CHAPrER-I : INtRODUCTION AND BACKGROU)t).

SECI'ION-I : INtRODUCfiON.

1

Human civilization, tor its genesis and growth, CJII'ea vastly to our use ot

language consisting ot sentences made up or words expressive or some ueanings.

We live in air and byldr but ordinarily remain unaware ot it. Similarl7, human

beings, as social animals mutuall7 communicating various ideas, perform all

their works and duties with the help ot meaningful words am sentences, bUt gene­

rally remain unaware of Ulis fact.. People in general ~ ponder OYer the actual

nature of a. word or that ot a sentence. Similarly, they seldom think orer how a

word or a sentence conveys a meaning. They rarely bot.ber about the particular

relation subsisting between. a word and its corresponding meaning. They are also

unawnre of what an *apabhrams~ • word is and ot whether it is denotative or mean-o

ing or not. But the Indian thinkers beginning trom the hoary past, discussed

tbeae problems and tried to find out their solutions.

This dissertation proposes to deal with various views about the concept

ot meaning put forward by different schools of Indian philosophy - the gramma­

rians (with special enphasis upon Niges'a), the M.imansists and the logicians. The ••

news of the Buddhists have been discussed in connection with the impc)ztt or words.

The riewa ot the rhetoricians regarding the functions ot conveying meanings haw

also been taken into account. Some references have also been made to the views

or the Monistic Vedantins and. the Cirvikas on some points. An attempt has been

made to point out their various purposes acting behin:i their dealing with the said

,_ ' problema. The concept. .of Apt a or au't#hori ty has elaborately been d1.5cussed in

/. conneet.ion with the nature or Sabda-pramana or Verbal Testimon,y. The discussion

Q

throughout is an open-minded one as tar as possible and no blind effor-t has been

made t.o support or refute any partiaxlar school ot philosophy. Sometiaes the views

ot aarae foreign thinkers have also been taken into account. in order to show their

2

similarity With some Indian views. /

, In the first chapter the nature or Sabda-pramana and earlr enquiries 0

into the nature of meaning, as found in the Zrihmana.s, the Nigbant.us and tb& <:) .,.,

NJ.rUkt.a, have been briefiy discussed as the background.

Meani~gs are taken to be eonve,eQ primarily by words. So, in the second .1'. . i .. : .

chapt,er, different views about the nature or word. am meaning_ have been discussed.

Wards signify meanings and so it must be adllitted that the7 have got some

!unctions of conveying meanings. Therefore, the third chapter deala wit.h differ­

ent views regarding these tunct.ions of words.

In t.bia connection d1fferent views about the nature and denotation or

'a~bhraia' (non-Sanskrit) words have been elaborately 4is cussed in the toul"t.h (}

chapter.

In our linguistic bebaviow we actually camnunicate our idea.s only throogh

sentences and not through isolated words. There tore, 1n the next and final

chapt.er different views about the nature of a sentence and. different. theories

regarding sentential meaning have been dealt w.l th. In conclu.sion an atteJ~~pt has

been made to trace the evolution of the concept ot meaning.

Different portions o£ the above-mentioned problems have previoblT been

discussed 1n different research treatises. v.bile utilising the learned disc:u-

ssions found in those works, this thesis aspires to a co.prehensive discussion

ot the concept ot meaning in a new setting with attempts ot sheddina tresh light.

on various problems. The concept of •ipta', Niges'S.'s 'Bauddhirtbarid&' and deno-

/ tation or apabhramaa words haw been dismssed elaborately and with greater 0

attent.ion ae the topics, so tar as .m1 knowledge goes., have not been treated as

Jet in detail they deserve. The attempt of tracing t.be evolution of tbe concept

ot meaniDg may also humbly claim to be c:riginal in the same sense. TM points,

which were elaborately dealt with in preYious research works, haw been discussed

in brief in the present dissertation tor obvious reasons.

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SBCriON - Il : GEI6SIS OF TUE PROBlEM.

We utter Y&rious sounds mme of which. are expressive ot JDBanings and

are called worda. Generally, a word. is taken . to be a combination or letters cr

articulate sounds wbich are transitory in character. But how do the tranaitoey

lett~rs CO!lbine tO form a word? Moreover, a word, e.g., 'cow' 1a uttered varioualy

by various persons and yet it seems to be the same word and conveys the SUie aoan­

ing. But bow is it possible? Again, ia it a tact that all p!ople understmS the

sae concept on hearing a particular word, e.g., 'cow'? It so, how? lt not., how

is it possible to communicate our ideas through linguistic usage With the help ot

sentences and words constitut.ing tb.em? Bow does a word always conve7 the same

sense? Wbat *tlpowrs a particular word to express a particular meaning? Such

point• stand in need of exposition it we want t.o understand the process ot commu-

n1cat1on ot ideas through the medium of language.

Frcm very ancient. times different schools of Indian philosophy tried 1n

right earnest to solve the problems tor various "'z. reasons or their own. The

grammarians are concerned with the dissection or language consisting or sentences,

.ords and meanirlgs. So they rightly took up tb.e issues tor solutiott. The Budd-

hists believe in the transitoriness of the whole world; moreover, they. do not. ••

accept the authoritJ of the Vedas. So, in order to challenge the aut.boritJ or the

Vedas consisting ot meaningfUl wordS and propositions, they tried to establish

the tranaitor7 nature of words and meanings. The Mimansiats' aim is to uJ:ilold the

authorit7 ot tbe Vedas and so they had to deal vith the aforesaid issues and they

tried to establish tbe eternity ot words, meanings and thair mutual relation.

The logici&rlS are ver1 much particular in their use ot language 1n the correct and

unaabigu.ous torm and, hence, they also took pains to discuss the said pooblems.

The rhetoricians deal with poetry composed by poets through a special coMbination

or beautiful worcls and meanings. There tore, they also dealt with these problems

in order to establish the special power o! communication belonging to the words

-4

!)

used by tbe poets muse. Due to such differences of their ends 1n rtev the same

problem assumed different forms of qQestions and those were answered dit!erently

by different schools of philosophical thought.

Most ot our ideas about various things are formed on the basis ot our

belief in the words ot others, beard or read by u.s. C«lly a small traction or our

daily performances is based on our direct knowledge. Indirect. knowl.edp arises

mainly through inference and wrbal testimony. Verbal testimony is baaed upon

words and meanings. So, in order to establish the trustworthiness of tbl scrip­

tures and the words ot the authorities, different philosophical schools bad to /

discuss the aforesaid problems. A 'brief discussion about tbe nature ot Sabda-

pramina. or verbal testimony is required for a clear understanciing ot thil point. 0

In Indian philosophy, 'prama' means knowledge or valid cognition and

• pramina' means the source or way or acquiring valid cognition. There vas a time 0

when in Europe there arose sceptics wbo maintained that no valid cognition can

ever be acquired. But that scepti,cism was rejected outright on the plea that,

in that case, the sceptic view itselt cannot be regarded as a valid one. There­

tore, everybod;y bas to admit that we can acquire knowledge. But, regarding the

way or val'S ot knowing, different thinkers differ widel7 aaong themselves. \\estern .... thinkers generally admit or two sources, viz., perception and inference. Among

Indian philosophical schools the Cirvikas take perception to 'bf. the only valid

source of knowledge. The Buddhists and tbe Vais'efikas accept perception alld

in.reren~ only. According to the Buddhists~ t.he worda ar the serm.ons of tbe

Buddha convey some valid ideas which 'Were attained by him through perception and.

the same are ascertained b7 others through interen oe. The Simkhya-philosopbera 0

admit ot verbal Testimony in addition to tbese two. A section or the logicians

. , to~~thes~ three. The Prabhikara-

school ot Mimamsa philosophy recognises 'Arthipatti • or postulation as the tirt.b ,.

- 5

method. To these .five, Kumirila Bbatta and his school ot Mlmimai philosopbJ and QQ 0

the monistic Vedantins add •Anupalabdhi • or non-cognition am thus admit ot •ix

ways of knowing.

(pratyaksam ekam cirvakib Jmn&da-sugat.au pmah. v.? (I II' 0 0 .,

- - ""'" - / anumanam ca. taccatha sankhiiJ! sa.bdam ca te api, 0 0 0

nyayaikades'ino 'P.}ievam upaminam ca kecana. v.8. ... 0

arthapattya sahaitini catvarJiha prabhikar&h, 0

abbiva-aasthanyetani bhitta vedantinasta.tha. v.9., Tar, p.56). 0 QO g4

Here we are concerned with Verbal Testillony only and so we propose to discuss ita

nature in brier.

Gautaca. the author of myaya-siitras {the NyaJ&-aJIIlorians), dltinea Verbal - - /'',· /.

Testimorq as the teachings of an 14pta • or authority. {aptop!ldesa!t aabdah. MS. 1.1. 7) o. tt

Vilvanitha, in his Vrtti on this sutra, explains the word 'aptopade~' as the 0 I>

instrument or agent trom which valid cognition of a unit or thought can bo acquir­

ed. (aptah yathinhah upWeaab libdabodbo yasmit. NVr, p.Z'l ). 'l'Mn he explains II 0 D

/ Verbal 'testimony as the instnlment. that giTes rise to .alid cognition or 'sabda t

{a unit ot thought-a aent.ence according to the logicians). According to the

Navya-NatJi.;yikas (the neo-logician.s) 1 the knowledge or the tel'll5 consti-tuting

:a sentence is tbe prima.ry or instrumental cause ( harana) ot ~bda-bodha or -,erbal oil

· cogni. tion; the memory-knowledge of the meanings of those terms acts as tbe

YJipira or intermediate function or this cause; the knowledge or tbe denotative

eapa.d. ty or the words is the auxiliary cause, and tbe ettect or tina]. result iJS

tbe verbal cognition.

(pada~ tu karanam dvaram tatra padirtha-dhlh, 0 <) • 0 6

a'abdabodhah phalam tasya saktidhlh sahalcirin'I. BP, y.81). 0 0 I) Q

Therefore, according to Vis.natha, the memory-knowmdge of tile words constituting ~

a sentence is the •Jcarana • ot sabdabodha and, hence, it is to b& termed as 0

.fabdapramana or Verbal Testimony. The reason behind is that a 'p-aaina • or source 0 0

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ot valid cognition is define4 as a ka.rana or instrumental cause of praai or valid . . ~

cognition.

(pramiaah karanam praminam it1 praaana-eiainya-la.ksanaa. TD ,p.24) ' "' I)" 0 0 (I 0 0

A 'kara~a' is b. defined as a cause having 1v7apira •. (asidliiranaa kira.naa ~ ~ 0 " 0

diate function is itself caused by the primary or instrmlental qose, wbich . .

giws rise to the main ettect or result as an immediate ct.uae of it. (t.ajja.n,atve

sati tajjanya-janaka.tvam Yyipirat.vatt. Ms, p.265). An axe is the primary ceuM ~ . .

(karana) or the cutting ot a tree (vrksa.cchedanaj which is the desired effect. D t 0

But. if the axe remain inactive on the ground, it eannot cut the tree. Tb4Jre

must be an axe-tree contact (with force) which is caused by the action or the

axe .-:·;.t and which 1tselt becomes the cause of the cutting or the tree. Therefor.,

the axe-tree contact is the VJipira and the axe is the karana as it possesses ' 0

thia YJipara. Similarly, the knowledge or parts ot speech giTes rise to the

recollection or tbeir meanings which causes verbal cognition. Thus the knowledge

of the terms possessea a vYi.pira in tbe torm ot the said. recollection and, hence,

it is the instrumental cause ot verbal cognition. Therefore, it is to be regard-- ...

ed as Verbal Testimony. Here there is no reference ot •apta 1 • 1-loreol'CFr • in the

altenaative explanation of the. term 'apte.' as g1118n in the ''t'rt.ti' ot Viti-nnitb&' • 0

which: has alreadJ been shown. is 'yathirtha • or 'valid' and. not a person having

authorit.J. But fjautama. himself opines that meanings are cognised trca words or

sentences only owing to their capacity arising tram their utterance by an &pta

or authority. (a~pad.e~-simartbP:c-~idartna-samprat,a~. NS.ll.l.5,3)

This clearly shows that the alternative explanation or N .• S.I.l. 7 as tor..arded

b7 Visvanatha is not in contormi.ty with ~; Gautaaa and, therefore, not acceptable.

Vats7iJ8na, the commentator on ~ya-siitras, also cQJJm•nts that verbal cognition

arise& from a sabd&. {a sentence) only because it is utt.ered. b7 an a-uthority;

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otherwise there t«>uld arise no verbal cogni ti.on. (apta.ir-aJ811 uktah ar.bct\h C) t)

i tyatah aampratyayah, nparyaye sampra.tyayabhiivat. NB, p.l23). Here w •• I) ~

that, according to Vatsyiyana, the tel"'l 1ipta 1 D~C&ns a fX'rson and not 'ftlid' as

explained by Vi{vanitha.

the senee of the term 'ipta 1 forms the object o! an interesting stud7.

