2014-06-11 value-for-money audit – report of the auditor ... · i favourably welcomed...

Report of the Auditor General of Québec to the National Assembly

for 2014-2015

Value-for-Money Audit

Spring 2014

Presentation of the Report’s Content

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 – Observations of the Acting Auditor General, Mr. Michel Samson Chapter 2 – Implementation and Operation of Service Areas − Special Audit Chapter 3 – Acquisition of Good and Services

Chapter 4 – Commission scolaire du Chemin-du-Roy: Management of the Complexe sportif Alphonse-Desjardins

Chapter 5 – Ferry Routes and Maritime Services Operated in Partnership

Chapter 6 – Prescription Drugs and Pharmaceutical Services

Chapter 7 – Unclaimed Financial Assets: Provisional Administration by Revenu Québec

Chapter 8 – Selection of Qualified Immigrant Workers − Follow-up on a Value-for-Money Audit

2

Observations of the Acting Auditor General, Mr. Michel Samson

C H A P T E R

1

Expanded Mandate for Value-for-Money Audits

Amendment to the Auditor General Act on June 14, 2013 Possibility of carrying out value-for-money (VFM) audits among

government’s “enterprises” without the prior agreement of the board of directors

One exception: Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec

Impacts of this legislative amendment VFM audit interventions possible without prior agreement in more than

20 additional entities Improvement in the parliamentary control over these entities

4 Ch. 1, Par. 4 et Ch. 1, Par. 4, 5

Expanded Mandate for Value-for-Money Audits (cont.)

The first step is a general review of activities. It makes it possible to acquire adequate knowledge of the areas or

activities that could be the subject of VFM engagements. It serves to plan future interventions pursuant to the Auditor General

Act.

Several engagements of general review of activities were incorporated into the work planning for 2014. Hydro-Québec (January) Loto-Québec (March) Société des établissements de plein air du Québec (SEPAQ) (March) Société des alcools du Québec (SAQ) (May)

5 Ch. 1, Par. 6-9


Current situation of work in progress To date, Loto-Québec has offered its collaboration and has concretely

demonstrated its willingness to comply with the prescribed conditions.

Recent meetings with representatives of the SAQ and the SEPAQ enabled to lay the groundwork for the execution of my interventions.

The situation is different at Hydro-Québec, which interprets in a restrictive and constraining way the powers entrusted to me.

6 Ch. 1, Par. 13, 14


Current situation of work in progress (cont.) Hydro-Québec has proposed to me ways of doing things that do not

respect my methodology. – It has not agreed to all my requests for documents. – It argues that it is not required to provide me with the documents produced

before June 14, 2013. – It asks that the subject of a VFM audit be defined before it can make

available to me certain documents. – It claims that I must justify the relevance of my requests in relation to the

specific subject of a VFM audit.

I favourably welcomed Hydro-Québec’s proposal to offer training sessions on topics it will have chosen.

Ch. 1, Par. 14-17 7


Hydro-Québec’s position is incompatible with the aim of greater transparency and increased efficiency in the public administration.

Consequences – Threatens the independence necessary for the execution of my

engagement – Compromises the efficiency of the general review of activities

engagement – Considerably delays execution of my work plan

Ch. 1, Par. 18 8


Exchanges with the chief executive officer and the chair of the audit committee to – Reiterate the importance of respecting the way I do things – Obtain all the documents necessary to execute my engagement

A letter from Hydro-Québec dated June 2 notified me I will have access to some documents I requested. It gives me hope that it will be the beginning of a more effective relationship.

My goal is to obtain from Hydro-Québec a collaboration similar

to the one I established with the other entities in which I carry out work.

Ch. 1, Par. 20, 21 9

Special Audit Implementation and Operation of Service Areas Public-Private Partnership Agreement

Audited Entity: Ministère des Transports du Québec

C H A P T E R

2

Context

On April 19, 2013, pursuant to section 36 of the Auditor General Act, the Conseil du trésor asked us to carry out a special audit concerning the public-private partnership (PPP) agreement for the implementation and operation of 7 service areas on Québec’s highways.

This project constitutes the phase 1 of a new highway park network of 33

service areas. It provides the construction and implementation of 5 service areas and the renovation of 2 existing areas.

The Department is currently working on the preparation of the business case for

the phase 2 of the project. This project is one of the first PPPs signed in Québec. The expected project

costs are – $35M for the partner, including $3.5M financed by investors, $31.5M by lenders – and $7M for the Department.

11 Ch. 2, Par. 1, 2, 4, 5, 13

Context (cont.)

Chronology of events since 2012 In March 2012, the partner sends the Minister an unilateral notice of

termination, alleging that the Minister has not respected some of the agreement’s clauses, in particular the one about paying some bonuses.

In December 2012, the partner applies for protection under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

From January to September 2013, the Ministère des Transports du Québec (MTQ) has to implement measures to maintain the service areas (more than $1M to date).

In August 2013, the receiver is appointed by the court. He ensures, among other things, that the service areas are in operation and manages all problems related to the facilities.

12 Ch. 2, Par. 6, Appendix 4

Our Audit

Audit objectives − To ensure that the agreement entered into rests on recognized best

practices in the awarding of public-private partnership contracts − To ensure that the MTQ conducts an adequate follow-up of the

partnership agreement with the private partner

Report centered around 2 axes − Development of the agreement − Management of the agreement


Audit Results

Evidence

Consequence

14

Good practice

Deficiency

Partnership Agreement Project Definition

The MTQ has not demonstrated that the services required in each service area are linked to needs. It chose the location of the areas based on the principle of establishing one every 100 km, but it has disregarded the existing services near highways exits. Premise to improve road safety: areas with basic services with stops at 60 min

intervals. Needs are not necessarily the same at the different service areas: the

customers and daily traffic of vehicles are very variable. Depending on the location, restaurant and fuel services may be easily

accessible (ex.: Maskinongé service area. A road user will have access to restaurant, convenience store and fuel services 4 times over a 56 km distance).

Insufficient overall cost-effectiveness can lead the government to assume part of the costs, which moves it away from its objective of self-financing service areas.

15 Ch. 2 Par. 22, 26-30

Partnership Agreement Assessment of the PPP Mode

The analysis conducted to demonstrate that the PPP is the best solution is incomplete. In January 2005, the information presented gives the added value of

the project for the 33 areas: 18 of them do not provide a sufficient return, including 3 of the 7 that will be selected.

