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2013 Field Investigation Report: Uzbekistan

With specific focus on Korean multinational companies involved in forced child/adult labor

Jong Chul Kim, Sejin Kim and Il Lee (APIL)1

1.Overview of Uzbekistan

According the Korean Department of Foreign Affairs, Uzbekistan’s land area is nearly twice as

big as that of the Korean peninsula, covering 447,400㎢. The population stands at 28,500,000

(2010), 2,500,000 of whom reside in Tashkent, the Uzbek capital. Uzbek is the official

language, although a considerable number speak Russian as well. 88% of the population

identify as Muslims – mostly Sunnis – while 9% are Russian Orthodox. By 2010 statistics, the

GNP stands at $1,366. Since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 until present,

Islam Karimov has been in long-term power, wielding politics of fear. The Karimov regime has

a notorious record of indiscriminately murdering hundreds of peaceful protestors back in 2005.

Endowed with abundant natural resources, Uzbekistan boasts 1.6tcm of natural gas reserves,

600 million barrels of crude oil, and is speculated to have 3,270 tons of gold deposits (5th largest

deposit in the world) and 185,800 tons of uranium (3.4 % of world market shares). The country

also produces 1 million ton of cotton annually, 70% of which is exported; this puts Uzbekistan

at the 55h largest cotton producer, and the 6th largest exporter in the world (all according to 2010

statistics).

South Korea accounts for 7.4% of Uzbekistan’s total exports, mostly purchasing raw energy and

raw cotton; South Korea is Uzbekistan’s 2nd biggest import source as well ($1.4 billion USD in

2010), inferior only to Russia. Major imported goods are automobile parts and automobiles.

Below is a table of the dollar amount of direct investment and the number of South Korean

corporations newly established in Uzbekistan from 2000 to June 2013, as reported by the

Export-Import Bank of Korea:

                                                                                                                         1 The authors are Korean Attorneys working for a non-profit, public interest lawyers’ group called the Advocates for Public Interest Law(APIL, www.apil.or.kr). APIL’s work includes assisting victims of humanm rights violations committed by Korean companies overseas. This report was created as part of a research project commissioned by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) in 2013, who requested an investation of cases of human rights abuses by Korean corporations overseas, and suggestions on remedial policy measures. The Korean version of the entire report can be accessed through the website of the NHRCK (www. http://www.humanrights.go.kr/03_sub/body02_4.jsp). The report was transalted into English by Hyun-Soo Lim, an undergraduate student at the University of Pennsylvania.  

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[Table 1] Korean firms’ investment in Uzbekistan by year

Year

Number of newly-

registered

corporations

Investment amount (in thousa

nds of USD)

2000 3 17,770

2001 2 60,177

2002 4 462

2003 5 5,252

2004 3 563

2005 10 8,695

2006 15 22,535

2007 32 70,043

2008 28 65,152

2009 14 32,323

2010 19 40,643

2011 13 53,191

2012 13 18,782

2013 8 8,141

2.Overview of Korean Corporations in Uzbekistan

In the last 10 years, manufacturing has dominated the type of industry amongst the Korean

corporations in Uzbekistan, followed by construction and real estate. However, the most striking

big investors in Uzbekistan are the Korean firms that use the cotton grown in Uzbekistan to

manufacture cotton yarn and cotton pulp; construction companies renovating and reconstructing

apartments; and those that extract natural gas to make a variety of chemical products. Besides

the firms mentioned, there are also airline companies involved in freight transport, banking and

finance firms, electronics and automobile part manufacturers.

[Table 2] Korean Corporations in Uzbekistan by Industry (2003-2012)

Type Industry Number of newly registered

firms

Amount invested (in millions

of USD)

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Manufacturing 66 120

Construction 15 4

Real Estate and Leasing 15 55

Wholesale and Retail 13 3

Professional, Scientific, and

Technological Services

9 8

Transportation 8 22

Mining 6 4

Lodging and Food 5 24

Finance and Insurance 5 33

Publishing, Media,

Communications and

Information Services

3 25

Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery 2 1

Business Facility Maintenance

and

Industry Support Services

2 0

Associations and Institutes,

Repair and other Individual

Services

2 0

Arts, Sports, and other

Recreational Services

1 0

Total 152 317

[Source] Korean Import-Export Bank

Our research sought to 1) investigate the existence of Human Rights violations that are common

to the resource-extraction industry (e.g. forced migration) 2) in the case of

renovation/reconstruction industries, analyze exposed incidents of forced migration and unjust

compensation through the media1, and 3) in the case of cotton and cotton pulp manufacturers,

study the problem of child/adult forced labor, a significant Huamn Rights problem that has

received international attention for over a decade.

However, this particular report will address a more narrow focus, more specifically, the last

objective: whether the Korean cotton company in question, Daewoo Textile, and the cotton pulp

manufacturing company in question, Globla Komsco Daewoo(GKD,) have been using cotton

harvested by forced labor of children and adults.

