431 paper - secession ism in georgia

8/8/2019 431 PAPER - Secession Ism in Georgia

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POLI 431 ± Nations & States: Developed World

Margaux Curie (260270897)

Prof. Ece Atikcan

14/04/2010

Secessionist claims and ethnic violence in post-Soviet Georgia:

Analyzing the root of secessionism in the Georgian territories of Abkhazia,South Ossetia and Ajaria.



1

Georgia and the Georgian territories: Abkhazia, Ajaria and South-Ossetia



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I: Secessionism and ethnic conflict: a credible commitment problem

In order to account for the increased level of ethnic violence in the

post-Soviet environment, the credible commitment theory will first be presented.

Developed by Fearon5

and Van Houten6, this argument relies on Brubaker¶s ³triadic

configuration´7and seeks to explain the variations in ethnic secessionism after the

collapse of Communism.

The credible commitment theory relies on a strategic interaction between the three

components of what Brubaker calls a ³triadic configuration´, composed of national

minorities, a nationalizing state and an external national homeland. The author defines a

nationalizing state as an ³ethnically heterogeneous nation-state, whose dominant elites

promote the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, or political

hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation on the politically alienated national

minorities´8. These national minorities, in the face of this process of ³assimilation and

discrimination´9, start to call for cultural and territorial autonomy from the state. The

final component of the triadic nexus is characterized by an external national homeland,

which can provide moral and material support to the minorities in the nationalizing state.

The relationship between the homeland and the national minorities does not rely on

ancestral origins, but is rather constructed through political action and a sense of

belonging to a same nation, with the homeland¶s elites monitoring and protecting the

5 James Fearon, ³Commitment problems and the spread of ethnic conflict´, in E thnic Conflict , ed. David A. Lake and DonaldRothchild (Princeton University Press), 107-1266 Pieter Van Houten, ³The role of homeland in ethnic relations: illustrations from Eastern Europe´ (paper presented at the

Midwest Political Science Association, Chigaco, April 1996)7 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 558 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 579 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 57



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interests of the minorities10

. The credible commitment theory therefore adapts and relies

on this triadic nexus, focusing on the conflictual interaction between a nationalizing state,

national minorities and an external national homeland, or an external power, which acts

in the name of the national homeland.To explain this strategic interaction, the argument

emphasizes the correlation between the level of support from the external homeland to

the minorities and the likelihood of secessionist claims and ethnic conflict. It follows that

if the external homeland makes a credible commitment to the minorities,thereby

providing moral or material support, leaders of the minority groups will have the

incentive to seek independence, and this at the cost of a civil war. On the contrary, if

there is no commitment, or the commitment is weak, the national minorities will not have

an incentive to violently rebel, but will rather wait or engage in low-level clashes11

. This

threshold of support therefore constitutes the crucial factor, which accounts for the

difference between a secessionist civil war and the absence of violence or the launch of a

low-level conflict.

Relying on Brubaker¶s triadic configuration, the credible

commitment argument offers a powerful and convincing mechanism to explain variations

in secessionist violence. When considering the Georgian case, this theory would therefore

predict that the minorities benefiting from Russian moral and material support engaged

themselves in a violent ethnic war in order to acquire independence from Tbilisi.

*

10 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5811 David Laitin, ³Secessionist rebellion in the Former Soviet Union´ Comparative Political Studies, Vol.34, No.8, (October 2001), 853-856



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II.Secessionism and ethnic conflict: the dilemma of territorial autonomy

Focusing on a different causal mechanism, the second theory

presented below points at territorial autonomy as being the key element conducive to

ethnic conflict and capable of elucidating the variations in secessionist outbursts across

Eurasia.

Territorial autonomy is defined as a political and legal construct, which gives

certain ethnic groups self-rule and authority over a specific territory. Without constituting

a state of their own, minorities enjoying territorial autonomy are able to self-govern by

enacting laws and statutes, administering their internal affairs and benefiting from a

recognized partial independence from the central government12

. By linking territorial

control to ethnicity ± known as ethno-territoriality ± territorial autonomy also introduces

an ethnofederal structure, which creates along ethnic lines different subunits within a

state. Unlike a unitary system, the institutional framework of an ethnofederal state

combines ³dual sovereignty, autonomy and coordination rather than subordination, as

well as subunits composed of geographically concentrated minorities´13

. In sum, an

ethnofederal state is constituted of different subunits divided along ethnic lines, which

enjoy territorial autonomy and partial independence from the central state, enabling them

to ³regulate their own affairs by enacting legal rules.´14

12 Hans-Joachim Heintze, ³On the legal understanding of Autonomy´ in Autonomy: applications and implications, ed. MarkkuSuksi (Kluwer Law International, 1998), 713 Valerie Bunce and Stephen Watts, ³Managing diversity and sustaining democracy: ethnofederal versus unitary states in the

post-communist world´ in Sustainable Peace: power and democracy after civil war , ed. Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild(Cornell University Press, 2005), 13514 Svante Cornell, ³Autonomy as a source of conflict: Caucasian conflicts in theoretical perspective´, W orld Politics No.54(January 2002), 248



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Itwould seemat first counterintuitive to assert that territorial autonomy and ethnofederal

structures may cause rather than prevent ethnic conflict. Indeed, many theorists in fact

perceive territorial autonomy as a ³cure-all prescription for ethnic tensions´15

and ³an

effective antidote for ethnopolitical wars of secession in Western and Third World

States´16

. By empowering the minorities, generating trust and countering the majority¶s

temptation to dominate, ethnofederalism is viewed as an effective solution17

. Moreover,

ethnofederalism is said to reduce the demand for sovereignty by increasing an ethnic

group¶s self-governance, and thus prevents political entrepreneurs to easily play the

ethnic card. To further support their argument, theorists point at the cases of Spain, India

or Belgium, whose rulers have successfully turned to ethnofederalism as a means of

reducing nationalist dissatisfaction18

. However, there is also significant evidence that

introducing an ethnofederal structure and granting territorial autonomy to ethnic

minorities is in fact a curse rather than a cure for ethnic tensions. Instead of relying on

minorities¶ integration, such as in a unitary state, ethnofederalism locks in ethnic

differences and may in fact isolate the minorities, making dialogue between groups

considerably more difficult. Moreover, territorial autonomy provides the minority with

institutional resources, patronage and leadership to push for independence19

, as well as

encourage people in an ethnic group to ³think and act according to a national category´20

.

15 David Meyer, ³A place of our own: does the ethnicization of territorial control create incentives for elites to conduct ethnopolitical mobilization? Cases from Caucasus in comparative perspective´ (paper presented at the Fifth Annual Convention of

the Association for the Study of Nationalities, New York, April 2000)16

Ted Robert Gurr, ³People against states: ethnopolitical conflict and the changing world system´, International StudiesQuarterly No.38 (Fall 1994), 36617 Valerie Bunce and Stephen Watts, ³Managing diversity and sustaining democracy: ethnofederal versus unitary states in the post-communist world´ in Sustainable Peace: power and democracy after civil war , ed. Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild(Cornell University Press, 2005), 13618 Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 2000), 143-14419 Valerie Bunce and Stephen Watts, ³Managing diversity and sustaining democracy: ethnofederal versus unitary states in the post-communist world´ in Sustainable Peace: power and democracy after civil war , ed. Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild(Cornell University Press, 2005), 13620 Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 2000), 141



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Finally, granting territorial autonomy further confers a particular minority delimited

borders, group identity and cohesion, mass media, external support as well as increased

willingness and capacity to act. As emphasized by Anderson, delimited borders form a

³powerful emblem for the birth of an anticolonial nationalism´, and promote the

formation of an imagined community21

. Group identity and cohesion are also important

factors since they lower the costs of collective action in autonomous regions. With regard

to the mass media, they enable the leadership to influence the population through news

coverage and quicken the ethnic mobilization process. Finally, by having institutional and

legal standing, as well as standard operating procedures, autonomous regions are more

likely to receive external support22

. As a result, despite being often perceived as a cure for

ethnic tensions, territorial autonomy does not seem to be conducive to inter-ethnic peace,

but rather to foster ethnic mobilization and increase violent secessionism.

In the post-Soviet environment, this theory therefore predicts that

solely autonomous regions would violently challenge the central government in order to

secede. With regard to the Georgian case, only the three autonomous subunits are thus

expected to brutally confront the state in order to acquire independence from Tbilisi.

*

III.The Georgian case in theoretical perspective: credible commitment or territorial

autonomy?

21 Benedict Anderson , Imagined Communities (Verso, 1991), 17522 Svante Cornell, ³Autonomy as a source of conflict: Caucasian conflicts in theoretical perspective´, W orld Politics No.54(January 2002), 253-256



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After having established their theoretical components and

expectations, the credible commitment and the territorial autonomy theories will now be

both applied to an empirical case. Focusing on Georgia, this part will strive to

demonstrate the superiority of the territorial autonomy argument over the credible

commitment theory in explaining the variations in secessionism and ethnic violence

among the Abkhazian, the South Ossetian, the Ajarian, the Azeri and the Armenian

minorities.

Composed of a newly independent nationalizing state undertaking an aggressive

campaign of Georgianization, five different national minorities, as well as a powerful and

strongly interfering Russian neighbour, the Georgian case offers the necessary elements

to test the credible commitment theory. Among the five concentrated ethnic groups, only

two, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, engaged themselves in a violent civil war against

Tbilisi. Already very unstable, the relationship between the central government and the

two rebellious minorities sharply deteriorated with the weakening of Moscow and the

introduction of the perestroika reforms, which increased the salience of ethnic diversity.

Witnessing an aggressive resurgence of Georgian nationalism, especially following the

election of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in 1990, Abkhazia and South Ossetia feared a loss of

their identities. Indeed, deeply chauvinist, Gamsakhurdia undertook a campaign of

Georgianization under the slogan ³Georgia for Georgians´ and enacted laws

strengthening the Georgian language23

. Inter-ethnic tensions therefore incredibly

worsened and degenerated into two ferocious civil wars, as both minorities

proclaimedtheir independence.Following the theoretical expectations of the credible

commitment argument, both of these territories should have received external support on

23 Tracey German, ³Abkhazia & South Ossetia: collision of Georgian and Russian interests´, Russie.Nei.Visions (June 2006), 6



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the part of an external national homeland, thereby giving them the incentive and the

capacity to violently secede from the nationalizing Georgian state.

With regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it was indeed both the Soviet Union and then

Russia, which assumed the role of the external homeland and provided moral as well as

physical support to Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, the respective Abkhaz and South Ossetian

capitals. In the face of Georgia¶s categorical refusal to release these two break-away

regions, Moscow¶s role was everything but neutral. There are several reasons to explain

the Soviet andthe Russian lack of neutrality and their commitment to both minorities.

Beginning prior the fall of Communism, the Abkhazian¶s and South Ossetian¶s ethnic

unrest was seen by Gorbatchev as a way to force Georgia to sign the New Union Treaty24

.

Gamsakhurdia even accused the Ossetian nationalists as being ³agents of Gorbachev,

who applies pressure on us through this war´ and who ³ threatens to detach South Ossetia

from Georgia, unless we sign the New Union Treaty´25

. Moscow was further interfering

in the two rebellious territories in order to undermine Georgia¶s drive towards

independence by weakening its ³national wholeness´. In light of the aggressive

resurgence of Georgian nationalism, supporting Sukhumi and Tskhinvali was therefore a

means for Gorbatchev to prevent the Soviet Union¶s disintegration, and possibly

establish and maintain a military foothold in the strategic Caucasus region26

. Seizing the

opportunity, Moscow therefore credibly committed to both ethnic groups as they began to

feel threatened by Gamsakhurdia campaign of Georgianization. Indeed, the Soviet Union

24 In an attempt to salvage the Soviet Union, Gorbatchev offered a reorganization of the different SSR into a new confederation,the ³Union of Sovereign States´. Proposing the New Union Treaty through referendum to the SSR, the project was never implemented, as Gorbatchev was the victim of a coup in August 1991, which quickened the disintegration of the USSR.Eventually, the proposal gave birth to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 25 Julian Birch, ³The Georgian/South Ossetian territorial and boundary dispute´, in Transcaucasian Boundaries, ed. John F.R.Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg, Richard Schofield (UCL Press Limited, 1996), 17126 Julian Birch, ³The Georgian/South Ossetian territorial and boundary dispute´, in Transcaucasian Boundaries, ed. John F.R.Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg, Richard Schofield (UCL Press Limited, 1996), 172-173



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offered moral as well as material support to both minorities in the form of new

technology, rockets and weapons27

. Tacit support was given to the nationalist movements

and military collusion on the ground with the Abkhazian and South Ossetian armies was

also frequent28. For instance, the Spetsnaz troops of the Soviet Military Intelligence

(GRU) based in Georgia supported the South Ossetian nationalists, while the Abkhazian

separatists were equipped with heavy weapons, such as anti-tank rockets, landmines and

automatic rifles29

. Despite the collapse of Communism, the collusion between Moscow,

Sukhumi and Tskhinvali was carried on and the civil war against Tbilisi kept on raging.

In the post-1991 environment, Russia continued to see itself as the gendarme of the

former Soviet Union and waswilling to interfere in its near abroad30

, aiming at³installing

and supporting pro-Russian governments in the Transcaucasus as a guarantee of

stability´31

.Moscow therefore militarily equipped and colluded with Abkhaz and South

Ossetian separatists movements, allowing them to win the upper hand against Georgian

invasions. Indeed, in March 1993, a decisive attack conferred Abkhazia victory and the

total control of its territory32. The hostilitiesin South Ossetia also finally ended in June

1992 with a Russian cease-fire,leaving the territory divided into areas controlled by

Georgia and areas administered by the South Ossetian government33

.

27 Julian Birch, ³The Georgian/South Ossetian territorial and boundary dispute´, in Transcaucasian Boundaries, ed. John F.R.

Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg, Richard Schofield (UCL Press Limited, 1996), 17128

Julian Birch, ³The Georgian/South Ossetian territorial and boundary dispute´, in Transcaucasian Boundaries, ed. John F.R.Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg, Richard Schofield (UCL Press Limited, 1996), 17529 Julian Birch, ³The Georgian/South Ossetian territorial and boundary dispute´, in Transcaucasian Boundaries, ed. John F.R.Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg, Richard Schofield (UCL Press Limited, 1996), 175-17630 Margot Light, ³Russia and Transcaucasia´, in Transcaucasian Boundaries, ed. John F.R. Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg,Richard Schofield (UCL Press Limited, 1996), 5331 Elizabeth Fuller, ³Russian Strategy in the Transcaucasus since the demise of the USSR´, Berichte des Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien No.3 (1994), 4032 Edmund Herzig, The New Caucasus: Armenia , Az erbaijan and Georgia (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999), 77-7833 Edmund Herzig, The New Caucasus: Armenia , Az erbaijan and Georgia (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999), 74



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Aside from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Ajarian ethnic minority also fiercely

challenged the central government in order to gain independence. In this case too,

Moscow provided moral and material support to the ethnic group, mainly through a large

local military basis34, as well as the settlement of a Russian garrison on the border,

allowing the Ajarian leader, Abashidze, to challenge the Georgian central government35

.

However, Ajaria was spared of any ethnic violence despite having Moscow¶s credible

commitment, and the challenge to Tbilisi remained political rather than armed. Yet, this

could be explained by the incredible weakness of the Georgian state following the

Abkhazian and South Ossetian civil wars. Unfolding while both wars were already

raging, the Ajarian people did not need to violently rebel in order to gain independence.

Desiring no further trouble with its provinces, Tbilisi let Abashidze establish an

autocratic rule and consolidate Ajaria¶s autonomy36

.

As a result, when analyzing the Georgian case in light of the credible commitment theory,

it indeed appears that the sole three ethnic minorities which experienced secessionist

rebellions all received moral and material support from the Soviet Union, and then

Russia. In the Abkhazian and the South Ossetian cases, Moscow¶s credible commitment

enabled them to launch a civil war against Tbilisi and subsequently defeat the Georgian

central government. Due to their numerical inferiority and lack of military equipment,

they would not have been credible enough to secede without Russian tacit and physical

support. In the case of Ajaria, Moscow¶s support allowed the ethnic minority to

consolidate its independence, but without engaging in a civil war due to Tbilisi incredible

34 Edmund Herzig, The New Caucasus: Armenia , Az erbaijan and Georgia (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999), 4635 Charles Fairbanks, ³Party, ideology and the public world in the former Soviet space´, in Politics at the end of the century, ed.Arthur Meltzer, Jerry Einberger and Richard Zinman (Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 25236 Jonathan Weatley, Georgia from national awakening to Rose Revolution: delayed transition in the Former Soviet Union (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 71



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weakness. Hence, when considering these three cases, the theoretical expectations

formulated by the credible commitment logic seem verified. The level of support of an

external power to a national minority in a nationalizing state, as stated in Brubaker¶s

nexus, indeed appears to be a crucialfactor in explaining the variations in secessionist

violence within Georgia.

Sheltering five concentrated minorities, Georgia also represents a suitable case to

analyze the territorial autonomy theory, since they wereattributed different administrative

status by the Soviet Union for administrative purposes. According to the hierarchical

matryoshka system of the Soviet regions, only three ethnic groups had been granted

autonomy by Moscow37

. Since the 1930s, the territories of Abkhazia and Ajaria were

Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) within the Georgian SSR, enjoying

political, administrative and cultural autonomy within their provinces. Autonomous

republics also comprised a Supreme Soviet, which represented a powerful legislative

body.Builtas an Autonomous Oblast (AO) in the 1920s, South Ossetia benefited from a

lower status but still enjoyed consequential institutional autonomy through its Supreme

Soviet, being directly subordinated to the accommodating Russian SFSR 38

rather than to

the Georgian SSR 39

. The two remaining minorities, the Armenians in Javakheti and the

Azeris in Southern Georgia, did not possess any territorial autonomy. It can thus be

noticed that only the three Georgian minorities, which fiercely challenged the central

government,all benefitted from an autonomous status, whereas no credible and strong

37 Jonathan Weatley, Georgia from national awakening to Rose Revolution: delayed transition in the Former Soviet Union (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 56 38 Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR)



14

separatist movement emerged in the two remaining ethnic groups. This initial observation

would suggest that territorial autonomy does play a role in determining the likelihood of

an ethnic group¶s secessionist claims.

Despite constituting only 17% of the ASSR population, the Abkhaz controlled 43% of the

Abkhaz Supreme Soviet¶s parliamentary seats. As the titular ethnicity, they benefitted

from affirmative action policies ensuring them full institutional control in spite of their

overwhelming numerical inferiority. Hence, the Abkhaz could dominate the republic¶s

political development and ethno-political activity, as well as were able to form alliances

with Russian and Armenian factions, thereby enabling them to completely control the

region and guaranteeing external support in the event of conflict. The ethnic mobilization

process was also greatly facilitated thanks to the existence of mass media and the active

leadership of Vladislav Ardzinba, elected chair of the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet in

December 1990. It was therefore the vital autonomous structure of Abkhazia, mainly the

Abkhaz Supreme Soviet, which enabled the minority to form a powerful ethnic elite

capable of taking control over the region¶s territory and administration40, and this despite

its substantial numerical inferiority.

In South Ossetia, the critical role of the Supreme Soviet in escalating inter-ethnic tensions

could also be observed. During the perestroika era, an Ossetian popular front named

Ademon Nykhas emerged, following the campaign Georgianization and the law

strengthening the position of the Georgian language in the province. Openly supporting

the Abkhaz struggle and petitioning for the unification of North and South Ossetia within

the Russian Federation, this nationalist movement was allowed through its control of the

40 Svante Cornell, ³Autonomy as a source of conflict: Caucasian conflicts in theoretical perspective´, W orld Politics No.54(January 2002), 263-266



15

Parliament to rally the Russian Federation to its cause and quickly mobilize the South

Ossetian people. By dominating the South Ossetian Supreme Soviet, the movement of

Ademon Nykhas was able to declare total independence from Georgia and abandon the

possibility of a compromise, thereby tremendously escalating the tensions and provoking

a protracted civil war 41

.

With regard to Ajaria, the province also enjoyed extensive autonomy through its Supreme

Soviet but was spared of any ethnic violence. As already seen, this could be explained by

Tbilisi extreme weakness after the Abkhaz and South Ossetian civil wars. Challenging

the Georgian central government through his control of the Parliament and Moscow¶s

protection, Abashidze had successfully established a rigid autocratic rule. The

institutional and financial resources of the autonomous republic had enabled him to bid

for national independence, even if no strong nationalist movement could appear, since the

Ajarian people were largely composed of ethnically Georgian Muslims42

. Controlling the

institutions and compensating for the weakness of the separate Ajarian identity,

Abashidze could therefore, thanks to the region¶s autonomous status, gain Russia¶s

support and peacefully consolidate his independent rule against Tbilisi, this latter being

too weak to oppose him43

.

When analyzing the Georgian case in terms of the territorial autonomy theory, it in fact

appears that the only three provinces that challenged, either politically or violently, the

central government, benefited from an autonomous status within the republic. By

affecting borders, group identity and cohesion, state institutions, leadership, mass media

41 Svante Cornell, ³Autonomy as a source of conflict: Caucasian conflicts in theoretical perspective´, W orld Politics No.54(January 2002), 266-26842 Jonathan Weatley, Georgia from national awakening to Rose Revolution: delayed transition in the Former Soviet Union (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 58-5943 Svante Cornell, ³Autonomy as a source of conflict: Caucasian conflicts in theoretical perspective´, W orld Politics No.54(January 2002), 273-275



16

and external support, territorial autonomy seems to be a necessary and crucial factor in

the variation of secessionism and ethnic violence within Georgia. Indeed, being deprived

of any autonomous position, the remaining two minorities neither formed a strong

separatist movement and nor vigorously or credibly opposed Tbilisi¶s Georgianization

campaign, lacking the institutional resources to do so.

With regard tothe Abkhazian, South Ossetian and Ajarian cases, both the credible

commitment and the territorial autonomy theories made correct predictions, expecting all

three to fiercely challenge Tbilisi to gain independence. Both arguments also expected the

Azeris to remain quiet, due to their lack, respectively, of Russian support and of

institutional autonomy. However, when analyzing the remaining Georgian ethnic group,

the Armenians concentrated in Javakheti, the territorial autonomy theory best explains the

political path taken by this minority, while the credible commitment argument fails to

make accurate predictions. The Armenians in Javakheti exhibited many similarities with

the South Ossetians,being largely oriented to their ethnic brothers in Nagorno-Karabakh,

while the South Ossetians were turned toward the North Ossetians. Moreover, they both

had a strong identity, a sense of exclusion within Georgia, and felt greatly threatened by

Gamsakhurdia¶s nationalist movement44

. Like in Tskhinvali, a separatist movement

named Javakhk was created to counter the strengthening of the Georgian language, which

sought to actively mobilize the population and acquire an autonomous status. However,

the Armenian minority was deprived of any institutional autonomy and territorial self-

rule, thereby preventing Javakhk to mobilize a large-scale popular movement. As no pre-

existing institutions were present, ethnic entrepreneurs and activists remained powerless,

44 Edmund Herzig, The New Caucasus: Armenia , Az erbaijan and Georgia (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999), 46



17

unable to win popular legitimacy and gain concessions from Tbilisi. With a comparable

conflict potential, it therefore appears that the autonomous status of South Ossetia was of

tremendous importance in its quest for independence. Indeed, the South Ossetian

separatist movement, Ademon Nykhas, did not enjoy a higher degree of initial legitimacy

than Javakhk 45

, but the region¶s institutional autonomy greatly facilitated the movement¶s

cohesion and strengthening. The existence of a powerful legislative body, the Supreme

Soviet, provided Ademon Nykhas an institutional channel against Georgia, as well as a

means to gather external support. On the contrary, lacking any administrative structure,

Javakhk had first the heavy burden to establish a legitimate chain of command and a clear

hierarchy, preventing its consolidation. The lack of autonomy therefore

drasticallystopped the Armenians in Javakheti from forming a strong and credible

separatist movement, and in the face of the Georgian nationalistic aspirations, they had

little to respond with except popular petitions and demonstrations46

. Highlighting the

crucial importance of territorial autonomy in explaining secessionism, the case of

Javakheti further undermines the credible commitment theory. Indeed, the region was the

site of a major Russian base located at Akhalkalaki47

and the local Armenian population

constituted over two-third of the soldiers and one-third of the commanding officers.

Benefitting from the heavy support of Russia, Javakheti also enjoyed full access to

armaments and military training48.

45 Svante Cornell, ³Autonomy as a source of conflict: Caucasian conflicts in theoretical perspective´, W orld Politics No.54(January 2002), 27146 Svante Cornell, ³Autonomy as a source of conflict: Caucasian conflicts in theoretical perspective´, W orld Politics No.54

(January 2002), 270-27247 Edmund Herzig, The New Caucasus: Armenia , Az erbaijan and Georgia (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999), 4648 Svante Cornell, ³Autonomy as a source of conflict: Caucasian conflicts in theoretical perspective´, W orld Politics No.54(January 2002), 270



18

It seems therefore that Russian credible commitment to the Armenians in Javakheti was

not a sufficient condition to allow them to plausibly rebel and gain independence. Hence,

territorial autonomy appears to be a necessary element in determining whether or not a

minority can credibly challenge a central government and form a strong secessionist

movement. In the end, this becomes an issue of causality: it was not because Abkhazia,

South Ossetia and Ajaria received Russian credible commitments that they rebelled, but

they rather obtained Russian support because they all enjoyed territorial autonomy. The

political and legal standing of an autonomous region conferred them a powerful

institutional means through which external funds and support could be channelled.

Furthermore, it has been identified in the literature on ethnopolitical conflict that group

cohesion and identity, willingness to act and capacity to act constitute the three major

elements conducive to conflict49

. By institutionalizing and promoting a separate identity,

as well as improvingcohesion through ethnic mobilization, leadership, mass media and

delimited borders, autonomous regions heavily contribute to a group¶s willingness to act .

Finally, already established powerful institutions provide a channel for contestation and

for drawing external support, also increasing a group¶s capacity to act . By fulfilling all

three categories, territorial autonomy is thus a necessary condition in explaining ethnic

secessionism. On the contrary, the credible commitment theory, by solely influencing a

group¶s capacity to act , is not sufficient to account for ethnic rebellion, as confirmed by

the case of Javakheti.

The analysis of post-Soviet Georgia in light of the credible

commitment and the territorial autonomy theories clearly demonstrated the superiority of

49 Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples versus states: minorities at risk in the new century (Washington D.C: USIP Press, 2000)



19

the latter in accounting for the dynamics in ethnic secessionism. When considering the

five different minorities within the republic, only the territorial autonomy argument

accurately predicts the variations, whereas the credible commitment theory is unable to

explain the failure of Javakheti separatist movement.

***

In the wake of the collapse of Communism, the former Soviet

empire and its former satellites were the theatre of dangerous inter-ethnic tensions, which

degenerated and escalated into violent civil wars. Constituted of five concentrated

minorities, Georgia was not an exception to the rule and also experienced tremendous

ethnic massacres. However, while all minorities had grievances with the regime and its

Georgianization campaign, only the regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Ajaria

credibly challenged Tbilisi, either violently or politically,in order to gain independence.

To account for these variations, two theories have been explored in this paper. The first

one, relying on Brubaker¶s ³triadic configuration´ and a credible commitment logic,

defined the level of external support for a minority as being the crucial factor explaining

violent secessionism. The second theory rather emphasized territorial autonomy as being

a powerful institutional weapon for separatist movements to mobilize ethnic groups and

channel external support. When analyzing the cases of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and

Ajaria, it has been observed that all three minorities enjoyed significant moral and

material support from Moscow, as well as benefitted from an autonomous status within

the republic. However, when studying the Armenian minority located in Javakheti, it

appears that the region¶s lack of autonomy prevented it to credibly challenge Tbilisi,



20

despite enjoying strong Russian support. Accurately predicting the secessionist dynamics

within Georgia, the territorial autonomy theory therefore best explains the variations in

ethnic conflict between the five minorities by influencing their group cohesion and

identity, as well as their willingness and capacity to revolt. Moreover, the predictive

power of this argument could be further demonstrated when considering the two

remaining countries of Transcaucasia, Azerbaijan and Armenian. Constituted of four

concentrated minorities, the sole region to experience violent ethnic conflict was located

in the autonomous province of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, while the other non-

autonomous minorities remained quiet.

In light of these findings, an important question seems to be raised: if autonomy and

ethnofederalism, the preferred policies to manage inter-ethnic tensions, are actually not a

cure but rather a curse, what else can be done? For this dilemma, there is of course no

easy answer nor any applicable model. The solution lies perhaps in finding the

optimalamount of decentralization in order to prevent a loss of control50, or maybe in

favouring a unitary system over an ethnofederal structure as long as democracy is not

consolidated51

.

50 Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 2000), 15451 Valerie Bunce and Stephen Watts, ³Managing diversity and sustaining democracy: ethnofederal versus unitary statesin the post-communist world´ in Sustainable Peace: power and democracy after civil war , ed. Philip Roeder andDonald Rothchild (Cornell University Press, 2005), 157



21

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