders can pick and choose the instruments that they require in accordance with "evolvingcircumstances" in the war theater. (None of these weapons in the Pentagon's "tool box", including conventional

bunker buster bombs, cluster bombs, mini-nukes, chemical and biological weapons are described as "weaponsof mass destruction" when used by the United States of America and its coalition partners).The stated objective is to:

"ensure the most efficient use of force and provide US leaders with a broader range of [nuclear andconventional] strike options to address immediate contingencies. Integration of conventional and nuclear forcesis therefore crucial to the success of any comprehensive strategy. This integration will ensure optimal targeting,minimal collateral damage, and reduce the probability of escalation." (Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations p.JP 3-12-13)

The new nuclear doctrine turns concepts and realities upside down. It not onlydenies the devastating impacts of nuclear weapons, it states, in no uncertain terms, thatnuclear weapons are "safe" and their use in the battlefield will ensure


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"minimal collateral damage and reduce the probability of escalation". Theissue of radioactive fallout is barely acknowledged with regard to tactical nuclear weapons. These variousguiding principles which describe nukes as "safe for civilians" constitute a consensuswithin the military, which is then fed into the military manuals, providingrelevant "green light" criteria to geographical commanders in the

war theater."Defensive" and "Offensive" ActionsWhile the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review sets the stage for the preemptiveuse of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, specifically against Iran (see alsothe main PNAC document Rebuilding America`s Defenses, Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century )

The Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations goes one step further in blurring the distinction between "defensive" and "offensive" militaryactions:

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"The new triad offers a mix of strategic offensive and defensive capabilities that includes nuclear and non-nuclear strike capabilities, active and passive defenses, and a robust research, development, and industrial

infrastructure to develop, build, and maintain offensive forces and defensive systems ..." (Ibid) (key conceptsindicated in added italics)

The new nuclear doctrine, however, goes beyond preemptive acts of "self-defense", it calls for "anticipatory action" using nuclear weapons against a"rogue enemy" which allegedly plans to develop WMD at some undefinedfuture date:Responsible security planning requires preparation for threats that are possible, though perhaps unlikely today.

The lessons of military history remain clear: unpredictable, irrational conflicts occur. Military forces mustprepare to counter weapons and capabilities that exist or will exist in the near term even if no immediate likelyscenarios for war are at hand. To maximize deterrence of WMD use, it is essential US forces prepare to usenuclear weapons effectively and that US forces are determined to employ nuclear weapons if necessary to

prevent or retaliate against WMD use. (Ibid, p. III-1, italics added)

Nukes would serve to prevent a non-existent WMD program (e.g. Iran)prior to its development. This twisted formulation goes far beyond the premises of the 2001 NuclearPosture Review and NPSD 17. which state that the US can retaliate with nuclear weapons if attacked withWMD:"The United States will make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force including

potentially nuclear weapons to the use of [weapons of mass destruction] against the United States, our forcesabroad, and friends and allies." ... (NSPD 17)"Integration" of Nuclear and Conventional Weapons PlansThe Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations outlines the procedures governing the use of nuclear weapons andthe nature of the relationship between nuclear and conventional war operations.The DJNO states that the:"use of nuclear weapons within a [war] theater requires that nuclear and conventional plans be integrated to the

greatest extent possible"(DJNO, p 47 italics added, italics added, For further details see Michel Chossudovsky, Nuclear War againstIran, Jan 2006 )

The implications of this "integration" are far-reaching because once thedecision is taken by the Commander in Chief, namely the President of the United States, to

launch a joint conventional-nuclear military operation, there is a risk thattactical nuclear weapons could be used without requesting subsequentpresidential approval. In this regard, execution procedures under the jurisdictionof the theater commanders pertaining to nuclear weapons are described as"flexible and allow for changes in the situation":"Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for defining theater objectives and developing nuclear

plans required to support those objectives, including selecting targets. When tasked, CDRUSSTRATCOM, as asupporting combatant commander, provides detailed planning support to meet theater planning requirements.All theater nuclear option planning follows prescribed Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the timeframe permitted by the crisis..Since options do not exist for every scenario, combatant commanders must have a capability to perform crisisaction planning and execute those plans. Crisis action planning provides the capability to develop new options,or modify existing options, when current limited or major response options are inappropriate....Command, control, and coordination must be flexible enough to allow the geographic combatant commanderto strike time-sensitive targets such as mobile missile launch platforms." Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations

Doctrine (italics added)Theater Nuclear Operations (TNO)

While presidential approval is formally required to launch a nuclear war,geographic combat commanders would be in charge of Theater NuclearOperations (TNO), with a mandate not only to implement but also toformulate command decisions pertaining to nuclear weapons . ( Doctrine for Joint

Nuclear Operations Doctrine )

We are no longer dealing with "the risk" associated with "an accidental orinadvertent nuclear launch" as outlined by former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara ,


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but with a military decision-making process which provides militarycommanders, from the Commander in Chief down to the geographicalcommanders with discretionary powers to use tactical nuclear weapons .Moreover, because these "smaller" tactical nuclear weapons have been"reclassified" by the Pentagon as "safe for the surrounding civilian

population", thereby "minimizing the risk of collateral damage" , there areno overriding built-in restrictions which prevent their use. (See MichelChossudovsky, The Dangers of a Middle East Nuclear War , Global Research, February 2006) .

Once a decision to launch a military operation is taken (e.g. aerial strikeson Iran), theater commanders have a degree of latitude. What thissignifies in practice is once the presidential

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decision is taken, USSTRATCOM in liaison with theater commanders candecide on the targeting and type of weaponry to be used. Stockpiled

tactical nuclear weapons are now considered to be an integral part of thebattlefield arsenal. In other words, nukes have become "part of the toolbox", used in conventional war theaters.Planned Aerial Attacks on Iran