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3. Why we chose Uzbekistan as the field investigation site

There are four major reasons why we selected Uzbekistan as our field investigation site. First,

Uzbekistan’s Human Rights situation is one of the world’s most vulnerable. President Karimov

in power for over 20 years, during the time period in which no Human Rights expert from the

United Nations except those from the United Nations Interantional Children’s Emergecny Fund

(UNICEF) had ever been allowed to visit (at the time of the field investigation, a team from the

International Labor Organization was permitted to enter for the first time).

In the past decade, due to Uzbekistan’s lack of proper governance and their possible implication

in serious Human Rights violations, European firms have largely withdrawn their invesments.

However, South Korea has consistently maintained or increased their FDI: from the 2011/2012

Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) report on Korean firms investing abroad,

we can see that the number of Korean corporations operating in Uzbekistan stands at 70, a

number inferior only to Russia in the entire Commonwealth of Independent States2.

In this context, we wished to pursue a fied investigation on Human Rights violations by Korean

corporations operating in a ‘high-risk Human Rights environment’.

Second, it is significant to note that state-owned enterprises – not just private firms – continue

to invest in Uzbekistan despite the high financial and Human Rights risks. Korean state-owned

enterprises, in the fields of natural resources (e.g. natural gas) development and cotton pulp

production, are currently in operation in Uzbekistan. Therefore, we were also interested in

analyzing the Human Rights record of ‘Korean state-owned enterprises abroad’.

Third, related literature shows that Korean corporations involved in large-scale redevelopment

in Tashkent have failed to provide fair compensation and even forced migration in multiple

instances. However, the most serious challenge is that they are implicated in forced child labor

(see Final Recommendation from the 2011 United Nations Committee on Children’s Rights, for

instance). In particular, international organizations like the ILO and international NGOs like

                                                                                                                         2   The exports in 2012 amounted to $1,766,516,000 USD. The figures have consistently been on the rise since 1992 when the trade between Uzbekistan and Korea started. Uzbekistan’s imports from Korea also jumped from $326,000 USD in 1992 to $42,362,000 USD in 2012. The trade item that saw the most increase in imports was cotton linter pulp (at $5,405,000 USD), a 26,764.8% increase from the year before (Source: Korea International Trade Association).  

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Human Rights Watch have repeatedly brought forth the issue of child/adult forced labor, but the

Uzbek government and the Korean enterprises in cotton production, GKD and Daewoo

Textile, have ‘denied the existence of forced child laobr’; therefore, the research team aimed to

visit Uzbekistan to investigate whether child/adult forced labor truly exists in cotton harvest and

whether the Korean corporations are involved in such rights violations.

Lastly, even if using raw cotton harvested by forced labor may not be a direct violaton of

Human Rights, it nonetheless is ‘a form of complicity in human rights violation, since it is an

act of neglect of due diligence in the supply chain’; thus, it is worth investigating if Korean

corporations are culpable of this form of complicity.

4. Methodology

Before visitng Uzbekistan, we investigated cases of Korean corporations’ Human Rights

violations in Uzbekistan through related literature. Then, from September 24th to October 4th,

2013, attorneys JongChul Kim, Sejin Kim, and Lee Il, employees of APIL, along with M

inchul Kim of the Center for Good Corporations, travelled to Uzbekistan, visiting major

cities including Tashkent, Bukhara, Jizzax, and Samarkand. During field investigation, we

1) conducted interviews with experts and local activists; 2) visited offices of Korean cor

porations (Daewoo Textile, GKD, state-owned enterprise in natural gas extraction and che

micals production, and construction company in reconstruction) to interview managers an

d employees; 3) visited schools and cotton fields - sites where forced labor most freque

ntly takes place, and 4) talked to the Korean Ambassador to Uzbekistan at the Korean

Embassy.

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[Photo] Map of Uzbekistan, showing major cities

[Table 3] Detailed Itinerary of the Uzbekistan Field Investigation

Date Areas travelled Activities

Tue, Sep. 24 Incheon-Tashkent -Departure from Incheon Airport

-Arrival at Tashkent Ariport

Wed, Sep. 25 Tashkent-Jizzax

-Talked to E, a Uzbken Human Rights activist

-Meeting with N, a victim of forced migration by a Korean

construction company

-Travelled to Jizzax, one of the largest cotton production

sites

-Meeting with O, a Human Rights activist in Jizzax

Thurs, Sep. 26

Jizzax

-Meeting with K, a farmer in the Jizzax region

- Talked to J, an Uzbek citizen

Fri, Sep. 27 Jizzax- Bukhara -Meeting with the President of Daewoo Textile in Bukhara

-Interviewed employees of the same firm

Sat, Sep. 28 Bukhara -Meeting with S, a Human Rights lawyer active in

Bukhara

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Sun, Sep. 29 Samarkand -Phone-interviewed K, an activist from Samarkand