Vatsyiyana explains the term. 'ipt1' as the attainment or assertive knowledge or

·some objects or eognition thrwgh sou valid sources or it.. Then he explains

the term •apta • as a person having •apt1' and also willins· to irnput that know­

ledge t.o others. Thus an 'apta' is a. person who na.s acqut.red the valid cop!tion

or some objects through some sources {or valid cognition) ar:xi at the sue time is

willing and efficient to impart that knowledge to others vlth strict taitbtul­

ness. (aptah khalu saksat.-krta-dbarma ,athi-drstas,arthasy.1 cikh,&pa)'isa;ri • 0 Q 001) c

prayukt.a upadesti. siksit-karanam arthasyapt.ib, tayi praY&rtata ityiptah. IB 1 $" " • 0 0

p.24). All the terms involved in the definition are significant. The ten

'dharma' 1a used to signify objects or knowledge. The tern, 'sikptkar~'

generallf means cognition through perceptionJ but here it aeans cognition through

any valid way or knowing. Bence inference also comes under the ken or 'aikbit.-"

•• • •

ot 1apta • trom Caraka-58!Phiti.. Bore 'ipt.a' is defined as a person who haa

acquired .: thorough and sound knowledge of the real nature ot sc:me objects by

direct ptrception and who never communicates this knowledge to others in a dis­

torted form as he does not yield to attacl'lllent, enVJ, abhorrence, etc. ( 'ipto niaa­

nubhawna vastu-tattvasya kirt.sn1Sna nisc.ayarin rigid.1va8iid-ap1 ninJathindi

)'&1! sah'-iti carake pa.taiijalih. VSUl, p.ll). liere tbe term 'anubhayena• rules ~ " ~

out the possibility of the inclusion ot in~Sterence,etc., in the sources of

acquiring knowledge by an i.pt.a. This may be tbe int.ention or the author o!

B7iJ4bhiaya also. But the term 'siksitkrta-dharmii ' is vague. The most i t.a.nt 0 • 0

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deviation of the definition given in Baraka-samhita !rom that or NJayabhAe,a 0 ~

is the inclusion ot 'the absence ot any influence of attachment, etc'. A person

yielding to attachment and the like distorts !acts and 1n that case he can never

be regarded as an. 1apta t. In fact, no person other than God (personal) il com-

. - - 1-pletely tree from attachment, etc. By including the term 'ragadivaaadapi' in the

definition or apta the author of Caraka-saahita seems to be influenced bJ the ~

Buddhist philosophy or 'Nirvana' or Vaeana-nirmukt1', i.e., freedom frO!Il attach-o

ment. •iSvara 1 is defined by Pataijjall in his JOga-s\itra as a person who is not ,

t.ouChed by the reaction due to klesa (pain) 1 kama (action) 1 vipi.ka (fruit or

action) and asaya (attachment).

/ / ) visesa 1svarah. YS.l. 64 • Tne utterance ot a h1.1J8an be1Jl8 1 qualifio4. bJ all the " "

pre-requisites m.entioned above 1 also attain the status of verbal Testimony since

as an a pta or authority he enjoys the same status as that of God who, as we haw

already seen, is to be considered as an apta. ( t.adiya-sabda-sajatyal-ltiuldkinim . 0

tathitvam iti bhavah. KT, p.l2). It the Vedas are taken to be God's creation, .,

God, is an 'apta 1 and, as such, the Vedas are a. valid source or knowledge. On the

other band, 1! these be regarded as ever-existent and not created bJ any agent, I .

then the Vedas are to be accepted as self-evident truths. • • . . Vatsyayaria opines that the status ot a.n apta may be attributed to the

speakers or yalid propositions irrespective or the seer, the :Warned Aryan a-a well

as to those who are not conversant vith the chaste Sanskrit words. (rsJi,rya-~.,

mlecchinim·.aam.inam l.aksanam. NB, p.24). The main principle to be adopted in deter-o 0 a fl

mirdng the apt.atva (status ot an authority) or a person is whetner his utterances

are made atter proper cognition ot tacts and whether he is free from all the above-

mentioned dra~cks.

It is to be noted in this eonllection that in the Nyaya school the concep-

tion ot apta is essentially connected with the theory of the agency of God in the

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crea·tion ot the univel"lJe. !n. the Joga-philosoph,-~ however~ God has not been

conceived as the Creator ot the universe; but, unlike the ~nsists, the. teachers

of Yoga phUosophy admit that the Vedas are tbe utterances ot God.

In Indian schools or philosoph,. the understandiftg of the meaning of a

sentence, i.e., verbal cognition, is known&$ •(abdabodha 1• urhis cognition of

{ /, N'-~

the meaning or a sentence, is a qualified cognition 'ri.sista-jnanaJ, a judgement, 0/j •

which results in the wake of the understanding or the meaning ot the constitueast

words in the sentence, not directly but coalesced. The word-meanings must be

m.utuall;y connected. This requires that there must be syntactical relation

(samsarga). This at the outset differentiates S'abdabodha from other types or valid It

cognition, t, e.g., perception, and inference, which concern neither with word­

meanings nor with their mutual syntactical relation". (lUi, p.85). However, the

c&rvakas inchtde it in perception. But the logicians and others. do not accept

,this view.

Perception is generated through 'sa.nnikarsa ', i.e., a relation like contact, 0

inherence, etc., established. between a sense-organ (indriya) and an obJect or

cognition ( visaya). (indriyirtha-sannikarsa-,jarcyam jnanam pratyaksam. ts, p.29). ".. 0 0 tJ 0

It may be or two t)1JeS, direct (lauldka) and indirect (al.aukika.). In.a ease or •••

direct perception the object m.t.ust be actually present to a sense organ. It must

also be tit f'or perception by that particular sense-or-gan. ~,:::=- :·:;::- :.__,,-:~?

Ia When. I see a jar 111 visual sense-organ comes in contact (samJOga) with the •

jar which .is a tit object of cognition by this sense-organ. Here the sannikarsa 0

1a 1samyaga.' {contact). Now, it is a fact that we acquire knowledge trora auch a 0

sentence that conveys a concept which is not amenable to our sents-perception.

Even it an object be so amenable, its ph,sical presence or its contact with our

sense-organs is not at aupecessary for its verbal cognition. However, direct

perception is not determined by word while verbal cognition is so det.enrlned.

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( lauldJca-pratya.kse ~bdasyinupayogitvi.t. KK, p.5()). Hence verbal cognition cannot 0

be comprehended under direct perception.

The cognition of sentential meaning cannot be considered as a type of

indirect perception also, Indirect perception is generated by indirect ctntact

(al.aukika. sanmkarsa) which is or three types - 'simin,a-la.ksana' • jnanal.akBana' ... ' 0 0 0 t)

and 1yogaja '. The ·logicians hold that, when .we cognise a particular in3.1v!dual

of a particular class we also at the same time comprehend the un1 versal inherent

in it. Through the knowledge or this generic property we might at the next

moment perCeive all the individuals belonging to the same claae eYeD though moat

ot them are not present to our sense-organs. This is an indirect cognition

through 'siminyalaksana sannikarsa '. Here the knowledge of the claas-ele•nt 0 0 0

acts as the sannikar~a. Thus, when we see a cow-individual ,.a also perceive

the universal cow-hood inhering in it, through which we naualiae all cows. But

all CO'II.'S 'are not present before our eyes and, henee, the perception is indirect.

(isattir-i5rayi~n tu siminya-jfianam 1!YI:t~,

'tad-indriyaja-tad-dharma-bodha-siraagryapeksate • .tiP, v .64) 0

According to tne logicians, this type ot indirect contact is the basis o! our

knowledge or pervasion or universal concomitance { vyipti) between two .fnti tiea, .. e .. g. between fire and smoke (tasm.id antar - vahir va sarvopa-sa:nhi.renivinabhivo!...

