pil cases - 1st batch

8/10/2019 PIL Cases - 1st Batch

1/47

KURODA v. JALANDONI

FACTS:

Petitioner, formerly a Lietenant!"eneral of t#e Ja$ane%e Army an& Comman&in'

"eneral of t#e Ja$ane%e Im$erial For(e%, )a% (#ar'e& *efore a military (ommi%%ion

%et *y +e(tive Or&er No. - of t#e Pre%i&ent of t#e P#ili$$ine%. Sai& ee(tive

or&er al%o e%ta*li%#e& a National /ar Crime% O0(e an& $re%(ri*e& rle% an&

re'lation% 'overnin' t#e trial of a((%e& )ar (riminal%. Petitioner (onten&e& t#at

+.O. No. - )a% ille'al an& n(on%tittional *e(a%e #e (annot *e trie& fro violation

of international (onvention%, li1e t#e "eneva an& 2a'e Convention%. Frt#ermore,

#e alle'e& t#at t#e $arti(i$ation of t)o Ameri(an la)yer% in t#e $ro%e(tion )a%

violative of or national %overei'nty.

ISSU+:

/#et#er t#e P#ili$$ine "overnment #a% t#e 3ri%&i(tion to try an& (onvi(t Kro&a for

violatin' $ro#i*ite& a(t% of t#e )ar.

2+LD:

+e(tive Or&er No. - i% le'al an& (on%tittional *e(a%e Arti(le II, Se(tion 4 of t#e

5647 Con%tittion e$li(itly $rovi&e% t#at 8t#e P#ili$$ine% renon(e% )ar a% an

in%trment of national $oli(y, an& a&o$t% t#e 'enerally a((e$te& $rin(i$le% of

international la) a% $art of t#e la) of nation.9In $roml'ation an& enfor(ement of +.O. No. -, t#e Pre%i&ent of t#e P#ili$$ine

eer(i%e& #i% $o)er a% (omman&er!in!(#ief of all arme& for(e%. oreover, it )a% in

aeren(e )it# t#e 'enerally a((e$te& $rin(i$le% an& $oli(ie% of international la)

)#i(# form $art of or Con%tittion.

/it# re'ar&% to t#e (ontention a*ot t#e $arti(i$ation of t)o Ameri(an la)yer%, t#e

P#ili$$ine% )a% n&er t#e %overei'nty of t#e Unite& State% an& t#%, )e )ere

e;ally *on& to'et#er )it# t#e US an& Ja$an, to t#e ri'#t% an& o*li'ation%

(ontaine& in t#e treatie%. T#e%e ri'#t% an& o*li'ation% )ere not era%e& *y or

a%%m$tion of fll %overei'nty.


2/47


3/47

KOOKOORITC2KIN v. SOLICITOR "+N+RAL

FACTS:

In A'%t 565, a$$ellee!$etitioner Koo1oorit(#1in >le& )it# t#e CFI of Camarine%Sr a $etition for natraliation, %$$orte& *y Ea t#e a0&avit% of e!J&'e Jaime .Reye% an& Dr. Salva&or ariano, re%i&ent% of Camarine% Sr, E* #i% &e(laration ofintention )#i(# )a% %)orn in Jly 56@, an& E( noti(e of #earin'. T#e $etition )a%>le& in A'%t 565 *t )a% not #ear& ntil A'%t = an& Se$t. 4@, 56 )#ena$$ellee!$etitioner $re%ente& #i% evi&en(e, %in(e t#e $rovin(e )a% inva&e& *y t#e

Ja$ane%e for(e% &rin' //I an& t#e (a%e re(or&% #a& to *e re(on%titte& after*ein' &e%troye& &rin' t#e )ar. A$$ellant Sol"en (ro%%!eamine& a$$ellee!$etitionerG% )itne%%e% *t &i& not >le any o$$o%ition an& &i& not $re%ent anyevi&en(e to (ontrovert t#e $etition. T#e CFI 'rante& t#e $etition for natraliation,>n&in' t#at a$$ellee!$etitioner )a% a native!*orn R%%ian )#o 're) $ a% a (itienof an& )a% $art of t#e military of t#e &efn(t Im$erial R%%ian "overnment n&ert#e Car%. 2e #a& %everal %tint% )#ile in military %ervi(e *efore #e 3oine& t#e /#iteR%%ian Army at ?la&ivo%to1 an& fo'#t a'ain%t t#e Hol%#evi1% ntil 56== )#en t#elatter for(e &efeate& t#e former. Ref%in' to 3oin t#e Hol%#evi1 re'ime, #e e& *y%ea to S#an'#ai, an& eventally )ent to anila a% $art of t#e 'ro$ of /#iteR%%ian% n&er A&miral Star1 in ar(# 56=4. 2e >nally $ermanently re%i&e& inIri'a, Camarine% Sr e(e$t &rin' #i% %tint in t#e 'errilla for(e in Caramoan from56= to Jly 567. T#e lo)er (ort al%o ma&e >n&in'% of t#e e%ta*li%#ment of #i%family, em$loyment, %o(ial life, #i% a*ility to %$ea1 an& )rite +n'li%# an& Hi(ol, #i%

'oo& moral (#ara(ter, aeren(e to t#e n&erlyin' $rin(i$le% of t#e P#ili$$ineCon%tittion, an& *ein' a %tatele%% ref'ee *elon'in' to no State.

ISSU+S:/N E5 a$$ellee!$etitionerG% &e(laration of intention to *e(ome a Fili$ino (itien)a% vali& an& %0(ient *a%i% for #i% $etition for natraliation, E= a$$ellee!$etitioner %0(iently e%ta*li%#e& le'al re%i&en(e in t#e P#ili$$ine% an& (ol& %$ea1an& )rite any of t#e $rin(i$al P#ili$$ine lan'a'e%, an& E4 a$$ellee!$etitioner )a%%tatele%% ref'ee.2+LD:

E5 Se(tion 7 of t#e Revi%e& Natraliation La) a$$lie% an& $rovi&e% t#at 8no&e(laration %#all *e vali& ntil entry for $ermanent re%i&en(e #a% *een e%ta*li%#e&an& a (erti>(ate %#o)in' t#e &ate, $la(e an& manner of #i% arrival #a% *eeni%%e&.9 /#ile a$$ellee!$etitionerG% &e(laration )a% re(on%titte&, t#e atta(#e&(erti>(ate referre& to in t#e &e(laration )a% not re(on%titte&. T#e SC rle& t#att#e la) &oe% not %tate t#at t#e (erti>(ate i% e%%ential to t#e vali&ity of t#e&e(laration a% t#e only re;irement i% for t#e %ai& (erti>(ate to *e i%%e&. T#ere i%t#e n(ontroverte& fa(t of a$$ellee!$etitionerG% $ea(efl an& (ontino% re%i&en(e


4/47

in t#e P#ili$$ine% for =7 year% an& %tatement in #i% &e(laration t#at a (erti>(ate #a&*een atta(#e& to t#e %ai& &e(laration. 2en(e, a$$ellee!$etitionerG% &e(laration )a%vali& n&er la) in vie) of ot#er (om$etent evi&en(e %#o)in' t#e fa(t% %o'#t to *ee%ta*li%#e& n&er t#e (erti>(ate t#at )a% not re(on%titte&.E= A$$ellee!$etitioner #a% %0(iently %#o)n le'al re%i&en(e in t#e P#ili$$ine% for a(ontino% $erio& of not le%% t#an 5@ year% a% re;ire& *y Se(tion = of t#e Revi%e&

Natraliation La). In a&&ition, a$$ellee!$etitioner #a& 'oo& (omman& of *ot#+n'li%# an& Hi(ol. /#ile t#ere may *e many %tan&ar&% ot t#ere, none )a% %et int#e la) on t#e re;ire& a*ility to %$ea1 an& )rite any of t#e $rin(i$al P#ili$$inelan'a'e%. A$$ellee!$etitioner 'ot alon' )ell )it# #i% (omra&e% &rin' #i%#aar&o% &ay% in t#e 'errilla movement t#% %#o)in' t#at #e %ati%>e& t#ere;irement of t#e la). T#ere )a% al%o (ir(m%tantial evi&en(e t#at a$$ellee!$etitioner al%o o'#t to 1no) #o) to )rite Hi(ol, )#i(# %e% t#e %ame al$#a*et%e& in +n'li%# an& %o )i&ely %e& in t#e P#ili$$ine%. "iven #i% 'oo& (omman& of+n'li%# a% %#o)n in #i% te%timony, a$$ellee!$etitioner (ol& ea%ily ma1e %e of t#e%ame al$#a*et in t#e $la(e )#ere #e #a& *een re%i&in' for =7 year%.E4 A$$ellant Sol"en a%%erte& t#at a$$ellee!$etitioner faile& to %#o) t#at #e lo%t #i%(itien%#i$ n&er t#e la)% of R%%ia an& t#at R%%ia 'rante& to Fili$ino% t#e %ame

ri'#t to *e natralie& (itien%. 2o)ever, t#e SC %till fon& t#at lo)er (ort &i& noterr in >n&in' a$$ellee!$etitioner a% a %tatele%% ref'ee. A$$ellee!$etitionerG%te%timony t#at #e i% not a R%%ian (itien an& t#at #e #a% no (itien%#i$ i%n(ontroverte&. T#ere i% al%o t#e )ell!1no)n rt#le%%ne%% of mo&ern &i(tator%#i$%'ivin' ri%e to a 'reat nm*er of %tatele%% ref'ee% or &i%$la(e& $er%on%, )it#ot(ontry or a'. T#e tyranni(al intoleran(e of &i(tator%#i$% to o$$o%ition tran%late%into *ea%tly o$$re%%ion, (on(entration (am$% an& *loo&y $r'e%, %(# t#at it i% onlynatral t#at t#o%e )#o ee to ot#er (ontrie% to e%(a$e %(# a %itation, %(# a%a$$ellee!$etitioner, lo%e all *on&% of atta(#ment% to t#eir former fat#erlan&%.


5/47

T2+ PAMU+T+ 2AHANA

FACTS:

T#e%e are t)o a$$eal% from &e(ree% of t#e &i%tri(t (ort of t#e Unite& State% for t#e%ot#ern &i%tri(t of Flori&a (on&emnin' t)o >%#in' ve%%el% an& t#eir (ar'oe% a%

$rie of )ar.

+a(# ve%%el )a% a >%#in' %ma(1, rnnin' in an& ot of 2avana, an& re'larly

en'a'e& in >%#in' on t#e (oa%t of C*a. It %aile& n&er t#e S$ani%# a' an& )a%

o)ne& *y a S$ani%# %*3e(t of C*an *irt#, livin' in t#e (ity of 2avana. It )a%

(omman&e& *y a %*3e(t of S$ain, al%o re%i&in' in 2avana. 2er ma%ter an& (re)

#a& no intere%t in t#e ve%%el, *t )ere entitle& to %#are #er (at(#.

2er (ar'o (on%i%te& of fre%# >%#, (a'#t *y #er (re) from t#e %ea, $t on *oar& a%

t#ey )ere (a'#t, an& 1e$t an& %ol& alive. Until %to$$e& *y t#e *lo(1a&in'%;a&ron %#e #a& no 1no)le&'e of t#e ei%ten(e of t#e )ar or of any *lo(1a&e. S#e

#a& no arm% or ammnition on *oar&, an& ma&e on attem$t to rn t#e *lo(1a&e

after %#e 1ne) of it% ei%ten(e, nor any re%i%tan(e at t#e time of t#e (a$tre.

T#e Pa;ete 2a*ana E5%t ve%%el )a% a %loo$ an& #a& a (re) of t#ree C*an%,

in(l&in' t#e ma%ter, )#o #a& a >%#in' li(en%e from t#e S$ani%# 'overnment, an&

no ot#er (ommi%%ion or li(en%e. S#e left 2avana an& )a% (a$tre& *y t#e Unite&

State% 'n*oat Ca%tine.