Mon, Sep. 30 Tashkent, Yangiyul

-Meeting with the manager of a Korean cotton pulp

production company, GKD

-Talked to employees at the same firm

Tues, Oct. 1 Tashkent

-Meeting with 10 Human Rights activists and journalists

based in Samarkand, Bukhara, and Tashkent

-Interviewed H, an activist involved in forced migration

case of a Korean construction company

Wed, Oct. 2 Tashkent,

Yangibozor

-Interviewede S, the only remaining teacher at the high

school visited / video footage taken

-Visited the cotton fields where child labor takes place

-Meeting with the manager a Korean gas company

-Interviewed the Korean Ambassador to Uzbekistran at the

Korean Embassy

Thurs, Oct. 3 Tashkent

-Meeting with N, victim of forced migration by a Korean

construction company

-Meeting with the manager of the construction company in

question

Fri, Oct. 4

Tashkent- Incheon

- Scheduled to visit KOTRA, but change of plans due to

the Uzbek Immigration Office/Intellignce Agency

demanding an investigation of the research team; took

refuge in the Korean Embassy, exited country with the

help of a consular representative

5. Related Statues and Regulations3

(1)International conventions relating to child/adult forced labor ratified by Uzbekistan

The Uzbek government has ratified the ‘ILO Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child

Labour’, the ‘ILO Convention No. 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour or Forced

Labour Convention’, and the ‘ILO Convention No. 138 on Minimum Age’, signing 7 of 8 major

international conventions on forced labor. Further, Uzbekistan has also ratified and is bound by

the ‘United Nations Convention on the Rights of Child’, the ‘Optional Protocol to the

Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child                                                                                                                          3 http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/2011TDA/Uzbekistan.pdf

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Pornography’, and the ‘Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,

especially Women and Children’.

(2)Uzbek domestic law on child/adult forced labor

Articles 18 and 33 of the Uzbek Constitution prohibit forced labor, and criminal law also

regards acts limiting physical liberty as a crime. Further, the ‘Children’s Rights Law’ prohibits

human trafficking of children and forcing children to engage in illegal activies, while the 2008

‘Act on Human Trafficking’ criminalizes human trafficking. The ‘Labor Law’ in Uzbekistan

and the aforementioned ‘Children’s Rights Law’ prohibit labor of children under the age of 16,

although part-time, lightweight work is allowed for children 15 years and older; the same laws

also dictate that children under the age of 18 not engage in dangerous labor.

In particular, relevant decrees further break down the law discussed above: ‘The Decree on the

List of Labor in Undesirable Labor Envrionments’ prohibits children under the age of 18 from

working in dangerous labor conditions, which explicitly include picking cotton from cotton

fields by hand. ‘The Decree on Approval of Provision on Requirements on Prohibition of Use of

Minors’ Labor’ prevents employers from hiring children for work that is specified on ‘The

Decree on the List of Labor in Undesirable Labor Environments’. The ‘undesriable

envrionment’ defined by this decree includes working underground, underwater, or in high-rise

elevation; using dangerous equipment; and moving or transporting heavyweight goods. The

decree also dictates that a parent or a labor investigator may cancel the labor contract if the

work harms the child’s health or welfare.

Moreover, on March 26th, 2013, the Uzbek Cabinet issued decrees concerning additional

protocols to implement the ‘ILO Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labou

r’ and the ‘ILO Convention No. 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour or Forced

Labour Convention’. The Cabinet decree applied the National Action Plan relating to p

rohibition of forced child labor, designating the Foreign Affairs and Labor Ministries as

the bodies responsible for carrying out the additional protocols.

6. Major findings

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(1)Whether the Korean corporations, Daewoo Textile and GKD, are complicit in Human

Rights violations

Uzbekistan produces around 1,000,000 tons4 of cotton fiber every year, 50,000~60,000 tons of

which are purchased by Daewoo Textile5 operating in Uzbekistan to produce cotton yarn that

they mostly sell abroad (only a portion of the yarn is sent to Korea). GKD6 buys cotton linter

from Uzbekistan to make cotton pulp, which is then sold to another country or sent to Korea to

make Korean banknotes, amongst other products.

When charged with allegations of forced child labor, the Korean corporations commonly retort

with the following five counterarguments:

First, some insist that there is no forced labor of children and adults in the cotton fields. Second,

others admit to children working in the cotton fields, but propose that such instance of child

labor cannot be viewed as a human rights violation. Third, still others argue that, even if the

Uzbek government harvests cotton through forced child/adult labor, it is impossible for Korean

corporations to know whether the cotton purchased has been cultivated by child labor. Fourth,

they suggest that Korean corporations are not at fault because they do not directly force people                                                                                                                          4 They produce 3 million tons in bowl, and 1 million ton in fiber, 700,000 tons of which are exported abroad by the Uzbek government through American/European cotton traders. 5 This cotton yarn manufacturing firm has their operating plants in Bukhara and Fergana. The Bukhara plant was more recently set up, commencing operations from Septebmer 15th, 2009. It currently employs 8 Korean nationals and 717 Uzbek locals. The Bukhara plant only manufactures cotton yarn, but the factory in Fergana also manufactures some types of fabric. China is the biggest destination of the firm’s products; others include Europe, Iran, and even Korea (although the amount sent to Korea, which is transported through Russia, is rather miniscule). Japan also receives some fabric. The firm purchases 50,000-60,000 tons out of 1 million tons of cotton cultivated yearly in Uzbekistan; they then use the cotton to manufacture around 45,000 tons of products. Every year, they report to the Uzbek government the amount of cotton they need; they negotiate the price as the average between the international market price (Index A) and the price desired by the Uzbek government (Index UZB). Although the firm has yet to make an official statement on the issue of forced labor, it is clear that they acknowledge the existence of the problem; the firm has noticed the boycott from the European market due to rising concerns over forced child labor, and has increasingly tried to enter other markets abroad. However, they have yet to take proper steps like setting up an independent monitoring system. The firm expressed hopes in rumored Uzbek government’s plans of mechanization of cotton harvest, but they believe that rapid change is unrealistic at best. 6 The cotton pulp manufacturing company, GKD, is a consortium whose parent firm is a Korean state-owned enterprise, Komsco, that has independently manufactured cotton pulp for a long period of time. GKD formed a consortium with Deawoo Textile. After a long period of negotiations, Komsco took over a cotton pulp production plant in Yangiyul from KOGOZI (KOGOZI is an Uzbek firm in which the Uzbek government used to have 25% of shares). Most of the cotton pulp produced is sold to Komsco, but some are sold to private companies as well. They also do business with Russia, and have settled contracts with or is in the process of negotiating with France, Switzerland, Bellarus, Ukraine, and Indonesia. GKD officially denies the existence of forced labor in Uzbekistan; and understandably so, since they will likely face a surge of political criticism from Korea if GKD publicly acknowledges being aware of the forced labor situation, which could lead to GKD having to close their business with huge losses [In October 2012, the company’s starting capital, takeover costs and additional investments stood at over $30 million USD, $19.2 million USD are loans to be paid over 10 years]. Not surprisingly, GKD was doing little in efforts to curtail forced labor and refused to consider an independent monitoring system that our research team proposed; they explained that they only have 4 Korean managers, and that they would prefer not to aggravate the Uzbek government.  

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into labor, since they merely buy the cotton made by forced child/adult labor to produce goods.

Lastly, some raise the question of which corporations may be justifiably held responsible - if

there is a human rights violation in the supply chain, is every corporation using that chain

complicit in the violation as well?

However, there are several flaws to the Korean corporations’ arguments. Addressing their

second counterargument, that cotton harvest by children may not be viewed as a rights

violation, we stress that there is a difference between child labor and children’s work. Helping

with household chores or trying out vaous non-dangerous work to find one’s interests may be

understood as children’s work, but being forced to labor in conditions that harm the child’s

body and mind, or engaging in dangerous work, must be regarded as child labor. What we see in

Uzbekistan is not only child labor, but a system that is organized and forced by the government;

therefore, it is one of the most serious human rights violations.

The third counterargument that defends Korean corporations on grounds of ignorance also

makes little sense. Virtually all of the cotton cultivated in Uzbekistan is bought by the Uzbek

government, who then exports the cotton or sells it to private firms, including Daewoo Textile

and GKD, in the domestic market. In other words, the firms that purchase cotton from the

Uzbek government do not have any say in where the cotton comes from; they must purchase

whatever the government has in store from the cotton fields around the country. But forced

labor in the cotton fields is not limited to a certain region in Uzbekistan; rather, it is chronically

widespread. Thereore, the proposition that Korean corporations “cannot know if the cotton was

produced by forced labor’ does not stand; they have more than enough reason to be skeptical

that the cotton purchased has been harvested by fair labor.

Furthermore, corporations must perform their due diligence not to be complicit in human rights

violations in the supply chain. Therefore, the fourth and fifth counterarguments that point to

non-applicability of responsibility cannot be accepted. Despite a decade of challenges raised

against forced child/adult labor, the Korean corporations in question have continued to purchase

cotton from Uzbekistan without any investigation on their own. Even if we accept the excuse of

ignorance – which is still doubtful considering the repeated voices from the local and

international community– they must be held responsible for being complicit in this violation of

Human Rights; their ignorance is a result of paying insufficient attention to the situation.

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[Photo] ‘Cotton Press’ used to produce cotton yarn; Daewoo Textile in Bukhara in Uzbekistan purchased it from the

Uzbek government

Thus, if the first counterargument – that forced labor does not exist in the cotton fields – can

indeed be conclusively refuted through evidence, the Korean corporations in question may

justifiably held responsible for earning profits from cotton harvested by victims of Human

Rights violation. The research team does conclude that forced child/adult labor persists in the

cotton fields in Uzbekistan. We show the evidence below.

(2) Evidence of the existence of child/adult forced labor in the Uzbek cotton fields

Besides countless reports from international organizations and civil society that proved the

existence of forced child labor in cotton cultivation in Uzbekistan, even Daewoo Textile have

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conceded the existence of forced labor when challenged by the Business and Human Rights

Resource Center 7 in a 2012 questioning. The Korean government also recommended to

Uzbekistan, in their Universal Periodic Review in 2013, that forced child labor be eradicated8.

To summarize the findings of our research from personal visits to schools and cotton fields to

conduct independent investigation, and from our interviews with local activists, 1) the current

Uzbek government’s surveillance of monitoring activists is more severe than any other year; 2)

Kolleji students aged 15 to 18 were being forced into cotton harvest as recent as September

2013; 3) adult forced labor has intensified; 4) students, including those in elementary and

middle schools, have their rights to education seriously impeded since their teachers are

mobilized for labor in the cotton fileds; and 5) paid child labor is also on the rise as adults evade

forced labor by hiring children to take their place.

