the sabda. -...
TRANSCRIPT
,,-' -··-
Methodology ( 137 )
Chapter VIII
€
The Sabda.
·~·
Sabda or verbal testimony is the next source of knowledge
with which we have to deal. In the Brahma-sutra Bha~yas,
this PramaJ).a bears considerable importance, because the Vedanta
system is mainly based on the testimony of scriptures. Brahma
sfltra must be viewed from two aspects; it is an important
philosophical treatise setting forth the system called the Vedanta,
but never the less it is an authoritative interpretation of the
doubtful points in the Upani~ads. This explains why Sabda or verbal
testimony is considered to be a very important PramaJ).a in the
study of Brahma-sutra Bha~yas.
In the Nyaya system Sabda is defined as the right
knowledge, which we derive from utterances of infallible and
absolutely truthful persons. 1 An absolutely truthful person is
one, who possesses the direct and right knowledge of a thing, who
is moved by the desire to make known to others the thing as
1 "emflq~~: ~·~= 1 " Gautama's Nyiya-siitra1 I. i. 7.
Methodolagy ( 138 )
he knows it, and who is fully capable of speaking of it. 1 Even
Mlecchas may have amidst them absolutely truthful persons
whose authority may be accepted. 2 Except in the case of an
omniscient being, the authoritativeness of tht! verbal testimony
depends on three factors, viz. ( 1 ) direct and right knowledge,
( 2) the desire to make known that knowledge and ( 3 ) the
ability to communicate it.
The trust-worthy verbal assertion
visible world ( Dr,tartha ) or the invisible
may relate to the
world ( Adr~tartha ).
The reliable words of ordinary truthful persons concerning things
belonging to this world fall in the first category, while those
of the .~;{~is, which refer to heaven and such other invisible things fall in the second. If only assertions concerning
visible things are considered reliable, then the Vedas would
become excluded. But the Vedas cannot be so excluded, because
the definition of Sabda Pramat;ta is fully applicable to them.
All knowledge derived from them is valid, for they are the
utterances of the infallible God. The Vedic knowledge is further
conveyed through the sages who are Aptas or reliable persons,
since they had intuitive perception of the truth, love for humanity
and the desire to communicate their knowledge.
Vatsyayana-bha~ya on Gautama's Nyaya-sutra, p. 21.
2 " !ifi1i~T~~,m~t e'IT<i (i5~1lJ~ 1 ., Vatsyayana-bha~ya on
Gautama's Nyaya-sutra, p. 21.
Methodology ( 139 )
There is another classification, according to which there
are two kinds of testimony, viz. Vaidika or scriptural and Laukika
or secular. Scriptural testimony is perfect and infallible by its
very nature, since it is the word of God. Of secular testimony,
only that which proceeds from trustworthy per3ons is valid, but
not the rest. 1 Classifying verbal testimony as Dr~tartha and
AdHtartha has reference to the nature of the objects of knowledge,
and as Laukika and Alaukika has reference to the source of the
knowledge.
The verbal assertions of a trustworthy person are not
in themselves sufficient to give us any knowledge of things.
The understanding of their meaning is necessary in acquirin:5
any knowledge from verbal statements. Hence while the validity
of verbal knowledge depends on its being based on the statement
of a trustworthy person, its possibility depends on the under
standing of the meaning of that statement.
As the knowledge of nrb:tl testi:n:lny d:!pends on the
understanding of the meaning of a sentence, the logical st-ructur ~
of a sentence and the relation of words in it deserve some
consideration. The Nyaya system defines a sentence as a
collection of significant words, which are endowed with (1) Akank~
or mutual interdependence to indicate the intended sense,
1 '' •n~ ftfcr~ 1 ~~ ~if<fi<ii :q 1 ~f~<tiiftxcrnu;tcm~~itcr JlifTilT+( 1
~TM ccrrn)Qi Slililllq_ I 61"'<l~JIIHII!ij", I '' Tarka-sangraha, p. 53.
,
Methodolo~y ( 140 )
(2) Yogyata or compatibility to accord with the sense of the
sentence and not render it futile and meaningless, and (3) Sannidhi
or the utterance of words in quick succes.sion without a long
pause between them. 1
A word is defined as a combination of significant letters.
The relation of the word and its meaning is due to convention.
The connntion that such and such a word should mean such
and such an object is established by God. 1
In addition to the three conditions, viz. Akaiik~, Yogyati
and Sannidhi, some N aiyayikas accept Tat puya as the fourth
condition of verbal knowledge. Titparya stands for the meaning
intended to be conveyed by a sentence. To understand the
meaning of a sentence we must consider the intention of the
writer or the speaker who uses it. Hence the understanding of
a sentence depends on the understanding of the Tatparya or the intended meaning.
The import of words according to the Nyaya system is
indivisual ( Vyakti ), form ( Akrti) and genus ( Jiti ). The Nyaya
holds that a word denotes all the three in different degrees.
1 '' ~~Jifu~llU ~)g: q~~~~T'l'lf;au~~t •n<fit~t "'"'~at srtftq
'lr.IIIW'~ftf~~~~~JifuqJ«I•'If ~r.rftatwrt q~01t e"\V iflif~t{ 1 , Kesava-misra : Tarka-bha~a, p. 49.
p. so. 2 "~~~~~'l~T ifl••~ ~ffi~\6~~a: ~fm: I " Tarka-saiigraha,
.. ...
Methodology ( Hl )
The N yaya theory accepts that the wcrd is not eternal. 1
Hence the Naiyayikas do not depend on the eternity of word
for the authoritativeness of the Vedas. According to N yl'i.ya,
the authority of the Veda depends on the omniscience of God
who creates it and trustworthiness of the sages who manifest it.
Thus the authority of the Veda depends on the inference of the
trustworthiness of their authors.
The Vaise~ikas do not accept Sabda as a seperate Pramar;ta,
but they seek to establish the validity of verbal testimony on
the strength of inference, on the ground of its being the utterance
of an infallible person. The Vaise~ika-sutras, however, tacitly
admit the validity of the scriptures on their own authority.
The Sankhya system accepts that the Veda is impersonal.
The Veda on account of its non-personal authorship, is free
from doubts and discrepancies, and is regarded as of self-evident
validity. Even though it is impersonal we need not consider its
words to be eternal.
Apta-vacana or valid assertion is self-sufficient in its authority.
It is always right, inasmuch as it is brought about by the words
of the Veda, which being independent of human authorship, is free
1 "a:rrf<::;r~•n~fr.irll<litCfl({ ~oifiCJ!Sq';:mJ''ii I " Gautama'a Nyaya-
siHra, II. ii. 13.
Methodology ( 14 2 )
from all defects. It is for this very reason that the knowledge
derived from Itihasa and the Smrti which are based upon the
Veda is regarded as right. 1
The authority of Kapila, the founder of this system, is
accepted on the score of his remembering the revealed texts
that he had studied during the previous time-cycles, just as
things known on the previous day are remembered by the sleeper
waking on the next day. s
The Sailkhyas do not accept the validity of the verbal
testimony of ordinary trustworthy persons. It is not recognised
in the Sankhya as a seperate Pram3.r;la, since it depends on
perception and inference. It is the testimony of the Veda or the
Smrti that is admitted as the third independent Pramfu).a,
since it gives us true knowledge about supersensuous realities
which cannot be known through perception and inference.
The authority of the Vedas may not be questioned since
they are Apauru~eya or impersonal. But since the revelations
1 . " tj.:i:q' ~<It~: Slii'TtiTlJ. I Slqllilllt~~<fltfll~f;{a~~~ ~~~t:iT~6'"!iTM'f~"'ffi<!~ .... "' ....
llClfa 1 tzyt ~~'t_~H~arfa~I~!l~TurCI'TCfll~f;{a~fq ~r;f ~m ~Cfftr 1 '' Vacaspati-misra :
Tattva-kaumudi, p. 12.
2 ~' Sltf~fct~lil~ <tifq~~~ Cfi~trr~T <ti~trTPti~T~a~fa~;r~ure~if:, §lnr~~~i!Cf
'l~~~lifJTffi~Tqt(f;n;rq"t!: 1 '' Vacaspati-misra : Tattva-kaumudi, p. 12.
Methodology ( 143 j
of Kapila are considered to be authoritative, there arises the
question of testing the authority of the revelations of other sages
who claimed similar reverence. Saiikhyas argue that reason is to
be applied in finding out what revelations are true and what not.
Pseudo-revelations such as the scriptures of the Buddhists, the
Jainas, the materialists and others are not authoritative, because
these are not right. This can be inferred from internal con
tradictions, being devoid of any sound basis, containing asser
tions unsupported by proofs, and being accepted by only a few
low and beastlike persons, M!ecchas and others. 1
In the t~eatment of the Sabda-pramli.J,la the v1ews of the
Sii.Iikhya and those of the Nyaya-Vaise~ika are some-what similar.
The Siilkhyas never openly opposed the Vedas. By their acceptance
of the Vedas they kept up ;:·their orthodoxy. They, however, dis
carded many old dogmas and silently ignored others.
With respect to the Sabda-pram3J;la the treatment of the
Yoga is similar to that of the Sankhya and there is nothing special
about it in this system.