0

vagantav~. NV .I 1.1.) Now, in the case of verbal cog~;~ition from such a aen-, 9

tence as, "t.he cow exists", there is neither any direct contact between a cow and

our eyes nor do we cognise all cow-individuals. tsnce verbal cognition cannot

be .included in this type ot indirect cognition generated through siminJa-lakaana-.. 0

sann1karsa. ~

It may be argued that verbal cognition should be regarded as a t7PJ or

indirect perception generated through jiiana-laksana-sannika.rsa where 111Ctm0ry-... 0 <')

knowledge or a previous direct perception acts as the relation or a particular

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sense-organ with an object which is not tit tor perception by that organ.

(rlsali yasya t&&J'I.iva. vyipiro jiinalaksanah BP, v.65). As tor example, on ~ ~ 0 0

seeing a fragrant piece of sandalwood somebody says : "surabhi candanam &ham . . ~

pa/,Bmi. u ('I see a fragrant sanda.l-lt'Ood' or '1 see that the sandal-wood 1s

:fragrant 1 ). But tragra.nce is not tit tor visual perception. So the visual

organ cannot come in contact with fragrance. Here what actually happens is that,

one remembers the tragrance or a piece ot sandal-wood scented before and this

m~ry impression acts as the sannikar~a • Memory being one kind. of knowledge

(jiiina), such a sannikarsa is named jlltna-laksana (of the nature ot knowledge). e o ~

Actually, this is a type of knowledge inhering in the self which comes 1n contact

with the mind and mind in its turn comes in contact with an external object.

( jilina-l.&ksana-sannikarsas~a sva-sam7Ukta-rna.nah-saayu.ktitma-samaveta-Jiiina-riipa.h ,, • ., 0 ? 0 0 0

Me, p. 263 ). Here the perceptual knowledge of fragrance 1s generated through

its memory knowledge. Similarly, the memory knowledge of word-meanings should

be cbnsidered as ~ina-laksana sannikarsa and, hence, verbal cognition generatec:t 0 0 0

through it is to be regarded e.s an indirect perception of the discussed t~.

But. the logi cia.ns cannot see eye to e,e with this view. In the above

example, fragrance is the qualifier (vile!aJ!&) and the sandalwood is the quali-••

ticaftd (vis~sya). But the case may also be a reverse one in another indirect 0

perception or this type, i.e. the object ot such perception (e.g., tragrance)

need not always be a q\i&lifier. The order may change (upanitayor vise~aqa.­

vi~$,a-bhivasya kiinacirit. IK, p.67). But in the case of the cognition ot a ~

sentential meaning the order of the qualifier and the quaUficand can nevw be

so reversed.. In the sentence, "t.he cow exists", the existence is the qualifier

and the cow is the qualiticand. This order admits ot no change. It is invari­

able~ (sva-ava-vrttyi' pad&rthanam upaathityuttaram gavidiy-astitvader anvayi-~ D

vagani vilaksano bodho, •••••••• S ... S/P, p.?). Moreover, the generation ot verbal ., .&

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cogrdtion depends upon syntactical pre-requisites of e.xptetancy (akinksa), ccm-, ~

patibility (,ogyata) and contiguity {isatti) (explained tully in Ql.V, ~c.l).

But, perception generated through j;analakaana sannikarsa does not do so. There-" 0 ~

tore, verba.l cognition cannot be brought under this typa ot indirect perception.

Indirect perception ot the 70gina generated through yogaja sannikarsa ., depends solely u~n their super-normal ponr ot yoga or meditation. lienee popular

and normal verbal cognition cannot even be compared to it •

Verbal cognition cannot be regarded as a tJP9 ot 118mory-knowlsdge (smrti) 0

also. According to the logicians, the' primary co,gnition (anubhava), the latent !

impression (samsldira) and its revived form, memory, must have the similAr objec-o

tive content and sequential inter-relation. fllt in .tte case of verbal cogni­

tion, the .meanings or words forming a. sentence are remembered in a discrete

manner independent ot each other. :\This tact. differentiates verbal cocnition

trom me~ory. (aaminikira-samskiraprabhavatvat. ~P, p.8) • 0

The Vaisesikas include the understanding of sentential meaning in infe-"

rential lmowledge. (etena $ibdam vyakhyatam. VS.U.2 • .3). ulnterence is baaed 0

on the ascertainment of .pervasaion (vyapti) between the inferable property (aidhya)

and :the mark {hetu)~ * inter something unperceived trom perceived facts. This ••

fundamental principle inYOlved in inference also holds good in the ca.Se or cogni-. ~.,..,.,__ <r.f ~-w...c,_,;v...;...,-'1-

tion or sentence mesning•is after all the ascert4inment ot the relation existing

" between the meanings of the COllponent words. This relation can be ascertained

only when t.he person who hears the sentence is not only sure that tho word-compo­

nents are syntactically related but also remembers it." {liN, p.91).

We inter fire as existing on a t!IOuntain from which incessant SIJOke ia

seen rising up. ~ say, 'the mountain possesses tire because it has smoke on it 1

like a kitchen' ( 'parvato vahniman ~t, yathi aahinasidau' ). \\e have already

acquired the knowledge or universal invariable concomitance (V}ipt.i) existing

between smoke and ·fire in the forni: 'where there is smoke, there is fire 1 • '!'hen

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on seeing smoke we remember this pervasion (vyapti) and we consider that the

mountain possesses smoke which is pervaded by ~ire ( vahni-v)'ip13-). Hence we come . /

to the concluSion that the mountain must have tire on it • The Vaisesikaa aain-o

tain that,~ .. ~'-:.~· similar is the case with verbal cognit.ion &lid Verbal Testaony.

From our experience or the linguistic behaviout' or our elders we acquire the

knowledge of universal invariable concomitance existing between the terms possess­

ing the triple syntactical requirements on the one hand and, on the other, the

relation subsisting amongst the meanings or the component wrds in a sentence.

Hence. on hearing a sentence ~ inter: 'These terms possess the relation subsisting

amongst the meanings conveyed by themselves because these are multitude of terms

possessing expectancy, etc., like a correct sentence (we heard from our elders)".

Hence the so-called verbal Testimony cannot enjoy a separate status of a pramina 0

(source or lmowledge) but should be included in inference. (nanwt.ini padini

sva-mri ti.rt.ha-samsarga-vanti atmnksidimat ~ pada-lcadambakatvit sad-vakyavad-0 0

i t.yanuminadeva samsarga-ja'na-sambhavic-c~bdo na pramanintaram i ti. TO, p. 54). 0 .,

The $yllogism may also be put in the form: " These word-meanings possess mutual

relation as they are recollect~d b;y the terms having eJqectanq, etc., like the

\ifOrd-meanings recollected by the terms 1 'bring the cow with the help of the stick".