T#e Lola E=n& ve%%el )a% a %(#ooner an& #a& a (re) of %i C*an%, in(l&in' t#e

ma%ter, an& no (ommi%%ion or li(en%e. S#e )a% %to$$e& *y t#e Unite& State%%team%#i$ Cin(innati, an& )a% )arne& not to 'o into 2avana, *t )a% tol& t#at %#e

)ol& *e allo)e& to lan& at Ha#ia 2on&a. S#e t#en %et for Ha#ia 2on&a, *t on t#e

net mornin', )#en near t#at $ort, )a% (a$tre& *y t#e Unite& State% %team%#i$

Dol$#in.

Hot# t#e >%#in' ve%%el% )ere *ro'#t *y t#eir (a$tor% into Key /e%t. A li*el for t#e

(on&emnation of ea(# ve%%el an& #er (ar'o a% $rie of )ar )a% >le&. +a(# ve%%el


6/47

)a% %ol& *y a(tion Et#e Pa;ete 2a*ana for t#e %m of 6@ an& t#e Lola for t#e

%m of @@. T#ere )a% no ot#er evi&en(e in t#e re(or& of t#e vale of eit#er

ve%%el or of #er (ar'o.

ISSU+:

/#et#er or not t#e >%#in' %ma(1% )ere %*3e(t to (a$tre &rin' t#e )ar )it#

S$ain.

2+LD:

No. Hy an an(ient %a'e amon' (ivilie& nation%, *e'innin' (entrie% a'o, an&

'ra&ally ri$enin' into a rle of international la), (oa%t >%#in' ve%%el%, $r%in'

t#eir vo(ation of (at(#in' an& *rin'in' in fre%# >%#, #ave *een re(o'nie& a%

eem$t, )it# t#eir (ar'oe% an& (re)%, from (a$tre a% $rie of )ar. ET#e (a%e t#en

&i%(%%e& in%tan(e% t#ro'#ot #i%tory )#ere >%#in' ve%%el% )ere (a$tre&.

It )ill *e (onvenient to refer to %ome lea&in' Fren(# treati%e% on international la) a%

&etermine& *y t#e 'eneral (on%ent of (ivilie& nation%.

+nemy %#i$%, %ay Pi%toye an& Dver&y, in t#eir Treati%e on aritime Prie%,

$*li%#e& in 577, are 'oo& $rie. Not all, #o)ever for it re%lt% from t#e

nanimo% a((or& of t#e maritime $o)er% t#at an e(e$tion %#ol& *e ma&e in

favor of (oa%t >%#ermen. S(# >%#ermen are re%$e(te& *y t#e enemy %o lon' a%

t#ey &evote t#em%elve% e(l%ively to >%#in'.

De C%%y, in #i% )or1 on t#e P#a%e% an& Lea&in' Ca%e% of t#e aritime La) ofNation%, a0rm% in t#e (leare%t lan'a'e t#e eem$tion from (a$tre of >%#in'

*oat%, %ayin', t#at in time of )ar t#e free&om of >%#in' i% re%$e(te& *y

*elli'erent% >%#in' *oat% are (on%i&ere& a% netral in la), a% in $rin(i$le, t#ey are

not %*3e(t eit#er to (a$tre or to (on>%(ation.

Ortolan, in t#e fort# e&ition of #i% Re'le% Internationale% et Di$lomatie &e la er,

after %tatin' t#e 'eneral rle t#at t#e ve%%el% an& (ar'oe% of %*3e(t% of t#e enemy

are la)fl $rie, %ay%: Nevert#ele%%, (%tom a&mit% an e(e$tion in favor of *oat%

en'a'e& in t#e (oa%t >%#ery t#e%e *oat%, a% )ell a% t#eir (re)%, are free from

(a$tre an& eem$t from all #o%tilitie%. T#e (oa%t!>%#in' in&%try i%, in trt#, )#olly

$a(i>(, an& of m(# le%% im$ortan(e in re'ar& to t#e national )ealt# t#at it may$ro&(e t#an maritime (ommer(e or t#e 'reat >%#erie%. Pea(efl an& )#olly

inoQen%ive, t#o%e )#o (arry it on, may *e (alle& t#e #arve%ter% of t#e territorial

%ea%, %in(e t#ey (on>ne t#em%elve% to 'at#erin' in t#e $ro&(t% t#ereof t#ey are

for t#e mo%t $art $oor familie% )#o %ee1 in t#i% (allin' #ar&ly more t#an t#e mean%

of 'ainin' t#eir liveli#oo&. A'ain, after o*%ervin' t#at t#ere are very fe) %olemn

$*li( treatie% )#i(# ma1e mention of t#e immnity of >%#in' *oat% in time of )ar,

#e %ay%: From anot#er $oint of vie) t#e (%tom )#i(# %an(tion% t#i% immnity i%


7/47

not %o 'eneral t#at it (an *e (on%i&ere& a% ma1in' an a*%olte international rle

*t it #a% *een %o often $t in $ra(ti(e, an&, *e%i&e%, it a((or&% %o )ell )it# t#e rle

in %e in )ar% on lan&, in re'ar& to $ea%ant% an& #%*an&men, to )#om (oa%t

>%#ermen may *e li1ene&, t#at it )ill &o*tle%% (ontine to *e follo)e& in maritime

)ar% to (ome. EA lot of o$inion% of ot#er )riter% )ere al%o in(l&e& )#i(# )ill not *e

mentione& in t#i% &i'e%t

T#i% revie) of t#e $re(e&ent% an& at#oritie% on t#e %*3e(t a$$ear% to %

a*n&antly to &emon%trate t#at at t#e $re%ent &ay, *y t#e 'eneral (on%ent of t#e

(ivilie& nation% of t#e )orl&, an& in&e$en&ently of any e$re%% treaty or ot#er

$*li( a(t, it i% an e%ta*li%#e& rle of international la), fon&e& on (on%i&eration% of

#manity to a $oor an& in&%trio% or&er of men, an& of t#e mtal (onvenien(e of

*elli'erent %tate%, t#at (oa%t >%#in' ve%%el%, )it# t#eir im$lement% an& %$$lie%,

(ar'oe% an& (re)%, narme& an& #one%tly $r%in' t#eir $ea(efl (allin' of

(at(#in' an& *rin'in' in fre%# >%#, are eem$t from (a$tre a% $rie of )ar.

T#e eem$tion, of (or%e, &oe% not a$$ly to (oa%t >%#ermen or t#eir ve%%el% ifem$loye& for a )arli1e $r$o%e, or in %(# a )ay a% to 'ive ai& or information to t#e

enemy nor )#en military or naval o$eration% (reate a ne(e%%ity to )#i(# all $rivate

intere%t% m%t 'ive )ay.

Nor #a% t#e eem$tion *een eten&e& to %#i$% or ve%%el% em$loye& on t#e #i'# %ea

in ta1in' )#ale% or %eal% or (o& or ot#er >%# )#i(# are not *ro'#t fre%# to mar1et,

*t are %alte& or ot#er)i%e (re& an& ma&e a re'lar arti(le of (ommer(e.

T#i% rle of international la) i% one )#i(# $rie (ort% a&mini%terin' t#e la) of

nation% are *on& to ta1e 3&i(ial noti(e of, an& to 'ive eQe(t to, in t#e a*%en(e of

any treaty or ot#er $*li( a(t of t#eir o)n 'overnment in relation to t#e matter.

Hy t#e $ra(ti(e of all (ivilie& nation%, ve%%el% em$loye& only for t#e $r$o%e% of

&i%(overy or %(ien(e are (on%i&ere& a% eem$t from t#e (ontin'en(ie% of )ar, an&

t#erefore not %*3e(t to (a$tre. It #a% *een %al for t#e 'overnment %en&in' ot

%(# an e$e&ition to 'ive noti(e to ot#er $o)er% *t it i% not e%%ential.

To t#i% %*3e(t in more t#an one a%$e(t are %in'larly a$$li(a*le t#e )or&% ttere&

*y r. J%ti(e Stron', %$ea1in' for t#i% (ort: Un&o*te&ly no %in'le nation (an

(#an'e t#e la) of t#e %ea. T#e la) i% of niver%al o*li'ation an& no %tatte of one or

t)o nation% (an (reate o*li'ation% for t#e )orl&. Li1e all t#e la)% of nation%, it re%t%

$on t#e (ommon (on%ent of (ivilie& (ommnitie%. It i% of for(e, not *e(a%e it )a%

$re%(ri*e& *y any %$erior $o)er, *t *e(a%e it #a% *een 'enerally a((e$te& a% a

rle of (on&(t. /#atever may #ave *een it% ori'in, )#et#er in t#e %a'e% of

navi'ation, or in t#e or&inan(e% of maritime %tate%, or in *ot#, it #a% *e(ome t#e

la) of t#e %ea only *y t#e (on(rrent %an(tion of t#o%e nation% )#o may *e %ai& to

(on%titte t#e (ommer(ial )orl&. any of t#e %a'e% )#i(# $revail, an& )#i(# #ave


8/47

t#e for(e of la), &o*tle%% ori'inate& in t#e $o%itive $re%(ri$tion% of %ome %in'le

%tate, )#i(# )ere at >r%t of limite& eQe(t, *t )#i(#, )#en 'enerally a((e$te&,

*e(ame of niver%al o*li'ation.

In t#e (a%e, ea(# ve%%el )a% of a mo&erate %ie, %(# a% i% not n%al in (oa%t

>%#in' %ma(1%, an& )a% re'larly en'a'e& in >%#in' on t#e (oa%t of C*a. T#e (re)of ea(# )ere fe) in nm*er, #a& no intere%t in t#e ve%%el, an& re(eive&, in retrn

for t#eir toil an& enter$ri%e, t)o t#ir&% of #er (at(#, t#e ot#er t#ir& 'oin' to #er

o)ner *y )ay of (om$en%ation for #er %e. +a(# ve%%el )ent ot from 2avana to

#er >%#in' 'ron&, an& )a% (a$tre& )#en retrnin' alon' t#e (oa%t of C*a. T#e

(ar'o of ea(# (on%i%te& of fre%# >%#, (a'#t *y #er (re) from t#e %ea, an& 1e$t

alive on *oar&. Alt#o'# one of t#e ve%%el% eten&e& #er >%#in' tri$, )e (annot

&o*t t#at ea(# )a% en'a'e& in t#e (oa%t >%#ery, an& not in a (ommer(ial

a&ventre, )it#in t#e rle of international la).

T#e (a%e )a% a&3&'e& t#at t#e (a$tre )a% nla)fl an& )it#ot $ro*a*le (a%e

or&ere& t#at t#e $ro(ee&% of t#e %ale of t#e ve%%el, to'et#er )it# t#e $ro(ee&% ofany %ale of #er (ar'o, *e re%tore& to t#e (laimant, )it# &ama'e% an& (o%t%.

CO KI C2A v. ?ALD+ TAN K+2

FACTS:

Co Kim C#am #a& a $en&in' (a%e t#at )a% >le& &rin' t#e $erio& of Ja$ane%e

o(($ation. 2e >le& a $etition of an&am%, in )#i(# #e i% re;e%tin' for t#e 3&'e

of t#e lo)er (ort to (ontine t#e $ro(ee&in'% in t#e Cort of Fir%t In%tan(e in

anila. Ht J&'e Ar%enio P. Dion ref%e& to ta1e (o'nian(e of an& (ontine t#e

$ro(ee&in'% of t#e %ai& (a%e %in(e t#e $ro(lamation i%%e& on O(to*er =4, 56 *y

"eneral Do'la% a(Art#r invali&atin' an& nllifyin' t#e 3&i(ial $ro(ee&in'% an&

3&'ment% of t#e (ort of t#e P#ili$$ine%, in t#e a*%en(e of an ena*lin' la), t#e

lo)er (ort% #ave no 3ri%&i(tion to ta1e (o'nian(e of an& (ontine 3&i(ial

$ro(ee&in'% $en&in' in t#e (ort% )#ile t#e 'overnment i% n&er t#e o(($ation oft#e Ja$ane%e.