In the MirnalJlsa the discussion about the nature
of the Sabda-pramru;ta bears the greatest importance, as the
1 '' at~'fficci :ij~,li!'t fifm•nq_ f<Tf~'L~i<I'RllillUif.i'i~ltlifi:r·crFi~'tf ~f'-:q~cr
~~~rMll: ~~rcre~: tr~lll~: qf(H{l~ ii~o~i{ 1 '' Vacaspati-misra: Tattva
kaumudi, p. 13
M~thodology ( II, 4 )
main doctrine of the Mirna:rpsa is to t~tablish the validity of the
Vedas above all means of knowledge. The discussion relates to
the question whether knowledge is presumably valid or not. The
Nyaya-Vai~e~ika system maintains that the validity or invalidity·
of knowledge can be established only externally; by itself it
vouchsafes for neither. The Mima:rpsakas hold exactly the opposite
view, viz. that knowledge by its very nature is valid. Suspicion
of defects in the means and conditions, and the contradiction .
of it by other knowledge engender doubt and suggest the need
for investigation. This doctrine of self-validity of knowledge
has an important bearing on the validity of Veda.
Sabda-pramii.J;la 1s defined as the means of knowedgc
that we get about things not within the purview of our perception
from relevant sentence~t by understanding the meaning of the
words, of which they are made up. 1
Verbal testimony 1s of two kinds, -viz. personal
( Pauruteya) and impersonal ( Apaurn~eya ). The words uttered
by men come under the first and the second denotes the Vedic
·words. 2 The first verbal testimony is valid if we are certain that
their authors are not untrustworthy, and the second is valid
in itself.
1 '' (I'S\' q~~crun~;:a~ ~~(lqG_q~~h.n;:'llfaCJi~~ ~~: q~r~~'!aT ~HIT<:!i ij't<~
'{~rtf: ~ij~~ml'ITI'<lQl~fCiq<:~<ti llf~f~gcrr<r~tq~r~~cr ira ~~ ~r·~1 ll'il't~"~ij 1 q'i~<~<fl: .. - "' ~·~: Sl;fT1fll, 1 " Cinnasvarni S1stri: Tantra-siddha:Ita-ratnaVJ.li, p. 63.
2 ":a;r:h~J;p:i Cll<l~ ~~: 1" Nyaya-kda, p. 803.
· Methodology ( 145 )
MimalJlsa has taken great pains to establish the impersonal
character of Veda, since that ensures its eternity and infaJlibility.
It is pointed out that in the case of the Veda there is no
tradition of divine or human authorship. Against the view of
Nyii.ya that the Veda is the work of God, Mimii.IJlsakas argue
that God is incorporeal. It is possible that the transmission of
the Vedas may continue from times immemorial by an uninter
rupted tradition of teachers and pupil9.. Even in the beginning
of a world-epoch the creator may remember the Vedas
in the previous epoch and teach them to the pupils. It is
stated that the }.{~is are not the authors of the Vedic Mantras
but they are only the seers, who are inspired with the eternal
truths, and they have apprehended and transmitted them.
The Mimii.lpsakas even interpret the historical references as
applicable to some universal phenomena. Thus the Veda is taken
to be infallible because it is impcrsoc.al and self-existent.
There is no possibility of any defect or error since it had
no beginning and end in time and since it is not written by
any one. As Kumarila says " Then too, in the case of Veda,
the assertion of freedom from reproach is very easy to put
forward, because there is no speaker in this case; and for this
reason the authoritativeness of the Veda can never even be
imagined. " 1 Thus the Veda is free from all the defects due
to the incapability of the author.
1 Kumarila-qha~~a: Sloka:-vartika, English Trans. by
Gailganatha jha, p. 31.
Methodology ( 146)
The impersonal nature of the Veda IS based on the
doctrine of the eternal character of words in general and the
Vedic words in particular. Jaimini refutes in detail the argue
ments advanced against the eternal character of words. He
accepts that words exist for ever m an unperceived form.
They are not created when they are uttered; they are made
only manifest. Uttering the same word at the same time by
different persons at different places does not contradict the
eternal character of words, because it is porDsible in the case
of an eternal omnipresent entity. Words do not undergo
modifications, but other words are substituted for those which
go out of use. So also utterance by different persons does
not cause any decrease or increase m the volume of words,
since the apparent decrease or increase is due to the sound
uttered by the speaker. 1
Both Prabhn.kara and Kurnarila argue that the signifi
cance of words belongs to the significance of the letters
themselves. 2 When a word is uttered each letter leaves behind
the impressions of its significance and these combine and bring
about the idea of the whole word, which has the power to
denote the meaning. The potency of the word originates in
1 J aimini : Pflrva-rnima!Jlsii-sfltras, I. i. 12-17.
2 S. Dasgupta: A hislory of Indian Philosophy Vol. I,
p. 393.
Methodology ( 147 )
the separate potencies of letters. Thus the letters are the direct
cause of verbal cognition according to the Mimii:rpsa system.
Mima:rpsakas do not accept the doctrine of Spho~a, as is done
by the grammarians.
According to the Mimarpsa the relation between the
word and its meaning is etemal. 1 It is natural and not created
by convention. Words and the objects denoted by them are
both eternal and so such relationship of words and their meanings
is naturally possible. If we are not able to understand the
meaning of a word, it is because the accessories of its cognition
are not accepted, not because it lacks expressiveness.
The process of understanding the meaning of words according to the theory of Prabhakara is called Anvitabhidhana-
v;'i.da. This view accepts that the meanings can only be known
from words occurmg in injunctive sentences. Words denote
things only as related to other factors of injunction.
Kumarila, however, thinks that words independently express
separate meanings which are subsequently combined into a
sentence expressing one connected idea. This theory is called
Abhihitanvaya-vada. The N yiiya also accepts the Abhihitanvaya
theory of acquiring the meaning of words.
1 ":aiitqf~<ii~ ~-~~lii<t ~i{<'~: I " slitra, I. i. 5.
J aimini : Purvamimaxp.sa-
Methodology ( 148)
As the Mima:rp.sakas accept a permanent relation of words
and their meanings, it is impossible to accept that words
denote individuals. If a word means a single individual only,
there cannot be an eternal connection between the word and
its meaning. So Mima:rp.sakas assert that words denote classes
and not individuals. Form ( Akrti ) which is eternal is capable.
of relation with eternal word. 1
As is said above, verbal testimony is divided into two
v1z. Laukika and Alaukika. Prabhakara holds that classes,
Laukika or
inference.
non-Vedic verbal cognition is . of the nature of
He does not include this division of verbal testimony
in. Sabda-pramiit;ta. Kumarila, however, considers the non-Vedic
verbal testimony also as Sabda-pramat;ta.
The Mima:q1sa holds that the purport of Veda is action. 2
The sole use of Veda lies in directing us to some ritual.
Vedas by means of their injunctions prompt men towards certain
ritualistic actions by declaring that such actions are beAeficial.
They may also prohibit us from actions which lead to harmful
effects. The part of Veda which does not contain such directions,
1 Kumarila-bhai!i!a : Sloka-vartika, English translation by
Gailganatha Jha, p. 281 f.
2 ' 1 a") f( ~~ttl~: Cfi'llct~roro:m, , " Sa':>ara-bha~ya on Jaimini
sutra, I. i. 1.
-•
Method~logy ( 149)
but only gives information about already existing things would
be useless. So such parts which are apparently unconnected with
actions are to be interpreted as bearing on a ritual injunction.
The Mima~p.sa theory may be called ritualistic pragmatism, for
according to it the value of Vedic knowledge is for ritualistic
activities.• Mimalp.sakas attempt to prove that every part of
the scriptures refers to act! of duty. Dharma, for the ascertain·
ment of which the Mimaxp.sa aims, is of the nature of
action. 2
This Dharma is not cognised by perception or inference,
11ince it is beyond the apprehension through senses. 3 The Veda
is the only source of the knowledge of Dharma. Perception
and inference as also the other Pramir;tas are not useful in
giving rise to the knowledge of Dharma. They are useful in
ordinary matters and for repudiating wrong views.
1 Chatterjee and Datta : An introduction to Indian
Philosophy, p. 369.
Purva-mima~p.sa-s,iltra,
I. 1. 2.
3 "~~ qW~-~ISIT&lmcr.~~sfq ~ ~rrrtilor 'tl;(m 1 ....
~~:eNW~aT itlilt fO\~~ ~~ Sl~~ij I
a~t~OT :q 'clllt~ a~~fr:~TIT'ii~: II '' ... Cinnasvami-sastri: Tantra-siddhanta-ratnavali, p. 7.
Methodology (no)
The Mim§.qlsakas broadly divide the Veda into ( 1 ) Vidhi
or injunctions, ( 2) Mantra or hymns, ( 3) Nii.madheya or names,
( 4) Ni~edha or prohibitions, and ( 5) Arthavada or explanatory
passages. 1 All these five parts refer to action. Injunctions
directly give the command or prompt a person to action.
Mantras remind the performer about the details and the sequence
of the action. At sacrifices they serve the purpose of recalling
to the mind of the performer the substance, the deity and other
things connected with them. The names serve the purpose of
distinguishing one ritual from another and thus they are u~eful
for action. The prohibitions are negative injunctions. The
Arthavida portion of the Vega is also subservient· to ritual.
It is made up of praise, blame or legends about certain ritual.