In May 2005, the government authorizes the implementation of phase

1 of the project in PPP mode without sufficient information on the project’s 7 areas, including information on cost-effectiveness and risks that each method involves.

In June 2008, the government authorizes the Department to conclude

an agreement with the partner for the 7 service areas.

16 Ch. 2, Par. 38-41

Partnership Agreement Assessment of the PPP Mode (cont.)

The added value of $17M, presented in September 2008, is very uncertain, because it is based on several unjustified assumptions, some of which unduly favouring the PPP mode.

Sales presenting a high degree of uncertainty due to the absence of

comparable actual data

Assets maintenance expenses of $17.1M higher for the conventional method (difference of 146%) without justification

Overvalued financing costs of $5M for the conventional method (use of the same rate for both methods despite a 24% lower borrowing rate for the government)

No sensitivity analysis to verify the effect of changes in key assumptions on the added value and to show decision makers the uncertainty surrounding this calculation.

17 Ch. 2, Par. 41-42

Partnership Agreement Partner Selection

The necessary measures for the selection of a partner were put in place – call for interest, call for qualification and call for proposals – and process auditor.

The soundness of the sole tenderer’s financing plan has not been

demonstrated. – The fixed revenues do not cover the basic funding and the operating costs;

only 5 of the 22 concessionaires pay fixed royalties. – No emergency plan demonstrating the capacity of investors to face

unforeseen events has been filed. – The financial model assumptions are very little supported by historical data

(10 months later, reduction of growth rates for 2 sites, namely 25 of the $39M in anticipated revenues).

– No confirmation from the lender indicating an acceptance in sharing risks is included in the agreement. Rather, it requires a 100% guarantee from the government not provided in the call for proposals.

Ch. 2, Par. 44-45, 48 18

Partnership Agreement Financial Model

Negotiations allowed with the selected candidate resulted in notable modifications of the financial model and the distribution of risks. Addition of management fees: sum paid annually to the partner by the

MTQ for the Saint-Augustin-de-Desmaures site ($2.3M for 6 years) Addition of bonuses for tourist offices (more than $13M over 20 years) Modification of revenue and expenditure assumptions by the partner for

certain service areas without justification

– Revenues: variation of -80% to 21%, overall decrease of 7% – Expenditures: overall decrease of 11%

Despite a higher-than-expected public financial participation, the financial model remains “fragile,” notably due to the uncertainty surrounding the key assumptions and the necessity of including performance bonuses.

Ch. 2, Par. 53-54, 56-57 19

Partnership Agreement Financial Model (cont.)

Some assumptions are unlikely. The anticipated annual increase in traffic volume of 3.8% for a service area

represents a growth of 206% over 30 years. The real growth was 24% between 2000 and 2010.

A small variation in a key assumption has a significant effect on the project’s cost-effectiveness. A decrease of $1 in the value of purchases per person represents 12 years of

operating losses. A decrease in the average number of occupants per vehicle of 0.47 (from 2.1 to

1.63, the latter value being the actual average in 2009) results in losses operating over 11 years.

The performance bonuses do not constitute a guaranteed revenue, but they are necessary to respect the coverage ratio of the debt service for the project’s first 8 years.

Ch. 2, Par. 58, 61, 64, Table 1 20

Partnership Agreement Guarantees and Risk Sharing

The guarantees granted limited the partner’s and lenders’ risks, and increased those of the MTQ. The agreement’s termination can lead to high costs for the MTQ. Among other things, it will have to pay

a total estimated amount of $47.6M if the termination takes place in the

5th year of operation including – the balance of the debt – the costs related to the prepayment of the debt – the amount of the return on the investors’ capital contribution for the duration

of the agreement (if there is a termination due to a default by the Minister)

and the professional fees related to the termination, the costs related to a new call for tenders and the costs associated with the temporary management of facilities.

Ch. 2, Par. 67-68, 75 21

Partnership Agreement Modifications to the Agreement

The agreement does not allow to take into consideration unforeseen situations and the evolution of the economic context, which would have been especially necessary since it rests on uncertain assumptions and was concluded for a long duration.

– No provision on financial rebalancing is included in the agreement if the

project’s actual cost-effectiveness is significantly below or above forecasts. – In fact, if the project generates much higher revenues than those

anticipated, the partner will benefit from it, because the royalties payable after 15 years to the MTQ are based on a low revenue rate.

Due to the revenue guarantees granted and the financial risk borne by the MTQ, it would have been normal for the MTQ to benefit from higher royalties if the project had been more cost-effective than expected.

22 Ch. 2, Par. 78, 80, 81

Management of the Agreement Control of Risks

The risks associated with obtaining construction permits and respecting environmental requirements should have led to a more rigorous follow-up.

– Two municipalities delayed in issuing the permits. – The Department intervened late with one of the municipalities to solve the

impasse. It did not respect the deadline of March 15, 2009. – The MTQ had to come to an agreement with the lenders to ensure that they

do not exercise their right to terminate the agreement. – For one site, the MTQ was unable to ensure the supply of drinking water,

which prevented the partner from taking possession of the site on the planned date.

Delays in obtaining the permits and the municipal and environmental certificates pushed back the start of work for several months, and the Department paid indemnities of $4M to the partner.

23 Ch. 2, Par. 93-96, 98-100

Management of the Agreement Control of Risks (cont.)

Despite the significant consequences for the Department of a default by the partner, the MTQ made no follow-up of its financial situation.

Considering the guarantees offered, the MTQ did not ask for information that would have allowed it to assess the partner’s financial health.

Few controls were conducted in each service area to assess the partner’s performance.

It withheld the payment of almost all performance bonuses and

bonuses for tourist offices without assessing the consequences on the partner’s financial health and its own situation.

– According to the financial model, for the first 15 years of the agreement,

these bonuses represent more than 22% of the partner’s total revenues (if they are excluded, there is a deficit).

Ch. 2, Par. 104, 106, 110, 114 24

Comments of the Audited Entity

The MTQ accepted 6 of the 8 recommendations. The two recommendations it disagrees with concern linking services to needs optimal distribution of risks by providing measures in the agreement,

such as financial rebalancing. The comments related to those recommendations have led a reaction from us.

Ch. 2, P. 36 25

Acquisitions of Goods and Services

Audited Entity: Centre de services partagés du Québec

C H A P T E R

3

Context

The mission of the Centre de services partagés du Québec (CSPQ), established in December 2005, is to provide or make available to public bodies the goods and the administrative services they require.

It offers services in 7 areas of activity, including human, material and information resources, and the acquisitions of goods and services.

