2014.09.22 - naec seminar_origins of the crisis
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Origins of the Crisis Drawing the Big Picture
September 22, 2014
Paul RamskoglerForeign Research Division, Oesterreichische Nationalbank
2
Determinants of the Crisis
1. The Supply of Credit
• Short-term interest rates
• Capital flows and long-term interest rates
2. The Demand for Mortgages and Securitized Bonds (SBs)
• Income inequality and debt
• Institutional investors and institutional funds
3. Institutional Factors
• Rise of shadow banking
• Enabling factors
3
Short-Term Interest Rates Made Leveraging Cheap
• Low interest rates reduced the cost of wholesale funding
• Lending standards were relaxed and credit supply increased
• The reliance on wholesale funding increased-1%
0%1%2%3%4%5%6%7%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008BOJ FED ECB
Policy Ratesin %
Source: Thomson Reuters.
1. The Supply of Credit
4
Net Capital Inflows Pushed Long-Term Interest Down
0.0%0.5%1.0%1.5%2.0%2.5%3.0%3.5%4.0%4.5%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008Euro area Japan United States
Long-Term Interest Ratesin %
Source: OECD.
-1200
-700
-200
300
800
1300
1800
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008EU Japan Asia and Pacific China
Net Capital Flows to the USin bn. USD
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
1. The Supply of Credit
5
Mainly European Inflows Fuelled Securitized Bond Issues
• European investors heavily invested in SBs
• US-based wholesale funding financed much of this investment
• This helped spread the crisis quickly to Europe
-1200
-700
-200
300
800
1300
1800
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008EU, in Japan, in Asia and Pacific, in China, inEU, out Japan, out Asia and Pacific, out China, out
GrossCapital Flows to and from the USin bn. USD
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
1. The Supply of Credit
6
Household Debt Increased Along Rising Income Inequality
• Debt ratios of US households increased steadily
• There was a noticeable co-movement of inequality and debt in the US
• Some relate this to conspicuous consumption
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.280.290.300.310.320.330.340.350.360.370.38
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Gini Coefficient (at disposable income, after taxes & transfers)Net Saving Rate (right axis)
Inequality and Debtin %
Source: OECD.
2. The Demand for Mortgages and Securitized Bonds
7
The Rise of Institutional Investors Changed Capital Demand
• There was an increasing shift toward capital-based pension schemes
• Increasing capital concentration shifted funds to institutional investors
• The liquidity preference of corporations increased, leading to a culmination of funds
44% 49% 53% 57% 59% 51%
76% 74% 76% 79% 78%63%
11% 11% 13% 15% 15%
13%
0%20%40%60%80%
100%120%140%160%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008EU (23 countries) USA Others
Total Assets of Institutional Investors
Source:OECD.
in % of total GDP
2. The Demand for Mortgages and Securitized Bonds
8
The Rise of Shadow Banking: Key Characteristics
Shadow banking implies:
• a term transformation providing deposit alternatives
• neither access to a lender of last resort nor conventional deposit insurance
• collateral provides some substitute for deposit insurance
• often an off-balance sheet transaction for the sponsoring institutions
3. Institutional Factors
9
Insured
Savings
The Rise of Shadow Banking: Securitization of Mortgages
Bank Borrower$
Loans
Depositor$
3. Institutional Factors
10
The Rise of Shadow Banking: Securitization of Mortgages
Institutional investors
Bank Borrower$
Loans
Loans
$
Securitize
d bonds
$AAA trancheAA tranche
...
...‘Toxic’ tranche
3. Institutional Factors
11
The Rise of Shadow Banking: Instruments
Guaranteed special purpose vehicles$
Securitize
d bonds
Originator Investors
$Asset-backed
commercial paper
Money market funds
Repurchase agreement
(repo)
$Securitized bonds
$
Shares
$
ReposRepos$
$Asset-backed commercial
paper
3. Institutional Factors
12
The Run on Shadow Banks
Repo Haircut Index (Gorton & Metrick 2012)
• The erosion of trust in the value of SBs triggered a run on shadow banks
• Only explicit guarantees stopped the run
3. Institutional Factors
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
2004-01-01
2004-05-20
2004-10-07
2005-02-24
2005-07-14
2005-12-01
2006-04-20
2006-09-07
2007-01-25
2007-06-14
2007-11-01
2008-03-20
2008-08-07
2008-12-25
2009-05-14
2009-10-01
2010-02-18
2010-07-08
2010-11-25
Overnight Commercial Paper Spreads (Net of Fed Funds Rate)Spread in basis points
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Lehman'sbankruptcy
Start of Subprime-Turmoil
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
US Net Assets of Prime Money Market FundsBillion USD
Source: Thomson Reuters.
Lehman bankruptcy
Start of Subprime-Turmoil
13
Enabling Factors
• Failure in rating models tacitly changed the information value contained in ratings
• Banks accepted high tail risks causing high ratings
• Management incentives were flawed and risk management was insufficient
• Regulatory changes of the 1980s and 1990s allowed substantial increases in leverage
3. Institutional Factors
14
Major Findings: Determinants of the Crisis
1. The Supply of Credit
• Short-term interest rates
• Capital flows and long-term interest rates
2. The Demand for Mortgages and Securitized Bonds (SBs)
• Income inequality and debt
• Institutional investors and institutional funds
3. Institutional Factors
• Rise of shadow banking
• Enabling factors
15
Conclusions
The analysis of the roots of the crisis has shown the necessity to:
• consider gross capital flows in the analysis
• move toward an inclusive growth model
• ensure productive use of institutional capital
• clearly separate shadow banking from traditional banking