An operational plan to wage aerial attacks on Iran has been in "a state ofreadiness" since June 2005. Essential military hardware to wage thisoperation has been deployed. (For further details see Michel Chossudovsky, Nuclear War againstIran, Jan 2006 ).Vice President Dick Cheney has ordered USSTRATCOM to draft a "contingency plan", which "includes a large-scale air assault on Iran employing both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons." (Philip Giraldi, Attack onIran: Pre-emptive Nuclear War , The American Conservative, 2 August 2005).USSTRATCOM would have the responsibility for overseeing and coordinating this military deployment as well as launching the military operation. (For details, Michel Chossudovsky, Nuclear War against Iran, Jan 2006 ).In January 2005 a significant shift in USSTRATCOM's mandate was implemented. USSTRATCOM was identified as "the lead Combatant Command for integration and synchronization of DoD-wide efforts in combatingweapons of mass destruction." To implement this mandate, a brand new command unit entitled Joint Functional Component Command Space and Global Strike , or JFCCSGS was created.Overseen by USSTRATCOM, JFCCSGS would be responsible for the launching of military operations "using nuclear or conventional weapons" in compliance with the Bush administration's new nuclear doctrine. Bothcategories of weapons would be integrated i nto a "joint strike operation" under unified Command and Control.According to Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, writing in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,"The Defense Department is upgrading its nuclear strike plans to reflect new presidential guidance and a transition in war planning from the top-heavy Single Integrated Operational Plan of the Cold War to a family of smallerand more flexible strike plans designed to defeat today's adversaries. The new central strategic war plan is known as OPLAN (Operations Plan) 8044.... This revised, detailed plan provides more flexible options to assureallies, and dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat adversaries in a wider range of contingencies....One member of the new family is CONPLAN 8022, a concept plan for the quick use of nuclear, conventional, or information warfare capabilities to destroy--preemptively, if necessary--"time-urgent targets" anywhere in theworld. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld issued an Alert Order in early 2004 that directed the military to put CONPLAN 8022 into effect. As a result, the Bush administration's preemption policy is now operational onlong-range bombers, strategic submarines on deterrent patrol, and presumably intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)."The operational implementation of the Global Strike would be under CONCEPT PLAN (CONPLAN) 8022, which now consists of "an actual plan that the Navy and the Air Force translate into strike package for theirsubmarines and bombers,' (Japanese Economic Newswire, 30 December 2005, For further details see Michel Chossudovsky, Nuclear War against Iran, op. cit.).CONPLAN 8022 is 'the overall umbrella plan for sort of the pre-planned strategic scenarios involving nuclear weapons.''It's specifically focused on these new types of threats -- Iran, North Korea -- proliferators and potentially terrorists too,' he said. 'There's nothing that says that they can't use CONPLAN 8022 in limited scenarios againstRussian and Chinese targets.' (According to Hans Kristensen, of the Nuclear Information Project, quoted in Japanese Economic News Wire, op. cit.)Nuclear Weapons Deployment AuthorizationThe planning of the aerial bombings of Iran started in mid-2004, pursuant to the formulation of CONPLAN 8022 in early 2004. In May 2004, National Security Presidential Directive NSPD 35 entitled Nuclear WeaponsDeployment Authorization was issued.The contents of this highly sensitive document remains a carefully guarded State secret. There has been no mention of NSPD 35 by the media nor even in Congressional debates. While its contents remains classified, thepresumption is that NSPD 35 pertains to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Middle East war theater in compliance with CONPLAN 8022.In this regard, a recent press report published in Yeni Safak (Turkey) suggests that the United States is currently:"deploying B61-type tactical nuclear weapons in southern Iraq as part of a plan to hit Iran from this area if and when Iran responds to an Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities". (Ibrahim Karagul, "The US is Deploying NuclearWeapons in Iraq Against Iran", (Yeni Safak,. 20 December 2005, quoted in BBC Monitoring Europe).This deployment in Iraq appears to be pursuant to NSPD 35 ,What the Yenbi Safak report suggests is that conventional weapons would be used in the first instance, and if Iran were to retaliate in response to US-Israeli aerial attacks, tactical thermonuclear B61 weapons could then belaunched This retaliation using tactical nuclear weapons would be consistent with the guidelines contained in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and NSPD 17 (see above).Israel's Stockpiling of Conventional and Nuclear WeaponsIsrael is part of the military alliance and is slated to play a major role in the planned attacks on Iran. (For details see Michel Chossudovsky, Nuclear War against Iran, Jan 2006 ).Confirmed by several press reports, Israel has taken delivery, starting in September 2004 of some 500 US produced BLU 109 bunker buster bombs (WP, January 6, 2006). The first procurement order for BLU 109 [BombLive Unit] dates to September 2004. In April 2005, Washington confirmed that Israel was to take delivery of 100 of the more sophisticated bunker buster bomb GBU-28 produced by Lockheed Martin ( Reuters, April 26,2005). The GBU-28 is described as "a 5,000-pound laser-guided conventional munitions that uses a 4,400-pound penetrating warhead." It was used in the Iraqi war theater:The Pentagon [stated] that ... the sale to Israel of 500 BLU-109 warheads, [was] meant to "contribute significantly to U.S. strategic and tactical objectives." .Mounted on satellite-guided bombs, BLU-109s can be fired from F-15 or F-16 jets, U.S.-made aircraft in Israel's arsenal. This year Israel received the first of a fleet of 102 long-range F-16Is from Washington, its main ally."Israel very likely manufactures its own bunker busters, but they are not as robust a s the 2,000-pound (910 kg) BLUs," Robert Hewson, editor of Jane's Air-Launched Weapons, told Reuters. (Reuters, 21 September 2004)The report does not confirm whether Israel has stockpiled and deployed the thermonuclear version of the bunker buster bomb. Nor does it indicate whether the Israeli made bunker buster bombs are equipped with nuclearwarheads. It is worth noting that this stock piling of bunker buster bombs occurred within a few months after the Release of the NPSD 35 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization (May 2004).Israel possesses 100-200 strategic nuclear warheads . In 2003, Washington and Tel Aviv confirmed that they were collaborating in "the deployment of US-supplied Harpoon cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads inIsrael's fleet of Dolphin-class submarines." (The Observer, 12 October 2003) . In more recent developments, which coincide with the preparations of strikes against Iran, Israel has taken delivery of two new Germanproduced submarines "that could launch nuclear-armed cruise missiles for a "second-strike" deterrent." (Newsweek, 13 February 2006. See also CDI Data Base)Israel's tactical nuclear weapons capabilities are not knownIsrael's participation in the aerial attacks will also act as a political bombshell throughout the Middle East. It would contribute to escalation, with a war zone which could extend initially into Lebanon and Syria. The entireregion from the Eastern Mediterranean to Central Asia and Afghanistan's Western frontier would be affected..The Role of Western Europe

Several Western European countries, officially considered as "non-nuclear states", possess tactical nuclear weapons, supplied to them by Washington.

The US has supplied some 480 B61 thermonuclear bombs to five non-

nuclear NATO countries including Belgium, Germany, Italy, theNetherlands and Turkey, and one nuclear country, the United Kingdom. Casually disregarded by theVienna based UN Nuclear Watch, the US has actively contributed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons inWestern Europe.

As part of this European stockpiling, Turkey, which is a partner of theUS-led coalition against Iran along with Israel, possesses some 90

thermonuclear B61 bunker buster bombs at the Incirlik nuclear air

base . (National Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons in Europe , February 2005)

Consistent with US nuclear policy, the stockpiling and deployment of B61in Western Europe are intended for targets in the Middle East.

Moreover, in accordance with "NATO strike plans", thesethermonuclear B61 bunker buster bombs (stockpiled by the "non-nuclear States")could be launched "against targets in Russia or countries in the MiddleEast such as Syria andIran" ( quoted in National Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weaponsin Europe , February 2005)Moreover, confirmed by (partially) declassified documents (released under the U.S. Freedom of InformationAct):"arrangements were made in the mid-1990s to allow the use of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe outside the area ofresponsibility of U.S. European Command (EUCOM). As a result of these arrangements, EUCOM nowsupports CENTCOM nuclear missions in the Middle East, including, potentially, against Iran and Syria"


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(quoted in http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/nato.htm italics added)With the exception of the US, no other nuclear power "has nuclear weapons earmarked for delivery by non-nuclear countries." (National Resources Defense Council, op cit)

While these "non-nuclear states" casually accuse Tehran of developingnuclear weapons, without documentary evidence, they themselves havecapabilities of delivering nuclear warheads, which are targeted at Iran. Tosay that this is a clear case of "double standards" by the IAEA and the "international community" is a

understatement.


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NUCLEARPRESENCE 1AC

THIS LOGIC OF PREEMPTION WILL NEVER STOPTODAYS GLOBAL MILITARY VIOLENCE IS

STRUCTURED BY A SYSTEM OF FEAR WHICH MUST CONSTANTLY IDENTIFY AND DESTROY NEW

TARGETSTOKEEPUSPREEMPTIVELYSAFE

MASSUMI, PROFESSORATTHE EUROPEAN GRADUATE SCHOOL, 200 7 [BRIAN, POTENTIAL POLITICSANDTHE PRIMACYOF PREEMPTION, THEORY & EVENT10:2 | PROJECT MUSE]

Fear is always a good reason to go politically conditional. Fear is the palpable action in thepresent of a threatening future cause. It acts just as palpably whether thethreat is determinate or not. It weakens your resolve, creates stress, lowers consumer confidence,and may ultimately lead to individual and/or economic paralysis. To avoid the paralysis, whichwould make yourself even more of a target and carry the fear to evenhigher level, you must simply act. In Bush administration parlance, you "go kinetic."6 Youleap into action on a level with the potential that frightens you. You dothat, once again, by inciting the potential to take an actual shape you can

respond to. You trigger a production of what you fear. You turn theobjectively indeterminate cause into an actual effect so you can actuallydeal with it in some way. Any time you feel the need to act, then all youhave to do is actuate a fear. The production of the effect follows assmoothly as a reflex. This affective dynamic is still very much in place, independent of Rumsfeld'sindividual fate. It will remain in place as long as fear and remains politically actuatable.

The logic of preemption operates on this affective plane, in thisproliferative or ontogenetic way: in away that contributes to the reflexproduction of the specific being of the threat. You're afraid Iraq is abreeding ground for terrorists? It could have been. If it could have been, itwould have been. So go ahead, make it one . "Bring 'em on," the President said, followingHollywood-trained reflex. He knew it in his "guts." He couldn't have gone wrong. His reflex was right. Because

"now we can all agree" that Iraq is in actual fact a breeding ground for "terrrorists". That just goes to prove thatthe potential was always there. Before, there was doubt in some quarters that Saddam had to be removed from

power. Some agreed he had to go, some didn't. Now we can all agree. It was right to remove him because doingso made Iraq become what it a lways could have been. And that's the truth.

Truth, in this new world order, is by nature retroactive. Fact growsconditionally in the affective soil of an indeterminately present futurity. Itbecomes objective as that present reflexively plays out, as a effect of thepreemptive action taken. The reality-based community wastes time studying empirical reality, theBushites said: "we create it." And because of that, "we" the preemptors will alwaysbe right. We always will have been right to preempt, because we have objectively produced a recursivetruth-effect for your judicious study. And while you are looking back studying thetruth of it, we will have acted with reflex speed again, effecting a new

reality. 7 We will always have had no choice but to prosecute the "war onterror," ever more vigilantly and ever more intensely on every potentialfront. We, preemptors, are the producers of your world. Get used to it.The War in Iraq is a success to the extent that it made the productivity ofthe preemptive "war on terror" a self-perpetuating movement. Even if theUS were to withdraw from Iraq tomorrow, the war would have tocontinue on other fronts no matter who controls Congress or who is in the White House. It

would have to continue in Afghanistan, for example, where the assymetrical tactics perfected in


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Iraq are now being applied to renew the conflict there. Or in Iran, which also always could

have/would have been a terrorist breeding ground . Or it could morph and moveto the Mexican-US border, itself morphed into a distributed frontline proliferating throughout the territory in

the moving form of "illegal immigration". On the indefinite Homeland Security front ofa protieform war, who knows what threats may be spinelessly incubatingwhere, abetted by those who lack the "backbone" to go kinetic.Preemption is like deterrence in that it combines a proprietary epistemology with a unique ontology in such away as to make present a future cause that sets a self-perpetuating movement into operation. Itsdifferences from deterrence hinge on its taking objectively indeterminateor potential threat as its self-constitutive cause rather than fully formed

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and specified threat. It situates itself on the ground of ontogeneticpotential.There, rather than deterring the feared effect, it actualizes the potential in a shape to which it hopes it can

respond. It assumes a proliferation of potential threats, and mirrors that

capacity in its own operation. It becomes proliferative . It assumes the objectiveimbalance of a far-from-equilibrium state as a permanent condition. Rather than trying to right the imbalance, itseizes it as an opportunity for itself. Preemption also sets a race in motion. But this is a race run on the edge ofchaos. It is a race of movement-flushing, detection, perception, and affective actuation, run in irreparably

chaotic or quasi-chaotic conditions. The race of preemption has any number of laps,each ending in the actual effecting of a threat. Each actualization of athreat triggers the next lap, as a continuation of the first in the samedirection, or in another way in a different field.Deterrence revolved around an objective cause. Preemption revolvesaround a proliferative effect. Both are operative logics. The operative logic ofdeterrence, however, remained causal even as it displaced its cause's effect. Preemption is an effectiveoperative logic rather than a causal operative logic. Since its ground is potential, there is no

actual cause for it to organize itself around. It compensates for the absence of an actualcause by producing an actual effect in its place. This it makes the motor of its movement: it converts an absentor virtual cause really, directly into a taking-actual-effect. It does this affectively. It uses affect to effectively

trigger a virtual causality.8 Preemption is when the futurity of unspecified threat isaffectively held in the present in a perpetual state of potentialemergence(y) so that a movement of actualization may be triggered that isnot only self-propelling but also effectively, indefinitely, ontologicallyproductive, because it works from a virtual cause whose potential nosingle actualization exhausts.Preemption's operational parameters mean that is never univocal. It operates in the element of vagueness andobjective uncertainty. Due to its proliferative nature, it cannot be monolithic. Its logic cannot close in around itsself-causing as the logic deterrence does. It includes an essential openness in its productive logic.9 It incites itsadversary to take emergent form. It then strives to become as proteiform as its ever-emergent adversary can be.

It is as shape-shifting as it is self-driving. It infiltrates across boundaries, sweeping up existing formations in itsown transversal movement. Faced with gravity-bound formations too inertial for it to sweep up and carry offwith its own operative logic, it contents itself with opening windows of opportunity to pass through. This is thecase with the domestic legal and juridical structure in the US. It can't sweep that away. But it can build into thatstructure escape holes for itself. These take the form of formal provisions vastly expanding the power of theexecutive, in the person of the president in his role as commander-in-chief, to declare states of exception whichsuspend the normal legal course in order to enable a continued flow of preemptive action.10

Preemption stands for conflict unlimited: the potential for peace

amended to become a perpetual state of undeclared war. This is the"permanent state of emergency" so presciently described by Walter Benjamin. In current Bush administration

parlance, it has come to be called "Long War" replacing the Cold War: a

preemptive war with an in-built tendency to be never-ending .


