(2008) mazzoleni, o. moral integrity and the reputation of politicians as perceived by supporters of...

8/16/2019 (2008) Mazzoleni, O. Moral Integrity and the Reputation of Politicians as Perceived by Supporters of Populist Partie…

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/2008-mazzoleni-o-moral-integrity-and-the-reputation-of-politicians-as-perceived 1/21

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpep20

Download by: [University of Glasgow] Date: 23 May 2016, At: 07:28

Perspectives on European Politics and Society

ISSN: 1570-5854 (Print) 1568-0258 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpep20

Moral Integrity and the Reputation of Politiciansas Perceived by Supporters of ‘Populist’ Parties: AComparison of Switzerland and Italy

Oscar Mazzoleni

To cite this article: Oscar Mazzoleni (2008) Moral Integrity and the Reputation of Politicians

as Perceived by Supporters of ‘Populist’ Parties: A Comparison of Switzerland and Italy,Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 9:1, 53-72, DOI: 10.1080/15705850701825469

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15705850701825469

Published online: 12 May 2008.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 52

View related articles

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/15705850701825469

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/15705850701825469

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rpep20&page=instructions

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rpep20&page=instructions

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15705850701825469

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/15705850701825469

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpep20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpep20



Moral Integrity and the Reputationof Politicians as Perceived by Supportersof ‘Populist’ Parties: A Comparison of Switzerland and Italy

OSCAR MAZZOLENIObservatory for Political Research, Bellinzona, Switzerland

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to highlight the public’s appraisal of politicians’ behaviour.We know from previous studies that citizens’ judgements of politicians are related to social and political characteristics. Nevertheless, the impact of partisan ties, especially in Europeancountries, has rarely been investigated. Using data drawn from surveys carried out in twoneighbouring regions, in Switzerland and Italy, we focus on the supporters of two right-wing populist parties, the Lega Nord and the Lega dei ticinesi. Empirical evidence shows that, incontrast with the anti-establishment and anti-corruption discourse of these parties, theirsupporters are more indulgent vis-a ` -vis politicians’ transgressions than the supporters of moremoderate and left-wing parties. In order to interpret these findings, we consider the position of these populist parties in their respective party systems (both were involved in governmentcoalitions at the time the survey was carried out), the behaviour and character of their leaders and their supporters’ attitudes regarding public and private conduct.

KEY WORDS: Switzerland, Italy, perceptions of politicians’ transgression, right-wingpopulist parties, electoral support, comparative analysis

From the pioneering research on the United States that took place in the 1960s and

1970s, to the more recent comparative studies addressing countries from just aboutevery continent, including Western Europe (Della Porta & Me ´ ny, 1997; Newell &

Bull, 2003), it is apparent that the issue of political corruption has held increasing

interest for political sociologists. The fact that the political elites in most democratic

regimes have been directly or indirectly struck by scandals has significantly

contributed to the ongoing development of this scientific interest. As has often been

noted, the mass media have also given a ‘new’ visibility to political corruption in

Western Europe (e.g. Blumler, 1990; Thompson, 2000). Another factor behind the

heightened significance of the issue is the presence of rhetoric of ‘anti-politics’ within

Correspondence Address: Oscar Mazzoleni, Observatory for Political Research, Switzerland, Viale

Franscini 32, CH-6500 Bellinzona, Switzerland; Tel.: 0041-(0)918146426; Fax: 0041-(0)918146419.

Email: [email protected]

Perspectives on European Politics and Society

Vol. 9, No. 1, 53 – 72, April 2008

ISSN 1570-5854 Print/1568-0258 Online 2008 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/15705850701825469



the political sphere (e.g. Mastropaolo, 2005), a rhetoric voiced in particular by those

emerging parties that have been labelled as ‘populist’ or ‘anti-establishment’. These

parties often put a harsh criticism of the political elites at the core of their agenda,

elites whom they accuse of incompetence, corruption and a betrayal of the interestsof the people (Schedler, 1997). While the emergence, and in certain cases the electoral

success of these parties can be explained in many ways, one might ask to what extent

their supporters express a specific form of stigmatisation of the virtual transgressions

of politicians.

In order to address this problem, we must first ask the more general question:

What determines the degree of tolerance or intolerance that citizens feel towards the

moral behaviour of politicians? To respond to this question, one must resort to the

studies of political corruption that are based on the analysis of public opinion (e.g.

Heidenheimer, 1989; Johnston, 1989). According to these studies, perceptions of

corruption and the degree of tolerance shown towards it seem to vary as a functionof socio-cultural resources and political socialisation, as well as party allegiances.1

One might ask if the supporters of the so-called ‘populist’ parties reveal a particular

sensitivity to the issue of political probity. Can one say, for example, that the

supporters of ‘populist’ parties are less tolerant of ‘unscrupulous’ politicians (‘the

ends justify the means’) and more sensitive to the question of moral reputation?

This paper attempts to provide some answers to these questions by way of a survey

conducted in two bordering regions: The Canton of Ticino (the Italian-speaking

region in the south of Switzerland) and the area of northern Italy that incorporates

the provinces of Como, Varese, Verbano-Cusio-Ossola and Lecco. In each of these

bordering regions, so-called ‘populist’ parties which made criticism of the political

establishment a key element of their discourse have gone on to demonstrate a certain

electoral longevity, even success, during the course of the 1990s and 2000s.

The Morality of Politicians in the Eyes of the People

Empirical studies regarding people’s tolerance of the moral transgressions of

politicians have tended to focus on three different aspects. First, the studies consider

the specificities and consequences of politicians’ behaviour. Some acts are judged

more harshly than others, while evaluations also vary with context. For example, it

has been shown that the severity with which ‘conflicts of interest’ are judged depends

on whether they are perceived as voluntary or involuntary. Similarly, clientelism canbe seen – under certain circumstances – as an obligation of the elected official, while

in other circumstances, such as when it takes the form of nepotism, for example, it is

criticised for breaking the rules of fairness (Johnston, 1989; Mancuso et al ., 2006).

Generally, the greater the extent to which the favour can be seen as indirect,

dislocated in time and proximate to the normal functioning of the political system,

the less gravely will the act be condemned (Bezes & Lascoumes, 2005, p. 779). Studies

that employ a definition of political corruption based on public opinion often ask

groups or representative samples to evaluate a series of acts that can be seen as more

or less corrupt, with the aim of identifying the extent to which they are or are not

considered tolerable (Gibbons, 1989). These studies assume that the vast majority of the citizenry is predisposed to condemning political corruption ‘on principle’; but

that corruption can be defined in different ways and similar acts can be variably

54 O. Mazzoleni



condemned. Alternatively, instead of asking respondents to evaluate concrete

situations, one can ask questions about the degree of tolerance in principle of

behaviour threatening to common moral rules and public reputations. We must

suppose in this case that responses will be influenced both by the ways in whichcitizens use moral rules to judge politicians’ behaviour, and by their propensity to

use accusations of political corruption in support of partisan positions arrived at on

other grounds.

Second, analyses of the transgressions of politicians have made reference to the

nature of the political environment. For instance, there has been some interest in the

relationship between tolerance of corruption, and political trust, especially with

respect to politicians, political parties and government institutions. Although

comparative analyses show that there is a rather strong positive correlation between

moral tolerance and political trust, it is difficult to establish a simple nexus of cause

and effect between them that is independent of political context (Anderson &Tverdova, 2005; Della Porta, 2000; Pharr, 2000). Tolerance of political corruption

also seems to be connected to party allegiances and voting choices. That which is

absolutely reprehensible to the supporters of one party may be tolerated by

supporters of another. Surveys conducted in Latin America have shown that voters’

perceptions of corruption do not generally seem to be a significant predictor of

voting for an opposition party, due to the fact that those most concerned about

corruption are less likely to participate in elections (Davis, et al ., 2004; Dominguez

and McGann, 1996). The impact of the institutional context is another factor that is

often taken into account. A particular corrupt act is judged more harshly in some

political systems than it is in other systems with contrasting institutional features.