ISSU+S:


9/47

5. /#et#er or not t#e 3&i(ial a(t% an& $ro(ee&in'% of t#e (ort ei%tin' in t#e

P#ili$$ine% n&er t#e P#ili$$ine +e(tive Commi%%ion an& t#e Re$*li( of t#e

P#ili$$ine% )ere 'oo& an& vali&.

=. /#et#er or not t#e $ro(lamation i%%e& *y "eneral Do'la% a(Art#r in

)#i(# #e &e(lare& 8t#at all la)%, re'lation% an& $ro(e%%e% of any of t#e'overnment in t#e P#ili$$ine% are nll an& voi&9 #a% invali&ate& all 3&'ment% an&

3&i(ial a(t% an& $ro(ee&in'% of t#e %ai& (ort%.

2+LD:

5. (ation from t#e National +(onomi( Con(il

%#o)in' t#at t#ere i% a %#orta'e in (ereal% or ri(e. 2en(e, t#e t#en +e(tive

Se(retary, R>no 2e(#anova, at#orie& t#e im$ortation of -,@@@ ton% of ri(e from

a*roa& to t#e &etriment of or lo(al $lanter%. Ramon "onale%, t#en $re%i&ent of

t#e Iloilo Palay an& Corn Planter% A%%o(iation a%%aile& t#e ee(tive a'reement%.


10/47

"onale% averre& t#at 2e(#anova i% )it#ot 3ri%&i(tion or in e(e%% of 3ri%&i(tion9,

*e(a%e Re$*li( A(t 47= $ro#i*it% t#e im$ortation of ri(e an& (orn *y 8t#e Ri(e

an& Corn A&mini%tration or any ot#er 'overnment a'en(y.

ISSU+:

/#et#er or not RA 47= $revail% over t#e = ee(tive a'reement% entere& into *y

a(a$a'al.

2+LD:


11/47

%ome time #e an& #i% fello) C#ine%e *%ine%%men en3oye& a 8mono$oly9 in t#e

lo(al mar1et in Pa%ay. Until in Jne 567 )#en Con're%% $a%%e& t#e RA 55@ or t#e

Retail Tra&e Nationaliation A(t t#e $r$o%e of )#i(# i% to re%erve to Fili$ino% t#e

ri'#t to en'a'e in t#e retail *%ine%%. I(#on' t#en $etitione& for t#e nlli>(ation of

t#e %ai& A(t on t#e 'ron& t#at it (ontravene& %everal treatie% (on(l&e& *y t#e RP

)#i(#, a((or&in' to #im, violate% t#e e;al $rote(tion (la%e E$a(ta %n& %ervan&a.2e %ai& t#at a% a C#ine%e *%ine%%man en'a'e& in t#e *%ine%% #ere in t#e (ontry

)#o #el$% in t#e in(ome 'eneration of t#e (ontry #e %#ol& *e 'iven e;al

o$$ortnity.

ISSU+:

/#et#er or not a la) may invali&ate or %$er%e&e treatie% or 'enerally a((e$te&

$rin(i$le%.

2+LD:


12/47

NORT2 S+A CONTIN+NTAL S2+LF CAS+

FACTS:

Net#erlan&% an& Denmar1 #a& &ra)n $artial *on&ary line% *a%e& on t#e

e;i&i%tan(e $rin(i$leEA!H an& C!D. An a'reement on frt#er $rolon'ation of t#e*on&ary $rove& &i0(lt *e(a%e Denmar1 an& Net#erlan&% )i%#e& t#i%

$rolon'ation to ta1e $la(e *a%e& on t#e e;i&i%tan(e $rin(i$le EH!+ an& D!+)#ere

a% "ermany )a% of t#e vie) t#at, to'et#er, t#e%e t)o *on&arie% )ol& $ro&(e an

ine;ita*le re%lt for #er. "ermany %tate& t#at &e to it% (on(ave (oa%tline, %(# a

line )ol& re%lt in #er loo%in' ot on #er %#are of t#e (ontinental %#elf *a%e& on

$ro$ortionality to t#e len't# of it% Nort# Sea (oa%tline. T#e Cort #a& to &e(i&e t#e

$rin(i$le% an& rle% of international la) a$$li(a*le to t#i% &elimitation. In &oin' %o,

t#e (ort #a& to &e(i&e if t#e $rin(i$le% e%$o%e& *y t#e $artie% )ere *in&in' on t#e

$artie% eit#er t#ro'# treaty la) or (%tomary international la).

Questions before the Court (as relevant to this post):

I% "ermany n&er a le'al o*li'ation to a((e$t t#e e;i&i%tan(e!%$e(ial

(ir(m%tan(e% $rin(i$le, (ontaine& in Arti(le - of t#e "eneva Convention, eit#er a%

a (%tomary international la) rle or on t#e *a%i% of t#e "eneva Convention

The Courts Decision:

T#e %e of t#e e;i&i%tan(e met#o& #a& not (ry%talli%e& into (%tomary la) an&

)a% i% not o*li'atory for t#e &elimitation of t#e area% in t#e Nort# Sea relate& to t#e

$re%ent $ro(ee&in'%.

Relevant Findings of the Court:

Natre of t#e treaty o*li'ation: I% t#e 567 "eneva Convention, an& in $arti(lar

Arti(le -, *in&in' on "ermany

5. Arti(le - of t#e "eneva Convention on t#e Continental S#elf %tate% t#at nle%% t#e

$artie% #ave a'ree& on a met#o& for &elimitation or nle%% %$e(ial (ir(m%tan(e%

ei%t, t#e e;i&i%tan(e met#o& )ol& a$$ly E%ee Arti(le -. "ermany #a% %i'ne& *t

not rati>e& t#e "eneva Convention, )#ile Net#erlan&% an& Denmar1 are $artie% to

t#e Convention. T#e latter t)o State% ar'e t#at )#ile "ermany i% not a $arty to t#e
http://iilj.org/courses/documents/SketchMap.pdfhttp://iilj.org/courses/documents/SketchMap.pdfhttp://iilj.org/courses/documents/SketchMap.pdfhttp://iilj.org/courses/documents/SketchMap.pdf


13/47

Convention Enot #avin' rati>e& it, %#e i% %till *on& *y Arti(le - of t#e Convention

*e(a%e:

(1) by conduct, by public statements and proclamations, and in other ways, the

Republic has unilaterally assumed the obligations of the Convention; or hasmanifested its acceptance of the conventional regime; or has recognied it as being

generally applicable to the delimitation of continental shelf areas

(!) the "ederal Republic had held itself out as so assuming, accepting or

recogniing, in such a manner as to cause other #tates, and in particular $enmar%

and the &etherlands, to rely on the attitude thus ta%en up' (the latter is called the

principle of estoppel)

=. T#e Cort re3e(te& t#e >r%t ar'ment. It %tate& t#at only a Vvery &e>nite very

(on%i%tent (or%e of (on&(t on t#e $art of a StateG )ol& allo) t#e (ort to

$re%me t#at a State #a& %ome#o) *e(ome *on& *y a treaty E*y a mean% ot#er

t#an in a formal manner: i.e. rati>(ation )#en t#e State )a% Vat all time% flly a*le

an& entitle& toWG a((e$t t#e treaty (ommitment% in a formal manner. T#e Cort

#el& t#at "ermany #a& not nilaterally a%%me& o*li'ation% n&er t#e Convention.

T#e (ort al%o too1 noti(e of t#e fa(t t#at even if "ermany rati>e& t#e treaty, %#e

#a& t#e o$tion of enterin' into a re%ervation on Arti(le - follo)in' )#i(# t#at

$arti(lar arti(le )ol& no lon'er *e a$$li(a*le to "ermany Ei.e. even if one )ere to

a%%me t#at "ermany #a& inten&e& to *e(ome a $arty to t#e Convention, it &oe%not $re%$$o%e t#at it )ol& #ave al%o n&erta1en t#o%e o*li'ation% (ontaine& in

Arti(le -.

4. NH: T#e ?ienna Convention on t#e La) of Treatie% of 56-6 E?CLT, )#i(# (ame

into for(e in 56@, &i%(%%e% more flly t#e o*li'ation% of t#ir& State% to treatie%. It

(learly %ti$late% t#at an o*li'ation ari%e% for a t#ir& State from a $rovi%ion of a

treaty only if E5 t#e $artie% to t#e treaty inten& t#e $rovi%ion to (reate t#i%

o*li'ation for t#e t#ir& State% an& E= t#e t#ir& State e$re%%ly a((e$t% t#at

o*li'ation in )ritin' EA. 47 of t#e ?CLT. T#e ?CLT )a% not in for(e )#en t#e ICJ

&eli*erate& on t#i% (a%e. 2o)ever, a% %een a*ove, t#e ICJG% $o%ition )a% (on%i%tent

t#e ?CLT. ESee t#e relevant $rovi%ion% of t#e ?ienna Convention on t#e La) of

Treatie%.

. T#e (ort #el& t#at t#e ei%ten(e of a %itation of e%to$$el )ol& #ave allo)e&

Arti(le - to *e(ome *in&in' on "ermany *t #el& t#at "ermanyG% a(tion &i& not
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14/47

%$$ort an ar'ment for e%to$$el. T#e (ort al%o #el& t#at t#e mere fa(t t#at

"ermany may not #ave %$e(i>(ally o*3e(te& to t#e e;i&i%tan(e $rin(i$le a%

(ontaine& in Arti(le - i% not %0(ient to %tate t#at t#e $rin(i$le i% no) *in&in' $on

it.

7. In (on(l%ion, t#e (ort #el& t#at "ermany #a& not a(te& in any )ay to in(r

o*li'ation% (ontaine& in Arti(le - of t#e "eneva Convention. T#e e;i&i%tan(e

%$e(ial (ir(m%tan(e% rle )a% not *in&in' on "ermany *y )ay of treaty.

Natre of t#e (%tomary international la) o*li'ation: I% "ermany *on& *y t#e

$rovi%ion% of Arti(le - of t#e "eneva Convention *y )ay of (%tomary international

la)

-. Net#erlan&% an& Denmar1 ar'e& t#at Arti(le - al%o ree(te& Vt#e a((e$te& rle

of 'eneral international la) on t#e %*3e(t of (ontinental %#elf &elimitationG an&

ei%te& in&e$en&ently of t#e Convention. T#erefore, t#ey ar'e&, "ermany i% *on&

*y it *y )ay of (%tomary international la).

. To &e(i&e if t#e e;i&i%tan(e $rin(i$le *on& "ermany *y )ay of (%tomary

international la), t#e (ort eamine& E5 t#e %tat% of t#e $rin(i$le (ontaine& in

Arti(le - a% it %too& )#en t#e Convention )a% *ein' &ra)n $ E= an& after t#e

latter (ame into for(e.