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NUCLEARPRESENCE 1AC

THE NORMALIZATION OF PREEMPTION WILL MAKE THEBIOPOLITICALCONTROL OF LIFE TOTAL

FREEDOMWILLBEVIOLENTLYELIMINATEDINASTATEOFABSOLUTEWAR

GOH, VISITING FELLOW AT HARVARD, 200 6 [IRVING, DISAGREEING PREEMPTIVE/ PROPHYLAXIS:FROM PHILIP K. DICK TO JACQUES RANCIRE, FAST CAPITALISM 2.1,HTTP://WWW.UTA.EDU/HUMA/AGGER/ FASTCAPITALISM/2_1/GOH.HTML]

Wait At present, the time of the preemptive presents the targeted bodywithout the chance, or the right, to offer a counter-hypothesis, so as toprove the preemptive erroneous. The targeted body of the preemptive is not offered, and cannot offer, aprophylaxis contra the preemptive so as to delay the elimination of the right to be alive. Inother words, in the staging of the preemptive, there is no space fordisagreement. His or her speech, phone or logosthe desperate cries (phone) of denial of any(future) wrongdoing; or the cries of injustice of a treatment towards another human being, articulatedin a linguistic idiom rational and intelligible (logos); and the cries to surrender(including deferring one's owninnocence for the sake of one's safety)no longer matters. It is no longer heard, as in the case of the preemptiveshooting in Miami. Even silence is not heard either, as in the case of the London shooting . The rush of apreemptive is a sonic barrage that drowns out any (silent) voice that seeksto defer it.The gap opened by a suspected body between itself and the lawthat promises the security of the territory is already too great. The law andits need to secure a terrifying peace cannot bear the widening or delayingof that interval by a further demand of a disagreeing counter-hypothesis orauto-prophylaxis.

To allow the normalization of the fatal preemptive would be to

institute the legitimization of an absolute or extreme biopolitics. Accordingto Foucault, biopolitics is the control and management of individualbodies by the State through technics of knowledge (usually through surveillance) of thosesame bodies. In a biopolitical situation, the State holds the exceptional power todetermine either the right to let live or make die the individual belonging to the State.Should the preemptive become a force of reason of contemporary life, onewould terribly risk submitting the freedom of life and therefore anunconditional right to be alive to a biopolitical capture, handing over theright to let die to the State police and military powers. It would be asituation of abdicatingthe body as a totally exposed frontier of absolutewar. For in the constant exposure of the imminent preemptive, the body atany timewhen decided upon by military or police powers to be asecurity threatbecomes the point in which the space and time ofconductibility of war collapse in a total manner.The preemptive reducesthe body to a total space of absolute war.Virilio has suggested thattheabsolute destruction of an enemyin war is procured when the enemy canno longer hypothesize an alternate if not counter route ortrajectory (of escape or counter-attack)from impending forces (1990: 17). In the sequence of executing the preemptive to itsresolute end, the escaping body faces that same threat of zero hypothesis.There is no chance for that body to think (itself) outside the vorticalpreemptive. Preemptive bullets into the head would take away that chanceof hypothesis.


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A spectral figure begins to haunt the scene now. And that is the figure ofthehomo sacer, who according to Agamben's analysis, is the one who in ancient times is killed without his or her death

being a religious sacrifice, and the one whose killers are nonindictable of homicide. This figure is also the signpar excellence of the absolute biopolitical capture of life by the State, inwhich the decision to let live and make die is absolutely managed and

decided by the State, and thereby the right to be alive is no longer the factof freedom of existence for the homo sacer(Agamben 1998). For the right to bealive to be secured in any real sense from any political capture, for it to bemaintained and guaranteed as and for the future of the human, the bodycannot be allowed to return to this figure of the homo sacer. But victims ofthe preemptive irrepressibly recall the figure of the homo sacer. In the currentlegal proceedings of the London shooting, it has not been the fact that the police officers shot an innocent Brazilian that theywill be charged. That charge remains absent. The charge of homicide against the officers remains elliptical. Instead, the plan has

been to charge them for altering the police log book to conceal the fact that they had mistakenly identified the victim as a terrorsuspect.


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NUCLEARPRESENCE 1AC

Thus we present the following plan: The United States

federal government should remove its tactical nuclear

weapons from Turkey. We claim the right to fiat and toclarify intent.

CONTENTION TWO: NUCLEARABSENCE

VOTING AFFIRMATIVE REOPENS THE SPACE OF DISAGREEMENT AGAINST THE CLOSED LOGIC OF

PREEMPTION OUR PLAN INTERRUPTS THE CONSENSUS FOR PREEMPTION GROWING AROUND THE

NEWMISSIONOFTACTICALNUCLEARWEAPONS

GOH, VISITING FELLOW AT HARVARD, 200 6 [IRVING, DISAGREEING PREEMPTIVE/ PROPHYLAXIS:

FROM PHILIP K. DICK TO JACQUES RANCIRE,FAST CAPITALISM

2.1,HTTP://WWW.UTA.EDU/HUMA/AGGER/ FASTCAPITALISM/2_1/GOH.HTML]For a critical response to the preemptive, such that a counter-hypothesisto disprove the preemptive is thinkable, such that no profiling politics ofhomo sacer is resurrected, and such that a right to be alive unconditionallyremains thinkable or remains open and free to thought, one needs to openthe space of disagreement with it and resist it, even though the State

cannot bear such an intervalbetween its preemptive law for territorialsecurity and the interruption of a disagreement . One nonetheless has tointerrupt the preemptive in overdrive to allow the counter-hypothesis or its

prophylaxis to surface or arrive; or, one has to interrupt the prophylaxis when it

precipitates into a destructive preemptive.And one cannot allow

this reserve

of the prophylaxis in contradistinction with the deadly preemptive to be the sole

domain or hidden property of exceptional power. It cannot be deferredto be the decision and the enclosed time of reading of power. That is in fact theaporia of the prophylaxis in the text of Minority Report. John Anderton comes to realize that the prophylaxis ofhim not being a criminal-to-come is possible only because only he, as a figure of sovereign power, as the chiefof "precrime" operations, has access to this strategic information. It is a privileged access, exceptional only tohim, and not to the others, the other common beings that do not personify the figure of law and thereforealready arrested for a crime they have not (yet) commit. Only John Anderton can be offered the prophylaxis(provided he chooses to want to read it), and only he can offer a prophylaxis. As he admits at the end of the text,"My case was unique, since I had access to the [prophylaxis] data. It could happen againbut only to the nextPolice Commissioner" (Dick 1997:353). But the sending and the offering of the prophylaxis cannot remain as

the exceptional reserve of figures of law. It must arrive from the other side of the law,arriving as the disagreement with the preemptive, and it must be listened

to. This disagreement will be the time that holds back if not delays thepreemptive so that a prophylaxis can come into negotiation with it.Disagreement here will be the enunciation of wait in response to thepreemptive. Indeed, wait is the word in Spielberg's adaptation upon which is hinged the critical durationthat offers the prophylaxis that will be the counter-hypothesis to the deadly preemptive. John Anderton gets aninitial glimpse of the value of holding back a second before rushing to the crime-scene-to-come, when acounter-check on the information of the address of the criminal-to-be shows it as obsolete. Finally arriving atthe right address, John Anderton proceeds to arrest the criminal-to-be, ignoring the cries of "wait" of the latter

perhaps because he has not committed any crime yet, or perhaps he did not intend to follow through the acthe thought he would commit. Anderton then, as the leader of the "precrime" task force, of course does not wait.


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But the critical value of wait and its offering of a prophylaxis or counter-hypothesis against the preemptivebegin to turn on John Anderton when his image and name appear as the future perpetrator of a future crime. Hethen understands the value of the enunciation of wait to disarticulate the accelerated judgment of the "precogs"

and to secure his right to be alive against the preemptive force of "precrime." But as said, wait cannot be thesole remainder of sovereignty. Wait must also arrive from the side of the one without power but under threat of

the preemptive. And it must be heard, and received by the forces of law deliveringthe preemptive. Wait might be an untimely word for the speed of thepreemptive. "There is little time to waste," as the police chiefs of the United States proclaim in consensus(New York Times. 25 July 2005). But wait is not insignificant refuse, ready to beabandoned absolutely in no time, if its act of refusal of the deadly speed ofthe preemptive in fact

(Continues)


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proves the preemptive wrong or that it offers another possibilityunthinkable to the preemptive and thereby keeps open the chance for the

right to be alive. Wait, in negotiation if not in disagreement with the speedof the preemptive, is that interruption, that possible chance and prophylaxis forthe right to be alive, by saying that there is something not totally rightabout the preemptive.5.An international organization representing police chiefs has broadened its policy for the use of deadly force bytelling officers to shoot suspected suicide bombers in the head.

Washington Post, as cited in Reuters. 04 August 2005.They should not be exterminating people unjustly. [2]

"Ban 'Shoot-to-Kill, Urge Family." BBC News. 27 July 2005.

The articulation of wait cannot be more urgent today. It must bepronouncedly reiterated, in disagreement with the deadly preemptive,before the latter becomes a "necessary" global security condition of livingin the world today. The deadly preemptive without chance for a counterhypothetic

prophylaxis being offered must be resisted against its gaining momentum toprocure a global consensual, legal status. And even if it is already in theprocess of being legalized or normalized as a contemporary fact or "necessity" of life in thistwenty-first century of insecurity, it still has to be disagreed with. According to Rancire,consensus is arrived at from a striated observation of the real. The realtoday is a situation in which terror is surprising major cities and cities thought to

be defensible against if not impenetrable to such surprises in ever greater media visibility and spectacle. Toprevent more of these terrifying surprises (mediatising themselves) elsewhere, orsuch that second surprises will not tear apart the same city, thedetermination has been to short-circuit the possible dissemination of suchterror at whatever cost. And this is where the preemptive has come in, theonly possible measure to erase the slightest shadow of the next surprise . Itcannot take chances. There is no chance for the counter-hypothesis. The real "isthe absorption of all reality and all truth in the category of the only thingpossible" (Rancire 1999:132). This is the real through which the consensus onthe preemptive is or will be reached . The consensus is that "which asserts, in allcircumstances, that it is only doing the only thing possible to do" (ibid.). The aggregation of the striated

observation of the real, the "only thing possible to do," and consensus, is the final collapse ofthinking of another trajectory of the future of the real, the erasure of theexposition of what is unthinkable or impossible that will falsify the future of "the onlything possible to do."


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NUCLEARPRESENCE 1AC

THIS SPACE OF INTERRUPTION IS NOT JUST AN ABSTRACT ONEREMOVING TACTICAL NUCLEAR

WEAPONS ALLOWS FOR TURKEY TO REPLACE THE AMERICAN LOGIC OF PREEMPTION WITH

DIPLOMACYANDCOOPERATION

LAMOND & INGRAM, BRITISH-AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL, 200 9 [CLAUDINE &PAUL, POLITICSAROUND US TACTICALNUCLEARWEAPONS INHOSTSTATES, BASIC GETTINGTOZERO PAPERS, NO. 11, JANUARY 23, HTTP://WWW.BASICINT.ORG/GTZ/GTZ11.PDF, P. 4]

Turkey

There is a rising sentiment amongst the population for the removal of USnuclear weapons from Turkish territory. In a recent survey,20 more than half therespondents stated that they are against nuclear weapons being stationed in Turkey. Almost 60% of the Turkish

population would support a government request to remove the nuclear weapons from their country, and 72%

said they would support an initiative to make Turkey a nuclear-free zone.21 There may be several causesbehind this sentiment, including the Iraq War, Turkish relations withneighboring states, budget expenditure and the moral concern over nuclear

weapons. The historic precedence of Greece, a NATO member and Turkeys historic rival, ending itscommitment to nuclear sharing in NATO may have further strengthened this tendency.There have been public expressions of resentment towards the US militarypresence in Turkey ever since the lead up to the US war with Iraq. The UnitedStates insisted on the government allowing American troops to use Turkey as a staging post, despiteoverwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion. Limited permission was granted after heavydebates and delay in the Turkish parliament.

Turkeys location has added an element of both risk and opportunity to NATO nuclear sharing. Turkeys close proximity to states deemedpotentially hostile, such as Iran and Syria, make Turkey a preferred

NATO base for TNWs. The risk, of course, is that stationing TNWs in Turkeymight provoke a pre-emptive strike upon NATO bases. Turkish

parliamentarians have expressed to NATO the difficulty of explainingthecontinued presence of US TNWs on Turkish territory to Muslim and

Arab neighbors. There is a fear that they undermine Turkeys cleardiplomatic objectives to act as a mediator within the region.

Turkey has a unique opportunity to play a positive role in promoting non-proliferation. Ending nuclear sharing and fully complying with the NPT would actas a powerful example to neighboring states and strengthen Turkeys

legitimacy. Moreover, efforts by the Turkish government to play a leadingrole in the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destructionwould receive overwhelming public support.22


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NUCLEARPRESENCE 1AC

AND, CHALLENGING THESE WEAPONS MUST BEGIN WITH TURKEYOTHERWISE, TURKEY WILL

SIMPLYBECOMETHEREPOSITORYOF ALL TACTICALNUCLEARWEAPONS

TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, M.A. IN PUBLIC POLICYAND ADMINISTRATIONAT UMASS-AMHERST, 20 10[ANNA, A STEP CLOSERTOA WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEARWEAPONS, COSMOPOLITAN REVIEW2.1,HTTP:// COSMOPOLITANREVIEW.COM/ARTICLES/56-2010-SPRING-VOL-2-NO1/201-A-STEP-CLOSER-TO-A-WORLD-WITHOUT-NUCLEAR-WEAPONS]

Although nuclear disarmament has long appeared to be a dream of far leftist idealists and religious scholars, thepast few years have shown significant political support for, as U.S. President Barack Obama called it in hisPrague speech, a world without nuclear weapons. Unlikely former U.S. hawks have argued that internationalsecurity threats are no longer dominated by a cold-war paradigm, but instead by terrorists, proliferation, andnon-state actors; nuclear deterrence as a strategy is increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective and theworld should pursue complete nuclear disarmament. Leaders from across the world have echoed Obamassentiment and pledged to work towards a world without nuclear weapons. While promoters of disarmamenthave been in favor of the current U.S. and Russian negotiations on a new START treaty, many are hoping for anew focus once Start is ratified: tactical nuclear weapons.