[Photo] October 2nd, 2013: APIL attorney Sejin Kim with E, an Uzbek Human Rights activist, in front of the cotton

fields in Yangibozor, Tashkent

(A) Strict surveillance to conceal child/adult forced labor

Since monitoring from the ILO began in September 2013, the Uzbek government’s watch over

cotton fields and over domestic/international activists against forced child labor has intensified.

For instance, Sergei Naumov, an Uzbek journalist, was arrested on September 21st, 2013 for

monitoring the cotton fields in which forced labor took place (at the time of writing on

September 30th, 2013, he was still under custody). An Uzbek activist our research team had

interviewed was also arrested the day after our meeting by a national intelligence agency

officer, and is now under house arrest9 (as of September 30th, 2013). When our team visited

cotton fields in Yangibozor, Tashkent, we were also arrested by the security guards there and

the police who arrived later; we were thus unable to take pictures of the children whom we

could clearly see were working at the fields10. Furthermore, on the day of our departure from

Uzbekistan, the Uzbek Immigration Office and the Natiional Intelligence Agency notified us of

their intention to bar our exit, threatening to arrest and investigate us.

                                                                                                                         7 http://www.business-humanrights.org/ 8 http://www.upr-info.org/IMG/pdf/recommendations_and_pledges_uzbekistan_2013.pdf 9 http://www.uznews.net/news_single.php?lng=en&sub=hot&cid=2&nid=23899) 10 http://www.cottoncampaign.org/2013/10/02/police-detain-south-korean-visitors- uzbek-human-rights-leader  

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[Photo] October 2nd, 2013: Research team member and E, an Uzbek Human Rights activist, are arrested by the police

while monitoring forced child labor in the cotton fields in Yangibozor, Tashkent

In order to give a false impression that schools have students inside, and to prevent children

who look too young from being discovered in areas (in particular, in inner-city Jizzax), some

Kolleji first-year students were often not sent to the cotton fields.

When children were sent to cotton fields, authorities would place them in the inner areas where

the view from outside is obscured, and securities would watch from the outskirts; some cotton

fields even had helicopters above to supervise the area. Schools often had surveillance officials

as well. The authorities would also suddenly push the mobilization date earlier than the ordinary

annual date, making it difficult for activists to monitor their actions. Therefore, even local

activists complained that it is almost impossible to even keep an eye on the cotton fields this

year.

“This happened quite recently. My fifth daguther was on her way to harvest cotton, moving

on a rear cart attached to a farm tractor with others. Then, street police stopped the driver of

the tractor and scolded him very severely, saying that people from the international community

could see this and make an issue out of it. From then on, all the buses in public transportation

have been turned into buses transporting cotton field labor, and regular citizens are forced to

uses taxis instead.”

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(K, from Jizzax)

“(while watching the cotton fields) On October 17th, 2012, I was arrested and detained for 15

days. They told me they could call me in again anytime in the next year. There is an infamous

prison in Uzbekistan that once you enter, you can never come out – during my detention, (they

told me that) I would be sent there if I am caught agin. But we’re going to keep monitoring the

fields, no matter how hard they make it for us.”

(O, from Jizzax)

B) Persisting forced child labor

Kolleji is equivalent to a Korean high school, although it is named so because the school teaches

professional or technical skills. Kollejis are attended by students aged 15.75 to 18.5 years; in

other words, the majority of students were still children. However, students in kollejis around

the country are forced to harvest cotton. In some areas, as discussed earlier, some high schools

let first-years stay behind, but schools in Samarkand, Naboi, and Kabrai in Kashkent have their

first-years go out to work as well. The conditions in which these students work are inadequate at

best, as explained below:

a)Accomodations and meals

In general, children in forced labor have accomodation near the cotton fields. But if the cotton

fields are near the school, they are told to sleep inside the school facilities and travel back and

forth from the cotton fields. The research team visited “Construction and Service Kolleji” in

Yangibozor, where every student was out in the cotton fields and every classroom was

converted into a dormitory for working students (See the video footage here: www.apil.or.kr/

1413).

The accomodations near the cotton fields are in even worse conditions. The authorities merely

provide blankets to people sleeping in cattlesheds, where mice and pests were commonly seen.

Still others did not even get to sleep in a cattleshed; they were pushed into containers, tents, or

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even on the bare ground11.

“Places like the cattle-shed have really cold floors, so it’s pretty dangerous to sleep t

here. You could get sick easily. But students have no choice but to go, since they cou

ld unofficially be kicked out of the school if they don’t.”

(M, from Tashkent)

Food is also inadequate. Meals are usually cooked on site near the lodging area, but the quantity

is always lacking. But even meals like these are mostly not provided for free. There was even a

terrible water-born disease case on September 2nd, 2013, when a group of first-year students

from “Light Industry Kolleji” in Jizzax fell ill after drinking water from a puddle because they

were not provided drinking water, while working at cotton fields and staying in a cattleshed,.