The 8Ubject ot inference (pak~) may be either the terms or their meaftings. But

eitberway 1 contend the logicians 1 the inference is incapable or producing verbal

cognition because the cognition generated by the parts of speech is an altogether

distinct kind tram that aroused by an inference. Besides, it produces the intros­

pective consciousness (anuvya.vasiya): 'l know trom words (or a sentence)'vhic~

differs trom tha.t aroused by an inference: 1 l lmow by inference 1 • ( ••• ua.

anumityapeksayi S'ibda-jninasya vila.ksanasya. j8bdit pratyemltJS.DUvyavasaya-siksikuya -o 0 " 0

sarva-sammata-tvit. TD, p.S4). This reply is not very sati.sfactory arnce it

rests on sell-consciousness which may vary from person to person. Of courae,

there are other arguments in favour o! regarding Verbal Teatitnony as sep1rate trcr.n

-14

inference. An inference, like the one mentioned above, cannot be a correct or

eYEm a possible one. The conclusion derived from it can be either a certainty

(par~ccheda) or a possibility (sambbava). It it be the former, the syllogisl'l is

vitiated by the detect of discrepancy {anai\(inta betvabli:aa) since a, certain con-

clus,ion is not warranted by the premises which cannot generate the cognition of

the particular relation subsisting among the word1eanings. If the latter alter­

na.ti,ve be accepted then there is no ascertaiment, (siddh1) ot the probandum

(adhya) and, hence, there will be no verbal cognition. ~hererore, '5~bda' or

Verbal Testimony must be recognised as a direct source ot knowledge which causes '

cog,nition or a peculiar sort.

(anaikintah paricchede sambba.ve ca na niscaJab. NK, p-390). 0 ~ ~

Moreover, when an ·entity is otherwise lmown, it can still be interred if there be

a will to do so. Without any such will no pre-perceived. entity can ever be interred • . I

But the case is otherw.i.se with verbal knowledge. A person is bound to have verbal

cognition, whether there is a will to have it or not, whenever he nears a senten

even it the sentence and the idea conveyed by it be already known to him. This

tact also differentiates verbal Testimony !rom inference. ( aiddM tve i cchim I)

vinipi bodha-darsanacca. VSLM., p.57). ••

/ . . . The neo-logicia.ns have taught the Vaisesikas tram. another angle. "Inter-

a

ence has been detined as a cogni.tion generated. by the inferential nark (liliga).

It the definition is accepted the ctuestion will natural.l7 arise: what would be

the inferential mark in the case or the understanding or a sentence meaning sucl-J

as,, for example, (i) gaur asti • ('the cow exists')? In an ordinary case of infe-

renee, say 1 1t.he mountain has fire because ot smoke', the 'smoke 1 is the ark

/ through trdlich the fire is known to exist on the 1nountain. The Vaiseaika should

0

find out some 'mark' by which 'e.xistence 1 can, on this theory, be proved to exist

in the cow". (NN, pp.91-92). Tlley, howeYer., may take semantica.l competence

(,ogyati) of the nature ot 'absence or aJl1 contradiction 1 as the mark. Thu.«1 the

given example may be put in the form: 'gaur astitvavan astitvabhava-Yirabit 1 ('the I

-15

cow bas existence because it lacks the absence of existence'). But it is a tact

that, in order to comprehend the meaning of the sentence it is not at all necessary

for us to know with certainty that the cow lacks non-existence. Or, in other

words, w need not have any prior knowledge or the existence ot tha cow in order

to grasp the meaning ot the sentence. (gavid&v.;.astitvader-anubhavarthaa oa tivad 0

- - ·-· - - 0 - / - - , -astitvider-badha-virahitva-ru~. yogya~tram lingam badha-niscayabhavenyatha-~ 0 0

/I'

siddhasya 10gyatiniscayasyanivas,.akatvit. SSP, pp.ll-12). Moreover, nobody

admits that verbal cognition arises trom such a multitude of words as: 'gha~a~ ka.r-

- b~ matvam. anayanam krtih' {'the pitcher to~ an accusative 1 bringing an etfort') 1

Q 0 " .,

because it lacks syntactical expectancy (ikink~) though it has coapetence.

Therefore, competence alone is not essential tor verbal cognition ani, hence, it

cannot be regarded as the 'mark 1 • So the Vaise~ika attempt to prove nrbal co§lli­

tlon as a case ot inference tails through and througb. (JOgyati-aiit.ra-littgaka­

sa..nsarginumina-syinvaya-buddhitve gha tab karma tvam 1 tyidi-stballyas yapt. tasya. . A 0 o

tathatvapata.t. s5P, p.l2).

Tile Vaisesikas ma1 defend their position by mentioning that, absence ot "

any hostile tact is necessary for acquiring any knowledge a.'ld, lack or eapectancy

being a hostile tact in· this case 1 the non-comprehension of judgemental thought. ~·

la quite natural. But this cannot bring them out of difficulty. Assertion of the

mark in the subject ot inference is indispensable for a V'cllid inference. But it

is a universal experience that, verbal cognition arises even !rom sentences where

competence is doubtful. But a.n entity, whose very existence in the subject is

. doubtful, cannot be regarded as a mark of inference. (;rouatayah ~ya-sth&le~ 0 0

- ,;7/ .

p,anvaya-buddher-anubhavik&tvacca. SSP, p.l.2).

Again, Sllltt4ctical competence m;;.y be defined as relatedness of the entities

conve,ed by the word& constituting a sentence. In that. case the inferable property

becomes identical with the mark ot interence because this relatedness is what we

actually want to infer. Thus an atte:ppt is made to prove what is already J:rOVOd

- 16

and this is known as a logical fallacy known as •sidd.na-sidhana • • ( e(abda-buddhau

! - IV"- . . - - , - -yo~ta-jnanatvena hetutvad anumitau tu het~tta~s.ca,asyaiva hetutvad )~gyata-

'

s~s"~ya-sthaliyinvaya-buddhau anumititva-kalpanasambhavid iti bhiva~. KK, p.l2). /

In order to steer clear of this difficulty the Vaiaefikas may put forward I

syntactical expectancy as the •mark' in lieu ot competence. But this does not '

help: them much. Syntactical expectancJ is defined as the sequential arra.ngecient ;

' of wJrds constituting a sentence~ (anvaya.-bodhinuk:Ulinuplirvi-paryavasitatvakSnksa.

. n

// .