This portion is accepted as an authority on Dharma, chiefly
because it tends to the recognition of the excellence of the
enjoined duty. It is accepted as authority only so far as it is
capable of being taken' along with the injunction declaring that
particular ritual~
The MimaiJlsii. lays down many' rules of interpretation
by the help of which one can arrive at the right purport of
Vedic passages. It discusses the auxiliary Pramar;tas by which
one can decide as to how Vedic passages may be connected with
each other as principal and subordinate. Th~y are six, viz,
1 " lfi'li6'1il~ fqfi:J'IOf~~f.\iJt'oll~<rl<:;iley-~5"ffcl"l'~ ~ ~~: I ''
Nyaya-kosa, p. 807.
-.. ·~~~~--------- ----__,.....,----
Methodology ( 151 )
( 1) Sruti or direct assertion, ( 2) Liilga or indirect implication,
( 3) Vakya or syntactical connection,· ( 4) Prakaral}a or context,
( 5) Sthana or position, and ( 6) Sama~{hya or name. Each
preceding Pramal}a is of greater force than the subsequent one. 1
The Mima~p.sa discusses the auxiliary Prama~as which decide the
sequence of the detai!s of ritual from references in passages,
at times spread over at different places. It is explained that
the order of the performance of action is based on six
PramaQ.as, viz. ( 1 ) Sruti or direct assertion, ( 2 ) Artha or
purpose, ( 3) Pa~ha or sequence in mention, ( 4) Sthana or
po3ition, ( 5) Mukhya or the order of the principal, and ( 6) Pravrtti
or the performance. s The Mimiiip.sa has formulated the ]a w of
nomenclature which has been divided into four classes, as
( 1) Tatprakhya or ba;;ed on the declaration, ( 2) Tadvyapadesya
or based on the mention of similarity, ( 3) Yaugika or based
on the etymology, and ( 4) Vakyarheda or based on the split
of the declaration. a Discussion of how a particular passage
may signify Vikalpa or option, Niyama or restriction of the
purport, Parisailkhya or precluding a particular meaning from it
occurs in the Mima~p.sa. All these and such other rules are
1 " ~faf~~rrcrt'fl~Jiifi{DT~t~Tc:rem~liRT eJJen~ qH~Jof(EllJiqf<~s:r<filSIT(( 1 "
Purva-mimalp.sa-sutra, II I. iii. 13
2 " (f?{ '<I e~~fDT s.tmlllT~ ~;:l{qqro~tJRIJ~~s;rC(~llJ~~Tf;J q-~ I " ':I - c. "'\
Cinnasvami-sastri: Tantra-siddhanta-ratnavali, p. 115.
3 Ganganatha Jha : Sloka-vartika, English trans., Intrc
duction 1 p. xxxi.
'Methodology ( 152 )
discussed as subsidiary to the elucidation of ritual, since according
to this system action is the main purport of the Veda. Though
these rules are not very important from the philosophical point
of view, they hiive their special significance in the study of the
Brahma-siitra Bhafyas, since all the Bha~yakaras have tacitly
accepted them, and have employed them copiously in the inter
pretation of scriptural authorities. They are of great value not only
to those who want to understand Vedic ritual but also to all
who are engaged in the work of finding out the exact import of
fixed texts. Intupreting the purpose of scriptures, according
to these cannons is recognised by Indian thinkers of different
shades of view.
The Sm:rtis propounded by M<~nu aad others are considered
authoritative. Their authority, however, is not independent, b;.tt
dependent on that of the Veda. Sages like Manu etc. being
well-versed in the meaning of the whole Veda remembered the
declarations spread over in its different branches, and put them
down in a simplified from in their books. 1 Thus the authority
of a Sm:rti text is based on some Vedic quotation, If it .is not
directly found, it is to be inferred. The Sm:rtis being based on
the Veda serve to giv~ us the knowledge of such religious duties as
are not mentioned directly in it. The Sm:rtis in contradiction
1 " ifrcn~~T f~ ~~~~qT: Olf'<1t~{lf"'!f~e~~ltl~H.~t~T -.:a(aa1 fC!~iffivrrf..l
'(ll~lra\TiaTf"'!' iilif~rr~~t~ ~'GJ;f,ra"ll"'li ifi-~~~l"'!l~~~~il ('!tC!T :q aRaT"'!'IlWJ:. ("~~;:~ ...... -at~f"'lilii"\l: 1" Cinnas,ami-sistri: Tantra·siddhanta-ratnavali, p. 30 . ..
Methodology ( 153)
to the Veda cannot be accepted as trustworthy. The Mimii.Ip.,;ii
is aware that the w called autbors of Srr:rtis may £erne-times be
contaminated with such defects as avarice etc.
The Advaita. VedAnta accepts most of the tenets of the
MimaJPsa school as regards verbal testimony as a means of
knowledge. A sentence whose purport is not falsified by any
other means of knowledge is considered to be valid. The two
divisions of the Sabda-pramii.Qa, viz. Laukika and Vaidika are
accepted.
Like the Mimaip.sakas, Sa:rikaradi.rya believes that the
word is eternal and its significance lies in the potency of the
lr.tters of which it is composed. He does not accept the Spho~a
theory of gramm'lrians. He accepts the doctrine of U pavar~a
that letters only are the word. 1 According to Sa:rikarf.carya, the
letters of which a word consists, assisted by certain order and
number, have through traditional use entered into a ·connection
with a definite sense. At the time when they are employed
they present themselves as such to the understanding,
which, after having apprehended the several letters m
succession, finally comprehends the entire aggregate, and they
thus unerringly intimate to the understanding their definite
1 11 CJUTi ~ Sl ~~: ~fa ~iiCJTOlqCJ~: 1 " Brahma-sutra Sankara-"'
bha~ya, I. iii. 28.
Methodology ( 1~4)
sense.1 Saiikaracarya asserts that individual letters have their
own intrinsic nature on account of which they are recognised
as the same. So they are considered to be eternal. Besides
being recognised as the same, it is the letters which have got
the meaning of the word, and so there 1s no necessity to
imagine the existence of Spho~a.
Acceptance of the doctrine of the eternity of word paves
the way for the proof of the theory of the eternity of the
Vedas. The position of Sankatacarya with respect to this point
is midway between the Mimi!psa and the N yaya-Vai~efika. He
admits that the Veda 15 Apaurufeya; · but he redefines that
word so as to make it signify that the eternal Veda is resus
citated by God at the beginning of each Kalpa. At that time
there occur in the mind of the creator first the Vedic words
arid then corresponding to them he creates the universe. 2
In
support of this theory San~uacarya quotes from Mahibharata,
which mentions the self-born Being as having firc.ot produced
the eternal, celestial Vedic word, which again, in its turn,
produced all activities. 3 The 'l£das embody the ideal form of
1 "q~o~C!~it ~it CIOTT: >;ifi~T~1~Q:1or ~~IQ'T~f<iil151'61fr'Cfi: ~o:a: ~qs~q~S-.. l:~~l!i<iv1~~!1Jt~•at u~l:aq~~CI'lf~o:~t ~~1 cnnu Q;CI ~~<iC!l1l6il't~Ha a~w~fl:i"fl"tOT S((~l~f~1i~fo:a 1 " Brahma-sutra Sankara-bha~ya, I. iii. 28.
2 " ~\1nqa\fq ~";: ~~~~: \~ ~fG:iiT: ~&G:r 'l<~fe m~~~<!:, _ qJ~::qT'Q~~-11m~tW6u~ftr il"''a 1 " Brahma-siitra Sankara-bha~ya, I. iii. 28.
3 " ('ifa~fq- ' al~T~fCl'lil~l f.:Ii~T CIT~t~1i~T l:<i~l3.CIT I at~T ~~~1 ~~~ ~a:
601h ~<i~~: 1\' ~~ 1" Brahma-3litra ~a:1:rara-bha~ya, I. iii. 28.
c.
Methodology ( 155) , .. . . ~
the u.niverse, and so they are eternal. What is meant by the
production of this· beginningless and endless Vedic speech is that
it is being imparted orally from the teacher to the disciple. 1
Vedas, as a collection of words, begin to exist at the creation,
and cease to exist at the universal dissolution. This means that
only the texts are not eternal, while their significance is eternal.
At the beginning of each Kalpa, when the creator reveals them,
he does not interfere either with their contents or with the order
of their words. God, the first promulgator of the Veda in
every cycle repeats it anew, but precisely as it was in earlier
cycles. The Siitra :a:Ja ~<I ::q ~~11~41~ 1 2 confirms the conclusion
that the Veda is not merely the source, but the eternal source
of the universe. The J;tgveda. tells us how the eternal speech
which was dwelling in the sages was found out by those who
performed the sacrifice. Sankarikii.rya quotes from Mahabhii.rata
which declares that, being permitted by Svayambhu, the sages
obtained by means of penance, the Vedas and Itihasas, which
were hidden at the close of the world epoch. • The origination of the world from the Sabda means the actullisation of the same
words in the form of objects. The will of Sarp.sii.ra as a whole
1 " 3tarilSC<~~ cn:;:r: ~:h:r~t~ll•nl:m;r<fi') S::!a~:, at;nfc:;f;I~::tl~T a:r-:lll{~~ll)
(~i~ra~cmt 1 " Brahma-sutra Sankara-bh~ya, I. iii. 28.