/#at )a% t#e (%tomary la) %tat% of Arti(le - at t#e time of &raftin' t#e

Convention

. T#e (ort #el& t#e $rin(i$le of e;i&i%tan(e, a% (ontaine& in Arti(le -, &i& not

form a $art of ei%tin' or emer'in' (%tomary international la) at t#e time of

&raftin' t#e Convention. T#e Cort %$$orte& t#i% >n&in' *a%e& on E5 t#e

#e%itation e$re%%e& *y t#e &rafter% of t#e Convention International La)

Commi%%ion on t#e in(l%ion of Arti(le - E$ara. -= an& E= t#e fa(t re%ervation% to

Arti(le - )a% $ermi%%i*le n&er t#e Convention EArti(le 5=. T#e (ort #el&:

W Arti(le - i% one of t#o%e in re%$e(t of )#i(#, n&er t#e re%ervation% arti(le of t#e

Convention EArti(le 5= re%ervation% may *e ma&e *y any State on %i'nin', ratifyin'

or a((e&in' for, %$ea1in' 'enerally, it i% a (#ara(teri%ti( of $rely (onventional rle%

an& o*li'ation% t#at, in re'ar& to t#em, %ome fa(lty of ma1in' nilateral

re%ervation% may, )it#in (ertain limit%, *e a&mitte& )#erea% t#i% (annot *e %o in


15/47


16/47

Duration

5=. T#e (ort #el& t#at &ration ta1en for t#e (%tomary la) rle to emer'e i% not

a% im$ortant a% )i&e%$rea& an& re$re%entative $arti(i$ation, niform %a'e an& t#e

ei%ten(e of an o$inio 3ri%.

lthough the passage of only a short period of time (in this case, * + years) is not

necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary

international law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an

indispensable re-uirement would be that within the period in -uestion, short though

it might be, #tate practice, including that of #tates whose interests are specially

a.ected, should have been both e/tensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the

provision invo%ed and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a

general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved (te/t in brac%etsadded)'

Opinio uris

54. 0pinio uris i% ree(te& in a(t% of State% ENi(ara'a Ca%e or in omi%%ion% E Lot%

(a%e in %o far a% t#o%e a(t% or omi%%ion% are &one follo)in' a *elief t#at t#e %ai&

State i% o*li'ate& *y la) to a(t or refrain from a(tin' in a $arti(lar )ay. EFor more

on opinio uris(li(1 #ere.

5. T#e Cort eamine& 57 (a%e% )#ere State% #a& &elimite& t#eir *on&arie% %in'

t#e e;i&i%tan(e met#o&, after t#e Convention (ame into for(e E$ara%. 7 !. T#e

(ort (on(l&e&, even if t#ere )ere %ome State $ra(ti(e in favor of t#e

e;i&i%tan(e $rin(i$le t#e (ort (ol& not &e&(t t#e ne(e%%ary o$inio 3ri% from

t#i% State $ra(ti(e. T#e Nort# Sea Continental S#elf Ca%e% (on>rme& t#at *ot# State

$ra(ti(e Et#e o*3e(tive element an& o$inio 3ri% Et#e %*3e(tive element are

e%%ential $re!re;i%ite% for t#e formation of a (%tomary la) rle.T#i% i% (on%i%tent

)it# Arti(le 4 E5 E* of t#e Statte of t#e ICJ. T#e follo)in' e$lain% t#e (on(e$t

of opinio urisan& t#e &iQeren(e *et)een (%tom% Ei.e. #a*it% an& (%tomary la):

&ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also

be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this

practice is rendered obligatory by the e/istence of a rule of law re-uiring it 2he

need for such a belief, ie, the e/istence of a subective element, is implicit in the

very notion of the opinio uris sive necessitatis 2he #tates concerned must
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17/47

therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation 2he

fre-uency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough 2here are

many international acts, eg, in the 3eld of ceremonial and protocol, which are

performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations of

courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty

57. T#e (ort (on(l&e& t#at t#e e;i&i%tan(e $rin(i$le )a% not *in&in' on

"ermany *y )ay of treaty or (%tomary international la) *e(a%e, in t#e (a%e of

t#e latter, t#e $rin(i$le #a& not attaine& a (%tomary international la) %tat% at

t#e time of t#e entry into for(e of t#e "eneva Convention or t#ereafter. A% %(#, t#e

(ort #el& t#at t#e %e of t#e e;i&i%tan(e met#o& i% not o*li'atory for t#e

&elimitation of t#e area% (on(erne& in t#e $re%ent $ro(ee&in'%.

ILITAR< X PARAILITAR< ACTI?I+S IN AND A"AINST NICARA"UA ENICARA"UA v. US

Overview:2he case involved military and paramilitary activities conducted by, or

with the assistance of, the 4nited #tates against &icaragua from 1561 to 1567 $ue

to a multilateral treaty reservation of the 4nited #tates (hereinafter called the


18/47

8andenberg reservation), the Court was compelled to base its 3ndings only on

customary and general principles of international law s a result, the &icaragua

case developed signi3cant urisprudence on clarifying customary international law

on the use of force and non9intervention, elements necessary to form customary

international law and the relationship between the latter and treaty lawControversial aspects of the decision included the court:s methodology used to

determine that the principle of non9intervention had attained customary law status,

the court:s reliance on 4& resolutions as a source of opinio uris and the court:s

reliance on multilateral treaties to determine customary international law in face of

the 8andenberg reservation

Reco!!endation: T#e Ni(ara'a (a%e (ontain% in!&e$t# &i%(%%ion% on t#e

relation%#i$ *et)een treaty an& (%tomary international la). St&ent% may )i%# to

rea& t#i% $o%t on t#e relation%#i$ *efore rea&in' t#e %yno$%i% of t#e (a%e.

In t#e Ni(ara'a (a%e, t#e ICJ &i%(%%e&:

T#e (om$eten(e of t#e ICJ to 'ive it% &etermination *a%e& on (%tomary

international la) in t#e fa(e of t#e ?an&en*er' re%ervation of t#e Unite&

State%.

T#e relation%#i$ *et)een treaty la) an& (%tomary international la).

+lement% of (%tomary international la).

T#e $ro#i*ition on t#e %e of for(e a% aus cogensnorm.

C%tomary international la) %tat% of t#e $rin(i$le of non!intervention.

The co!petence of the "C# to give its deter!ination based on custo!ar$international la%

5. T#e Unite& State% )#en a((e$tin' t#e (om$l%ory 3ri%&i(tion of t#e ICJ En&er

Arti(le 4-E= of t#e ICJ Statte entere& into t#e ?an&en*er' re%ervation. T#i%

re%ervation *arre& t#e ICJ from %in' (ertain mltilateral treatie% in t#e a&3&i(ation

of t#e &i%$te.
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3


19/47

=. T#e Unite& State% #el& t#at t#i% re%ervation *arre& t#e Cort from &eterminin'

t#e (a%e even on t#e *a%i% of (%tomary an& 'eneral $rin(i$le% of international la)

*e(a%e (%tomary la) $rovi%ion%, on )#i(# Ni(ara'a relie& on, )ere i&enti(al to

$rovi%ion% in treatie% %o'#t to *e e(l&e&. He(a%e of t#e i&enti(al (ontent, t#e

Unite& State% ar'e&, treaty $rovi%ion% %$ervene an& %*%me t#e $arallel(%tomary la) $rovi%ion E%ee *elo).

4. T#e Cort &i%a'ree&. It #el& t#at mltilateral treaty re%ervation% (ol& not

$re(l&e t#e Cort from &eterminin' (a%e% relyin' (%tomary international la)

*e(a%e t#e latter ei%t% in&e$en&ently of treaty la).

&< 2he 4nited #tates disagreed with the Court:s determination to proceed with the

case and refused to participate further, including at the merits stage (see the

declaration made by the 4nited #tatesin this regard) lthough the Court wasbarred from resorting to multilateral treaties, it referred to the latter, including the

4& Charter, to identify the e/istence, nature and scope of various customary law

principles Commentators criticised the Court for circumventing the multilateral

reservation in this manner

Relationship bet%een treat$ la% and custo!ar$ international la%

. A% )e note& *efore, t#e Unite& State% ar'e& t#at )#en (%tomary international

la) an& treaty la) (ontain t#e %ame (ontent t#e treaty la) %*%me% an&

%$ervene% (%tomary international la). In ot#er )or&%, 8t#e ei%ten(e of $rin(i$le%

in t#e Unite& Nation% C#arter $re(l&e% t#e $o%%i*ility t#at %imilar rle% mi'#t ei%t

in&e$en&ently in (%tomary international la), eit#er *e(a%e ei%tin' (%tomary

rle% #a& *een in(or$orate& into t#e C#arter, or *e(a%e t#e C#arter inen(e& t#e

later a&o$tion of (%tomary rle% )it# a (orre%$on&in' (ontent9 E$ara 5.

7. In it% re%$on%e, t#e Cort &i%tin'i%#e& t)o %itation%:

Ea Sitation% )#ere t#e (%tomary la) $rin(i$le% )ere i&enti(al to treaty

$rovi%ion% an&

E* Sitation% )#ere (%tomary la) an& treaty la) ri'#t% an& o*li'ation% &iQere&

in re%$e(t of t#e %ame %*3e(t matter.

-. In %itation% )#ere (%tomary la) $rin(i$le% )ere i&enti(al to treaty $rovi%ion%

Eree(te& a% Ea a*ove, t#e Cort, ;ite (orre(tly, &i%a'ree& )it# t#e vie) of t#e
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/19/world/text-of-us-statement-on-withdrawal-from-case-before-the-world-court.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/19/world/text-of-us-statement-on-withdrawal-from-case-before-the-world-court.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/19/world/text-of-us-statement-on-withdrawal-from-case-before-the-world-court.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/19/world/text-of-us-statement-on-withdrawal-from-case-before-the-world-court.html


20/47

Unite& State%. It #el& t#at even if $rin(i$le% of (%tomary international la) are

(o&i>e& into treatie%, t#e former (ontine% to ei%t %i&e *y %i&e )it# t#e latter. For

treaty $artie%, *ot# (%tomary an& treaty la) a$$ly an& if, for %ome rea%on, t#e

treaty (ea%e% to a$$ly t#e i&enti(al (%tomary la) $rovi%ion (ontine% to a$$ly

*et)een t#em naQe(te& E%ee more on $ara 5.

. T#e fa(t t#at (%tomary international la) ei%t% alon'%i&e treaty la) )a% an

ar'ment *ro'#t *y Nor)ay an& Denmar1 in t#e &orth #ea Continental #helf

Cases. In t#e%e (a%e%, t#e t)o (ontrie% #avin' faile& to attri*te an o*li'ation

n&er Arti(le - of t#e "eneva Convention% of 567 to "ermany, %o'#t to *in&

"ermany via (%tomary international la). In t#i% (a%e t#e Cort &etermine& t#at

Arti(le - neit#er ree(te& (%tomary la) at t#e time of t#e (o&i>(ation, nor #a& it

attaine& t#at %tat% at t#e time of t#e &etermination. In t#e &icaragua case, t#e

Cort relie& on t#e &orth #ea Continental #helf Casesto %$$ort t#e a%%ertion t#at$rin(i$le% of (%tomary international la) (an ei%t %i&e *y %i&e )it# i&enti(al treaty

la) $rovi%ion% an& t#e latter &oe% not %$ervene t#e former in a manner )#ere t#e

former (ea%e% to ei%t E$ara 5.

. T#e Cort al%o relie& on Arti(le 75 of t#e UN C#arterto %#o) t#at a treaty it%elf

(an re(o'ni%e t#e ei%ten(e of (%tomary international la) on t#e %ame %*3e(t

matter. T#e term 8in#erent9 in Arti(le 75 re(o'ni%e& t#at (%tomary la) ri'#t% of

%elf!&efen%e ei%te& alon'%i&e treaty $rovi%ion%.

6. Rle% (ontainin' t#e %ame (ontent (ol& *e treate& &iQerently in (%tomary

international la) an& in treaty la). For eam$le, treaty la) may (ontain in%tittion%

or me(#ani%m% to en%re t#e eQe(tive im$lementation of it% $rovi%ion%, in(l&in'

t#o%e t#at ree(t (%tomary la). One (ol& ta1e t#e CortG% rea&in' of Arti(le 75 a%

an eam$le. A State t#at eer(i%e% t#e ri'#t of %elf!&efen(e n&er Arti(le 75,

a((or&in' to t#e UN C#arter, #a% an o*li'ation to re$ort t#e %e of for(e

imme&iately to t#e Se(rity Con(il. T#e Cort #el& t#at t#i% )a% a treaty

re;irement an& one t#at &i& not ei%t n&er (%tomary la). Intere%tin'ly, alt#o'#

t#e failre to re$ort &i& not re%lt in a *rea(# of (%tomary international la), t#eCort in&i(ate& t#at t#e Unite& StateG% failre to o*%erve t#i% re;irement

(ontra&i(te& #er (laim to *e a(tin' in %elf &efen(e E%ee $ara% =@@, =47.

5@. T#e Cort &i%(%%e& %itation% )#ere (%tomary international la) an& treaty la)

$rovi%ion% )ere not i&enti(al E%ee $oint E* a*ove. For eam$le, t#e Cort referre&

to t#e fa(t t#at (on(e$t% %(# an& ne(e%%ity an& $ro$ortionality, or t#e &e>nition of
http://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2014/02/28/north-sea-continental-shelf-cases-summary/http://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2014/02/28/north-sea-continental-shelf-cases-summary/http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_16937.htm?selectedLocale=enhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_16937.htm?selectedLocale=enhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_16937.htm?selectedLocale=enhttp://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2014/02/28/north-sea-continental-shelf-cases-summary/http://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2014/02/28/north-sea-continental-shelf-cases-summary/http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_16937.htm?selectedLocale=enhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_16937.htm?selectedLocale=enhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_16937.htm?selectedLocale=en


21/47

)#at (on%titte% an arme& atta(1, are not fon& n&er Arti(le 75, or t#e UN C#arter,

*t in (%tomary la). T#e Cort (on(l&e& t#at E5 t#i% $rove% t#at (%tomary

international la) (ontine% to ei%t alon'%i&e treaty la) an& t#at E= area% 'overne&

*y t#e t)o %or(e% of la) &o not Eal)ay% overla$ an& t#e rle% &o not Eal)ay%

#ave t#e %ame (ontent.

8Wt#e C#arter, #avin' it%elf re(o'nie& t#e ei%ten(e of t#i% ri'#t Ein#erent

(%tomary la) ri'#t of %elf!&efen(e n&er A. 75 of t#e UN C#arter, &oe% not 'o on

to re'late &ire(tly all a%$e(t% of it% (ontent. For eam$le, it &oe% not (ontain any

%$e(i>( rle )#ere*y %elf!&efen(e )ol& )arrant only mea%re% )#i(# are

$ro$ortional to t#e arme& atta(1 an& ne(e%%ary to re%$on& to it, a rle )ell

e%ta*li%#e& in (%tomary international la). oreover, a &e>nition of t#e 8arme&

atta(19 )#i(#, if fon& to ei%t, at#ori%e% t#e eer(i%e of t#e 8in#erent ri'#t9 of%elf!&efen(e, i% not $rovi&e& in t#e C#arter, an& i% not $art of treaty la). It (annot

t#erefore *e #el& t#at Arti(le 75 i% a $rovi%ion )#i(# 8%*%me% an& %$ervene%9

(%tomary international la).9

55. In (a%e of a &iver'en(e *et)een treaty la) an& (%tomary international la), for

t#e $artie% to t#e treaty, amon'%t t#em%elve%, t#e treaty $rovi%ion% a$$ly a% le/

specialis. T#e (ortG% %$$ort for t#i% $rin(i$le (an *e fon& in $ara% 5@ an&

55. T#e Cort, in (on(l%ion, e$laine& t#e relation%#i$ *et)een t#e UN C#arter

an& (%tomary international la) in t#e follo)in' manner:

82o)ever, %o far from #avin' (on%titte& a mar1e& &e$artre from a (%tomary

international la) )#i(# %till ei%t% nmo&i>e&, t#e C#arter 'ave e$re%%ion in t#i%

>el& Eon t#e %e of for(e an& %elf &efen(e to $rin(i$le% alrea&y $re%ent in

(%tomary international la), an& t#at la) #a% in t#e %*%e;ent for &e(a&e%

&evelo$e& n&er t#e inen(e of t#e C#arter, to %(# an etent t#at a nm*er of

rle% (ontaine& in t#e C#arter #ave a(;ire& a %tat% in&e$en&ent of it. T#e

e%%ential (on%i&eration i% t#at *ot# t#e C#arter an& t#e (%tomary international la)

o) from a (ommon fn&amental $rin(i$le otla)in' t#e %e of for(e ininternational relation%. T#e &iQeren(e% )#i(# may ei%t *et)een t#e %$e(i>(

(ontent of ea(# are not, in t#e CortG% vie), %(# a% to (a%e a 3&'ment (on>ne&

to t#e >el& of (%tomary international la) to *e ineQe(tive or ina$$ro$riate Eto t#e

$artie% of t#e C#arter )#o are *on& *y t#e C#arterW Etet in *ra(1et% a&&e&

E$ara 55.9


22/47

The relationship bet%een custo!ar$ international la% and us cogens

54. T#e (ort (ite& material $re%ente& *y Ni(ara'a, t#e Unite& State% an& t#e

International La) Commi%%ion to ar'e t#at t#e $ro#i*ition on t#e %e of for(e

(ontaine& in Arti(le =E of t#e UN C#arter #a% attaine& t#e %tat% of a 3% (o'en%

norm. T#e Cort fon& t#i% to *e 8A frt#er (on>rmation of t#e vali&ity a%

(%tomary international la) of t#e $rin(i$le of t#e $ro#i*ition of t#e %e of for(e

e$re%%e& in Arti(le =, $ara'ra$# , of t#e C#arter of t#e Unite& Nation%W9 E$ara

56@.

The necessar$ ele!ents to deter!ine the e&istence of custo!ar$international la%

5. T#e Cort, %imilar to t#e Nort# Sea Continental S#elf Ca%e, (on%i&ere& *ot# t#e

%*3e(tive element Eopinio uris an& t#e o*3e(tive element EState $ra(ti(e a%e%%ential $re!re;i%ite% to t#e formation an& el(i&ation of a (%tomary

international la) norm E$ara =@. T#e 3ri%$r&en(e of t#e Ni(ara'a (a%e

(ontaine& an im$ortant (lari>(ation in(on%i%tent State $ra(ti(e &oe% not aQe(t t#e

formation or (ontine& ei%ten(e of a (%tomary $rin(i$le %o lon' a% t#e

in(on%i%ten(y i% 3%ti>e& a% a *rea(# of t#e rle.

8It i% not to *e e$e(te& t#at in t#e $ra(ti(e of State% t#e a$$li(ation of t#e rle% in

;e%tion %#ol& #ave *een $erfe(t, in t#e %en%e t#at State% %#ol& #ave refraine&,

)it# (om$lete (on%i%ten(y, from t#e %e of for(e or from intervention in ea(#ot#erG% internal aQair%.

T#e Cort &oe% not (on%i&er t#at, for a rle to *e e%ta*li%#e& a% (%tomary, t#e

(orre%$on&in' $ra(ti(e m%t *e in a*%oltely ri'oro% (onformity )it# t#e rle. In

or&er to &e&(e t#e ei%ten(e of (%tomary rle%, t#e Cort &eem% it %0(ient t#at

t#e (on&(t of State% %#ol&, in 'eneral, *e (on%i%tent )it# %(# rle%, an& t#at

in%tan(e% of State (on&(t in(on%i%tent )it# a 'iven rle %#ol& 'enerally #ave

*een treate& a% *rea(#e% of t#at rle, not a% in&i(ation% of t#e re(o'nition of a ne)

rle.

If a State a(t% in a )ay $rima fa(ie in(om$ati*le )it# a re(o'nie& rle, *t &efen&%

it% (on&(t *y a$$ealin' to e(e$tion% or 3%ti>(ation% (ontaine& )it#in t#e rle

it%elf, t#en )#et#er or not t#e StateG% (on&(t i% in fa(t 3%ti>a*le on t#at *a%i%, t#e

%i'ni>(an(e of t#at attit&e i% to (on>rm rat#er t#an to )ea1en t#e rle. E$ara

5-9


23/47


24/47

way may not eventually become binding international law (either by attaining

customary law status or becoming codi3ed into treaty law) @t can, if there is

ade-uate #tate practice and opinio uris 2he argument is that opinio uris cannot be

said to e/ist based merely on a vote in favour of a non9binding resolution + in the

absence of an e/amination of subse-uent consistent and general #tate practice(which, in turn, re=ects or con3rms opinio uris)

Custo!ar$ international la% relating to principles of non'intervention

5-. T#e Cort #el& t#at Arinciples such as those of the non9use of force (para 151),

non9intervention (para 15!), respect for the independence and territorial integrity of

#tates, right of collective self defence (para 15*) and the freedom of navigation,

continue to be binding as part of customary international law, despite the operation

of provisions of conventional law in which they have been incorporated (te/t in

brac%ets added)'

5. T#e CortG% >n&in' t#at $rin(i$le of non!intervention forme& a $art of

(%tomary international la) invite& (riti(i%m from (ommentator%, $artly *e(a%e

t#ey &i%a'ree& t#at t#e $rin(i$le forme& (%tomary international la) an& $artly

*e(a%e of t#e CortG% o)n (ontra&i(tion% in (omin' to it% (on(l%ion% an&

ina&e;a(y of analy%i% E%ee *elo). T#e CortG% (ontra&i(tion %tem% from t#i%

%tatement: ' 2he principle of non9intervention involves the right of every

sovereign #tate to conduct its a.airs without outside interference;

though examples of trespass against this principle are not infrequent, the

Court considers that it is part and parcel of customary international

law'(emphasis added Aara !B!)

5. T#e Cort *e'an it% analy%i% )it# t)o ;e%tion%: 8Not)it#%tan&in' t#e

mlti$li(ity of &e(laration% *y State% a((e$tin' t#e $rin(i$le of non!intervention,

t#ere remain t)o ;e%tion%: >r%t, )#at i% t#e ea(t (ontent of t#e $rin(i$le %o

a((e$te&, an& %e(on&ly, i% t#e $ra(ti(e %0(iently in (onformity )it# it for t#i% to *e

a rle of (%tomary international la)9T#e >r%t ;e%tion )a% &i%(%%e& in a

$revio% $o%t an& )ill not *e &i%(%%e& #ere.

5. Alt#o'# t#e ;e%tion %eeme& to &ire(t t#e Cort to)ar&% i&entifyin' an

ei%tin' (%tom, in it% re%$on%e t#e Cort %eeme& to #ave alrea&y &etermine& t#at

t#e (%tomary la) $ro#i*ition of non!intervention ei%te&. In t#e follo)in' $a%%a'e
http://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2012/11/15/nicaragua-vs-us-case-summary/http://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2012/11/15/nicaragua-vs-us-case-summary/http://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2012/11/15/nicaragua-vs-us-case-summary/http://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2012/11/15/nicaragua-vs-us-case-summary/


25/47

t#e Cort &eli*erate% if, in (ontra%t, a (%tomary la) ri'#t to intervention #a&

evolve&.

8T#ere #ave *een in re(ent year% a nm*er of in%tan(e% of forei'n intervention for

t#e *ene>t of for(e% o$$o%e& to t#e 'overnment of anot#er State. T#e Cort i% not#ere (on(erne& )it# t#e $ro(e%% of &e(oloni%ationW It #a% to (on%i&er )#et#er

t#ere mi'#t *e in&i(ation% of a $ra(ti(e ill%trative of *elief in a 1in& of 'eneral ri'#t

for State% to intervene, &ire(tly or in&ire(tly, )it# or )it#ot arme& for(e, in %$$ort

of an internal o$$o%ition in anot#er State, )#o%e (a%e a$$eare& $arti(larly

)ort#y *y rea%on of t#e $oliti(al an& moral vale% )it# )#i(# it )a% i&enti>e&. For

%(# a 'eneral ri'#t to (ome into ei%ten(e )ol& involve a fn&amental

mo&i>(ation of t#e (%tomary la) $rin(i$le of non!intervention.9 E$ara% =@-, =@.

56. T#e Cort )ent on to #ol&, a% *efore, t#at for a ne) (%tomary rle to *eforme&, not only m%t t#e a(t% (on(erne& 8amont to a %ettle& $ra(ti(e9, *t t#ey

m%t *e a((om$anie& *y t#e o$inio 3ri% %ive ne(e%%itate%9.

8T#e %i'ni>(an(e for t#e Cort of (a%e% of State (on&(t $rima fa(ie in(on%i%tent

)it# t#e $rin(i$le of non!intervention lie% in t#e natre of t#e 'ron& oQere& a%

3%ti>(ation. Relian(e *y a State on a novel ri'#t or an n$re(e&ente& e(e$tion to

t#e $rin(i$le mi'#t, if %#are& in $rin(i$le *y ot#er State%, ten& to)ar&% a

mo&i>(ation of (%tomary international la). In fa(t #o)ever t#e Cort >n&% t#at

State% #ave not 3%ti>e& t#eir (on&(t *y referen(e to a ne) ri'#t of intervention ora ne) e(e$tion to t#e $rin(i$le of it% $ro#i*ition. T#e Unite& State% at#oritie%

#ave on %ome o((a%ion% (learly %tate& t#eir 'ron&% for intervenin' in t#e aQair% of

a forei'n State for rea%on% (onne(te& )it#, for eam$le, t#e &ome%ti( $oli(ie% of

t#at (ontry, it% i&eolo'y, t#e level of it% armament%, or t#e &ire(tion of it% forei'n

$oli(y. Ht t#e%e )ere %tatement% of international $oli(y, an& not an a%%ertion of

rle% of ei%tin' international la).9

=@. T#e Cort al%o note& t#at t#e Unite& State% #a% not %o'#t to 3%tify it%

intervention in Ni(ara'a on le'al 'ron&%, *t #a& only 3%ti>e& it at a $oliti(al

level. T#e Unite& State% #a& not a%%erte& for it%elf le'al ri'#t of intervention in

t#e%e (ir(m%tan(e%. T#e Cort, )it#ot frt#er analy%i% into State $ra(ti(e, almo%t

imme&iately $ro(ee&e& to >n& t#at 8Wno %(# 'eneral ri'#t of intervention,

in %$$ort of an o$$o%ition )it#in anot#er State, ei%t% in (ontem$orary

international la). T#e Cort (on(l&e% t#at a(t% (on%tittin' a *rea(# of t#e

(%tomary $rin(i$le of non!intervention )ill al%o, if t#ey &ire(tly or in&ire(tly


26/47

involve t#e %e of for(e, (on%titte a *rea(# of t#e $rin(i$le of non!%e of for(e in

international relation% E$ara [email protected]

Develop!ent of a parallel custo!ar$ international la%

In a&&ition to t#e (omment% ma&e a*ove in itali(%, anot#er intere%tin' a%$e(t of t#e

3&'ment i% t#at it %o'#t to &ivor(e (%tomary international la) o*li'ation from t#e

i&enti(al treaty o*li'ation *e(a%e of t#e 3ri%&i(tional *ar to (on%i&er mltilateral

treatie%. In it% (on%i&eration of (%tomary international la) it &evelo$e& (ertain

$rin(i$le% in&e$en&ently of t#e treaty. For eam$le, Arti(le =E of t#e UN C#arter

$ro#i*it% t#e t#reat or %e of for(e a'ain%t anot#er State. T#e Cort #el& t#at t#e

%ame $ro#i*ition on t#e %e of for(e (ol& *e fon& n&er (%tomary international

la) an& a% aus cogensnorm. T#e Cort t#en )ent on to (ate'orie t#e %e of for(e

n&er (%tomary la) a% eit#er a 8'rave %e of for(e9 Ei.e. %e of for(e amontin' to

an arme& atta(1 or a 8le%% 'rave %e of for(e9 Ei.e. %e of for(e t#at fall% %#ort of an

arme& atta(1 for eam$le, t#e t#reat to %e for(e. T#e Cort, t#en, re%tri(te& t#e

ri'#t of %elf!&efen%e to a %itation )#ere t#ere #a& *een a 'rave %e of for(e Eor an

arme& atta(1, a% &e>ne& *y t#e Cort. If one )ere to #ol& t#at t#e relevant C#arter

$rin(i$le% )ere (lear, $re(i%e an& nam*i'o%, one (ol& %ay t#i% &ivor(e&

inter$retation (ol& re%lt in (%tomary la) &evelo$in' in a manner t#at i% not in

line )it# t#e C#arter an& t#ere*y (reatin' %e$arate ri'#t% re'ime% of la) t#at

'overn t#e %ame %*3e(t matter. T#i% i% *e(a%e, t#en, t#e t)o re'ime% )ol& *e

irre(on(ila*le. 2o)ever, t#e fa(t remain% t#at t#e C#arter &oe% leave room for

inter$retation for eam$le, on t#e &e>nition of an arme& atta(1 or on t#e %e of

for(e. In (a%e% of am*i'ity, Arti(le 45 of t#e ?ienna Convention on t#e La) of

Treatie%&ire(t% % to loo1 at, inter alia,%*%e;ent $ra(ti(e an& any relevant rle%

of international la) t#at may*e a$$li(a*le. In ot#er )or&%, a treaty (an *e

inter$rete& )it# t#e a%%i%tan(e of (%tomary an& 'eneral $rin(i$le% of international

la). In t#i% (a%e, t#e &evelo$ment of (%tomary la) )ol& al%o mean a $otential

&evelo$ment of am*i'o% treaty la) an& a re(on(iliation of treaty an& (%tomary

la) $rovi%ion%.

aterial on the *icaragua case

2he following contains a list of scholarly articles and other material that discuss the

&icaragua case @f you would li%e to add to the list, please note your suggestions in

the comment bo/
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/viennaconvention.pdfhttp://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/viennaconvention.pdfhttp://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/viennaconvention.pdfhttp://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/viennaconvention.pdf


27/47

T#e3&'ment in(l&in' %e$arate o$inion% of in&ivi&al 3&'e% an& %mmarie% of t#e

3&'ment an& or&er%

T#e /orl& Cort an& J% Co'en%, 5 AJIL 64, "or&en A. C#ri%ten%on. C#ri%ten%on

ar'e% t#at an in&e$en&ent &evelo$ment of t#e (%tomary la) ri'#t &ivor(e& fromt#e treaty (an #ave )i&er (on%e;en(e%:

/e #ave t#en a &o*le irony. T#e Cort %e% t#e Unite& State% $o%ition a((e$tin'

t#e treaty norm a'ain%t t#e t#reat or %e of for(e al%o a% a (%tomary norm $o%%i*ly

#avin' 3% (o'en% ;ality, in $art, to 3%tify ta1in' 3ri%&i(tion a% a matter ;ite

in&e$en&ent of t#e norm t#at ot#er)i%e fall% n&er t#e mltilateral treaty

re%ervation. Sin(e t#ere are t)o %e$arate %or(e% of t#e la), t#e (#oi(e of t#e one

%or(e rat#er t#an t#e ot#er mean% t#at t#e norm relie& $on %rvive% t#e

3ri%&i(tional *ar to t#e %e of t#e ot#er. (an(e E5 AJIL 5@@, 56.

Tra%#in' (%tomary international la), Antony DGAmato, 5 AJIL 5@= E56 Efll

tet: EDGAmato &i%(%%e% t#e $a(ity of State $ra(ti(e eamine& *y t#e

international (ort of 3%ti(e *efore (on(l&in' t#at t#e $rin(i$le non!intervention

forme& $art of (%tomary international la). 2e ar'e% t#at t#e a((e$tan(e of

"eneral A%%em*ly re%oltion% &o not manife%t o$inio 3ri%. 2e %tate% t#at t#e Cort

faile& to (on%i&er t#at Arti(le =E (ontine& to evolve t#ro'# t#e year%.

T#e /orl& CortG% A(#ievement,Ri(#ar& Fal1, 5 AJIL 5@-EFal1 ta1e% a 'enerally

$o%itive a$$roa(# to t#e 3&'ment, 'ive% a 'oo& overvie) of t#e (a%e an& J&'e

S#)e*elG% &i%%ent

Dra)in' t#e ri'#t line, Tom J. Farer, 5 AJIL 55=EFarer ta1e% a (ol&!)ar (ontetal

a$$roa(# to t#e 3&'ment an& %$$ort% t#e CortG% narro) vie) of an arme& atta(1

an& %elf &efen(e.
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=70&code=nus&p3=4http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&p3=5http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&p3=5http://anthonydamato.law.northwestern.edu/adobefiles/a87a-trashing.pdfhttp://anthonydamato.law.northwestern.edu/adobefiles/a87a-trashing.pdfhttp://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=70&code=nus&p3=4http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&p3=5http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&p3=5http://anthonydamato.law.northwestern.edu/adobefiles/a87a-trashing.pdfhttp://anthonydamato.law.northwestern.edu/adobefiles/a87a-trashing.pdf


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Some o*%ervation% on t#e ICJG% $ro(e&ral an& %*%tantive innovation%, T#oma% .

Fran(1, 5 AJIL 55-E(riti(ie% t#e &etermination of relevant State $ra(ti(e in

relation to non!intervention an& t#e relian(e on UN re%oltion% to illi(it opinio

urisEit alle'e% t#at t#e Cort %o'#t to #ar&en %oft la) $rematrely. Fran1 $oint%

ot t#at t#e intervention% fallin' %#ort of arme& atta(1% )ol& not allo) State% totar'et re*el 'ro$% in anot#er StateG% territory even if t#e in%r'en(y i% $lanne&,

traine&, arme& an& &ire(te& from t#at territory.

Prote(tin' t#e CortG% in%tittional intere%t%: /#y not t#e ar*ry a$$roa(#

i(#ael J. "lennon, 5 AJIL 5=5 E&i%(%%e% re%ervation% *efore t#e ICJ an& t#e

CortG% $rero'ative to &etermine it% o)n 3ri%&i(tion

Di%(retion to &e(line to eer(i%e 3ri%&i(tion, +&)ar& "or&en, 5 AJIL

5=6E&i%(%%e% t#e &i%(retionary $o)er of t#e (ort to &e(line to eer(i%e it%3ri%&i(tion at t#e merit %ta'e%.

T#e Ni(ara'a 3&'ment an& t#e ftre of t#e la) of for(e an& %elf!&efen%e, Jo#n

La)ren(e 2ar'rove 5AJIL 547E2ar'rove (riti(ie% t#e ICJG% (on%tr(tion of t#e

notion of (olle(tive %elf &efen%e, arme& atta(1 an& for(i*le (ontermea%re%.

Som*er ree(tion% on t#e (om$l%ory 3ri%&i(tion of t#e international (ort, ar1

/e%ton Jani%, 5 AJIL 5

C%tom on a %li&in' %(ale, Fre&eri( L. Kir'i% 5 AJIL 5-EKir'i% &i%(%%e% t#e

relation%#i$ *et)een State $ra(ti(e an& o$inio 3ri%, (riti(ie% t#e met#o&% Eor la(1

t#ereof of t#e Cort in &eterminin' t#e (%tomary la) natre of Arti(le =E of t#e

C#arter. Point% ot t#at a(tal State $ra(ti(e on intervention &i& not %$$ort t#e

CortG% >n&in'%.

T#e International Cort live% nto it% name, 2er*ert /. Hri''%, 5 AJIL .