To carry out its mission ‒ it intends to rationalize and optimize these services to generate economies

for the government ‒ while ensuring their quality and their fit with client needs.

In 2012-2013, acquisitions of $25,000 or more totalled $728.9M and were made through 779 contracts.

27 Ch. 3, Par. 2, 3, 6, Table 1

Context (cont.)

The CSPQ must ensure that entities of the governmental administration can purchase quality goods and services, at the best price possible and in accordance with the current regulation and standards of accessibility, equity and transparency.

There are 2 categories of acquisitions ‒ mandated purchases (specific and one-time needs) ‒ and consolidated procurements (common and recurring needs).

The departments and budget-funded bodies are under the obligation

of using the CSPQ’s services, including ‒ to enter into supply contracts of a value greater than $25,000 ‒ or when a consolidated procurement for the goods and services to acquire

is available.

28 Ch. 3, Par. 5, 12, 13

Our Audit

Objectives To obtain the assurance that in terms of acquisitions, the CSPQ

‒ takes into account essential factors for effectively fulfilling its mission ‒ acquires goods and services in an efficient and economical manner ‒ and obtains in a timely manner the necessary information, assesses its

performance and reports on it.

Our work ‒ deals with the acquisitions of goods and services by the CSPQ between

April 2010 and March 2013 ‒ excludes professional service contracts related to information processing,

construction work and contracts worth less than $25,000 ‒ and notably includes the examination of 26 acquisition files and interviews

with suppliers and clients.

Ch. 3, Par. 19, Appendix 1 29

Acquisition Process

An acquisition process generally includes 3 phases and several steps (figure inspired by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD).

30 Ch. 3, Par. 14, Figure 1

Acquisition Planning

31 Ch. 3, Par. 33, 35, 40, 43

The CSPQ does not demonstrate a good understanding of its role with regard to market intelligence and does not perform the tasks expected of an acquisitions expert in terms of needs assessment. Most purchasers have little knowledge of the products or services they

are responsible for acquiring and of the concerned area of activity. ‒ In three quarters of the files examined, they had not conducted additional

research.

The CSPQ did not succeed in establishing a true culture of eco-responsibility in acquisitions. ‒ Few of the purchasers met with understand their awareness-raising

responsibilities and the issues that these responsibilities raise.

It has not established clear orientations on the means to take to comply with the legislation in terms of regional economic impact.

Acquisition Planning (cont.)

The CSPQ does not have the assurance that free competition is exercised effectively. ‒ In the 22 examined files where the contracts had been awarded through

public calls for tenders, 50% had been awarded even though 2 tenders or less were classified as conform and acceptable.

‒ No change was considered for the acquisition strategy in a file whose contract, of an annual value of $1M, has been awarded to the same supplier for almost 15 years.

The degree of precision and clarity of certain calls for tenders

is insufficient. ‒ For the consolidated procurements examined, the number of addenda

varied from 2 to 9, with an average of 5 per file; for the same file, 136 questions from suppliers resulted in the addition of 7 addenda.

‒ For mandated purchases, in 9 of the 15 public call for tender files examined, we could not find traces of exchanges with the client or of research about the technical specifications.

32 Ch. 3, Par. 48-51, 54

Evaluation of Tenders

The insufficiency of directives and the lack of rigour in the execution of tasks do not facilitate the fair treatment of suppliers. In addition, the CSPQ sometimes places itself in situations of non-compliance with the regulation in force. The quality of the evaluation of eligibility and conformity criteria differs

from one file to another.

Among the files examined, at least 7 tenders were deemed in conformity even though they did not meet one of the conformity or eligibility conditions of the call for tenders, which should have resulted in their rejection.

One contract was awarded to the wrong supplier. It had to be terminated after being in effect for 7 months, and the process had to be started over.

33 Ch. 3, Par. 58, 60-62

Organization of Work

The organization of work does not facilitate the optimal processing of acquisitions.

No overall vision of ongoing and upcoming acquisitions and no annual

planning allowing the CSPQ to adequately manage the flow of requests

Several breaks in services for consolidated procurements

‒ Breaks of about 3 months in 2 of the examined files ‒ Several delays varying between 4 days and 21 months between the end of

a contract and the start of a new one observed in the documents obtained ‒ Purchases made by departments on an individual basis at higher costs

during these breaks

Extension of a contract for 7 months to ensure service continuity: increase of its initial value of over $7M, equivalent to entering into a contract by mutual agreement

34 Ch. 3, Par. 67, 70, 72-74

Strategic Approach

The CSPQ’s strategy for carrying out its vision and its mission in terms of acquisitions is not clearly established. It was only in 2012, 7 years after its creation, that it developed

statements about its vision and mission in the acquisitions domain.

It has not yet established a clear strategy to specify how it will manage to materialize them.

From March 2012 to October 2013, the Direction générale des acquisitions (DGACQ) underwent 3 administrative reorganizations, which did not facilitate the development of a common vision, the retention of labour and the delivery of quality services.

There is a lack of continuity in actions and efforts over time.

35 Ch. 3, Par. 96-98, 103

Quality of Service Delivery and Know-How

The CSPQ has not succeeded in applying a management method based on a client-centred approach.

There is no culture fostering a healthy business relation.

The Centre does not communicate to its clients information that is essential to them to better plan their acquisitions, such as ‒ an estimate of the time required to process their request ‒ and the degree of advancement of the file.

Clients do not have a good perception of the role of the CSPQ’s purchasers with regard to mandated purchases.

There remain sources of client dissatisfaction, including with regard to ‒ the quality of services ‒ communication ‒ the processing time of files.

36 Ch. 3, Par. 108-112

Quality of Service Delivery and Know-How (cont.)

The CSPQ has not established a service offering that is tied to the priority needs of clients and oriented on goods and services that generate government savings. It has little information on the evolution of its clientele and on its needs

to improve its service offering.

Almost all the clients we met with do not use the CSPQ’s services when they are not obligated to do so.

The CSPQ’s reflections for the purpose of increasing the use of its acquisition services were focused more on the expansion of mandatory adhesion than on the methods to be put in place to improve the quality of its services.

37 Ch. 3, Par. 114, 115, 125, 126

Quality of Service Delivery and Know-How (cont.)

The CSPQ has not taken sufficient measures to develop and conserve the organizational expertise needed to implement best practices.

The CSPQ’s expertise is not maintained through the recruitment of

personnel that is necessarily qualified in the acquisitions domain.

Before fall 2013, it did not have a training and development strategy.