Since the 1950s, NATO has deployed U.S. owned tactical nuclear

weapons (TNW) and their accompanying delivery vehicles at bases inEurope. Short-range missiles developed during the Cold War for use during in-theater conventional battlesituations, TNW are non-strategic in the sense that they dont provide strategic deterrence; they are militarilydistinct from strategic missiles which are thought to provide a guarantee of mutually assured destruction.During the Cold War, it was thought that these short range TNWs would provide a ladder of escalation infighting should combat take place on European soil. NATO did not have the conventional weaponry necessaryto rebuke a Russian ground invasion of Western Europe, and would have been able to employ these sub-strategic TNW in conventional warfare while limiting the conflict from escalating to full-blown internationalnuclear war.At the height of deployment there were over 7,000 U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Due to major reductions,including the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991, today there are only between 150-200 TNW that arestationed at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey. Many experts argue that TNW nolonger provide any military or strategic purpose for NATO but instead maintain symbolic security guarantees

between the U.S. and European NATO allies. At the beginning of February, Polish Foreign Minister RadekSikorski and Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt published an op-ed in the New York Times calling for newnegotiated reductions for both U.S. and Russian TNW. This call was supported by a letter to NATO Secretary

General Rasmussen penned by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs for Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, TheNetherlands, and Norway, asking for the topic to be discussed at the upcoming meeting in Tallinn.Following the calls from European leaders to move towards a more focused discussion on the possibility ofreducing or removing TNW from Europe, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has stated that discussions on

NATOs nuclear policy and posture will continue up until the NATO summit in November when a newstrategic concept will be approved. Though this sounds promising for proponents of disarmament, Rasmussenalso emphasized practicality and that as long as nuclear weapons exist, it would be wise to have and maintain anuclear capacity as part of a credible deterrence.

NATO will likely look to the U.S. for leadership on this issue . Althoughthere have been rumors that the Obama Administration is interested in reducing the role of nuclear weapons in

NATOs mission, conservative domestic politics will continue to stress the importance of nuclear deterrenceand indivisible security guarantees within NATO. Conservatives in the U.S. are also concerned about securityissues for the Baltic States and some Eastern European states that have expressed their desire for continued

NATO TNW deployment to strategically balance Russias increased revanchism. Additionally, neitherItaly nor Turkey have expressed their desire to have the nukes removed

from their bases; some suspect that the presence of TNW in Turkey is what has prevented them fromdeveloping their own nuclear weapons technology to counterbalance the growing threat of neighboring Iran.

Advocates for removing TNW from Europe should be careful not to pushtheir agenda too quickly; if European leadership requests immediateremoval of TNW at the same time that an increasing threat of a nuclearIran creates more conservative domestic pressure in the U.S., Europeansmay find themselves with TNW being moved from Germany,

Luxembourg, and Belgium to the Incirlik base in Turkey , a situation


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which could be more dangerous and less helpful to the overall goals of

disarmament than a maintenance of the status quo would have been .

In Western Europe, TNW are militarily fairly useless, but in Turkeysrelative proximity to Iran, TNW may begin to be included in strategic

planning once again . As NATO deliberates, caution and tact is advised,

less disarmament advocates are left to shake their heads and repeat the oldadage, Be careful what you wish for ... CR


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NUCLEARPRESENCE 1AC

AND, CHALLENGING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS SPILLS OVER TO BROADER ACTION AGAINST

NUCLEARVIOLENCEITWILLSETTHEDISARMAMENTFRAMEFORFUTURENUCLEARPOLICIES

KELLEHER& WARREN, 200 9, PROFESSOROF PUBLIC POLICYATTHE UNIVERSITYOF MARYLAND &EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF GENERATION CITIZEN [BY CATHERINE M. KELLEHER AND SCOTT L.WARREN, GETTING TO ZERO STARTS HERE: TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OCTOBER,HTTP://WWW. ARMSCONTROL.ORG/ACT/2009_10/KELLEHER]

A critical debate on nuclear weapons is once again in the limelight. PresidentBarack Obama has unequivocally, ambitiously, and repeatedly stated hisultimate vision of a world without nuclear weapons . Under the Obamapolicy, zero nuclear weapons46 is, for the first time in U.S. history, anoperational, tangible U.S. policy goal and thus a measuring stick againstwhich to judge a host of shorter-range, less ambitious initiatives or

actions.[1]

Obama has acknowledged that the goal will not be reached during his presidency, and probably not even duringhis lifetime. Nevertheless, it is a dramatic move, probably the most dramatic foreign policy commitment in aprincipally domestic presidential agenda.

The question ofhow to reduce or eliminate tactical nuclear weapons

should be (and, Obama experts promise, will be) among the first in this ambitious

campaign, once an agreement extending the logic and verification protocols of START is reached. Anagreement to extend key provisions of the treaty, at least on an interim basis, will have to be reached by the time

the current treaty expires December 5. A formal agreement is expected to follow early next year. Tacticalnuclear weapons are an important priority partly because of theirseemingly easy solution, but also because the challenges they present areemblematic of those in the larger arms control debate.


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NUCLEARPRESENCE 1AC

FINALLY, PUBLIC DEBATE IS KEYCHALLENGING THE PLANNING OF PREEMPTIVE WARS AGAINST

IRANANDOTHERSSHIFTSTHEDEBATEANDEXPOSESMILITARISMTO INDIVIDUALANDCOLLECTIVE

CHANGE

CHOSSUDOVSKY, PROFESSOROF ECONOMICSATTHE UNIVERSITYOF OTTAWA, 200 6 [MICHAEL, ISTHE BUSH ADMINISTRATION PLANNING A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST? WILL THE US LAUNCH "MINI-

NUKES" AGAINST IRAN IN RETALIATION FOR TEHRAN'S "NON-COMPLIANCE"? GLOBAL RESEARCH,FEBRUARY 22, HTTP://WWW. GLOBALRESEARCH.CA/INDEX.PHP?CONTEXT=VA&AID=2032]

The World is at a Critical Cross-roadsIt is not Iran which is a threat to global security but the United States of America and Israel.

In recent developments, Western European governments --including the so-

called "non-nuclear states" which possess nuclear weapons-- have joined the bandwagon. In

chorus, Western Europe and the member states of the Atlantic

alliance (NATO ) have endorsed the US-led military initiative against

Iran.

The Pentagon's planned aerial attacks on Iran involve "scenarios" usingboth nuclear and conventional weapons . While this does not imply the use of nuclearweapons, the potential danger of a Middle East nuclear holocaust must,nonetheless,be taken seriously . It must become a focal point of the antiwarmovement, particularly in the United States, Western Europe, Israel and

Turkey.It should also be understood that China and Russia are (unofficially) allies of Iran, supplying them withadvanced military equipment and a sophisticated missile defense system. It is unlikely that China and Russiawill take on a passive position if and when the aerial bombardments are carried out.

The new preemptive nuclear doctrine calls for the "integration" of"defensive" and "offensive" operations. Moreover, the importantdistinction between conventional and nuclear weapons has been blurred..

From a military standpoint, the US and its coalition partners including Israeland Turkey are in "a state of readiness."

Through media disinformation, the objective is to galvanize Westernpublic opinion in support of a US-led war on Iran in retaliation for Iran'sdefiance of the international community.War propaganda consists in "fabricating an enemy" while conveying theillusion that the Western World is under attack by Islamic terrorists, whoare directly supported by the Tehran government."Make the World safer", "prevent the proliferation of dirty nuclear devicesby terrorists", "implement punitive actions against Iran to ensure thepeace". "Combat nuclear proliferation by rogue states"...

Supported by the Western media, a generalized atmosphere of racism andxenophobia directed against Muslims has unfolded, particularly inWestern Europe, which provides a fake legitimacy to the US war agenda.The latter is upheld as a "Just War". The "Just war" theory serves tocamouflage the nature of US war plans, while providing a human face tothe invaders.What can be done?The antiwar movement is in many regards divided and misinformed on the nature of the US military agenda.Several non-governmental organizations have placed the blame on Iran, for not complying with the "reasonable


23/29

demands" of the "international community". These same organizations, which are committed to World Peacetend to downplay the implications of the proposed US bombing of Iran.

To reverse the tide requires a massive campaign of networking andoutreach to inform people across the land, nationally and internationally,in neighborhoods, workplaces, parishes, schools, universities,municipalities, on the dangers of a US sponsored war, which contemplates

the use of nuclear weapons. The message should be loud and clear: Iran is not the threat. Evenwithout the use of nukes, the proposed aerial(Continues)


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bombardments could result in escalation, ultimately leading us into a broader war in the Middle East.

Debate and discussion must also take place within the Military andIntelligence community, particularly with regard to the use of t acticaln uclear w eapons, within the corridors of the US Congress, inmunicipalities and at all levels of government . Ultimately, the legitimacyof the political and military actors in high office must be challenged.The corporate media also bears a heavy responsibility for the cover-up of US sponsored war crimes. It must also

be forcefully challenged for its biased coverage of the Middle East war.For the past year, Washington has been waging a "diplomatic arm twisting" exercise with a view to enlistingcountries into supporting of its military agenda. It is essential that at the diplomatic level, countries in theMiddle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America take a firm stance against the US military agenda.Condoleezza Rice has trekked across the Middle East, "expressing concern over Iran's nuclear program",seeking the unequivocal endorsement of the governments of the region against Tehran. Meanwhile the Bushadministration has allocated funds in support of Iranian dissident groups within Iran.

What is needed is to break the conspiracy of silence, expose the media liesand distortions, confront the criminal nature of the US Administration and of those governmentswhich support it, its war agenda as well as its so-called "Homeland Security agenda" which has alreadydefined the contours of a police State.

The World is at the crossroads of the most serious crisis in modern history.The US has embarked on a military adventure, "a long war", whichthreatens the future of humanity .

It is essential to bring the US war project to the forefront of political debate , particularly in NorthAmerica and Western Europe. Political and military leaders who are opposed to the war must take a firm stance, from within their

respective institutions. Citizens must take a stance individually and collectively against war

FOCUSING ON TACTICAL WEAPONS ADVANCEMENTS ARE KEYNEW STRATEGIC SYSTEMS ARE

ALWAYS CHALLENGED, BUT SMALLER WEAPONS GO UNNOTICEDMOST LIKELY SCENARIO FOR

NUCLEARWAR

RAJARAMAN, PROFESSOROF THEORETICAL PHYSICSAT JNU, 200 2 [R., BANBATTLEFIELDNUCLEARWEAPONS, 4/22/2, THE HINDU, HTTP://WWW.HINDUONNET.COM/THEHINDU/2002/04/22/STORIES/2002042200431000.HTM]

Whatever military advantage tactical sub-kiloton weapons may offer, it isnot worth the price of destroying the time-tested psychological barrierblocking the road to nuclear holocaust .THE NOTION of using tactical nuclear weapons as just another piece ofarsenalin waging war, rather than as a deterrent against nuclear attacks, has startedrearing its head again. During the Afghan offensive, the U.S. Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld,when asked whether the U.S. planned to use tactical nuclear weapons to "flush

out" the Taliban and Al-Qaeda members from their shelters, would not rule out such contingencyplans. In the event, no nuclear weapons were used in Afghanistan, but one cannot remain sanguine about the prospects ofsuch reticence in future conflicts if one goes by the recent disclosures of a "Nuclear Posture Review" document prepared by thePentagon. The document reportedly recommends contingency plans to use tactical nuclear weapons not just in retaliationagainst biological or chemical weapons but even in the event of surprising military developments. Stronger, nuclear tippedearth-penetrating weapons are also on the anvil. In the words of a nuclear arms expert, all this "makes nuclear weapons a toolfor fighting a war rather than deterring it".

It is vital to register strong worldwide opposition to the use of suchweapons . In countries fortunate enough not to possess them already, such as India and Pakistan, there should be amutually agreed ban on their development.
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htmhttp://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/%202002042200431000.htm


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At first sight, a call for opposing the less potent tactical weapons may seemsilly in a world which already has loads of giant nuclear bombs going up to themulti-megaton range. Historically, the branching out of weapon builders into smallertactical bombs has taken place relatively unopposed. As the initial arsenalof 15-20 kiloton fission bombs of the type used in Hiroshima gradually grew to include "hydrogen" (fusion)

bombs running into megatons in TNT equivalent, each stage of this growth was met withalarm and protest by anti-nuclear activists. But somewhere along the linestarted a parallel development of smaller "tactical" nuclear weapons,originally intended for use in Europe should conflicts flare up between the NATO and Soviet blocs, far away from the Cold War principals. Advocates of suchbattlefield nuclear weapons argue that with theirrelatively low yield they neednot be viewed as such horrendous things since they would not causesignificantly more damage than a barrage of giant conventional bombs. But there are very sound reasons fo r vigilantly opposing these battlefield nuclearweapons which pose a grave danger of a different sort , no matter how low their yield.That danger stems from opening, after a very long gap, the nuclear Pandora's box. Itshould be remembered that

subsequent to thetwo atom

bombs dropped on Japanin rapid

succession at the end of World War II, there has been no known incidence of nuclearweaponusage except for tests. This despite the fact that the nuclear arsenals have grownfrom a handful of weapons in the hands of the Americans to tens ofthousands of far morepowerful bombs spread among a half a dozen countries. It is not as if therehas been a shortage of major conflicts involving countries possessingnuclear weapons. We have had , among others, the Korean War , the Vietnam war, theSoviet war in Afghanistan , the Iraqi war , the Sino-Soviet borderskirmishes and most pertinently for us, the Kargil conflict . Some of these were longdrawn out wars with heavy casualties. The U.S. in Vietnam and theSoviets in Afghanistan had to bear the ignominy of losing the wars tosmaller and technologically less developed

(Continues)


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SOLVENCY: TACTICAL WEAPONS KEY(Continues)

antagonists. One might have imagined that under such severecircumstances nations would employ all available weapons in their powerto turn

defeat into victory. Yet, none of these countries used a nuclear bomb evenonce.There were a variety ofdifferent reasons behind each of these examples ofabstinence from using nuclear weapons. But one major common factorcontributing to all of them has been an ingrained terror of nucleardevastation. The well documented images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, theawesome photographs of giant mushroom clouds emerging from nucleartests in the Pacific and the numerous movies based on nuclearArmageddon scenarios have all contributed to building up a deep rootedfear of nuclear weapons. This is not limited just to the abhorrence felt byanti-nuclear activists. It permeates to one extent or anotherthe psyche of all but themost pathological of fanatics. It colours the calculations, even if notdecisively, of the most hardened ofmilitary strategists. The unacceptabilityof nuclear devastation is the backbone of all deterrence strategies. There isnot just a fear of being attacked oneself, but also a strong mental barrieragainst actually initiating nuclear attacks on enemy populations, no matterhow much they may be contemplated in war games and strategies. As aresult a taboo has tacitly evolved over the decades preventing nations , at leastso far, from actually pressing the nuclear button even in the face of seriousmilitary crises.It is this taboo which will be broken if battlefield nuclear weapons, however small, begin to be used.Once the line dividing nuclear weapons and conventional bombs is crossed , it will

become acceptable to use "baby nukes" and the radiation deaths that go with it. A gradual erosion of thefeeling ofabhorrence against nuclear weapons is bound to occur. The use of asub-kiloton artillery shell in battle by one country will elicit a similar response withpossibly a heavier yield weapon, if not in the same war, somewhere else.The ante will keep going up till eventually the use of bigger multi-kilotonand megaton weapons would be contemplated more seriously as realisticmilitary alternatives. The single largest universal deterrent against nuclearholocaust will be lost forever.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE THE MOST VIOLENTTHEY MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AN