Where a single party has long dominated government office, as in post-war Japan,

there does one find greater tolerance of corruption, especially among supporters of

the governing party itself (Pharr, 1999). In a more polarised political field, on the

other hand, concern about corruption is more widespread (Davis et al ., 2004).

Third, analyses tend to emphasise the impact of specific socio-economic conditions

and socialisation patterns. In other words, the social and political profile of the

ordinary citizen can also play an important role. In his ground-breaking research

conducted in several American cities, Gardiner (1970) demonstrated how it is the

members of the most prosperous classes, those most socialised to the norms of the

dominant culture and with the greater access to political information, that are also

the most tolerant of political acts that might be judged as deviant. On the basis of this study, we can deduce that the citizenry with the greatest resources and those

who are the most politically informed are also more familiar with the idea that the

pursuit of one’s own private interests goes on inside political circles as well as

outside. This would foster the perception that certain acts are more the fruit of merit

and experience than an expression of actual corruption. Individuals with greater

training and education, higher income and other social resources would therefore

tend to see corruption in a more restrictive or legalistic sense. Those with fewer

resources share a broader definition of political corruption (which also includes

favouritism, for example), where the realm of the reprehensible is much wider than

that of the strictly illegal (Gibbons, 1989; Redlawsk et al., 2005). At the same time,some aspects linked with socialisation patterns have been gone into in less depth,

particularly the way in which people’s judgements of the transgressions of politicians

Moral Integrity and the Reputation of Politicians 55



are connected to the norms, principles and values that are prevalent within social and

political spheres. For instance, can we say that those who are most tolerant of the

moral transgressions of politicians also have a more permissive view of public

morality in general? And conversely, is it true that those less tolerant of trans-gressions in politics are also less permissive in other aspects of public and private

life? Or should we rather suppose that there is no direct relationship between the

criteria of judgement applied to social spheres (public and private) and to political

spheres?

Furthermore, these questions are rarely articulated with the phenomenon of so-

called ‘populist parties’. One of the main specificities of these parties is that their

leaders condemn the political establishment (Schedler, 1997; Taggart, 2000). Given

that these parties are often supported by citizens with low cultural and socio-

economic resources, especially in the present widespread form of radical-right wing

parties (Betz, 1994; Norris, 2005), should we therefore conclude that supporters of these parties are generally less tolerant of behaviour by politicians that might

potentially be deemed illicit? Analysis of the French situation seems to confirm that

perceptions of politicians are more negative among supporters of the Front National

than among those who support the other main parties (Lascoumes & Mazzoleni,

2007). However, the French case reveals some ambivalence in the condemnation of

corruption among supporters of the Front National, especially when acts have been

carried out by politicians in the name of the common interest (Muxel, 2007).

Moreover, there are at least two aspects that might challenge the hypothesis of lower

tolerance among supporters of so-called ‘populist’ parties. First, the position of the

‘populist’ party depends on the party system patterns that are at play: These parties

can be positioned outside the government or they can be directly involved, usually as

part of a coalition. In this latter position, their supporters could be or could become

more sociologically heterogeneous, such as would be the case in a ‘catch-all’ party.

Second, more or less all over Europe, the leaders of these parties very often have

criminal records and yet these convictions do not seem to have compromised their

influence among their supporters. Consequently, any analysis of the relationship

between ‘populist’ supporters and moral expectations demands a careful considera-

tion of the political and partisan context.

Swiss and Italian Regions ComparedHere we will analyse the attitudes of citizens in two regions of Western Europe – the

Canton of Ticino in Switzerland, on the one hand, and a section of northern Italy on

the other. Both these regions have seen the emergence of strong ‘populist’ parties

over the course of the past two decades: The Ticino League and the Northern

League, respectively. Our study focuses on two countries that would seem to be a fair

distance apart on the scale that measures perceptions of corruption. On

Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2003,

Switzerland occupied eighth place, while Italy was placed as low as 35th. More

recently, the gap between these two countries has remained more or less the same.

The issue of political corruption in Switzerland, a nation that boasts one of theworld’s most stable institutional structures and political systems, is one that has been

all but absent from the political agenda until recent years. The situation in Italy is

56 O. Mazzoleni



very different, where corruption has recently loomed large. The reasons for this have

deep roots in Italy’s history (Blondel, 1997; Della Porta, 1996; Galli della Loggia,

1998) as well as in the more recent political corruption scandals (called Tangentopoli ,

or ‘Bribe City’) that were strongly associated with the transition between the so-called First and Second Republics in the 1990s (Bull & Rhodes, 1997; Newell & Bull,

2003).

However, there are also a number of close similarities between these countries. On

the one hand, there seems to be no lack of ‘grey areas’ in Switzerland, considering

that its consociational political system is based on widespread informal exchange.

Furthermore, we have recently seen the emergence of significant political scandals

(such as the Swissair bankruptcy) and a growing visibility of corruption within the

media (Queloz, 2000). Lastly, condemnation of the ‘political class’ as a rhetorical

resource in political struggles has surged with the emergence and growth of the so-

called Swiss ‘populist’ parties, such as the Ticino League, a regionalist party whichwas founded in the early 1990s in opposition to the old consociational system

(Albertazzi, 2006; Mazzoleni, 1999, 2005). Italy, and its northern regions in

particular, also saw the birth and the rise of regionalist leagues and ‘anti-

partitocratic’ protest (e.g. Biorcio, 1997; Cento Bull & Gilbert, 2002). In both

countries, these parties have participated in governing coalitions and have therefore

had partially to accommodate themselves to the ‘rules of the game’, by accepting

agreements and compromises with other parties that they had previously criticised as

‘establishment’. On the other hand, the leaders of ‘populist’ parties in both regions

have been accused of violating laws as well as basic moral codes (in Switzerland, the

leader and ‘lifelong’ president of the League has often been implicated in criminal

proceedings and sometimes even convicted). The main difference is that being part of

a coalition in the ‘bi-polar’ Italian system requires a greater degree of accommoda-

tion than is the case in the Swiss canton, where regional ministers are directly elected

by citizens according to a proportional system, and where elected representatives are

less compelled to form coalition pacts. For these reasons, our main hypothesis

contends that the supporters of the two leagues are not more sensitive than anyone

else to the transgressions of politicians.

Indulgence and Intransigence towards Political Transgression

In attempting to confirm this hypothesis, I used the results of a survey conducted in2003 on a sample of about 2,900 citizens from the Canton of Ticino and from the

four northern Italian provinces of Varese, Como, Verbano-Cusio-Ossola and

Lecco.2 This comparative survey involved asking respondents to indicate the extent

to which they agreed with two statements. The first read as follows: ‘The means used

by politicians do not matter, so long as they keep their electoral promises’. The

statement was intended to assess the extent to which politicians were allowed morally

to transgress in pursuit of a ‘just’ result, in accordance with the principle that ‘the

ends justify the means’. The second postulated: ‘If a politician is suspected of

corruption, he/she must be removed from office’. This allowed us to evaluate

people’s tolerance of situations in which the moral reputation of a politician comesunder discussion. Indeed, two aspects are given emphasis by our questionnaire: To

what extent are Italian and Swiss citizens prepared to accept a politician who violates




basic moral laws so long as they fulfil their responsibilities towards the electorate?

And to what extent are those same citizens willing morally to condemn corrupted

politicians?