Certain measures to reinforce training and foster integration are being deployed, including ‒ mentoring and skills development programs ‒ and a training plan that aims to ensure a common knowledge base.

38 Ch. 3, Par. 129, 131, 132, 134

Performance Measurement

39 Ch. 3, Par. 136, 137, 140, 141

The CSPQ does not adequately measure its performance with regard to the acquisition of goods and services.

It has not defined objectives related to the quality of services that it

wishes to offer, nor has it defined related targets and indicators.

It does not measure the savings associated with processes, which are an integral part of the government’s expectations concerning the rationalization and optimization of administrative services (productivity gains generated by the development of centralized expertise).

As for the economies of scale of $76.5M published in the 2012-2013 annual management report, the deficiencies detected in the methodology used significantly compromise the reliability of the reported amount.

Risk Management

The CSPQ does not have an integrated risk management system despite the existence of major risks related to the acquisitions domain.

Several measures that would make it possible to prevent or detect

risks related to acquisitions are not yet considered in critical steps of the process. ‒ For example, variance analysis is not a common practice, even though

significant variances are observed between the estimate cost and the amount of the winning tender or between the amounts received from tenderers.

The CSPQ has not ensured that the risks it faces are adequately

managed.

40 Ch. 3, Par. 145, 149, 150


The audited entity accepted all our recommendations.

41 Ch. 3, P. 34

Commission scolaire du Chemin-du-Roy: Management of the Complexe sportif Alphonse-Desjardins Audited Entity: Commission scolaire du Chemin-du-Roy

C H A P T E R

4

Context

In 2003, the Commission scolaire du Chemin-du-Roy, the Ville de Trois-Rivières and the Fondation Les Amis des Estacades formed the non-profit organization Complexe multidisciplinaire les Estacades (CMDE).

The mandate of this organization is to manage the activities and

buildings related to the Complexe sportif Alphonse-Desjardins project. This project consists of 9 phases. The first 4 phases are mostly

complete, and the 5th is starting up. – The Commission scolaire du Chemin-du-Roy owns the facilities of phases 1

to 3 (tennis pavilion, Olympic ice pavilion, indoor synthetic surface), and it is expected that it will also own those of phase 5 (multi-purpose coliseum whose cost is anticipated at $60.2M).

43 Ch. 4, Par. 3, 5, Table 1

Our Audit

Audit objective To obtain the assurance that the school board manages the buildings it

owns as part of the Complexe sportif Alphonse-Desjardins project according to sound management practices and that it adequately controls the use of the public funds invested.

Work scope Work was carried out among the Commission scolaire du Chemin-

du-Roy and the Complexe multidisciplinaire les Estacades.

44 Ch. 4, Appendix 1

The School Board’s Mission

The school board should question the relevance of participating in such a project, considering that its primary mission is related to educational services and that it is assigned the key financial risks under the business model.

– The sports complex is a major investment for the school board. • 21% of its fixed assets (44% if phase 5 is added) • 16% of its long-term debts (39% if phase 5 is added)

– For the school board, the main user of the sports complex’s facilities is the

secondary school Académie les Estacades. • About 1,700 students, a little more than 600 of whom are registered in sport-study

programs. • Only the students of certain programs regularly use the complex’s facilities.

45 Ch. 4, Par. 18-21

Construction Costs

For the completion of phases 1 to 3, the cost overruns totalled $10.4M, which is an increase of more than 40% compared to the estimated costs.

Actual costs of $35.3M and estimated costs of $24.9M This increase is explained by unexpected work and costs higher than

estimated costs.

In February 2013, during the completion of phase 5, erroneous information was transmitted to the Société québécoise des infrastructures.

The school board and the CMDE indicated that, for phases 1 to 3, work was completed at a cost equal to the estimated costs.

Ch. 4, Par. 23, 24, 26, Table 3 46

The Project’s Self-Financing

Until the fall of 2013, the information conveyed was that the project was self-financed. The sports complex project generates large annual deficits for the

school board, ranging from $700K to $1.2M in the past five years.

These deficits do not take into account the amounts the school board pays for the use of the facilities and certain services received from the CMDE.

The school board must allocate to this project, on a continual basis, amounts that could have been used for purposes more directly related to its educational mission.

47

Ch. 4, Par. 28, 30

Elements of Financial Risk

There are risks that the costs for the school board could be even higher. Among these elements, note the sharing of costs and risks in the contractual agreements signed

by the parties the CMDE’s profitability the uncertainties related to the construction of phase 5 and certain construction problems.

48 Ch. 4, Par. 36

Elements of Financial Risk (cont.) Contractual Agreements

No analysis demonstrates that the amounts provided for in the agreements entered into with the CMDE and the Ville de Trois-Rivières are justified in proportion to the services provided and the risks incurred. – Rental of premises – Fees paid for management of assets and residual hours – Rental of equipment

The agreement signed with the Ville de Trois-Rivières in

September 2013 is being renegotiated. – In the absence of phase 5, there exists a doubt as to the Ville’s subsidy

amounts for the upcoming years for phases 1 to 3. The school board does not have the assurance that the agreements

favour an equitable sharing of revenues and expenditures based on the services provided and risks incurred.

49 Ch. 4, Par. 39, 40, 43, Table 5

Elements of Financial Risk (cont.) The CMDE’s Profitability

Considering the CMDE’s accumulated deficit of $377K as at June 30, 2013, the school board incurs a significant financial risk as the owner of a large part of the project.

– Since the start of the project, the school board has advanced funds of over $1.2M to the CMDE, $465K of which was receivable on June 30, 2013.

– The school board also stood surety for the CMDE with regard to an amount not exceeding $300K.

Over the last 2 years, the CMDE has earned profits ($40K in 2013 and $183K in 2012), but its financial health remains fragile.

– The CMDE’s recent performance is based on ad hoc subsidies from the Ville ($277.5K in 2013 and $237.5K in 2012).

50 Ch. 4, Par. 45-47

Elements of Financial Risk (cont.) Investment in Phase 5

In the event that phase 5 is completed by the school board, the latter is assigned the key risks under the agreement currently in force.

– According to the agreement signed between the school board and the Ville de Trois-Rivières, the school board agrees to pay for the excess expenses that may arise in the phase 5 project, whose cost is estimated at $60.2M.

– As for the Ville, it assumes 50% of the provision for risks up to a maximum of $1.25M.

In the opposite case, the amounts the school board already invested in this phase risk being lost.

– 3 professional service contracts, totalling $3.5M, have been awarded. – To date, $1.5M has been paid to suppliers for the start-up of phase 5.

51 Ch. 4, Par. 49, 51, 52

Elements of Financial Risk (cont.) Construction Problems

Major problems detected during the construction of the first phases of the sports complex project increase the financial risks for the school board.

– The school board filed legal proceedings against the engineering firms

and the contractor that worked on the Olympic ice pavilion, for major defects arising from the design and the construction.

– As at June 30, 2013, the expenses incurred for attorneys’ fees, certain corrective work and other costs in connection with this dispute amounted to $1.2M.

– In November 2012, an expert report confirmed the presence of pyrrhotite in the sports complex facilities.

52 Ch. 4, Par. 54-57

Follow-up of the Sports Complex’s Management

The school board does not perform adequate supervision of the management of the sports complex that it has entrusted to the CMDE.

– The school board has disbursed sums of money to the CMDE on several occasions without being able to demonstrate to us how the payment was justified.

• Since 2003-2004, payments to the CMDE for supervision and remuneration costs: $2.2M

• In 2008-2009, credit note of $100K issued to the CMDE to split the energy rate saving, despite the fact that the school board assumes the entirety of these costs.

– Acquisition transaction of around $200K for which the CMDE did not obtain the school board’s written authorization as provided for in the asset management agreement.

The school board is unable to ensure that it receives all the profits owed to it and that it gives all the prior authorizations needed for the actions taken by its mandatary.

53 Ch. 4, Par. 60, 63, 64

Reporting to the Commissioners

Members of the Council of Commissioners were not adequately informed with respect to the state of the situation regarding the sports complex project.

– The information communicated to the Council of Commissioners until the fall of 2013 suggested that the sports complex project was at no cost for the school board.

– The commissioners were misinformed about the cost overruns with regard to the completion of phases 1 to 3. Although the overruns totalled $10.4M, the commissioners were informed only of an overrun of $1.7M.

– Little information is presented concerning the management of the CMDE. The commissioners monitored the management of the sports complex

based on incomplete information that did not give an adequate vision of the project.

54 Ch. 4, Par. 69-73

Secondment

The 2 school board employees who are the subject of the secondment from 2009 to 2014 received higher remuneration than that provided for by the school board’s salary conditions.

– For 2013, this additional remuneration represents $34,150 in the case of the CMDE’s director general and $24,770 in the case of the coordinator of the material resources department.

– The CMDE paid its director general an annual bonus corresponding to 6% of his total remuneration, namely nearly $8,600 for 2013.

• Since 2010-2011, no bonus can be paid to the management personnel of a school board.

These situations are not in compliance with the applicable regulation.

55 Ch. 4, Par. 77-79



56 Ch. 4, P. 25

Ferry Routes and Maritime Services Operated in Partnership

C H A P T E R

5 Audited Entity: Société des traversiers du Québec

Context

The mission of the Société des traversiers du Québec (STQ) is to ensure the mobility of persons and goods through quality, safe and reliable maritime transportation services.

At March 31, 2013, the STQ manages 13 ferry routes and

maritime services

– 6 ferry routes operated directly by the STQ, including one in partnership for cargo transportation

– and the others, namely 5 ferry routes and 2 maritime services, operated by partners under a contract.

58 Ch. 5, Par. 1, 2

Our Audit

Objective: obtain the assurance that the STQ conducts in total transparency an efficient follow-up of the operation by partners of ferry routes and maritime services, and that it respects government orientations in this regard

Three axes audited – Organization of ferry routes and maritime services operated

in partnership – Follow-up exercised by the STQ over partners – Governance and reporting made by the STQ


Services Organization Operating Method Analysis

The STQ has not clearly established its overall vision for the operating method to favour for the transportation related to each ferry route and maritime service.

There has been no analysis of the different possible service organization models.

– Research work planned in 2011 to contribute to its reflection on the

operating method to favour: work not performed The STQ does not have the assurance that it uses the most optimal

service organization model that takes into account the characteristics of each ferry route and maritime service.

– Vessel used – Clientele and sector needs – Partner expertise, etc.

60 Ch. 5, Par. 15-17

Services Organization Integration Planning

The STQ did not adopt in a timely manner a global plan to guide the integrations of the ferry routes and maritime services operated in partnership.

– Integration decisions made on a case-by-case basis – No overall planning for the integration into its own network of 3 ferry

routes operated in partnership, 2 in 2012-2013 and the other one in 2013-2014

There are risks to this situation

− effectiveness of its management of ferry routes and maritime services − and additional costs.

61 Ch. 5, Par. 20, 21, 23

Services Organization Integration Decisions

Starting in 2012-2013, the Société decided to operate itself 3 ferry services that were in partnership, without demonstrating that this operating method is the most advantageous one.

The prior analysis neglects important aspects.

– Advantages and inconveniences of the possible solutions not stated – Long-term financial implication and social acceptance not taken into

consideration

These decisions did not receive approval from the board of directors or from the MTQ before the Société moved forward.

Overall, there is a cost increase, an important portion of which is vessel related.

62

Ch. 5, Par. 25-29

Services Organization Partnership Contract Development

The contract requirements are variable from one contract to another, and some important clauses are absent in the majority of the contracts.

Different requirements for elements that should have some uniformity

– Correction period – Penalties to pay in the case of non-compliance – Sending of permits and proof of insurance – Survey on quality of services

This affects their follow-up and leads to risks of ineffectiveness and unfairness in the management of the network.

63 Ch. 5, Par. 32-34

Monitoring of Partners Contract Follow-up

The STQ’s follow-up of contracts with partners is neither systematic nor sufficient nor done in a timely manner.

– Lack of follow-up for regulatory provisions (ex.: presence of the

registration certificate) – No structured analysis of operational data received (number of

passengers or vehicles, volume of goods, fuel consumption, etc.) – Deficiencies in the follow-up of amounts paid to partners: insufficient

verification of elements used to establish the compensation that the Société pays (declared operating costs, ticketing revenues, etc.) in return for services rendered

The feedback given to partners is variable and is not very

formalized.

64 Ch. 5, Par. 40-44, 51, 58

Monitoring of Partners Contract Management

The Société does not ensure that its contract management concerning ferry routes and maritime services operated in partnership always respects good practices.

– Lack of competition not adequately documented by the STQ for 2 contracts

awarded by mutual agreement – No recourse to the assessment of its partners’ performance

This way of doing things is insufficient to ensure accessibility and fair treatment of suppliers, as well as the sound management of public funds.

The management of amendments has deficiencies.

– Amendments not always made even if the situation demands it – Signatures provided after the contracts or amendments come into force in

several cases

65 Ch. 5, Par. 59-61

Monitoring of Partners Performance Assessment

The measures implemented to monitor the performance of partners do not enable the STQ to adequately assess it (measures not used for all partners and deficiencies in their use).

– Performance program applied to only 5 of the 9 partners – Expected level of performance and quality of services not

established – No clear directives to provide a uniform and objective evaluation of

the program – Partners not informed of assessed elements or results to obtain

66 Ch. 5, Par. 63-65

Governance and Reporting

The Société has not provided to the board of directors and the MTQ a complete analysis of its completed and upcoming integration decisions, and of their budgetary repercussions.

– Such an analysis should have included, among other things, the

advantages of the integrations and long-term financial impact, especially on the STQ’s budgets.

The MTQ and STQ have not entered into a service agreement,

and the five-year business plan has not been approved yet. – Government orientations that have been defined since 2011 plan

such actions.

67 Ch. 5, Par. 74, 75, 78, 79



68 Ch. 5, P. 26

Prescription Drugs and Pharmaceutical Services

Audited Entities: Centre de santé et de services sociaux (CSSS) Alphonse-Desjardins CSSS de Jonquière CSSS de Memphrémagog Hôpital Santa Cabrini Institut universitaire de cardiologie et de pneumologie de Québec Ministère de la Santé et des Services sociaux

C H A P T E R

6

Context

Prescription drugs provided for free by health and social services institutions in the event of hospitalization, accommodation or some ambulatory services

Prescription drugs distributed in institutions must be, with some exceptions, listed on the provincial formulary – The Institut national d’excellence en santé et en services sociaux (INESSS)

recommends to the Minister which prescription drugs to include on the formulary.

– It consists of 8,033 prescription drugs (April 2014). – Each institution creates its own “local formulary” of prescription drugs for

widespread use based on the provincial formulary, which contains between 1,500 and 3,400 prescription drugs, depending on the audited institution.

Use of drugs not listed on the institution’s local formulary – It is possible for reasons of special medical needs, in case of emergency or for

exceptional treatment and with approval from the conseil des médecins, dentistes et pharmaciens (CMDP) of the institution.

70 Ch. 6, Par. 2, 4-6

Context (cont.)

71 Ch. 6, Table 1

Prescription drug-related costs compared to the budget of audited institutions in 2012-2013 (in dollars)

Our Audit

Objectives Assess to what extent the Department supports health and social

services institutions in managing resources related to prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services

Obtain the assurance that the audited institutions manage medication-related resources efficiently and economically

Determine whether the audited institutions have established controls that ensure pharmaceutical services are delivered safely and prescription drugs are used appropriately

Report articulated around 3 axes Procurement of prescription drugs Use of prescription drugs Management of pharmaceutical processes


Our Audit (cont.)

Audited entities Ministère de la Santé et des Services sociaux

5 institutions – CSSS Alphonse-Desjardins (Chaudière-Appalaches) – CSSS de Jonquière (Saguenay–Lac-Saint-Jean) – CSSS de Memphrémagog (Estrie) – Hôpital Santa Cabrini (Montréal) – IUCPQ (Capitale-Nationale)

Consultation of 2 group purchasing organizations that negotiate the cost of prescription drugs with manufacturers SigmaSanté (Montréal, Laval and Estrie regions)

Groupe d’approvisionnement en commun de l’Est du Québec (GACEQ)

73 Ch. 6, Par. 14, 15

Procurement of Prescription Drugs Cost of Prescription Drugs

Scarce integration of the actions of group purchasing organizations and important differences in the prices paid for prescription drugs – Each group has its own procurement process (no sharing). – The groups only carry out ad-hoc comparisons of prices obtained with other

groups or the public plan.

No systematic follow-up of prices by the Department, which does not

allow it to analyze the differences or target potential savings – The Act provides the Department with limited scrutiny over the groups

and the procurement strategies they choose. – The 4 group purchasing organizations meet regularly, and the Department

sometimes attends the meetings; however, no price strategy exists.

74 Ch. 6, Par. 21-24

Procurement of Prescription Drugs Cost of Prescription Drugs (cont.)

Examination of all contracts negotiated by SigmaSanté (2012) and the GACEQ (2013), and comparison of the cost of 844 prescription drugs with the same manufacturer

For 275 prescription drugs (33%), the price differences between the 2 group

purchasing organizations are more than 10%, and up to 892%. – No analysis was carried out to determine the causes of differences. The different call for

tender dates can explain part of it due to a change in competition.

Sometimes, for the same drug, the manufacturer submits a tender during a call for tenders from one group but not from the other group. – SigmaSanté received no tender for 480 drugs, and the GACEQ, for 772, which is 11%

and 22%, respectively, of the products asked for in calls for tenders. – When a group cannot enter into an agreement with a manufacturer, the institutions pay

the manufacturer’s price or the price on the list of the public plan for drugs, and no guaranteed price is established for the coming years.

75 Ch. 6, Par. 25-27

Procurement of Prescription Drugs Cost of Prescription Drugs (cont.)

76 Ch. 6, Table 2

Example of 8 prescription drugs with important price differences by group purchasing organization (prices as at March 31, 2014)

Procurement of Prescription Drugs Drug Shortages

Few measures implemented by the institutions to minimize the effects related to drug shortages

There is no standard indicating minimum stock levels that institutions must maintain, especially for critical drugs.

The drug stocks last from 5 days to 8 weeks depending on the audited institution.

The 2 group purchasing organizations have arranged for the supplier to have a minimum stock level for some critical drugs. However, the level is different from one group to the next. – GACEQ: 4-month stocks for 23 drugs (requirement) – SigmaSanté: 3-month stocks for 122 drugs (suggestion)

In the event of a shortage, the institutions must ration the products they have in stock and take exceptional measures.

77 Ch. 6, Par. 21, 30-32

Procurement of Prescription Drugs Access to Prescription Drugs for Special Medical Needs

Decisions concerning access to prescription drugs for special medical needs are made on a case-by-case basis and can raise ethical issues.

– The decisions are sometimes hard to make, especially in the case of palliative

care or when a drug’s positive effects are poorly documented.

– There is a risk that the people concerned may be pressured so that the institution grants access to a drug.

– An institution may grant access to a drug, while another may deny it, which creates disparities.

