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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, respondents.

QUISUMBING,J.:

This petition forcertioraripursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution1dated September27, 1995 and the Decision2dated April 10, 1996 of the Court of Appeals3in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533,4and the Orders5dated August29, 1994 6and February 2, 19957that were issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-93-18394. 8

The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant petition, as stated in the questioned Decision9, are as follows:

On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, SaudiArabia. . . .

On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow crewmembers Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning whenthey returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in te(sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, aroomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian policecame and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.

When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakartaincident. They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. InJakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for the immediate

release of the detained crew members but did not succeed because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraidthat she might be tricked into something she did not want because of her inability to understand the local dialect.She also declined to sign a blank paper and a document written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowedplaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.

Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreedto deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendantSAUDI (sic). In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.

On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind her, her superiorsrequested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him,he brought her to the police station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakartaincident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a statement dropping the case againstThamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch theafternoon flight out of Jeddah.

One year and a half later or on lune 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of herflight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah tosee Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office broughther to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They told her that this wasnecessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appearbefore the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.

Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIA's Manila manager, AslamSaleemi, that the investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.

In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happenedthen but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident.


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After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was about to take off, aSAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she wastold to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at thecrew quarters, until further orders.

On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to herastonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five monthsimprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamerand Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco,dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, incontravention of Islamic tradition. 10

Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied anyassistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for herupkeep, she worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the internationalflights. 11

Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia.Shortly before her return to Manila, 12she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause.

On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint 13for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its countrymanager.

On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss 14which raised the following grounds, to wit: (1) that theComplaint states no cause of action against Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or

demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has nojurisdiction to try the case.

On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss) 15. Saudia filed a reply 16thereto on March 3, 1994.

On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint 17wherein Al-Balawi was dropped as party defendant. On August 11, 1994,Saudia filed its Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint 18.

The trial court issued an Order 19dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Saudia.

From the Order of respondent Judge 20denying the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on September 20, 1994, its Motion forReconsideration 21of the Order dated August 29, 1994. It alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case onthe basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On October 14,1994, Morada filed her Opposition 22(To Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration).

In the Reply 23filed with the trial court on October 24, 1994, SAUDIA alleged that since its Motion for Reconsideration raised lack ofjurisdiction as its cause of action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply, even if that ground is raised for the first time on appeal.Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines does not have any substantial interest in the prosecution of the instant case, andhence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.

Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order 24dated February 2, 1995, denying SAUDIA's Motion for Reconsideration. Thepertinent portion of the assailed Order reads as follows:

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on September 20,1994, and the Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on October 14, 1994, as well as the Replytherewith of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on October 24, 1994, considering that a perusalof the plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which is one for the recovery of actual, moral and exemplary damages plusattorney's fees, upon the basis of the applicable Philippine law, Article 21 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines,

is, clearly, within the jurisdiction of this Court as regards the subject matter, and there being nothing new ofsubstance which might cause the reversal or modification of the order sought to be reconsidered, the motion forreconsideration of the defendant, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 25

Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition forCertiorariand Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ ofPreliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order 26with the Court of Appeals.

Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with Temporary Restraining Order 27dated February 23, 1995, prohibitingthe respondent Judge from further conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in the interim.

In another Resolution 28promulgated on September 27, 1995, now assailed, the appellate court denied SAUDIA's Petition for theIssuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit:


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The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED, after considering the Answer,with Prayer to Deny Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder, it appearing that hereinpetitioner is not clearly entitled thereto (Unciano Paramedical College, et.Al.,v. Court of Appeals, et.Al., 100335,

April 7, 1993, Second Division).

SO ORDERED.

On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the instant Petition 29for Review with Prayer for Temporary RestrainingOrder dated October 13, 1995.

However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent Court of Appeals rendered the Decision30

dated April 10, 1996, nowalso assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery ofdamages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held thatcertiorariisnot the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case ofan adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.

On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order 31dated April 30,1996, given due course by this Court. After both parties submitted their Memoranda, 32the instant case is now deemed submittedfor decision.

Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:

I

The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 based on Article 21 of the New CivilCode since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch as this case involves whatis known in private international law as a "conflicts problem". Otherwise, the Republic of the Philippines will sit injudgment of the acts done by another sovereign state which is abhorred.

II

Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a jurisdictional requirement. Besides, the matter as toabsence of leave of court is now moot and academic when this Honorable Court required the respondents tocomment on petitioner's April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary RestrainingOrder Within Ten (10) Days From Notice Thereof. Further, the Revised Rules of Court should be construed withliberality pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.

III

Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996 decision in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 entitled "Saudi ArabianAirlines v. Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al." and filed its April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With PrayerFor A Temporary Restraining Order on May 7, 1996 at 10:29 a.m. or within the 15-day reglementary period asprovided for under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP NO.36533 has not yet become final and executory and this Honorable Court can take cognizance of this case. 33

From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the following issues emerge for our resolution:

I.

WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZONCITY HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-18394 ENTITLED "MILAGROS P. MORADA V.SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES".

II.

WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN THIS CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULDGOVERN.

Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the outset. It maintains that private respondent'sclaim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifiesthe instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissirule. 34

On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 35and 21 36of the CivilCode, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law. 37


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Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that the interplay of events occurred in two states, thePhilippines and Saudi Arabia.

As stated by private respondent in her Amended Complaint 38dated June 23, 1994:

2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign airlines corporation doing business in thePhilippines. It may be served with summons and other court processes at Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.).Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building, 114 Valero St., Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila.

xxx xxx xxx

6. Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian authoritiesagreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in service bydefendant SAUDIA. In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.

7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind her, her superiorsreauested her to see MR. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him,he brought her to the police station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakartaincident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a statement dropping the case againstThamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch theafternoon flight out of Jeddah.

8. One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before the departure ofher flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddahto see Mr. Meniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office broughther to a Saudi court where she was asked to sigh a document written in Arabic. They told her that this wasnecessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appearbefore the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.

9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy onJune 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIA's Manila manger,Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.

10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothinghappened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakartaincident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was about totake off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take that flight. At the Inflight Service Officewhere she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain inJeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.

11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to herastonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five monthsimprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamerand Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco,dancing, and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; (3) socializing with the male crew, in contraventionof Islamic tradition.

12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the case, plaintiff sought the help of the Philippines Embassy inJeddah. The latter helped her pursue an appeal from the decision of the court. To pay for her upkeep, she workedon the domestic flights of defendant SAUDIA while, ironically, Thamer and Allah freely served the internationalflights. 39

Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, we agree with petitioner that the problemherein could present a "conflicts" case.

A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a"foreign element". The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associationsare rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception. 40

The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. 41The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of theparties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves propertiessituated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form. 42

In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, andthat petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as aflight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila,Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise.


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We thus find private respondent's assertion that the case is purely domestic, imprecise. Aconflictsproblem presents itself here, andthe question of jurisdiction 43confronts the courta quo.

After a careful study of the private respondent's Amended Complaint, 44and the Comment thereon, we note that she aptlypredicated her cause of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.

On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice giveeveryone his due and observe honesty and good faith.

On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, goodcustoms or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.

Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of Appeals, 45this Court held that:

The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction bygranting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight tospecifically provide in the statutes.

Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, we agree with privaterespondent's assertion that violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipalforum.

Based on the allegations 46in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction 47we find that theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. 48Its authority to try and hearthe case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:

Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", ishereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:

xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and cots or the value of the property in controversy exceedsOne hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where thedemand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos(P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)

xxx xxx xxx

And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court the venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:

Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. [Now Regional Trial Court]

(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) Personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of thedefendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of theplaintiff.

Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City assumingjurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious. Relativeadvantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex", "harass",or "oppress" the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favorof the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. 49

Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the courta quofound it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to takecognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere,i.e.in the Kingdomof Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.


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Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of theparties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.

Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein. By filing her Complaint and AmendedComplaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.

The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions 50praying for the dismissal of Morada's Amended Complaint.SAUDIA also filed an Answer InEx Abundante Cautelamdated February 20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit from the motionsfiled, is that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trialcourt's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.

As held by this Court inRepublic vs. Ker and Company, Ltd.: 51

We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962, aside from disputing the lower court's jurisdictionover defendant's person, prayed for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action hasprescribed. By interposing such second ground in its motion to dismiss, Ker and Co., Ltd. availed of an affirmativedefense on the basis of which it prayed the court to resolve controversy in its favor. For the court to validly decidethe said plea of defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it necessarily had to acquire jurisdiction upon the latter's person, who,being the proponent of the affirmative defense, should be deemed to have abandoned its special appearance andvoluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.

Similarly, the case ofDe Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that;

When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, itmust be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any otherpurpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to thejurisdiction of the court. A special appearance by motion made for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of thecourt over the person will be held to be a general appearance, if the party in said motion should, for example, askfor a dismissal of the action upon the further ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. 52

Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial court hasjurisdiction over the case and that its exercise thereof, justified.