As predicted, analysis of the responses showed that the majority of citizenscondemn transgressive acts committed by politicians as well as any compromise of

their moral reputations. In both Switzerland and Italy, the majority chooses not to

agree with the statement: ‘The means used by politicians do not matter, so long as

they keep their electoral promises’; 67% of citizens from the northern Italian

provinces disagree with it while 59% of their Swiss counterparts do so. The second

statement, ‘If a politician is suspected of corruption, he/she must be removed from

office’ gives rise to an even greater level of consensus in the two regions, though this

time support is lower among the Italians (74%) than it is among the Swiss (84%). It

would seem, therefore, that the citizens of the Italian provinces are more

disapproving of the moral transgressions of politicians, while showing greaterreserve with regard to accusations of corruption. In other words, there would seem

to be different priorities of judgement on either side of the border. On the one hand,

the morally transgressive act committed in the name of electoral promises might be

less severely condemned in Ticino, due in part, perhaps, to a political system that

is less conflictual and polarised, as well as the fact that the issue of political

corruption was of less public relevance there – at least at the time the study was

conducted. In contrast, given that accusations of corruption have been at the centre

of political conflict in Italy in recent years, and were particularly central during the

second Berlusconi government (2001 – 2005), it should not be surprising that a

smaller percentage of Italians demand the suspension of a politician ‘merely’ because

his or her moral reputation has been called into question by an accusation of

corruption.

The two indicators seem to measure two different phenomena, since the statistical

correlation between them is not significant in either context. However, it is possible

to construct a typology that combines responses to both of the questions (Table 1).

How do moral permissiveness and the condemnation of corruption combine in the

two regions? If we consider the minority group of those who are critical of moral

transgressions but opposed to the suspension of politicians accused of corruption, we

Table 1. Typology of moral tolerance towards politicians

‘The means used by politicians don’t matter, so long as they keep theircampaign promises’

Agree or strongly agree Disagree or strongly disagree

‘If a politician is suspected of corruption, he/she must beremoved from office’

Disagree or strongly disagree ‘Indulgents’Canton of Ticino 11.0%Northern Italian provinces 20.5%

‘Legalists’Canton of Ticino 12.8%Northern Italian provinces 15.0%

Agree or strongly agree ‘Formalists’

Canton of Ticino 30.2%Northern Italian provinces 28.6%

‘Intransigents’

Canton of Ticino 46.0%Northern Italian provinces 35.8%

Source: Survey OVP (2003).

58 O. Mazzoleni



notice a similar proportion of respondents in both contexts. The same is true for the

larger group of those that we might label – for want of a better term – as the

‘Formalists’, that is to say those who accept moral transgressions so long as they do

not call the politician’s public reputation into question. Conversely, the other twogroups are proportionally dissimilar, with those intolerant of transgressive acts and

allegations of corruption (a group we have defined as ‘Intransigents’) being less

numerous among the Swiss than among the Italians. Meanwhile, those tolerant of

both (the ‘Indulgents’) are more numerous among the Italians than among the Swiss.

Socio-Demographic Aspects

To what extent do the expressed opinions respond to different social, cultural and

political logics? What are the points of convergence between the two regions? From

the socio-demographic viewpoint, some notable similarities emerge, as well as somesignificant differences (Table 2).3

Among the Italian ‘Indulgents’, males and individuals between 18 and 30 years of

age are over-represented. In this same category, in Switzerland, we find a

predominance of males and business people. Among Italian ‘Formalists’, there is a

preponderance of women, people over 60, shopkeepers, craftsmen and people with

lower educational skills. In Ticino, the elderly and those with only compulsory levels

of education are also over-represented in this category. The ‘Legalist’ orientation is

one that is largely held by Italians between the ages of 18 and 45 and those with a

university education. In Italy, the ‘Intransigents’ are composed mostly of people

between 46 and 60 years of age and those with a compulsory level of education. In

Switzerland, women are predominant in the ‘Intransigent’ category, alongside people

with lower educational levels, as is also the case in Italy. In both contexts, people

with less education are over-represented among both the ‘Formalists’ and the

‘Intransigents’: In other words, the groups that most expect politicians to maintain

an impeccable moral reputation. However, in both Ticino and the Italian provinces,

less educated citizens are anything but uniform when it comes to judging the moral

transgression of a politician who nonetheless maintains his or her electoral promises.

Even so, in keeping with studies conducted in other countries, our research confirms

the tendency of people with more educational skills to criticise moral transgression,

but from a more ‘Legalist’ position. This suggests a logic of moral judgement centred

upon a stricter sense of definition, where the accusation of corruption, or rather thefact that a politician’s moral reputation has been brought into question, is not

enough formally to suspend him or her from office.

Political Trust

It is useful to compare perceptions of the transgression of moral rules with levels of

trust in politicians, political parties and governments. Our analysis shows, on the one

hand, several points of convergence between the two contexts: In both Switzerland

and Italy, the ‘Intransigents’ show a lower level of trust in political parties than do

the other groups. Conversely, those who are generally willing to tolerate morallytransgressive acts by politicians have at least a moderate or – in the case of

Switzerland – a high degree of trust in political parties.




T a b l e 2 .

S o c i o - d e m o g r a p h i c a s p e c t s a n d m o r a l t o l e r a n c e t o w a r d p

o l i t i c i a n s i n C a n t o n o f T i c i n o a

n d i n t h e N o r t h e r n I t a l i a n p r o v

i n c e s

N o r t h e r n I t a l i a n p r o v i n c e s

C a n t o n o f T i c i n o

‘ I n d u l g e n t s ’

‘ F o r m a l i s t s ’

‘ L e g a l i s t s ’

‘ I n t r a n s i g e n t s ’

T o t a l

p C h i 2 1

C r a m e r ’ s V





T o t a l

p C h i 2 1

C r a m e r ’ s V

S e x M

a l e

2 3 . 1

2 6 . 2

1 5 . 5

3 5 . 1

1 0 0 . 0

* *

0 . 0 7 1 * *

1 3 . 4

2 9 . 8

1 6 . 7

4 0 . 1

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

0 . 1 4 2 * * *

F e m a l e

1 8 . 2

3 0 . 8

1 4 . 5

3 6 . 5

1 0 0 . 0

9 . 1

3 0 . 1

9 . 6

5 1 . 2

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

2 0 . 5

2 8 . 6

1 5 . 0

3 5 . 9

1 0 0 . 0

1 1 . 0

3 0 . 0

1 2 . 8

4 6 . 2

1 0 0 . 0

A g e 1 8

– 3 0 y e a r s

2 9 . 4

2 7 . 3

1 5 . 7

2 7 . 6

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

0 . 1 0 4 * * *

1 4 . 2

2 1 . 9

1 9 . 7

4 4 . 3

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

0 . 1 1 8 * * *

3 1 –

4 5 y e a r s

1 9 . 7

2 4 . 7

2 0 . 1

3 5 . 5

1 0 0 . 0

1 1 . 0

2 4 . 0

1 7 . 9

4 7 . 1

1 0 0 . 0

4 6 –

6 0 y e a r s

1 6 . 4

2 8 . 0

1 1 . 6

4 4 . 1

1 0 0 . 0

7 . 3

3 1 . 7

1 0 . 0

5 1 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

M o r e t h a n

6 0 y e a

r s

1 9 . 2

3 4 . 7

1 1 . 7

3 4 . 5

1 0 0 . 0

1 2 . 7

3 7 . 3

6 . 5

4 3 . 5

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

2 0 . 6

2 8 . 7

1 4 . 9

3 5 . 8

1 0 0 . 0

1 1 . 2

2 9 . 4

1 3 . 0

4 6 . 5

1 0 0 . 0

L e v e l o f e d

u c a t i o n

P r i m a r y

s c h o o l

1 7 . 0

3 3 . 9

7 . 2

4 1 . 9

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

0 . 1 5 1 * * *

1 2 . 9

3 6 . 0

7 . 9

4 3 . 3

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

0 . 1 4 0 * * *

H i g h s c h

o o l o r

p r o f e s s i o n a l

e d u c a t i o n

2 2 . 1

2 8 . 1

1 7 . 5

3 2 . 3

1 0 0 . 0

1 1 . 0

3 0 . 5

1 0 . 8

4 7 . 7

1 0 0 . 0

U n i v e r s i t y

2 4 . 1

1 6 . 5

2 5 . 5

3 4 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

9 . 9

1 9 . 1

2 7 . 6

4 3 . 4

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

2 0 . 6

2 8 . 5

1 5 . 0

3 5 . 9

1 0 0 . 0

1 1 . 1

2 9 . 8

1 2 . 7

4 6 . 3

1 0 0 . 0

P r i n c i p a l p

r o f e s s i o n

E n t r e p r e

n e u r /

s e l f - e m

p l o y e d

w o r k e r

2 7 . 1

2 0 . 3

1 8 . 6

3 3 . 9

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

0 . 1 4 2 * * *

1 8 . 3

2 3 . 3

1 1 . 7

4 6 . 7

1 0 0 . 0

n . s .

n . s .

S h o p k e e p e r /

a r t i s a n

2 0 . 0

4 0 . 0

1 4 . 3

2 5 . 7

1 0 0 . 0

4 . 3

3 0 . 4

8 . 7

5 6 . 5

1 0 0 . 0

E m p l o y e

e

2 0 . 8

2 2 . 9

2 3 . 5

3 2 . 8

1 0 0 . 0

1 0 . 5

2 4 . 5

1 5 . 4

4 9 . 7

1 0 0 . 0

T e a c h e r

1 6 . 7

1 3 . 6

3 3 . 3

3 6 . 4

1 0 0 . 0

1 0 . 4

2 5 . 0

1 6 . 7

4 7 . 9

1 0 0 . 0

W o r k e r

1 8 . 6

2 9 . 0

9 . 0

4 3 . 4

1 0 0 . 0

1 0 . 0

3 1 . 8

1 2 . 7

4 5 . 5

1 0 0 . 0

F a r m e r

0 . 0

0 . 0

0 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

0 . 0

0 . 0

5 0 . 0

5 0 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

O t h e r p r

o f e s s i o n s

9 . 1

2 2 . 7

2 7 . 3

4 0 . 9

1 0 0 . 0

4 . 5

2 7 . 3

1 3 . 6

5 4 . 5

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

1 9 . 8

2 4 . 4

1 9 . 3

3 6 . 5

1 0 0 . 0

1 0 . 7

2 6 . 1

1 4 . 3

4 8 . 8

1 0 0 . 0

1

n . s . ¼ n o t s i g n i fi c a n t ; * p 5

0 . 1 , * * p 5

0 . 0 5 ,

* * * p 5

0 . 0 1 .

S o u r c e :

S u r v e y O V P ( 2 0 0 3 ) .

60 O. Mazzoleni



The nature of this trust seems different in the two contexts, however, which

confirms the hypothesis that disapproval of political corruption can significantly

depend on the specific political configuration. In Italy, where the level of trust in

politicians and political institutions is lower on average than in Ticino (Mazzoleni,2004), those least trustful tend to be found mostly among the ‘Intransigents’ and less

so among the ‘Formalists’. The ‘Indulgents’ and to a lesser degree the ‘Legalists’

both claim that their trust in politicians has remained unchanged or even increased

(Table 3). In short, in Italy, where legal convictions for political corruption have

been headline news for many years and the issue of corruption has long been

exploited for political ends, different ways of judging the gravity of alleged

corruption are quite clearly linked to different levels of trust in politicians. In

Switzerland, however, it is only among the ‘Intransigents’ that we find a

preponderance of citizens who feel their trust has diminished. We can deduce from

this analysis that judgement of the moral behaviour of politicians in Italy is moreclosely linked to people’s trust, while this connection is somewhat less direct in

Switzerland. A confirmation of this phenomenon can be found in the degree of trust

that citizens show in the national government. While in Italy, there is a significant

link between trust in the government and a moral tolerance of political behaviour, in

Switzerland there is no statistical association at all. In Italy, as expected, those with a

moderate or high level of trust in the government (of Berlusconi) are more

‘Indulgent’, whilst those with lower levels of trust tend to judge politicians more

rigorously from a moral point of view. In the Canton of Ticino, once again, it is only

among the ‘Intransigents’ that there is a disproportionately high percentage of less

trusting citizens.

In summary, with the exception of the category of ‘Intransigents’, which is less

trusting in both Italy and Switzerland, political context seems to have a significant

influence on the relationship between political trust, and an attitude of tolerance

towards political wrongdoing and allegations of corruption. In Italy’s bi-polar

context, where political scandals have long been at the centre of the political conflict

between the government and opposition parties, there is a more intense relationship.

In Ticino, which has a consociational system wherein the government is formed by

all the main parties, the connection between tolerance of corruption and political

trust is considerably less evident, except in the case of trust in political parties.

Left and Right

Analysis of the positioning of respondents on the left – right axis further reinforces

the hypothesis that people’s judgements of political transgression are bound up with

specific political contexts. We asked respondents to position themselves on a left –

right axis from 0 to 10, recoding the variable into six categories and also taking into

account those who chose to answer ‘Don’t know’ or ‘Prefer not to answer’. In both

Switzerland and Italy, the ‘Intransigents’ are concentrated above all towards the left

or centre-left, though this is more clearly the case in Italy (Table 3). Meanwhile, the

Italians who position themselves to the centre-right and most especially to the right

belong preponderantly to the category of the ‘Indulgents’. Nevertheless, there is adivision among the Italians that is worth noting: A significant percentage of those

who place themselves at the centre-right are not more tolerant of political




T a b l e 3 .

P o l i t i c a l a p e c t s a n d

m o r a l t o l e r a n c e t o w a r d p o l i t i c i a n s , i n C a n t o n o f T i c i n o a n d i n

t h e N o r t h e r n I t a l i a n p r o v i n c e s




‘ I n t r a n s i

g e n t s ’

T o t a l

p C h i 2 1

C r a m e r ’ s V

N o r t h e r n I t a l i a n p r o v i n c e s

T r u s t i n

p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s

L o w t r u s t

1 5 . 9

2 6 . 2

1 5 . 2

4 2 . 7

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

0 . 1 1 4 * * *

M e d i u m t r u s t

2 4 . 8

3 1 . 5

1 4 . 0

2 9 . 7

1 0 0 . 0

H i g h

t r u s t

2 5 . 8

2 2 . 6

2 2 . 6

2 9 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

2 0 . 6

2 8 . 8

1 4 . 7

3 5 . 8

1 0 0 . 0

P e r c e p t i o n o f t h e e v o l u t i o n o f t r u s t i n p o l i t i c i a n s

I n c r e a s e d o r u n c h a n g e d

3 1 . 6

2 5 . 3

1 7 . 5

2 5 . 6

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

0 . 2 6 2 * * *

D e c r e

a s e d

1 2 . 9

3 0 . 3

1 3 . 1

4 3 . 7

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

2 0 . 5

2 8 . 3

1 4 . 9

3 6 . 3

1 0 0 . 0

T r u s t i n

g o v e r n m e n t

L o w t r u s t

9 . 2

2 7 . 0

8 . 2

5 5 . 7

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

0 . 1 9 8 * * *


2 4 . 4

2 9 . 2

1 7 . 3

2 9 . 2

1 0 0 . 0

H i g h

t r u s t

2 7 . 6

3 1 . 0

1 7 . 1

2 4 . 3

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

2 0 . 7

2 8 . 8

1 4 . 8

3 5 . 6

1 0 0 . 0

P o l i t i c a l s e l f - p l a c e m e n t

L e f t

1 0 . 8

2 3 . 2

1 0 . 3

5 5 . 7

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

0 . 1 6 5 * * *

C e n t r e - l e f t

1 6 . 1

2 5 . 0

1 5 . 7

4 3 . 2

1 0 0 . 0

C e n t r e

1 7 . 3

3 7 . 6

1 2 . 7

3 2 . 4

1 0 0 . 0

C e n t r e - r i g h t

2 6 . 8

2 1 . 9

2 2 . 8

2 8 . 5

1 0 0 . 0

R i g h t

3 3 . 6

2 7 . 2

1 7 . 6

2 1 . 6

1 0 0 . 0

D o e s n ’ t k n o w o r p l a c e

1 6 . 3

3 4 . 1

1 1 . 8

3 7 . 8

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

2 0 . 6

2 8 . 4

1 5 . 1

3 5 . 8

1 0 0 . 0

P a r t y i d

e n t i fi c a t i o n


8 . 8

2 2 . 2

1 0 . 7

5 8 . 2

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

0 . 1 6 1 * * *


2 9 . 8

2 5 . 2

2 2 . 1

2 2 . 9

1 0 0 . 0

N o r t h

e r n L e a g u e

3 1 . 8

3 1 . 8

2 3 . 9

1 2 . 5

1 0 0 . 0

N o p a r t y i d e n t i fi c a t i o n

2 0 . 2

3 0 . 9

1 3 . 4

3 5 . 4

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

2 0 . 5

2 8 . 6

1 5 . 1

3 5 . 9

1 0 0 . 0

( c o n t i n u e d

)

62 O. Mazzoleni



T a b l e 3 .

( C o n t i n u e d

)




‘ I n t r a n s i

g e n t s ’

T o t a l

p C h i 2 1

C r a m e r ’ s V

C a n t o n o f T i c i n o

T r u s t i n

p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s

L o w t r u s t

8 . 1

2 3 . 5

1 3 . 3

5 5 . 1

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

0 . 1 1 2 * * *


1 3 . 1

3 2 . 7

1 2 . 8

4 1 . 5

1 0 0 . 0

H i g h

t r u s t

8 . 8

4 3 . 9

1 5 . 8

3 1 . 6

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

1 1 . 3

3 0 . 3

1 3 . 1

4 5 . 3

1 0 0 . 0

P e r c e p t i o n o f t h e e v o l u t i o n o f t r u s t i n p o l i t i c i a n s

I n c r e a s e d o r u n c h a n g e d

1 2 . 7

3 2 . 6

1 3 . 6

4 1 . 1

1 0 0 . 0

* *

0 . 0 9 6 * *

D e c r e

a s e d

9 . 4

2 7 . 6

1 2 . 6

5 0 . 3

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

1 0 . 9

2 9 . 9

1 3 . 1

4 6 . 2

1 0 0 . 0

T r u s t i n

g o v e r n m e n t

L o w t r u s t

1 0 . 0

2 4 . 5

9 . 1

5 6 . 4

1 0 0 . 0

n . s .


1 1 . 9

3 1 . 8

1 2 . 3

4 4 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

H i g h

t r u s t

1 0 . 3

2 8 . 2

1 5 . 8

4 5 . 7

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

1 1 . 3

3 0 . 1

1 2 . 9

4 5 . 7

1 0 0 . 0

P o l i t i c a l s e l f - p l a c e m e n t

L e f t

2 . 6

2 1 . 4

1 8 . 8

5 7 . 3

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

0 . 1 1 1 * * *


1 3 . 0

2 0 . 1

1 8 . 2

4 8 . 7

1 0 0 . 0

C e n t r e

1 1 . 6

2 9 . 8

1 2 . 7

4 5 . 9

1 0 0 . 0


1 2 . 4

3 5 . 0

1 3 . 6

3 9 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

R i g h t

1 2 . 7

3 8 . 8

1 0 . 4

3 8 . 1

1 0 0 . 0

D o e s n ’ t k n o w o r p l a c e

1 1 . 0

3 1 . 0

9 . 2

4 8 . 8

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

1 0 . 9

2 9 . 8

1 2 . 9

4 6 . 3

1 0 0 . 0

P a r t y i d

e n t i fi c a t i o n

P s - V e

r d i - P d l - M p s - P l s t

7 . 3

2 1 . 8

2 0 . 6

5 0 . 3

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

0 . 1 0 4 * * *

T i c i n o L e a g u e

2 0 . 9

3 1 . 3

6 . 0

4 1 . 8

1 0 0 . 0

P p d

9 . 8

3 2 . 2

1 1 . 2

4 6 . 9

1 0 0 . 0

P l r t

9 . 7

4 1 . 0

1 0 . 3

3 9 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

N o p a r t y i d e n t i fi c a t i o n

1 1 . 6

2 8 . 1

1 2 . 7

4 7 . 6

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

1 1 . 0

3 0 . 2

1 2 . 8

4 6 . 1

1 0 0 . 0

1

n . s . ¼ n

o t s i g n i fi c a n t ; * p 5

0 . 1 , * * p 5

0 . 0 5 ,

* * * p 5

0 . 0 1 .

S o u r c e :

S u r v e y O V P ( 2 0 0 3 ) .




wrongdoing, even when a politician stays true to his or her electoral promises.

Overall, however, those who consider themselves as belonging to the centre-right or

the right are very reluctant to demand the suspension of a politician accused of

corruption. In the Italian sample, therefore, it would seem to be confirmed thatcitizens view the problem of moral reputation as an integral aspect of the clash that

occurs between political opponents. This is not the case in Switzerland, where those

aligned with the right tend to accept a certain degree of moral transgression from

politicians, but only so long as it does not sully their public reputations.

For the most part, the analysis of party allegiances confirms our findings with

respect to the left – right axis. Supporters of the Italian centre-right and, to a lesser

extent, those of the Northern League are themselves divided. Some accept

transgression from politicians, while others condemn it, yet both groups generally

reject the need to suspend a politician accused of corruption. In Switzerland, the

configuration is different insofar as supporters of the Ticino League largely belong tothe ‘Indulgent’ category. The centrist Liberal-Radical Party (PLRT) has held

political sway over the Canton of Ticino for many decades with current levels of

support at more than 30% of the electorate. Adherents of the party accept the

transgression of common morality in the name of electoral promises, yet support the

premise that a politician accused of corruption should be removed from office.

Supporters of Socialist and Green parties, on the other hand, tend to be highly

‘Legalist’ in their views, creating a paradoxical convergence, at least on the surface,

with a significant part of the Italian centre-right.

In short, with regard to our main issue, the supporters of so-called ‘populist’ parties,

generally oriented towards the right, see the moral transgression of politicians in

different ways within each of the two different contexts. In the Canton of Ticino, there

would seem to be a greater level of ‘Indulgence’, while in Italy there appears to be a

defensive, ‘Legalistic’ reaction to the notion that the accusation of corruption is enough

to justify removal from office. In any case, the analysis only partially confirms our

hypothesis that the supporters of these ‘populist’ parties tend to be more pragmatic and

tolerant than other party supporters, and less disposed to condemn political corruption.

These results suggest that, regardless of context, the anti-corruption rhetoric used by

the leaders of the populist parties does not necessarily affect their supporters. In the

Swiss and Italian political field, supporters of the leagues are in fact among those most

inclined to accept that politicians need not follow rigid moral rules. To what extent does

tolerance towards politicians derive from moral criteria that belong more generally tothe public and private spheres? Specifically, can we claim that league supporters are

more indulgent in other areas of life as well?

Public and Private Morality

Let us first ask if the varying degrees of tolerance of political wrongdoing can be

connected to value systems and cultural norms variably shared by citizens. One

approach in examining this aspect is to ask if one’s judgement of politicians is

connected to a moral code (be it public or private) that is drawn from the principles of

everyday life. As we know, political corruption is a complex concept with manypossible definitions. A classic interpretation, founded on the principle of shared

interest, sees it as any form of behaviour on the part of a public official that deviates

64 O. Mazzoleni



from accepted norms in order to serve private interests (Huntington, 1968). It

becomes essential, therefore, to understand the criteria that constitute ‘accepted

norms’. Working from cues provided by an ample selection of sociological texts (Arts

& Halman, 2004; Inglehart, 1977; Sciolla, 2004), we attempt to examine the featuresof civicness that exist in the two bordering regions. Our study makes it possible to

understand the extent to which the following deviant acts are deemed always,

sometimes or never justifiable: ‘Declaring lower income to the tax office’; ‘Not paying

for public transport’; ‘Not voting’; ‘Paying a public official in order to gain

employment’; ‘Killing in self-defence’; ‘Paying for sex’; ‘Not separating rubbish for

recycling’; ‘Extramarital relations’; and ‘Feigning illness to stay home from work’.4

Analysis of the responses reveals that there is a linear relationship between the

extent to which these acts are viewed as acceptable and the degree of tolerance of the

transgressions of politicians. Those who are most indulgent towards politicians tend

statistically to have a less restrictive civicness. Conversely, those most intolerant of political corruption also have a greater than average tendency to disapprove of the

deviant acts listed above (Table 4). In the intermediate categories, the degree of

tolerance is more nuanced and tends to be determined by the nature of the single act.

Furthermore, in Italy, it is acts involving the payment of taxes or fares on public

transport that correlate with judgements of political morality, while in Switzerland

the connection can also be found in relation to those aspects that would seem to be

most removed from the political sphere, such as extramarital relations, for example.

In attempting to collate these results more effectively, we have established two

indices that measure the degree of acceptability of the deviant acts listed previously,

with regard to both the ‘public’ sphere and the ‘private’ sphere.5

Although there are no strong coefficients, one can see a direct link in the Italian

sample between those who are tolerant with regard to acts in everyday life, especially

public acts, and those who show a tolerance of the transgressions of politicians. This

also holds true for the Swiss citizens, though in a less pronounced way. The Swiss

people differ, however, insofar as they are more likely than the Italians to manifest a

connection between transgressions in the private sphere and their judgements of

political morality. Here again, the degree of tolerance expressed in the private sphere

tends to be associated with the judgement of a politician’s morality. These results

seem to confirm the hypothesis that judgements of the morality of politicians

respond to criteria whose roots can be found in a broader spectrum of everyday life.

Values and Political Context

It would be interesting to know, therefore, whether the spheres of private and public

morality have a specific role in influencing people’s judgements of politicians, in a

way that is independent of factors connected to the context, such as levels of trust in

political actors and other social and cultural aspects. It is also important to

understand the extent to which support for a party, particularly for either of the two

leagues in question, might constitute a root factor in the different ways that political

transgression is tolerated and the differing degrees to which it is tolerated. We have

sought to understand these phenomena by way of a multivariate statistical analysis,using four logistical regression models where the dependent variables are the four

types of orientation towards transgression discussed above (Table 5).




T a b l e 4

. M e a n t o l e r a n c e o n p r i v a t e a n d p u b l i c i s s u e s s e l e c t e d b y j u d g e m e n t t o w a r d s p o l i t i c i a n s i n C a n

t o n o f T i c i n o a n d i n t h e N o r t h e r n I t a l i a n

p r o

v i n c e s





T o t a l

p C h i 2 1

C r a m e r ’ s V

T i c i n o

I t . P r o v .

T i c i n o

I t . P r o v .

T i c i n o

I t . P r o

v .

T i c i n o

I t . P r o v .

T i c i n o

I t .

P r o v .

T i c i n o

I t . P r o v .

T i c i n o

I t . P r o v .

L o w t h r e s h o l d o f

a c c e p t a b i l i t y t o w a r d

p r i v a t e m o r a l i s s u e s

9 . 0

1 6 . 2

3 0 . 0

2 5 . 7

1 1 . 6

1 5 . 4

4 9 . 4

4 2 . 6

1 0 0 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

* * *

0 . 1 0 4 * * *

0 . 1 8 8 * * *

H i g h t h r e s h o l d o f



1 3 . 9

2 6 . 9

3 0 . 0

3 2 . 5

1 4 . 8

1 4 . 3

4 1 . 0

2 6 . 3

1 0 0 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

1 1 . 0

2 0 . 6

3 0 . 1

2 8 . 5

1 2 . 9

1 5 . 0

4 6 . 0

3 5 . 9

1 0 0 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

L o w t h r e s h o l d o f



9 . 4

1 7 . 0

3 1 . 9

2 8 . 7

9 . 1

1 5 . 3

4 9 . 5

3 9 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

* * *

* * *

0 . 1 5 4 * * *

0 . 1 1 2 * * *

H i g h t h r e s h o l d o f



1 3 . 7

2 5 . 6

2 7 . 6

2 8 . 2

1 7 . 8

1 4 . 6

4 0 . 9

3 1 . 6

1 0 0 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

T o t a l

1 1 . 2

2 0 . 7

3 0 . 1

2 8 . 5

1 2 . 8

1 5 . 0

4 5 . 9

3 5 . 8

1 0 0 . 0

1 0 0 . 0

1

n . s . ¼ n o t s i g n i fi c a n t ; * p 5

0 . 1 , * * p 5

0 . 0 5 ,

* * * p 5

0 . 0 1 .

S o u r c e :

S u r v e y O V P ( 2 0 0 3 ) .

66 O. Mazzoleni



Table 5. Tolerance towards politicians: Four models (binary logistic regression)

Northern Italianprovinces Canton of Ticino

B Exp(B) Sig.1 B Exp(B) Sig.

‘Indulgents’Degree of public morality 0.043 1.044 *** 0.028 1.028 *Degree of private morality 0.015 1.015 n.s. 0.047 1.048 *Trust in politicians

(ref. cat. decreasing)0.965 2.626 *** 0.458 1.581 **

Centre-right oriented(ref. cat. left)

1.079 2.942 ***

Northern League 1.051 2.859 ***Other parties’ identification 0.261 1.298 n.s.No party identification 0.770 2.159 ***Low level of education

(ref. cat. university)70.307 0.736 n.s. 0.359 2.249 n.s.

High school 70.097 0.907 n.s. 0.126 1.369 n.s.Gender (ref. cat. female) 0.139 1.150 n.s. 0.328 1.172 n.s.Ticino League 0.811 1.399 ***Ppd 0.314 1.433 n.s.Plrt 0.159 1.134 n.s.No party identification 0.336 1.388 n.s.Constant 73.160 0.042 *** 73.668 0.026 ***

Cox & Snell’s R2 0.075;Nagelkerke’s R2 0.118;

N ¼ 307

Cox & Snell’s R2 0.022;Nagelkerk’s R2 0.044;

N ¼ 110

‘Formalists’Degree of public morality 0.049 1.050 *** 0.018 1.018 n.s.Degree of private morality 70.002 0.998 n.s. 70.025 0.975 n.s.

Trust in politicians(ref. cat. decreasing)

70.301 0.740 ** 0.221 1.247 n.s.


70.074 0.928 n.s.

Northern League 0.184 1.202 n.s.Other parties’ identification 70.496 0.609 ***No party identification 0.352 1.422 n.s.Low level of education

(ref. cat. university)0.828 2.289 *** 0.941 1.869 ***

High school 0.620 1.859 *** 0.623 1.606 ***Gender (ref. cat. female) 70.163 0.850 n.s. 0.043 2.560 n.s.Ticino League 0.626 1.489 *Ppd 0.474 2.563 *Plrt 0.940 1.864 ***

No party identification 0.398 1.044 *Constant 71.912 0.148 *** 72.133 0.118 ***


N ¼ 416


N ¼ 293

‘Legalists’Degree of public morality 70.024 0.976 n.s. 70.019 0.981 n.s.Degree of private morality 70.024 0.977 n.s. 0.098 1.103 ***Trust in politicians

(ref. cat. decreasing)0.136 1.146 n.s. 0.027 1.027 n.s.