78 Ch. 6, Par. 37-40

Procurement of Prescription Drugs Local Formulary and Added Value of Certain Drugs

Drugs not recommended by the INESSS or not approved by Health Canada listed on the local formulary of the audited institutions Authorization for each patient based on reasons for using the drug and

clinical situation not required by the institutions, as determined by regulation

Presence of drugs not recommended by the INESSS on local formularies – Only 2 institutions were able to identify them (6% and 7%, respectively, of

the drugs on the list).

Presence of drugs not approved by Health Canada on local formularies, except at the CSSS de Memphrémagog – Other patients could receive these treatments without specific authorization

from the CMDP, which is a debatable practice since Health Canada has not ruled on their safety.

79 Ch. 6, Par. 43-45

Use of Prescription Drugs Control of Their Use

Few controls completed by the audited institutions following drug administration and no assurance of their optimal use

– Rules for their use and decision-making tools have been implemented.

However, the institutions each make their own rules and do little sharing of the decision-making tools they have developed.

– Except for drugs whose use is controlled by the government, no institution analyzes or inspects drug losses, which does not allow them to be quantified or the causes to be determined.

– The institutions do not carry out sufficient follow-ups of prescriptions or drug utilisation reviews to, for example, find practices to improve upon.

80 Ch. 6, Par. 53, 54, 56, 59, 60

Management of Pharmaceutical Processes Integrated Drug Management

Drug use process’ management in the audited institutions not sufficiently integrated – No continual improvement process to identify bottlenecks – No regular measure of delays between steps of the cycle and no

standardized target – Regular follow-up of drugs generating the greatest expenditures conducted

by the CSSS Alphonse-Desjardins, the CSSS de Jonquière and the IUCPQ

Few indicators to ensure the drug cycle’s performance – Few comparisons between the institutions – No indicators or ratios established by the Department – Calculation of data not standardized

81 Ch. 6, Par. 70-74

Management of Pharmaceutical Processes Offering of Pharmaceutical Services

No orientations from the Department for the required level of service and pharmacists’ assignments to care units

Audited institutions unable to assess whether the services offered are aligned with needs – No references to the number of pharmacists per institution or the minimum

number of hours of service they must complete – No knowledge of the optimal proportion of hours completed by the

pharmacists compared to the hours completed by technical personnel

Proportion of hours completed by pharmacists different from one institution to the next (causes for differences not analyzed)

82 Ch. 6, Par. 77-81

Management of Pharmaceutical Services Preventing Conflicts of Interest

Presence of a policy for managing conflicts of interest in all audited institutions, but it is not applied

Most employees as well as managers we met do not know their organization’s policy.

Pharmacy departments have accepted rebates issued directly by manufacturers following the institutions’ purchases, which is not compliant with the law. – The CSSS Alphonse-Desjardins accepted $42,820 (pharmacy project). – The IUCPQ received $5,000 (pharmacist training). – The CSSS de Jonquière received $5,472 (amount integrated into the

pharmacy’s budget).

The audited institutions have not developed a framework for visits from pharmaceutical representatives to avoid undue pressure being placed on personnel.

83 Ch. 6, Par. 84-86, 88

Comments of the Audited Entities

84

The audited entities accepted all our recommendations.

Ch. 6, P. 31

Unclaimed Financial Assets: Provisional Administration by Revenu Québec

C H A P T E R

7 Audited Entity: Revenu Québec

Context

The purpose of the Unclaimed Property Act is to facilitate the recovery of unclaimed property by right-holders and to ensure that property in respect of which the right-holders remain unknown or untraceable is delivered to the state.

A financial asset may not be claimed following common life

events, such as

– a right-holder moving and forgetting to inform the holder of the change of address

– and a forgotten amount accumulating in a retirement plan from a job held for a short period of time.

86 Ch. 7, Par. 1, 6

Context

The following table presents an overview of the financial market of the key categories of holders as at December 31, 2012

Ch. 7, Par. 10 87

Context (cont.)

Management process for unclaimed financial assets


Holders of financial assets

Receipt of unclaimed financial assets by Revenu Québec

Search for right-holders

Holders audit

Remittance of liquidated financial asset

to the Generations Fund

Liquidation of securities

Right-holder untraceable Remittance of unclaimed

financial asset to the right-holder

Our Audit Work Objectives

Obtain the assurance that Revenu Québec

– has adopted an efficient and equitable management strategy with regard to the receipt and recovery of unclaimed financial assets

– promotes the search for right-holders and, when they are untraceable, oversees and manages the liquidation of unclaimed financial assets in an efficient and coherent way so as to promptly remit the amounts to the state

– and manages the risks associated with the project concerning the implementation of an application for the management of unclaimed property in an efficient and economical way so as to meet operational and management needs.


Holders Remittances

The system for the recovery of unclaimed financial assets is based on the responsibility of holders to declare and remit to Revenu Québec unclaimed financial assets when they have any.

A small percentage of holders make remittances of unclaimed financial assets; Revenu Québec has not developed a strategy or set objectives to optimize the recovery of such assets.

– Only 23% of holders subject to the Act have made remittances of unclaimed

financial assets from 2006 to 2012. – In the securities brokers category, the percentage drops to 8%. – For financial services cooperatives, the percentage was 91% in 2012.

Ch. 7, Par. 27, 28, 30, 31 90

Risk Identification and Assessment

Revenu Québec has not identified nor assessed the risks related to the recovery of unclaimed financial assets.

Some risks are associated with the system for the recovery of unclaimed financial assets

– a lack of knowledge about the Act by holders – a different interpretation they may have of the Act – and a voluntary non-compliance with the Act by certain holders.

Without sufficient control measures, various factors may explain the non-receipt of unclaimed financial assets.

– For example, in the presence of a pension plan in a deficit situation, an

administrator may not make all the necessary efforts to remit the amounts owed.

91 Ch. 7, Par. 36-38

Means of Intervention

Revenu Québec makes little use of the means of intervention that would enable it to ensure that holders comply with the Act. It does not communicate regularly with holders to make the Act known. It almost never collects interest on arrears. It does not institute penal proceedings that could lead to fines. It conducts few audits, and these do not cover all categories of holders

subject to the Act. – 89% (107 out of 120) of the audits were on holders who administer pension

plans. – No audits were conducted for securities brokers even though only 8% of

them have made a remittance to Revenu Québec since 2006. Revenu Québec does not have the assurance that holders comply with Act.