2 Brahma-siitra Sankara-bha~ya, I. iii. 29.
3 " ~mo:as~itar4~rr~fij~6J~~~= 1 "' ~f~ ((IJ6l 'i,.~ilif:tll((T: ~C(~~:arr u ' '
Brahma-siitra Sankara-bhafya, I. iiL 29.
Methodolo:y ( l56)
is eternal in spite of dissolutions ana creations. So the eternity
of the Vedas is not affected, because the names and forms of
each new creation are the same as those of the preceding worlds
that were dissolved. 1 The whole world including the sun, the
moon etc. is arranged by the highest God on the pattern of
the arrangement of the previous world 2 So in the period of
dissolution of the universe the continuation of the Veda is not
stopped, inasmuch as there is the certainty of the perpetual
vision of the Veda by HiraQ.yagarbha and by other gods ind ];{~is on account of the grace of the highest God. Thus the Veda is
self-existent; only it is not the self-same Veda, but a series of
re-issues of an eternal edition which goes back to the beginning
less time. Its validity is self-evident and direct, since it:
constitutes the word of God.:~
According to Sai1karacarya, Brahman is the source of the
great body of the scripture comprising the l;tgveda etc. supple
mented by innumerable disciplines, illuminating all things like
a lamp, and which is itself omniscient as it were. Such a body of scripture cannot originate from any one eh;e except the
1 " 01~ 1!:<~ f<'~~~a~<~T~ima1 ~~~·~~'ijCJc<JTG; ~~·~ fotc~ccrllftl s:Jtir~~il..l "
Brahma·siitra Sankara-bha~ya, I. iii. 29.
2 "~'1r:q~q~;i) '<Tial ~tll'i_~Cfi~q~?t I '' Brahma-siitra Sankara-
bhii~ya, I. iii. 30.
3 " 6m;r-{l'l'~q(<JJ'i"'TCI'al'ffq iiQJ6~'f~l~~wl51llT~f ~lJCIT~i~Vll~;rJo:JAj -'1 .. "' iif~:;uiQtliiTU~Tf~•r{N: 1 , Brahma-siltra Sankara-bha~ya, I. iii. 30.
Methodology ( 157)
omniscient Being. Sankaricarya believes that the vast mass of
the holy Vedic texts has originated from that great Being,
even without an effort, in sport as it were, like human breath,
as is declared in the BrhadaraJ;lyakopani~ad. 1 Thus it may be
seen that the authoritativeness of the Veda is defended on grounds
other than those urged by the Mimihpsa system.
His firm belief in the authority of the Vedas urged
Sankaracarya to find out a cons·stent view of the universe in
all the Upani~ads regarded as one whole. He insists on inter
preting the U pani~ads in a single coherent manner. According
to him the knowledge of Reality which we gain from the
Upani~ads is uniform throuhout, and it is without contradiction.
Thus Sa:ilkaracarya accepts the; main position of the
Mimatpsi with respect to the Veda, by asserting that it is
self-existent and eternal. As regards the purport of the Veda,
however, the view of Sankaradi.rya is far different from that of
the Mimatpsii.. He does not accept that the purport of the Veda
is action. He advances several arguments to refute the
position of Jaimini and Sahara, who declare that activity being
the aim of Sruti, passages which have no such aim would be
1 " :al'~PH~;f<.f <!5'1<!5T~l~~ 3;l.lilf.:r:,;:m.JCJ(\ ?.l~ifl"'"~T li_ijT~)i'f: ~~<f:, ' Of~l{
~1 i!._ij~~ f"I:l!:<fl6(1it~ l!E:rct~: ' ~~lllf~ \la: 1 " Brahma-siitra SJ.nkara-
bha~ya, I. i. 3.
Methodology ( 158 )
useless, 1 and that the purpose of the Veda is to give the knowledge of some kind of activity. 2 He does not restrict the
validity of Vedic texts to injunctive statements. According to
him the truth revealed by the s-:ripture is fundamental unity of
Being. The only harmonious and cumulative conclusion of
Upanifadic passages is the declaration of the nature of Brahman.
The words in these passages refer directly and undoubtedly to
Brahman, so it would be improper to imagine that they refer
to an altogether different thing, v1z. action. To do so is to
commit error in two ways; it is to rejec~ the Brahman which is
categorically indicated and to accept the action which is not
so stated."'
$ankaradirya pbints out that even the Mi:mi'i.Ip.sa recog
nises that there are certain passages in the Veda called Artha
vadas, which refer to already existing things. The Mimal}lsa
system interprets these passages as subordinate to some action,
since they serve no purpose of their o\vn. So Sankaricarya
asserts that the passages declaring Brahman must be considered
1 "Ofll<tFH7.1 Pti?:~l~t'f~qiif<r+ta~qhnil,l ,, Jaimini: Piirva-mimalJl;a
~iitra, I. ii. '1.
2 '"t2T fit a~?:~T'~: <Ri<rUcrw:tl{ I" Sa~ara-bha~ya on Jaimini
sutra, I. i. 1.
3 " e'i:il:{ f~ ~o:a• m-qT~ anqii~a~7.{T~(?:I ~faqr~'6t~w:t ~;r.:rmnf.I 1 ,, ~ ~ ~
Brahma-sutra Sankara-bh~ya, I. i. 4.
4 " w:t :q o~Tw:ti q~W{j ili"GH<J~qf~lifq frlfJit'<{j ~'l'<'Cil.lS"fll~?:l'l'l;rSqfo:a{CfiEtfOJT
~viT, ~a{l<'7.f~o~tfOJT~R~rn(( 1 " Brahma-sutra Sankara-bha•ya, I. ·i. 4.
.... -:---- ._..
Methodology ( 159)
equally valid as portions of Veda. Moreover as the.y serve the
great purpese of being helpful in the realisation of the summum
bonum of man's life by making him free from all pains, the
U pani~adic passages declaring Brahman need not be considered subordinate to action. So in the Advaita Vedanta statements
like ' Tattvamasi ' acquire an independent logical value.
Sankaradl.rya is prepared to concede that action may be
the purport of the Bdihmal)a portion of the Veda, but as regards
the U pani~ads he firmly asserts that their main purpose is to
declare the eternal reality viz. Brahman. 1 According to him
the teachings of the KarmakaQ.qa were intended for inferior
types of as pi rants, whereas the teachings of the U panifads or
J:M.nakal)qa were intended only for superior aspirants, who have
transcended the limits of sacrificial duties, and who have no
desire for any earthly blesl:lings or for any heavenly joy.
Karmakanda is intended for those who are still under ·the spell
of Avidya, and Jnanakfu;l4a for those that have seen the hollow
ness of the activities it commends and are striving to transcend
them.2 Thus Sankaracarya gets over the antithesis between the
]nanaka1;1qa and the Karmaka:r;~4a by assuming that they are
addressed to different classes of people. What IS considered
----·----------------------------------------------------
1 '• iiil\<il~ ~o<~T ~•11 ~~l:'-1 ~~ g; llci 'f;Jcl(CI'\i if~ ~~~l(filfa 1 '' "'
Brahma-sutra Sankara-bhf.~;a, I. i. 4
2 S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I,
p. 436.
Methodology ( 160)
de&irable and true from a lower stand-point 1s undesirable and
not altogether true from the higher.
The acceptance of such a gradation of teachings is faci
litated by Sailkaracarya's acceptance of the doctrine of the
relative authority of Pramiil}.as. Sailkaracarya does not give
equal validity to all PramaQ.as. Perception etc. which speak
of diversity are considered to be invalid when
conflict with the teaching of the revelation
they come in
that all is one.
The primary aim of all PramaQ.as is to serve empirical purposes.
Common knowledge is true only as long as the identity of
oneself with Brahman is not realised, as dreams are, until one
does not awake. In the same way the validity of all Vedic
texts is not absolute but relative. The Vedic texts which speak
of action and thus teach diversity are only for empirical purposes.
These teachings are not true m the ultimate sense. 1 The
Veda does not thereby vouch for the ultimate reality of Svarga
or anything connected with it. Only the Upani~adic statements
that teach the unity of all beings are true in the absolute sense.
Though Sailkariidi.rya accepts the doctrine of inherent self-validity
of PramaQ.as, he thus modifies it by the doctrine of their
relative authority.
Brahma-siitra Sailkara-bhr~ya, Introduction.
Methodology ( 161 )
In the opm10n of Sankar!i.carya scriptural testimony is
most important in metaphysical matters. Again and again he
reiterates that Brahman cannot be known through perception or
other means of knowledge, for the fact that Brahman is the
self of all cannot be understood except by means of Sruti passages
such as- 1 That thou art '. 1 The ultimate oneness of thing
taught in the U pani~adic texts cannot be negated by the percep-:
tual experience of men. Inferences being dependent on perception
cannot contradict the non-duality taught, in the Upani~ads. As
all Vedanta passages declare the fundamental unity of Being,
there is no proof to contradict it. Thus in metaphysical matters
such a1 the nature of Brahman Sastra supercedes all other
Pramat;tas. In this sphere perception, inference etc. may be service
able when they do not come in conflict with the Sruti texts!.
In the opinion of Sankaradirya the authority of perception
is held to be supreme in the practical world. In this sphere
even Sruti cannot supercede the facts given by perception
As 1·egards the properties of matter ordinary science is to be
accepted as authoritative.
1 " Of 'if qf~f"lf63't!<Hg;~q-~q~~sfq Slfl{I5JfG.f<llil~cci ~&lOT:, 1 a;;Cfqfu ' ~fa
t1ll~'ll11C{t'l ~l~il<'a'tano:t<in~'lill"lc<ll~ I" Brahma-sutra Sankara-bha~ya, I. i. 4.
2 " 0{ 'iHif~~l~T~Tfifq ~1.11~1.1 ~'{ Sllfllli i'&If~I6T'lli( I fiist ~t~T~IiTSOI-"' "' ""
~CIT~~'-"q 'l't\el1Cifil~ S{qyoi', Sl~l1CITC1610{t<ilil 1!_qq~fqlifl:{i:C{J'i"'f ~~lll"lt~ 1 "
Brahma-sutra Sankara-bha~ya, I. i. 2.
Methodology ( 162)
As all the Pramii;las including the Veda are only empiri
cally true, when the Sastra speaks of the fundamental unity
of Being, we have to accept that a false means may lead to
a true end. Sankaracarya accepts even this untenable position
and points out many instances in life where an unreal thing
indicates the real. This position does not go against his central
doctrine, because all Pramai;las including the Sastra ultimately
vanish at the realisa.tion of the real nature of At man. 1
As Sankaracarya believes that only Srutis can reveal
super-sensuous matters, 2 he does not give absolute validity to
Sm:rtis. They are considered valid in so far as they confirm
to the Sruti. Even though composed by revered sages, Srn:rtis
cannot attain authoritative status, if their statements are not
based on Sruti texts. 3 As regards the question, which of the
conflicting Srn:rtis should be accepted and which should be
rejected, Sankaracarya follows the view of J aimini. He accepts
Brahma-siitra Eankara-bha~ya, I. i. 4.
Also- " ~tHii'Slt?.I?.~T ?.~acQ~OJc~~ ifi~a: 1
w&fifi<i ~~( 11'1T'li' ~<IRiff.lll?.~T\l. II "
bha~ya, I. i. 4.
Brahrna-siitra Sankara-
· 2 " -. =<mfiFI~<~'fi~~~~;a'tor ~fk~qw~a ~a ~ifq ~hn<~f?.~si f.rtl:i!ijJ
~<~l<l. 1 ,, Brahma-siitra San~{ara-bha~ya, II. i. 1.
3 " m?.~e ~fa:, sn'llo~ src~iftt'Sc<IJ<l. 1 ~;rr-i ~~fa: sn~Jro4 Slfa ~nct~to~l<l. 1 "
Brahma-siitra Sankara-bha~ya, I. iii. 28.
Methodology ( 163)
the Sm:rti which is harmonious in teaching with the Sruti, and he
rejects that which comes in conflict with it. 1
In discussing the theory of the eternal nature of words,
Sankaradtrya accepts that the words denote the class and not
the individual. 2 The relation between the words and the classes
is eternal, since the classes are eternal. The individuals have
origin and destruction and not the classes. a
Though Sankaracarya accepts the concept of Jati, later
Advaitins like Citsukha do not accept it. Citsukha refutes the
notion of class-concept on the ground that it cannot be proved
either by perception or by inference. Moreover it 1s difficult to
prove how it can be related with the individuals.
Sankaracarya generally accepts the various rules . of
intervretation evolved by the Purva-mimaiJlsa system; and he
shows considerable skill m their application to U pani~1dic
statements without making them subservient to ritual. A fe\v
1 '' fcft~fa~R~T :q ~ila~ctlllCI'l\~ifiijoliS~a~qf\~SO:lla\qf((Gilit :q ~(ll;y~ . .nftull: ' ~ ~
~all: Sl'llatilct~~T ~au: 1 '' Brahma-sutra Sankara· bhafya, I I. i. 1. ' ~
2 " arr~fqf~ll:~ {l~ctt ~if<''<i'r ct o~ftfifl1: 1 '' :grahma-sutra Sankara-
bha~ya, I. iii. 28. 3 '' O<lf~q(q~mctJ~qCGjJfi<lt"'li fit(Git<I'F« il<llf<::{l•~lil ififKqfi(UcJT ~'l\~ij I 'I
~ ~
Brahma-l:liitra Sankara-bha~ya, I. iii. 28.
Methodology ( 164)
cases may be cited here as typical illustrations. In Sutra
II I. iii. 44, he refers to the J aimini·sfitra- ~fttf~~l'fqlif1.1SI'ii~Ui~6'11-"" "'
~'-ITo:tf 6~~ qro::rtl~1.1~Plf1iSI~ 1, 1 and proves that the indicatory
marks ( Linga) in the Vedic texts quoted by him are of greater
force than the leading subject matter { Prakaral).a ) of the portion
where they occur. In Brahma-sfitra III. iii. 25, he quotes the
same Jaimini-sfitra and proves that Mantras which, either by
indicatory mark ( Liilga ) or syntactical relation ( Vakya ) or
some other means vf proof, are shown to be subordinate to
certain sacrificial actions, cannot, because they occur in the
Upani~ads also, be connected with the Vidyas on the ground of
mere proximity ( Sannidhi ). Proximity as a means of proof
regarding the connection of subordinate matters with the principal
matter is weaker than direct enunciation ( Sruti ). 2
Sailkaracarya refers to the law of nomenclature discussed
in the Purva-mimarpsa and points out that in the meditation
advised by the Vedanta it is not applicable. Following Badarayal}a
he asserts that the cognitions intimated by all the Vedanta
texts are identical, on account of the non-difference of injunction
and so on. 3
1 J aimini : Purva-mimarpsa-sfitra, I I I. iii. 13.
2 " ~~') far 6f<t~: ~c1.1T~~ll 'tll~ Sl~ a~ 1 " Brahma-sfitra ~ ~ ~ ~
Sankara-bha~ya, III. iii. 25.
3 " i\ s ;:IHI'~tm;'!l) it~~rcrr~ne1~ij S(qq ~<I 'iilq ' ~ ~T~T ~liT~R;rr
f~'CJT'lc~' ~liT~~ qf~'t!T: 1 '' Brahma-sfitra Sankara-bhafya, II I. iii. 1.
M ethodolegy
According to the system of Ramanuja
is defined as the instrument which produces
( J 65 )
Sabda-pramat;ta
the knowledge
obtained from sentences not uttered by an untrustworthy person
or that which is exempt from sense-errors ( Karat;ta-do~a ) and
contraries ( Badhaka·pratyaya ).1 It is classified into two
divisions, viz~ Paurufeya and Apauru~eya,
All the texts which depend upon the free will of man
are classed as Pauruf~ya and their authority depends on their
being trustworthy.
Amongst the scriptures the authority of the Veda stands
unquestioned. The Vedas are considered to be eternal. At
every world-epoch Isvara only gives utterance to them. At the
outset of a creation God evolves out of his consciousness what
past orders of the Vedas have lain there and teaches them to
Caturmukha. This assures the eternality and the super-human
origin of the Vedas and thus there is absence of errors and
contraries.
The Smrtis, the, epics and the Purat;tas are considered
to be authoritative, since they expound the ideas contained in
the Vedas. Paficaratra Agamas also are accepted as valid since
1 Srinivasa: Yatindramata-dipika, III.
----------- ..._,...------- ---- -
Methodology ( 166)
they owe their origin to the divine Vasudeva. 1 Thus Ramanuja
reckons not only the Veda as revealed but also the Paiicaratra
Agama, regarding the whole of it as eventually going back to
a Vedic or some equally untainted source. Thus he places the
Paiicaratm Agamas on the same footing as the Vedas.
In this respect the view of Ramanujadi.rya greatly differs
from that of Sankaradi.rya. In the last Adhikara~a of . Brahma
sutra II. ii, Sankaradi.rya remarks that the Bhagavata doctrine
deserves only partial acceptance, in so far as it holds that Isvara
is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe.
He, however, asserts that the doctrine cannot be accepted entirely
owing to the numerous contradictions in it and owing to its
containing many passages contradictory to the Vedas. 2 But
Ramanuja strongly attacks this position. He defends the
authority of the Paiicara~ra Agama by saying that it is the essence
of the Vedas and it explains more easily their hidden purport. 3
He quotes many texts to support his view that the Lord himself,
1 " <ijijl ~~Fo~: lfUlij~l!oT ~H.T~IIT: ~CI~~CI q3-1'i'U";£~~ 'l·~~~~~ ~fa,
ot~CI~cra~cri~~~f~·.;nf~ t~'Q?1~fa =<~ af~JJ~o\o<'Simlll;:li ~ ~~pq~G;~Pj[f~ij ~if~il.l ''
Ramanuja : Sri-bhal;lya, II. ii. 42.
2 " fctSifo6il:l~=<J(~sm~ iisfctocr ~q~+~ij ........ ~~fCJSifije.'if~=<I il<lfa 1 "
Brahma-sfitra Sankara bha~ya, l I. ii. 45.
3 '' ~~ SJi'~~l:6111l'l~i:l~fil-'211~qft.fJJo~T~IOJ.. fcp•~qCJ1~11?1~crTOJ,. ~ito'«l~
§\~~\<lrn~i3iJCJ'ifT~ ij~q~l'lltll!TOI~lf'if qSt{\1";£~1~ ~q~~q f~\f+~ifi~,fu f~~CIV'( I "
Ramanuja : Sr1-bha~ya, II. ii. 4 ~-
... -.. --.,
Methodology ( 167)
being compassionate to the devotees, has summarised the U pa
ni~ads in the form of Pailcaratra Agamas.1 He winds up the
Adhikara:r;ta with a long ~iscussion on the authoritativeness of
the Bhagavata doctrine, and argues that it is strongly recommended
in the Mahabharata by Vyasa himself, the author of the Siitras.
He remarks that the statement that Sa:r;t<}ilya, not finding any
satisfaction in the Sruti and Smrti, at last found it m this
doctrine is opposed in no way to the latter, 2 on the othEr
hand it means a high eulogy of them.
It is very difficult to decide who of the two Bha~yakaras
has interpreted the Sutra f<l"ijT;nfc=:~~ ~r~qf([~'<l: 1 3 correctly; and
consequently it is also difficult to decide whether the Adhikara:r;ta
is only a refutation of the Bhagavata doctrine or whether it
aims at establishing it. Dr. Thibaut prefers Ramanuja's inter-
1 '' ~~"'~·~ ?.i~T ~R ~~~ lll!CI'T"l,. ~f~: I
~:q;Ff<fill:f?1T fer~ ~fs:q~q ?.i'fl§'"'ll.. II ""
Also- l.~ 'f{lqf;jet~ "'H!~~'f~([1J.. I
61~·~'li?1Tfi~([Jra-. qs:q~J?~FnnfiG:all.. 11 '' ~ ~
Ramanuj~ : Sri-bha~ya, II. ii. 42.
2 " 6l'!~L~ ~~~ ~~liltqf;j60T -. ~·~fij cr"t;nif:~fcf~ ei?li!_- l.f6, ~~?1-
wn~..lle~~<~:q6T'f-.T<fif~ae~ q~q_ot"'?.il?.i<fi~TqT;jt 'l:;:mT•Ifcr~ fl.l1([: 1 ''
Ramanuja : Sii-bhi.i~ya, I I. ii. 42.
3 Brahma-siitra Sailkara-bhafya, II. ii. 44, & Sri-bhafya,
II. u. 41.
Methodology ( 168)
pretation of the Adhikara:Q.a. 1 Dr. Belvalkar, however, thinks
that Ramanuja's explanation lacks conviction. 2 Dr. Ghate also
holds the view that the opinion of Thibaut is not acceptable.ll
According to the system of Ramanuja, the authority of
the Srn:rtis is considered to be dependent on the Vedas. Sm:rtis
only help to clarify the purport of the U pani~adic sentences.
The help of Sm:rtis is necessary for those who are not so
well-versed in the Vedic lore. But only those Sm:rtis which
do not contradict the Vedic doctrine are to be accepted as
authoritative, while those which go against the purport of the
Vedas are to be disregarded. 4 The authority of the Purar;tas
and epics is also dependent on Srutis in a similar way. It may
be noted that the doctrine of Ramanuja draws upon the
Pural)as and Paficaratra Agamas for support to a very large
extent.
1 G. Thibaut : The Vedanta Siitras with the commentary
by Sankaracarya, Introduction, p. Iii.
2 Belvalkar : Brahmasiitras of Badaraya:Q.a with the
comment of Sankatadl.rya, Ch. II Q. ii Not~s, p. 205.
3 G hate : The Vedanta, p. 89.
4 " <I~fq ~O!'l~CJN?.Il;:r(iJRtiifili'ijSit?.l f5Tf~Cii~~HSHI1UJ6il1!<FH~ fifl1Cil~SI faqR~-"\ .... ....
quCJl~ a~t1~~~11.1T<:q~ar~t srfijq~urt ij!l;q~~urifttf~all., ijttrsfq ij~tti:!~.nf\OJ1"1TifTRoif·
SI«rraRt il~ift"lf ~a'l~t a?t;q~~OJT<I Si<i~T"!Tif~CJ<pretci ~ sre1~~~~fa ~fa~~~~t Clifq~~qfa~tt~OJ'l?.il 1 " Ramanuja : Sri-bha~ya, II. i. 1.
Methodology ( 169)
In the opinion of Ramanuja, the Veda is the only
authority for the knowledge of super-sensuous matters and
Brahman can be known only through it, 1 Its veracity .lies in
a region beyond that which can be actually observed or uP.der
stood by finite intelligence. Scripture is our only source
regarding super-sensuous matters, though reason may be employed
in its support.
In the system of Ramanuja there is no necessity of
considering the relative authority of different Pramar;ns, since
valid PramaQ.as cannot contradict each other. The perception
of· diversity in the world ·is valid, so also 1s the scriptural
testimony of the unity of Atman and Brahman. These two
PramaQ.as are only to be reconci:ed by considering the diversity
as the embodiment of the Lord. This view is supported by the
Sruti text of the Antarya:ni Bra~ma:t;J.a, where the world is
spoken of as the body of God. 2 Here the testimony of the
Vedic text must prevail; it cannot be set aside by ordinary
perception.
1 " JmO'JT~~-=arn1f.:it~t~C'f SH~~~~!:(illllflf~'-la~T, 'llltiJf: ~T~Cfi!:['ITO'J~crTa, l "
Ramanuja: Sri-bha~ya, I. i. 3.
Also:- " iii' ~O'J: Il'IIO'Jtra~Ts:r~raat ~'-Ita', (I~ <im WI ~•nfq Il'ITOJWJ o-q:q;q 1 '' ... Ramanuja: Vedanta-dipa, III. ii. 22.
2 Abhyankar :
duction, p. 65-56.
Sarvadauhna-sailgraha, Sanskrit intra-
Methodology ( 170)
As there is no mutual antagonism between any two
Pramfi.JJ.as, scriptural testimony cannot be said to be superior in
Talidity to perceptual experience. Therefore scriptures are to
be interpreted in such a way that they do not come in conflict
with the testimony of perceptual knowledge. So the perception
of the reality of the outside world cannot be set aside by the
statements of the scriptural texts which speak of its falsity.
Those texts are to be interpreted so as to accord with valid
perception. Thus according to the Ramanuja system all PramaQ.as
are absolutely valid upto ~he end.
Sailkaradirya's view, that even scriptures are false in the
ultimate ,sense and there is possibility of attaining knowledge by
false means, is not subscribed by the followers of Ramanuja.
It is asserted that falsehood can never lead to truth. Only
from one right knowledge we can come to another.
In the opmwn of Ramanuja all words ultimately denote
God.l. They need not, on that account, be considered as
synonymous, since the outward form of the denoted object is
Sarvadarsana-sailgraha,
P• 104. Also- '' -.:t Sl e<Jf~qift: q~"f~~~ f;(~f'i~SI~o~<f q~•ic(ffi\
a~SI<m:: q~'IS¥1: e11ro ~-~~?;J •fij PcriN: 1 '' Ramanuja : Sri-bhi\fya,
I. i. I, p. 117.
Methodology ( 171 )
diverse, while the internal self of all is the Lord. In explaining
the Vedic text concerning the creation of the name and form
Ramanuja has explained his doctrine in detail.
The principle that every word eventual!y signifies God
enunciated by Rarnanuja helps us to understand- the meaning
of the Upani~adic statement "That thou art 1' according to the
Visi~tadvaita system. Here the word 1 that 1 finally denotes God
having the entire world as his body; and 1 thou 1 denotes God
having the individual soul as his body. Thus the whole state
ment declares the identity of the embodied God in both.
As regards the antithesis between the Karmakat;tga and
the Jiinnakat;tga, the view of Ramanujacarya is different from
that of Sankaracarya. He does not consider that they are
really antithetical, and maintains that the two portions of the
Veda together form a single teaching intended for the same
class of persons • .~ The scripturul injunctions are but commands
of God. The scripturLs only show what actions would be!
pleasing to God and what are against his command. The
object of scriptural sacrifices is the worship of God and all
the different deities that are worshipped in these &;acrifices are
1 '' ttiij~~f:O"faH'(~~<ltJ'!~h t" Wimanuja: Sri-bha~ya 1 I. i. I, p.5.
Also-" og;;:;f ~I{ :q t'lT~IJ{~~~'~'l'fT~f~tll~f~f•'fiCfiqfll: q~q~~"'TU'l"'l~~:
q~q!l~" Hn~ur iillll~ tft~ 'l~If<=:"'IT f<~fcrf~.~~flfa ~1~ur llfaqiva 1 I'
Karnanuja: S.i-bha~ya, I I I. iv. 26.
M~thodology ( 172)
but different names of God himself.l Thus the PiirvakaQ.ga
dwells upon the modes of worshipping God; and the Uttaraklii)IJa
upon the nature of God. Ramanuja thus co-ordinates the two
sections of Veda ry considering them to be complementary.
As Ramanuja gives equal importance to the Piirvakii.Q.ga
and the JfianakaQ.ga, his view is different from the Advaita view
as well as the Mima~p.sa view. Like the Mima~p.sa he does not
believe that the ultimate purport of Veda is only action. He con
sider& that the rule that the meaning of words is only to denote
action is not binding 2 Accordingly the doctrine that the Vedanta
aignifies the highest Brahman as the purport of the Jiiiina-kaQ.cJ.a
stands uncontradicted.