1.013 2.754 ***

Northern League 1.205 3.338 ***

Other parties’ identification 1.648 5.195 ***No party identification 0.522 1.686 *

(continued )




The Italian results confirm the importance of public and private virtues withrespect to each type of tolerance, even though their impact remains low. Gender does

not seem to play a specific role in the Italian sample, whereas in the Swiss canton,

women appear to be more ‘Intransigent’ while men lean more towards the

‘Legalistic’ type. What clearly emerges from both the Swiss and Italian samples is

that people who claim that their trust in politicians has remained the same or

increased are invariably located among the ‘Indulgents’, just as those who declare

themselves less trusting of politicians tend to be more ‘Intransigent’ in that regard.

Generally speaking, people with higher educational status are more critical of the

moral transgression of politicians, but are so from a ‘Legalistic’ standpoint,

suggesting moral criteria inspired by a juridical (or strict) conception of corruption,such that the mere allegation of corruption does not constitute sufficient grounds for

suspending a politician from his or her office.

Table 5. (Continued )

Northern Italianprovinces Canton of Ticino

B Exp(B) Sig.1 B Exp(B) Sig.

Low level of education(ref. cat. university)

71.552 0.212 *** 71.250 0.286 ***

High school 70.497 0.608 *** 71.036 0.355 ***Gender (ref. cat. female) 70.060 0.942 n.s. 0.475 1.608 **Ticino League 71.883 0.152 ***Ppd 70.586 0.556 *Plrt 70.847 0.429 ***No party identification 70.546 0.580 **Constant 71.248 0.287 *** 71.228 0.293 ***


N ¼ 222


N ¼ 131

‘Intransigents’Degree of public morality 70.076 0.927 *** 70.020 0.980 *Degree of private morality 0.007 1.007 n.s. 70.035 0.965 *Trust in politicians

(ref. cat. decreasing)70.558 0.572 *** 70.363 0.696 ***

Centre-right oriented (ref. cat. left) 71.497 0.224 ***Northern League 72.027 0.132 ***Other parties’ identification 71.214 0.297 ***No party identification 70.904 0.405 ***Low level of education

(ref. cat. university)0.365 1.441 * 70.290 0.749 n.s.

High school 70.081 0.922 n.s. 0.074 1.077 n.s.Gender (ref. cat. female) 0.071 1.074 n.s. 70.372 0.689 ***

Ticino League 70.204 0.816 n.s.Ppd 70.212 0.809 n.s.Plrt 70.338 0.713 n.s.No party identification 70.159 0.853 n.s.Constant 1.313 3.717 *** 0.887 2.428 ***


N ¼ 541


N ¼ 461

1n.s.¼not significant; * p50.1, ** p50.05, *** p50.01.

68 O. Mazzoleni



Without revealing marked differences compared to other adherents of the centre-

right, support for the Northern League has a significant impact on both the

‘Indulgent’ and ‘Legalistic’ categories – independent of public or private dimensions

of morality, trust in politicians, educational status or gender. In other words, theinternal division that our bivariate analysis revealed among supporters of this party is

confirmed. Meanwhile, those who adhere to centre-left parties are confirmed as being

more ‘Intransigent’, while social-democrats in Switzerland are more ‘Legalistic’.

If we go deeper, we discover that supporters of the Northern League and the

Ticino League are different, in their respective contexts, from the supporters of other

parties in terms of their greater tolerance of deviant acts in the private sphere.

Moreover, in the case of the Northern League, there is a higher tolerance of public

malfeasance than is manifest among the general population and among supporters of

other centre-right parties. Among supporters of the Northern League and to a lesser

extent, those of the Ticino League, people with higher levels of education are under-represented and there is a general tendency to be less indulgent. In each context,

however, supporters of the two leagues are not significantly different from those of

other parties so far as the educational qualifications of their supporters is concerned.

Conclusions

Our survey tends to confirm some of the results reported in the literature regarding

tolerance of political corruption in other parts of the world. By looking at two

general issues, we have tried to assess the degree of tolerance shown towards the

transgressions of politicians. Independent of the historical and political differences

that exist between the Italian-speaking Swiss and the people of northern Italy,

cultural resources and the trust shown towards politicians seem to play a similar role

in the two regions. People with high educational levels tend to be more inclined than

other groups to condemn and stigmatise the acts of politicians that might potentially

be seen as transgressive, even when they have been performed with the aim of

fulfilling promises made to the electorate. At the same time, these categories of

people seem to adopt a legalistic conception of political corruption when making

their appraisal, to the extent that the fact that the moral reputation of a politician

has been brought into question is not, for them, sufficient grounds for suspending

him or her from office. Furthermore, those who declare that their trust in politicians

has remained the same or increased are among the more ‘Indulgent’ with respect tothe arguably ‘deviant’ acts and compromised reputations of politicians, while those

whose trust has decreased in recent years tend to be more morally ‘Intransigent’

towards politicians. It is also true in both countries, however, that people with a

lower level of education are far from uniform in the way they judge political

wrongdoing motivated by the need to fulfil promises made to the electorate.

Furthermore, it is clear that the degree of tolerance that Swiss and Italian

individuals reveal towards arguably transgressive acts by politicians is influenced in

part by their respective political contexts. As one would expect, the Italian citizens,

particularly those belonging to the centre-right parties, are much more reluctant

morally to condemn a politician accused of corruption. Indeed, throughout the1990s and 2000s, the use of anti-corruption rhetoric has been a central feature of

political struggle in Italy. From 2001 to 2005, the Northern League was part of the




governing coalition headed by Silvio Berlusconi who, as is well known, has been

repeatedly indicted on charges of political corruption. The effects of this conflict are

also reflected in the attitudes towards political corruption that persist among

supporters of the centre-right and the centre-left. While supporters of the latter areclearly aligned with the group we have described as morally ‘Intransigent’,

supporters of the centre-right are instead divided between outright condemnation

of political transgression and an attitude of tolerance where ‘the ends justify the

means’, a stance that is generally accompanied, it should be said, by a refusal to

suspend a politician accused of corruption. From this standpoint, supporters of the

Northern League are no different from the rest of the centre-right. In other words,

they show no greater stigmatisation of ‘immoral’ political behaviour, but instead

reveal a greater tolerance of possible transgressions and of politicians caught up in

allegations of corruption. This greater tolerance as compared to the supporters of

other parties is also found among the supporters of the Ticino League. The TicinoLeague has participated in a governing coalition at the cantonal level and their

leader has repeatedly been accused of breaking the law – a fact that has not led to his

leadership being called into question at any time since 1991. Even more than their

Italian counterparts, the Swiss supporters of the Ticino League show a broad

tolerance of political transgression, in terms of both action and reputation.

Another and clearer convergence between supporters of the leagues in each country

is their greater level of tolerance with regard to rules of public and private conduct, an

attitude that generally correlates with their tolerant judgements of politicians. In fact,

while league supporters from the two countries differ in the levels of trust (or mistrust)

they harbour towards politicians, political parties and governments, they are united in

their difference from the supporters of other parties when it comes to certain criteria

of judgement that are not strictly connected to the political sphere. In short, among

supporters of the Northern League and the Ticino League, there is a direct correlation

between a higher tolerance of political corruption and a willingness to indulge those

actions that could be considered deviant in the context of common moral standards

that persist in the private or public spheres.

If our analysis contributes to knowledge about common perceptions of political

corruption, then it also suggests, by its limits, issues for further research that might

employ both quantitative and qualitative approaches. For instance, while our

questionnaire asked for judgements about politicians generally, we might ask

whether the answers of the supporters of ‘populist’ parties in either context weregiven with the actions of their own leaders in mind. Unfortunately, our survey does

not permit us clearly to distinguish the particular dimension from the general (i.e. to

distinguish opinions about the leaders of the ‘populist’ parties, from opinions about

politicians generally). Moreover, it remains unclear if supporters of the leagues

simply avoid moral criteria when judging the acts of politicians, or if it is more a case

of them adopting moral criteria, but applying them with greater tolerance, making a

distinction between theory and practice when it comes to this particular field.

Acknowledgements

This is a revised version of a paper presented to the workshop, ‘Corruption and

Democracy in Europe: Public Opinion and Social Representations’, University of

70 O. Mazzoleni



Salford, 29 – 31 March 2007. I am grateful to the participants and the editor of this

issue for their remarks.