EVERYDAYPATHOLOGYOFTHENUCLEARSYSTEM

ZIZEK, SENIOR RESEARCHER, INSTITUTEOF SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITYOF LJUBLJANA, 200 2 [SLAVOJ,WELCOMETOTHEDESERTOFTHEREAL!, P. 108-109]ALONG THE SAME LINES, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DISCERN WHAT IS REALY NEW IN THE LIST OF

SEVENSTATESCONSIDEREDBYTHE USA TOBETHEPOTENTIALTARGETOFITSNUCLEARWEAPONS

(NOTONLY IRAQ, IRANAND NORTH KOREA, BUTALSO CHINAAND RUSSIA): ITISNOTTHELISTAS

SUCHWHICHISPROBLEMATIC, BUTITSUNDERLYINGPRINCIPLE NAMELY, THEABANDONMENTOF

THE GOLDEN RULE OF COLD WAR CONFRONTATION, ACCORDING TO WHICH EACH OF THE

SUPERPOWERSPUBLICLYPROCLAIMEDTHATUNDERNOCONDITIONSWOULDITBETHEFIRSTTOUSE


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NUCLEARWEAPONS: THEUSEOFNUCLEARWEAPONSREMAINEDTHETHREATOF MADNESS (MUTUALLY

ASSURED DESTRUCTION) WHICH, PARADOXICALLY, GUARANTEED THAT NO CONFLICT WOULD EXPLODE

BEYONDCERTAINLIMITS. THE US A NOWRENOUNCEDTHISPLEDGEANDPROCLAIMEDTHAT IT IS

READYTOBETHEFIRSTTOUSENUCLEARWEAPONSASPARTOFTHEWARAGAINSTTERRORISM, THUSCANCELLINGTHEGAPBETWEENORDINARYANDNUCLEARWARFARE, THAT IS, PRESENTINGTHEUSEOF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS PART OF 'NORMAL' WAR. I AM ALMOST TEMPTED TO PUT IT IN KANTIANPHILOSOPHICAL TERMS: IN THE COLD WAR, THE STATUS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS`TRANSCENDENTAL', EVENNOUMENAL (THEYWERENOTTOBEUSEDINANYACTUALWAR; RATHER,

THEYDESIGNATEDALIMITOFTOTALDESTRUCTIONTOBEAVOIDEDINANY`EMPIRICAL' WARFARE);

WHILENOW, WITHTHENEW BUSHDOCTRINE, THEUSEOFNUCLEARWEAPONSISREDUCEDTOJUST

ANOTHEREMPIRICAL (`PATHOLOGICAL ') ELEMENTOFWARFARE.


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WEMUSTCALLINTOQUESTIONWARPLANS, ORDETERRENCERHETORICWILLDRIVETHEDEBATE

THEPLANRECLAIMSPOLICYMAKINGFORTHEPUBLICTHROUGHDEBATE

CLARKE, PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY AT RUTGERS, 200 6 [LEE, MISTAKEN IDEAS AND THEIREFFECTS, THE OXFORDHANDBOOKOFCONTEXTUALPOLITICALANALYSIS, ED. GOODIN & TILLY, P. P.311-312]

Organizations scholar Chris Demchack argues that "technologically-induced organizationalchanges will tend to establish a field of choices and condition the waymilitary options are selected by insiders and viewed by outsiders" (Demchakop, 4). This logic applies to nuclear weapons. While the technologies are products of human effort they becomesuch overwhelming social facts that they become strong constraints on future action.

Most writings on nuclear diplomacy and nuclear war planning neglect thelow degree of coordination in their respective organizational system s,emphasizing instead the one concept that unifies them: deterrence, Doing socreates the impression that there has indeed been a single system. In this telling, high-level politicians set military and diplomatic goals, which in turn proposeweapons systems that would meet those goals. All actions are driven by the sameconception of deterrence.

But deterrence is a complicated concept, and has served more purposesthan a simple view acknowledge. Long ago, Robert Jervis (1976; 1984) brought attention to the

problem of misperception in nuclear diplomacy. In particular, the standard view neglects thesymbolic functions that deterrence has sometimes served. Rather thandriving talk and choices about nuclear weapons (and defense), the

idea of deterrence has been used to justify decisions and actions

already made. Ideas about deterrence have legitimated courses of actionthat were driven by nuclear warfighting capabilities and technicalsystems acquisition. The larger point is that deterrence rhetoric was mainly in the public realm. It wasdirected especially at the Soviet Union. of course, but also toward the American public in an effort to legitimatewhatever was the current policy, to secure funds for weapons procurement, or simply for electoral purposes.For example, talk in the Reagan administration. especially in the early 1980s, of a "window of vulnerability.'

(a term revived from the 1950s) tried to convince people, through the media, that America was open to a Sovietpreemptive strike.Deterrence rhetoric was used misleadingly to try to convince audiences that America's war planning wasanimated by rational, intellectual considerations. That rhetoric was aimed at misleading domestic and foreignaudiences into believing that civilian politicians both were in contrast nuclear weapons and understood thetechnologies they had at their disposal.It is worth pausing here to point out several major mistakes in the history I've discussed: the neglect bystrategists and policy-makers of nuclear winter and nuclear-generated fire, and the logical problem ofmaintaining control of the arsenal in hostilities. If either factor were given serious consideration a good bit ofnuclear discourse would have looked irrational. The idea of nuclear winter is that even a small handful of largedetonations would throw enough debris into the upper atmosphere that the sun would be blotted out for a periodof time sufficient to threaten the survival of hundreds of millions of people, and perhaps all of civilization(Powers Grinspoon 1986). Thus even a first strike launch that drew no response would be suicidal. Such arealization suggests that the rational course of action would he to disarm, or at least draw back to a second-strike force. For if the models that project nuclear winter are valid, then self-deterrence is as important as other-deterrence. But under that condition, the whole project looks like one giant mistake.The problem of nuclear-generated fire is crucial. As noted, Eden (2004) has shown that military plannerssystematically ignored fire damage in their estimates of nuclear-generated damage. The organizational

production of military blindness said that the only damage that mattered was the damage from blasts. One resultof this deeply mistaken idea was that the militant requested numbers of weapons at least twice as large asnecessary for the amount of destruction they wanted to achieve. Had the knowledge of fire been folded into war

plans, the number of necessary warheads would drop, damage estimates would increase, projections of nuclearwinter would have been bolstered, and the representation that nuclear war could be controlled would berevealed as a mistake.

One effect of the mismatchbetween nuclear war planning and nuclearwar talk was that the latter of was importantly obscured from publicview. Had the built-in, all-or-nothing assumptions of planning been


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more in the public realm, those who tried to persuade us that nuclear

wars could he fought like any other could have been challenged more

effectively. The notion of a nuclear war that was less-than-Armageddonwas long sought after by nuclear planners and policy-makers . It was anotion that was even in the literal sense of the word, chimerical. The very

idea of fighting and winning a nuclear war was misleading.

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