Ch. 7, Par. 43, 59, 61, 62, Table 5 92

Holders Audit

The amounts recovered following audit work are limited, and several audits have resulted in no recovery.

The 59 files whose audits were completed as at December 31, 2012, concerned only pension plan holders. – From 2006 to 2012, no amount was recovered for two thirds of the files

that were audited and completed by Revenu Québec (40 out of 59). – For the 19 other files, the recovered amounts totaled $1.9M and varied

from $464 to $530,785.

93 Ch. 7, Par. 68-70

Holders Audit (cont.)

The audit procedures are insufficient and do not promote an optimal recovery of amounts owed.

Out of the 26 files examined, 15 resulted in no recovery.

– No evidence for 10 files, as Revenu Québec relied only on the holder’s declaration to conclude that no financial asset should have been remitted

– Insufficient audit work for the 5 other files

The procedures used for the 11 files that did allow financial assets to be recovered were also insufficient.

Additional amounts could have been remitted to Revenu Québec through more complete and appropriate work.

Ch. 7, Par. 68, 73-77 94

Holders Audit (cont.)

Revenu Québec does not assess the efficiency of its audit work. Processing delays and the time invested by auditors are very variable and, in the majority of cases, the audits extend over several years.

The audits extend over 2 years for

– 40% of completed files (24 out of 59) – and 64% of ongoing files as at December 31, 2012 (35 out of 55).

Out of the 120 audits, 33 lasted over 5 years.

Revenu Québec determined in 2006 that it takes 86 hours to complete an audit. The audits required over 200 hours for – 40% of completed files (24 out of 59), 8 of which resulted in no recovery – and 55% of ongoing files as at December 31, 2012 (30 out of 55).

95 Ch. 7, Par. 82-84, 88-90, Table 6

Search for Right-Holders

We randomly chose 87 out of 8,322 financial assets that required active searching.

Revenu Québec does not always search for right-holders as provided by its policy.

For 16 assets, it did not send a letter to the right-holder.

– It had enough information to complete a search for the right-holder for 13 assets whose value ranged from $2,040 to $47,880.

– For 3 assets whose value ranged from $2,447 to $58,587, the holder had provided no information, and Revenu Québec was unable to set the search process in motion.

For 27 assets, it cannot be ascertained that the search for right-holders was

done correctly. Revenu Québec did not keep any copy of the letter sent to the right-holder.

In 32 cases, the right-holders claimed their financial asset, but Revenu Québec does not know how they were informed of it.

Ch. 7, Par. 94, 97-100, 102 96

Liquidation of Financial Assets and Remittance to the State

Financial assets that have been liquidated are delayed in being remitted to the state.

Except for registered retirement assets, Revenu Québec lets one year go by from the time the financial assets are received before remitting them to the state.

A total of $5.9M in liquidated financial assets received before 2012 were still held by Revenu Québec as at December 31, 2012.

Registered retirement assets worth $22.4M were accumulated and retained from 2000 to 2011.

– Revenu Québec has not determined the length of the provisional

administration for these assets.

Ch. 7, Par. 105, 107, 109, 110 97

Implementation of a Management Computer System

In 2006, Revenu Québec chose to adopt a new application for the management of unclaimed property.

The project has experienced several delays, which has caused an

increase in costs when compared with initial estimates. – Phase 1 was completed 2 years behind. – Phase 2 was completed 5 years behind.

The initial budget of $4.1M increased by 63%, and the costs were

$6.7M on the phase 2 implementation date, in March 2014.

98 Ch. 7, Par. 114, 118, 119, 125

Implementation of a Management Computer System (cont.)

The anticipated benefits supporting the choice of the application were

poorly assessed in 2006, and the update of that assessment in September 2013 remains very optimistic. – In its business case that was approved in October 2006, Revenu Québec

assessed that the project would be cost-effective starting in the first year of operation.

– The 2013 assessment considers certain benefits that are not related to the implementation of the computer system and over which Revenu Québec has no control.

Revenu Québec is unable to adequately determine whether it can

recover the costs associated with the project and the time needed to do so.

99 Ch. 7, Par. 128, 131, 134



Ch. 7, P. 32 100

Follow-up on a Value-for-Money Audit Selection of Qualified Immigrant Workers

Audited Entity: Ministère de l’Immigration et des Communautés culturelles The name of the entity was up-to-date as of April 22, 2014.

C H A P T E R

8

Follow-up on Recommendations

Follow-up on the auditing mandate carried out in 2009-2010 Satisfactory progress for 6 of the 7 recommendations (86%) of the

Auditor General that were the subject of a follow-up

Satisfactory progress for the 4 recommendations of the Committee on Public Administration

102 Ch. 8, Tables 1, 2

Recommendations of the Auditor General Satisfactory Progress

Selection system Follow-up on the 2009 selection grid objectives

– Increase in the proportion of the selected candidates with training in a preferred field

Revision of the list of training fields Selection-related indicators and targets Addition of these elements to the strategic plan for 2012-2016 Supervision of the selection of qualified workers Guidelines to lessen the subjectivity of the assessment of certain

factors – Language skills, training field, adaptability

Measures to detect false or misleading information or documents – Increase in the number of rejections from 66 to 162 per year

103 Ch. 8, Par. 14, 15, 17, 33, 39, 40

Recommendations of the Auditor General Satisfactory Progress (cont.)

Compliance and fairness of decisions Since 2011, implementation of various tools, such as a database on the

comparative assessment of studies and quality control

Strategic plan Addition of objectives on expected results and indicators making it

possible for the Department to evaluate its performance Program assessment and client satisfaction Completion of mandates in this respect

104 Ch. 8, Par. 27, 45, 57, 58

Recommendations of the Auditor General Unsatisfactory Progress

Quality of reporting

Little information – on the key risks that could impact the achievement of results and the means

implemented to reduce them – on the efficiency of the Department’s activities – on the comparison with similar organizations

Ch. 8, Par. 51, 52 105

Recommendations Committee on Public Administration

Satisfactory progress

Expectations conveyed – Request to implement the necessary conditions to ensure quality work from

personnel in accordance with the legislative framework

Prior controls – Improve controls, such as by establishing an analysis sheet to promote

uniform evaluations of candidates

Adaptability factor – Establish a reference tool to objectively evaluate this factor and use an

outline for notes from the personnel

Action plan follow-up – Submit in March 2011 a status report on the implementation of the

action plan

106 Ch. 8, Par. 35, 64, 66, 70

2014-06-11 value-for-money audit – report of the auditor ... · i favourably welcomed...

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