2nd week 1 personality rights decisions

8/10/2019 2nd Week 1 Personality Rights Decisions

1/58

Lisbon = Oct. 2013 Intensive Course 2nd week/1

Personality rights

I. Decisions

1.German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) (July 17, 2013)

(relevant passages will be translated in class)

Zitierung: BVerfG, 1 BvR 3167/08 vom 17.7.2013, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 33),http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20130717_1bvr316708.htmlFrei fr den nicht gewerblichen Gebrauch. Kommerzielle Nutzung nur mit Zustimmung desGerichts.

BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT

- 1 BvR 3167/08 -

Im Namen des Volkes

In dem Verfahrenberdie Verfassungsbeschwerde

der Frau A

- Bevollmchtigte:

Rechtsanwltin Silke Acker,Hannah-Arendt-Strae 3 - 7, 35037 Marburg -
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20130717_1bvr316708.htmlhttp://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20130717_1bvr316708.htmlhttp://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20130717_1bvr316708.html


2/58

gegena)

den Beschluss des Oberlandesgerichts Nrnberg vom 2. Oktober2008 - 8 U 1300/08 -,

b) das Endurteil des Landgerichts Nrnberg-Frth vom 26. Mai 2008- 11 O 9725/07 -

hat die 3. Kammer des Ersten Senats des Bundesverfassungsgerichts durch

den Vizeprsidenten Kirchhof,den Richter Masingund die Richterin Baer

am 17. Juli 2013 einstimmig beschlossen:

1. Das Endurteil des Landgerichts Nrnberg-Frth vom 26. Mai 2008 - 11 O 9725/07 -und der Beschluss des Oberlandesgerichts Nrnberg vom 2. Oktober 2008 - 8 U1300/08 - verletzen die Beschwerdefhrerin in ihrem Grundrecht aus Artikel 2Absatz 1 in Verbindung mit Artikel 1 Absatz 1 des Grundgesetzes.

Die Entscheidungen werden aufgehoben.

Die Sache wird an das Landgericht Nrnberg-Frth zurckverwiesen.

2.

Der Freistaat Bayern hat der Beschwerdefhrerin die imVerfassungsbeschwerdeverfahren entstandenen notwendigen Auslagen zu erstatten.

3. Der Wert des Gegenstands der anwaltlichen Ttigkeit fr dasVerfassungsbeschwerdeverfahren wird auf 25.000 (in Worten:

fnfundzwanzigtausend Euro) festgesetzt.

Grnde:

I.

1

Die Verfassungsbeschwerde betrifft den Datenschutz im privaten Versicherungsrecht.Sie wendet sich gegen versicherungsvertragliche Obliegenheiten bei der Feststellung desVersicherungsfalls.

2

1. Die Beschwerdefhrerin schloss mit der Beklagten des Ausgangsverfahrens, einemLebensversicherungsunternehmen, einen Vertrag ber eine Berufsunfhigkeitsversicherung.Die dem Vertrag zugrunde liegenden Tarifbedingungen enthielten unter anderem die folgendeBestimmung:


3/58

3

5 Welche Mitwirkungspflichten sind zu beachten, wenn Leistungen verlangt werden?

(1) []

(3) Bei Berufsunfhigkeit der versicherten Person sind zustzlich einzureichen: []

b) ausfhrliche Berichte der rzte, die die versicherte Person gegenwrtig behandeln bzw.behandelt oder untersucht haben, ber Ursache, Beginn, Art, Verlauf und voraussichtlicheDauer des Leidens sowie ber den Grad der Berufsunfhigkeit bzw. bei Berufsunfhigkeitinfolge Pflegebedrftigkeit ber Art und Umfang der Pflegebedrftigkeit; []

(4) Wir knnen auerdemallerdings auf unsere Kostenweitere rztliche Untersuchungendurch von uns beauftragte rzte sowie notwendige Nachweise auch ber diewirtschaftlichen Verhltnisse und ihre Vernderungen verlangen, insbesondere zustzliche

Ausknfte und Aufklrungen.

Die versicherte Person hat rzte, Krankenhuser und sonstige Krankenanstalten sowieAlten- und Pflegeheime, bei denen sie in Behandlung oder Pflege war oder sein wird,sowie Pflegepersonen, andere Personenversicherer und Behrden zu ermchtigen, unsauf Verlangen Auskunft zu erteilen.

4

Die Beschwerdefhrerin machte gegenber der Beklagten Ansprche wegeneingetretener Berufsunfhigkeit aufgrund von Depressionen geltend. Die auf demAntragsformular der Beklagten vorgedruckte Schweigepflichtentbindungserklrung,die eine Ermchtigung zur Einholung sachdienlicher Ausknfte bei einem weiten Kreisvon Auskunftsstellen enthielt, strich die Beschwerdefhrerin durch und unterschriebdas Antragsformular nur im brigen.Anschlieend korrespondierten die Beklagte und dieBeschwerdefhrerin mehrfach ber eine Schweigepflichtentbindung. Die Beschwerdefhrerinerklrte sich durch ihren damaligen Rechtsanwalt zur Erteilung von Einzelermchtigungen

bereit. Daraufhin bersandte die Beklagte ihr folgende, vorformulierte Erklrungen zurSchweigepflichtentbindung ihrer Krankenkasse, zweier rztinnen sowie der DeutschenRentenversicherung Bund:

5

Im Zusammenhang mit meinem Antrag auf Berufsunfhigkeitsleistungen gebe ich

ausdrcklich mein Einverstndnis, dass [die Krankenkasse beziehungsweise diejeweilige rztin] der [Beklagten] umfassend anhand der vorliegenden Unterlagen bermeine Gesundheitsverhltnisse, Arbeitsunfhigkeitszeiten und BehandlungsdatenAuskunft erteilt. []

6

Die Erklrung hinsichtlich der Deutschen Rentenversicherung Bund lautete:

7


4/58

Im Zusammenhang mit meinem Antrag auf Berufsunfhigkeitsleistungen gebe ich

ausdrcklich mein Einverstndnis, dass die Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund [] der

[Beklagten] umfassend ber meine Gesundheitsverhltnisse, bzw. ber meine beruflicheSituation Auskunft erteilt.

Ich ermchtige den o.g. Sozialversicherungstrger, gem 67 b SGB X alle vorliegendenmedizinischen Gutachten und Berichte der [Beklagten] in Kopie zur Verfgung zu stellen.[] (Hervorhebung im Original)

8

Die Beklagte forderte von der Beschwerdefhrerin fr die Mehrkosten im Zusammenhang mitden Einzelermchtigungen eine Kostenbeteiligung in Hhe von 20 Euro je Ermchtigung. DerLeistungsantrag werde nach Eingang der Ermchtigungen und des Gesamtbetrages weiter

bearbeitet. Die Beschwerdefhrerin bat um Konkretisierung der gewnschten Ausknfte.Dem kam die Beklagte nicht nach; der Leistungsantrag knne erst nach Erhalt der

unterschriebenen Schweigepflichtentbindungen sowie des geforderten Betrages weiterbearbeitet werden.

9

Die Beschwerdefhrerin klagte auf Zahlung der monatlichen Rente aus der Versicherung.

10

2. Das Landgericht wies die Klage ab. Die Beschwerdefhrerin sei der ihr zumutbarenObliegenheit der Vorlage beziehungsweise der Ermglichung der Vorlage im Hinblick aufrztliche Unterlagen zum behaupteten Versicherungsfall schuldhaft nicht nachgekommen.Daher sei die Beklagte leistungsfrei. Der Beschwerdefhrerin habe das Recht zugestanden,die allgemeine Schweigepflichtentbindung im Rahmen des schriftlichenLeistungsantragsformulars nicht zu unterzeichnen. Sptestens durch Zusendung derEinzelermchtigungsformulare sei klar gewesen, dass die Beklagte weitere Ausknfte frerforderlich hielt. Selbst wenn der inhaltliche Umfang der Einzelermchtigungen zu weitgefasst sein sollte, habe es gleichwohl der Beschwerdefhrerin oblegen, dem von ihrerkannten Interesse der Beklagten an Ausknften nachzukommen.

11

3. Das Oberlandesgericht wies die Berufung mit angegriffenem Beschluss zurck.Richtigerweise habe das Landgericht offengelassen, ob die Beschwerdefhrerin zur Zahlungder von der Beklagten fr die Bearbeitung geforderten Kostenpauschale und zuruneingeschrnkten Abgabe der Einzelermchtigungen verpflichtet gewesen sei.

12

Die Beklagte habe der Beschwerdefhrerin mit der bersendung der vorbereitetenEinzelermchtigungen eine Mglichkeit geboten, ihre informationelle Selbstbestimmung zuwahren und zugleich ihrer Mitwirkungspflicht nachzukommen. Es sei zumutbar gewesen, zur

Erhaltung ihres Leistungsanspruchs die Einzelermchtigungen, wenn sie ihr noch zuweitgehend erschienen seien, entsprechend etwa durch Streichung des Wortes umfassendoder auch in zeitlicher Hinsicht einzuschrnken und dann unterzeichnet zurckzusenden,


5/58


6/58

16

1. Die angegriffenen Entscheidungen des Landgerichts und des Oberlandesgerichtsverletzen die Beschwerdefhrerin in ihrem durch Art. 2 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Art. 1Abs. 1 GG gewhrleisteten allgemeinen Persnlichkeitsrecht in seiner Ausprgung als

Recht der informationellen Selbstbestimmung.

17

a) Im Privatrechtsverkehrentfalten die Grundrechte ihre Wirkkraft als verfassungsrechtlicheWertentscheidungen durch das Medium der Vorschriften, die das jeweilige Rechtsgebietunmittelbar beherrschen (vgl. BVerfGE 7, 198 ; 42, 143 ; 103, 89 ). DenGerichten obliegt es, diesen grundrechtlichen Schutz durch Auslegung und Anwendung deseinfachen Rechts zu gewhren und im Einzelfall zu konkretisieren. Ihrer Beurteilung undAbwgung von Grundrechtspositionen im Verhltnis zueinander kann dasBundesverfassungsgericht nur dann entgegentreten, wenn eine angegriffene Entscheidung

Auslegungsfehler erkennen lsst, die auf einer grundstzlich unrichtigen Auffassung von derBedeutung eines Grundrechts beruhen (vgl. BVerfGE 18, 85 ; 42, 143 ; 54, 148; BVerfGK 9, 353 ; stRspr).

18

b) Die angegriffenen Entscheidungen sind an der aus Art. 2 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Art. 1Abs. 1 GG folgenden Pflicht der staatlichen Gewalt zu messen, dem Individuum eineinformationelle Selbstbestimmung im Verhltnis zu Dritten zu ermglichen.

19

aa) Das allgemeine Persnlichkeitsrecht umfasst die Befugnis des Individuums, ber diePreisgabe und Verwendung seiner persnlichen Daten - hier seiner Gesundheitsdaten -selbst zu bestimmen (vgl. BVerfGE 65, 1 ; 84, 192 ).Dieses Recht entfaltet alsobjektive Norm seinen Rechtsgehalt auch im Privatrecht und strahlt so auf die Auslegung undAnwendung privatrechtlicher Vorschriften aus (BVerfGE 84, 192 ). Verkennt einGericht, das eine privatrechtliche Streitigkeit entscheidet, in grundstzlicher Weise denSchutzgehalt des allgemeinen Persnlichkeitsrechts, verletzt es durch sein Urteil dasGrundrecht des Brgers in seiner Funktion als Schutznorm (vgl. BVerfGE 84, 192 ).

20

Die aus dem Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung folgende Schutzpflicht gebietet es,dafr Sorge zu tragen, dass informationeller Selbstschutz fr Einzelne tatschlich mglich ist.Zwar steht es dem Individuum frei, Daten anderen gegenber zu offenbaren oder sichvertraglich dazu zu verpflichten. Hat aber in einem Vertragsverhltnis ein Partner ein solchesGewicht, dass er den Vertragsinhalt faktisch einseitig bestimmen kann, so ist es Aufgabe desRechts, auf die Wahrung der Grundrechtspositionen der beteiligten Parteien hinzuwirken, umzu verhindern, dass sich fr einen Vertragsteil die Selbstbestimmung in eineFremdbestimmung verkehrt (vgl. BVerfGE 103, 89 ; 114, 1 ; BVerfGK 9, 353).

21


7/58


8/58

25

Deshalb oblag hier den Gerichten die Gewhrleistung eines wirksamen Schutzes derinformationellen Selbstbestimmung. Die Vertragsbedingungen der Versicherer sind -

jedenfalls hinsichtlich der datenschutzrechtlichen Konditionen - praktisch nicht verhandelbar

(BVerfGK 9, 353 ; vgl. - fr die Lebensversicherung - BVerfGE 114, 73 ).Versicherte einer Berufsunfhigkeitsversicherung knnen nicht auf die Mglichkeit verwiesenwerden, um des informationellen Selbstschutzes willen einen Vertragsschluss zu unterlassenoder die Leistungsfreiheit des Versicherers hinzunehmen. Berufsttige sind vielfach daraufangewiesen, fr den Fall der Berufsunfhigkeit durch Abschluss eines entsprechendenVersicherungsvertrags vorzusorgen, um ihren Lebensstandard zu sichern.

26

bb) Den danach sich aus der Verfassung ergebenden Anforderungen an einenhinreichenden Ausgleich zwischen den betroffenen Grundrechtspositionen, dem

Interesse an informationellem Selbstschutz einerseits und dem in der Berufsfreiheitwurzelnden Interesse an der Offenlegung von Informationen andererseits, werden dieangegriffenen Entscheidungen nicht gerecht. Sie tragen den Belangen derBeschwerdefhrerin nicht hinreichend Rechnung.

27

(1) Durch die von den vorformulierten Einzelermchtigungen vorgesehene Entbindung vonder Schweigepflicht wrde der Beklagten ermglicht, auch ber das fr die Abwicklung desVersicherungsfalls erforderliche Ma hinaus in weitem Umfang sensible Informationen berdie Beschwerdefhrerin einzuholen. Dies trifft die Belange der Beschwerdefhrerin erheblich,weil sich die Daten auf detaillierte Angaben zu ihrer Gesundheit und den rztlichenBehandlungen, also auf Angaben hchstpersnlicher Natur beziehen. Zwar werden in denEinzelermchtigungen vier Auskunftsstellen benannt. Aus den Einzelermchtigungen war

jedoch nicht ansatzweise erkennbar, welche konkreten Informationen die Beklagte zurPrfung des Versicherungsfalls bentigt. Die benannten Auskunftsgegenstnde - etwaGesundheitsverhltnisse, Arbeitsunfhigkeitszeiten und Behandlungsdaten - sind soallgemein gehalten, dass sie kaum zu einer Begrenzung des Auskunftsumfangs fhren. Erfasstwerden nahezu alle bei den benannten Auskunftsstellen ber die Beschwerdefhrerinvorliegenden Informationen. Die Weite der erfassten Auskunftsgegenstnde wird durch dieVerwendung des Wortes umfassend in den vorformulierten Erklrungen unterstrichen. Die

Formulierung der Einzelermchtigungen umfasst damit auch Informationen, die fr dieAbwicklung des Versicherungsfalles bedeutungslos sind. So liegen schon der Krankenkasseregelmig Informationen ber praktisch jeden Arztbesuch und Krankenhausaufenthalt derversicherten Person vor, so dass bereits insoweit annhernd alle Angaben ber dieGesundheitsverhltnisse und Behandlungsdaten erfasst sind. Dass diese nicht in ihrer Gnzefr die Bearbeitung des Versicherungsfalles von Bedeutung sind, liegt auf der Hand.

28

(2) Die Beschwerdefhrerin kann nicht, wie es die angegriffenen Entscheidungen alsausreichend ansehen, auf die Mglichkeit verwiesen werden, die vorformulierten

Einzelermchtigungen selbst zu modifizieren oder die erforderlichen Unterlagen eigenstndigvorzulegen. Zwar haben die erkennenden Gerichte damit der Beschwerdefhrerin eineMitwirkungsmglichkeit zuerkannt. Jedoch erlegen sie damit der Beschwerdefhrerin auf, die


9/58

Interessen der Gegenpartei zu erforschen und belasten sie fr den Fall, dass die vorgelegtenUnterlagen oder die modifizierten Ermchtigungen fr unzureichend erachtet wrden, in nichttragbarer Weise mit dem Risiko eines Verlusts des Leistungsanspruchs. Dieser Weg ist nichtgeeignet, den informationellen Selbstschutz der Beschwerdefhrerin im Dialog mit demVersicherungsunternehmen zu gewhrleisten. Die vorprozessuale anwaltliche Vertretung der

Beschwerdefhrerin ndert daran nichts, weil auch die Mglichkeit anwaltlicher Beratungnicht das Risiko beseitigt, dem die Beschwerdefhrerin ausgesetzt ist.

29

(3) Die angegriffenen Entscheidungen lassen beim Ausgleich der sich gegenberstehendenGrundrechtspositionen unbercksichtigt, dass es dem Schutz der Beschwerdefhrerinmglicherweise erheblich dienen kann, die Beklagte aber nicht unverhltnismig belastenmuss, wenn von ihr eine weitere Einschrnkung der geforderten Einzelermchtigungenverlangt wird. Zwar kann der Umfang der Einzelermchtigungen dabei nicht vornhereinschon auf die fr die Prfung des Leistungsanspruchs relevanten Informationen begrenzt

werden, weil dem Versicherer zunchst selbst noch nicht bekannt ist, welche dies sind. Jedochliee sich in Betracht ziehen, die von den Einzelermchtigungen umfassten Informationenetwa zunchst auf solche weniger weitreichenden und persnlichkeitsrelevantenVorinformationen zu beschrnken, die ausreichen, um festzustellen, welche Informationentatschlich fr die Prfung des Leistungsfalls relevant sind. Eine zumindest grobeKonkretisierung der Auskunftsgegenstnde knnte so den erheblichen Umfang der durch dieEinzelermchtigungen zugnglichen, berschieenden Informationen begrenzen und damitdem Recht der Beschwerdefhrerin auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung Rechnung tragen.Die Verfahrenseffizienz wrde durch eine solche Konkretisierung der Auskunftsgegenstndenur geringfgig beeintrchtigt. Angesichts des Umfangs der bei der Krankenkasse derBeschwerdefhrerin und der Deutschen Rentenversicherung Bund vorliegenden Unterlagenist es ohnehin wahrscheinlich, dass die Beklagte den Auskunftsgegenstand im Rahmen einerAnfrage an diese prziser formulieren wrde als in den Einzelermchtigungen.

30

2. Die angegriffenen Entscheidungen beruhen auf dem Verfassungsversto. Es kann nichtausgeschlossen werden, dass die Gerichte zu einem anderen Ergebnis gelangt wren, wenn siedas durch Art. 2 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG gewhrleistete allgemeinePersnlichkeitsrecht in seiner Ausprgung als Recht der informationellen Selbstbestimmung

bei der Auslegung und Anwendung der streitentscheidenden Vorschriften des Privatrechts

zutreffend bercksichtigt htten.31

3. Der Verfassungsbeschwerde ist danach stattzugeben und die Grundrechtsverletzungfestzustellen ( 95 Abs. 1 Satz 1 BVerfGG). Die angegriffenen Entscheidungen sindaufzuheben ( 95 Abs. 2 BVerfGG) und die Sache an das Landgerichtzurckzuverweisen.

32

4. Der Freistaat Bayern hat der Beschwerdefhrerin die notwendigen Auslagen imVerfassungsbeschwerdeverfahren nach 34a Abs. 2 BVerfGG zu erstatten.


10/58


11/58

DANTEC, Andr GATTOLIN, Jol LABB, Jean-Vincent PLAC, Mmes AlineARCHIMBAUD, Marie-Christine BLANDIN, Corinne BOUCHOUX, MM. JeanDESESSARD, Jacques MZARD, Pierre-Yves COLLOMBAT, Robert TROPEANO,Jean-Claude REQUIER, Jean-Pierre PLANCADE, Yvon COLLIN, Mme Anne-MarieESCOFFIER, MM. Franois FORTASSIN, Raymond VALL, Jean-Michel BAYLET,

Mmes Franoise LABORDE, Nicole BORVO COHEN-SEAT, Eliane ASSASSI,Marie-France BEAUFILS, M. Eric BOCQUET, Mmes Laurence COHEN, CcileCUKIERMAN, Annie DAVID, Michelle DEMESSINE, Evelyne DIDIER, MM.Christian FAVIER, Guy FISCHER, Thierry FOUCAUD, Mme Brigitte GONTHIER-MAURIN, MM. Grard LE CAM, Michel LE SCOUARNEC, Mmes IsabellePASQUET, Mireille SCHURCH et M. Paul VERGS, snateurs ;

Et le mme jour par M. Jean-Marc AYRAULT, Mme Patricia ADAM, MM. Jean-PaulBACQUET, Dominique BAERT, Jean-Pierre BALLIGAND, Grard BAPT, MmesDelphine BATHO, Marie-Nolle BATTISTEL, MM. Jean-Louis BIANCO, SergeBLISKO, Daniel BOISSERIE, Mmes Marie-Odile BOUILL, Monique BOULESTIN,

MM. Pierre BOURGUIGNON, Jrme CAHUZAC, Jean-Christophe CAMBADLIS,Thierry CARCENAC, Laurent CATHALA, Guy CHAMBEFORT, Jean-PaulCHANTEGUET, Grard CHARASSE, Alain CLAEYS, Mme Marie-FranoiseCLERGEAU, MM. Pierre COHEN, Frdric CUVILLIER, Pascal DEGUILHEM, GuyDELCOURT, Bernard DEROSIER, Julien DRAY, Tony DREYFUS, WilliamDUMAS, Mme Laurence DUMONT, MM. Jean-Paul DUPR, Olivier DUSSOPT,Christian ECKERT, Henri EMMANUELLI, Mmes Corinne ERHEL, Martine FAURE,M. Herv FRON, Mmes Aurlie FILIPPETTI, Genevive FIORASO, MM. PierreFORGUES, Jean-Louis GAGNAIRE, Mme Genevive GAILLARD, MM. GuillaumeGAROT, Paul GIACOBBI, Jean-Patrick GILLE, Mme Annick GIRARDIN, MM. JolGIRAUD, Daniel GOLDBERG, Mme Pascale GOT, MM. Marc GOUA, JeanGRELLIER, Mme Elisabeth GUIGOU, M. David HABIB, Mmes DanileHOFFMAN-RISPAL, Sandrine HUREL, Franoise IMBERT, MM. MichelISSINDOU, Serge JANQUIN, Henri JIBRAYEL, Rgis JUANICO, Armand JUNG,Mme Marietta KARAMANLI, MM. Jean-Pierre KUCHEIDA, Jrme LAMBERT,Jack LANG, Mme Colette LANGLADE, MM. Jean-Yves LE BOUILLONNEC,Gilbert LE BRIS, Jean-Marie LE GUEN, Bruno LE ROUX, Mme MaryliseLEBRANCHU, MM. Michel LEFAIT, Patrick LEMASLE, Mmes CatherineLEMORTON, Annick LEPETIT, MM. Bernard LESTERLIN, Michel LIEBGOTT,Franois LONCLE, Jean MALLOT, Jean-Ren MARSAC, Philippe MARTIN, MmesMartine MARTINEL, Frdrique MASSAT, M. Didier MATHUS, Mme Sandrine

MAZETIER, MM. Klber MESQUIDA, Jean MICHEL, Arnaud MONTEBOURG,Pierre-Alain MUET, Philippe NAUCHE, Henri NAYROU, Christian PAUL, GerminalPEIRO, Jean-Luc PRAT, Jean-Claude PEREZ, Mme Sylvia PINEL, M. FranoisPUPPONI, Mme Catherine QUR, MM. Dominique RAIMBOURG, SimonRENUCCI, Mmes Marie-Line REYNAUD, Chantal ROBIN-RODRIGO, MM. MarcelROGEMONT, Bernard ROMAN, Gwendal ROUILLARD, Ren ROUQUET,Christophe SIRUGUE, Jean-Louis TOURAINE, Philippe TOURTELIER, Jean-Jacques URVOAS, Daniel VAILLANT, Jacques VALAX, Alain VIDALIES, Jean-Michel VILLAUM et Philippe VUILQUE, dputs.

LE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL,

4.

Vu l'ordonnance n 58-1067 du 7 novembre 1958 modifie portant loi organique sur leConseil constitutionnel ;


12/58

Vu la loi n 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative l'informatique, aux fichiers et auxliberts ;

Vu les observations du Gouvernement en rponse la saisine ainsi que sesobservations complmentaires produites la demande du Conseil constitutionnel,

enregistres le 15 mars 2012 ;

Vu les observations en rplique prsentes par les snateurs requrants, enregistres le20 mars 2012 ;

Le rapporteur ayant t entendu ;5. 1. Considrant que les dputs et snateurs requrants dfrent au Conseil

constitutionnel la loi relative la protection de l'identit ; qu'ils contestent laconformit la Constitution des dispositions de ses articles 5 et 10 ;

- SUR LES ARTICLES 5 et 10 :

2. Considrant que l'article 5 de la loi dfre prvoit la cration, dans les conditionsprvues par la loi du 6 janvier 1978 susvise, d'un traitement de donnes caractrepersonnel facilitant le recueil et la conservation des donnes requises pour la dlivrancedu passeport franais et de la carte nationale d'identit, destin prserver l'intgrit deces donnes ; que, parmi celles-ci, figurent les donnes contenues dans le composantlectronique scuris de la carte nationale d'identit et du passeport dont la liste estfixe l'article 2 de la loi, qui sont, outre l'tat civil et le domicile du titulaire, sa taille,la couleur de ses yeux, deux empreintes digitales et sa photographie ;

3. Considrant que cet article 5 permet que l'identification du demandeur d'un titred'identit ou de voyage s'effectue en interrogeant le traitement de donnes caractre

personnel au moyen des donnes dont la liste est fixe l'article 2, l'exception de laphotographie ; qu'il prvoit galement que ce traitement de donnes caractrepersonnel peut tre interrog au moyen des deux empreintes digitales recueillies dans letraitement, en premier lieu, lors de l'tablissement des titres d'identit et de voyage, endeuxime lieu, pour les besoins de l'enqute relative certaines infractions, surautorisation du procureur de la Rpublique ou du juge d'instruction, et, en troisimelieu, sur rquisition du procureur de la Rpublique aux fins d'tablir, lorsqu'elle estinconnue, l'identit d'une personne dcde, victime d'une catastrophe naturelle ou d'unaccident collectif ;

4. Considrant que l'article 6 de la loi dfre permet de vrifier l' identit du possesseurde la carte d'identit ou du passeport partir des donnes inscrites sur le documentd'identit ou de voyage ou sur le composant lectronique scuris ; qu'il permetgalement que cette vrification soit effectue en consultant les donnes conservesdans le traitement prvu l'article 5 en cas de doute srieux sur l'identit de la

personne ou lorsque le titre prsent est dfectueux ou parat endommag ou altr ;

5. Considrant que l'article 10 permet aux agents individuellement dsigns et dmenthabilits des services de police et de gendarmerie nationales d'avoir accs au traitementde donnes caractre personnel cr en application de l'article 5, pour les besoins de

la prvention et de la rpression des atteintes l'indpendance de la Nation, l'intgritde son territoire, sa scurit, la forme rpublicaine de ses institutions, aux moyensde sa dfense et de sa diplomatie, la sauvegarde de sa population en France et


13/58

l'tranger et aux lments essentiels de son potentiel scientifique et conomique et desactes de terrorisme ;

6. Considrant que, selon les requrants, la cration d'un fichier d'identit biomtriqueportant sur la quasi-totalit de la population franaise et dont les caractristiques

rendent possible l'identification d'une personne partir de ses empreintes digitalesporte une atteinte inconstitutionnelle au droit au respect de la vie prive ; qu'en outre,en permettant que les donnes enregistres dans ce fichier soient consultes des finsde police administrative ou judiciaire, le lgislateur aurait omis d'adopter les garantieslgales contre le risque d'arbitraire ;

7. Considrant, en premier lieu, que l'article 34 de la Constitution dispose que la loifixe les rgles concernant les garanties fondamentales accordes aux citoyens pourl'exercice des liberts publiques ainsi que la procdure pnale ; qu'il appartient aulgislateur, dans le cadre de sa comptence, d'assurer la conciliation entre, d'une part, lasauvegarde de l'ordre public et la recherche des auteurs d'infractions, toutes deux

ncessaires la protection de principes et de droits de valeur constitutionnelle et,d'autre part, le respect des autres droits et liberts constitutionnellement protgs ; qu'illui est tout moment loisible d'adopter des dispositions nouvelles dont il lui appartientd'apprcier l'opportunit et de modifier des textes antrieurs ou d'abroger ceux-ci enleur substituant, le cas chant, d'autres dispositions, ds lors que, dans l'exercice de ce

pouvoir, il ne prive pas de garanties lgales des exigences constitutionnelles ;

8. Considrant, en second lieu, que la libert proclame par l'article 2 de la Dclarationdes droits de l'homme et du citoyen de 1789 implique le droit au respect de la vie

prive ; que, par suite, la collecte, l'enregistrement, la conservation, la consultation et lacommunication de donnes caractre personnel doivent tre justifis par un motifd'intrt gnral et mis en oeuvre de manire adquate et proportionne cet objectif ;

9. Considrant que la cration d'un traitement de donnes caractre personnel destin prserver l'intgrit des donnes ncessaires la dlivrance des titres d'identit et devoyage permet de scuriser la dlivrance de ces titres et d'amliorer l'efficacit de lalutte contre la fraude ; qu'elle est ainsi justifie par un motif d'intrt gnral ;

10. Considrant, toutefois, que, compte tenu de son objet, ce traitement de donnes caractre personnel est destin recueillir les donnes relatives la quasi-totalit de la

population de nationalit franaise ; que les donnes biomtriques enregistres dans ce

fichier, notamment les empreintes digitales, tant par elles-mmes susceptibles d'trerapproches de traces physiques laisses involontairement par la personne ou collectes son insu, sont particulirement sensibles ; que les caractristiques techniques de cefichier dfinies par les dispositions contestes permettent son interrogation d'autresfins que la vrification de l'identit d'une personne ; que les dispositions de la loidfre autorisent la consultation ou l'interrogation de ce fichier non seulement aux finsde dlivrance ou de renouvellement des titres d'identit et de voyage et de vrificationde l'identit du possesseur d'un tel titre, mais galement d'autres fins de policeadministrative ou judiciaire ;

11. Considrant qu'il rsulte de ce qui prcde qu'eu gard la nature des donnes

enregistres, l'ampleur de ce traitement, ses caractristiques techniques et auxconditions de sa consultation, les dispositions de l'article 5 portent au droit au respectde la vie prive une atteinte qui ne peut tre regarde comme proportionne au but


14/58

poursuivi ; que, par suite, les articles 5 et 10 de la loi doivent tre dclars contraires la Constitution ; qu'il en va de mme, par voie de consquence, du troisime alina del'article 6, de l'article 7 et de la seconde phrase de l'article 8 ;

- SUR L'ARTICLE 3 :

12. Considrant que l'article 3 de la loi dfre confre une nouvelle fonctionnalit lacarte nationale d'identit ; qu'aux termes de cet article : Si son titulaire le souhaite, lacarte nationale d'identit contient en outre des donnes, conserves sparment, lui

permettant de s'identifier sur les rseaux de communications lectroniques et de mettreen oeuvre sa signature lectronique. L'intress dcide, chaque utilisation, desdonnes d'identification transmises par voie lectronique. Le fait de ne pas disposer de la fonctionnalit dcrite au premier alina ne constitue

pas un motif lgitime de refus de vente ou de prestation de services au sens de l'articleL. 122-1 du code de la consommation ni de refus d'accs aux oprations de banquementionnes l'article L. 311-1 du code montaire et financier.

L'accs aux services d'administration lectronique mis en place par l'tat, lescollectivits territoriales ou leurs groupements ne peut tre limit aux seuls titulairesd'une carte nationale d'identit prsentant la fonctionnalit dcrite au premier alina du

prsent article ;

13. Considrant que, selon l'article 34 de la Constitution, la loi fixe les rglesconcernant les droits civiques et les garanties fondamentales accordes aux citoyens

pour l'exercice des liberts publiques et l'tat et la capacit des personnes ; qu'elledtermine galement les principes fondamentaux des obligations civiles etcommerciales ; qu'en l'tat actuel des moyens de communication et eu gard audveloppement gnralis des services de communication au public en ligne ainsi qu'l'importance prise par ces services dans la vie conomique et sociale, les conditionsgnrales dans lesquelles la carte nationale d'identit dlivre par l'tat peut permettre une personne de s'identifier sur les rseaux de communication lectronique et demettre en oeuvre sa signature lectronique, notamment des fins civiles etcommerciales, affectent directement les rgles et les principes prcits et, par suite,relvent du domaine de la loi ;

14. Considrant que l'article 3, d'une part, permet que la carte nationale d'identitcomprenne des fonctions lectroniques permettant son titulaire de s'identifier surles rseaux de communication lectroniques et de mettre en oeuvre sa signature

lectronique et, d'autre part, garantit le caractre facultatif de ces fonctions ; que lesdispositions de l'article 3 ne prcisent ni la nature des donnes au moyen desquellesces fonctions peuvent tre mises en oeuvre ni les garanties assurant l'intgrit et laconfidentialit de ces donnes ; qu'elles ne dfinissent pas davantage les conditionsdans lesquelles s'opre l'authentification des personnes mettant en oeuvre ces fonctions,notamment lorsqu'elles sont mineures ou bnficient d'une mesure de protection

juridique ; que, par suite, le lgislateur a mconnu l'tendue de sa comptence ; qu'il enrsulte que l'article 3 doit tre dclar contraire la Constitution ;

15. Considrant qu'il n'y a lieu, pour le Conseil constitutionnel, de soulever d'officeaucune autre question de conformit la Constitution,

6. D C I D E :


15/58

Article 1er.- Sont dclares contraires la Constitution les dispositions suivantes de laloi relative la protection de l'identit :

- les articles 3, 5, 7 et 10 ;- le troisime alina de l'article 6 ;

- la seconde phrase de l'article 8.

Article 2.- La prsente dcision sera publie au Journal officiel de la Rpubliquefranaise.

Dlibr par le Conseil constitutionnel dans sa sance du 22 mars 2012, o sigeaient :M. Jean-Louis DEBR, Prsident, M. Jacques BARROT, Mme Claire BAZYMALAURIE, MM. Guy CANIVET, Michel CHARASSE, Renaud DENOIX deSAINT MARC, Valry GISCARD d'ESTAING, Mme Jacqueline deGUILLENCHMIDT, MM. Hubert HAENEL et Pierre STEINMETZ.

7. Journal officiel du 28 mars 2012, p. 5607 (@ 6)

Recueil, p. 158

English Version

Decision no. 2012-652 DC of 22 March 2012

Identity Protection Act

In the conditions provided for by Article 61-2 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Councilwas seized of an application relating to the Identity Protection Act on 7 March 2012 by MrFranois REBSAMEN, Ms Jacqueline ALQUIER, Ms Michle ANDR, Messrs AlainANZIANI, David ASSOULINE, Bertrand AUBAN, Dominique BAILLY, Ms DelphineBATAILLE, Messrs Claude BRIT-DBAT, Michel BERSON, Jean BESSON, MsMaryvonne BLONDIN, Messrs Yannick BOTREL, Martial BOURQUIN, Ms BernadetteBOURZAI, Ms Nicole BRICQ, Messrs Jean-Pierre CAFFET, Pierre CAMANI, Ms Claire-Lise CAMPION, Messrs Jean-Louis CARRRE, Luc CARVOUNAS, Bernard CAZEAU,Yves CHASTAN, Jacques CHIRON, Ms Karine CLAIREAUX, Mr Grard COLLOMB, MsHlne CONWAY MOURET, Messrs Jacques CORNANO, Roland COURTEAU, Jean-

Pierre DEMERLIAT, Ms Christiane DEMONTS, Messrs Claude DILAIN, ClaudeDOMEIZEL, Ms Odette DURIEZ, Ms Frdrique ESPAGNAC, Messrs Jean-Luc FICHET,Jean-Jacques FILLEUL, Ms Catherine GNISSON, Samia GHALI, Messrs Jean-PierreGODEFROY, Claude HAUT, Edmond HERV, Claude JEANNEROT, RonanKERDRAON, MS Virginie KLS, Messrs Jacky LE MENN, Alain LE VERN, Jean-YvesLECONTE, Ms Marie-Nolle LIENEMANN, Messrs Jeanny LORGEOUX, Jacques-BernardMAGNER, Franois MARC, Marc MASSION, Ms Michelle MEUNIER, Ms DanielleMICHEL, Messrs Jean-Pierre MICHEL, Grard MIQUEL, Jean-Jacques MIRASSOU, ThaniMOHAMED SOILIHI, Jean-Marc PASTOR, Franois PATRIAT, Daniel PERCHERON,Bernard PIRAS, Ms Gisle PRINTZ, Messrs Daniel RAOUL, Thierry REPENTIN, RolandRIES, Gilbert ROGER,

Ms Patricia SCHILLINGER, Messrs Jean-Pierre SUEUR, Simon SUTOUR, MichelTESTON, Ren TEULADE, Richard YUNG, Ms Leila ACHI, Ms Esther BENBASSA,


16/58

Messrs Ronan DANTEC, Andr GATTOLIN, Jol LABB, Jean-Vincent PLAC, Ms AlineARCHIMBAUD, Marie-Christine BLANDIN, Corinne BOUCHOUX, Messrs JeanDESESSARD, Jacques MZARD, Pierre-Yves COLLOMBAT, Robert TROPEANO, Jean-Claude REQUIER, Jean-Pierre PLANCADE, Yvon COLLIN, Ms Anne-Marie ESCOFFIER,Messrs Franois FORTASSIN, Raymond VALL, Jean-Michel BAYLET, Ms Franoise

LABORDE, Ms Nicole BORVO COHEN-SEAT, Ms Eliane ASSASSI, Ms Marie-FranceBEAUFILS, Mr Eric BOCQUET, Ms Laurence COHEN, Ms Ccile CUKIERMAN, MsAnnie DAVID, Ms Michelle DEMESSINE, Ms Evelyne DIDIER, Messrs Christian FAVIER,Guy FISCHER, Thierry FOUCAUD, Ms Brigitte GONTHIER-MAURIN, Messrs Grard LECAM, Michel LE SCOUARNEC, Ms Isabelle PASQUET, Ms Mireille SCHURCH and MrPaul VERGS, senators;

And on the same day by Mr Jean-Marc AYRAULT, Ms Patricia

ADAM, Messrs Jean-Paul BACQUET, Dominique BAERT, Jean-Pierre BALLIGAND,Grard BAPT, Ms Delphine BATHO, Ms Marie-Nolle BATTISTEL, Messrs Jean-Louis

BIANCO, Serge BLISKO, Daniel BOISSERIE, Ms Marie-Odile BOUILL, Ms MoniqueBOULESTIN, Messrs Pierre BOURGUIGNON, Jrme CAHUZAC, Jean-ChristopheCAMBADLIS, Thierry CARCENAC, Laurent CATHALA, Guy CHAMBEFORT, Jean-Paul CHANTEGUET, Grard CHARASSE, Alain CLAEYS, Ms Marie-FranoiseCLERGEAU, Messrs Pierre COHEN, Frdric CUVILLIER, Pascal DEGUILHEM, GuyDELCOURT, Bernard DEROSIER, Julien DRAY, Tony DREYFUS, William DUMAS, MsLaurence DUMONT, Messrs Jean-Paul DUPR, Olivier DUSSOPT, Christian ECKERT,Henri EMMANUELLI, Ms Corinne ERHEL, Ms Martine FAURE, Mr Herv FRON, MsAurlie FILIPPETTI, Ms Genevive FIORASO, Messrs Pierre FORGUES, Jean-LouisGAGNAIRE, Ms Genevive GAILLARD, Messrs Guillaume GAROT, Paul GIACOBBI,Jean-Patrick GILLE, Ms Annick GIRARDIN, Messrs Jol GIRAUD, Daniel GOLDBERG,Ms Pascale GOT, Messrs Marc GOUA, Jean GRELLIER, Ms Elisabeth GUIGOU, Mr DavidHABIB, Ms Danile HOFFMAN-RISPAL, Ms Sandrine HUREL, Ms Franoise IMBERT,Messrs Michel ISSINDOU, Serge JANQUIN, Henri JIBRAYEL, Rgis JUANICO, ArmandJUNG, Ms Marietta KARAMANLI, Messrs Jean-Pierre KUCHEIDA, Jrme LAMBERT,Jack LANG, Ms Colette LANGLADE, Messrs Jean-Yves LE BOUILLONNEC, Gilbert LEBRIS, Jean-Marie LE GUEN, Bruno LE ROUX, Ms Marylise LEBRANCHU, Messrs MichelLEFAIT, Patrick LEMASLE, Ms Catherine LEMORTON, Ms Annick LEPETIT, MessrsBernard LESTERLIN, Michel LIEBGOTT, Franois LONCLE, Jean MALLOT, Jean-RenMARSAC, Philippe MARTIN, Ms Martine MARTINEL, Ms Frdrique MASSAT, MrDidier MATHUS, Ms Sandrine MAZETIER, Messrs Klber MESQUIDA, Jean MICHEL,

Arnaud MONTEBOURG, Pierre-Alain MUET, Philippe NAUCHE, Henri NAYROU,Christian PAUL, Germinal PEIRO, Jean-Luc PRAT, Jean-Claude PEREZ, Ms SylviaPINEL, Mr Franois PUPPONI, Ms Catherine QUR, Messrs Dominique RAIMBOURG,Simon RENUCCI, Ms Marie-Line REYNAUD, Ms Chantal ROBIN-RODRIGO, MessrsMarcel ROGEMONT, Bernard ROMAN, Gwendal ROUILLARD, Ren ROUQUET,Christophe SIRUGUE, Jean-Louis TOURAINE, Philippe TOURTELIER, Jean-JacquesURVOAS, Daniel VAILLANT, Jacques VALAX, Alain VIDALIES, Jean-MichelVILLAUM and Philippe VUILQUE, Members of Parliament.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL,

Having regard to Ordinance no. 58-1067 of 7 November 1958 as amended, concerning thebasic law on the Constitutional Council;


17/58

Having regard to Act n 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on Data Processing, Data Files andIndividual Liberties;

Having regard to the observations of the Government in response to the application and itscomplementary observations submitted upon request by the Constitutional Council, registered

on 15 March 2012;

Having regard to the observations in response filed by the applicant senators, filed on 20March 2012;

Having heard the rapporteur;

1. Considering that the applicant members of Parliament and senators have submitted theIdentity Protection Act to the Constitutional Council; that they object that the provisions ofArticles 5 and 10 of that act are unconstitutional;

- WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLES 5 and 10:

2. Considering that Article 5 of the act referred provides for the establishment, in theconditions provided for under the aforementioned act of 6 January 1978, of a databasecontaining personal data in order to facilitate the collection and conservation of the datarequired for the issue of French passports and national identity cards which is intended tomaintain the integrity of these data; that these include the data contained in the secureelectronic chip on the national identity card and passport as listed in Article 2 of the act whichinclude, in addition to the marital status and residence of the holder, its height, eye colour,fingerprints and photograph;

3. Considering that Article 5 enables an applicant for an identity or travel document to beidentified by consulting the database containing personal data through the data listed inArticle 2, with the exception of the photograph; that it also provides that the databasecontaining personal data may be consulted using two fingerprints collected in the database,first upon issue of identity and travel documents, secondly for investigative requirementsrelating to certain offences if authorised by the public prosecutor or the examining judge, andthirdly upon request by the public prosecutor in order to establish the identity of a deceased

person who has fallen victim to a natural disaster or a collective accident, if it is unknown;

4. Considering that Article 6 of the act referred enables the identity of the holder or an identity

card or passport to be verified on the basis of the data reported on the identity or traveldocument or on the secure electronic chip; that it also enables this verification to be carriedout by consulting the data conserved in the database provided for under Article 5 in the event

that there is a serious doubt as to the identity of the person or where the document presented isdefective or appears to have been damaged or modified;

5. Considering that Article 10 enables officers who have been individually designated andduly authorised from the national police and gendarmeriedepartments to gain access to thedatabase containing personal data established pursuant to Article 5 for the purpose of

preventing or punishing attacks against the independence of the Nation, its territorial integrity,its security, the republican form of its institutions, its defence or diplomatic service, to

safeguard its population in France and abroad and the essential elements of its scientific andeconomic potential, and to prevent or punish acts of terrorism;


18/58

6. Considering that, according to the applicants, the establishment of a biometric databasecovering almost all of the French population, the characteristics of which enable a person to

be identified on the basis of its fingerprints, amounts to an unconstitutional breach of the rightto respect for private life; that moreover, in permitting the information contained in thisdatabase to be consulted for administrative purposes or by the investigating police, Parliament

failed to adopt legal guarantees against the risk of arbitrary action;

7. Considering in the first place that Article 34 of the Constitution provides that the act shallspecify the rules relating to the fundamental guarantees to be afforded to citizens for the

purpose of exercising public freedoms as well as in relation to criminal procedure; that it isfor Parliament, acting within the bounds of its competence, to ensure that a balance is struckon the one hand between the safeguarding of public order and bringing offenders to justice,

both of which are necessary in order to uphold principles and rights of constitutional standing,and on the other hand the respect for other rights and freedoms protected under constitutionallaw; that it is at any time at liberty to adopt new provisions which may appear appropriate to itand to amend earlier texts or to repeal and replace them, as the case may be, with other

provisions, provided that when exercising this power it does not impinge upon the legalguarantees of constitutional standing;

8. Considering, secondly, that the freedom proclaimed under Article 2 of the 1789 Declarationof the Rights of Man and the Citizen implies the right to respect for private life; thataccordingly, the collection, registration, conservation, consultation and communication of

personal data must be justified on grounds of general interest and implemented in an adequatemanner, proportionate to this objective;

9. Considering that the establishment of a database containing personal data intended tomaintain the integrity of the data necessary for the issue of identity and travel documentsmakes it possible to render the issue of these documents more secure and to improve theefficiency of the fight against fraud; that it is accordingly justified on grounds of generalinterest;

10. Considering however that, given its object, this database containing personal data isintended to collect data relating to almost all of the population of French nationality; thatsince the biometric data registered in this file, including in particular fingerprints, arethemselves liable to be compared with physical traces left involuntarily by an individual orcollected unbeknown to him, they are particularly sensitive; that the technical characteristicsof this database as defined by the contested provisions enable it to be consulted for purposes

other than the verification of an individual's identity; that the provisions of the act referredauthorise this database to be consulted or viewed not only in relation to the issue or renewal ofidentity and travel documents or to verify the holder of such a document, but also for other

purposes of an administrative nature or by the investigating police;

11. Considering that according to the above, having regard to the nature of the data registered,the scope of this processing, its technical characteristics and the conditions under which itmay be consulted, the provisions of Article 5 violate the right to respect for privacy in amanner which cannot be regarded as proportionate to the goal pursued; that accordingly,Articles 5 and 10 of the act must be ruled unconstitutional; that the same applies, inconsequence, to the third subparagraph of article 6, Article 7 and the second phrase of Article

8;

- WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE3:


19/58

12. Considering that Article 3 of the act referred establishes a new function for the nationalidentity card; that pursuant to that article: If requested by its holder, the national identity cardmay also contain data, stored separately, enabling it to identify itself on electroniccommunication networks and to affix its electronic signature. Upon each use, the interested

party shall decide which identification data are to be transmitted electronically.

The fact that an identity card does not have the functions described in the first subparagraph

does not constitute legitimate grounds for refusal to sell or to provide services pursuant toArticle L. 122-1 of the Consumer Code or to deny access to the banking operations mentionedunder Article L. 311-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code.

Access to the electronic administration services implemented by the State, the local

authorities or their groupings cannot be limited solely to the holders of a national identity cardhaving the functions described in the first subparagraph of this Article;

13. Considering that, according to Article 34 of the Constitution, legislation shall determine

the rules concerning: civil rights and the fundamental guarantees afforded to citizens for theexercise of their civil liberties; that it shall also determine the fundamental principles of civiland commercial obligations; that under the current state of means of communication andhaving regard to the general development of online communication services for the public aswell as the importance of these services in economic and social life, the general conditionsunder which the national identity card issued by the State may enable a person to identifyitself on electronic communication networks and to affix its electronic signature, in particularfor civil and commercial purposes, directly pertain to the rules and principles cited above, andaccordingly fall within the purview of the law;

14. Considering that Article 3 on the one hand permits the national identity card to includeelectronic functions enabling its holder to identify itself on electronic communication

networks and to affix its electronic signature, whilst on the other hand guarantees the optionalnature of these functions; that the provisions of Article 3 do not specify either the nature ofthe data through which these functions may be implemented or the guarantees ensuring the

integrity and confidentiality of this data; that they do not define in any greater detail theconditions under which the persons implementing these functions are to be authenticated,especially when they are minors or are subject to legal protection; that accordingly,Parliament acted in excess of its powers; that accordingly Article 3 must be ruledunconstitutional;

15. Considering that there are no grounds for the Constitutional Council to raise ex officioanyother question concerning compatibility with the Constitution,

HELD:

Article 1 .- The following provisions of the Identity Protection Act are hereby ruledunconstitutional:

- Articles 3, 5, 7 and 10;

- the third subparagraph of Article 6;

- the second phrase of Article 8.


20/58

Article 2.- This decision shall be published in the Journal officiel of the French Republic.

Deliberated by the Constitutional Council in its session on 22 March 2012, sat on by: MrJean-Louis DEBR, President, Mr Jacques BARROT, Ms Claire BAZY MALAURIE,Messrs Guy CANIVET, Michel CHARASSE, Renaud DENOIX de SAINT MARC, Valry

GISCARD d'ESTAING, Ms Jacqueline de GUILLENCHMIDT, and Messrs HubertHAENEL and Pierre STEINMETZ.

3.

UK Supreme Court Private Life Decision ofFebruary 24, 2010

[Home][Databases][World Law][Multidatabase Search][Help][Feedback]

United Kingdom Supreme CourtYou are here:BAILII>>Databases>>United Kingdom Supreme Court>> Norris v Government of UnitedStates of America [2010] UKSC 9 (24 February 2010)URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/9.html

Cite as: [2010] UKSCUni9, [2010] 2 All ER 267, [2010] 2 WLR 572, [2010] Lloyd's Rep FC 325, [2010]2 AC 487

[New search][Printable PDF version][Buy ICLR report:[2010] 2 AC 487][Buy ICLRreport:[2010] 2 WLR 572][Help]

Summary

Hilary Term[2010] UKSC 9

On appeal from:[2009] EWHC 995 (Admin)

JUDGMENT
http://www.bailii.org/http://www.bailii.org/http://www.bailii.org/http://www.bailii.org/databases.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/databases.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/databases.htmlhttp://www.austlii.edu.au/links/World/http://www.austlii.edu.au/links/World/http://www.austlii.edu.au/links/World/http://www.bailii.org/form/search_multidatabase.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/form/search_multidatabase.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/form/search_multidatabase.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/bailii/help/http://www.bailii.org/bailii/help/http://www.bailii.org/bailii/help/http://www.bailii.org/bailii/feedback.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/bailii/feedback.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/bailii/feedback.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/http://www.bailii.org/http://www.bailii.org/http://www.bailii.org/databases.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/databases.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/databases.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/http://www.bailii.org/form/search_cases.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/form/search_cases.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/form/search_cases.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/9.pdfhttp://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/9.pdfhttp://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/9.pdfhttps://shop.iclr.co.uk/Subscr/welcome.aspx?docId=XAC2010-2-487https://shop.iclr.co.uk/Subscr/welcome.aspx?docId=XAC2010-2-487https://shop.iclr.co.uk/Subscr/welcome.aspx?docId=XAC2010-2-487https://shop.iclr.co.uk/Subscr/welcome.aspx?docId=XWLR2010-2-572https://shop.iclr.co.uk/Subscr/welcome.aspx?docId=XWLR2010-2-572https://shop.iclr.co.uk/Subscr/welcome.aspx?docId=XWLR2010-2-572http://www.bailii.org/bailii/help/http://www.bailii.org/bailii/help/http://www.bailii.org/bailii/help/http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/9.%28image1%29.pdfhttp://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/9.%28image1%29.pdfhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2009/995.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2009/995.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2009/995.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2009/995.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/9.%28image1%29.pdfhttp://www.bailii.org/bailii/help/https://shop.iclr.co.uk/Subscr/welcome.aspx?docId=XWLR2010-2-572https://shop.iclr.co.uk/Subscr/welcome.aspx?docId=XAC2010-2-487http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/9.pdfhttp://www.bailii.org/form/search_cases.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/http://www.bailii.org/databases.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/http://www.bailii.org/bailii/feedback.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/bailii/help/http://www.bailii.org/form/search_multidatabase.htmlhttp://www.austlii.edu.au/links/World/http://www.bailii.org/databases.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/


21/58

Norris (Appellant) v Government of United States of America (Respondent)

before

Lord Phillips, PresidentLord Hope, Deputy President

Lord RodgerLady HaleLord BrownLord ManceLord JudgeLord CollinsLord Kerr

JUDGMENT GIVEN ON

24 February 2010

Heard on 30 November and 1 December 2009

AppellantJonathan Sumption QCMartin Chamberlain(Instructed by White & Case LLP)

RespondentDavid Perry QCLouis Mably

(Instructed by Crown Prosecution Service)

IntervenerRichard Hermer QCJoseph MiddletonAlex Gask(Instructed by Liberty)

LORD PHILLIPS, with whom all the members of the court agree

Introduction

1. A judge who is holding an extradition hearing pursuant to the Extradition Act 2003("the 2003 Act") is required to consider whether the extradition of the person againstwhom the order is sought would be compatible with that person's human rights underthe Human Rights Act 1998. If not, that person must be discharged. The issues of

principle raised by this appeal relate to the approach that should be adopted in carrying outthis exercise where extradition will interfere with that person's right to respect for his privateand family life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("theConvention").

2. Once I have identified these principles, I shall apply those that are relevant to the case of theappellant, Mr Norris. His extradition is sought by the respondent, the United StatesGovernment ("the Government"), in order that he may be tried on an indictment charging himwith obstruction of justice. His case is that when the consequences of extradition to the

article 8 rights that he and his wife enjoy in this country are weighed against the publicinterest in his extradition for what is no more than an ancillary offence, the interferencethat this would cause with those rights cannot be justified. This case was rejected by


22/58

District Judge Evans and by the Divisional Court, consisting of Laws LJ and Openshaw J. Ishall say no more about the facts until I have dealt with the issues of principle.

The 2003 Act

3.

The 2003 Act created a new extradition regimethat was intended to simplify the process.Under the new regime considerations that were for the Secretary of State are transferred to thecourt, and these include the compatibility of extradition with Convention rights. Part 1 of the2003 Act deals with extradition to "Category 1 territories". These are, in effect, members ofthe European Union which operate the European Arrest Warrant. Part 2 deals with extraditionto Category 2 territories that have been designated by order of the Secretary of State. TheUnited States is a category 2 territory. Under both Part 1 and Part 2 procedures the appropriate

judge has to carry out an extradition hearing at which he considers whether there exists any ofthe prescribed statutory bars to extradition. These include incompatibility with Conventionrights. Section 21 in Part 1 and section 87 in Part 2 provide in identical terms that the judge"must decide whether the person's extradition would be compatible with the Convention

rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998". If yes, an order for extraditionmust follow. If no, the person must be discharged.

4. General provision is made in both Part 1 and Part 2 for circumstances that may well involveinterferences with Convention rights. Section 13 in Part 1 and section 81 in Part 2 barextradition by reason of "extraneous considerations" which might result in discrimination oran unfair trial, in violation of the Convention. Section 14 in Part 1 and section 82 in Part 2

provide that extradition is barred by the passage of time if, but only if, this would makeextradition appear unjust or oppressive. Section 91 in Part 2 precludes extradition where itappears to the judge that the physical or mental condition of the person whose extradition issought is such that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him. It is not alleged that anyof these provisions applies in the case of Mr Norris.

Extradition treaties

5. Public international law does not impose a general duty upon countries to accede to requestsfor extradition. Obligations to extradite arise out of bilateral treaties. Nonetheless a number ofConventions have been concluded that impose on states an obligation to extradite or prosecutein respect of certain offences or which limit the grounds upon which a state can refuse toextradite. These reflect increasing international cooperation in the fight against crime.

6.

The relevant treaty in the present case is the Extradition Treaty of 1972 between theUnited Kingdom and the United States, for this applies in the case of any extraditionproceedings in which the extradition documents were submitted before 26 April 2007. On thatdate a new treaty, the Extradition Treaty of 2003 (Cm 5821) came into force. The extraditiondocuments in this case were submitted in January 2005.

7. The 1972 Treaty imposes, subject to specified exceptions, mutual obligations to extradite inrespect of offences which carry a sentence of at least 12 months imprisonment in each

jurisdiction. Article V (2) of the 1972 Treaty provides that extradition may be re fused on anyground which is specified by the law of the requested party. Thus the United Kingdom willnot be in breach of its treaty obligations if, by reason of section 87 of the 2003 Act,

extradition is refused on human rights grounds.

Common ground


23/58

8. Article 8 of the Convention provides:

"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and hiscorrespondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except

such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interestsof national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the

prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection ofthe rights and freedoms of others"

9. The following matters are common ground:

i) In this case, as in most extradition cases, extradition of Mr Norris from this country willinterfere with his exercise in this country of his right to respect for his private and family life.

ii) This interference will be in accordance with the law.

iii) The critical issue in this case is whether this interference is "necessary in a democraticsocietyfor the prevention of disorder or crime".

iv) Resolving this issue involves a test of proportionality. The interference must fulfil a"pressing social need". It must also be proportionate to the "legitimate aim" relied upon to

justify the interference.

10.The Government contends that the legitimate aim, or pressing social need, is the honouring ofextradition arrangements (an important aspect of the prevention of crime), that this aimweighs heavily in the scales and that the circumstances in which interference with article 8rights will not be proportionate to it will be exceptional.

11.Mr Sumption QC for Mr Norris does not challenge this assertion. He accepts that it will onlybe in exceptional circumstances that extradition will be refused on the ground that it involvesa disproportionate interference with article 8 rights. He submits, however, that this fact cannot

be translated into a legal principle. The court cannot impose on a person challengingextradition a threshold requirement of demonstrating that his case is exceptional. He submitsthat this is what the Divisional Court did.

The primary issue of principle

12.The primary issue of principle is whether the court can properly require a person resisting

extradition on article 8 grounds to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. Mr Sumptioncontends that the Divisional Court erred in doing just this. His argument is preciselyexpressed in the following two paragraphs of his written case:

"19. [The Divisional Court's] essential error was that they sought to balance the principle ofinternational cooperation in enforcing the criminal law, against the respect due to the privateand family life of accused persons. Concluding that the former was the more potent interest,they held as a matter of law that the latter could prevail only on facts which were 'striking orunusual' or which reached a 'high threshold'. Hence the question which they certified as beingof general public importance:

'Is the public interest in honouring extradition treaties such as to require, in any extraditioncase, that an appellant must show 'striking and unusual facts' or reach 'a high threshold' if hisarticle 8 claim is to succeed?'


24/58

The effect is to create a strong presumption against the application of article 8 in extraditioncases, and to require exceptional circumstances before any objection to extradition on article 8grounds can succeed, a proposition which has been rejected by the House of Lords, followinga substantial body of case law in the European Court of Human Rights.

20. The correct approach is to balance the public interest in the extradition of this particular

accused against the damage which would be done to the private or family life of thisparticular accused and his family. The court must ask how much damage will really be doneto the orderly functioning of the system of extradition, or the prevention of disorder or crime,

by declining to extradite Mr. Norris in this case. And whether that damage is so great as tooutweigh the devastating impact that extradition would have upon the rest of his and hiswife's life together. These questions must, moreover be answered with an eye to the fact thatthe test imposed by article 8(2) is not whether his extradition is on balance desirable, butwhether it is necessaryin a democratic society."

13.For the Government Mr Perry QC has not sought to challenge the assertion that the court mustnot replace the test of proportionality with a test of exceptionality. His submission has beenthat the Divisional Court has not done so. All that it has done is to acknowledge the fact that,in an extradition context, an article 8 challenge will rarely succeed. This is unobjectionable.

Subsidiary issues of principle

14.A number of subsidiary issues of principle in relation to the application of the test ofproportionality in an extradition case became apparent in the course of argument. These are asfollows:

i) Is the gravity of the crime in respect of which extradition is sought a relevant factor? Mr

Sumption submits that it is and that this weighs in favour of Mr Norris for, so he submits, theextradition crime in this case is not a grave one. Mr Perry joins issue with this last contention,but submits that the gravity of the extradition crime is of no relevance. The obligation toextradite only arises in respect of offences which attract at least 12 months' imprisonment.Subject to that it matters not whether the person whose extradition is sought is a thief or amass murderer.

ii) Do you consider the interference in respect for family rights solely from the viewpoint ofthe person whose extradition is sought ("the extraditee"), or also from the viewpoint of othermembers of his family who are affected? Mr Perry submits the former, so that we shouldconsider only the effect of extradition on Mr Norris. Mr Sumption submits the latter, and

places particular emphasis on the effect that Mr Norris' extradition will have upon his wife.

iii) Is it relevant to consider whether it would be possible to prosecute the extraditee in therequested state? It has become common to urge this possibility as a factor that weighs againstextradition. It is not suggested that Mr Norris could be prosecuted in this jurisdiction forobstructing justice in the United States, so this issue is of no interest to Mr Sumption. MrPerry none the less urges us to make it clear that the possibility of prosecution in the requestedstate is an irrelevance.

Preliminary observations

15.Before embarking on an analysis of the jurisprudence I would make these preliminaryobservations. The jurisprudence often deals with deportation and extradition withoutdistinguishing between the two. In one context this is understandable. Usually human rightsissues relate to the treatment of an individual within the jurisdiction of the State whoseconduct is under attack ("domestic cases"). Issues have, however, arisen as to whether, and


25/58

in what circumstances, the Convention can be infringed by despatching a person to a territorywhere there is a risk that his human rights will not be respected ("foreign cases"). Inconsidering such issues it may be of no or little relevance whether the individual in question isfacing deportation or extradition. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that this questionis of no relevance in a case such as the present . This is a domestic case. The family rights

that are in issue are rights enjoyed in this country. The issue of proportionality involvesweighing the interference with those rights against the relevant public interest. Thepublic interest in extraditing a person to be tried for an alleged crime is of a different orderfrom the public interest in deporting or removing from this country an alien who has beenconvicted of a crime and who has served his sentence for it, or whose presence here is forsome other reason not acceptable. This is a matter to which I shall return after consideringthe relevant jurisprudence.

The Strasbourg ju r isprudence

16.I propose to follow the development of the Strasbourg jurisprudence in relation to deportation

and extradition with particular reference to the issues raised on this appeal. The starting pointis Soeri ng v Uni ted Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439. This was the first case in which theStrasbourg Court recognised that the Convention could be infringed by sending a person to acountry where Convention rights would be violated. It was an extradition case. The issue waswhether the United Kingdom would be in breach of the Convention if it extradited theapplicant to Virginia to stand trial for capital murder. The evidence was that, if he wasconvicted, the applicant would face up to eight years on death row. This, he contended, would

be inhuman and degrading treatment.

17.The Court accepted this argument. It first made this observation in relation to the fact thatarticle 1 of the Convention requires each contracting state to secure the Convention rights forthose "within their jurisdiction".

"86. . . . Article 1 cannot be read as justifying a general principle to the effect that,notwithstanding its extradition obligations, a Contracting State may not surrender anindividual unless satisfied that the conditions awaiting him in the country of destination are infull accord with each of the safeguards of the Convention. Indeed, as the United KingdomGovernment stressed, the beneficial purpose of extradition in preventing fugitive offendersfrom evading justice cannot be ignored in determining the scope of application of theConvention and of article 3 in particular."

18.

The Court went on to conclude, however:"88 . . . It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, that'common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law' to which thePreamble refers, were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another Statewhere there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of beingsubjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed. Extradition in suchcircumstances, while not explicitly referred to in the brief and general wording of article 3,would plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendment of the article, and in the Court's viewthis inherent obligation not to extradite also extends to cases in which the fugitive would befaced in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or

punishment proscribed by that article.91 In sum, the decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issueunder article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where
http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1989/14.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1989/14.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1989/14.html


26/58

substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited,faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or

punishment in the requesting country."

19.In paras 110 and 111 the Court considered an argument advanced on behalf of Soering that it

was relevant that, instead of extraditing him to Virginia, he could be deported to his owncountry, Germany, where he could be tried without the risk of the death penalty or death rowconditions. The United Kingdom Government urged that no such distinction should be drawn.The Court held, nonetheless:

"However, sending Mr Soering to be tried in his own country would remove the danger of afugitive criminal going unpunished as well as the risk of intense and protracted suffering ondeath row. It is therefore a circumstance of relevance for the overall assessment under article3 in that it goes to the search for the requisite fair balance of interests and to the

proportionality of the contested extradition decision in the particular case.

. . .

A further consideration of relevance is that in the particular instance the legitimate purpose ofextradition could be achieved by another means which would not involve suffering of suchexceptional intensity or duration." (paras 110, 111)

20.At para 113 the Court dealt with a submission that extradition would also infringe theapplicant's article 6 rights because he would not be able to obtain legal assistance in Virginia.The Court held:

"The right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings, as embodied in Article 6, holds a prominentplace in a democratic society. The Court does not exclude that an issue might exceptionallybe

raised under Article 6 by an extradition decision in circumstances where the fugitive hassuffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country. However,the facts of the present case do not disclose such a risk. " (emphasis added)

21.In HG v Switzerl and (Application No 24698/94) (unreported) given 6 September 1994 theCommission considered the admissibility of a complaint by a Turkish national that extraditionfrom Switzerland to Turkey to serve a sentence imposed for kidnapping and raping a 14 yearold girl would infringe article 3 because of Turkish prison conditions, article 6 because histrial in Turkey had not been fair and article 8 because extradition would interfere with respectfor his family life in Switzerland. The Commission held in para 2 that expulsion or extraditionmight "in exceptional circumstances" involve a violation of fundamental rights because of theserious fear of treatment contrary to article 2 or 3 in the requesting country. It further held thatan issue might "exceptionally"be raised under article 6 where a fugitive had suffered or riskedsuffering "a flagrant denial of a fair trial" in the requesting state (emphases added). TheCommission held that, on the facts, this was not such a case. It went on to reject theadmissibility of the article 8 claim on the facts.

22.In Raidl v Austria (1995) 20 EHRR CD 114 the Commission once again considered theadmissibility of a claim that extradition to Russia on suspicion of murder had infringed theapplicant's Convention rights. After finding ill-founded a complaint based on article 3 theCommission went on to consider the applicant's complaint that extradition had interfered with

her married life in Austria, thereby violating her article 8 rights. The Commission held at p123:
http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1995/93.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1995/93.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1995/93.html


27/58

"the interference with the applicant's family life was proportionate to the legitimate aim

pursued,given the seriousness of the crime, of which theapplicant was suspectedeven beforeshe contracted marriage in Austria." (emphasis added)

23.In Launder v Uni ted Kingdom (1997) 25 EHRR CD67 the Commission considered the

admissibility of a complaint that the United Kingdom would violate articles 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8 ifit extradited him to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. In finding the applicationmanifestly ill-founded the Commission said this in relation to article 8, at para 3:

"The Commission considers that it is only in exceptional circumstances that the extradition ofa person to face trial on charges of serious offences committed in the requesting state would

be held to be an unjustified or disproportionate interference with the right to respect for familylife." (emphasis added)

24.In Chahal v Uni ted Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413 the United Kingdom had detained MrChahal for some six years on the ground that they were taking action against him with a view

to his deportation, this being a justification for interference with the article 5 Convention rightto liberty by virtue of article 5(1)(f). The Government wished to deport him to India becausehe was suspected of involvement in terrorism. The Court held that, because of the danger oftorture or inhuman or degrading treatment that he would face if deported, his deportationwould violate article 3. It rejected the contention of the UK Government that the fact that he

posed a risk to the security of the United Kingdom had any relevance to the assessment of thisquestion. Mr Chahal and his wife and two children, who joined in his application, alsocontended that his deportation would violate their article 8 rights to respect for their familylife in the United Kingdom. The Court held that it had no need to decide this hypotheticalquestion.

25.

The principles to be applied when considering the proportionality of deportation that wouldinterfere with article 8 family rights were first enunciated by the Court in Boultif vSwitzerland(2001) 33 EHRR 50.The applicant, an Algerian, had married a Swiss citizen andestablished a home in Switzerland. He then committed a robbery for which he received a twoyear prison sentence. After he had come out of prison the Swiss authorities refused to renewhis residence permit. This meant that he would have to return to Algeria whither, the Courtfound, his wife could not reasonably be expected to follow him. The Court laid down thefollowing principles:

"46. The Court recalls that it is for the Contracting States to maintain public order, in

particular by exercising their right, as a matter of well-established international law andsubject to their treaty obligations, to control the entry and residence of aliens. To that end theyhave the power to deport aliens convicted of criminal offences. However, their decisions inthis field must, in so far as they may interfere with a right protected under paragraph 1 ofArticle 8, be necessary in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing socialneed and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see Dalia, cited above, p.91, 52, and Mehemi v. France, judgment of 26 September 1997, Reports 1997-VI, p. 1971, 34).

47. Accordingly, the Court's task consists in ascertaining whether the refusal to renew theapplicant's residence permit in the circumstances struck a fair balance between the relevantinterests, namely the applicant's right to respect for his family life, on the one hand, and the

prevention of disorder and crime, on the other.
http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1997/106.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1997/106.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1996/54.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1996/54.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1996/54.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/2001/497.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/2001/497.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/2001/497.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/2001/497.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1996/54.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1997/106.html


28/58

48. The Court has only to a limited extent decided cases where the main obstacle to expulsionis the difficulties for the spouses to stay together and in particular for a spouse and/or childrento live in the other's country of origin. It is therefore called upon to establish guiding

principles in order to examine whether the measure was necessary in a democratic society.

In assessing the relevant criteria in such a case, the Court will consider the nature and

seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant; the length of the applicant's stay in thecountry from which he is going to be expelled; the time elapsed since the offence wascommitted as well as the applicant's conduct in that period; the nationalities of the various

persons concerned; the applicant's family situation, such as the length of the marriage; andother factors expressing the effectiveness of a couple's family life; whether the spouse knewabout the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship; and whetherthere are children in the marriage, and if so, their age. Not least, the Court will also considerthe seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the country oforigin, though the mere fact that a person might face certain difficulties in accompanying heror his spouse cannot in itself exclude an expulsion."

Applying these principles, the Court found violation of article 8.

26.In ner v The Netherlands(2007) 45 EHRR 14the Grand Chamber confirmed the principleslaid down inBoultif, adding to these at para 58:

"the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of thedifficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to whichthe applicant is to be expelled; and

-the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country ofdestination."

27.The Court then went on to say this:

"59. The Court considered itself called upon to establish 'guiding principles' in the Boultifcasebecause it had 'only a limited number of decided cases where the main obstacle to expulsionwas that it would entail difficulties for the spouses to stay together and, in particular, for oneof them and/or the children to live in the other's country of origin' . . . . It is to be noted,however, that the first three guiding principles do not, as such, relate to family life. This leadsthe Court to consider whether the 'Boultifcriteria' are sufficiently comprehensive to renderthem suitable for application in all cases concerning the expulsion and/or exclusion of settledmigrants following a criminal conviction. It observes in this context that not all such migrants,no matter how long they have been residing in the country from which they are to be expelled,necessarily enjoy 'family life' there within the meaning of article 8. However, as article 8 also

protects the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and theoutside world (see Pretty v the United Kingdom, no.2346/02, [61], (2002) 35 EHRR 1) andcan sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's society identity (see Mikulic v Croatia,

No.53176/99, [53], BAILII:[2002] ECHR 27), it must be accepted that the totality of socialties between settled migrants and the community in which they are living constitute part of theconcept of 'private life' within the meaning of article 8. Regardless of the existence orotherwise of a 'family life', therefore, the court considers that the expulsion of a settledmigrant constitutes interference with his or her right to respect for private life. It will depend

on the circumstances of the particular case whether it is appropriate for the Court to focus onthe 'family life' rather than the 'private life' aspect.
http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/873.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/873.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/873.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/2002/427.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/2002/427.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2002/27.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2002/27.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2002/27.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2002/27.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/2002/427.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/873.html


29/58


30/58

evaluation, having regard to the facts of the particular case. While it is unusual for anapplicant to be able to make out a case of breach of the Convention in such circumstances, itis by no means unknown.

31.The third situation is where, in a domestic case, breach of article 8 rights within the territory

of the respondent State is advanced as a bar to extradition. There is, in fact, no reported casein which such a complaint has succeeded, or even been held admissible where not joined withother allegations of breach.

32.So far as the subsidiary issues are concerned,

i) The reasoning of the Court in Soering 11 EHRR 439 and the express reference to "theseriousness of the crime" inRaidl20 EHRR CD 114, 123 suggest that the gravity of the crimein respect of which extradition is sought is capable of being a material factor.

ii) There is no support for the proposition that the Court is solely concerned with the familyrights of the applicant, to the exclusion of those of other members of the family. On thecontrary, at least in deportation and expulsion cases, the Grand Chamber has made it clear inner 45 EHRR 421 that the interests of children are particularly material, and there is noreason to conclude that the same is not true in an extradition case, in so far as family rightsweigh in the balance at all.

iii) The Court in Soering held that the possibility of trying a defendant in a forum where hisfundamental rights will not be at risk can be a material factor when considering the

proportionality of extradition in the face of a risk to those rights.

The domestic jur isprudence

33.When considering the domestic jurisprudence it is important to distinguish between the threedifferent categories of case that I have identified in paragraphs 29 to 31 above. It is a failure todo so that has led to the primary issue of principle in this appeal.

34.I shall start my survey of the domestic cases with three appeals to the House of Lords thatwere heard together R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator; Do v Immigration Appeal Tribunal[2004] UKHL 26; [2004] 2 AC 323; R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home

Department [2004] UKHL 27; [2004] 2 AC 368. The appellants in each appeal wereunsuccessful asylum applicants who were resisting removal from the United Kingdom. InUllah the applicants complained that in the countries to which they were to be removed theirarticle 9 rights to practise their religions would be infringed. In Razgar the applicant

complained that in Germany, to which country he was to be removed, he would not receiveappropriate treatment for psychiatric illness from which he suffered, with the consequencethat there would be interference with his article 8 right to respect for his private life. Thusthese were foreign cases; indeed it was on these appeals that Lord Bingham of Cornhill coinedthe phrases "domestic cases" and "foreign cases" that I have adopted in this judgment: see[2004] 2 AC 323,paras 8-9. The principal issue was whether, in a foreign case, rights otherthan article 3 could be engaged. The House of Lords, applying dicta of the Strasbourg Court,held that they could.

35.In paragraphs 17 to 20 of Razgar Lord Bingham set out five sequential questions that animmigration adjudicator should consider in cases where removal was resisted in reliance on

article 8. The fourth was whether interference with the article 8 right was necessary in ademocratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-

being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1989/14.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1989/14.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/26.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/26.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/26.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/26.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/27.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/27.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/27.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/27.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/26.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/26.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/26.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/27.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/27.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/26.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/26.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/eu/cases/ECHR/1989/14.html


31/58

morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others these being the criteria ofjustification under article 8(2). The fifth question, assuming an affirmative answer to thefourth question, was whether such interference was proportionate to the legitimate public endsought to be achieved.

36.

Lord Bingham made the following comments on the answers to these questions:

"19. Where removal is proposed in pursuance of a lawful immigration policy, question (4)will almost always fall to be answered affirmatively. This is because the right of sovereignstates, subject to treaty obligations, to regulate the entry and expulsion of aliens is recognisedin the Strasbourg jurisprudence (see Ullah[2004] 2 AC 323,339, para 6) and implementationof a firm and orderly immigration policy is an important function of government in a moderndemocratic state. In the absence of bad faith, ulterior motive or deliberate abuse of power it ishard to imagine an adjudicator answering this question other than affirmatively.

20. The answering of question (5), where that question is reached, must always involve thestriking of a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of thecommunity which is inherent in the whole of the Convention. The severity and consequencesof the interference will call for careful assessment at this stage."

He subsequently added:

"Decisions taken pursuant to the lawful operation of immigration control will be proportionatein all save a small minority of exceptional cases, identifiable only on a case by case basis."

It is not apparent that these observations were restricted to foreign cases. They appear to havebeen of general application to cases of immigration control.

37.More generally, so far as there was discussion in these appeals of the approach to foreigncases, no distinction was drawn between expulsion and extradition. Indeed, in Ullah at para13 Lord Bingham held that what he described as the Soering principle was potentiallyapplicable in either case. He held that in either case successful invocation of Conventionrights in a foreign case required the satisfaction of a stringent test. Where qualified rights,such as those under articles 8 and 9, were concerned, it would be necessary to show that therewould be a flagrant denial or gross violation of the right, so that it would be completelydenied or nullified in the destination countrysee para 24.

38.In Razgar, at para 42, Baroness Hale of Richmond, emphasised the distinction between

foreign cases and domestic cases. She said:

"The distinction is vital to the present case. In a domestic case, the state must always act in away which is compatible with the Convention rights. There is no threshold test related to theseriousness of the violation or the impo

2nd week 1 personality rights decisions

Documents