SSP, ;p.l2). 1'hus it belongs to words and not to the concept.s conveyed by thew. i

"Obviously expectancy cannot be an attribute or the subject of inference. The ! .

subject is invariably a concept or an entity. Thus the inference is based on an

unprowd mark, a fallacy called svarlipasiddhi, which happens when the mark cannot I

be proved to exist in the subject. or inference 11• (NN, p.95). Moreover, expectancy

j

I . . is aipotential cause that generates verbal cognition b7 its very existence (svarupa-

i sat~}. The hearer need not be aware or its existence. But a mark, on the other

!

hand~ must be consciously known to be existent in the subject of inference before !

hand~ Therefore, verbal cognition cannot be brought under the ken or inferential i

knowledge. (svar\ipa-sattyevinvaya-buddhav-upa)'Ujyate, na tu jnati, pramiriabhavat. 1 { "'

/"/ : SSP,!p.l5)•

I ~

Another point goes to distinguish verbal cognition fran inference. The i

logicians hold that the Slbject or inference must alwa.)'S be limited or detenuined I

by sdme property, i.e. it must be a pa.rtimla.r entity in which the existence of an I I

inferable property is sought to be proved. The subject cannot be ambiguous. For I

exam~le, fire is inferred to be existent in a particular mountain having a definite

char~cter. But if' the meaning or such a sentence as 'ghalAd an,.a~' ( •something I

ditterent trom a pitcheri) be taken to be deriwd through inference ctnd. not through I j

Verbal Testimony, then the :inferable quality is 'dU'ference' and the subjec-t or I

inference to which it is ascribed .is an indefinite 'something'. It ,.,., be argued

- 17

that the subject 1n this case may be specified as 'that which is possessed of

dif.ference•. But in that case the delimiting property of subjectness (paksativa-., cchedaka) is the 'difference 1 (trom cloth, etc.) by which 'that • is qualified. But

our inferable property, too, is this difference and thus it involves the r.llAcy

ot petitio principii. So we cannot comprehend the meaning of such a sentence

through the process or inference. (paksavidllayinvaya.sya. bhane 'pyanyatva-prakiren-g ~

- - -- s"sp-r ' any.tsya ta.trabhavat. ·. 1 p.l9J.

There is yet another point that goes against the Vailesika view. When . . ~

caus&l conditions leading to tw different types of ·COgnitioo in r8Sp!Ct of the

same object • perception and inference, remain present at the same time, perception

onrrides inference,. Between perception and verbal cognition also' the former

overrides the latter in the said circumstances, Similarly; it is experienced that,

if a person bears the sentence 1 'the hill is fiery' at & moment when on seeing

smoke on the hill he is about to inter the existence o£ fire on i~f.~ be atfmc»

stops interring and acquires the knowledge from tb:t sentence. Thus verbal. cogni-

tion '<!:~~·overrides inference. Tbis mutual exclusion alao shows that verbal eogni­/

tion is different from perceptual and inferential knowledge. (sabdadhiyah prat.ya-o

- - -- / - -ksat.vabhyupagam.e pratyaksadi-sama.n~ prati sabda-samgryah pratibandbaktva-s4Jubha-·t) 0 to::) 0 ••

• ,., vat. SSP, p.lO).

Thus there is r10 other way out but. to accept verbal coeni tion as a • sptcial

type of cognition distinct trom perceptual and inferential ones and, consequently,

Verbal Testimony must be awarded the status of a valid source of knowledge separate

·trcxn the process ·Of perception ana inference. "Unlike perception it is a =ed,iate

knowledge like inference,, etc. But in N;iya ttl! tiefinition of inference ba.s been ; /--formulated in such a way that it excludes sabd.abodha. Inference is a cogniticn

generated through the mediacy of the knowledge of pervasion (,y8.ptiJ, .,.-~~while

iabdabodha is through the cognition or tbe constituent wards to a ~ntence •

• • • • • • fbe meanings or individual 'NOrds my be known to us before, but their syntactic

- 18

relation is what is given by the new sentence. This relation which would be the

'mark' if it were an inference, is not given to us before". (NN, p.98J.

However, one may or may not accept Verbal 'testimony as a. separate and va.Ud

way of knowing. Bu.t universal use of language eomples any thoughtful ani inqui­

sitive m.ind to thinf(over the science ot meaning. "In tbeir attempt to justify

the authority of the Vedas the ancient thinkers raised valuable proble~~~S, vhieh

can be studied ror their own importance, independently or that of the Vedas.

The problem of language as the verbal SJ2llbol or thought, of words, meanings, and

tl1e relation between meaning and its symbols, of the knowledge or ~antng, the

perception of words and. meaningal the -worlds or thought., meaning and reality,

the import of propositions, the source and ultimacy of the validity ot knowledge '

etc., and finally of the claim of verbal tea timon)' to be an independent source

or kn.o.ledge, han been discussed so seriously' thoroughly am logicallJ that i

~heir philosophical worth can be 1gnorecl only through an unphilosophical pre ju-

dice". (SWK, p.250).

- 19

CHAPl'ER - I.

SECTION III : .t;ariy Enquiries.

Studies in the science of meaning are now receiving more and more

encouragement from the students of Semantics. But the ,,· question of the

relation subsisting between sound and sense, which is the central problea of the

science or meaning, was nowhere taken up so seriously as it was in India. A

primary beginning of the science of meaning is to be found in the Brihmanas 0

where we notice the first attempts at giving etymological justification ot

~es. The thinking mind of the ancient Indo...Aryans pondered over tlr! question

how a particular word always gives rise to a particula.r concept. They began to

search after and examine such a concept associated with the same word as would

justify its inseparable relation with the corresponding concept • Thus the

Brihmal,ls.thave shown the path along which we sh9uld proceed in order to construct

the real biography or words. .tn his Veda Miitirgsi (p.226), Anirva~ aa.intains

that in different Br'h:'D.anas there are at least six hundred cases where attempts 0

f1a:ve been made to find out the meaning of words. Let us diScuss some of them.

In the Aitareya. Brihmana, the meaning of the word 1&gni' is explained as 0

'the first of gods '• (agnir-vai devi.nam avamah. AB.I/1). Here the 'WOrd is deri-o •• •

ved trom the root 1ag 1 meaning 'to be tirst •. The same meaning is explained

more clearly in another sentence where it is said that, Agni is the face, i.e.,

first of the gods. (agnir mukham prathamo deva.t&nam. AB I/4). The same sense is 0

expressed in another sentence in the Taittiriya Brihma~ where it is remarked

that~ Aijni is the foremost, i.e., first among the gods. (agnir agre prathamo

devatanam. TB II/4/3/3). The meaning is all the more explicit in another sentence

where it is said that, "lie was born first among the gods and so he is named Agni 11•

(vaja.saneyinstvevam amananti. 1sa. va e~oJ.gre devatanam aji,-a.ta tasmad..agnir-/

namati t. Sp, p.)). This derivation is all the more interesting as the position

ot god Agni in the Vedic pantheon is thus made clear to us • Similarly the meaning

- 20

of the term 'purohita 1 , an epithet; .. of Agni, is explained in tbe Taittiriya

Sambiti as : 'The priests place him (Agni-tire) in front of thea am so be is 0

callecl 'purohita'. (pura enam dadhati. Tai.ll/l/2/9). This explain.e the place 0

· ot tire in a Vedic sacrifice. In the same manner the meaning ot the word

'Mgiras' is explained in the Aitare.J& Brihmana as : 'Those who were charcoals 0

· became the Allgirasas ' • (;ydngiri &sa!pt611gi-raso 1bhavan. AB. lll 3 .34). Thus

the word •aitgiras' is derived from the word 'ailgira' (charcoal). This indicates

that the ADgfrasas were a group of men who died and became ebareoals as they

were burnt atter death. This derivation .is all the more interesting as it indi­

cates that the custom of burning dead-bodies was in vogue even in the Vedic age.