As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1) What legalsystem should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extentshould the chosen legal system regulate the situation. 53

Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that should ultimately control. Although ideally, allchoice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions of justice and predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is

then faced with the problem of deciding which of these two important values should be stressed. 54

Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This processis known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". It is the "process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to thekind of question specified in a conflicts rule." 55The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law. 56

Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or operative fact. 57An essential element ofconflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factuarelationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as thesitusof theres, the placeof celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. 58

Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of the applicablelaw. 59These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting factors" could be any of the following:

(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;

(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;

(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situsisdecisive when real rights are involved;

(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made, amarriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts andtorts;

(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties, orthe place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;


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(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex lociintentionis;

(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. Thelex fori the law of theforum is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of "procedure" not going to thesubstance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex foriapplies whenever the content of theotherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one othe exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and

(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of itsmaster or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts ofaffreightment. 60(Emphasis ours.)

After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended Complaint deemed admitted for purposes ofthe motion to dismiss, we are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondent's assertion that although she wasalready working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of thecharges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out,she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.

There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the "handing over" or "turning over" of the person of private respondent toJeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner's purported act contributed to and amplified oreven proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitatedthe arrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioner's authority as employer, taking advantageof the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction andimprisonment of private respondent was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and

reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once dulyproven.

Considering that the complaint in the courta quois one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of contact" could be theplace or places where the tortious conduct orlex loci actusoccurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find thatthe Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is inthe Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, shehad honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, giveher due and observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of theinjury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-allharm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged,according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs ofthe alleged tort.

Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule oflex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort

liability61

have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the moderntheories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State of the most significant relationship" rule, which in our viewshould be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case.

In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be takeninto account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injuryoccurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporationand place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. 62

As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise noquestion that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged herein the business of international air carriage. Thus, the "relationship" between the parties was centered here, although it should bestressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the mostsignificant contact with the matter in this dispute, 63raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (hereinpetitioner), in our view, has been properly established.

Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the place "having the most interest in theproblem", we find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application to and controlin the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdictionover the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could properly applyPhilippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioner's insistence that "[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has theburden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter." 64As aptly said by private respondent, she has "noobligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21" of theCivil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she never alleged that Saudi law should governthis case. 65And as correctly held by the respondent appellate court, "considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking theapplicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabiais". 66


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Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding the trial court's denial of defendant's (hereinpetitioner's) motion to dismiss the case. Not only was jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial wasobviously available, and expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the stateintimately concerned with the ultimate outcome of the case below, not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also for thevindication of the country's system of law and justice in a transnational setting. With these guidelines in mind, the trial court mustproceed to try and adjudge the case in the light of relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign element or elementsinvolved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as prejudging the results of the case in any manner whatsoever.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition forcertiorariis hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 entitled "Milagros P. Morada vs.Saudi Arabia Airlines" is hereby REMANDED to Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased,Executor and Heir-appellees,vs.HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA,oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR,J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special ProceedingNo. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executorto reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring

Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue,one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of thetestator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was bornin the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named daughter, MARIALUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

x x x x x x x x x

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of

age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she beenat any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum ofTHREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the saidMaria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One HundredPesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accruedthereon, is exhausted..

x x x x x x x x x

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the incomefrom the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind orcharacter, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from anysource whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....


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It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified thepayment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter,Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of herlegitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child ofthe deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws ofthe Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of twoacknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that thelaw that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire lawthereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in

California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should beapplicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent,she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time ofhis death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, inaccordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolutedominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In reKaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel,filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THEACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE INTHE INHERITANCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS,ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOIDOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE

DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR ISCONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.

V

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TOONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his

death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following factsadmitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensenwas born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed schoolteacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of SanFrancisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913,during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed thePhilippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he againreturned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.


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Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this HonorableCourt, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation offacts. 1wph1.t

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World WarII. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. AppelleesCollective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last will andtestament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St.Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born inNew York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned toCalifornia very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned oracquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make homein the State of California.

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the most permanentabode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict ofLaws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, Californiafrom 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until

1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenshipby acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. Butdomicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has neverbeen. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time,certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for severalweeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear,however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former"home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as wellas physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requiresbodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used withmany shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insistthat any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which isas follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount ofsuccessional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of theperson whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the countrywhere said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national law"is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union

having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 othe Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other thanthe private law of the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below,sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property bywill in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellantinvokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of itsowner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.