Notes

1 For a critical review of the literature, see Bezes and Lascoumes (2005).2 The survey was conducted by postal questionnaire using a random sample of adult residents. For the

analyses, data has been weighted by educational level, gender, age and regional/provincial context.3 In order to highlight the statistical differences, I adopt the criteria of standardised adjusted residuals

(values higher than þ/7 1.96). See Sheskin (2004).4 The question was formulated as follows: ‘You will find below a list of somewhat widespread acts. Could

you please tell us if each of these acts are, in your opinion, never or always justified, using a scale from 1

to 7, where 1 means ‘‘An act that is never justified’’ and 7 means ‘‘An act that is always justified’’.’5 The method used to obtain these indices was a factor analysis (extraction method ML and OBLIMIN

rotation. Expl. Var. 30%; REPR 19%).

References

Albertazzi, D. (2006) The lega dei ticinesi: The embodiment of populism, Politics, 26(2), pp. 133– 139.

Anderson, C. J., & Tverdova, Y. V. (2003) Corruption, political allegiences and attitudes toward

government in contemporary democracies, American Journal of Political Science, 47(1), pp. 91 – 109.

Arts, W., & Halman, L. (Eds) (2004) European Values at the Turn of the Millennium (Amsterdam: Brill

Academic Publishers).

Betz, H.-G. (1994) Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (New York: St Martin’s Press).

Bezes, P., & Lascoumes, P. (2005) Percevoir et juger la ‘corruption politique’. Enjeux et usages des

enquetes sur les repre ´ sentations des atteintes a ` la probite ´ publique, Revue Franc ¸ aise de Science Politique,

55(5– 6), pp. 757– 786.

Biorcio, R. (Ed.) (1997) La Padania Promessa. La Storia, le Idee e la Logica d’azione Della Lega Nord (Milan: Il Saggiatore).

Blondel, J. (1997) Institutions et comportements politiques italiens: ‘anomalies’ et ‘miracles’, in:

I. Diamanti & M. Lazar (Eds) Politique a ` l’italienne, pp. 7 – 30 (Paris: PUF).

Blumler, J. (1990) Elections, the media and the modern publicity process, in: M. Ferguson (Ed.) Public

Communication: The new imperatives, pp. 101 – 103 (London: Sage).

Bull, M., & Rhodes, M. (Eds) (1997) Crisis and Transition in Italian Politics (London: Frank Cass).

Cento Bull, A., & Gilbert, M. (Eds) (2002) The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics

(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan).

Davis, C., Camp, R., & Coleman, K. M. (2004) The influence of party systems on citizens’ perceptions of

corruption and electoral response, Comparative Political Studies, 37(6), pp. 677– 703.

Della Porta, D. (1996) Actors in corruption: Business politicians in Italy, International Social Science

Journal , 149, pp. 349 – 364.Della Porta, D. (2000) Social capital, beliefs in government, and political corruption, in: S. J. Pharr &

R. D. Putnam (Eds) Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? , pp. 208– 228

(Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Della Porta, D., & Me ´ ny, Y. (Eds) (1997) Democracy and Corruption in Europe (London: Pinter).

Dominguez, J. I., & McCann, J. A. (Eds) (1996) Democratizing Mexico: Public Opinion and Electoral

Choices (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University).

Galli Della Loggia, E. (1998) L’identita ` Italiana (Bologna: Il Mulino).

Gardiner, J. (1970) The Politics of Corruption (New York: Russell Sage Foundation).

Gibbons, K. M. (1989) Variations in attitudes toward corruption in Canada, in: A. Heidenheimer,

M. Johnston & T. Levine (Eds) Political Corruption, pp. 763 – 780 (New Brunswick, NJ and London:

Transaction).

Heidenheimer, A. (1989) Perspectives on the perception of corruption, in: A. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston

& T. LeVine (Eds) Political Corruption, pp. 149 – 164 (New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction).

Huntington, S. (1968) Modernization and corruption, in: S. Huntington (Ed.) Political Order in Changing

Societies, pp. 59 – 71 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).




Inglehart, R. (Ed.) (1977) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western

Publics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

Johnston, M. (1989) Right and wrong in American politics: popular conceptions of corruption, in:

A. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston & T. Levine (Eds) Political Corruption, pp. 743 – 762 (New Brunswick,

NJ and London: Transaction).

Lascoumes, P., & Mazzoleni, O. (2007) Conceptions de la fonction politique et des atteintes a ` la probite ´

publique dans le jugement des citoyens ordinaries. Paper presented at the ninth French Political

Association Congress, Toulouse, 3 – 4 September.

Mancuso, I., Atkinson, M., Blais, A., Greene, M., & Nevitte, N. (Eds) (2006) A Question of Ethics:

Canadians Speak Out (Toronto: Oxford University Press).

Mastropaolo, A. (Ed.) (2005) La Mucca Pazza Della Democrazia. Nuove Destre, Populismo, Antipolitica

(Torino: Bollati Boringhieri).

Mazzoleni, O. (1999) La Lega dei Ticinesi. Vers l’inte ´ gration?, Swiss Political Science Review, 5(3),

pp. 79–95.

Mazzoleni, O. (Ed.) (2004) Culture Politiche e Culture Civiche a Confronto. Il Caso Della Regione Insubrica

(Bellinzona: Ustat).

Mazzoleni, O. (2005) Multilevel populism and centre-periphery cleavage in Switzerland: The case of theLega dei Ticinesi, in: Y. Me ´ ny & D. Caramani (Eds) Challenges to Consensual Politics: Democracy,

Identity, and Populist Protest in the Alpine Region, pp. 209 – 227 (Bruxelles: PIE-Peter Lang).

Muxel, A. (2007) Rapport au politique et jugements sur la probite ´ . Paper presented at the CEVIPOF

conference ‘De ´ mocratie et corruption. Tous corruptibles?’, Paris, 19 – 20 December.

Newell, J., & Bull, M. J. (2003) Political corruption in Italy, in: M. J. Bull & J. Newell (Eds) Corruption in

Contemporary Politics, pp. 37 – 50 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave).

Norris, P. (Ed.) (2005) Radical Right: Parties and Electoral Competition (Cambridge and New York:

Cambridge University Press).

Pharr, S. J. (1999) Are citizens cynical or lax? Corruption tolerance and one-party dominance. Paper

presented at the conference on political parties and corruption, Schuman Center, European University,

Florence, Italy.

Pharr, S. J. (2000) Officials’ misconduct and public distrust: Japan and the liberal democracies, in:S. J. Pharr & R. D. Putnam (Eds) Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? ,

pp. 173 – 201 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

Queloz, N. (2000) La corruption en Suisse: une plaisanterie, in: G. Blundo (Ed.) Monnayer Les Pouvoirs.

Espaces, Me canismes et Repre sentations de la Corruption, pp. 177 – 195 (Paris and Gene ` ve: PUF/IEUD).

Redlawsk, D., McCann, P., & James, A. (2005) Popular interpretations of ‘corruption’ and their partisan

consequences, Journal of Political Behaviour, 27(3), pp. 261 – 283.

Schedler, A. (Ed.) (1997) The End of Politics? Explorations into Modern Antipolitics (London: Macmillan

Press).

Sciolla, L. (2004) La Cfida dei Valori. Rispetto Delle Regole e Rispetto dei Diritti in Italia (Bologna: Il

Mulino).

Sheskin, D. J. (2004) Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical Procedures (New York:

Chapman & Hall/CRC).

Taggart, P. (2000) Populism, (Buckingham, UK: Open University Press).

Thompson, J. B. (Ed.) (2000) Political Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age (Cambridge, UK:

Polity Press).

72 O. Mazzoleni

(2008) mazzoleni, o. moral integrity and the reputation of politicians as perceived by supporters of...

Documents