It also indicates that Angtraaas were a group of forefathers ot the Vejic Aryans.

In a figurative sense, the word. may also be taken to mean produeer or tire or

fire-priest. The ~tapatha Brihmana derived the term 'arka 1 from the root 'arc' .,

and explained the meaning as : *'He (the creator) was engaged in a sacrifice &l¥l

trom him water was created; be thought, •wnat came out of me vb1le l was engaged

in sacritiee?' So i.t (water} is 'arka'. {so 'r.cannacarat. tasjircata ipo' jiya-/

tircato vU me kam abhud iti tacievarkasyirkatvaa. SBr. X/6/S/1). 'i'hus the

S/ -atapatba Bra.hmana ·comes to the conclusion that t~ M)rd

0 'arka 1 •an.s..water.

•

(apo vi arkah. sBr. X/6/S/2). 0

This investigation ot meaning advanced further in the next stage b7 the

Nighantus and the elaborate et)'mologica.l interpretations of the Nirukta.s. "Al-oo

ready in early times Indian scholars busied theaselves with the interpretation ot

the Rgveda. So-called Nighantus or • glossaries' , collaet.ions ot rare am obscure Q 00

words whaich occur in the h;vm.ns, wete prepared. The tirat co!llllentator ot the

Rgveda, lldlose work is preserved to us 1 was YiiSka. who on the basis or the lfighaq"'!' 0 0

tus, explains a great llUtllber ot Vedic verses in his wrk N1rukta {i.e., Et;rmo-o

logy). This Iiska, who doubtless is older than Pan1n1, already quotes no less ' 0

than seventeen pred£cessors, whose opinions trequentl;r contradict each other". {HIL, p.6o). ,

-21

There were m&n7 Nigha~~us only one of which, generally aeeribed to

sikalya, bas come down to us with the commentary of Iiska. "Belval.kar dates Yiaka 'a

Nirukta from the 7th century B.,. This is likely enough, though not certain, But.

we have no idea how much earlier the Nt~~us may be.' (Hll., p.2Sl). Th11

shows that' even in the hoary past' Indian thinkers put their efforts to inns-

tigate into the mea~gs of wrds 1 of course 1 tound in the · Vedas. nt he Nighan-~

~us are !i ve lists of words 1 which are diri.ded into three sections • !he first

section (Naighantuka.ki:nda) consists ot three lists, 1n which Vedic words are I'J q "0

collected under certain .main ideas. For instance, there are quoted 21 na.moa tor I

'earth', 15 for 'gold • 1 1.6 for 'air' 1 101 tor 'water' 1 122 verbs tar 'to go' 1

26 adjectives and adverbs tor 'quick' 1 12 !or 'much' 1 an:i so on. The- eecond

section (Naigamakity!a or Aikapadika) contains a list ot ambiguous am particul.t.rl;y

difficult l«)MS or the Veda, while the tbi.rd section {Daivata-kind.a) gives a ti/Y

classification or the deities according to their regions, earth, sky and heaven".

(lUL, p.2Sl). This description or M.Wl.nternitz gives us a general idea ot the

Nigh~~us. The Nighaq\u1 which is still extrtnt, shows the earliest specimens

of Indian lexicography and presents to us a collectiOil ot Vedic 11Grcls arranged

·in several groups according to their meanings. (Jlirii4hi hi,am etaBidilfhabda-••

· eamudi1e S81J,ljiiety-abhipri;ya.~. Our, p.6). In it a number ot words denoting the

same meaning have been placed in one group ( :-::=:::~and several

·groups of such type are found 1n the 1figh8J!~U. lt has also been noticed that a

single word may denote more than one meaning. { ekirtham aneka-obd• ityetad-

, uktam. atha yinyanekirthinyeka-8abdam tin,a.to 'nukramis,aito •navagata-svara-saaaki-. , ~ ... --.,. ' .

· rmesca nigs.miig.s-tad aikapadikala ityaca.~ate. Nir.IV, p .• 291). ln his Mahib~~,1 .:fi_ Patanjali also bas dratm our attention to this important tact that there ~~- m&117uf/-

1001'da like 1lndra 1 ,

1:%kra 1 , 1puruhiita 1 and 1purandara 1

, all of which deno£i f- ~ Indra, the king ot gods, and there are also other words like •a~a 1 ,

1 pichi 1~; : ~

1Jita!& I I etC • J 8S.Ch Of Which denoteS SeVeral llle&niDgB • (V&h&VO hi sabdi~twthi. . <

.•• f . .

Modern scholars recogl'lise_ tlte importance or l~eography tor the at.udy

ot meanins. Ot course, there are ~ome who may object to etl'U!ologieal int.rpre­

tations as they are c;:) sanetimes fanciful and misguiding. But it is not a aut ti-l

cient teason wbt we should ignore them altogether as inefficient to render us

any: help .in our en~iry ot meaning. we cannot ignore tbe tact that the acience

ot ~tJmologr 1 at least as it was ~rke4 out by the authors ot the Niruktas 1

seems to han been based upon the proper and. :£)radical investigation or aeaning.

!aska explains the word 'deva.ra 1 (younger brother or one's huaband) as

the abbreviated form of the t'WO terms, 'clvitl,af'A varatt • M&ning, 'the second

bridegroom'. (devara~ l<asa&d, dvitiyo vara ucyate. N1r, p.248j. Thus he finds I

in it the reminiscences of an ancient social custom which is well-lmown to the

Indians trom_ the tales or Sugriva and Vibhl~aqa of the Rima~. Both of them

tOQk the ~ves of their elder brothers as their own wins, after the demise of

their elder brothers. S.imila.rly, Yiska brings out the meaning of the word

'ld.tava 1 (gambler) as the imitation of the terms ·~ tava asti 1 {

1\\ilat have you?) • ••

(~tava ~ tavistl~i ~bd.inuktti~. Hir, p.4?1). Th.ereby he shows the charac-

teristics of a gambler. In the same way he explains the wrds like 1kika' as

coined through the imitation ot the cawing ot the bird (crow) and thu.9 the vord

denotes the particular class or birds (crows). (kika iti s~bdinuk{ti~. l~ir, p.264.

Vide also: yi~~ evasau sAbdliJ! lraroti tayaivanu~,.a tas1a namipi bl\avati.

~~ )1.265). Iaska's exposition ot the meaning of the wrd 'duhiti' (daughter)

is very much interesting. He explains : "dupiti durhiti diire hiti dogdherva•

{Nir, p.2C17). The word comes !rom either 'durhiti' meaning a female issue wo

is always g1 ven improperly whenever or whereever she tna7 be given away 1n marriage

-23

to somebody; or, the ~rd might have been formed by tbe contraction or the terms

1dire biti' meaning a female child who is good (to her rather) it she Un:s arar;

the word might also have been derived from the root 'duh 1 (to milk) a:s a daughter

alw&JS tries to milk (to take something trCill) her rather. (duhita durhiii. sa hi -

yatraiva dl,ate tatraiva durdatti. bhavati. diire ri sati sa pituh ';hiti pat~ 'ZJ ,.,i"'

bhavatiti duhitetyucyate. dogdhervi. sa hi nitye eva pituh siksat dra.v,ac a .,. o

dogdhi prart.hani-~vit. fr~, p.208). 'Thus he beautitull7 bri~s out the cha-

racteristic relation ot a daugh.t.er to her tatner, at least as it ~ras in India at

the time ot Yiska. The word may also be taken to primarilf signify the duty

ot milking which the unmarried girls used to perform in the morning. He turther

explains the term 'variha' as the shortened form ot the wrd 'varihira 1 (good

meal). ( variho megho bha:rati varliifarah. Nir, p.4Cl)). Very often Xiska bas "

given us what is called tolJtt-et1Jllolog having no bearing either on gammar or on

philosophy. But 1 tor: our purpose, it is interesting so tar as we can read into

this process an evolution of the science or word and mean1ng •

There are many such explanations scrutinising which no one wilb Y8nture

to maintain tbat Xiska could not foresee the important, intellectual canons or

language lie are now in possession ot. SimilArly, tbe dissertations or Darga, I

•• the; famous commentator ot Yi'ska 's t~irukta, on the words 'praV'I!JB', 1udira' and

;

1n1$trilltSa' show positive instances haw the intellectual process or generalisation . I

works in the expansio.n .of meaning. The original meaning or the word 1 pr&Tlin ' IJ

is •a man who is an expert in playing on lyre 1 • But, by generalisation, the word

now signifies one who is an expert in an7 discipline. Similar are the cues wi tJl

the words ~~~- 1uclara' and 'm&tri~!s&'. (pra~dira-Jd.strs.naaB:-sabdi ut't!~-ari"r-- / - -thibhidheya-sambandhilJ ~anta.l} kriy8-~amanJ&-hetu-mitram asri tyanye-tyevartbin-

tarettu va.rtante. tad yatha pr&kt~~ ntp~ praYiiJO giftdharve. &tra h78'Jy&

mukhn vrttih. sa e'!a s~ artham abhidheyam utstjyaiva gi'ndharvam abb1isa-,_ 0 0

-24

utpanna-kau"'lo bhavati sa tatrocyate praviql iti. Dur, pp. 122-23). AnOther

classical example of this process is the word '~la' (an expert) whfch bas

been the cause or he8dache to the rhetoricians. (discussej in Cb.Ill, S.c.IV).

language is an organic boci;y and bas both physical and pllJcbolo&ie&l aap cte

represented by words and meanings respectively. The relation of a. word with its

corresponding meaning is the same as subsists betwen the body and the soW..

Thoughts arising in our minds 1'1~ their audible expressions through word• pro­

duced by our vocal organs. Patai'Cjali is correct in obserrlng that ttu~xpression

ot thought is the sole purpose that is served by the use ot words. (art~-gatyar­

thah s~bda-prayoga.b.artham sam.prat,a,ay1syiidti S"abd.ab pra;yuj)'&te. MB;:~, 111, p.30). o . o ~ 0 -a a

The Indian etJI'llologiats assert greater importance to the psychological oide in

their principles or derivation. This is evident trm the express state•~& ot

Yaska that, 1n deriving words, especially those which do not signify the usual

senses by mere gramatical mode or analysis, one should pay greater attention to

their meanil'ltn~t. (ath&nanvite •-rthe 'prid.esl.ke nkire 'rthanitJ&h parllcMta ken&cid-""'0- C> ~

vrtti-sim'inyenividyaaiine siminye 'p~ksara-varna-siin.in)'i"n-air~-na tu na .., .. .. nirvriiyih-na s~UDakiram idriyeta • Nir, p.l20). The main purpose or etJ~~ology is

to explain the .meanings ot those 1ftlrds, which cannot be uuierstood by eu7 gra-. ..

mmatical derivations and herein lie the characteristics of Nirukta (~tymology ).

(na ea nirukte k&rat<a-hiraka-lava.kid.i..s&bda vyutpid,ante subodhaiva hi t.•tim ~

vyutpatti~ prasiddhaiva ca. vfcikaral'Aa it1. ,a eva tu durbodha~ pa.ro~iti-poro~a-1

.rtta)'O bilmakrd-arordara-vaitasa-parva-~bdidaya.st.i" eva YJUtpi'dJ& niruc,ante. 0 0 •

t~u hi Tise~tba-Yatt.a niruktasya. Nir, p.l.24).

liska 'a conception or verb is very much int.eresting. ite. obsenes that

the verbs like •vrajati' (goes), 'pacati 1 (cooks), etc., aean series or actions

having a beginning and an end. (p\irvi'parlbhu~ bha:vam 'ikhyatenacatatate vrajati­

pacatityupalcama-prabhttyapavarga-paryantam. Nir, l, p.s). The term 'apavarga­

par,.antan f, used by iliSka in this definition or verb, sugests the basi& or our

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division of the con1inuous streams or active moments into ditt·erent crosa-aectiona

ot history. The word •apavarga' means •attainment or the result.' A root is taken

to mean an action which leads to SCI!le results. · (phala-vyipra-]01"-dhit.uh. C¢.'1'\I..O~ .j)

Thus the root 'gam' (to go) signifies a series or su\)...ordinate actions beginning

trom the first step down to the last step by which t.ha destination is reached.

,Nothing in the universe remains without an action even tor a moment. So, actiona

Will, no doubt, continue even after the destination is arrived at. fn spite of

this tact, with an eye to the result we want to achieve, we abStract ~Y a

:se§ftent of the action stream and give it the name 'ga~~ .. ' (going), because this

ser.res our practical purpose. "A series of action-mQments is called 'one action''

, or kri7i from. tho pragnatic consideration ot the result to which the- series is

·thought to be directed.. The series is taken to ~ one or identical and t.he ever­

. changing sub-ordinate moments of action are conveniently ignored. The serial

unity is superimposed on the diversity or the successive moments. This reminds

us ot the Buddhist eoneepticm or a constructed streaa of moments (ksanasttiina )n. ~ It

(PL, p.l6).

Such examples tram the Brihm&nas and the Nirukt.a can easily be multiplied. ()

But we need not do so because our purpose is only to show the antiquity or the •• • enquiry into the concept or meaning and this works as the backgrourr:S of the dis-

cussions carried out by different schools ot Indian philosophy.