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The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Codeand it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case ofKaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State ofCalifornia, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of thetestamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen.Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine oftherenvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent'sdomicile, which is the Philippines.

The theory of doctrine of renvoihas been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign lawfor decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign lawminus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Lawsrule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principleis the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. Thiswould have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponentsof the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yetthere seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict ofLaws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theoryavoid this inextricabilis circulasby getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps theopponents of the renvoiare a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoiplead that greater uniformity will result fromadoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whetherthe renvoishould be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choiceof the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against thewoman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for thewoman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if bothcourts accepted the renvoi.

The Restatement accepts the renvoitheory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and where the validity ofa decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of theparties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person'stitle to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of theparties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, andFrance. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestatesuccession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's lastdomicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions,or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law,however, would show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it wouldrefer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on thesurface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is tointestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on theassumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the lattercourse, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the

conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrowersense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the furtherquestion may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is aquestion which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequentdiscussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the"Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the questionpostulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the maincontroversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoiis that the courtof the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but alsoits rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction


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prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of therenvoihas generally been repudiated by the Americanauthorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoihas also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzenin an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:

The recognition of the renvoitheory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating notonly the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to thistheory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.

x x x x x x x x x

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of thefollowing theses:

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personalstatute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law ofthe place where the act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarilycompetent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.

x x x x x x x x x

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciledin Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distributepersonal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make thedistribution in accordance with the law of nationality that is the English law he must accept this reference back to hisown law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, itsinternal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intendedand appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply tosuch of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the

domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law thatthe domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution ofthe property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legalquestions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It islogical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the samerules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that thedomiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling bythe Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, isthe general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostitonof a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had itsorigin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourseand the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the ruleis more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national lawis the internal law ofCalifornia. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents thereinand another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribedfor its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law ofCalifornia as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of Californiain accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and itsconflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec.946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in thePhilippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national lawof the deceased should govern. This contention can not besustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law onconflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the


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testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent isnot domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and shouldnot refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be likea football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country ofhis domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if thequestion has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while thePhilippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of theparent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867;Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the

decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be acitizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in thestate of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of theprovisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile,pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that thepartition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.Bengzon, C.J., took no part.


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-35694 December 23, 1933

ALLISON G. GIBBS, petitioner-appelle,vs.THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,oppositor-appellant.THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellants.Allison D. Gibbs in his own behalf.

BUTTE,J.:

This is an appeal from a final order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, requiring the register of deeds of the City of Manila tocancel certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, covering lands located in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, and issue inlieu thereof new certificates of transfer of title in favor of Allison D. Gibbs without requiring him to present any document showing

that the succession tax due under Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code has been paid.

The said order of the court of March 10, 1931, recites that the parcels of land covered by said certificates of title formerly belongedto the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs; that the latter died intestate in Palo Alto, California, onNovember 28, 1929; that at the time of her death she and her husband were citizens of the State of California and domiciled therein.

It appears further from said order that Allison D. Gibbs was appointed administrator of the state of his said deceased wife in case No.36795 in the same court, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Eva Johnson Gibbs, Deceased"; that in said intestateproceedings, the said Allison D. Gibbs, on September 22,1930, filed an ex parte petition in which he alleged "that the parcels of landhereunder described belong to the conjugal partnership of your petitioner and his wife, Eva Johnson Gibbs", describing in detail thethree facts here involved; and further alleging that his said wife, a citizen and resident of California, died on November 28,1929; thatin accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wifeprevious to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration; that the conjugal partnership ofAllison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs, deceased, has no obligations or debts and no one will be prejudiced by adjucating saidparcels of land (and seventeen others not here involved) to be the absolute property of the said Allison D. Gibbs as sole owner. The


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court granted said petition and on September 22, 1930, entered a decree adjucating the said Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole andabsolute owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California. Gibbs presented this decree to the register ofdeeds of Manila and demanded that the latter issue to him a "transfer certificate of title".

Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code provides in part that:

Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of property any document transferring real property or real rights thereinor any chattel mortgage, by way of gifts mortis causa, legacy or inheritance, unless the payment of the tax fixed in thisarticle and actually due thereon shall be shown. And they shall immediately notify the Collector of Internal Revenue or thecorresponding provincial treasurer of the non payment of the tax discovered by them. . . .

Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds of the City of Manila, declined to accept as binding said decree ofcourt of September 22,1930, and refused to register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on theground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid. Thereupon, under date of December 26, 1930, Allison D. Gibbsfiled in the said court a petition for an order requiring the said register of deeds "to issue the corresponding titles" to the petitionerwithout requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax. After due hearing of the parties, the court reaffirmed said order ofSeptember 22, 1930, and entered the order of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this appeal.

On January 3, 1933, this court remanded the case to the court of origin for new trial upon additional evidence in regard to thepertinent law of California in force at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs, also authorizing the introduction of evidence with referenceto the dates of the acquisition of the property involved in this suit and with reference to the California law in force at the time of suchacquisition. The case is now before us with the supplementary evidence.

For the purposes of this case, we shall consider the following facts as established by the evidence or the admissions of the parties:Allison D. Gibbs has been continuously, since the year 1902, a citizen of the State of California and domiciled therein; that he and

Eva Johnson Gibbs were married at Columbus, Ohio, in July 1906; that there was no antenuptial marriage contract between theparties; that during the existence of said marriage the spouses acquired the following lands, among others, in the Philippine Islands,as conjugal property:lawphil.net

1. A parcel of land in the City of Manila represented by transfer certificate of title No. 20880, dated March 16, 1920, and registered inthe name of "Allison D. Gibbs casado con Eva Johnson Gibbs".

2. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer certificate of title No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, in which it iscertified "that spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee simple" of the land therein described.

3. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer certificate of title No. 28331, dated April 6, 1927, which it states"that Allison D. Gibbs married to Eva Johnson Gibbs" is the owner of the land described therein; that said Eva Johnson Gibbs diedintestate on November 28, 1929, living surviving her her husband, the appellee, and two sons, Allison J. Gibbs , now age 25 andFinley J. Gibbs, now aged 22, as her sole heirs of law.

Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tax on inheritances, legacies and other acquisitionsmortis causa"provides in section 1536 that "Every transmission by virtue of inheritance ... of real property ... shall be subject to the following tax."It results that the question for determination in this case is as follows: Was Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death the owner ofa descendible interest in the Philippine lands above-mentioned?

The appellee contends that the law of California should determine the nature and extent of the title, if any, that vested in EvaJohnson Gibbs under the three certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331 above referred to, citing article 9 of the Civil Code.But that, even if the nature and extent of her title under said certificates be governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the laws ofCalifornia govern the succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code.

Article 9 of the Civil Code is as follows:

The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon

Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country." It is argued that the conjugal right of the California wife incommunity real estate in the Philippine Islands is a personal right and must, therefore, be settled by the law governing herpersonal status, that is, the law of California. But our attention has not been called to any law of California thatincapacitates a married woman from acquiring or holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance with the lex rei sitae.There is not the slightest doubt that a California married woman can acquire title to land in a common law jurisdiction likethe State of Illinois or the District of Columbia, subject to the common-law estate by the courtesy which would vest in herhusband. Nor is there any doubt that if a California husband acquired land in such a jurisdiction his wife would be vestedwith the common law right of dower, the prerequisite conditions obtaining. Article 9 of the Civil Code treats of purelypersonal relations and status and capacity for juristic acts, the rules relating to property, both personal and real, beinggoverned by article 10 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, article 9, by its very terms, is applicable only to "Spaniards" (now, byconstruction, to citizens of the Philippine Islands).

The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, known as the "Jones Law") as regards thedetermination of private rights, grants practical autonomy to the Government of the Philippine Islands. This Government,therefore, may apply the principles and rules of private international law (conflicts of laws) on the same footing as an


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organized territory or state of the United States. We should, therefore, resort to the law of California, the nationality anddomicile of Mrs. Gibbs, to ascertain the norm which would be applied here as law were there any question as to her status.

But the appellant's chief argument and the sole basis of the lower court's decision rests upon the second paragraph of article 10 ofthe Civil Code which is as follows:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of thesuccessional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whosesuccession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.

In construing the above language we are met at the outset with some difficulty by the expression "the national law of the personwhose succession is in question", by reason of the rather anomalous political status of the Philippine Islands. (Cf. Manresa, vol.1, Codigo Civil, pp. 103, 104.) We encountered no difficulty in applying article 10 in the case of a citizen of Turkey. (Miciano vs.Brimo, 50 Phil., 867.) Having regard to the practical autonomy of the Philippine Islands, as above stated, we have concluded that ifarticle 10 is applicable and the estate in question is that of a deceased American citizen, the succession shall be regulated inaccordance with the norms of the State of his domicile in the United States. (Cf. Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil., 130137; In reEstate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156, 166.)

The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the entire community property withoutadministration belongs to the surviving husband; that he is the absolute owner of all the community property from the moment ofthe death of his wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the wifeprecedes that of the husband he acquires the community property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased wife, butbecause she never had more than an inchoate interest or expentancy which is extinguished upon her death. Quoting the case ofEstate of Klumpke (167 Cal., 415, 419), the court said: "The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of California) are uniformto the effect that the husband does not take the community property upon the death of the wife by succession, but that he holds it

all from the moment of her death as though required by himself. ... It never belonged to the estate of the deceased wife."

The argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If he takes nothing by succession from his deceased wife, how canthe second paragraph of article 10 be invoked? Can the appellee be heard to say that there is a legal succession under the law of thePhilippine Islands and no legal succession under the law of California? It seems clear that the second paragraph of article 10 appliesonly when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines and in accordance with the law of the PhilippineIslands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in otherwords, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in propertywithin the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.

In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke (178 U. S., 186, 191; 44 Law ed., 1028, 1031), the court said:

It is principle firmly established that to the law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for the rules whichgovern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. (UnitedStates vs. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115; 3 L. ed., 287; Clark vs. Graham, 6 Wheat., 577; 5 L. ed., 334; McGoon vs. Scales, 9

Wall., 23; 19 L. ed., 545; Brine vs. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 96 U. S., 627; 24 L. ed., 858.)" (See alsoEstate of Lloyd, 175 Cal.,704, 705.) This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personalproperty is subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it issituated.

It is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478:

In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex rei sitae, the respective rights of husband and wife in suchproperty, in the absence of an antenuptial contract, are determined by the law of the place where the property is situated,irrespective of the domicile of the parties or to the place where the marriage was celebrated. ( See also Saul vs. HisCreditors, 5 Martin [N. S.], 569; 16 Am. Dec., 212 [La.]; Heidenheimervs. Loring, 26 S. W., 99 [Texas].)

Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of thecommunity lands here in question must be determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae.

It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as community property of the conjugal partnership of theappellee and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that of her husband. Article 1407 ofthe Civil Code provides:

All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively tothe husband or to the wife. Article 1395 provides:

"The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of law applicable to the contract of partnership in all matters in which suchrules do not conflict with the express provisions of this chapter." Article 1414 provides that "the husband may dispose by will of hishalf only of the property of the conjugal partnership." Article 1426 provides that upon dissolution of the conjugal partnership andafter inventory and liquidation, "the net remainder of the partnership property shall be divided share and share alike between thehusband and wife, or their respective heirs." Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife,upon the acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title therein equal to that of her


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husband, subject to the power of management and disposition which the law vests in the husband. Immediately upon her death, ifthere are no obligations of the decedent, as is true in the present case, her share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her heirsby succession. (Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil Code; cf. also Coronel vs. Ona, 33 Phil., 456, 469.)

It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of herhusband, in the Philippine lands covered by certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of their acquisition tothe date of her death. That appellee himself believed that his wife was vested of such a title and interest in manifest from the secondof said certificates, No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, introduced by him in evidence, in which it is certified that "the spouses AllisonD. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee simple of the conjugal lands therein described."

The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and thistransmission plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a taxon inheritances. (Cf. Re Estate of Majot, 199 N. Y., 29; 92 N. E., 402; 29 L. R. A. [N. S.], 780.) It is unnecessary in this proceedingto determine the "order of succession" or the "extent of the successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which would beregulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.

The record does not show what the proper amount of the inheritance tax in this case would be nor that the appellee (petitionerbelow) in any way challenged the power of the Government to levy an inheritance tax or the validity of the statute under which theregister of deeds refused to issue a certificate of transfer reciting that the appellee is the exclusive owner of the Philippine landsincluded in the three certificates of title here involved.

The judgment of the court below of March 10, 1931, is reversed with directions to dismiss the petition, without specialpronouncement as to the costs.

Avancea, C. J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.

Street, J., dissents.


Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO, petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERSCORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 104911-14 December 5, 1994

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ET AL., petitioners,vs.HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. and/or ASIAINTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 105029-32 December 5, 1994

ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDER CORPORATION and BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA,ROMEO PATAG, RIZALINO REYES, IGNACIO DE VERA, SOLOMON B. REYES, JOSE M. ABAN, EMIGDIO N. ABARQUEZ,ANTONIO ACUPAN, ROMEO ACUPAN, BENJAMIN ALEJANDRE, WILFREDO D. ALIGADO, MARTIN AMISTAD, JR., ROLANDOB. AMUL, AMORSOLO ANADING, ANTONIO T. ANGLO, VICENTE ARLITA, HERBERT AYO, SILVERIO BALATAZO, ALFREDOBALOBO, FALCONERO BANAAG, RAMON BARBOSA, FELIX BARCENA, FERNANDO BAS, MARIO BATACLAN, ROBERTO S.BATICA, ENRICO BELEN, ARISTEO BICOL, LARRY C. BICOL, PETRONILLO BISCOCHO, FELIX M. BOBIER, DIONISIOBOBONGO, BAYANI S. BRACAMANTE, PABLITO BUSTILLO, GUILLERMO CABEZAS, BIENVENIDO CADALIN, RODOLFOCAGATAN, AMANTE CAILAO, IRENEO CANDOR, JOSE CASTILLO, MANUEL CASTILLO, REMAR CASTROJERES, REYNALDOCAYAS, ROMEO CECILIO, TEODULO CREUS, BAYANI DAYRIT, RICARDO DAYRIT, ERNESTO T. DELA CRUZ, FRANCISCO DEGUZMAN, ONOFRE DE RAMA, IGNACIO DE VERA, MODESTO DIZON, REYNALDO DIZON, ANTONIO S. DOMINGUEZ,


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GILBERT EBRADA, RICARDO EBRADA, ANTONIO EJERCITO, JR., EDUARTE ERIDAO, ELADIO ESCOTOTO, JOHNESGUERRA, EDUARDO ESPIRITU, ERNESTO ESPIRITU, RODOLFO ESPIRITU, NESTOR M. ESTEVA, BENJAMIN ESTRADA,VALERIO EVANGELISTA, OLIGARIO FRANCISCO, JESUS GABAWAN, ROLANDO GARCIA, ANGEL GUDA, PACITOHERNANDEZ, ANTONIO HILARIO, HENRY L. JACOB, HONESTO JARDINIANO, ANTONIO JOCSON, GERARDO LACSAMANA,EFREN U. LIRIO LORETO LONTOC, ISRAEL LORENZO, ALEJANDRO LORINO, JOSE MABALAY, HERMIE MARANAN,LEOVIGILDO MARCIAL, NOEL MARTINEZ, DANTE MATREO, LUCIANO MELENDEZ, RENATO MELO, FRANCIS MEDIODIA,JOSE C. MILANES, RAYMUNDO C. MILAY, CRESENCIANO MIRANDA, ILDEFONSO C. MOLINA, ARMANDO B. MONDEJARRESURRECCION D. NAZARENO, JUAN OLINDO, FRANCISCO R. OLIVARES, PEDRO ORBISTA, JR., RICARDO ORDONEZ,ERNIE PANCHO, JOSE PANCHO, GORGONIO P. PARALA, MODESTO PINPIN, JUANITO PAREA, ROMEO I. PATAG,FRANCISCO PINPIN, LEONARDO POBLETE, JAIME POLLOS, DOMINGO PONDALIS, EUGENIO RAMIREZ, LUCIEN M.RESPALL, GAUDENCIO RETANAN, JR., TOMAS B. RETENER, ALVIN C. REYES, RIZALINO REYES, SOLOMON B. REYES,VIRGILIO G. RICAZA, RODELIO RIETA, JR., BENITO RIVERA, JR., BERNARDO J. ROBILLOS, PABLO A. ROBLES, JOSEROBLEZA, QUIRINO RONQUILLO, AVELINO M. ROQUE, MENANDRO L. SABINO, PEDRO SALGATAR, EDGARDO SALONGA,NUMERIANO SAN MATEO, FELIZARDO DE LOS SANTOS, JR., GABRIEL SANTOS, JUANITO SANTOS, PAQUITO SOLANTE,CONRADO A. SOLIS, JR., RODOLFO SULTAN, ISAIAS TALACTAC, WILLIAM TARUC, MENANDRO TEMPROSA, BIENVENIDOS. TOLENTINO, BENEDICTO TORRES, MAXIMIANO TORRES, FRANCISCO G. TRIAS, SERGIO A. URSOLINO, ROGELIOVALDEZ, LEGORIO E. VERGARA, DELFIN VICTORIA, GILBERT VICTORIA, HERNANE VICTORIANO, FRANCISCOVILLAFLORES, DOMINGO VILLAHERMOSA, ROLANDO VILLALOBOS, ANTONIO VILLAUZ, DANILO VILLANUEVA, ROGELIOVILLANUEVA, ANGEL VILLARBA, JUANITO VILLARINO, FRANCISCO ZARA, ROGELIO AALAGOS, NICANOR B. ABAD,ANDRES ABANES, REYNALDO ABANES, EDUARDO ABANTE, JOSE ABARRO, JOSEFINO ABARRO, CELSO S. ABELANIO,HERMINIO ABELLA, MIGUEL ABESTANO, RODRIGO G. ABUBO, JOSE B. ABUSTAN, DANTE ACERES, REYNALDO S.ACOJIDO, LEOWILIN ACTA, EUGENIO C. ACUEZA, EDUARDO ACUPAN, REYNALDO ACUPAN, SOLANO ACUPAN, MANUELP. ADANA, FLORENTINO R. AGNE, QUITERIO R. AGUDO, MANUEL P. AGUINALDO, DANTE AGUIRRE, HERMINIOAGUIRRE, GONZALO ALBERTO, JR., CONRADO ALCANTARA, LAMBERTO Q. ALCANTARA, MARIANITO J. ALCANTARA,BENCIO ALDOVER, EULALIO V. ALEJANDRO, BENJAMIN ALEJANDRO, EDUARDO L. ALEJANDRO, MAXIMINO ALEJANDRO,ALBERTO ALMENAR, ARNALDO ALONZO, AMADO ALORIA, CAMILO ALVAREZ, MANUEL C. ALVAREZ, BENJAMIN R.AMBROCIO, CARLOS AMORES, BERNARD P. ANCHETA, TIMOTEO O. ANCHETA, JEOFREY ANI, ELINO P. ANTILLON,

ARMANDRO B. ANTIPONO, LARRY T. ANTONIO, ANTONIO APILADO, ARTURO P. APILADO, FRANCISCO APOLINARIO,BARTOLOME M. AQUINO, ISIDRO AQUINO, PASTOR AQUINO, ROSENDO M. AQUINO, ROBERTO ARANGORIN, BENJAMINO. ARATEA, ARTURO V. ARAULLO, PRUDENCIO ARAULLO, ALEXANDER ARCAIRA, FRANCISCO ARCIAGA, JOSE AREVALO,JUANTO AREVALO, RAMON AREVALO, RODOLFO AREVALO, EULALIO ARGUELLES, WILFREDO P. ARICA, JOSE M.ADESILLO, ANTONIO ASUNCION, ARTEMIO M. ASUNCION, EDGARDO ASUNCION, REXY M. ASUNCION, VICENTEAURELIO, ANGEL AUSTRIA, RICARDO P. AVERILLA, JR., VIRGILIO AVILA, BARTOLOME AXALAN, ALFREDO BABILONIA,FELIMON BACAL, JOSE L. BACANI, ROMULO R. BALBIERAN, VICENTE BALBIERAN, RODOLFO BALITBIT, TEODORO Y.BALOBO, DANILO O. BARBA, BERNARDO BARRO, JUAN A. BASILAN, CEFERINO BATITIS, VIVENCIO C. BAUAN,GAUDENCIO S. BAUTISTA, LEONARDO BAUTISTA, JOSE D. BAUTISTA, ROSTICO BAUTISTA, RUPERTO B. BAUTISTA,TEODORO S. BAUTISTA, VIRGILIO BAUTISTA, JESUS R. BAYA, WINIEFREDO BAYACAL, WINIEFREDO BEBIT, BEN G.BELIR, ERIC B. BELTRAN, EMELIANO BENALES, JR., RAUL BENITEZ, PERFECTO BENSAN, IRENEO BERGONIO, ISABELOBERMUDEZ, ROLANDO I. BERMUDEZ, DANILO BERON, BENJAMIN BERSAMIN, ANGELITO BICOL, ANSELMO BICOL,CELESTINO BICOL, JR., FRANCISCO BICOL, ROGELIO BICOL, ROMULO L. BICOL, ROGELIO BILLIONES, TEOFILO N. BITO,FERNANDO BLANCO, AUGUSTO BONDOC, DOMINGO BONDOC, PEPE S. BOOC, JAMES R. BORJA, WILFREDO BRACEROS,ANGELES C. BRECINO, EURECLYDON G. BRIONES, AMADO BRUGE, PABLITO BUDILLO, ARCHIMEDES BUENAVENTURA,BASILIO BUENAVENTURA, GUILLERMO BUENCONSEJO, ALEXANDER BUSTAMANTE, VIRGILIO BUTIONG, JR., HONESTO

P. CABALLA, DELFIN CABALLERO, BENEDICTO CABANIGAN, MOISES

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