3. building a bridge to asia - anu...
TRANSCRIPT
3. BUILDING ABRIDGE TO ASIA
In Colombo, on the morning of 9 January 1950, a smallcrowd gathered to catch a glimpse of representatives
arriving for the conference. Delegates posed for a publicityphotograph in the gardens opposite the Senate building,unperturbed by a recent theft of explosives and threats todisrupt the meeting. Ceylonâs first Prime Minister andconference chairman, the affable Don StephenSenanayake, moved proudly among the representativesfrom eight nations and smiled through his magnificentdrooping moustache. He knew that the Colomboconference would make headlines and that Ceylon would,at least briefly, be in the world spotlight. To ensuremaximum publicity, the British provided confidential dailyreports to the US State Department and granted Americanjournalists access to the daily background briefings typically
only open to Commonwealth reporters. The popular pressin Australia celebrated the âfrank get-togetherâ as a triumphof the egalitarian nature of the Commonwealth with âallmembers ⊠now equal, irrespective of their size, race orcreedâ.1 Australiaâs Percy Spender, who had only beenforeign minister for two weeks since the Menziesgovernmentâs sweeping victory, also mingled among thedelegates from Britain, Canada, Ceylon, India, NewZealand, Pakistan, and South Africa. Following the photosession, Senanayake ushered the delegates and theirentourages inside. The sixty-year-old Prime Minister ofIndia, Jawaharlal Nehru, jauntily trotted up the stairs,demonstrating his energy to everyone. By contrast, theinfirm British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, his strengthsapped further by the tropical heat, was carried from thestreet to the meeting room atop a palanquin (a chair carriedon the shoulders of four men). The image served as an aptmetaphor for the end of British imperialism and the rise ofAsian nationalism. Indeed, although not officiallyattending, the Americans saw the conference as somethingof a last hoorah for the British Empire: âthe dying glow of asetting sunâ, as one US congressman put it.2
Once assembled, proceedings moved quickly. In thehot conditions, the congenial opening speeches anddiscussion were disturbed only by the Senate buildingâsresident crows, who called raucously through the openwindows. At regular intervals, Senanayake broughtproceedings to a halt with a clap of his hands. Almostimmediately, barefooted servants dressed in white sarongsand red sashes padded among the delegates bearing trays oficed water and sweet tea.3 In welcoming delegates,Senanayake signalled the central purpose of the historicmeeting. The obstacles to regional stability, he said, wereeconomic â not political â and nothing less than the
Building a Bridge to Asia 37
peace and future of the world depended on helping Asiasupport her increasing population.
No one knew quite what to expect from theAustralian delegation. Spenderâs wife, Jean, always said thather husband had a knack for attracting public attention. Byvirtue of his temperament and professional experience, fewmen were better qualified to raise international interest inAustraliaâs concerns about the political future of Asia.4 ForSpender, the British Commonwealth Foreign MinistersâMeeting presented a tantalising opportunity to establishAustralia as a force in regional affairs; and he made noattempt to disguise the anti-communist sentiment whichdrove his determination to launch an aid program for Southand SouthâEast Asia. Before he left Colombo, Spender tolda reporter that he hoped to find a way to support Asians intheir bid to âdevelop their own democratic institutions andtheir own economies and thus protect them against thoseopportunists and subversive elements which take advantageof changing political situations and low living standardsâ.5
In his opening address, he returned to one of his favoritethemes and told of the âinescapable factâ of Australiaâsgeographical proximity and the increasingly active role inregional affairs she wanted to play. Delegates, he said, had aresponsibility to determine a clear course of action to helpstabilise the region and they must not squander theopportunity. âCould not the old Commonwealth countriescontribute part of their resources for the economicdevelopment of this area?â Spender asked, gently preparingdelegates for his own prescription for regional development,due to be presented the following day.
According to Spenderâs own recollection, he beganformulating a strategy for bringing Western finance to bearon Asiaâs seemingly intractable economic problems duringthe long flight from Sydney to Ceylon. Although the
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan38
comment is characteristic of Spenderâs brusque style, thiswas, in fact, probably the first time he had a chance toexamine his briefing papers in detail. Of course, they wererich with documents on Asian affairs written by some of thesharpest minds in the Department of External Affairs,which would have been unavailable to him while inopposition. Nevertheless, the âwide authorityâ Menzies hadgranted Spender over how to approach the conferenceundoubtedly enhanced his sense of propriety.6 Spender,however, was in for a surprise.
On the afternoon of the second day, Ceylonâsunassuming Finance Minister, Junius Richard Jayewardene,stunned everyone, most of all the Australians, when heforeshadowed his own proposal for regional economicdevelopment. The essence of Jayewardeneâs proposal was forAsian governments to draw up ten-year developmentprograms and for the Commonwealth to consider whattechnical and financial assistance it could provide andguarantee a fixed price for primary exports. A committee ofexperts would then tour Asia and make recommendationsbased on what the Commonwealth had made available.Incensed that another delegation appeared to have pipped theAustralians, Spender later accused Jayewardene ofâdeliberately jumping the gunâ.7 Spender need not haveworried. Delegates responded unenthusiastically toJayewardeneâs overly ambitious vision. Moreover, the idea of aregulated Commonwealth trading bloc raised more politicaland economic complexities than it claimed to solve. Thatevening, Spender and his advisers from the DEA, ArthurTange and Laurence McIntyre, retired to the colonialsplendor of the Galle Face Hotel to finalise the memorandumthey had begun writing on the plane. Around this time, itwould seem, they also took advice from senior British officials,who were keen for Australia to take the lead and thus deflect
Building a Bridge to Asia 39
any expectation that the United Kingdom was about to offer amore substantial financial contribution. On the morning of11 January the Australians tabled their freshly-completeddocument ahead of the Ceylonese delegation, thus ensuringthat theirs would be considered first.
Like his Commonwealth colleagues, Spender knewthat, without a massive injection of funds, talk of aneconomic bulwark against communism was futile.8 As hetold Menzies in a telegram from Colombo, his principalobjective was to âshow a genuine willingness to meet theserious drift in the political and economic situation inSouth East Asia, as a basis for an immediate approach tothe United States with a view of enlisting their activeparticipationâ.9 The Australian memorandum was structuredaround the speedy delivery of financial and technicalassistance in order to demonstrate the Commonwealthâsresolve to fight communism. Drawing heavily on the workof John Burton, the Australian plan located the provisionof aid as an international response to the rise of Asiancommunism: through economic and social developmentthe âideological attractions which communism exerts willlose their forceâ.10 It called on the Commonwealth tocontribute to the UNâs Technical Assistance Program, toprovide aid to Asia on a bilateral basis, to coordinate theaid delivery with other Commonwealth governments, andfor Asian nations to make submissions detailing theirdevelopment needs, and for the conference to establish aconsultative committee to oversee the logistics ofdelivering aid to the region. The recipients would beCeylon, India and Pakistan, with non-Commonwealth Asiato be included as soon as possible.
Central to Spenderâs tactics at Colombo was hisconviction that an expensive and open-ended scheme, suchas Jayewardeneâs âsomewhat grandiose proposalâ for an
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan40
Asian Marshall Plan, would repel the United States.Although delegates had politely dismissed Jayewardeneâsideas as unworkable, Spender feared that any obvious lackof consensus among the delegates would jeopardise theentire conference: the Commonwealth would appearfractured and ill-prepared to meet the task of Asiandevelopment with conviction. In private, Spender persuadedJayewardene to support a joint memorandum basedprimarily on the ideas circulated by Australia. The British,anxious to avoid accusations of post-colonial domination,were content to let Australia take the lead. For his part,Spender tactfully dampened suspicion of economicimperialism by including a clause suggesting that the formof development âis for Asian countries themselves todetermineâ.11 New Zealand agreed to sponsor the proposal,despite private misgivings about Spender, whom theSecretary for the Department of External Affairs, AlisterMcIntosh, thought âan absolute little tickâ, and their doubtsabout the very idea of an aid program for Asia. âIt isperfectly ridiculous to think that we of the BritishCommonwealth countries, even with the aid of the UnitedStates, can with economic aid effectively stem the tide ofCommunismâ, wrote McIntosh; âfor one thing we canât doenough quickly, and for another, what we do is going tobe swallowed up and lost in ineffective administration.We havenât a hope in the worldâ.12
Throughout the conference, Spender emphasised theutmost importance of a rapid and enthusiastic responsefrom Western powers. As if on cue, Spenderâs entreatiesabout the impending threat of communism and the needfor the Commonwealth to move quickly received a timelyillustration on the very days delegates were considering hisproposals. On 13 January 1950, the Soviet Unionâs walkoutof the UN Security Council, in protest at the failure of the
Building a Bridge to Asia 41
Security Council to recognise the Chinese communistregimeâs right to take Chinaâs seat on the council,demonstrated SinoâSoviet rapport. However, risinginternational tension and Spenderâs determination werenot enough to guarantee uncritical support for theproposals. India wanted further research to be conductedbefore committing to any specific development programs.The British were the most reticent of all, remindingdelegates of their governmentâs responsibilities in Africaand the Middle East and of the money already given for thepost-war reconstruction in SouthâEast Asia. Nevertheless,publicly, each delegation agreed that communism posed athreat to the region and that economic and socialimprovement was vital to regional stability. The jointmemorandum captured the broad scope of this idea, andshowed the right blend of flexibility and precision, whichthe Ceylonese proposal lacked. Further, the memorandumstressed that the restoration of Asia as an economicallyproductive region would also have commercial benefits forthe West. Towards the end of proceedings, representativesvoted unanimously in favour of what they now called theâSpender resolutionâ â and some even began talking of aâSpender Planâ for Asia. All agreed to meet for the inauguralmeeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee inSydney in four months time. The Ceylonese governmentcapped off the conference by showering upon the delegates aâglittering series of entertainmentsâ, including a rare showingof the sacred relic of Buddhaâs tooth during an excursion toKandy, the capital of the hill country â an experiencewhich seemed to fortify the ailing Bevin!13
Spender was certainly pleased with the outcome ofthe Colombo conference, but there was little exuberance.He knew how far he had to go. Upon his return to Canberra,he began a campaign to raise domestic and international
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan42
support for an Asian aid program. Specifically, he continuedto woo the United States, hoping to win them over to theColombo proposals and involve them more explicitly inAustraliaâs regional security. Indeed, giving aid to Asiaserved the dual purpose of building relations with Asia, butalso with the United States. It was a policy validated byAustraliaâs ambassador to the United States, NormanMakin, who, in December 1949, told his newly-electedMinister that efforts should be directed towards makingAustralia indispensable to Americaâs strategic and economicplanning. Although sacrifices would have to be made,rendering âtechnical and material assistance to the countriesof SouthâEast Asia ⊠would receive the warm approval andgoodwill of the USâ.14 Now a decision on the magnitude ofAustraliaâs contribution had to be reached quickly in orderto demonstrate Australiaâs commitment to sharing theburden of combating communism in alliance with theAmericans.15 Privately, Spender lobbied Cabinet. Publicly,he adopted a broader strategy that emphasised the growingthreat of international communism, regional instability, theinadequacy of the UN, Australian vulnerability, and thenecessity of US financial support for Asia.
On 9 March 1950, Spender delivered one of theclearest articulations of conservative foreign policy to theHouse of Representatives. He told of the growing force ofcommunism and Australiaâs vulnerability in post-colonialAsia â with Australia drifting within the grasp ofcommunism, without the stability of a resolute and strongally. The Soviet Union and communist China were toblame for throwing Asia into disarray, casting it and theworld into a âtrance of uncertainty, doubt and fearâ. Shouldcommunism prevail, Spender said, âand Vietnam comeunder the heel of Communist China, Malaya is in danger ofbeing out-flanked and it, together with Thailand, Burma
Building a Bridge to Asia 43
and Indonesia, will become the next direct object of furtherCommunist activitiesâ. The burden of regional security nowfell to Australia because Britain and America had ânot yetcompleted their adjustments to the new situationâ. Spenderdeftly juxtaposed another image of Australia as a purposefuland strong Pacific power which, assuming appropriate andresolute action, could assert a stabilising presence in Asia:âWe live side by side with the countries of South andSouthâEast Asia, and we desire to be on good-neighbourterms with them. Above all, it is in our interest to fostercommercial and other contacts with them and give themwhat help we can in maintaining stable and democraticgovernments in powerâ. By developing the proposalsendorsed at the Colombo conference, Australia would giveto the maximum extent of its capacity âthose resourceswhich will help consolidate the governments of SouthâEastAsia on such a basis that no extremism can flourishâ.16
Unlike Evatt and Burton, Spender had grave doubtsabout the ability of the UN to protect Australianinterests, especially considering that it includedrepresentatives from those who were âworking to disruptthe order we believe inâ. Instead, to avert the communistthreat he hoped to create two mutually supportiveinstruments of Australian foreign policy: economicdiplomacy (encompassing a âpolicy of good-neighbourlyassistanceâ) and a military alliance with the United States.Using the same sentimental tone employed by Menzies todraw Australia closer to Britain, Spender regularly spokeof the United States as sharing a âcommon heritage andway of lifeâ. Importantly, he held little hope for a Britishâadjustment in Australiaâs favourâ and he considered theUnited States to be the natural substitute to helpAustralia secure both the economic and military aspects ofits foreign policy objectives:
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan44
I am sure our friends of the United States will notmisunderstand me when I say that their greateminence in world affairs to-day not only imposescorresponding obligations upon them, which itshould be recorded they have most generously beenwilling to accept, but it also makes impossible thesolution of such problems as we are discussingwithout their active co-operation.17
Few would have missed the point: the era of theEvatt/Burton analysis of world affairs was over and theUnited States, not the UN, was to be the mainstay ofAustraliaâs future survival in SouthâEast Asia and thePacific. But the prospect of an Asian aid program served theleft-wing political agenda equally well. Leslie Haylen â aradical Laborite who led a parliamentary delegation toJapan in 1948 and caused a furore in Australia by shakinghands with Emperor Hirohito â thought an aid programmight even realise a new sense of belonging:
We must cast our eyes on the Asian scene andendeavour to understand what the Asian is seeking.We must assist him as far as we can with goods andservices, and cease ⊠this ridiculous habit of lookingcontinually to Atlantic Charters, Atlantic pacts, andother similar regional agreements for ourpreservation. On the evidence before us we are onour own in the Pacific. Asian nation or Pacificpower, what does it matter? We are an outpost of8,000,000 people dedicated to the task of being goodneighbours to the millions of people to our north. Wecan, here and now, build up goodwill and strengthenthe feeling that we are part of the great southernlands of Asia; that we do âbelongâ; that we are notantagonistic; and that we are not a handful of white
Building a Bridge to Asia 45
people who have come to this country to exploit itand then to get out. Our interests are those of Asia.
An insistent sense of cultural and racial vulnerability,combined with a desire to engage constructively with theregion, prompted both sides of the house to support theSpender Plan as one way of maintaining âdemocracy inAsiaâ and âthe future of every Australian man, woman andchildâ.18
While Spenderâs efforts were sufficient to convincecabinet to allocate ÂŁA13 million for Asian developmentprojects, they were not enough to move the US StateDepartment, which remained equivocal but not dismissive.Acting Secretary of State, James Webb, told his Canberrarepresentative to convey the message that, although theydeclined to attend the Sydney meeting, Americaâs non-attendance did not imply a âlack of interest in or sympathy⊠with the purposes and objectivesâ of the Colomboproposals.19 Even better than diplomatic assurances, theDEA took solace in the United Statesâ expanding,if âimperfectly formulatedâ policy towards Asia, notablyTrumanâs announcement of substantial economic aid forIndonesia and the French in Indochina.20 At this point,however, Spenderâs biggest problem was the cautiondisplayed by the British government.
On Monday 15 May 1950, delegates met at AdmiraltyHouse, the Governor-Generalâs Sydney residence, for thefirst meeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee.Before the opening session, delegates had a chance to takein the view across the water, perfectly framed by the SydneyHarbour Bridge, an emblem of Australian industrial andtechnological prowess. This modern, thriving metropoliswas a ready example to the delegates of what âfree men andwomenâ could accomplish, Spender was later to write.21
Days earlier, delegates had been treated to much of what
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan46
Sydney had to offer: sight-seeing, lavish dinners, and a dayat the Randwick races. The largest function was a formalreception at the Australia Hotel. Spender put his cares aside,turned on the charm, and together with his wife welcomedmore than 300 guests. At one point Spender cheekilysuggested to a Ceylonese delegate and his pregnant wife thatif their baby was a boy they should name him âSydneyâ, if agirl, âCanberraâ.22 Outside, the atmosphere was less frivolousand police clashed with communist demonstrators,protesting Commonwealth military action in Malaya. In theconfusion, Eleanor Hinder of the British delegation (theonly female delegate) was mistaken for a demonstrator andwas about to be apprehended when another delegateprotested her innocence.
Spenderâs resolve to launch an aid program for Asiahad intensified since the Colombo meeting. By the time ofthe Sydney meeting, he had become consumed with itsimportance, no doubt helped along by the press, whichurged representatives towards more than âa circumspectelaborationâ of the Colombo proposals.23 By the time of theSydney meeting, differences between the Australian andBritish approach to regional collaboration that emerged inColombo had deepened, in large part owing to theiruncoordinated strategies. Indeed, with the Foreign Officeconcerned not to âfrighten the United States Administrationaway from cooperation by loose talk of American aid instaggering amountsâ, they advised their representatives toassiduously âavoid exchanging ideas with the Australian,United States or other representativesâ.24 As delegatesarrived, Spender wrote to Bevin and explained his concernthat âthe UK government might not be in a position duringthe Sydney discussions to accept proposalsâ that he had inmind. âQuite franklyâ, Spender threatened, if Britainhesitated to commit funds, he would be âcompelled to
Building a Bridge to Asia 47
acknowledge publicly that the conference had failed andthe Australian Government, for its part, be obliged toindicate that it would now seek to implement a programmeof its own in conjunction with whatever other Governmentsmight wish to assistâ.25 All this before the conference hadeven begun! A stoush between Australia and Britainseemed unavoidable.
Over the weekend Spender suggested to his fellowdelegates that they should open the first session to thepublic to generate maximum interest in the meeting.Reluctantly they agreed, on condition that the speech benon-controversial, and they be given a chance to see anadvance copy. Delegates were soon astonished to see thatSpender intended to use the open session to publicly revealthe most contentious of his proposals. Protest from theother delegations, particularly the British, saw Spenderback down. Nevertheless, the open session went ahead anddelegates cordially exchanged the usual platitudes. Incontrast to Spenderâs boiling energy, the British arrived inmore sombre and cautious mood. Still reeling from the costof war, Britain saw the Colombo proposals as an opportunityto address their own economic ills and revitalise the UnitedKingdom as a force in Asian affairs. A desire to useAmerican finance to offset the massive debts owed to Indiaand Pakistan underpinned the British position: for themthere was simply âno prospect of a satisfactory settlement ofthe sterling balance problem consistent with a continuouseconomic development in South and South East Asiaunless new money can be found for development ⊠fromthe United Statesâ. Although the Australians did not seethis document, they knew well that Britain had her âeyesvery much on the dollars to be obtainedâ from theAmericans and later dismissed her as being inspired âmoreby economic interests than foreign policyâ.26 The DEA
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan48
never considered the release of sterling debt to India andPakistan a genuine contribution to regional development,merely an action that they would have taken regardless ofthe Colombo proposals.27
Convinced that the best way to persuade the UnitedStates to join was to show an immediate commitment toputting money into Asia, Spender proposed the immediateformation of a technical assistance scheme and anemergency aid pool, which both Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth Asian countries could draw upon. TheAustralian delegation intended these two schemes tosupplement a much longer-term capital aid program. TheBritish opposed both proposals because more planning wasrequired and they would not extend further finance on topof their already heavy debt. Worse still, their argumentshelped persuade Asian representatives â initiallyattracted to the concept â to reject the idea. Theargument that long-term economic planning would bemore likely to attract a greater portion of American aidimpressed the Indian and Ceylonese representatives. TheCanadian delegation, also under instructions to avoidextended commitments, simply did not see the value inbuilding an interim program. By the close of the meetingâthe Australian band wagonâ, reflected the Canadians,âseemed considerably less crowded than it had been earlierin the afternoonâ. Only Pakistan stood by the Australiandelegation, primarily because it needed immediate financeto resettle eight million refugees from India.28
As self-appointed taskmaster, nothing infuriatedSpender more than the apparent lack of commitment on thepart of delegates towards the meetingâs high purpose. By theafternoon of the first day of the meeting, he could no longerdisguise his contempt for Britainâs lack of commitment.During a secret session, Spender lambasted those who
Building a Bridge to Asia 49
criticised his proposals and then, according to a British report,âmade a slashing attack on the United Kingdom attitudewhich he suggested had no regard to the Colombo resolutionâ.Spender then warned delegates âthat if the Australianresolution was not adopted he would have to report the fullfacts to his Parliamentâ. Stunned, the Canadian delegate feltthe display was âmore intemperate than any [he had] everheard except at conferences where Soviets were presentâ.Another wondered if the Australian minister had somehowimbibed the spirit of his predecessor, Doc Evatt.29
For his outburst, Spender earned the tag theâcocksparrowâ. The Australians parried by nicknaming LordMacDonald, the leader of British party, âNo CommitmentMacâ. And before long both delegations were invokingnational stereotypes in their now public dispute. Australiaplayed the role of cajoling dominion â the Empireâs enfantterrible â while Britain played the reprimanding parent.Australia accused Britain of timidity, stand-offishness, andfollowing a âtypically narrow Treasury approachâ. TheBritish followed up by suggesting that Australia wasâbetraying signs of youthful impatienceâ.30 Ted Williams,the British High Commissioner in Canberra, delivereda scathing report card:
The most disappointing delegation was theAustralian. It was their misfortune ⊠to feelcompelled to take the initiative to a degree for whichthey were inadequately equipped, and it was stillmore unfortunate that the proposals which theyadvanced so vigorously ⊠should be revealed onexamination as shallow and lacking in substance.Worst of all, these proposals seem to be regarded bythe Australian Delegation themselves as closelylinked with Mr. Spenderâs personal prestige ⊠Less
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan50
happily it must be added that Mr. Spenderâs hopesthat his reputation as an international statesmanwould be firmly established by the Sydney meetinghave been completely disappointed. It is to beexpected that other Delegations will in reporting totheir Governments not fail to comment not only onhis arrogant and willful conduct and undignifiedwithdrawals, but also on his patent failure in theordinary duties of a chairman.31
But a crisis in Commonwealth relations was avertedwhen delegates reached an easy consensus over the proposalto provide long-term capital aid. Delegates agreed that eachrecipient country should produce comprehensive six-yeardevelopment plans for consideration at the second meeting ofthe Consultative Committee, scheduled for September 1950.As it stood, the principal donor nations were Australia, NewZealand, the United Kingdom and Canada. Recipient nationsincluded India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Non-CommonwealthAsian countries were soon encouraged to join the program.But the issue of supplying technical assistance would not goaway. Later, Spender dropped the original proposal in favourof a fresh memorandum. The Australian delegation suggesteda technical assistance program running for three years from1 July 1950. At a cost of ÂŁ8 million, Australia, Canada, andthe United Kingdom would each contribute one third. After anumber of amendments, delegates finally agreed and theBritish and Canadian delegations reported that they wereauthorised to contribute. However, that same evening,Spender revived the emergency credit proposal, therebythrowing the conference into disarray. Afterwards, LordMacDonald explained privately the British objections to thenew proposals.32 Not to be dissuaded, a relentless Spendersubmitted yet another paper on emergency credits. This time
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Robert Mayhew of the Canadian delegation told Spenderthat there was insufficient time to discuss his proposalsand they must wait until the September meeting of theConsultative Committee in London. Before the close of theconference, Spender withdrew.
In his memoirs, the cocksparrow admitted that hehad not been âthe easiest, nor perhaps the most urbane, ofchairmenâ. His greatest sin, however, was to have upsetWashington, who thought Spender was âheavy-handed andtactlessâ, intent on establishing âa foreign policy independentnot only of the UK but of the entire Commonwealth inthose areas where it cannot obtain general agreementâ. Bycasting aside the âsoft language of diplomacyâ, as Spendercalled it, he almost destroyed the collaborative atmospherehe thought so crucial to getting the United States involved.And at the conclusion of the meeting a solid commitmentfrom the Americans remained outstanding.
The stress of the Sydney conference inflamedSpenderâs duodenal ulcer and forced him to convalesce inBowral, in the southern highlands of New South Wales.33
Given his tenacious approach, Spender may have thoughtit entirely appropriate that the program bear his name.But when the Consultative Committee convened forthe second time, in London between 25 September and4 October 1950, the âColombo Planâ emerged as thepreferred label; talk of the âSpender Planâ was quietlyforgotten by all but a few.
Before the London meeting, a standing committeeconvened in Colombo to establish a Council for TechnicalCooperation and discuss the technical aid bound for India,Pakistan and Ceylon. On the more difficult issue of thecapital aid program, Commonwealth officials had to reachimportant and politically complex decisions about the waydonor nations would provide and coordinate their aidprograms. Although the Commonwealth unceremoniously
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan52
rejected Jayewardeneâs dream of an Asian Marshall Plan,they might have forgiven him for drawing the parallel. Afterall, as the first major multilateral program of foreignassistance after the Second World War, the Marshall Planinitially appeared to offer a practical model for the delivery ofaid to the region. Through the Organisation for EuropeanEconomic Cooperation (OEEC), the United States spentbillions on reconstruction in order to foster economic andspiritual resistance to the attractions of communistideology.34 The OEEC had a decentralised governing agencywith power residing with national delegations, and itpromoted international cooperation, but not economic andpolitical integration. It also had a weak secretariat and asecretary-general with limited authority.35 Of course, thesituation in Asia was radically different. In Sydney, Spenderacknowledged the âgreat divergenceâ in economic and socialdevelopment within Asia and recognised that the physicaland human infrastructures of Europe did not exist on thesame scale in Asia, and that there was no pre-war precedentagainst which to measure the goals of reconstruction. In whatcan best be described as a profound understatement, Spendersummed up by saying that âeconomic planning for a region sodiverse as South and SouthâEast Asia will not be easy. Thereare no ready-made guidelinesâ.36 To make the ConsultativeCommittee mechanism flexible and robust enough to tacklesuch a task, Commonwealth policy-makers faced numerousobstacles. Not only did the Consultative Committee have toremain a tacitly non-communist avenue for regionalcooperation, it had to be free from political qualifications inorder to attract Asian countries, and represent nations ofvarying political persuasions that were at substantiallydifferent stages of economic development. Overlay thepolitical and strategic goals Western policy-makers hoped toachieve through the provision of aid, and the challengesfacing the Consultative Committee were immense.
Building a Bridge to Asia 53
In the first flush of excitement to attract additionaldonors, the DEA planned to persuade Asian governmentsnot to âraise obstacles to the inclusion of France and theNetherlandsâ.37 But the endeavour proved ill-conceived,and France and the Netherlands were quietly sidelined fromthe Colombo Plan negotiations. In such a sensitive climate,Australia dropped the idea, regarding it as âpremature andimpoliticâ. With French troops still engaged in Indo-Chinaand the imbroglio over West New Guinea far from over, theinclusion of these powers had the potential to jeopardisethe entire program. Later, the DEA determined that theinclusion of France and the Netherlands would alienateBurma, Indonesia and Thailand, leaving a schemeâpreponderantly for CommonwealthâAsian and âWesternâgovernments, which was not and is not the intention of thePlanâ. Further, pressure for their admission would âprovideammunition for communist propaganda (ânew form ofcolonialismâ) against the Planâ.38
In Sydney the Consultative Committee had proveditself a robust, if somewhat unwieldy, forum for discussingregional issues. But why was it necessary to duplicateestablished UN mechanisms, such as ECAFE, which alreadyfunded Asian development programs? Or, as CanadaâsMinister for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, explainedwhen he returned home after the Colombo meeting toaddress parliament: did the world need a new committee tobring aid to Asia âmerely because it looks like an attractivepiece of international furniture for an already cluttered-uphomeâ?39 While the exact nature of the ConsultativeCommittee was determined in private discussions betweenAustralian, British, and American officials, parliamentarydiscussion presented Spender with an opportunity to garnergovernment and opposition support for the new venture.Spender used the debate to reinforce his conviction that the
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan54
communist threat required a rapid response, and, onceagain, he attacked the excesses and inefficiencies of the UNmultilateral aid agencies. More to the point, he deemedECAFE an inappropriate mechanism for the delivery of aidbecause the Soviet Union and China were both membersand Canada and Ceylon were not â a clear violation of theCommonwealthâs anti-communist agenda.40 With theConsultative Committee framed as an independent (i.e.non-UN) and tacitly non-communist development forum,Australia had a more direct aid relationship with Asia. Theinformal structure established a congenial and non-threatening forum outside the communist gaze and, asSpender suggested, filled a âconspicuous gap in an area ofprofound interest to Australiaâ.41 Most importantly,Australiaâs limited aid budget would not be subsumed underthe mantle of another UN program, thus giving Australiathe freedom to use aid for specific political, strategic, anddiplomatic objectives. British thinking ran on similar lines.Not only did the forum give Western powers the chance tobring âdiscrete [sic] pressure to bear on the underdevelopedcountries to tackle the problems of development planning ina realistic and energetic wayâ, it provided a venue whereAsian countries could discuss development issues âfranklyand without publicity (or polemical interference from theRussians, who are members of ECAFE)â.42 Althoughcommunist powers expressed little interest in joining theColombo Plan, which they considered an imperialist ruse, in1952 the Consultative Committee invited ECAFErepresentatives to observe the annual conference. Thedecision amounted to a tactful compromise because Westernpowers considered it decidedly easier to manage theRussians and Chinese within the confines of ECAFE, thanrisk having them joining the Colombo Plan andcompromise its non-communist exclusivity.43
Building a Bridge to Asia 55
Australian parliamentarians and bureaucrats hopedthat the United States would broaden its cold wareconomic and military strategies to include Asia. Theoutbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, by amplifyingfears of a wider regional conflict, lent greater urgency toCommonwealth plans to apply financial and technicalassistance as a containment strategy. And Australiaâs speedydespatch of force to the Korean peninsula served as atangible expression of the commitment to fightingcommunism and its support for US foreign policy, as didwithholding recognition of communist China, andgranting recognition of Vietnamâs anti-communist leader,Bao Dai. These decisions would eventually help secure thesecond arm of Spenderâs regional security strategy, namelythe ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and United States)Treaty, officially endorsed in February 1951. But Spenderalso hoped that the United States would now be far morepredisposed to joining the new aid program. Behind thescenes, US officials began talking more freely about thepossibility and implications of funding: that US foreignpolicy should rely on something more than military mightin order to contain Asian communism, and thatcooperation would build a link between east and west âmorepowerful than guns and more precious than goldâ.44
Washingtonâs decision to appoint a liaison officer tothe London meeting of the Consultative Committee wasthe clearest indication yet of Americaâs changed attitudetowards Asian development. Yet, British and Australianrepresentatives knew there was no guarantee of USendorsement and that the results of this meeting would bemore important than those of the previous two.45 The firstjob faced by delegates was to assess the developmentquestionnaires (similar to those used by the OEEC)distributed after the Sydney conference on the suggestion of
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan56
the British official Robert âOttoâ Clark.46 The economicand technical blueprints submitted to the meeting,however, proved to be little more than an attempt to givethe impression that donor nations were making a genuineattempt to quantify Asiaâs economic needs, while providinga convenient means of arriving at a total figure with whichto approach the United States. Revealing attitudesunderwritten by no small amount of paternalisticcondescension, most thought Asian governments ill-equipped to assess their own developmental needs. InAugust 1950, James Plimsoll, Australiaâs representative tothe UN, reported to Burtonâs replacement at the DEA,Alan Watt. A senior official from the EconomicCooperation Administration explained that he had littleâfaith in questionnairesâ because âmost under-developedcountries [were] unfitted to estimate their needs accuratelyor sensiblyâ. He also suggested that the Commonwealth andthe United States should determine the total amount ofassistance to be allocated to Asia and leave decisions onâthe nature of that assistanceâ to their representatives âonthe spotâ.47 The fact that the Commonwealth had topostpone the London meeting by two weeks after it becameobvious that Asian non-Commonwealth governments werestruggling to complete the questionnaires on timereinforced the apparent ineptitude of aid recipients. In anyevent, the simple attendance of non-Commonwealth Asiawas more important than completion of the six-yeardevelopment plans and, regardless of what they specified,there was no time for âsubstantial modificationâ of theprograms already planned by the UK Government.48
Malcolm MacDonald, the UK Commissioner-General inSingapore, reasoned that by at least appearing to beresponsive to these blueprints, even if they provedirrelevant, donor nations avoided âthe psychological error of
Building a Bridge to Asia 57
arousing suspicion amongst these sensitive peoplesâ.49
Despite the extension of time, the first report of theConsultative Committee included Commonwealth Asiaonly. Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam eachattended the London meeting without lodging formalrequests for assistance. Burma and Indonesia, still wary ofpost-colonial domination, attended as observers only.
The economic blueprints served a more useful tacticalpurpose in persuading the United States that joining theColombo Plan would not bind them indefinitely tounderwriting Asiaâs journey to modernity. During aninformal meeting between Treasury, the Foreign Office andthe US Department of State, Clarke reported that indrawing up their economic blueprints since the Sydneymeeting, Asian governments had âscaled down the size ofthe development programs to a point considerably belowwhat we would originally have desired to undertake ⊠[and]they have recognised that the limiting factor is the amountof external financial assistance likely to be availableâ.50 Bysuggesting that Asian governments had exercised restraintand did not see the offer of aid as an opportunity to profiteer,British officials sought to allay American fears of anexpensive, politically-charged and long-term assistanceprogram. Nevertheless, Commonwealth donor nationscould only provide ÂŁ362 million of the ÂŁ1,085 millionrequired and now waited, as Spender put it, for the UnitedStates to âfill the political and economic gap.â51
The major concern for the Commonwealth was thatany public presumption of American finance might offendWashington and jeopardise the entire program. Indeed,Spender feared the United States saw the entire conferenceas a ham-fisted attempt by the Commonwealth to âimpose acommitment upon the United States in the form of a reportalready prepared for publicationâ.52 The Americans suggested
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan58
that the Commonwealth aid scheme should not appear tobe dependent on US aid; that it should emphasise discreteâproject basedâ development rather than continuousfinancial support; that it not imply the US aid would beused to solve the United Kingdomâs currency difficulties;and, finally, that the report should not mention a âgapâ to befilled by a third party. Tiptoeing around the US sensitivityto âthe gapâ prompted the plain-speaking Tange to reportthat â[n]evertheless the fact of the matter is that there issuch a gap and, unless it is filled the plan could not beimplemented without drastic modificationâ.53 With US aidintegral to the successful launch of the program, theLondon meeting was intended to suit an American visionfor Asian economic development. The report concludedwith the inevitably ambiguous statement that theConsultative Committee âcould review progress ⊠draw upperiodic reports, and ⊠serve as a forum for the discussionof developmental problemsâ; yet the precise âform of such anorganisation cannot be determined until it is clear what thesources of external finance will beâ.54
Just as Commonwealth policy-makers worked to getthe United States involved, they nevertheless worried thatthe sheer volume of US aid, in addition to the concessionsmade to secure that aid, had the potential to distort theColombo Planâs economic and developmental objectives. Inparticular, concerns were raised about American insistenceon tying the bulk of their aid contribution to the purchase ofUS supplies, which would effectively stem the expected flowof dollars that might otherwise be spent on British andAustralian goods. Project aid of this kind would not meetIndiaâs need for food imports that could be sold on to financetheir own development plans with minimal inflation. Large-scale infrastructure projects, and the inevitable bevy ofWestern expertise that came with them, were also more
Building a Bridge to Asia 59
liable to bring accusations of post-colonial interference.Compromise was reached on most of these issues; inoperation, the Colombo Plan involved a range of aidprograms, from externally-funded âtiedâ infrastructureprojects and âlocally-fundedâ development, through the saleof donated commodities, to collaborative projects betweenlocal technicians and workers, and international staff. Ingeneral, American policy-makers insisted on a large measureof independence from the Commonwealth organisation inorder to meet their own strategic and economic objectives,and maintain congressional approval. The United Stateseventually agreed to join the Colombo Plan in November1950 (they were officially admitted in February 1951), oncondition the scheme remained informal, exploratory,advisory and consultative.55 It was indicative of the controlthe Americans hoped to retain over their aid allocationsthat they demanded that word âCommonwealthâ be omittedfrom the Consultative Committeeâs official title â the finalprice of US involvement.56
It is important not to overstate the degree to whichAustralian (and British) leaders danced to Washingtonâstune. At all times, Australia pursued an aggressively self-interested policy, based on a distinctly realist interpretationof its own political and strategic imperatives. Indeed,subservience to the United States sharpened Spenderâssense of what the Colombo Plan meant for Australiaâs ownpolitical, military and social objectives. He had a strongsense of the Colombo Planâs significance beyond its role insecuring American finance. In addition to helping cementthe ANZUS Treaty, the scheme was to have the wide-reaching â if ambiguous â goal of neutralisinganti-Western sentiment directed towards Australia. Hecabled Menzies from London, explaining that Australiashould use the influence of the Commonwealth âas a
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan60
cohesive force progressively to bind Asia to the West in away which has so far been impossible by direct politicalpressure in a region whose rationalism is founded onreaction against the Westâ. Where the United Kingdom wasanxious to âbe quit of responsibilitiesâ in Asia, Australiashould be ready to take charge: âdeliberate Australianisolation from Asia while we are achieving our smallpopulation increases seems to me to lose us the opportunityof using foreign policy effectively in our long term defenceâ.Again, the vulnerable outpost mentality, which dominatedso much of Australian foreign policy, reared its head. Atthis stage, Spender prescribed very little in the way of aconstructive engagement strategy for Australia. Rather, hesaw the Colombo Plan as an instrument deployed as âpart ofa foreign policy designed to deny this important part of theworld to Soviet Russian influenceâ.57
With his plan for emergency credits and a technicalaid pool subsumed beneath the Colombo Planâs twin prongsof a capital and technical aid program, Spender was forcedto revise the total amount of Australiaâs contribution to theplan. Of course, he took the opportunity to try to secureeven more. The stakes could not have been higher, he toldMenzies from London, with an early indication of Australiaâsgenerous support âessential if we are to carry to success theinitiative we have takenâ. He suggested that wool exportearnings supported an initial contribution of around ÂŁA10million. Although he did not spell it out, the implicationwas that this level of funding would be sustained over thesix-year life of the scheme. This ÂŁA60 million ambit claimwas sternly rebuffed, first by Menzies, who thought the ideaâquite impracticableâ in view of Australiaâs heavy defencecommitments and the future rehabilitation of Korea, andlater by Cabinet. Instead, Menzies restricted Spender to atotal of less than ÂŁA25 million and advised that the grand
Building a Bridge to Asia 61
gesture of ÂŁA10 million in the first year set a dangerouslyunrealistic precedent. Although conciliatory in defeat,Spender said that a first contribution of just ÂŁA3 or 4million would be âconspicuous in its inadequacyâ, and hepressed for permission to make a much higher first offer,with the proviso that subsequent allocations would beconsiderably reduced. Nevertheless, just as Australiarebuked the tight-fisted British, other delegates lookedaskance at Australiaâs lack of charity. The Canadians, forexample, privately suspected that Australia overstated thefinancial hardships she would incur through herinvolvement with the aid scheme. In late 1950, theeconomies of Asia and Australia received a sudden, if short-lived, boost from US spending and stockpiling programsinduced by the Korean War. With good prices for wool andrising sterling levels, Lester Pearson explained to hisfinance minister , âthe Australians are not going to have topull in their belts this year in order to meet theircontributions to the Colombo Planâ. In December, withAmerica having just agreed to join the Colombo Plan,Cabinet approved Spenderâs recommendations, adding thatthe terms in which the formal announcement would beexpressed would first need approval from the Prime Ministerand that âcare must be taken to avoid raising theexpectations on the part of the proposed recipientsâ.58
In the estimation of the British Chancellor of theExchequer and conference chairman, Hugh Gaitskell, theLondon meeting of the Consultative Committee wascharacterised by a âstriking sense of common purposeâ,assisted by the fact that Spender adopted a lower profile andwas in a âmuch more constructive mood than at Sydneyâ.59
Some of the enmity present in Sydney re-emerged inLondon, albeit in muted form, when the Australiandelegation chided the United Kingdom for rushing
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan62
discussions which did not concern British interests and fortheir otherwise âlukewarmâ attitude towards the inclusion ofnon-Commonwealth Asia. Australia âfound it necessary toinsist on more emphasis on the âhumanitarianâ approachâ inorder to make it easier to bring other Asian countries intothe program. Gaitskell conceded the point, but saved hisdisapproval with the Australian delegation â and, ofcourse, its leader â for his diary. Spender, he wrote, was âlikea little terrier, self-important, talks a good deal ⊠He has noinhibitions about raising awkward subjects and is what youcall fairly crude ⊠but then so are most Australiansâ.60
Since 1945, Australian policy-makers and politiciansknew that many Asian governments feared that acommitment to a Western aid program entailed strategicand military entanglements with the anti-communist bloc.Nevertheless, some Australian politicians leapt on theemerging mechanism as an opportunity to restore theprestige and âhistoric destinyâ of the English-speaking world.The conservative Alexander Downer, for example,suggested that the Consultative Committee would blossomforth into a âpermanent Empire Secretariatâ responsible forlaw and order, and offered the chance to âadopt a moreforthright attitudeâ over territorial disputes, such asIndonesian designs for West New Guinea. âIn our desire tohelp the peoples of South and SouthâEast Asiaâ, hecontinued, âwe should set out not only to feed them but alsoto lead themâ.61 Downerâs muscular approach was, in fact, aneat caricature of what Australia hoped its aid programmight achieve under the best possible conditions. However,the Australians would need to exercise a little more tactand diplomacy, even by Spenderâs standards, in their effortsto entice Asian leaders into the Colombo Plan.
Australian and British policy-makers were concernedto expand the Consultative Committee beyond a kind of
Building a Bridge to Asia 63
confederacy of Commonwealth nations, but withoutappearing to dominate or compromise Asian economic andpolitical sovereignty. Spender told Menzies during theSydney conference that, with Asian leaders wary ofeconomic imperialism, it was crucial ânot to appear toinfringe the sovereign rights of states which had acquiredtheir independenceâ.62 For should independent Asia fail tojoin the scheme, the Consultative Committeeâs symbolicrole as a unifying bridge between post-colonial Asia and theWest would be jeopardised, and in the DEAâs estimation, itmight then be âregarded as a purely British orCommonwealth âshowââ.63 Fear of offending Indonesiaâssensibilities and thus pushing them away from Westerninfluence, for example, tempered Australiaâs impatiencewith the tortuous negotiation process. Australian officialsjuggled their rising frustration with Indonesiaâs neutralforeign policy â which Hugh Gilchrist, the First Secretaryof the embassy in Djakarta, derided as a position ofâsuperficial neutrality between the Soviet and anti-Sovietblocsâ â and their unease at forcing Indonesia to make acommitment to the Colombo Plan.64 Asian assertivenesshad direct ramifications for Australian efforts to engagewith the region, and the increasingly assertive behaviour ofmany Asian governments, with their apparent solidarityagainst the Western and Eastern political blocs, madeAustralian and British representatives nervous. John Hood,Australiaâs Ambassador to Indonesia, told Casey that theâsense of solidarity which appears to be growing amongSouthâEast Asian peoplesâ meant that âany attempt tobustle them into an anti-communist camp may well havethe effect of uniting them in an angry reaction against allWestern influenceâ.65 After much diplomatic wrangling,Indonesiaâs decision to join the Consultative Committee inlate 1952 proved an important step in the development ofAustralianâIndonesian relations. In the estimation of the
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan64
British Ambassador to Indonesia, Derwent Kermode, theColombo Planâs mantra of âaid without stringsâ proved to beâa useful weapon in the prime task of breaking down thewalls of suspicion and distrust of the West with which manyIndonesians still surround themselvesâ.66
The very nature of the Consultative Committee as amalleable and non-coercive forum helped reassure tentativegovernments that joining the new confederation camewithout strings, military or otherwise.67 Other regionaldevelopment forums oriented toward bilateral cooperation,such as the South Pacific Commission (SPC) â which had noformal connection to the UN and was mandated only tocorrelate and disseminate information concerning Pacificcountries, to make recommendations for the promotion ofeconomic and social development, and to facilitate thediscussion of problems of mutual concern â provided a usefultemplate.68 Publicly, the Consultative Committee echoed thespirit of the SPC. Like the SPC, the Consultative Committeehad no supra-national powers, took no collective decisionssave for voting in new members and deciding the location ofthe annual meeting, and only made recommendations toparticipating governments. As donors and recipientsnegotiated their aid projects on a bilateral basis throughstandard diplomatic channels, the Consultative Committeesimply became a public discussion forum and clearing-housefor the admission of new members and the consolidation ofnational development reviews in the annual report. Not onlywas this an appropriate and workable forum considering thevarious agenda the committee was forced to bear, but it provedsufficiently benign to attract most of SouthâEast Asia over thenext four years: Indo-China (1951), Burma and Nepal (1952),Indonesia (1953), Thailand and the Philippines (1954). Japanalso joined in 1954, but as an aid donor.
ââââ
Building a Bridge to Asia 65
Throughout the Commonwealth in the 1950s, the wordsâColombo Planâ became synonymous with aid initiatives forSouth and SouthâEast Asia. The diverse nature of projectsfinanced under the scheme and their wide geographicdistribution lent credence to the image of the plan as asystematic and integrated approach to regionaldevelopment and cooperation. Donor governments usedthe relaxed nature of the proceedings to further politicaland economic ends. On one level, the annual meetingoffered an ideal opportunity for the promotion of Westernpolitical objectives. As one Foreign Office appraisalclaimed, âthe meeting of the Consultative Committee is themajor event of the year so far as the Colombo Plan isconcerned. It is an occasion of worldwide interest and thefullest possible use should be made of the publicityopportunitiesâ.69 The Colombo Plan forum also provided anattractive package for Australian generosity and helpeddisguise the limited nature of the early donations. The DEAquietly confessed that Australiaâs early effort, whichconsisted primarily of a donation of wheat and flour toIndia and Ceylon, would have been sent âwhether there hadbeen a Colombo Plan or notâ.70 These contributions weresold to pay for major infrastructure programs, such asrailways, roads, dams and hydro-electric power plants.Beyond this, Australia typically directed its capital aidcontributions towards the creation of more efficient,mechanised agricultural production. For example, of theÂŁA10 million in capital assistance provided by Australia toPakistan between 1950 and 1957, 62 per cent went towardsirrigation projects, and a further 13 per cent was devoted tothe supply of tractors and refrigeration plants. Just 2 percent went to increasing power generation capacity.71 Butthe Colombo Plan was not a coherent program for regionaldevelopment. It featured no centralised or multilateral
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan66
institutions, no blueprint for integrated economicregionalism, and it had no substantive decision-makingpower. The âwhole enterpriseâ, wrote Canadian academicWilliam Harrison, âwas something of a misnomer ⊠a co-operative and co-ordinated study of a number of economicsituations, too varying as to stages and patterns of growth,and too immense in the aggregate, to be consideredamenable to any centrally planned and directed scheme ofdevelopmentâ.72
Talk of a military defence strategy was taboo duringthe formation of the Colombo Plan. Spender and otherCommonwealth officials tactfully avoided the thorny issueof collective military defence by proposing a course towardsregional integration through economic cooperation.73 It ishardly surprising the Colombo Plan emerged as a nebulousand relatively benign regional forum. Arguably,Commonwealth policy-makers could not have achievedthese complex, intertwined objectives within multilateralagencies under UN control. Yet, loaded as it was withpolitical and military objectives, the welfare of Asianpeople now assumed a greater significance than ever before.This occurred, not because of a groundswell of humanitariansentiment, but because their well-being was now seen toimpinge on the post-war order imagined by Western powers.
To some extent, the Colombo Plan was a façade, adevice intended to lure independent Asia into an alliancewith the Western bloc. Its congenial unity was calculated toentice non-Commonwealth Asia, secure the material mightof the United States, and marginalise the Soviet Union. On1 July 1951, the Colombo Plan finally lurched into existencewith its public symbolism intact. As Tangeâs appraisalconfirmed, the result was tantamount to a diplomaticsleight-of-hand. The Colombo Conference, he wrote,âproved an opportunity for creating a piece of Commonwealth
Building a Bridge to Asia 67
machinery devoted specifically to a purpose which, in theminds of the public in the Commonwealth, was straight-forward and uncomplicated by any doubtful politicalmotivesâ.74 From Australiaâs perspective, Asiaâs economicprogress, cold war anxiety, and a deep concern about theconsequences of decolonisation for political stability, allcoalesced beneath a malleable regional forum, ostensiblydedicated to economic progress. The Menzies governmenthoped that relations augmented under the Colombo Planwould rejuvenate the Commonwealth bond betweenAustralia and the governments of South Asia and help toinstall Australia as a regional authority free to pursue itsinterests alongside a compliant Asian elite.
Although Spender offended the sensibilities ofWestern allies, he infused the right degree of urgency anddesperation into the proceedings in order to get Australiaâ and otherwise unenthusiastic Commonwealth powers âto commit finance and technical resources to the struggleagainst communism. By virtue of his rumbustious diplomacy,Spender galvanised Australiaâs role in the formation of theColombo Plan and as a force in regional affairs. Yet earlyreports from among Australiaâs more idealistic diplomatsrevealed a degree of doubt about the capacity of an aidprogram to stabilise the region and bolster Australiaâsregional profile. In 1950 Francis Stuart, now OfficialSecretary at the Australian High Commission in NewDelhi, wrote of a widespread âpublic curiosityâ aboutAustralia and the âremarkable extent to which Australiaâsexistence as something of a power in the world is knownand acceptedâ. However, in the longer term he was less sure:the âconduct of South East Asian relations with Australia islikely to present something of a continuing dilemma toSouth East Asiaâs leaders; events compel them to co-operate with us, but we must not believe that their hearts
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan68
are really in it.â75 But for now â with the question of justhow the Colombo Plan might achieve its breathtakinglyambitious goals still unanswered â the optimists couldignore the doubters.
Footnotes1 T. Remme, Britain and regional cooperation in SouthâEast Asia, 1945â49,
London, Routledge, 1995, p. 208; Age, 7 January 1950; Sydney MorningHerald, 10 January 1950
2 Charles Bohlen, âMinister to American Embassy in Paris: seventh meeting ofthe policy planning staff in the State Department, 24 January 1950â, FRUS,1950, vol. 3, pp. 620â21
3 D.V. LePan, Bright glass of memory, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979, pp.170â71
4 J. Spender, Ambassadorâs wife, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1968, p. 15 Sun (Sydney), 3 January 19506 P. Spender, Exercises in diplomacy: the ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan,
Sydney, Sydney University Press, 1969, pp. 194â214 7 D. Wolfstone, âThe Colombo Plan ten years afterâ, Far Eastern Economic
Review, 3 August 1961, p. 2198 Spender, Exercises in diplomacy, pp. 197, 271â729 Cable, Spender to Menzies, 11 January 1950, A1838 item 532/7 part 1, NAA10 âEconomic policy in South and SouthâEast Asia: memorandum by the
Australian delegationâ, 11 January 1950, A1838, 381/3/1/3 part 1a, NAA11 Cable, Spender to DEA, 14 January 1950, A1838, 532/7 part 1, NAA12 I. Gibbons, ed., Undiplomatic dialogue: letters between Carl Berendsen and Alister
McIntosh, 1943â52, Auckland, Auckland University Press in association withthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1993, pp. 226, 202â05
13 Gibbons, Undiplomatic dialogue, p. 20214 Despatch, Makin to Spender, 23 December 1949, A4231, 1949/Washington,
NAA15 âSouthâEast Asia preparations for the Consultative Committeeâ, A1838,
708/9/2, NAA16 CPD (HoR), vol. 6, 9 March 1950, pp. 623â3917 CPD (HoR), vol. 6, 9 March 1950, pp. 623â3918 CPD (HoR), vol. 206, 21 March 1950, p. 97319 âThe Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australiaâ, 18 March 1950,
FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, p. 6320 R.N. Birch, âEconomic assistance in SouthâEast Asiaâ, 10 February 1950,
A1830, TS708/9/2 part 1, NAA
Building a Bridge to Asia 69
21 Spender, Exercises in diplomacy, p. 24422 Sydney Morning Herald, 14 May 1950; R. Bodinagoda, interview with author,
8 September 1999, Colombo23 Sydney Morning Herald, 12 May 195024 Cable, Foreign Office to Commissioner General for United Kingdom in
SouthâEast Asia, Singapore, 10 March 1950, FO 371/84553, PRO, UK25 Cable, Spender to Harrison, 10 May 1950, A1838, 708/9/2 part 2, NAA26 R. Butler & M.E. Pelly (eds.), Documents on British Policy overseas, series 2: the
London conferences â AngloâAmerican relations and Cold War strategy,JanuaryâJune 1950, vol. 2, London, HMSO, 1987, p. 158; R. Hyam (ed.),British documents on the end of empire, vol. 2: the Labour government and the endof empire 1945â1951, part 2: economics and international relations, London,HMSO, 1992, p. 142; Cable, J.F. Nimmo, London, to Fred Wheeler, Treasury,Canberra, 15 June 1950, A1838, 708/12/1 part 1, NAA; A. Tange, âPoliticalobjectives of the Colombo Plan â working paperâ, 19 March 1952, A1838,3004/11 part 1, NAA
27 Tange, âPolitical objectives of the Colombo Plan â working paperâ28 âProposal of Australian Government for establishment of a Commonwealth
fundâ, 3 May 1950, CP529, 16/A/5, NAA; LePan, Bright glass of memory, p.196; âUK delegation to Consultative Committee, Sydney, to theCommonwealth Relations Office, Londonâ, 16 May 1950, FO 371/84546,PRO, UK; Documents on Canadian external relations, vol. 16, Ottawa, QueenâsPrinter, 1999, p. 1214
29 âUK delegation to Consultative Committee, Sydney, to the CommonwealthRelations Office, Londonâ; LePan, Bright glass of memory, p. 197; Documents onCanadian external relations, vol. 16, p. 1214
30 Sydney Morning Herald, 17 May 195031 Williams, UK High Commission, Canberra to Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations, 29 June 1950, FO 371/84548, PRO, UK32 Spender, Exercises in diplomacy, p. 262. For the full text of the final
communiquĂ©, see Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 21, 1950, pp.350â51
33 D. Lowe, âPercy Spender and the Colombo Plan 1950â, Australian Journal ofPolitics and History, vol. 40, no. 2, 1994, p. 171; Spender, Exercises indiplomacy, p. 262; A. Tange, Monologue, TRC 2447, tape 3, NLA
34 M.J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction ofWestern Europe, 1947â1952, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987,pp. 45, 142â44, 204â07
35 L. Gordon, âThe Organisation for European Economic Cooperationâ,International Cooperation, vol. 10, no. 1, 1956, pp. 1â11; L. Gordon,âEconomic regionalism reconsideredâ, World Politics, vol. 13, no. 2, 1961, pp.231â53
36 âStatement to be made by Hon. Spender KC â Australian Minister forExternal Affairs and leader of the Australian delegation at opening of theCommonwealth Consultative Committee, May 15, 1950â, CP529, 16/A/4/2,NAA
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan70
37 âProposal of Australian government for establishment of a Commonwealthfundâ, 3 May 1950, CP529, 16/A/5, NAA
38 Cable, DEA, Canberra to High Commissioner, London, Karachi, Ottawa, 8February 1951, A1838, 851/18/8 part 3, NAA
39 L.B. Pearson, âThe Colombo conferenceâ, External Affairs of Canada, vol. 2,no. 3, March 1950, p. 82
40 CPD (HoR), vol. 208, 8 June 1950, pp. 4013â27; L.P. Singh, The politics ofeconomic cooperation in Asia: a study of Asian international organizations,Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1966, pp. 181â82
41 CPD (HoR), vol. 208, 8 June 1950, p. 401342 âBrief for Lord Readingâs visit to Rangoon â ECAFE and the Colombo Planâ,
undated (circa January 1951), FO 371/101248, PRO, UK; S.P. Bray, âReport ofthe Australian delegation to the committee on industry and trade of theEconomic Commission for Asia and the Far East, second session, Bangkok, 9to 17 May 1950â, June 1950, A9879, 9121/7, NAA; âReport of the meeting ofthe British Commonwealth Consultative Committee, Sydney May 15 to 20,1950â, A1838, 708/12/1 part 1, NAA
43 âBrief for Australian delegationâ, British Commonwealth ConsultativeCommittee on aid to South and SouthâEast Asia, Sydney, May 1950, CP529,16/A/4/1, NAA
44 Telegram, Satterthwaite, US Embassy, Colombo, to Secretary of State,Washington, 11 November 1950, RG 59, 846E.00 TA/11-1150, USNA
45 R.H. Scott to M.E. Dening, UK Embassy Washington, 8 September 1950, FO371/84584, PRO, UK
46 Spender, Exercises in diplomacy, p. 264; LePan, Bright glass of memory, p. 20947 Memo, J. Plimsoll to A. Watt, âEconomic development of South East Asiaâ,
11 August 1950, A5460, 301/5, NAA48 Cable, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, London to DEA and
various posts, 2 August 1950, A1838, 708/12/1 part 2, NAA49 Cable, Commissioner-General, Singapore to Commonwealth Relations
Office, âFollow-up of Sydney conferenceâ, 5 August 1950, A5460, 301/5,NAA
50 âRecord of informal United StatesâUnited Kingdom discussion, Londonâ, 22September 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 5, pp. 212â15
51 Cable, Spender, London to Menzies, 27 September 1950, A3320, 3/4/2/1 part2, NAA
52 Letter, Spender to Bevin, 8 September 1950, A1838, 708/9/2 part 2, NAA53 A. Tange, âPoints about Colombo Plan of interest to Australiaâ, 15 December
1950, A5460, 301/5, NAA54 Commonwealth Consultative Committee, The Colombo Plan for cooperative
economic development in South and SouthâEast Asia: report by the ConsultativeCommittee, SeptemberâOctober 1950, London, His Majestyâs Stationery Office,1950, p. 63. See also: Cable, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations,London to DEA, Canberra, 19 December 1950, A6364, LC1950/015, NAA
55 Telegram, âSecretary of State (Acheson) to US Embassy, Londonâ, 22November 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, pp. 160â61
Building a Bridge to Asia 71
56 Tange, âPolitical objectives of the Colombo Plan â working paperâ57 Cable, Spender to Menzies, 28 September 1950, A4534, 44/13 part 3, NAA58 Cable, Spender to Menzies, 28 September 1950; Cable, Menzies to Spender, 1
October 1950, A9879, 2202/E1 part 1, NAA; Cable, Spender to Menzies, 2October 1950, A9879, 2202/E1 part 1, NAA; Documents on Canadian externalrelations, vol. 17, Ottawa, Queenâs Printer, 1999, p. 1044; Cabinet submission37a, December 1950, A4940, C353, NAA
59 Hyam, British documents on the end of empire, p. 142 60 âDepartmental notes on the London meeting of the Commonwealth
Consultative Committee, September 6 to October 4, 1950â, A5460, 301/5,NAA; P. Williams, ed., The diary of Hugh Gaitskell, 1945â1956, London,Cape, 1983, pp. 200â01
61 CPD (HoR), vol. 208, 8 June 1950, pp. 4029â3162 Cable, Spender to Menzies, 25 May 1950, A1838, 381/3/1/3 part 4, NAA;
âBritish Commonwealth Consultative Committee meeting in Sydney: somegeneral conclusionsâ, 24 May 1950, A1838, 381/3/1/3 part 4, NAA
63 W.T. Doig, âNotes for the Minister: proposed discussion with Dr. Subardjo onthe Colombo Planâ, 19 September 1951, A1838, 3004/11 part 1, NAA
64 Despatch, Gilchrist to DEA, 21 April 1952, A4231, 1952/Djakarta, NAA65 Despatch, Hood to Casey, 13 July 1950, A4231, 1950/Djakarta, NAA66 Cable, D.W. Kermode, British Embassy, Djakarta, to Anthony Eden, Foreign
Office, 20 November 1952, FO371/101245, PRO, UK67 Summary Record, âConsultative Committee: seventh plenary session, Friday
19 May 1950â, A5460, 301/5, NAA68 N.J. Padelford, âRegional cooperation in the South Pacific: twelve years of the
South Pacific Commissionâ, International Organization, vol. 13, no. 3, 1959,pp. 383â84
69 âColombo Plan Consultative Committee meeting, Singapore, September1955: UK delegation paperâ, 16 September 1955, DO 35-5726, PRO, UK
70 J.W. Cumes, âThe Colombo Plan: present status of the Australian effortâ, 8January 1952, A1838, 2020/1/12 part 1, NAA
71 Government of Pakistan, Foreign aid review committee, Ministry of EconomicAffairs, Karachi, July 1957, A1838, 2020/1/11, NAA
72 W.E.C. Harrison, Canada in world affairs, 1949â1950, Toronto, OxfordUniversity Press, 1957, p. 231
73 J.R.E. C arr-Gregg, âThe Colombo Plan: a Commonwealth program forSoutheast Asiaâ, International Conciliation, no. 467, January 1951, pp. 16â21
74 Tange, âPolitical objectives of the Colombo Plan â working paperâ75 Letter, F. Stuart to A. Watt, 28 August 1950, A1838, 3004/ 11 part 1, NAA
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan72