2021.1014 flying lessons

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FLYING LESSONS for October 14, 2021

FLYING LESSONS uses recent mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances. In almost all cases design characteristics of a specific airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents—but knowing how your airplane’s systems respond can make the difference in your success as the scenario unfolds. So apply these FLYING LESSONS to the specific airplane you fly. Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers’ data and recommendations taking precedence. You are pilot in command, and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make.

FLYING LESSONS is an independent product of MASTERY FLIGHT TRAINING, INC. www.mastery-flight-training.com

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This week’s LESSONS: Special Operations The FAA’s preliminary report states the very basic facts:

The experimental Glastar was the subject of an ALNOT [Alert Notice, instigated by Air Traffic Control when an aircraft is overdue or otherwise presumed lost] and crashed under unknown circumstances, near Waukesha, Wisconsin. The pilot and passenger perished and the two-seat experimental aircraft was destroyed.

An industry website adds that the airplane only made it a few miles from the airport before crashing. It also includes links to news accounts that provide even more details. The pilot and his passenger were departing Milwaukee’s Timmerman Airport (KMWC) en route to Salina, Kansas (KSLN), about 500 nautical miles to the southwest. A GPS-direct flight from KMWC to KSLN passes through the Waukesha airport (KEUS) Class D airspace. See: https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/268495 https://patch.com/wisconsin/waukesha/small-plane-down-waukesha-neighborhood-report

FLYING LESSONS reader Robert “Captain Bob” Katz prepared and sent me a copy of the ATC recording of this flight, edited to shorten its duration. The recording (which like most voice recordings of accident flights) was hard to listen to, but it also provides these additional facts:

• The pilot requested and was granted a Special VFR clearance to depart Timmerman airport.

• The airplane departed runway 22R, more or less directly on course for Salina and pointed directly toward the Waukesha airport.

• The KMWC controller provided the pilot a frequency to contact Milwaukee Approach after takeoff. When handed off, the pilot sounded confident and quite cheerful.


• Initial contact with Departure sounded equally upbeat, but after radar identification, when the controller asked the pilot to confirm his aircraft type and destination the pilot appeared either to not hear or not understand. Instead, the pilot responded “Go ahead.” The controller attempted several times to get the information.

• The controller then directed the pilot to remain clear of the KEUS Class D airspace. The pilot responded, “Could you give me a heading, please?”…in a higher pitched, excited or nervous tone. The pilot’s voice continued this higher pitch, even cracking, when he finally provided the aircraft type and destination.

• The controller gave the pilot a heading of 180 degrees; when he asked the pilot to provide his on-course heading the pilot gave only part of the heading, then asked the controller to “hang on”—in an even more excited tone.

• The controller then directed the pilot to fly heading 260 degrees and asked the pilot to confirm that he could not climb (because of the clouds that in part required the Special VFR departure), and the pilot said “That’s right, I’m right at the….”, presumably, cloud bases. The controller said “I can barely hear you” and directed the pilot to “maintain VFR on course.”

• The controller then asked if the pilot was trying to pick up an IFR clearance and the pilot replied no, he had filed a VFR flight plan. He also said he had to turn about 30 degrees to pick up his en route course.

• The controller queried another pilot who reported the cloud tops to be at 4600 feet MSL.

• The controller permitted the pilot to turn on course, and noted the airplane was climbing. “Are you climbing through a gap in the clouds,” he asked, “trying to get on top of the clouds?” The pilot responded, in a tone that suggests (to me) a sense of resignation, “We gotta climb…I hope to get above the clouds.”

• The controller asked the pilot to provide the identifier for his destination, Salina, which he did; there was a short unintelligible “blip” that may have been the pilot or may have been an artifact of Mr. Katz’ editing, and then the controller asked “are you going to get maintain VFR to your destination or do you need to go back to Timmerman?”

• The controller then reported that radar contact was lost, and in increasingly higher tones of his own called to the pilot…who did not respond.

As I said, such recordings are always hard to hear. I usually don’t include them in FLYING LESSONS—there’s no reason to sensationalize tragedy—unless I think they add value to what we can learn. The early confidence, the routine and even happy early exchange that rapidly turns to signs of stress and fear and resignation, remind us how quickly things can change if we do not command the situation. See: http://www.mastery-flight-training.com/n628rs--kmwc--10122021.html https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2011-title14-vol2/pdf/CFR-2011-title14-vol2-sec91-157.pdf

Early reports suggest the airplane broke up in flight prior to impact. This is usually the result of exceeding VNE, the Never Exceed or “red line” speed, and overstressing the airplane either from aerodynamic stresses or a pilot’s aggressive attempts to escape a spiral.

We’ll leave the investigation to the professionals at this point. In the usual FLYING LESSONS way, however, there are some LESSONS we can learn from this event regardless of the ultimate Probable Cause to be determined by the NTSB.

Special VFR is defined by 14 CFR 91.157. Special VFR:

• Must be requested by the pilot. It cannot be offered by ATC;

• Is only permitted, however, when specifically cleared by controllers;


• Permits visual flight in visibility as low as one statute mile as determined by the pilot;

• Requires the pilot to remain clear of clouds;

• Requires certain aircraft equipment in daytime; at night requires the pilot to be instrument rated and the airplane equipped for IFR flight;

• Includes a host of other requirements and qualifiers as listed in the regulation; and importantly

• Is only authorized “below 10,000 feet MSL within the airspace contained within the upward extension of the lateral boundaries of the controlled airspace designated to the surface for an airport.”

See https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2011-title14-vol2/pdf/CFR-2011-title14-vol2-sec91-157.pdf

That last point might more easily be understood as meaning:

…within Class D airspace, or in Class E airspace around an airport, including extensions, when that controlled airspace extends to the surface (a Class E Surface Area)…

…which is fairly common at busier nontowered airports with instrument approaches.

Class E Surface Area, depicted by a dashed magenta line

Special VFR: • Is an exception to the VFR rule requiring cloud separation at least 500 feet below, 2000

feet laterally and 1000 feet above clouds in controlled airspace below 10,000 feet, and also no less than three statute miles visibility. As long as the pilot remans clear of clouds in at least one mile visibility, VFR flight is permitted…if cleared by Air Traffic Control.

• Exists only within the boundaries of Class D airspace or Class E surface areas—typically only four nautical miles around the airport, although this may be tailored to the location and often includes rectangular extensions along the extended runway centerlines. There is no exception to the VFR rules outside these small circles around these airports.

• Does not negate the requirements for minimum safe altitudes above terrain, obstacles and people as contained in 14 CFR 91.119: 500 feet above uncongested areas or 1000 feet above congested areas as defined by the regulation. There is also provision for flight over “open water or sparsely populated areas,” but most of the continental United States does not meet this definition.

See https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/chapter-I/subchapter-F/part-91/subpart-B/subject-group-ECFRe4c59b5f5506932/section-91.119

In other words, Special VFR is a device used to take off from or land under VFR when the weather is below VFR minimums. It does not exist away from the immediate airport environment, nor is it an authorization for enroute flight below VFR minimums. Even if the pilot remains in uncontrolled airspace—usually within 1200 feet of the ground away from airports—the pilot must remain at or above the minimum safe altitudes.

To highlight the practical use of Special VFR, let’s return to our tragic example. The flight reportedly crashed at 1433Z (0933 local time). The historical record of weather at the Waukesha airport, two miles from the crash site, includes (the bold font indicates closest to the time of the crash):

KUES 121645Z 26007KT 5SM BR OVC004 15/15 A2986 KUES 121545Z 25008KT 5SM BR OVC004 15/15 A2984


KUES 121445Z 27007KT 5SM BR OVC004 15/15 A2983 KUES 121345Z 25009KT 2 1/2SM BR OVC004 15/15 A2982 KUES 121245Z 27009KT 3SM BR OVC004 16/16 A2978

The weather at Waukesha was by definition beyond the limits of the pilot’s Special VFR clearance at Timmerman. The LESSON: Special VFR is a tool to get you to “regular” VFR conditions for en route flight. If you can’t maintain VFR visibility and cloud separation and at the same time fly at or above the 91.119 minimum altitudes, then you can’t fly more than four nautical miles from the airport if you depart with a Special VFR clearance.

The pilot could have requested Special VFR through the Waukesha Class D, but Approach specifically required him to remain clear of the Class D…and that would not have made any difference beyond Waukesha’s airspace.

Whatever the cause of this crash, I can’t end this discussion without remembering that this and all the other examples we use in FLYING LESSONS Weekly involve real people like the couple who died in the Glastar. Pilots may make mistakes, bad choices we may find to be anything from ill-advised to negligent to sometimes even intentional. The real tragedy would be if a pilot should read or hear about this crash and then make a similar choice afterward. See https://www.cbs58.com/news/sources-plane-crashes-in-residential-neighborhood-in-waukesha

It’s easy to look at METARs and TAFs and make a go/no go decision. But recall that these observations and forecasts are valid only in the immediate vicinity of the reporting point (usually an airport). They do not describe conditions that may exist between the reporting points.

I find the Graphical Weather Products, especially the Forecast Clouds, to be extremely useful for anticipating conditions between the reporting points. These charts indicate the extent of cloud coverage, and the bases and tops of layers. This is valuable for visual flight, and for ice avoidance for instrument flight as well.

My friends in the Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association (COPA) have a saying: “Loss of control of an aircraft is always preceded by loss of command of that aircraft.” Loss of Control in Flight

(LOC-I) is the common outcome of attempted visual flight in instrument conditions (“VFR into IMC”). I submit that, if the Glastar crash was indeed a VFR into IMC loss of control, that it was preceded by the pilot’s loss of command as expressed (potentially, should the investigation confirm it) by attempting to “extend” a Special VFR clearance beyond the four nautical mile limit from the airport. See www.cirruspilots.org

Reader Katz, when sending the recording, included his thought: Pilot was NOT instrument qualified. Circumstances are very similar to the Kobe Bryant crash and San Diego [Cessna 340] yesterday. Air Traffic Controller did NOT grasp the seriousness of this situation. Sadly, it is NOT his job to do so.

He added: Loss of Control follows a loss of COMMON SENSE.

What might be the “common sense” of Special VFR?


• Use Special VFR mainly for arrivals. If you’re VFR but cannot maintain VFR to landing at a Class D airport or one with a Class E surface area, request Special VFR to land at that airport.

• Use Special VFR for departures only if you need to for a localized area of less-than-VFR weather near the departure airport, but you know—because of hard weather data and reports, not just hope—that you’ll be in better conditions that meet VFR minimums before you are four miles away from the departure airport.

• If you depart under Special VFR and find you cannot maintain VFR visibility and cloud clearance requirements and minimum altitudes above terrain, persons and congested areas, that you immediately return to the departure airport before flying more than four miles beyond the airport.

• And finally, command of your flight means remaining within the boundaries set by your certificates and ratings; your currency and current level of proficiency; the limitations set by the equipment in the aircraft; the environment: weather, terrain and obstacles; and the regulations that apply to all these factors.

Comments? Suggestions? Questions? Let us know at [email protected].

See https://pilotworkshop.com

See www.nafinet.org.

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Pursue Mastery of Flight.

Thomas P. Turner, M.S. Aviation Safety Flight Instructor Hall of Fame 2015 Inductee 2010 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the Year 2008 FAA Central Region CFI of the Year Three-time Master CFI

FLYING LESSONS is ©2021 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. For more information see www.mastery-flight-training.com, or contact [email protected].

2021.1014 flying lessons

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