[Photo] October 2nd, 2013. A classroom in the Kolleji in Yangibozor, Tashkent that we visited. Students and teachers

were all out working in the cotton fields, and classrooms were turned into dormitories to accommodate them.

b) Quotas, working hours, compensation and deductions

Most regions have an average daily quota of 60kg, although there are some differences by area:

in Yangibozor, Tashkent, the individual daily quota was 40 kg of cotton; in Bukhara, 80-85 kg;                                                                                                                          11 According to E from Tashkent, there was a time in 2012 when the authorities simply laid out blanekts underneath a waterway to lodge the students

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in Jizzax, a striking 120 kg for university students. School principals do not have a daily quota,

but a seasonal quota. Therefore, principals check if students meet their daily quotas to make

sure that the seasonal quota is filled by the end of the season.

In order to complete these daily quotas, workers toil from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m., while in certain

occasions, work starts at 6 a.m.

Compensation for the harvested cotton is miniscule, although the exact amount varies by region.

The minimum we witnessed was 150 som per kg (e.g. in some areas of Jizzax; equivalent to

$0.07 USD), and the maximum was 200 som per kg (e.g. in some areas of Bukhara). But most

places paid 170 som per kg (Navoy paid 160 som per kg, although workers were often paid less

for ‘inferior quality’ due to cold weather or rain).

Compensation is paid weekly, but with fee deductions. Generally, the deductions are capped at

50%, but some students who do not fill their quotas receive no pay whatsoever and even incur

debt. This is not only because the quota itself is very high, but also because the government tries

to collect every bit of cotton possible, so they would force people to work in fields with little

cotton left. This phenomenon was most common nearing last days of harvest season.

The most common item for deduction is food. A very small number of places provides meals for

free, but only if the quota is completed (if the quota is not met, meals need to be paid for13. Most

people were unable to fill their quotas), but most regions deduct meal costs from paid

compensation. Other deductions include electricity, health care, transportation, and police

escort. Some even charge for lodging12.

“My wife is a nurse. She just came back yesterday after working at the cotton fields,

but she has to go again the day after tomorrow. Once she goes, she needs to stay at t

he dormitory there for about 10 days before coming home. The daily quota is 70 kg,

but if she can’t make it for whatever reason, we need to pay 40,000 som for 10 days;

my monthly salary is 30,000 som as a doctor. We get 170 som per kg of cotton, but

                                                                                                                         12 Lodging and quotas are only part of the problem. Children work long hours under the sun without any safety equipment; they are given only a sack for collecting cotton. Many children suffer from scars, are exposed to pesticides without any protection, and some even faint from sunstroke. As of 25, September 2013, an activist,E, from Tashkent told us of a recent incident in hich 15 children ran away from a farm called Yachamaili in Tashkent because they could not bare the terrible working conditions in the cotton fields.

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there are multiple deductions for transportation, police convoy, meals and accommodatio

n. So we actually have to save money from a month before harvest season to account

for all the additional expenses (deductions).”

(P, from Tashkent)

c) Sanctions

Students who refuse cotton labor receive low grades in school (in which case they are

disqualified for government-sponsored scholarships) or face expulsion. Schools also force non-

complying students to take on costly projects. The authorities in a village in Jizzax even

reportedly threatened to cut off electricity.

In many cases, one may evade forced labor by paying a penalty. In Jizzax, the penalty for

Kolleji students was $200 USD (university students pay $350-370 USD, and merchants had to

pay a daily penalty of 15,000-50,000 som).

Supervisors check on people’s quotas until 2 a.m. daily, and there are sanctions for not

completing the quota. If the quota is repeatedly unfulfilled, police and other authorities publicly

humiliate or physically abuse the students, and even hold them in custody for days. In Jizzax,

people were forced to harvest cotton at night under the light from a running cultivator. In

Bukhara, students had their scholarships deducted if their quotas were not filled. They also had

their vacation days taken away, which usually means 1-2 days every 10 days during the harvest

season.

“There is a cotton field labelled 13-a in Dustlik, Jizzax. The students from “Law and Business

kolleji” who work there are publicly punished if they don’t fill a certain quota – they are

physically abused by hand or verbally insulted.”

(O, from Jizzax)

(C)Intensifcation of forced labor of adults

In 2013, forced labor of adults intensified as the government scrambled to make up for

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insufficient labor13. One of the most striking cases is that of Bukhara: in 2012, only 50% of

medical professionals and workers (e.g. doctors and nurses) were mobilized for labor, but in

2013, up to 70% are being forced into cotton harvest. The situation is worse in Jizzax, where

everyone in health centers is forced into cotton labor except for 2 doctors and 2 nurses.

Uzbek citizens employed in the federal sector - teachers in the Ministry of Education, doctors

and nurses in the Ministry of Health, provincial/city/county officials in the Federal and Regional

Administrative Offices, village heads, students in police and military academies, employees in

broadcast and journalism, central bank employees - are amongst those called for forced labor.

Foreign-owned companies are better off, but employees of regular private firms are also subject

to forced labor as well.

Workers employed outside the federal sector are also subjected to forced labor, if they receive

pensions or other welfare benefits from the government1416.

“My mother is over 60 years of age, and her kidney is very weak, so she really shouldn’t do

hard labor. But they told us to pay 40,000 som a day (equivalent to $18 USD) in fines if she

doesn’t come out. So today, my brother who is visiting from abroad went to the fields in place

of my mom. The village head goes around visiting every household to call them out to the

fields, but I really don’t understand on what grounds they mobilize people and by what

justification […] It really upsets me.”

(J, from Tashkent)

“When it’s harvest season, they close all the markets and prevent people from working (in

order to mobilize them for labor). So it’s hard to even buy basic goods. They also interfere

with transportation around markets, so it’s inconvenient for people to travel. One of my

relatives is a bus driver, and the police stop him from driving around harvest season. So he just

stays home during the season, since he could be forced into cotton harvest if he is seen outside

                                                                                                                         13 Adults were mobilized for forced labor in July 2013 as well to weed cotton fields, but the scale of mobilization was much grander in September 14 Although the system is not entirely clear, it appears to be that the retirement funds for state employees and any social welfare that the government controls are used as indirect tools for strengthening the forced labor structure. “All funding from the government is included. Even if you work for a private firm, if you get national pensions or anything like that, you need to go and work. In reality, we need to pay bribes to get child support too… I had to pay 30,000-60,000 som to get that…” (O, from Jizzax).  

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anyway and he obviously doesn’t want that.”

(J, from Tashkent)

“University and Kolleji school students are forcefully labored by their teachers into cotton

harvest, corporate employees receive pressure from their boss, and my mother at home is

pressured by the village head and civil society head. If you receive state pension, severance

pay, or child support (parents with children aged 0-2 receive 18,000 to 20,000 som a month),

the state threatens that they’ll cut off the funds if no one from the household volunteers to go.”

(O, from Jizzax)

The Uzbek government also recruits adults from other areas if there is not enough local labor

available, forcing them to stay in poor lodging while working in the cotton fields for an

extended period of time. In places like Jizzax where the cotton fields are many but the labor is

few, state employees, doctors, kolleji students, and broadcasting company employees from

Tashkent are brought in and forced to stay and work for around 2 months.

(D)Forced labor of teachers and the violation of children’s right to learn

Elementary, middle, and kolleji school teachers are indiscriminately mobilized for cotton labor.

In the case of Jizzax, teachers usually go to the cotton fields on a 10-day cycle. Mayers in each

province decide whether teachers will rotate on this cycle, or all the teachers will be mobilized

at all times, depending on the progress on completing the quota. In Tashkent, teachers are

usually called on rotation (however, the kolleji we visited in Yangibozor had only one teacher

stay behind in the school; everyone else was out in the fields with their students). Provinces

outside Tashkent, including Naboi and Jizzax, had only 10 or so teachers left in the school; the

others were all called out to the fields.

“There is huge corruption here. Cotton is basically a magic wand, filling up the pockets of

the country. During cotton harvest season, there is rampant corruption at every stage. A

teacher goes to the principal, paying $300 to ask that he/she not be sent to the cotton fields.

Then, the teacher who is not called to the cotton fields is exempted, but he/she does not go to

school, either; since the authorities have spies, he/she actually should not show up at

school.”

(S, from Bukhara)

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While teachers are out harvesting cotton, classes cannot be taught. In some cases, teachers from

other classes fill in for the missing instructor, but there is still significant disruption in learning.

In some cases, students simply spend time sitting inside the classroom without teacher

supervision. While forced labor of elementary and middle school students has decreased, that of

their teachers has gone up, causing a severe impediment of children’s right to education.

“My daughter is a teacher there, and she says teachers are also called to the cotton fields.

She refused to go and got someone else in her place, which means she had to pay that other

person 10,000 som, and 1,000 som extra for tranposrtation. But the person who labored

takes all the wage for work […] in reality, school classes are not being taught at all.”

(K, from Jizzax)

“It’s true that kolleji school freshmen aren’t called to the cotton fields, but they just sit

there in the classroom because the teachers are gone to the fields. Even all the doctors aged

45 and below have to go to the fileds. My wife is a doctor, but she is 54, so she isn’t

called. Instead, she needs to serve night duty 3 times a month, rather than the regular once a

month.”

(S, from Bukhara)

“As for teachers, elementary and middle school teachers teaching grades 1-9 are also called

to the cotton fields (as well as kolleji school teachers). So even if children in grades 1-9 are

not mobilized, they just sit there in the school for 45 minutes and go home because their

teachers are not there.”

(M, from Tashkent)

(E) Emergence of a new form of paid child labor

Adults who are mobilized into forced labor, especially those recruited from Tashkent to go into

other areas to collect cotton, tend to hire people to work in their place since the wages paid are

ridiculously low and the cotton harvest is very hard labor. To hire a replacement, one usually

pays 300 som per kg [depending on the region, some pay a daily wage of 10,000 som and

transportation fee of 1,000 som (i.e. Jizzax) or 40,000 som for 10 days’ work (i.e. Bukhara)].

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Some intentionally hire children as replacement, since they would usually accept a lower

compensation from the hirer.

“People who come from Tashkent to Jizzax to harvest cotton usually hire students to do

their work for them. In the suburban areas, there are students who aren’t forced by the

school to fill quotas but rather willingly get hired by adults to do their work. I have a

daughter who works at the local water pipe management agency. She was hired in such way

last year and received 35,000 som by working for 20 days, and also got paid for the cotton

she collected. She used the money to buy a new iPhone. My younger daughter who is a

freshman in kolleji school wanted to do the same, but I didn’t let her. Freshman students are

under the watch of the international community so the school doesn’t really make them

labor, but it’s the students themselves who, in order to earn extra cash, get hired by adults to

go to the cotton fields to fill the adults' quotas.”

(K, from Jizzax)

“If a farmer harvests cotton before the season begins and sells it, he wouldn’t need to use

student labor, but would have to call on most of his relatives and acquaintances to have them

to work for harvesting cotton. But even that’s very forceful coercion. The government says

they are not using child labor, and the international community doesn’t frown upon this. But

now the coercion has seeped into the family. The farmers are forcing their daughters and

sons to do this.”

(S, from Bukhara)

“As criticism against forced child labor has risen amidst the international community, they

are increasingly mobilizing old and high-ranking citizens like state employees in Tashkent.

But since those people don’t wish to work in the cotton fields, they would hire students who

are not recruited and thus a new form of child labor emerges that way. It’s really

complicated. Even some middle school students would go to earn money, I’ve seen quite a

few of them.”

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(K, from Jizzax).

7. Summary and Analysis

We can summarize the complicity in Human Rights violation of Korean corporate producers of

cotton yarn and cotton pulp, Deawoo Textile and GKD, as follows:

As recent as the cotton harvest season in 2013, forced child labor was rampant in Uzbekistan,

and forced adult labor even worsened. Since forced labor intensified, teachers would be

mobilized into cotton fields, leaving the students behind in serious impediment of their right to

education; the current system has also given birth to a new form of child labor, as adults hire

children to work in their place in order to fulfill the forced labor quotas.

Despite the facts established above, GKD has denied the existence of forced child labor in the

Uzbek cotton fields; they cited the Uzbek law against forced child labor as support for their

reasoning. However, as is the case with other legal areas in Uzbekistan, the laws are far from

being properly implemented. The regulations are a mere alibi, concealing the truth of Human

Rights violations in the region. The simple existence of legislation says nothing about

implementation in reality; GKD and Daewoo may not use such legislations as an excuse for

their ignorance of the rampant forced labor problem.

If there is indeed a problem of forced labor in Uzbekistan, GKD and Daewoo Textile, who

purchase cotton collected by such labor to manufacture cotton yarn and cotton pulp, can be said

to be complicit in such Human Rights violations. Although the Korean firms do not directly

coerce children and adults into labor, they must be blamed for turning a blind eye to such

serious human rights violation in the supply chain while benefiting from enhanced profit.

The Korean corporations have failed to perform due diligence in investigating Human Rights

violations of children/adults, and preventing, avoiding, and ameliorating such acts of violation

and its results. For instance, during the interviews, it was revealed that the Korean manager of

GKD did not even grasp the legal definition of a 'child', mistaking the term to solely mean those

attending elementary and middle schools.

“(when questioned on the definition of ‘child’) Don’t you usually call elementary and

middle school students ‘children’?”

(M,

manager of a Korean state-owned enterprise engaged in cotton pulp production in Tashkent)

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Furthermore, despite the fact that domestic and international communities have repeatedly

raised concerns over forced child labor, especially in the 2012 Parliamentary Inspection, the

Korean firms, GKD and Daewoo Textile did not have any measures to prevent or avoid being

complicit in forced child labor. However, a more fundamental problem lies with their failure to

thoroughly analyze the financial risks while making large investment decisions in Uzbekistan,

and also with their disregard of the significant risk of getting complicit in serious Human

Rights violations like forced child labor.

As shown earlier, the Korean government, despite its legal duty to protect Human Rights, has

also failed to provide any prevention, relief, and settlement measures while the Korean firms

were being involved in serious human rights violations abroad. Ministry of Trade, Investment

and Energy and KOTRA, who had overseen the investment and business operation processes,

Ministry of Strategy and Finance who was responsible for permitting overseas incorporation,

Korea Export-Import Bank that extended huge loans to the firms, the National Pension Fund

which has invested in POSCO (a holding compay of Daewoo Textile), the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and the Korean Embassy in Uzbekistan15 who insist that they are unaware of human

rights violations by Korean firms, and that they do not view monitoring Human Rights risks as

responsibility of a state agency abroad, must all be held accountable for complicity of the

Korean corporations in Human Rights violations.

                                                                                                                         15 They argue that Uzbekistan is so underdeveloped that children must engage in cotton harvest as well, and that if foreign corporations leave, the children will be in worse economic conidition. Thus, the Korean Embassy believes that it is actually better for Uzbekistan’s development if the corporations in question stay in Uzbekistan.