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click here for freelancing tutoring sitesUS v Ang Tang Ho43 Phil. 1 – Political Law – Delegation of Power – Administrative BodiesIn July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.HELD: First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.

Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.Mabanag v Lopez Vito78 Phil 1Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.CASCO v GIMENEZG.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in same law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the bank’s auditor refused to honor the vouchers since he maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: “The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:xxxxxxxxx

“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.”

The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBP’s auditor. Casco maintains that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde” He further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”.HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde” The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.Bengzon v senate blue ribbon committee203 SCRA 767

It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.Garcia V MataG.R. No. L-33713Facts: Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments.

Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service.

On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57).

Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA.

It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.

SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.Demetria v Alba148 scra 208Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the BatasanPambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”

Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.Endencia v. David

G.R. No. L-6355-56Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that “SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.” According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.HELD: By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. “The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. ** The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials. The independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.The doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.Aglipay v. Ruiz64 Phil 201The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church took place sometime in 1936. In commemoration thereof. then Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz, initiated the production of certain stamps the design of which would have in their center a chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat as border design. Eventually, the stamps were produced and some were sold pursuant to Act No. 4052, which provides for appropriation.Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the production and sale of such stamps. Aglipay contends that the funding of said stamps commemorative to a particular religious event is in violation of Sec 13, Article 6 of the Philippine Constitution which prohibits the appropriation or usage of public money for the use or benefit of any church or denomination.ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the said stamps violate the Constitution.HELD: No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was emphasized on the stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila as being the seat of such event.

Act No. 4052 on the other hand did not appropriate any public money to a religious event. Act No. 4052 appropriated the sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and merely authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and “as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government”. The fact that the fund is being used for such is only incidental to the function of Director of Posts and under his discretion.On religious freedomThe Supreme Court noted however that the elevating influence of religion is recognized here as elsewhere. Evidence would be our preamble where we implored the aid of divine providence to establish an ideal government. If should also be further noted that religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not an inhibition of profound reverence to religion.Estrada v. Desierto353 SCRA 452 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – De Jure vs De Facto President – Arroyo a de jure presidentJoseph “Erap” Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Erap’s term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of Erap’s surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, Erap’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Estrada’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.Soliven v Makasiar

167 SCRA 393 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – President’s Immunity From Suit – Must Be Invoked by the PresidentLuis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.Gloria v CAFacts:

Private respondent Dr. BienvenidoIcasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.

Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the implementation of his reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasiano’s right to security of tenure.

The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit.

2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his security of tenure.

Held:

1. Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent. As held in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644):

"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals (Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138).

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."

Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced. (Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000)Forbes v TiacoForbes vs. ChuocoTiaco (16 Phil 534)Posted: August 10, 2011 in Political Law01The three plaintiffs in error severally sued the defendants in error, alleging that Mr. Forbes was the governor general of the Philippines, Trowbridge chief of the Secret Service of Manila, and Harding chief of police of the same; that the plaintiff was a Chinese person, lawfully resident in the Philippines, and that the defendants forcibly deported the plaintiff to China, and forcibly prevented his return for some months; that the plaintiff returned on March 29, 1910, and that the defendants threatened and were trying to expel the plaintiff again,—Trowbridge and Harding acting throughout under the order of the defendant Forbes. There was a prayer for an injunction and damages. The defendants demurred, but the demurrer was overruled and a temporary injunction granted. Thereupon Forbes, Harding, and Trowbridge sued for writs of prohibition against the judge and the respective plaintiffs, alleging that the

expulsion was carried out in the public interest and at the request of the proper representative of the Chinese government in the Philippines, and was immediately reported to the Secretary of War. The complaints were demurred to, but the supreme court overruled the demurrers, granted the prohibition, and ordered the actions dismissed. The judge, having declined to join in the applications for writs of error, was made a respondent, and the cases are here on the ground that the plaintiffs have been deprived of liberty without due process of law. Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. at L. 691, 692.

2The purpose of the first suits, of course, was to make the governor general personally answerable in damages for acts done by him by color of his office and in pursuance of what he deemed to be his duty, as well as to prevent his exercising similar power in the future. This sufficiently appears by the declarations, which suggest and do not exclude official action, and is alleged in the complaints for prohibition. On April 19, 1910, in less than three weeks after the original suits were brought, the Philippine legislature passed an act which, reciting that the governor general had authorized the deportation ‘in the exercise of authority vested in him by law,’ enacted that his action was ‘approved and ratified and confirmed, and in all respects declared legal, and not subject to question or review.’ So that, if ratification by that body can dispose of the matter, no court has authority to entertain the suits.