Determinin' US re%$on%i*ility for (ontra o$eration% n&er international la), Fran(i%

?. Hoyle

C%tomary international la) in t#e Ni(ara'a Ca%e, Ri3$1ema.(bstract< 0n ! Dune

156? the @nternational Court of Dustice passed udgment in the case concerning

military and paramilitary activities in and against &icaragua ecause of a

reservation that the 4nited #tates had made when it accepted the urisdiction of the

Court, the Court could not pronounce a decision regarding the dispute insofar as it
https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=81+A.J.I.L.+86&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=e68533dae10c80191ff34d59bc5ab351https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=81+A.J.I.L.+86&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=e68533dae10c80191ff34d59bc5ab351http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=5087544https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=81+A.J.I.L.+86&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=e68533dae10c80191ff34d59bc5ab351https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=81+A.J.I.L.+86&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=e68533dae10c80191ff34d59bc5ab351http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=5087544


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concerned multilateral convertions s a resuld of this, the Court was compelled to

base its udgment largely on rules of customary international law and general

principles of law 2he rules of customary law which were relevant for the udgment

corresponded to a signi3cant e/tent, as regards their content, to the rules of treaty

law which the Court was unable to apply, such as the prohibition on the use of forceof rticle !, paragraph 7 of the Charter of the 4nited &ations 2his led the Court to

indicate in precise terms how rules of treaty law and rules of customary law which

have a corressponding content can co9e/ist and how the e/istence of rules of

customary international law can be established in general @n addition, the Court

e/amined in some detail the e/istence and content of certain speci3c rules of

customary international law)

Le $e$le, (Ge%t moiYT#e )orl& (ort an& #man ri'#t%, 5 AJIL 54

LJIL Sym$o%im: Di%(%%ion of t#e ICJ Ni(ara'a J&'ment

T#e Im$a(t of t#e &icaragua Ca%e on t#e Cort an& It% Role: 2armfl, 2el$fl, or In

Het)een, Lori Fi%ler Damro%(#EA*%tra(t: At t#e time t#e Unite& State% )it#&re)

from $arti(i$ation in t#e Ni(ara'a (a%e at t#e International Cort of J%ti(e, t#e US

'overnment e$re%%e& (on(ern t#at Vt#e (or%e on )#i(# t#e Cort may no) *e

em*ar1e& (ol& &o enormo% #arm to it a% an in%tittion an& to t#e (a%e of

international la)G. T#i% e%%ay eamine% )#et#er or to )#at etent t#e anti(i$ate&

ne'ative eQe(t% (ame to $a%%. It (on(l&e% t#at &ire $re&i(tion% of #arm to t#eCort )ere over%tate&. T)enty!>ve year% later, t#e rate at )#i(# %tate% a((e$t t#e

CortG% 3ri%&i(tion #a% #el& %tea&y. Only a fe) %tate% #ave a&&e& 3ri%&i(tional

re%ervation% (on(ernin' military a(tivitie%. T#e mi of (a%e% *ein' *ro'#t to t#e

Cort #a% %#ifte& to)ar&% a more re$re%entative &i%tri*tion. State% are 'enerally

(om$lyin' )it# t#e CortG% &e(i%ion%, t#o'# %ome (om$lian(e $ro*lem% remain.

T#e mo%t %erio% ne'ative im$a(t #a% *een on t#e )illin'ne%% of t#e Unite& State%

E%till t#e CortG% mo%t a(tive liti'ant to $arti(i$ate flly in international &i%$te

%ettlement.

T#e Prin(i$le of Non!Intervention =7 el&. It i% $ro$o%e& t#at t#e CortG% 56- analy%i% not only remain% of a(tality
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/20/ljil-symposium-discussion-nicaragua/http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8484009&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0922156511000628http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8484009&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0922156511000628http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8484009&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0922156511000628http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8484009&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0922156511000628http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8484015&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0922156511000641http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/20/ljil-symposium-discussion-nicaragua/http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8484009&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0922156511000628http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8484009&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0922156511000628http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8484015&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0922156511000641


30/47


31/47

Overvie%:

Colm*ia 'rante& a%ylm to a Pervian, a((%e& of ta1in' $art in a military

re*ellion in Per. /a% Colm*ia entitle& to ma1e a nilateral an& &e>nitive

;ali>(ation of t#e oQen(e Ea% a $oliti(al oQen(e in a manner *in&in' on Per an&)a% Per )a% n&er a le'al o*li'ation to $rovi&e %afe $a%%a'e for t#e Pervian to

leave Per

Facts of the Case:

Per i%%e& an arre%t )arrant a'ain%t ?i(tor Ral 2aya &e la Torre 8in re%$e(t of t#e

(rime of military re*ellion9 )#i(# too1 $la(e on O(to*er 4, 566, in Per. 4 mont#%

after t#e re*ellion, Torre e& to t#e Colom*ian +m*a%%y in Lima, Per. T#e

Colom*ian Am*a%%a&or (on>rme& t#at Torre )a% 'rante& &i$lomati( a%ylm in

a((or&an(e )it# Arti(le =E= of t#e 2avana Convention on A%ylm of 56= an&

re;e%te& %afe $a%%a'e for Torre to leave Per. S*%e;ently, t#e Am*a%%a&or al%o

%tate& Colom*ia #a& ;ali>e& Torre a% a $oliti(al ref'ee in a((or&an(e )it# Arti(le

= ontevi&eo Convention on Politi(al A%ylm of 5644 Enote t#e term ref'ee i% not

t#e %ame a% t#e Ref'ee Convention of 5675. Per ref%e& to a((e$t t#e nilateral

;ali>(ation an& ref%e& to 'rant %afe $a%%a'e.

Questions before the Court:

E5 I% Colom*ia (om$etent, a% t#e (ontry t#at 'rant% a%ylm, to nilaterally ;alify

t#e oQen(e for t#e $r$o%e of a%ylm n&er treaty la) an& international la)

E= In t#i% %$e(i>( (a%e, )a% Per, a% t#e territorial State, *on& to 'ive a 'arantee

of %afe $a%%a'e

E4 Di& Colom*ia violate Arti(le 5 an& = E= of t#e Convention on A%ylm of 56=

E#ereinafter (alle& t#e 2avana Convention )#en it 'rante& a%ylm an& i%

t#e (ontine& maintenan(e of a%ylm a violation of t#e treaty

The Courts Decision:

Relevant Findings of the Court:

(1) @s Colombia competent, as the country that grants asylum, to unilaterally -ualify

the o.ence for the purpose of asylum under treaty law and international lawE


32/47

5. T#e (ort %tate& t#at in t#e normal (or%e of 'rantin' &i$lomati( a%ylm a

&i$lomati( re$re%entative #a% t#e (om$eten(e to ma1e aprovisional;ali>(ation of

t#e oQen(e Efor eam$le, a% a $oliti(al oQen(e an& t#e territorial State #a% t#e

ri'#t to 'ive (on%ent to t#i% ;ali>(ation. In t#e TorreG% (a%e, Colom*ia #a% a%%erte&,

a% t#e State 'rantin' a%ylm, t#at it i% (om$etent to ;alify t#e natre of t#eoQen(e in a nilateral an& &e>nitive manner t#at i% *in&in' on Per. T#e (ort #a&

to &e(i&e if %(# a &e(i%ion )a% *in&in' on Per eit#er *e(a%e of treaty la) Ein

$arti(lar t#e 2avana Convention of 56= an& t#e ontevi&eo Convention of 5644,

ot#er $rin(i$le% of international la) or *y )ay of re'ional or lo(al (%tom.

=. T#e (ort #el& t#at t#ere )a% no e$re%%e& or im$lie& ri'#t of nilateral an&

&e>nitive ;ali>(ation of t#e State t#at 'rant% a%ylm n&er t#e 2avana Convention

or relevant $rin(i$le% of international la) E$. 5=, 54. T#e ontevi&eo Convention of

5644, )#i(# a((e$t% t#e ri'#t of nilateral ;ali>(ation, an& on )#i(# Colom*iarelie& to 3%tify it% nilateral ;ali>(ation, )a% not rati>e& *y Per. T#e Convention,

$er %ay, )a% not *in&in' on Per an& (on%i&erin' t#e lo) nm*er% of rati>(ation%

t#e $rovi%ion% of t#e latter Convention (annot *e %ai& to ree(t (%tomary

international la) E$. 57.

4. Colom*ia al%o ar'e& t#at re'ional or lo(al (%tom% %$$ort t#e ;ali>(ation. T#e

(ort #el& t#at t#e *r&en of $roof on t#e ei%ten(e of an alle'e& (%tomary la)

re%t% )it# t#e $arty ma1in' t#e alle'ation:

2he Aarty which relies on a custom of this %ind must prove that this custom is

established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Aarty (that)

it is in accordance with a (1) constant and uniform usage (!) practiced by the #tates

in -uestion, and that this usage is (*) the e/pression of a right appertaining to the

#tate granting asylum (Columbia) and (7) a duty incumbent on the territorial #tate

(in this case, Aeru) 2his follows from rticle *6 of the #tatute of the Court, which

refers to international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as

law(te/t in brac%ets added)'

. T#e (ort #el& t#at Colm*ia &i& not e%ta*li%# t#e ei%ten(e of a re'ional (%tom

*e(a%e it faile& to $rove (on%i%tent an& niform %a'e of t#e alle'e& (%tom *y

relevant State%. T#e (tation% an& (ontra&i(tion% in State $ra(ti(e &i& not allo)

for t#e niform %a'e E%ee al%o en&el%on, 56 an& %ee al%o Ni(ara'a (a%e, $.

6, t#e le'al im$a(t of (tation% of State $ra(ti(e. T#e (ort al%o reiterate& t#at

t#e fa(t t#at a $arti(lar State $ra(ti(e )a% follo)e& *e(a%e of $oliti(al e$e&ien(y


33/47

an& not *e(a%e of a *elief t#at t#e %ai& $ra(ti(e i% *in&in' on t#e State *y )ay of a

le'al o*li'ation Eo$inio 3ri% i% &etrimental to t#e formation of a (%tomary la)

E%ee Nort# Sea Continental S#elf Ca%e% an&Lot% Ca%efor more on o$inio 3ri%:

F2Ghe Colombian >overnment has referred to a large number of particular cases inwhich diplomatic asylum was in fact granted and respected ut it has not shown

that the alleged rule of unilateral and de3nitive -uali3cation was invo%ed or that

it was, apart from conventional stipulations, e/ercised by the #tates granting

asylum as a right appertaining to them and respected by the territorial #tates as a

duty incumbent on them and not merely for reasons of political e/pediency 2he

facts brought to the %nowledge of the Court disclose so much uncertainty and

contradiction, so much =uctuation and discrepancy in the e/ercise of diplomatic

asylum and in the oHcial views e/pressed on various occasions, there has been so

much inconsistency in the rapid succession of conventions on asylum, rati3ed bysome #tates and reected by others, and the practice has been so much in=uenced

by considerations of political e/pediency in the various cases, that it is not possible

to discern in all this any constant and uniform usage, mutually accepted as law,

with regard to the alleged rule of unilateral and de3nitive -uali3cation of the

o.ence'

7. T#e (ort #el& t#at even if Colom*ia (ol& $rove t#at %(# a re'ional (%tom

ei%te&, it )ol& not *e *in&in' on Per, *e(a%e Per far from having by its

attitude adhered to it, has, on the contrary, repudiated it by refraining from ratifyingthe Iontevideo Conventions of 15** and 15*5, which were the 3rst to include a

rule concerning the -uali3cation of the o.ence Fas political' in natureG in matters

of diplomatic asylum' (See in t#i% re'ar&, t#e le%%on on $er%i%tent o*3e(tor%.

Similarly in t#e Nort# Sea Continental S#elf Ca%e%t#e (ort #el& Vin any event t#e . .

. rle )ol& a$$ear to *e ina$$li(a*le a% a'ain%t Nor)ay in a% m(# a% %#e #a&

al)ay% o$$o%e& any attem$t to a$$ly it to t#e Nor)e'ian (oa%tG.

-. T#e (ort (on(l&e& t#at Colm*ia, a% t#e State 'rantin' a%ylm, i% not

(om$etent to ;alify t#e oQen(e *y a nilateral an& &e>nitive &e(i%ion, *in&in' onPer.

(!) @n this speci3c case, was Aeru, as the territorial #tate, bound to give a guarantee

of safe passageE
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34/47

. T#e (ort #el& t#at t#ere )a% no le'al o*li'ation on Per to 'rant %afe $a%%a'e

eit#er *e(a%e of t#e 2avana Convention or (%tomary la). In t#e (a%e of t#e

2avana Convention, a $lain rea&in' of Arti(le = re%lt% in an o*li'ation on t#e

territorial %tate EPer to 'rant %afe $a%%a'e only after it re;e%t% t#e a%ylm

'rantin' State EColm*ia to %en& t#e $er%on 'rante& a%ylm ot%i&e it% nationalterritory EPer. In t#i% (a%e t#e Pervian 'overnment #a& not a%1e& t#at Torre leave

Per. On t#e (ontrary, it (onte%te& t#e le'ality of a%ylm 'rante& to #im an&

ref%e& to 'rant %afe (on&(t.

. T#e (ort loo1e& at t#e $o%%i*ility of a (%tomary la) emer'in' from State

$ra(ti(e )#ere &i$lomati( a'ent% #ave re;e%te& an& *een 'rante& %afe $a%%a'e

for a%ylm %ee1er%, *efore t#e territorial State (ol& re;e%t for #i% &e$artre. On(e

more, t#e (ort #el& t#at t#e%e $ra(ti(e% )ere a re%lt of a nee& for e$e&ien(y an&

ot#er $ra(ti(e (on%i&eration% over an ei%ten(e of a *elief t#at t#e a(t amont% to ale'al o*li'ation E%ee $ara'ra$# a*ove.

2here e/ists undoubtedly a practice whereby the diplomatic representative who

grants asylum immediately re-uests a safe conduct without awaiting a re-uest from

the territorial state for the departure of the refugeebut this practice does not and

cannot mean that the #tate, to whom such a re-uest for safe9conduct has been

addressed, is legally bound to accede to it'

(*) $id Colombia violate rticle 1 and ! (!) of the Javana Convention when itgranted asylum and is the continued maintenance of asylum a violation of the

treatyE

6. Arti(le 5 of t#e 2avana Convention %tate% t#at 8It i% not $ermi%%i*le for State% to

'rant a%ylmW to $er%on% a((%e& or (on&emne& for (ommon (rime%W E%(#

$er%on% %#all *e %rren&ere& $on re;e%t of t#e lo(al 'overnment.9

5@. In ot#er )or&%, t#e $er%on!%ee1in' a%ylm m%t not *e a((%e& of a (ommon

(rime Efor eam$le, mr&er )ol& (on%titte a (ommon (rime, )#ile a $oliti(al

oQen(e )ol& not.T#e a((%ation% t#at are relevant are t#o%e ma&e *efore t#e

'rantin' of a%ylm. TorreG% a((%ation relate& to a military re*ellion, )#i(# t#e (ort

(on(l&e& )a% not a (ommon (rime an& a% %(# t#e 'rantin' of a%ylm (om$lie&

)it# Arti(le 5 of t#e Convention.


35/47

55. Arti(le = E= of t#e 2avana Convention %tate% t#at 8A%ylm 'rante& to $oliti(al

oQen&er% in le'ation%, )ar%#i$%, military (am$% or military air(raft, %#all *e

re%$e(te& to t#e etent in )#i(# allo)e&, a% a ri'#t or t#ro'# #manitarian

toleration, *y t#e %a'e%, t#e (onvention% or t#e la)% of t#e (ontry in )#i(#

'rante& an& in a((or&an(e )it# t#e follo)in' $rovi%ion%: Fir%t: A%ylm may not *e'rante& e(e$t in r'ent (a%e% an& for t#e $erio& of time %tri(tly in&i%$en%a*le for

t#e $er%on )#o #a% %o'#t a%ylm to en%re in %ome ot#er )ay #i% %afety.9

5=. An e%%ential $re!re;i%ite for t#e 'rantin' of a%ylm i% t#e r'en(y or, in ot#er

)or&%, t#e $re%en(e of 8an imminent or $er%i%ten(e of a &an'er for t#e $er%on of

t#e ref'ee9. T#e (ort #el& t#at t#e fa(t% of t#e (a%e, in(l&in' t#e 4 mont#% t#at

$a%%e& *et)een t#e re*ellion an& t#e time )#en a%ylm )a% %o'#t, &i& not

e%ta*li%# t#e r'en(y (riteria in t#i% (a%e E$$. =@ !=4. T#e (ort #el&:

@n principle, it is inconceivable that the Javana Convention could have intended

the term urgent cases' to include the danger of regular prosecution to which the

citiens of any country lay themselves open by attac%ing the institutions of that

country @n principle, asylum cannot be opposed to the operation of ustice'

54. In ot#er )or&%, Torre )a% a((%e& of a (rime *t #e (ol& not *e trie& in a (ort

*e(a%e Colom*ia 'rante& #im a%ylm. T#e (ort #el& t#at 8$rote(tion from t#e

o$eration of re'lar le'al $ro(ee&in'%9 )a% not 3%ti>e& n&er &i$lomati( a%ylm.

5. T#e (ort #el&:

@n the case of diplomatic asylum the refugee is within the territory of the #tate

decision to grant diplomatic asylum involves a derogation from the sovereignty of

that #tate @t withdraws the o.ender from the urisdiction of the territorial #tate and

constitutes an intervention in matters which are e/clusively within the competence

of that #tate #uch a derogation from territorial sovereignty cannot be recognised

unless its legal basis is established in each particular case'

57. A% a re%lt, e(e$tion% to t#i% rle are %tri(tly re'late& n&er international la).

n e/ception to this rule (asylum should not be granted to those facing regular

prosecutions) can occur only if, in the guise of ustice, arbitrary action is substituted

for the rule of law #uch would be the case if the administration of ustice were

corrupted by measures clearly prompted by political aims sylum protects the


36/47

political o.ender against any measures of a manifestly e/tra9legal character which

a >overnment might ta%e or attempt to ta%e against its political opponents 0n

the other hand, the safety which arises out of asylum cannot be construed as a

protection against the regular application of the laws and against the urisdiction of

legally constituted tribunals Arotection thus understood would authorie thediplomatic agent to obstruct the application of the laws of the country whereas it is

his duty to respect them #uch a conception, moreover, would come into con=ict

with one of the most 3rmly established traditions of Katin9merica, namely, non9

intervention Ffor e/ample, by Colombia into the internal a.airs of another #tate li%e

AeruG

5-. A%ylm may *e 'rante& on 8#manitarian 'ron&% to $rote(t $oliti(al $ri%oner%

a'ain%t t#e violent an& &i%or&erly a(tion of irre%$on%i*le %e(tion% of t#e $o$lation.9

Efor eam$le &rin' a mo* atta(1 )#ere t#e territorial State i% na*le to $rote(t t#eoQen&er. Torre )a% not in %(# a %itation at t#e time )#en #e %o'#t ref'e in t#e

Colom*ian +m*a%%y at Lima.

5. T#e (ort (on(l&e& t#at t#e 'rant of a%ylm an& rea%on% for it% $rolon'ation

)ere not in (onformity )it# Arti(le =E= of t#e 2avana Convention E$. =7.

2he grant of asylum is not an instantaneous act which terminates with the

admission, at a given moment of a refugee to an embassy or a legation ny grant

of asylum results in, and in conse-uence, logically implies, a state of protection, theasylum is granted as long as the continued presence of the refugee in the embassy

prolongs this protection'

@n the case of diplomatic asylum the refugee is within the territory of the #tate

decision to grant diplomatic asylum involves a derogation from the sovereignty of

that #tate @t withdraws the o.ender from the urisdiction of the territorial #tate and

constitutes an intervention in matters which are e/clusively within the competence

of that #tate #uch a derogation from territorial sovereignty cannot be recognised

unless its legal basis is established in each particular case'


37/47

57. A% a re%lt, e(e$tion% to t#i% rle are %tri(tly re'late& n&er international la).

n e/ception to this rule (asylum should not be granted to those facing regular

prosecutions) can occur only if, in the guise of ustice, arbitrary action is substituted

for the rule of law #uch would be the case if the administration of ustice werecorrupted by measures clearly prompted by political aims sylum protects the

political o.ender against any measures of a manifestly e/tra9legal character which

a >overnment might ta%e or attempt to ta%e against its political opponents 0n

the other hand, the safety which arises out of asylum cannot be construed as a

protection against the regular application of the laws and against the urisdiction of

legally constituted tribunals Arotection thus understood would authorie the

diplomatic agent to obstruct the application of the laws of the country whereas it is

his duty to respect them #uch a conception, moreover, would come into con=ict

with one of the most 3rmly established traditions of Katin9merica, namely, non9intervention Ffor e/ample, by Colombia into the internal a.airs of another #tate li%e

AeruG

5-. A%ylm may *e 'rante& on 8#manitarian 'ron&% to $rote(t $oliti(al $ri%oner%

a'ain%t t#e violent an& &i%or&erly a(tion of irre%$on%i*le %e(tion% of t#e $o$lation.9

Efor eam$le &rin' a mo* atta(1 )#ere t#e territorial State i% na*le to $rote(t t#e

oQen&er. Torre )a% not in %(# a %itation at t#e time )#en #e %o'#t ref'e in t#e

Colom*ian +m*a%%y at Lima.

5. T#e (ort (on(l&e& t#at t#e 'rant of a%ylm an& rea%on% for it% $rolon'ation

)ere not in (onformity )it# Arti(le =E= of t#e 2avana Convention E$. =7.

2he grant of asylum is not an instantaneous act which terminates with the

admission, at a given moment of a refugee to an embassy or a legation ny grant

of asylum results in, and in conse-uence, logically implies, a state of protection, the

asylum is granted as long as the continued presence of the refugee in the embassy

prolongs this protection'

DI?+RSION OF /AT+R FRO T2+ +US+ EN+T2+RLANDS v. H+L"IU


38/47

Facts

On ay l=t#, 5-4, Hel'im an& t#e Net#erlan&% (on(l&e& a Treaty t#e $r$o%e of

)#i(# )a% to %ettle $ermanently an& &e>nitively t#e re'ime 'overnin' &iver%ion%

of )ater from t#e e%e for t#e fee&in' of navi'ation (anal% an& irri'ation

(#annel%.(+)Arti(le I of t#i% Treaty $rovi&e& for t#e (on%tr(tion *elo) ae%tri(#t, in

Net#erlan&% territory, of a ne) inta1e )#i(# )ol& (on%titte t#e fee&in' (on&it

for all (anal% %itate& *elo) t#at to)n an& for irri'ation in t#e Cam$ine an& in t#e

Net#erlan&%.(,)

T#e Hel'ian "overnment a((e$te& t#e Treaty not )it#ot rel(tan(e, in vie) of t#e

fa(t t#at it $rovi&e& for only one inta1e an& t#at to *e %itate& in forei'n territory.

/#en t#e e(onomi( &evelo$ment of t#e Hel'ian an& Net#erlan&% $rovin(e% of

Lim*r' ne(e%%itate& t#e enlar'ement of (ertain (anal% an& t#e (on%tr(tion of ne)

)or1%, t#e t)o State% %i'ne& in 56=7 a ne) a'reement &e%i'ne& to %ettle t#e

&iQeren(e% )#i(# #a& ari%en in re%$e(t of t#e (on%tr(tion $ro'ramme%. After t#e

re3e(tion of t#i% a'reement *y t#e Net#erlan&% Fir%t C#am*er, t#e Net#erlan&%

$ro(ee&e& to (on%tr(t an& (om$lete t#e Jliana Canal, t#e Ho%%(#evel& Lo(1 an&a

pil cases - 1st batch

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