The bearing of the doctrine of the co-ordination of the
JMna-kaQ.ga and the KarmakaQ.ga is very great on the practical
discipline of the Ramanuja school. Mere. understanding of the
words of the scriptures is not considered sufficient. Actions that are
taught in the Vedas are to be performed, not for obtaining respective
fruits but for securing the grace of God. By it one can attain
emancipation. Man's actions cannot guarantee anything to
~~·;m1iilm~-!Qfa q:j~qa ~l~: ~~Sf srft:lqrG:f~~lla 1 " 1\.amanuja: Sri-bhaf;a, I.i.l,
p. 128 .,;f 2 "CliTliT~ -g;~ o~(qf6fda f""("'liiT fo:{~if"'Cf;J: 1 " Ra.r.a 'uja: Sri-bha~ya,
I. i. 1, p. 124.
~\1 e: hodology ( 173 )
him n:erely ac: the fruit of those actions, but good or bad
frui!s are reaped in accordance with the pleasure or displeasure
of God. By good actions and devotion there is an ultimate
expansion of one's intellect and finally in meditation bearing
the character of devotion a man has an intuition of reality. 1
Since the obje::t intuited is not directly presented, the nature
of Sak~atUi.ra. is said to be indirect in character; yet, so far as
its immediacy and clearness go, it is not inferior to perceptual
knowledge. This Sak~tkara is the means of emancipation and
it is acquired through the grace of God. 2 Scriptural texts
refer to the attainment of such Sak~tkara on the part of the
Eages Yam<Jdeva and others, who saw the one Brahman with
th~ material and immaterial objects for its distinguishing modes.'
Madhvacarya refers to the Sabda-prama1,1a only as is
employed in philosophical matters. He divides it into two kinds, viz.
valid and invalid. The valid verbal t(stimony consists of scriptures,
--which are free from defects. These scriptures are again divided
as Apauru~eya, or those which are not the compositions of
1 " :a:Jfq ::q ~~N~ ~"?1<fmOT~ +Ififa~lflq~ fWI~"?.iRirJ -g:ctr~lf ~~~lt'fiH:, WI1~€lfa
sqfa~qft\~?1lil<tfl~lla 1 " Riimanuja : Sri- bha~ya, II I. ii. 23. "- c:.
2 " ~;j ::q <tl'f?.il~.,..l~~frQ~ll_ci \<ITo:IT'tJRfi~Tf~~<tl•~ f<t~~Qlmfll~ffiqil-
~~~fij~q f.l\Rt~?.if~?1ill{~~~~l~?.iTfa~?.ii!TSI?.i10TT~<tijlfJOi ~~~'if;jf;JC~'Qiil'~lf+I: 1{..~<4 I'' c:. _.
Ramanuja: Sri-bh~ya, III. iv. 26. 3 " lfo: ~~~~~a~na<t~qTOTi '-llil'~<fR'\;rt ~~if Sl<fil~nf~1fC!_ ~;riG:tf~~~q-
Cf"tQt~taff~qqs"ff<tflil2aT?.it ~fq i'~~urt~T~~~?.j Slffiifij I " Ramanuja: Sri· bha?ya, ~ ....
II I. ii. 24.
Mcthocology ( 17-4 )
persons, and Pauru~ !ya or those which are the compositions
of persons. All these scriptl'l·res are considered to be valid and
irrchaded under the name Agama or Sastra. The Apauru~eya scripture has absolute validity, and is considered to be infallible.
The Pauru~eya scripture may be fallible.
In the Apauru~eya Sastra, Madhva includes all the Vedic
literature consisting of the four Vedas, the Brahma:r;tas and the
Upani~ads. In the Pauru~;ya Sastra he includes Mahabharata,
Ramaya:r;ta and the Paficaratra Agamas. Whatever scriptures are
harmoneous In purport to these are considered authoritative,
while others are not so. 1
l\Iadhvacarya considers that the purport of the Veda
and that of the Pancaratra Agamas is identical and so they
are authoritative. 2 In his v1ew about scriptural testimony
Madhva, like Ramanuja, shows greater leaning towards Agamas
and PuraQ.as than Sankara do,::s.
1 " ~~~~: ~Tilltt<ri :q llH([ qJS'tfU'S{ifiil I ~ ~
"~(Tm~oi ~q ~Rilyqi~f'il'Cft~a 11 ... ~"''tf~ili~~iffi(~ Q'i't{ ~t~ s:r::ttma~ 1
aTmY<i) ~t"'t~~tatir ~q flit~ ~qtq aa u " ~
Brahma-Sfltra Madhva-bha~ya, I. i. 3.
Also:- Sarvadarsana-sangraha, p. 274.
2 " ~~'tS'f\r-f<IT~'i~tfl1tnilur qscr(T?f(~q !:llij'JVlJil~'l 1 " Brahma-sfttra "" "\
Madhva- bha~ya, I. i. 3·.
Methodology · l ~r::
I~ .
Like other Bhafyakaras, Madhvacarya believes that
PramaQas hke perception and inference are not helpful m
knowing the nature of reality. We have to depend on scriptures
in general and the Vedas in particular for the true !mowledge
of Brahman.
Madhvadi.:-ya gives equal importance to all the parts
of Veda and considers that the hymns and the Brahma"Qas are
as useful and valid as the Upani~ads. He does not consider
that there is any antithesis between the KarmakaQ4a and the
JfianakaQ4a.
Invalid verbal testimony as is found in pseudo-scriptures
( Agamabhasa) consists of defects and discrepancies. These
defects are of many kinds. Not being capable to denote the
intended meaning, denoting it in the wrong way, repeating
what is already obvious, not being directed to a purpo~e,
being directed to an undesirable purpose, directing impossible
means, directing more difficult means when easier ones are
available are some of the defects of verbal testimony which make it invalid.
Following Badarayat;la, Nimbarkacarya also asserts that
the nature of Brahman can be expressed only by a scriptural
text, 1 as the signifying powers of such text directly originate
1 11 f;;mT~<i ~il ~l~SiillllfCli~ illHISI'ITUf'fi'l_ , ~'l(ij~d\;ft 6T~q(q~~T eft
a~CI ~1ffil 1 " Brahma-sutra Nimbarka-bha~ya, I. i. 4. "\
_ _j
Methodology ( 176)
from God. Perception ~nd inference cannot be employed in
super-sensuous matters.
In scriptures we hear of dualistic and monistic texts.
The only way in which the claims of both these types of texts
can be reconciled is by coming to a position of. comr r )mis~ that Brahman is at once different from and identical with the
world of spirit and matter. The scriptural texts that speak of
duality refer to the duality that subsists between ultimate sub
stance, the Brahman, which alone has independent existence,
and souls and matter which have only a dependent existence.
The scriptural texts that deny duality refer to the ultimate
entity \vhich has independent existence and which forms the
common ground and basis of all kinds of existence. The texts
that refer to Brahman by negations signify how it is different
from all other things which are limited by material conditions.t
Nimbarka does not accept the Mimfi.~p.sa view that the
purport of Veda consists in enjoining the performance of the
Vedic duty. According to Nimbarka, the goal of the performance
of all duties is the attainment of emancipation. The result
of all deeds ultimately produces a desire for knowing Brahman
and through it produces the fitness for the attainment of eman
cipation. The obligatory duties are helpful in purifying the
1 S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III,
p. 431.
Methodology ( 177)
,mind and in producing a desire for true knowledge; and
voluntary deeds are subservient to Brahman by producing a
part of the bliss of the unity of Brahman or by producing
superhuman bodies for the performer making him more fit for
emancipation. Thus Nimbarkadi.rya s"C~ordinates the Purvakii."Q.ga
to the Joanakanga. 2
According to the system the doctrine of Bhedl.bheda
is the fundamental doctrine. Nimbarka interprets the famous
sentence " Tattvamasi" in the light of this doctrine. According
to him the word " Tat " signifies the eternal omnipresent
Brahman, and "Tvam" refers to the individual soul whose existence
d~pends on Brahman, and "Asi'~ bring out the relation between the
two which is one of difference compatible with non-difference.
Nimbarka accepts the necessity of Smrtis for the eluci
dation of Srutis, but according to him the authority of Smrtis is
is dependent on Vedic texts. Only those Smrtis which are not
contradictory to the V cdas are considered authoritative, the rest
are invalid. Srinivasa quotes from Manu and points out that all
1 " t.l~~~f~<ii~~~"j :q1f'if<ii1Re~t~~~6~1~00 JlGtfiilil~~~f~{Ciilfu~ "'
.-ll~quurt ~~q~ElW~Tf.l "l_atf.f 'IPil!qifrq.:~fa ~lil ~lwt~~~fq JI&IWC::~~~~~
~ rnr qv~~n;ii~: ' fli•'f ifil~t ~i)l&lff.I~~~~·uf~uq'R\Of~~~ ·~~u~ '\ ..
•'~"iif'1: 1" Srbivasa: Vedanta-kau&tubha on Niml.arkabhafya, I. i. 4.
Methodology ( 178)
heterdox Srrq:tis should be left out of consideration since they mis
guide the people. 1
Vallabhad.rya also asserts that the Sastra is the fina]
authority in metaphysical matters. The nature of Brahman as
is described in the Veda must be accepted as it is, since it is
known only from that source. • In the system of Vallabhacarya
the authority of scriptures stands supreme. Other PramaQ.as
are useful only if they do not come in conflict with the Sruti
texts. So far as they are in consonance with the Sruti their
authority is accepted.
Vallabhacarya does not accept the allegorical method
of interpreting Vedic texts. He believes in the literal inter
pretation of Veda. He asserts that every letter of Veda is to
be accepted as significant, otherwise it would result in the
non-belief in the authenticity of the scripture as a whole.
Even though the Mima:rp.sakas themselves accept the meta
phorical interpretation of such portions of Veda as Arthavadas,
Vallabhacarya refuses to subscribe to their view.
1 '' ij'ITSS~ ~qr-:~: I ~·
~T ~mT: ~~) ~1~ ~T~t~ ~~!~:I .. .. at: ~.n ~'lfiWt: it~~ a~'OT f~ m: ~~~m: II ''
Srinivasa: Vedanta-kaustubha, II. i. 1.
2 "Ill H ~ftqf\;rll~ ~1~~ ~ stfijqTVa al~\l~~~cn;qtq 1" Valla bha: c. ..
A:Qu-bh~ya, I. i. 19,
Methodology ( 179)
Amongst the authoritative scriptures Va11abhadi.rya in
cludes Bhagavata also. In this system instead of Prasthanatrayi,
there is Prasthana-catu,taya, viz. Veda, Bhagavadgita, Bada
raya:t;lasiitra, and Srimadbhagavata. Each subsequent Prasthii.na
removes the doubt in the pr~:.-vious one and thus all of them
together manifest the true doctrine. 1
As Veda is authoritative in all its parts the reconci
liation of apparently contradictory texts is an important
problem for Vallabhacarya. He believes that the whole of
Veda consisting of the two sections, Piirvakil}.ga, and Uttara
k~ga, discusses only one topic, and it is the topic of God.
On this ground it must be considered that the two systems
of Jaimini and BadarayaJ;ta constitute one Sastra. In this
re'3pect, like Ramii.nuja, Vallabha follows the theory of Vrtti-
kara. He shows the two MimaJP.sii.s as forming one science
on the ground that both of them treat of one topic, VlZ.
God and have the sole purpose of giving liberation to
mankind.
According to Vallabhacarya, God possesses innumerable
divine qualities of which Kriyll and Jfiana are prominent. The
Piirvakii.J;tga describes God in the form of Kriya or Yajfia,
1 "~: ~"'fCfN~ ~RR{5{lfUr ~if ft I c.
elllf'1lll'ill eliRI~ !l'llui <r~·~t~~ II ~( ~~~;i q~ffi<t~ I" Tattvadipa-nibandha, I. 7
I
Methodology ( 180)
while the Uttarakii.J;lga describes him in the form of Jiiana,
known as Brahman. The Piirvak3J;tga thus represents one
aspect of God, while the U ttarak3J;tga represents another
aspect, and consequently the two K3J;tgas maintain their in
dependence. This justifies the theory that the Piirva-mima~p.sa
and the Uttara-mimaip.sa are two independent branches of one
and the same science. Thus Vallabhadi.rya established the
harmony between action and knowledge. In this respect he
greatly differs from the Mimamsakas and the Advaitins of the
Sal').kara school.
In order to support his theory about the harmony
of Karman and Jiiana, Vallabhacarya adduces an important
argument by referring to the fact that Jaimini was a disciple
of Badarayal').a. 1 He considers that it is not possible for the
pupil to teach a doctrine that comes into conflict with the
theory of the teacher.
By the reconciliation of the Karmamarga and Jiianamarga naturally a greater stress comes to be laid upon sacrificial action. As a staunch follower of the Vedic path this is quite natural in the case df Vallabhacarya. In this connection it may be noted that he has been described by
his son as Karma-marga-pravartaka. 2 Vallabhacarya believes
1 ~~~~ilc;r cs~re~ ur~eRT: ~ffiCilltt, t" AI.lu-bh:ifya, I. i. 3. 2 G."' H. Bhatt : Journal of the Oriental Institute, I. iv. 353.
Methodology
that the performance of sacrifices is
God, who gives the reward according
of the performer. If the performer of
( 181 )
calculated to please
to the qualifications
the sacrifice happens
to possess the knowledge of Brahman, God appears in person
and gives him gradual liberation. In the absence of know
ledge, the God in the form of five sacrifices gives the
happiness of soul or the world of heaven. Vallabha.cii.rya
thus accepts the old theory of action cum knowledge in •
the path of Maryada, which is restricted
follow the ordinary orthodox method in
1iberation.1
to those who
their pursuit of
There ts, however, another path which transcend•
all limitations. This path is called Pu~~imarga. In it one
has to rely completely upon God's grace for liberation.
If a person qualifies himself for the grace of God through most intense love and devotion, the God may choose to
show his grace to the man, and then he gives him libera
tion immediately :1 By this theory of the two paths, viz.
Maryada-marga and Pu.~irnarga, VaJlabhacarya comes in pos
session of the spiritual legacy which reconciles action,
knowledge and devotion.
1 "iliQ~UiT: fsti11Tm~~')~q~~~Cfq'l(( ~~~mit f"Ucl: I" Vallabha
dirya At;lu-bha~ya., I. i. 2.
2 ccfctftaeT'loi fcl~ct ~~ S~i!fll"il~k\T t'' At;1u- bha~ya, IV. ii. 7.
Also- 11Sf'~illt11s~~iii6T\1.l: Sl'llUiill'lif~:vnaUJ: 1" Aq u-bh~ya, IV. iv. 9.
Methodo[ogy ( J82 I
The theory of Vallabhadi.rya lays more stress on
the Sruti pas&ages which describe Brahman as possessed of
different attributes, since he believes that God possesselii
qualities. The nature of God can be summarised by his
attribute Saccidananda. The Highest, when viewed from ih
aspect of Sat, and when associated with action only, is
Yajfiapurufa, who can be propitiated by actions as stated
in the Brahmal)as. When the Highest is viewed from its
aspect of knowledge ( Cit ) and when associated with wisdom,
it is Brahman, and can be approached through Jfiina as
stated in the Upani~ads. The Highest, when viewed from its
aspect of bliss ( Ananda ), IS KffJ;la, the Supreme, and
he has to be worshipped according to the principles of
GWi. and Bhagavata.
Vallabhacarya is faced not only with the difficulty
of reconciling the contradictory Vedic passages rcfering to Karman and Jiiana respectively, but also with the difficulty
of reconciling the contradictory passages which speak of
Brahman as Sagul)a'. and Nirgul)a respectively. He asserts
that the Sruti passages which declare that the highest has
no qualities mean merely that he has not the ordinary
qualities. He believes that his main doctrine, that Brahman possesses extraordinary qualities and is such that in its nature even contradictory qualities are reconciled, stands unrefuted. 1
1 "a~ SJ~~;no:n~<it ~rn~ftl~t q) q UT<Iill.:~;aflllltJfta-vr itfa o:ns<iv.-"""'' ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~fa fo:t""'<i<i: 1" Al,lu-bha~ya, III. ii. 24. Also-"a~li9 faSI~<ii: ~~f.Rii:oq'li"l<i~~ij fliSHfla.\ fq-·(.N 1" AJ;lu-bha~ya, III.ii.21. ...
"'
Methodology ( 183 )
The importance of Sabda PramaJ.la in Indian philoso
phy, and especially in the Vedanta system, does not deserve
to be minimised. It is often argued by critics that the
growth of Indian philosophical thought was stultified by the
limitations set on it by an undue reverence for the authority
of scriptures. Whether this objection is based on plausible
reasons becomes only a debatable point, when we see that
the great Acaryas of the Vedanta system, v1z. Sankaracarya
and others, upheld the authority of scriptures and yet
opened up astoundingly new avenues of thought. Here I
only intend to make out that the acceptance of Sabda
Pramava in the way of the Acharyas serves an important
purpose in philosophical method. In admitting Sabda as a
full-fledged means of knowledge, the Vedanta recognises
the value of intuitive thought. In doing this it also recog
nises the fact that philosophical thought has a structure
of its own, and in its changes it obeys the laws of that
structure. 1
where
leads
In the realm of
it is suspected
us quite beyond
metaphysics, we arrive at a stage
that the chain of our arguments
the reach of our faculties. There
we have no reason to trust our common methods of· argu
ment, or to think that our usual analogies or probabilities
have any authority. Our line is too short to fathom such .
1 Collingwood : An essay on philosophical method, p. 224.
Methodol.ogy ( 184 )
immense abysses. 1 At such a stage the right understanding
of the recorded intuitive experiences of an uninterrupted
tradition of mystics is the only recourse. The importance
of Sabda Pram~a must be viewed in this light.
Thus the Acaryas seem to be on the right path,
when they view the truths recorded m the Vedas as
authoritative, To them there. truths are the products of
spiritual intuition on the part of ~~is, the seers who
were able to discern the eternal truths by raising their
life spirit to the plane of universal spirit. Their value is
acquired from their adequacy to experience. 2 When the
Vedas are regarded as the highest authority, all that is
meant is that the most exacting of all authorities is the
authority of fact&. 3
1 Collingwood : An essay on philosophical method, p, 223.
( Hume's remark quoted by Collingwood).
2 S. Radhakrishnan : An Idealist View of life, p. 90.
3 Cf. Brahma·siitra Bhafyakaras interpreting the word
Pratyak~a in the Sutras as denoting Vedic texts.