(4) pd 1829 - obstruction of justice

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ROGER POSADAS, ET. AL. VS. OMBUDSMAN, ET. AL.,

G.R. NO. 131492, 29 SEPTEMBER 2000

By: Casaña, Shiendy Loufer D. LLB I-1

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

FACTS: The Philippine Supreme Court upheld the supremacy of the constitutional rights of

Filipino citizens over attempts by law enforcers to harass the lawyers and officials of the

University of the Philippines (UP) whose only fault was to defend and protect the basic right of

two of their college students (who were suspects in a fraternity-related death of a UP student) to

be free from any form of search and seizure without valid warrants of arrest issued by the courts

for the purpose. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) retaliated against the UP lawyers

and officials by filing a criminal complaint against them for alleged violation of P.D. No. 1829

ISSUES:(1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly

made without a warrant.

(2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No.

1829.

HELD:(1) The arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither

were the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. The

question was whether Rule 113 Sec. 5 paragraph (b) of the Rules of Court applies because a

crime had just been committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating

that the two students Narag and Taparan were probably guilty.

The NBI contended that a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person "when an

offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that

the person to be arrested has committed it" and that a law enforcer “who had knowledge of facts

gathered by him personally in the course of his investigation” may arrest a suspect without a

warrant of arrest.

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The Supreme Court however noted that in contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar

tried to arrest Narag and Taparan “four days after the commission of the crime”. They had “no

personal knowledge of any fact” which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty

of the crime. What they had were the “supposed positive identification of two alleged

eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI”.

(2) The Court stressed that to allow the arrest which the NBI agents intended to make

without warrant “would in effect allow them to supplant the courts”. The determination of the

existence of probable cause that the persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the

judge to make. The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal

offenders only if the latter are “committing or have just committed a crime”. Otherwise, “we

cannot leave to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect

our civil liberties”.

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JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELESVS. HON. MANUEL B. GAITE, ET. AL.G.R. NO. 165276, 25 NOVEMBER 2009

By: Casaña, Shiendy Loufer D.LLB I-1


FACTS:On 13 April 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for Kidnapping under Article 271 of the

Revised Penal Code (Inducing a Minor to Abandon His Home) against Michael Vistan, the

Tolentino spouses, the Nazareno spouses and Guevarra spouses, all maternal relatives of Maria

Mercedes Vistan.

Prompted by his overwhelming desire to retaliate against petitioner and get himself off

the hook from the kidnapping charge, Michael Vistan had deliberately, maliciously, selfishly and

insensitively caused undue physical, emotional and psychological sufferings to Maria Mercedes

Vistan, all of which were greatly prejudicial to her well-being and development.

Thus, on 1 December 1999, petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the

Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10

(a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of

Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina

Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.

However, Provincial Prosecutor Amando C. Vicente denied the recommendation of the

Investigating Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted for Violation RA 7610. He also

approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the charge for Violation of PD 1829. On18

March 2003 petitioner contended in the Court of Appeals that the Department of Justice (DOJ)

erred in dismissing the complaint against respondent Michael Vistan for violations of Presidential

Decree No. 1829 (PD No. 1829). The CA ruled, however, that the facts of the case as portrayed

by petitioner do not warrant the filing of a separate Information for violation of Section 1(e) of PD

No. 1829.

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ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the dismissal by the DOJ secretary of

the complaint of violation of Section 1(e) of P.D. 1829 (Obstruction of Justice) against private

respondent Michael Vistan.

HELD:

NO. There is no jurisprudence that would support the stance taken by petitioner.

Notwithstanding petitioner's vehement objection in the manner the CA had disposed of the said

issue, this Court agrees with the same. The CA ruled that the position taken by petitioner was

contrary to the spirit of the law on "obstruction of justice,” in the wise:

x x x It is a surprise to hear from petitioner who is a member of the bench to argue that

unserved warrants are tantamount to another violation of the law re: "obstruction of justice."

Petitioner is like saying that every accused in a criminal case is committing another offense of

“obstruction of justice” if and when the warrant of arrest issued for the former offense/ charge is

unserved during its life or returned unserved after its life – and that the accused should be

charged therewith re: "obstruction of justice." What if the warrant of arrest for the latter charge

("obstruction of justice") is again unserved during its life or returned unserved? To follow the line

of thinking of petitioner, another or a second charge of "obstruction of justice" should be filed

against the accused. And if the warrant of arrest issued on this second charge is not served,

again, a third charge of "obstruction of justice" is warranted or should be filed against the

accused. Thus, petitioner is effectively saying that the number of charges for "obstruction of

justice" is counting and/or countless, unless and until the accused is either arrested or voluntarily

surrendered. We, therefore, find the position taken by petitioner as contrary to the intent and

spirit of the law on "obstruction of justice." x x x

As correctly observed by the CA, the facts of the case, as portrayed by petitioner, do not

warrant the filing of a separate information for violation of Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829. This

Court agrees with the CA that based on the evidence presented by petitioner, the failure on the

part of the arresting officer/s to arrest the person of the accused makes the latter a fugitive from

justice and is not equivalent to a commission of another offense of obstruction of justice.

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SOLLER VS. SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 144261-62. 09 MAY 2001

By: Altea, Anna AlyssaLLB I-1


FACTS:

This was a case for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raising the issue of the

propriety of the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases entitled

“People of the Philippines vs. Prudente D. Soller, Preciosa M. Soller, Rodolfo Salcedo, Josefina

Morada, Mario Matining and Rommel Luarca” wherein petitioners are charged with Obstruction

of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under P.D.

No. 1829.

It appears that in the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael a municipal guard, was

shot and killed along the national highway at Bansud, Oriental Mindoro while driving a

motorcycle together with petitioner Soller’s son, Vincent M. Soller. His body was brought to a

medical clinic located in the house of petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller, the Municipal Mayor, and his

wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the Municipal Health Officer. An autopsy was conducted on the

same night on the cadaver by petitioner Dr. Preciosa Soller with the assistance of petitioner

Rodolfo Salcedo, Sanitary Inspector, and petitioner Josefina Morada, Rural Health Midwife.

A complaint was later filed against the petitioners by the widow of Jerry Macabael with

the Office of the Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy to mislead the investigation of the

fatal shootout of Jerry Macabael by:

(a) altering his wound ;

(b) concealing his brain;

(c) falsely stating in police report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he

had only one; and

(d) falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no blackening around his wound

when in truth there was.

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Petitioners Soller denied having tampered with the cadaver of Jerry Macabael, and

claimed, among others that Jerry Macabael was brought to their private medical clinic because it

was there where he was rushed by his companions after the shooting, that petitioner Prudente

Soller, who is also a doctor, was merely requested by his wife Preciosa Soller, who was the

Municipal Health Officer, to assist in the autopsy considering that the procedure involved sawing

which required male strength, and that Mrs. Macabael’s consent was obtained before the

autopsy.

But two Information were indeed filed with the Sandiganbayan charging the petitioners for

criminally alter and suppress the gunshot wound and conceal the brain of Jerry Macabael with

intent to impair its veracity, authenticity, and availability as evidence in the investigation of

criminal case for murder against the accused Vincent Soller, the son of herein respondents.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan had

no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ Motion to

Quash on the ground that the accusation involves the performance of the duties of at least one

of the accused public officials, and if the Mayor is indeed properly charged together with that

official, then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the entire case and over all the co-

accused.

HELD:

The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious. The court held that the rule is that in

order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be

inquired into. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the statute law

or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied. For this purpose in criminal

cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of

the action.

The Court found:

The action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations on May 25, 1999

charging the petitioners with the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of

Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829.

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x x x x x x x x x

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary

Grade “27” or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers

mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional

trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the

case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as provided by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, amended.

The Supreme Court observed that the bone of contention here is whether the offenses

charged may be considered as committed “in relation to their office” as this phrase is employed

in Section 4 of PD 1892.

As early as Montilla vs. Hilario, the Supreme Court interpreted the requirement that an

offense be committed in relation to the office to mean that “the offense cannot exist without the

office” or “that the office must be a constituent element of the crime. People vs.

Montejo[51]enunciated the principle that the offense must be intimately connected with the office

of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance, though improper or irregular of

his official functions.

In this case, the Informations subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 quoted

earlier, fail to allege that petitioners had committed the offenses charged in relation to their

offices. Neither are there specific allegations of facts to show the intimate relation/connection

between the commission of the offense charged and the discharge of official functions of the

offenders, i.e. that the obstruction of and apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders

was committed in relation to the office of petitioner Prudente Soller, whose office as Mayor is

included in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) of P.D. 1606 as amended. Although the petitioners

were described as being “all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health

Officer, SPO II, PO I, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife”, there was no allegation that the offense of

altering and suppressing the gunshot wound of the victim with intent to impair the veracity,

authenticity and availability as evidence in the investigation of the criminal case for murder

(Criminal Case No. 25521) or of giving false and fabricated information in the autopsy report and

police report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the apprehension of the

offender (Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in the performance of official function. Indeed the

offenses defined in P.D. 1892 may be committed by any person whether a public officer or a

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private citizen, and accordingly public office is not an element of the offense. Moreover, the

Information in Criminal Case No. 25522 states that the fabrication of information in the police

and autopsy report “would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of herein

petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller”. Thus there is a categorical indication that

the petitioners spouses Soller had a personal motive to commit the offenses and they would

have committed the offenses charged even if they did not respectively hold the position of

Municipal Mayor or Municipal Health Officer.

Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges were intimately

connected with the discharge of the official functions of accused Mayor Soller, the offenses

charged in the subject criminal cases fall within the exclusive original function of the Regional

Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan. So the petition was granted and the orders were set aside

for being void for lack of jurisdiction.

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PEOPLE V. MEDINA AND CARLOSG.R. NO. 127157, 10 JULY 1998

BY: Altea, Anna AlyssaLLB I-1


FACTS:

In this case, Jaime B. Medina and accused Virgilio Carlos were apprehended by

members of the Narcotics Intelligence and Suppression Unit (NISU) under the Philippine

National Police Narcotics Command (PNP-NARCOM) for selling Methamphetamine

hydrochloride without authority of law. The two were brought before Assistant City Prosecutor

Lillian H. Ramiro for inquest. Carlos denied any involvement in the transaction by claiming that

he merely accompanied appellant to the place of the sale, while Medina stated that he was only

supposed to buy the regulated drug at the agreed price of P250,000.00 when the policemen

arrived and arrested them. Appellant added that, at his request, Carlos merely drove the car

used by them.

They were however charged in an Information where they were alleged to have

conspired and confederated together and mutually helped each other, not having been

authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then

and there wilfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale 306.71 grams of methamphetamine

hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.

The court below rendered judgment holding that appellant conspired with accused Carlos

in the illegal sale of 306.71 grams of shabu. As the trial court appreciated the presence of craft,

fraud or disguise as aggravating circumstances against herein appellant, he was sentenced to

suffer the supreme penalty of death. In the same decision, an alias warrant of arrest was issued

by the court for the arrest of accused Virgilio Carlos.

Medina sought the reversal of the ruling, saying that the lower court erred in finding a

conspiracy between him and Virgilio Carlos.

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HELD:

The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the trial court. It held that in the case at bar,

appellant was not merely present in a passive manner at the scene of the crime as he contends.

He definitely took an active participation in the sale of the shabu. He was positively identified as

the driver of the car carrying accused Carlos and the regulated drugs. When the duo arrived at

the agreed place, appellant went down to check if the buyer brought the money while Carlos

waited inside the car. Then, upon learning that the poseur-buyer had the money, appellant

signaled to his companion indicating such fact.

No other conclusion could follow from appellant's actions except that he had a prior

understanding and community of interest with Carlos. His preceding inquiry about the money

and the succeeding signal to communicate its availability reveal a standing agreement between

appellant and his co-accused under which it was the role of appellant to verify such fact from the

supposed buyer before Carlos would hand over the shabu. Without such participation of

appellant, the sale could not have gone through as Carlos could have withdrawn from the deal

had he not received that signal from appellant. It is undeniable, therefore, that appellant and his

co-accused acted in unison and, moreover, that appellant knew the true purpose of Carlos in

going to the restaurant.

But the lower court considered the ruling sentencing the appellant to death due to its

appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of craft, fraud or disguise. The Supreme Court

found that a comprehensive search in the records of this case do not reveal these

circumstances:

The reason for this can be found in the very rationale adopted by the lower court in appreciating

the said circumstances against appellant in the dispositive portion of its decision. The court

stated that craft, fraud or disguise led to the escape and non-arrest of Virgilio Carlos, hence it

apparently imputes the same to appellant.

While we share the trial court's disgust over the still unexplained escape of accused

Carlos, we cannot approve its attribution to herein appellant as the author of such craft, fraud or

disguise or even that the same should aggravate his liability in the present case. For, even

assuming ex gratia argumenti that appellant had a part in the release of Carlos, it is obvious that

the aggravating circumstances involved do not pertain to the offense charged in the information

and are completely unrelated to the crime of illegal sale of shabu.

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PEOPLE V. ELIAS LOVEDIOROG.R. NO. 112235, 29 NOVEMBER 1995

By: Altea, Anna AlyssaLLB I-1


The court a quo should have borne in mind that the charge against appellant is for illegal

sale of shabu and not for obstructing the apprehension and prosecution of a criminal offender or,

for that matter, perjury. In fact, if such circumstances in themselves constitute punishable

crimes, or are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor, they

cannot be considered as aggravating circumstances.

To be considered as an aggravating circumstance and thereby resultantly increase the

criminal liability of an offender, the same must accompany and be an integral part or

concomitant of the commission of the crime specified in the information; and although it is not

necessarily an element thereof, it must not be factually and legally discrete therefrom. Besides, it

is highly problematical whether the Spanish legal concept of astucia, fraude and disfraz, adopted

in our Revised Penal Code, can find application at all to the dismissal of the case against Carlos.

In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court held that the lower court erred in considering

against herein appellant the supposed aggravating circumstances of craft, fraud or disguise. The

violation of Section 15 subject of the amended indictment was consequently committed without

any aggravating circumstance.

The Supreme Court here verified that acts punishable under Presidential Decree No.

1829 cannot be construed or constituted as mere aggravating circumstances, if indeed they

were present in the case. They are penalized under the law as liable under PD 1829 and they

must be made liable as such.

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FACTS:

An off-duty policeman was walking when a man suddenly walked beside him fired a gun

at the policeman's right ear and killed the policeman. The man who shot Lucilo had three other

companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground.

After taking the latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled. A witness

identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro. Elias Lovedioro y

Castro was charged and convicted in the Regional Trial Court for the crime of Murder under

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant claims that the lower court erred in holding him liable for murder and not

rebellion. He claims that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New

People's Army. Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in

furtherance of subversive ends," should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion

under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal

shot but merely acted as look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have been

charged merely as a participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of

Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only the penalty

of prision mayor by the lower court.

The Solicitor General in turn avers that the crime committed by appellant may be

considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent

for the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive ends."

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public

uprising against the government. By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or

multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined

bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its

pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a political character.

This peculiarity was underscored in the case of People v. Hernandez. thus:

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In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such

common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the

intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the

purpose of removing from the allegiance to the Government the territory of the Philippine Islands

or any part thereof, then it becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being

part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.

Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes

a different color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than

the crime of murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes

imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political

end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.

In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive,

being a state of mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows.

Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a common

crime-alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty-could benefit from the

law's relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. The Court said that the ruling in Enrile v.

Amin[45] was instructive in this regard. The Supreme Court observed and ruled:

x x x This Court held, against the prosecution's contention, that rebellion and violation of

P.D. 1829 could be tried separately 14 (on the principle that rebellion is based on the Revised

Penal Code while P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the act for which the senator was being

charged, though punishable under a special law, was absorbed in the crime of rebellion being

motivated by, and related to the acts for which he was charged in Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R. Nos.

92163 and 92164) a case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor of Senator Enrile and holding

that the prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1829 cannot prosper because a separate

prosecution for rebellion had already been filed and in fact decided, the Court said:

The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule that the

theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to

offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.

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[I]intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and

he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former

associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political

or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the

crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.

It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused

should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive

relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of

rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice. The burden of proof that the act committed was

impelled by a political motive lies on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in the

information. It must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence.

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MARIETTA K. ILUSORIO VS. SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 171659, 13 DECEMBER 2007

By: Tan, AbegailLLB I-1


FACTS:

Petitioner, Marietta K. Illusorio filed a complaint for robbery, qualified trespass to

dwelling, and violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1829 against private respondents Sylvia

K. Ilusorio (Sylvia), Cristina A. Ilusorio (Cristina), Jovito Castro (Jovito), and five (5) John Does.

Marietta alleged that she together with 3 Illusorios, owns and controls the majority of the shares

of stock of Lakeridge Corporation (Lakeridge), the registered owner of Penthouse Unit 43-C

(Penthouse Unit 43-C) of the Pacific Plaza Condominium

She was given the full authority to take care of the said Penthouse unit. On November

1999, herein respondents forcibly entered the penthouse and caused the loss of jewelry (this is

the subject of the robbery case). Jovito, chief security of the Pacific Plaza permitted the forcible

entry of five unknown persons and he failed to cooperate with the police and even concealed

information pertinent to the incident.

On their counter-affidavit, they alleged that there could not be robbery and qualified

trespass to dwelling because, as officers of Lakeridge, they had the right to enter Penthouse

Unit 43-C.

In his separate Counter-Affidavit, Jovito explained that the incident cited by Marietta in

her Complaint-Affidavit where she claimed that Penthouse Unit 43-C was forced open by

breaking the door and locks was really an act of maintenance of the property upon written

request made by Sylvia as one of the legitimate unit owners per the records of Pacific Plaza.

In a Resolution dated February 1, 2000, Prosecutor II Office of the City Prosecutor of

Makati City dismissed the charges against private respondents for lack of probable cause.

Marietta’s motion for reconsideration of the Resolution was denied in an Order dated May

2, 2000.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the charge against Jovito for violation of P.D. No. 1829 should prosper.

HELD:

The evidence adduced does not support afinding of probable cause for the offenses

defined in the provisions cited above. Marietta failed to prove, by competent evidence, that: (1)

Penthouse Unit 43-C was the dwelling place of Erlinda; (2) she has authority over the said unit;

(3) Sylvia and Cristina had no authority to enter the unit and conduct acts of maintenance

thereon; and (4) Sylvia and Cristina were armed when they effected entrance. Based on these

circumstances, the charges of robbery and qualified trespass to dwelling must inevitably fail.

Perforce, the charge against Jovito for violation of P.D. No. 1829 should also be dismissed.

(4) pd 1829 - obstruction of justice

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