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While U.S. leaders have focused on actual orillusory security threats in distant regions, there isa troubling security problembrewingmuch closerto home. Violence inMexico,mostly related to thetrade in illegal drugs, has risen sharply in recentyears and shows signs of becoming even worse.That violence involves turf fights among the vari-ous drug-trafficking organizations as they seek tocontrol access to the lucrative U.S. market. To anincreasing extent, the violence also entails fightingbetween drug traffickers and Mexican militaryand police forces.

The carnage has already reached the point thatthe U.S. State Department has issued travel alertsfor Americans traveling inMexico.U.S. tourism tocities on Mexico’s border with the United States,where the bloodshed has been the worst, hasdropped sharply. Even more troubling, the vio-lence is spilling across the border into communi-ties in the southwestern United States.

U.S. officials, alarmed at the growing power ofthe Mexican drug cartels, have pressured the gov-ernment of Felipe Calderón to wage a more vigor-ous anti-drug campaign. Calderón has respondedby giving the army the lead role in efforts to elim-inate the drug traffickers insteadof relying on fed-eral and local police forces, which have been thor-

oughly corruptedbydrugmoney.Washingtonhasrewarded Calderón’s government by implement-ing the initial stage of the so-called MéridaInitiative. In June 2008,Congress approved a $400million installment modeled on Plan Colombia,the anti-drug assistance measure for Colombiaand other drug-source countries in the Andeanregion. That program, now in its ninth year, hasalready cost more than $5 billion, without signifi-cantly reducing the flow of drugs coming out ofSouth America. The Mérida Initiative will likelycost billions and be equally ineffectual.

Abandoning the prohibitionist model of deal-ingwith thedrugproblem is the only effectivewayto stem the violence in Mexico and its spilloverinto the United States. Other proposed solutions,including preventing the flow of guns from theU.S. to Mexico, establishing tighter control overthe border, and (somehow) winning the war ondrugs are futile. As long as theprohibitionist strat-egy is in place, the huge black market premium inillegal drugs will continue, and the lure of thatprofit, together with the illegality, guarantees thatthe most ruthless, violence-prone elements willdominate the trade. Ending drug prohibitionwould de-fund the criminal trafficking organiza-tions and reduce their power.

Troubled NeighborMexico’s Drug Violence Poses a Threat to the United States

by Ted Galen Carpenter

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author ofeight books, including Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America(Palgrave/Macmillan).

Executive Summary

No. 631 February 2, 2009

3597_PA631_1stClass:3597_PA631_1stClass 1/15/2009 9:43 AM

Introduction:The Rising Tide of Violence

There has been an alarming spike in vio-lence in Mexico in recent years, most of whichis associated with the trafficking in illegaldrugs and the efforts of the Mexican govern-ment to shut down that trade. The extent ofviolence was already at a troubling level as ear-ly as 2002 and 2003.1 Since then, though, thesituation has dramatically worsened, and thecarnage is increasingly impacting communi-ties in the southwestern United States. It hasreached the point that it poses a legitimatenational security issue for U.S. policymakers.

Although there are nearly a dozen drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico, includingseven significant cartels, two groups are espe-cially powerful. One is the Federation (some-times called the Pacific cartel), an associationthat emerged from a 2006 accord between theSinaloa cartel and several secondary traffick-ing syndicates in and around Mexico’s Pacificstate of Sinaloa. The Federation’s principalrival is the Gulf cartel, based in the city ofMatamoros in the Mexican state of Tamauli-pas, along the eastern portion of the borderwith Texas. It has another major base fartherwest in the city ofNuevoLaredo.2 Both groupsare extremely violent, with the Gulf cartel hav-inganespecially potent cadreof enforcers—theZetas—who are highly trained anti-drug mili-tary personnel who defected to the traffick-ers.3 A third faction, the Tijuana cartel (onceperhaps the most powerful organization), hasdeclined somewhat in recent years as severaltop leaders have been arrested or killed.4

Indeed, over the past six or seven years, theTijuana cartel has been the frequent target ofhigh-profile police and military operations.

These groups, especially theGulf cartel andthe Federation, battle law enforcement agen-cies and one another for control of the accesscorridors to the lucrative U.S. drug market.5

An incident in Nuevo Laredo in April 2008illustrates how brazen the drug traffickershave become. The Gulf cartel’s Zetas openlysought recruits to their ranks, posting help-

wanted signs and hanging a giant banneracross a major thoroughfare. The banner’smessage was: “The Zetas want you, soldier orex-soldier. We offer a good salary, food andbenefits for your family.Don’t suffer anymoremistreatment and don’t go hungry.”6

Even supposed victories in the drug warprove tobemixedblessings at best. As Stratfor,a risk-assessment consulting organization,notes: “Inter-cartel violence tends to swingupwardafterU.S. orMexicanauthoritiesman-age to weaken or disrupt a given organization.At any point, if rival groups sense an organiza-tion might not be able to defend its turf, theywill swoop in to battle not only the incumbentgroup, but also each other for control.”7

Theturfbattleshavebeenferocious. In2005,more than 1,300 people perished in drug-relat-ed violence. By 2007, the yearly total had soaredto 2,673. And it continues to getworse. By earlyAugust 2008, the body count for that yearalready exceeded the number of fatalities in allof 2007.8 By mid-November, some estimatesput the toll at more than 4,500.9

There have been especially nasty episodesthis year. In early May, more than a hundredpeoplewerekilled in a singleweek.OnMexico’snational day in September, drug gang hitmentossed two grenades into a packed crowd cele-brating theholiday in thecityofMorelia,killingeight people and wounding dozens. And over aseven-dayperiod in lateOctober, 50peoplediedin shootouts or executions in one city alone—Tijuana.10

Although most victims seem to be partici-pants in the drug trade, several hundred policeofficers and soldiers have also died in the fight-ing. Many police personnel feel under siege. InMay 2008, three Mexican police chiefs request-ed political asylum in the United Statesbecauseofdrugcartel threats to themandtheirfamilies.11 There is a growing number of othercasualties as well, including 24 journalists whohave been killed execution-style since 2000.12

Many reporters now flatly refuse to cover sto-ries involving the cartels.13 And there are theinnocent bystanders who are caught in thecrossfire when fights erupt between the druggangs or between gang members and the

2

Even supposedvictories in thedrug war prove

to be mixedblessings at best.


authorities. Newsweek correspondent MichaelMillernotes that innocent victims just this yearinclude a little girl in Ciudad Juarez, six peoplein front of a recreation center in the same city,a 14-year-old girl in Acapulco, two small chil-dren in Tijuana, and other people who weresimply in the wrong place at the wrong time.14

The violence sometimes takes on especiallygruesome characteristics. Victims typicallybear signs of extensive torture, and one of thefavorite tactics the cartels use when they wishto make an emphatic point is to behead theirvictims anddisplay those heads in a highly vis-ible place.15 Two years ago, the heads of amur-dered police strike force commander and oneof his agents were left jammed onto a fence infront of the police station in the prominentPacific seaside resort of Acapulco.16 A shorttime later, five severed heads were tossedacross the dance floor in a nightclub in thestate of Michoacan. Others have been left nearschools, courthouses, and other governmentfacilities.17

Pamela Starr, an international relationsscholar at the University of Southern Califor-nia, concludes that the death toll in Mexico isnowsimilar “to a country in the throesof a civ-il war.”18 The U.S. State Department warnedAmerican travelers in April 2008 that battlesbetween drug-trafficking gangs (and betweenthose gangs and Mexican military and police)in portions of northern Mexico were so severethat they constituted “the equivalent of mili-tary small-unit combat and have included useof machine guns and fragmentation gre-nades.”19 That warning remains in effect.

The adverse impact of the fighting has beenmost pronounced in Mexican cities along theborder with the United States. In Tijuana, mer-chants estimate that tourism is down as muchas 90 percent from 2005, when an estimated 4millionpeoplevisitedthecity.Halfof thedown-townbusinesses—some2,400 enterprises—haveclosed their doors in the past three years.Washington Post correspondent Manuel Roig-Franzia notes that matters are not much betterin the other border cities. Empty markets “havebecome the norm in Ciudad Juarez” (directlyacross the border from El Paso), and in Nuevo

Laredo five major hotels have shut down.20

Mexico’s main tourist locales, such as Cancunand Acapulco, have fared significantly better sofar, but officials and business leaders are ner-vous as reports proliferate about the bloodshedafflicting other areas.

Impact on Americans

The turmoil in Mexico is no longer a con-cern merely to that country. Increasingly, theviolence is affecting Americans who travel ordo business in Mexico, and there are even atroubling number of incidents in whichMexico-related violence has spilled across theborder into the United States itself.

A State Department report released inAugust 2008 noted that 131 U.S. citizens werevictimsofhomicidesor “executions” inMexicobetween July1, 2005, and June30,2008.21 Mostof those victims perished in cities along theU.S.–Mexico border where drug-related fight-ing has been the most intense. Some of thoseindividuals were undoubtedly involved in thedrug trade, but others were not. Indeed, evencoming from a prominent family does notseem to guarantee immunity: in June 2008, afemale relative of Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)was kidnapped in Ciudad Juarez, one of theareas in which the drug gangs have been themost active.22

There are indications that cartel hitmenhave struck at individuals inside the UnitedStates. In the past two years, seven people werekilled execution-style in Laredo, Texas, acrosstheRioGrande fromoneofMexico’smost vio-lent cities,NuevoLaredo. The victims includeda man whom the hitmen stalked and killednearhisplaceofwork, andanothermanwhomthey gunned down in the parking lot of a pop-ular restaurant. Authorities arrested and con-victed twoGulf cartel enforcers for the stringofexecutions.23 In October 2008, enforcers kid-napped a Las Vegas child because a relativeallegedly owed money to one of Mexican druggangs.24

The cartels have now become bold enoughto put Americans living in the United States

3

There areindications thatcartel hitmenhave struck atindividuals insidethe United States.


on target lists for execution. In June 2008, U.S.Immigration and Customs Enforcement offi-cials obtained what appeared to be a hit listfrom one of the cartels. The list reportedlynamed nearly 20 people, primarily individualsliving in southern New Mexico, but also inAlbuquerque,NewMexico, andEl Paso, Texas.The list even included a sheriff’s captain inLuna County, New Mexico.25 It has becomecommonplace for the cartels to publish suchlists of Mexican nationals, including policeofficers, but this was a new level of brazenness.

Even U.S. officials concede that the drug-related violence inMexico does not respect bor-ders. As early as summer 2005, John P. Walters,directorof theOfficeofNationalDrugControlPolicy during the Bush administration, noted:“Thekillingof rival traffickers isalreadyspillingacross theborder.Witnessesarebeingkilled.Wedo not think the border is a shield.”26 In June2008, Walters again emphasized the spilloverfeature. “Theshockingcharacterof someof thisviolence, the viciousness of these groups, is notgoing to respect borders. It already doesn’t.”Not only does the violence already spill acrossthe border, “it will come more aggressively towherever it feels it can survive and brutally takemoney and power.”27 A Dallas narcotics officeralso cited evidence of a spillover effect. “We’reseeing an alarming number of incidents involv-ing the same type of violence that’s become alltoo common in Mexico, right here in Dallas.We’re seeing execution-style murders, burnedbodies, and outright mayhem . . . It’s like thebattles being waged in Mexico for turf havereached Dallas.”28 Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-TX)reaches a similar conclusion. “If you look atsome of the Mexican—the drug cartels’—pres-ence on the U.S. side, it’s in Laredo, it’s in SanAntonio, it’s in Houston, Dallas and otherareas.”29

U.S. law enforcement personnel, especiallyBorder Patrol agents, are increasingly the tar-gets of violence on the U.S. side of the bound-ary. A 2006 report by the majority staff of theHouse Homeland Security Committee notedthat at one time, smugglers “would drop thedrugs or abandon their vehicles when con-fronted by U.S. law enforcement.” That is no

longer the case. “In today’s climate,U.S. BorderPatrol agents are fired upon from across theriver and troopers and sheriff’s deputies aresubject to attacks with automatic weaponswhile the cartels retrieve their contraband.”30

Some attacks have come from Mexicans wear-ing military uniforms. It is not certain whetherthey are smugglers with stolen uniforms or ifrogue elements of the Mexican military areattacking U.S. law enforcement personnel onbehalf of traffickers.

According to a Department of HomelandSecurity report, in just the first nine monthsof 2007, there were 25 incursions by Mexicanmilitary or police personnel, some of whichwere in support of trafficking operations.31

Proponents of enhanced border security con-tend that the situation is much worse thanthe Department of Homeland Securityadmits. Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA) allegesthat there were more than 200 Mexican mili-tary incursions into U.S. territory betweenJanuary 2006 and August 2008.32 Rep. TomTancredo (R-CO), commenting on an Oc-tober 31, 2008, incident in which sevenMexican soldierswere taken into custodynearYuma, Arizona, charged: “This is not anuncommon occurrence. Often times, it is theresult of the Mexican military providing coveressentially for drug transportation across intoour country, and/or creating a diversion so itwill draw our people away from the placewhere the drugs are coming across.”33 Whilesome of the incursions are probably innocenterrors along a border that is not always wellmarked, others are decidedly suspicious. Forexample, in early August Mexican militarypersonnel held a U.S. Border Patrol Agent atgunpoint. They retreated back into their owncountry only when the Patrol dispatchedbackup agents to the scene.34

An October 2008 FBI intelligence bulletinobtained by theWashingtonTimes suggests thatthe drug syndicates are becoming even moreaggressive in their willingness to confront U.S.border patrol agents and other law enforce-ment officers. The Zetas are reportedly stock-piling weapons in safe houses inside theUnited States, especially in southern Texas.

4

U.S. lawenforcementpersonnel,

especially BorderPatrol agents,

are increasinglythe targets of

violence on theU.S. side of the

boundary.


The Gulf cartel’s regional leader allegedlyordered reinforcements to takeuppositions ina tactical operations area or “plaza” in the areanear the Texas towns of McAllen and Mission,about five miles from the border with Mexico.Those reinforcementswere armedwithassaultrifles, bullet-proof vests, and grenades.35

According to the bulletin, the main responsi-bility of the reinforcement cells was to “seekout people owing the cartel money for lost,stolen, or seized drug loads or profits.” Thosepeople, primarily U.S. residents or citizens, areforced to pay up or are kidnapped. The plazacells are also “proactively seeking out andeliminating rival drug and alien smugglinggroups.” Zeta operatives have been instructedto “engage law enforcementwith a full tacticalresponse should law enforcement attempt tointervene” in cartel operations in Texas.36

Bogus Solution:Stopping the Flow of Guns

intoMexicoThe Mexican government has responded

to Washington’s complaints about the surg-ing violence by blaming supposedly lax U.S.gun laws. Mexico’s attorney general, EduardoMedina Mora, typified that view, saying: “Ithink American [gun] laws are absurd” be-cause “they make it very easy for citizens toacquire guns.”37

Gun control advocates in the United Stateshave taken up the same theme. A New YorkTimes editorial encapsulated the logic ofstrengthening the restrictions on firearms as away to more effectively wage the war on drugssouth of the border. “Mexico has no hope ofdefeating the traffickers unless this country isalso willing to do more to fight the drug war athome—starting with a clear commitment tostop the weapons smugglers.”38 University ofSouthern California scholar Pamela Starr goeseven further, arguing that U.S. leaders shouldfocus “on the southward flow of arms andammunition that is fueling an explosion ofdrug-related violence in Mexico.” She stressesthat “an estimated 97 percent of the arms used

by the Mexican cartels—including military-gradegrenade launchersandassaultweapons—arepurchased at sportinggoods stores andgunshows on the U.S. side of the border and thensmuggled south, according to theMexicangov-ernment.”Her proposed solution is a “Cabinet-level initiative to attack the illicit gun trade.Thedepartments of Homeland Security, Justice,State, Defense, and Treasury all need to beinvolved.” Echoing the arguments of Mexicanpolitical leaders, Starr asserts: “The UnitedStates is enabling the bloodshed in Mexico. Wehave a moral responsibility to stop arming themurderers and kidnappers—our national secu-rity demands it.”39

Even some U.S. political leaders have accept-ed the Mexican government’s explanation forthe surgingviolence. In June2008, theBushandCalderón administrations announced a newprogram, theArmasCruzadas (CrossedArms), tostem the flowof guns fromtheUnitedStates toMexico. Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA) defendedthe initiative, saying: “As drugs come into ourcountry, money and illegal firearms go out. Weoweit toourneighborstohelpcutdownonout-bound smuggling.”40

The notion that the violence in Mexicowould subside if the United States had morerestrictive laws on firearms is devoid of logicand evidence. Mexican drug gangs would havelittle trouble obtaining all the guns they desirefrom black market sources in Mexico and else-where. After all, the traffickers make their for-tunes operating in a black market involvinganother product, and they have vast financialresources to purchase whatever they need toconduct theirbusiness.Evenassumingthat theMexican government’s estimate that 97 per-cent of the weapons used by the cartels comefrom stores and gun shows in the UnitedStates—and Mexican officials are not exactlyobjective sources for such statistics—the traf-fickers rely on those outlets simply becausethey are easier and more convenient, notbecause there are no other options. One couldclose every sporting goods store in the south-western states, and the measure would not dis-arm the drug gangs. If Washington and thevarious state governments adopted the fire-

5

TheMexicangovernment hasresponded toWashington’scomplaints aboutthe surgingviolence byblamingsupposedly laxU.S. gun laws.


arms“reforms” thatMexicoCity isdemanding,the principal result would be to inconveniencelaw-abiding American gun owners and mer-chants.

Moreover, the research on restrictive gunlaws in both U.S. and foreign jurisdictionsshows no correlation between tough laws anda decline in homicides and other crimes.41

Attempts to lay theblame forMexico’s chaosatthe door of U.S. gun laws are either naive or acynical effort to find a scapegoat. Tighteningfirearms laws in the United States (even if thatwere politically feasible) is not a solution to theviolence in Mexico.

Bogus Solution:Seal the Border

An increasingly popular measure amongAmericans to stem drug-related violence seep-ing into the United States from Mexico is togreatly increase border security.42 Proponentstout the alleged effectiveness of measures tak-en to date, even as they press for stronger ini-tiatives. RepresentativeHunter combines boththemes:

While we have made some progress inrecent years toward creating a moreenforceable border, we still have a lot ofwork left to do. Moving forward, wemust continue strengthening securitythrough manpower, technology andinfrastructure, including the most reli-able and effective enforcement tool sofar: border security fencing. Much likemany other areas of the border today,the land corridor that once existed be-tween Tijuana, Mexico, and San Diego,California, was for many years consid-ered to be the most prolific and danger-ous smuggling route in the nation. Itwas not until I wrote into law the con-struction of a double border fence thatdrug smugglers and armed gangs lostcontrol of this corridor and conditionson both sides of the border started toimprove.43

What Hunter did not mention is that thetraffickers merely moved their preferred tran-sit corridor a little farther to the east, crossinginto California in a more remote desertregion rather than through the more urban-ized, visible, and guarded San Diego metro-politan area. There was no evidence that thefence and increased surveillance did anythingmore than cause thema slight inconvenience.

Although the principal reason for passageof the Secure FenceAct of 2006was anger overthe flow of undocumented immigrants, con-cern about the drug trade and the violenceaccompanying itwas also a factor. Representa-tive Hunter was candid about that motive.“Recurring confrontations with Mexican sol-diers,much like thedrug smugglers and illegalimmigrants that attempt to cross into theU.S.through Mexico each day, further illustratewhy fencing and other infrastructure remainsso important to the security and enforcementof our border.”44 A major source of resistanceto fully funding anti-drugmeasures inMexicohas come from members of Congress, includ-ing influential Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX), who want more of the money directed tobeefingup law enforcement on theU.S. side ofthe border.45

Proposals to seal or “secure” the borderwith Mexico are unrealistic. The desire formore security along the border is under-standable, and some additional steps may beuseful, but the logistics of attempting to dra-matically reduce incursions along the 1,952-mile land border with Mexico would be pro-hibitively difficult. Not only would that goalrequire building the North American equiva-lent of the Berlin Wall, it would entail sta-tioning tens of thousands of trained lawenforcement, and possibly military, person-nel to guard it and prevent breaches. Clearly,the more limited measures, such as the exis-tence of flimsy fences and periodic appear-ances by the U.S. Border Patrol, have notworked. Hundreds of thousands of unautho-rized immigrants cross the border intoremote sectors of the southwestern stateseach year. Professional drug traffickers arenot going to be stymied by such systems

6

Although theprincipal reasonfor passage of theSecure Fence Actwas anger over

the flow ofundocumentedimmigrants,

concern aboutthe drug tradeand violence

was also a factor.


when ordinary immigrants are not.Even if it were possible to seal the land bor-

der, the trafficking organizations have inge-nious ways of coping. On numerous occa-sions, U.S. authorities have detected tunnelsunderneath the border. Some of those facili-ties are incredibly sophisticated, with electriclights, rail lines, and air conditioning.46 Con-trolling the border above ground is no guar-antee that it will be controlled below ground.

Aside fromtheproblemofdealingwith leak-age of drugs and violence through the landbor-der, traffickers can bypass it entirely and enterthe United States through the lengthy coastlinein the Gulf of Mexico or along the Californiacoast. Inadditiontousingspeedboats (themostcommon method), the Mexican cartels havebeguntoemulatetheirColombiancolleaguesbyutilizing submarines to bring their product tomarket.47 And drug traffickers can circumventfences and border checkpoints by evading radarand flying over the border in small planes.Indeed, the cartels seem to maintain a veritablefleet of such planes to bring shipments into theUnited States.48

The immensity of the task means thatschemes to seal the border are just as futile asthe calls to stop the southward flow of guns asa solution to the problems of drug traffickingand drug-related violence. Policymakers mustlook elsewhere for effective measures. Unfor-tunately, the most popular proposal is toredouble the effort to win the war on drugs—yet another false panacea.

Bogus Solution:Win theWar on Drugs

U.S. policy seems to assume that if theMexican government can eliminate the topdrug lords, their organizations will fall apart,thereby greatly reducing the flow of illegaldrugs to the United States. Washington hasnow backed up that policy with a lucrative aidpackage, the Mérida Initiative, to help fundlaw enforcement reforms and other anti-drugefforts. In the summer of 2008, the U.S.Congress approved the first installment ($400

million) ofwhat is designed tobe a$1.4billionmulti-year program modeled after PlanColombia, the initiative that began in 2000 forColombia and its Andean neighbors.49 In alllikelihood, the price tag of the MéridaInitiative will ultimately exceed $1.4 billion,just as Plan Colombia has now lasted morethan seven years, with cost ballooning tomorethan $5 billion.

U.S. officials have rejoiced at the willing-ness of Mexican President Felipe Calderón’sadministration to make the drug war—andespecially the capture of major trafficking fig-ures—a high priority. The State Department’s2008 International Narcotics Control StrategyReportpraisedCalderón for launching “aggres-sive operations across Mexico to reassert con-trol over areas that had fallen under the virtu-al dominion of the drug cartels.” The reportnoted further that Mexican authorities extra-diteda record83 fugitives to theUnitedStates,including the leaderof theGulf cartel, andhadseized more than 48 metric tons of cocaine in2007, more than twice the amount seized in2006.50

Since Calderón took office in 2006, theMexican government has for the first time giv-en the military a lead role in combating thetraffickers. Approximately 36,000 troops arenow involved in that effort, in addition to sev-eral thousand federal police officers. The prin-cipal outcome of that strategy, however, hasbeen an even greater level of violence, withmil-itary personnel increasingly becoming targets.The military also has now been exposed to thetemptation of financial corruption that hadpreviously compromised Mexico’s local andfederal police forces so thoroughly.

Decapitation Strategies Don’t WorkThe belief that neutralizing Mexican drug

kingpins will achieve a lasting reduction indrug trafficking is the same assumption thatU.S. officials made with respect to the crack-down on the Medellín and Cali cartels inColombiaduring the1990s. Subsequentdevel-opments have shown that assumption to beerroneous. Indeed, an October 2008 report bythe Government Accountability Office found

7

Schemes to sealthe border are asfutile as the callsto stop thesouthward flowof guns as asolution to theproblems of drugtrafficking anddrug-relatedviolence.


that while opium poppy cultivation and hero-in production in Colombia had declined sincethe start of Plan Colombia, coca cultivationand cocaine production (the country’s princi-pal drug export) had actually increased by 15percent and 4 percent, respectively.51 The elim-ination of the Medellín and Cali cartels merelydecentralized the Colombian drug trade.Instead of two large organizations controllingthe trade, today some300smaller, looselyorga-nized groups do so.

More to the point, the arrests and killingsof numerous topdrug lords in bothColombiaand Mexico over the years have not had ameaningful impact on the quantity of drugsentering the United States. Cutting off onehead of the drug-smuggling Hydra merelyresults in more heads taking its place.

Indeed, one might wonder how seriousMexico’s anti-drug campaign will be in thelong run. U.S. leaders held out hopes thatCalderón’s predecessor, Vicente Fox, woulddisrupt the trade. Similar hopes were invest-ed in earlier Mexican administrations, but anoticeable pattern emerged in all of thosecases. Early on, new Mexican presidents typi-cally went out of their way to impress on U.S.policymakers that they were serious aboutcooperating with Washington and taking onthe drug lords. Then, within a few years, theefforts dwindled into futility marked by offi-cial corruption.

The Problem of CorruptionThe corruption factor makes it especially

unlikely thatCalderónwillmake anymore last-ing progress than previous administrationsagainst the drug trade. Several major scandalshavesurfaced in just thepastyear. InApril2008,authorities arrested the police chief of Reynosafor allegedly protecting members of the Gulfcartel.52 In October, prosecutors charged thatemployees of the federal Attorney General’sofficewereworking for a subunit of theSinaloacartel. Two top employees of the organizedcrime unit and at least three federal policeagents assigned to it were allegedly passinginformation to the cartel regarding surveillancetargets and potential raids. They supposedly

received payments of between $150,000 and$450,000 permonth for their information.53 Lessthan two weeks later, prosecutors an-nouncedthatRodolfode laGuardiaGarcia, thenumber-two official in Mexico’s Federal Bureau ofInvestigation from 2003 to 2005, had beenplaced under house arrest pending an investi-gation into allegations that he, too, had leakedinformation to the Sinaloa cartel.54 The scan-dals continued in lateNovember,whenthegov-ernment announced the arrest ofNoéRamírez,who,until July2008,was thechiefof theSpecialOrganized Crime Investigation Division, forallegedly taking bribes from traffickers.55

Ramírez had been President Calderón’s highlyregarded drug policy czar and the chief liaisonwith U.S. anti-drug officials.

The size of the alleged payoffs under-scores why Mexican law enforcement person-nel are so susceptible to corruption by thecartels. By cooperating with the drug traf-ficking syndicates, those individuals can earnmore—often far more—in a single monththan they could ever hope to earn in theirlegal jobs in years—and in some cases, morethan they could earn in decades.56 Suchtemptation is hard to resist. According to aformer mid-level Tijuana policeman: “Thereis barely a Mexican police officer along theU.S. border who isn’t involved in the drugtrade. Even if you try to resist, your superiorspressure you into it or sideline you.”57 He hadresigned from the force after personally wit-nessing his commander receive a $5,000bribe to ignore drug smuggling in his sector.

Not surprisingly, drug-related corruption,ranging from low-echelon police officers tothe highest-level officials, has had a long his-tory in Mexico. During the 1990s, theNational Police Commander was caught with$2.4 million in the trunk of his car. Later hewas convicted of givingmore than$20millionto another government official to buy protec-tion for one of Mexico’s most notorious druglords.58 Perhaps the most embarrassing inci-dent prior to the recent Ramírez arrestoccurred in the mid-1990s when PresidentErnesto Zedillo appointed General José deJesús Gutiérrez Rebollo to be Mexico’s new

8

The arrestsand killings of

top drug lords inColombia and

Mexico have nothad a meaningful

impact on thequantity of drugs

entering theUnited States.


drug czar. The general seemed to have excel-lent drug-fighting credentials, having person-ally led a much-publicized raid against thehead of the Sinaloa cartel. U.S. officials greet-ed Gutiérrez Rebollo’s appointment enthusi-astically. U.S. drug czar Barry McCaffreygushed: “He has a reputation for impeccableintegrity. . . .He’s a deadly serious guy.”59 Threemonths later, the Mexican government an-nounced that its new drug czar was in a maxi-mum-security prison, charged with takingbribes andprotecting the nation’s largest drugtrafficker. The general had indeed been toughon drug trafficking—tough, that is, on organi-zations that competedwithhis patron’s cartel.

The latest scandal in Mexico’s AttorneyGeneral’s office, though, suggests that drug-related corruption may not be confined toMexican government agencies. One of thesuspects in that episode has reportedly toldinvestigators that he paid a spy in the U.S.embassy for information on the U.S. DrugEnforcement Administration operations inMexico.60

Drug warriors in both Mexico and theUnited States repeatedly rationalize unpleas-ant revelations regarding corruption. Forexample, when Noé Ramírez was arrested,Thomas Schweich, former deputy assistantsecretary of state for international law enforce-ment, stated: “I find the whole situationencouraging. If you are a corrupt official, youare no longer immune to prosecution no mat-ter howhighup you are. It shows a lot of polit-icalwill on thepart ofCalderón.”61 Thebizarrelogic that the worse things get, the better theyreally are is not confined to the corruptionissue; it extends to the surging violence aswell.A recent article in the Economist noted that atleast 4,000 people had been murdered in 2008in incidents involving traffickers. “Officials saythat is a sign that governmentpressure [on thedruggangs] is having an effect.”62 The reality isthat bad developments are usually just baddevelopments, and they point to a deteriorat-ing—not an improving—situation.

It is not surprising that supply-side anti-drug initiatives have failed in Colombia andother countries and are now failing in Mexico.

The global trade in illegal drugs is a vast,extremely lucrative enterprise, estimated at$320 billion a year, withMexico’s share of thattrade generally thought to be about $25–35billion.63 TheUnitedStates is the largest singleretail market, but U.S. demand is not the onlyrelevant factor. The American market is actu-ally relatively mature, with overall consump-tion not substantially different from what itwas a decade or two decades ago. The mainareas of demand growth are in EasternEurope, the successor states of the formerSoviet Union, and some portions of theMiddle East and Latin America. According tothe United Nations, there has been a notice-able increase in the consumption of opiatesthroughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia,especially the former Soviet states. In WesternEurope, the principal increase has been in theuse of cocaine.64 In the Middle East, even sucha politically authoritarian and religiously con-servative society as Iran iswitnessing a surge inboth drug trafficking and drug use, especiallyof heroin. That problemhas reached the pointthat the Supreme Leader’s representative inone province has labeled drug abuse and traf-ficking to be the Iranian society’s “thorniestproblem.”65 The bottom line is that the de-mand for illegal drugs on a global basis isrobust and is likely to remain so.

Robust Consumer DemandMakesVictory Impossible

That sobering reality has ominous implica-tions for the strategy that advocates of a “warondrugs” continue topush.Their strategyhaslong had two major components. The first isto shut off the flow of drugs coming fromdrug-source countries, through various meth-ods of drug crop eradication, developmentalaid to promote alternative economic opportu-nities, interdiction of drug shipments, andsuppression of money-laundering activities.The second component is to significantlyreduce demand in theUnitedStates through acombinationof criminal sanctions, drug treat-ment programs, and anti-drug educationalcampaigns.

At best, efforts at domestic demand reduc-

9

The demand forillegal drugs ona global basisis robust andis likely to remainso.


tion have achieved only modest results, andthe supply-side campaign has been even lesseffective. Moreover, with global demand con-tinuing to increase, even if drug warriors suc-ceeded in their goal of more substantiallyreducing consumption in the United States, itwouldhave little adverse impact on traffickingorganizations. There is more than enoughdemand globally to attract and sustain traf-fickers who are willing to take the risks to sat-isfy thatdemand.Andsince the illegalityof thetrade creates a huge black market premium(dependingon the drug, 90percent ormore ofthe retail price), the potential profits to drugtrafficking organizations are huge.66 Thus, thesupply-side strategy attempts to defy the basiclaws of economics, with predictable results. Itis a fatally flawed strategy, and Washington’sinsistence on continuing it causes seriousproblems of corruption and violence for a keydrug-source and drug-transiting country suchas Mexico.

Thus, the notion that the solution to theviolence in Mexico is to win the war on drugsis asmucha chimera as the other two so-calledsolutions. Given the healthy state of globaldemand, there is no prospect of ending—oreven substantially reducing—the trade in ille-gal drugs. There is only one policy change thatwould have a meaningful impact.

The Only Real Solution

The brutal reality is that prohibitionismsimply drives commerce in a product under-ground, creating an enormous black-marketpotential profit that attracts violence-prone,criminal elements. Even the U.S. State Depart-ment has conceded that point, although itremains blindly committed to a prohibitioniststrategy.

Drug organizations possess and wieldthe ultimate instrument of corruption:money. The drug trade has access toalmost unimaginable quantities of it.No commodity is so widely available,so cheap to produce, and as easily

renewable as illegal drugs. They offerdazzling profit margins that allowcriminals to generate illicit revenues ona scale without historical precedent.67

Governments around the world seem to beawakening to the problems caused by a strictprohibitionist strategy. Such countries as theNetherlands and Portugal have adopteddecriminalizationmeasures (de factoorde jure)for possession and use of small quantities ofdrugs.68 That view is takinghold in theWesternHemisphere aswell. Thepresident ofArgentinahas endorsed the decriminalization of drugconsumption, and the president of Hondurashas gone even further, embracing the legaliza-tionofdruguse.69 Indeed, thatsentimentseemsto be growing in Mexico itself. The PRD (Partyof the Democratic Revolution), the country’slargest opposition party, has called for druglegalization, and even President Calderón hasproposed decriminalizing the possession ofsmall amounts of street drugs.70

Those proposals are modest steps in theright direction, and they certainly are moresensible than Washington’s knee-jerk supportfor comprehensive prohibition. Legalizing, oreven decriminalizing, drug possession has thebeneficial effect of not stigmatizing (andsometimes ruining) the lives of users. Andsuch reforms have the salutary effect of notfilling prisons with nonviolent offenders. Buteven those desirable reforms do not get to theroot cause of the violence that accompaniesthe drug trade. Unless the production and saleof drugs is also legalized, theblack-market pre-mium will still exist and law-abiding business-es will still stay away from the trade. In otherwords, drug commerce will remain in thehands of criminal elements that do not shrinkfrom engaging in bribery, intimidation, andmurder.

Because of its proximity to the huge U.S.market, Mexico will continue to be a cockpitfor that drug-related violence. By its domesticcommitment to prohibition, the UnitedStates is creating the risk that the drug cartelsmay become powerful enough to destabilizeits southern neighbor. Their impact on

10

Prohibitionismdrives commerceunderground,creating an

enormous blackmarket that

attracts violence-prone, criminal

elements.


Mexico’s government and society has alreadyreached worrisome levels. Worst of all, thecarnage associated with the black markettrade in drugs does not respect nationalboundaries. The frightening violence nowconvulsing Mexico could become a routinefeature of life in American communities, asthe cartels begin to flex their muscles northof the border.

When the United States and other coun-tries ponder whether to persist in a strategyof drug prohibition, they need to consider allof the potential societal costs, both domesti-cally and internationally.71 Drug abuse is cer-tainly a major public health problem, and itssocietal costs are considerable. But banningthe drug trade creates economic distortionsand an opportunity for some of the mostunsavory elements to gain dominant posi-tions. Drug prohibition leads inevitably to anorgy of corruption and violence. Those areeven worse societal costs, and that reality isnow becoming all too evident in Mexico.

The only feasible strategy to counter themounting turmoil in Mexico is to drasticallyreduce the potential revenue flows to thetrafficking organizations. In other words, theUnited States needs to de-fund the cartelsthrough the legalization of currently illegaldrugs. If Washington abandoned the prohi-bition model, it is very likely that other coun-tries in the international community woulddo the same. At that point, the profitmarginsfor the drug trade would be similar to themargins for other legal commodities, andlegitimate business personnel would becomethe principal players. That is precisely whathappened when the United States ended itsquixotic crusade against alcohol in 1933. Tohelp reverse the burgeoning tragedy of drug-related violence in Mexico, Washingtonneeds to adopt a similar course today.

Notes1. See Ted Galen Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy:Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America(New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2003), chap. 7.

2. Colleen W. Cook, Congressional Research Service

Report forCongress:Mexico’sDrugCartels (Washington:LibraryofCongress,October16,2007),pp.2–4.Alsosee JohnP.SullivanandAdamElkus, “StateofSiege:Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal,August 2008, http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/84-sullivan.pdf.

3. For an analysis of the history and tactics of theZetas, see George W. Grayson, “Los Zetas: TheRuthless Army Spawned by a Mexican DrugCartel,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 30,2008.

4. The latest blow came in late October, 2008,when Mexican security forces arrested EduardoArellano Felix, the latest member of the ArellanoFelix family to head the shrinking cartel. “MexicanDrug Lord Is Arrested,” Reuters, October 27, 2008.

5. The battles between rival gangs extend intoMexico’s prisons. In November 2008, five prison-ers died in a shoot-out in a jail in Mazatlan. Thatwas the latest incident in a wave of killings inMexican jails during the summer and autumn of2008. A week earlier, seven people were killed infighting between cartel inmates in a prison in thestate of Durango, and in October, 21 men per-ished in fighting among rival drug gangs in aprison in Reynosa on the border with Texas. “FiveDie in Shootout at Mexican Jail,” New York Times,November 8, 2008.

6. E. Eduardo Castillo, “Mexican Cartel RecruitingHitmen,” Associated Press, April 14, 2008.

7. Stratfor.com, “Drug Cartels: The Growing Vio-lence in Mexico,” October 2006.

8. “In 8 Months, Mexico Drug-Related KillingsTop 2007 Total,” Agence France Presse, August 16,2008.

9. “Crime Reporter Shot Dead in North MexicoBorder City,” Agence France Presse, November 13,2008.

10. Chris Ayres, “FiftyDead in SevenDays inMexi-co’s Drug War,” Times (London), October 6, 2008;“Grenade Attacks Kill 8 on Mexico’s NationalDay,”National Post, September 16, 2008; and “Canthe Army Out-Gun the Drug Lords?” Economist.com, May 15, 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/americas/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=11376335.

11. “Mexican Police Ask U.S. Asylum” WashingtonTimes, May 15, 2008.

12. “Crime Reporter Killed in Mexican BorderCity,” Associated Press, November 13, 2008.

11


13. William Booth, “Violence against JournalistsGrows in Mexico’s Drug War,” Washington Post,November 25, 2008.

14. Michael Miller, “The Age of Innocents,”News-week, November 3, 2008.

15. William Booth, “Mexico Drug Cartels Send aMessage of Chaos, Death,”Washington Post, Decem-ber 4, 2008.

16. James C. McKinley Jr., “With Beheadings andAttacks, Drug Gangs Terrorize Mexico,”NewYorkTimes, October 26, 2006.

17. Ioan Grillo, “Behind Mexico’s Wave of Be-headings,” Time, September 8, 2008.

18. Pamela Starr, “Mexico’s Spreading DrugViolence,” Los Angeles Times, October 22, 2008.

19. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of ConsularAffairs, Travel Alert, April 14, 2008, http://travel/state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/pa/pa_3028.html?css=print.

20. Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Tijuana Strip TurnsGhostly in Wake of Drug Violence,” WashingtonPost, June 16, 2008.

21. U.S. Department of State, “Current Report ofNon-Natural Death Causes Abroad, July 1, 2005–June 30, 2008, Mexico,” http://travel.state.gov/law/family_issues/death/death_594.html?css=print.

22. “Congressman’s Kin Kidnapped in Mexico,Released,” Associated Press, June 25, 2008.

23. CBS 11 TV, “Drug Violence Spills Over theBorder from Mexico,” October 27, 2008, http://cbs11tv.com/local/Mexican.drug.lords.2.505995.html.

24. “Mexico: The Iraq Next Door,” editorial, In-vestor’s Business Daily, November 12, 2008.

25. Alicia A. Caldwell, “Mexican Cartel List TargetsAmericans, Police Say,” Associated Press, June 20,2008.

26. Quoted in Danna Harman, “Mexican DrugCartels’s Wars Move Closer to U.S. Border,” USAToday, August 17, 2005.

27. CNN, “Lou Dobbs Tonight,” June 4, 2008.

28. Megan Basham, “Cartel Assassins,” AmericanSpectator, August 17, 2005, http://www.spectator.org/archives/2005/08/17/cartel-assassins.

29. CNN, “Lou Dobbs Tonight,” June 9, 2008.

30. Majority Staff of the House Committee onHomeland Security, Subcommittee on Investi-gations, “A Line in the Sand: Confronting theThreat at the Southwest Border,” Interim Report,October 2006, p. 19.

31. Department of Homeland Security, Customsand Border Protection, Office of Border Patrol,“Mexican Government Incidents,” Fiscal YearReport, 2007, pp. 4, 7–15.

32. Jerry Seper, “Official Questions Mexico atBorder,”Washington Times, August 11, 2008.

33. Casey Wian, “U.S. Border Agents Detain Mexi-can Troops,” CNN.com, November 1, 2008.

34. Jerry Seper, “Border Patrol Agent Held atGun-point,”Washington Times, August 6, 2008.

35. The extent of Zeta arsenals, both inMexico andthe United States, became apparent in earlyNovember 2008 when a raid in Reynosa nettedJaime Gonzalez Duran, one of the unit’s top lead-ers. The weapons seized included more than 500firearms, a half-million rounds of ammunition,150 grenades, a LAW anti-tank rocket, grenadelaunchers, and explosives. In short, it was the arse-nal one would expect from a capable military orga-nization, not just an ordinary “drug gang.”Stratfor.com, “WorryingSigns fromBorderRaids,”November 12, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20081112_worrying_signs_border_raids/?utm_source=Tweekly-utm.

36. Quoted in Sara A. Carter, “FBI Warns of DrugCartelArming,”WashingtonTimes,October 26, 2008.

37. Quoted in “Mexico Slams ‘Absurd’ U.S. GunLaws as Drug War Rages,” Reuters, June 14, 2008.

38. “Mexico at the Brink,” editorial, New YorkTimes, June 4, 2008.

39. Starr.

40. “Lou Dobbs Tonight,” June 9, 2008.

41. John C. Moorhouse and Brent Wanner, “DoesGunControlReduceCrimeorDoesCrime IncreaseGun Control?”Cato Journal 26, no. 1 (Winter 2006):103–124;C. E.Moody andT. B.Marvell, “Guns andCrime,” Southern Economic Journal 71, no. 4 (2005):720–736; and Don B. Kates and Gary A. Mauser,“Would Banning Firearms Reduce Murder andSuicide? A Review of International Evidence,”Bepress Legal Series, Working Paper 1413, June 6,2006, http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps1413.

42. CNN host Lou Dobbs is one of the most out-spoken advocates of that approach, both to

12


reduce the amount of illegal immigration and tostop the spread of drug trafficking and its associ-ated violence spilling across the border. See, forexample, his comments on two programs. CNN,“Lou Dobbs Tonight,” May 14, 2008, transcript,pp. 1–2, and June 9, 2008, transcript, p. 2.

43. Duncan Hunter, “National Security = BorderSecurity,”Washington Times, June 12, 2008.

44. Quoted in Seper, “Official Questions Mexicoat Border.”

45. StewartM. Powell, “Chertoff Blisters Congressover Aid to Mexico,” Houston Chronicle, June 5,2008.

46. Catherine Elsworth, “Air-Conditioned DrugsSmuggling Tunnel Discovered on U.S.-MexicoBorder,” Telegraph (London), September 4, 2008.

47. Kevin G. Hall, “U.S. Intelligence PromptedMexico’s Seizure of Drug Sub,” McClatchy NewsService, July 18, 2008. According to the U.S. mili-tary’s Southern Command, at least 40 drug sub-marines have been spotted since 2006, mostly offthe Pacific coast of Central America or Mexico.

48.RobinEmmott, “MexicoCaptures19Suspect-edDrug Gang Planes,” Reuters, November 13, 2008.

49.ManuelRoig-Franzia, “Anti-DrugAssistanceAp-proved for Mexico,”Washington Post, June 28, 2008.

50. U.S. Department of State, InternationalNarcoticsControl Strategy Report, 2008, March 2008, p. 176.

51. United States Government AccountabilityOffice, “Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction GoalsWere Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved;U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reduc-ing Assistance,” Report to the Honorable Joseph R.Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Re-lations, U.S. Senate, October 2008, GAO-09-71.

52.OlgaR.Rodriguez, “MexicoAgentsArrestBorderPolice Chief,” Associated Press, April 17, 2008.

53. E. Eduardo Castillo, “Mexico Reveals DrugCorruption Network,” Washington Times, October27, 2008.

54. E. Eduardo Castillo, “Mexico: Former SeniorOfficial Under Investigation,” Associated Press,November 8, 2008.

55. Alexandra Olson, “Mexico: Ex-Drug Czar Alleg-edly Took Cartel Money,” Associated Press, Novem-ber 21, 2008.

56. Many rank-and-file police in Mexico earn a

meager $5,000 per year. Ioan Grillo, “Mexico’sCocaine Capital,” Time, August 14, 2008.

57. Quoted in Robin Emmott, “Police CorruptionUndermines Mexico’s War on Drugs,” Reuters,May 23, 2007.

58. See Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy, p. 177.

59. Quoted in ibid., p. 178.

60. E. Eduardo Castillo, “Mexican Official: DrugSpy Says He Leaked DEA Info,” Associated Press,October 27, 2008.

61. Quoted in Olson.

62. “Spot the Drug Trafficker,” Economist.com, Oc-tober 30, 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1251 4107.

63. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,2007 World Drugs Report (2007), p. 176, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf; Grillo, “Cocaine Capital.”

64. United Nations, International Narcotics Con-trol Board, Report of the International Narcotics Boardfor 2007, pp. 95, 100, http://www.incb.org/incb/en/annual-report-2007.html.

65. Quoted in A. William Samii, “Drug Abuse:Iran’s Thorniest Problem,” Brown Journal of WorldAffairs 9, no. 2 (Winter/Spring 2003): 283.

66. The extent of the blackmarket premiumvariesboth by drug and over time. One prominent studyconcluded that cocainewasmore than four timesasexpensive as it would be in a legal market, whileheroin was a whopping 14 times as expensive.Jeffrey A. Miron, “The Effect of Drug Prohibitionon Drug Prices: Evidence from the Markets forCocaine and Heroin,” Review of Economics andStatistics 85, no. 3 (August 2003): 522–530.

67. U.S. Department of State, Bureau for Inter-national Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,March 2006, pp. 18–19.

68. For a detailed analysis of Portugal’s reforms andtheir generally beneficial results, see Glenn Green-wald, Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: ATemplate for a More Effective and Just DrugPolicy,” Cato Institute White Paper (forthcoming).Unfortunately, the Netherlands seems to be waf-fling on its reforms. SeeToby Sterling, “AmsterdamMoves to Close a Fifth of ‘Coffee Shops,’” Associ-ated Press, November 21, 2008.

69. “Legalize Drugs to Fight Trafficking: Zelaya,”

13


Agence France Presse, October 13, 2008. For aconcise analysis of Zelaya’s proposal and thegrowing sentiment for the liberalization of druglaws in the Western Hemisphere, see Juan CarlosHidalgo, “President of Honduras Calls for DrugLegalization,” Cato-at-Liberty, October 14, 2008,http://www.cato-at-liberty.org.

70. Miguel Angel Gutierrez, “Mexico Seeks toDecriminalize Small-Time Drug Use,” Reuters,October 3, 2008.

71. See Timothy Lynch, ed., After Prohibition: AnAdult Approach to Drug Policies in the 21st Century(Washington: Cato Institute, 2000).

14

STUDIES IN THE POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES

630. AMatter of Trust: Why Congress Should Turn Federal Lands intoFiduciary Trusts by Randal O’Toole (January 15, 2009)

629. Unbearable Burden? Living and Paying Student Loans as a First-YearTeacher by Neal McCluskey (December 15, 2008)

628. The Case against Government Intervention in Energy Markets:Revisited Once Again by Richard L. Gordon (December 1, 2008)

627. A Federal Renewable Electricity Requirement: What’s Not to Like?by Robert J. Michaels (November 13, 2008)

626. The Durable Internet: Preserving Network Neutrality withoutRegulation by Timothy B. Lee (November 12, 2008)

625. High-Speed Rail: The Wrong Road for America by Randal O’Toole(October 31, 2008)

624. Fiscal Policy Report Card on America’s Governors: 2008 by Chris Edwards(October 20, 2008)

623. Two Kinds of Change: Comparing the Candidates on Foreign Policyby Justin Logan (October 14, 2008)

622. A Critique of the National Popular Vote Plan for Electing the Presidentby John Samples (October 13, 2008)

621. Medical Licensing: An Obstacle to Affordable, Quality Care by ShirleySvorny (September 17, 2008)

620. Markets vs. Monopolies in Education: A Global Review of the Evidenceby Andrew J. Coulson (September 10, 2008)


619. Executive Pay: Regulation vs. Market Competition by Ira T. Kay and StevenVan Putten (September 10, 2008)

618. The Fiscal Impact of a Large-Scale Education Tax Credit Program byAndrew J. Coulson with a Technical Appendix by Anca M. Cotet (July 1, 2008)

617. Roadmap to Gridlock: The Failure of Long-Range MetropolitanTransportation Planning by Randal O’Toole (May 27, 2008)

616. Dismal Science: The Shortcomings of U.S. School Choice Research andHow to Address Them by John Merrifield (April 16, 2008)

615. Does Rail Transit Save Energy or Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions? byRandal O’Toole (April 14, 2008)

614. Organ Sales and Moral Travails: Lessons from the Living Kidney VendorProgram in Iran by Benjamin E. Hippen (March 20, 2008)

613. The Grass Is Not Always Greener: A Look at National Health CareSystems Around the World by Michael Tanner (March 18, 2008)

612. Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification: Franz Kafka’s Solutionto Illegal Immigration by Jim Harper (March 5, 2008)

611. Parting with Illusions: Developing a Realistic Approach to Relationswith Russia by Nikolas Gvosdev (February 29, 2008)

610. Learning the Right Lessons from Iraq by Benjamin H. Friedman,Harvey M. Sapolsky, and Christopher Preble (February 13, 2008)

609. What to Do about Climate Change by Indur M. Goklany (February 5, 2008)

608. Cracks in the Foundation: NATO’s New Troubles by Stanley Kober(January 15, 2008)

607. The Connection between Wage Growth and Social Security’s FinancialCondition by Jagadeesh Gokhale (December 10, 2007)

606. The Planning Tax: The Case against Regional Growth-ManagementPlanning by Randal O’Toole (December 6, 2007)

605. The Public Education Tax Credit by Adam B. Schaeffer (December 5, 2007)

604. A Gift of Life Deserves Compensation: How to Increase Living KidneyDonation with Realistic Incentives by Arthur J. Matas (November 7, 2007)


PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2PA Masthead.indd 2 2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM2/9/06 2:08:35 PM

603. What Can the United States Learn from the Nordic Model? by Daniel J.Mitchell (November 5, 2007)

602. Do You Know the Way to L.A.? San Jose Shows How to Turn an UrbanArea into Los Angeles in Three Stressful Decades by Randal O’Toole(October 17, 2007)

601. The Freedom to Spend Your Own Money on Medical Care: A CommonCasualty of Universal Coverage by Kent Masterson Brown (October 15,2007)

600. Taiwan’s Defense Budget: How Taipei’s Free Riding Risks War by JustinLogan and Ted Galen Carpenter (September 13, 2007)

599. End It, Don’t Mend It: What to Do with No Child Left Behind by NealMcCluskey and Andrew J. Coulson (September 5, 2007)

598. Don’t Increase Federal Gasoline Taxes—Abolish Them by Jerry Taylor andPeter Van Doren (August 7, 2007)

597. Medicaid’s Soaring Cost: Time to Step on the Brakes by JagadeeshGokhale (July 19, 2007)

596. Debunking Portland: The City That Doesn’t Work by Randal O’Toole(July 9, 2007)

595. The Massachusetts Health Plan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly byDavid A. Hyman (June 28, 2007)

594. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policiesby Bryan Caplan (May 29, 2007)

593. Federal Aid to the States: Historical Cause of Government Growth andBureaucracy by Chris Edwards (May 22, 2007)

592. The Corporate Welfare State: How the Federal Government SubsidizesU.S. Businesses by Stephen Slivinski (May 14, 2007)

591. The Perfect Firestorm: Bringing Forest Service Wildfire Costs underControl by Randal O’Toole (April 30, 2007)

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