3The first doubt that naturally would occur is whether, if a right of action had vested previously, it could be taken away by such a statute. But it generally is recognized that in cases like the present, where the act originally purports to be done in the name and by the authority of the state, a defect in that authority may be cured by the subsequent adoption of the act. The person who has assumed to represent the will and person of the superior power is given the benefit of the representation if it turns out that his assumption was correct. O’Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U. S. 45, 52, 52 L. ed. 676, 678, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 439; United States v. Heinszen, 206 U. S. 370, 382, 51 L. ed. 1098, 1102, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 742, 11 Ann. Cas. 688; ThePaquete Habana, 189 U. S. 453, 465, 47 L. ed. 901, 903, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 593; Phillips v. Eyre, L. R. 6 Q. B. 1, 23, 10 Best & S. 1004, 40 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 28, 22 L. T. N. S. 869; Secretary of State v. KamacheeBoyeSahaba, 13 Moore, P. C. C. 22, 86, 7 Moore, Ind. App. 476. Compare West Side Belt R. Co. v. Pittsburgh Constr. Co. 219 U. S. 92, 55 L. ed. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 196; Dunbar v. Boston & P. R. Corp. 181 Mass. 383, 385, 386, 63 N. E. 916.

4Therefore the deportation is to be considered as having been ordered by the governor general in pursuance of a statute of the Philippine legislature directing it, under their combined powers, and it is unnecessary to consider whether he had authority, by virtue of his office alone, as declared by the statute, or whether, if he had not, he had immunity from suit for such an official act done in good faith. The former matter now is regulated by a later statute providing for a hearing, etc. No. 2113. February 1, 1912. On the question thus narrowed the preliminaries are plain. It is admitted that sovereign states have inherent power to deport aliens, and seemingly that Congress is not deprived of this power by the Constitution of the United States. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 707, 728, 37 L. ed. 905, 911, 918, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 231, 41 L. ed. 140, 141, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 977; Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U. S. 296, 302, 46 L. ed. 917, 920, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 686; United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 289, 290, 48 L. ed. 979, 983, 984, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 719. Furthermore, the very ground of the power in the necessities of public welfare shows that it may have to be exercised in a summary way through executive officers. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 263, 49 L. ed. 1040, 1044, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644; Moyer v.

Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 84, 85, 53 L. ed. 410, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 235. So that the question is narrowed further to the inquiry whether the Philippine government cannot do what unquestionably Congress might.

5As Congress is not prevented by the Constitution, the Philippine government cannot be prevented by the Philippine Bill of Rights alone. Act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. at L. 691, 692. Deporting the plaintiffs was not depriving them of liberty without due process of law, unless on other grounds the local government was acting beyond its powers. But the local government has all civil and judicial power necessary to govern the Islands. Act of March 2, 1901, chap. 803, 31 Stat. at L. 895, 910, act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, § 1, 32 Stat. at L. 691. The forms are different, but as in Hawaii, the proximate source of private rights is local, whether they spring by inheritance from Spain or are created by Philippine legislation. See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 354, 51 L. ed. 834, 836, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526; Perez v. Fernandez, 202 U. S. 80, 91, 92, 50 L. ed. 942, 945, 946, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561. It would be strange if a government so remote should be held bound to wait for the action of Congress in a matter that might touch its life unless dealt with at once and on the spot. On the contrary, we are of opinion that it had the power as an incident of the self-determination, however limited, given to it by the United States.

6By § 86 of the act of July 1, 1902, all laws passed by the Philippine government are to be reported to Congress, which reserves power to annul them. It is worthy of mention that the law under consideration was reported to Congress and has not been annulled. The extension of the Chinese exclusion and immigration laws to the Philippine Islands has no bearing on the matter. The right to remain, for instance, under the act of April 29, 1902, chap. 641, § 4, 32 Stat. at L. 176, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 524, does not prevail over a removal as an act of state.

7It is held in England that an act of state is a matter not cognizable in any municipal court. Musgrave v. Pulido, L. R. 5 App. Cas. 103, 108, 49 L. J. P. C. N. S. 20, 41 L. T. N. S. 629, 28 Week. Rep. 373. And that was the purport of the Philippine act declaring the deportation not subject to question or review. As the Bill of Rights did not stand in the way, and the implied powers of the government sanctioned by Congress permitted it, there is no reason why the statute should not have full effect. It protected the subordinates as well as the governor general, and took jurisdiction from the court that attempted to try the case.

8Whether prohibition is technically the proper remedy, historically speaking, we need not inquire. On such a matter we should not interfere with local practice except for good cause shown. In substance the decision of the Supreme Court was right.

9Judgment affirmed.Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability549 SCRA 77 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department – Inquiry in aid of legislation – Executive PrivilegeLegislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers

In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.David vs. Arroyo G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006Facts of the case:

During the celebration of People Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP 1017 for brevity) declaring a state of national emergency. The President also issued General Order (G.O.) No. 5 implementing PP 1017.

The President stated that over the past months, elements in political opposition have conspired with extreme left represented by NDF- CCP- NPA and military adventurists, which caused her to declare such order. The President considered aims to oust the President and take- over reigns of government as clear and present danger.

On March 3, President Arroyo lifted PP 1017.

Solicitor General argued that the basis of declaring PP 1017 was that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the AFP.

However despite the contentions of the Solicitor General, the Magdalo group indicted the Oakwood mutiny and called to wear red bands on their left arms to show disgust.

At the same time Oplan Hackle I was discovered, which constitutes plans of bombings and attacks on PMA Alumni Homecoming in Baguio, the same event where the President was invited. The next morning after the alumni homecoming celebration, a bomb was found inside the campus.

PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao also intercepted information that PNP- SAF members are planning to defect from the administration, while on the same view Congressman PepingCojuanco plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo Administration.

Huge number of soldiers joined the rallies to provide critical mass and armed component to Anti- Arroyo protests.

Bombings of telephone communication towers and cell sites in Bulacaan and Bataan was also considered as an additional factual basis after the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5.

Because of these incidental series of events which clearly presents a critical situation, President Arroyo cancelled all activities related to EDSA People Power I. Mike Arroyo, then Executive Secretary, announced that warrantless arrest and takeover of facilities can be implemented.

Succeeding this announcement was the arrest of Randy David, a Filipino journalist and UP professor due to a mistake of fact that he was actually involved in the street rallies. Seizure of Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante-- all local news publication, took place which, according to the PNP, was meant to show a strong presence to tell the media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help rebels in bringing down the government. Police also arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, who then represented the Anakpawis Party.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuance of Presidential Proclamation PP 1017 is unconstitutional? Whether or not the arrest of Randy David and the seizure of Daily Tribune et. al., is unconstitutional?

Ruling of the court:

Respondents claim that such petition is moot and academic based on the issuance of PP 1017, but the Court rejects such contention. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy. In this case, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 which calls for military aid.

Most people then equate it to martial law, but such case is different wherein the basis then was the 1973 Constitution. Under the present 1987 Constitution, the President may summon armed forces to aid him in supporting lawless violence.

The President's declaration of state rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or conduction of a public moment of interest. State of national emergency, however, is the prerogative of the President. Her exercise of emergency powers such as the taking over of privately owned utility requires delegation from the Congress, which is entirely different from the martial law.

As to the seizure of the Daily Tribune and the arrest of Randy David, the Court considers those actions unlawful based on the fact that it violates the constitutional mandate of freedom of expression.GUDANI VS. SENGAPosted by kaye lee on 10:51 PMGR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative Investigation]

FACTS:The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.In the Matter of The Petition for Habeas Corpus of TeodioLansang v. Garcia

Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would,

without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.Aquino v. EnrileG.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enrile’s answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’ declaration of Martial Law.ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the President’s order.Olaguer v Military CommissionG.R. No. L-54558 May 22, 1987In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp BagongDiwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. “When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic.” But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.ATTY. ELPIDIO SORIANO III VS. REUBEN LISTA, ET AL.G.R. No. 153881. March 24, 2003

Facts: Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of office, which requires confirmation of the COA.

Held: Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act or statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayer’s suit because petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was transferred from the Department of National Defense to the Office of the President, and later to the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC).