45...the chinese central military commission (cmc) bolstered the countryÕs strategic deterrent by...

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2012 68: 45Bulletin of the Atomic ScientistsJohn W. Lewis and Xue Litai

Making China's nuclear war plan

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Making China’s nuclear warplan

John W. Lewis and Xue Litai

AbstractFor the last decade of Mao ZedongÕs rule in China, his revolutionary thinking dominated all strategic planningand operations and directly shaped the policies of the strategic rocket forces, the Second Artillery. Only in themid-1980s did MaoÕs legacy give way to concepts governing nuclear forces throughout the world and permitthe development of ChinaÕs first nuclear strategy and acceptance of the principles of nuclear deterrence. Stepby step, the ever-more complex command-and-control mechanisms of the PeopleÕs Liberation Army adoptedand refined new roles for its nuclear and conventional missiles to support peacetime diplomacy, to managemilitary crises, and to pursue combat readiness. The authors examine the evolution of ChinaÕs overall defensestrategy, with a focus on central elements of todayÕs nuclear war plan and how they are operationalized. Theyseek to answer this question: How did conventional missiles change nuclear strategy, the organization of thecombined conventional-nuclear missile forces for both deterrence and combat, and the relationship of theSecond Artillery to the other military commands?

KeywordsChina, double command, military strategic guideline, nuclear strategy, nuclear war plan, PeopleÕs LiberationArmy, Second Artillery

In the latter half of the 1980s,the Chinese Central MilitaryCommission (CMC) bolstered the

countryÕs strategic deterrent by addingconventionally armed missiles to itsstrike forces. At first, the missiles wereviewed as part of a menu of weapons forforeign arms sales, though little thoughtappears to have been given to their even-tual role in the order of battle for thePeopleÕs Liberation Army (PLA).1

Starting in 1993, ChinaÕs military strat-egy was transformed as the conventionalmissile arsenal grew. US capabilities

demonstrated in the Gulf War, as wellas the increased threat of Taiwan declar-ing independence from the mainland,created a more sophisticated approachto the concept of nuclear deterrence,the combined use of conventional andnuclear missiles, and preparations for across-strait war with Taiwan and theUnited States. In the decades that fol-lowed, these seemingly separatechanges came together and led to theformulation of a war plan that presentsboth the Chinese and potential militaryadversaries with daunting uncertainties.

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The basic dilemma stems from thedeployment of both nuclear and conven-tional missiles on bases controlled bythe Second Artillery, which previouslyhad been solely tasked with overseeingthe countryÕs nuclear deterrent, andthe close links those bases have to thetheater military commands.

If, in a time of high tension, theChinese command authorized a conven-tional missile attack as an act of preemp-tive self-defense, the enemy and its alliescould not know if the incoming missileswere conventional or nuclear. In a worst-case scenario, a Chinese first-strike con-ventional attack could spark retaliationthat destroys Chinese nuclear assets,creating a situation in which escalationto full-scale nuclear war would not justbe possible, but even likely.

China’s conceptual approachto nuclear weapons

A basic understanding of the Chineseapproach to nuclear weapons includesthe knowledge of BeijingÕs military strat-egy or basic military strategic guideline(junshi zhanlu¬e fangzhen ),nuclear policy (he zhengce ),nuclear strategy (he zhanlu¬e ),nuclear deterrence theory (he weishelilun ), applied strategic prin-ciples (zhanlu¬e yunyong yuanze

), and operational regula-tions (zuozhan tiaoling ).These conceptual elements form a six-tier hierarchy and define the theoreticalbasis of ChinaÕs buildup of nuclearforces and nuclear war plan. In theory,they determine how ChinaÕs nuclearforces are deployed and employed forcombat.

Yet, what began as the pursuit of aÒpureÓ nuclear war plan could not

resist the influence of changes thatgained momentum in the 1980s and con-tinue to the present day. The authorita-tive ChinaÕs National Defense in 2006puts it this way: ÒPursuing a self-defensive nuclear strategy, ChinaÕsnuclear strategy is subject to the stateÕsnuclear policy and military strategyÓ(State Council of the PeopleÕs Republicof China, 2006: Sect. II). Nuclear strategyitself, now being tested in repeated mili-tary exercises, has adjusted to the intro-duction of conventional missiles into theSecond Artillery, the emergence andmanagement of the ever-present threatof Taiwan ÒseparatismÓ as the centralmilitary priority, and the developmentof an overall war plan that integratesnuclear and conventional weapons andSecond Artillery command structuresinto the theater military commands.

The starting point for the PLAÕs mili-tary strategy is Òactive defenseÓ (Lewisand Xue, 2011a,b), a principle that aims toÒgain mastery by striking only after theenemy has struck firstÓ (hou fa zhi ren

) (Peng et al., 1989: 169). Thatprinciple finds direct expression in thecountryÕs fundamental nuclear policy,now approaching its 50th anniversary.

From its first nuclear test in 1964,China has not substantially changed itsdeclared nuclear policy (Yao, 2007).Specifically, over most of the past dec-ades, that policy has included theseessential components (Jia and Dong,1999: 410”415; Feng, 1993: 1311; Ma, 2007:101”105):

. Nuclear weapons should be com-pletely prohibited and thoroughlydestroyed worldwide.

. The threats presented by thenuclear powers have compelledChina to develop nuclear weapons;

46 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68(5)


its small arsenal is only for self-defense.

. At no time and under no circum-stances will China be the first touse nuclear weapons, an obviousderivative of a no-first-use policy,or hou fa zhi ren.

. China will not use or threaten touse nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or in nuclearweapon-free zones.

. China opposes nuclear prolifer-ation, will never help other coun-tries develop nuclear weapons,and will not deploy nuclear weap-ons in other countries.2

. Since the 1980s, China hasdemanded that countries importingnuclear-related materials andequipment from China accept theInternational Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) safeguards and notretransfer them to a third countrywithout ChinaÕs consent. Chinahas also guaranteed that allimported nuclear materials andequipment would be used only forpeaceful purposes.3

Even a cursory examination of thesecomponents leads to a conclusion that isobvious but needs to be noted: ChinaÕsnuclear policy is controlled by nationalpolitical concerns and decisions.BeijingÕs leaders have traditionallydeemed nuclear weapons to be politicalinstruments with a deterrent role thatnow is considered central (Peng et al.,1989). Their position results in a well-recognized aspect of ChinaÕs inter-national arms control statements thatoften mention and explain its nuclearpolicy but not its nuclear strategy,which is dominated by military consid-erations. Simply put, nuclear policy is

open and widely promulgated, whilenuclear strategy is sensitive and rarelyelaborated in public.

Nuclear strategy contains decisionsrelevant to weapons procurements,deployment, and employment, and tocivil defense (Wu and Wu, 2007).Chinese officials call these decisionsthe ÒcontentÓ (neirong ) or Òelem-entsÓ (yaosu ) of nuclear strategy(Ma, 2007; Yao, 2007). Nuclear strategycovers the requirements for deterrenceand the principal national security andcombat missions of ChinaÕs nuclearforces, as well as the organization ofthose forces, plans for nuclear war pre-paredness, and regulations for nuclearalerts and targeting under wartime con-ditions (Ma et al., 1992; Li and Teng,2007). Chinese military experts havecompared their nuclear-related concep-tual elements as a whole to the USnuclear war plan, or Single IntegratedOperational Plan (SIOP), as it wascalled until 2003.4

After the formal establishment of theSecond Artillery on July 1, 1966, thoseresponsible for the initial buildup ofthe nuclear forcesÑfrom Mao Zedongto Marshal Nie RongzhenÑprovidedguidance on nuclear policy, not nuclearstrategy, and no leaders since then haveever expressed any interest, let alonecrafted a Ònuclear doctrineÓ (he xueshuo

).5 In terms of the building andemployment of nuclear weapons, theymerely limited the scale of ChinaÕsnuclear arsenal to Òminimum retaliationmeansÓ (qima de huanji shouduan

), providing almost noother details6 (Nie, 1986). For thisreason and the chaotic Chinese politicalclimate over the decade of the CulturalRevolution from 1966 to 1976, theSecond Artillery only slowly developed

Lewis and Xue 47


rigorous operational and targeting plans.From 1964 up to the late 1980s, the nationdid not have an explicit nuclear strategy.It rejected ÒWesternÓ concepts ofnuclear deterrence and had yet to agreeon such critical components as appliedstrategic principles and operationalregulations.7

With the return to power of DengXiaoping in 1977,8 the Central MilitaryCommission for the first time gave pri-ority to encouraging strategic studies. InDecember 1979 and July 1981, the SecondArtillery convened symposiums on theapproved nuclear conceptual elements,and within a year its leaders promul-gated ÒThe Military Language of theSecond ArtilleryÓ and new work regula-tions. In 1983, they established theMilitary Academic Department (JunshiXueshu Bu ), which wasresponsible for conducting strategic stu-dies. The next year, the Second Artilleryestablished the Committee forAcademic Research (Xueshu YanjiuWeiyuanhui ), composedof retired senior officers who wouldengage in theoretical research.

The main task for these officers wasto formulate the Second ArtilleryÕs Òsci-ence of operationsÓ (zhanyi xue )and operational principles and rules formissile launch units. The SecondArtillery assigned Major General LiLijing, then deputy director of theCommittee for Academic Research, tooversee the studies on the science ofoperations. Almost immediately, how-ever, Li Lijing recognized the flaw inhis assignmentÑthe absence of aformal integrated nuclear strategyÑandreported it to the Second Artillery,which authorized him to establish anuclear strategy research team to drafta comprehensive nuclear strategy.

From March to November 1987, a seriesof symposia on Òacademic issues regard-ing [military] strategy and nuclear strat-egyÓ were held in Beijing (Shen, 2008:142). Some 50 to 60 experts fromChinaÕs Academy of Military Science,the National Defense University, theCommission of Science, Technology,and Industry for National Defense, theMinistry of State Security, and theSecond Artillery attended to draft thenationÕs nuclear strategy. It took twomore years before the CMC formallyendorsed the final version of thestrategy.

The draft represented a meaningfulbreak from the past and provided thebasis for advancing the current Òlimitednuclear retaliationÓ (youxian he baofu

) strategy, which replacedthe term Òminimum retaliationÓ (Zhang,1994: 119). Only in 2006 did China, for thefirst time, proclaim its current Òself-defensive nuclear strategyÓ (ziweifangyu de he zhanlu¬e ).Its fundamental goal was to Òdeterother countries from using or threaten-ing to use nuclear weapons againstChinaÓ (State Council of the PeopleÕsRepublic of China, 2006: Sect. II).Thereafter, the vague term ÒselfdefenseÓ most often replaced Òlimitednuclear retaliationÓ as the declarednuclear strategy.

China and nuclear deterrencetheory

Before the development of a nuclearstrategy, the Central MilitaryCommission repudiated the ideasbehind deterrence and linked it withÒimperialist blackmail.Ó Such rejectionwas repeatedly echoed in Chinese offi-cial statements. For example, ChinaÕs



first white paper on arms control andnonproliferation issued in 1995 stated,ÒThe Chinese Government has alwaysopposed nuclear blackmail and nucleardeterrence policyÓ (Teng, 2011: 26).

Such public statements did not reflectreality. Although MaoÕs immediate suc-cessors could not safely embrace theconcept of nuclear deterrence, noenemy, they held, could ignore the exist-ence of ChinaÕs nuclear weaponsarsenal, and current military analystsnow claim that China in fact had adoptedan Òexistential nuclear deterrenceÓ (cun-zaixing he weishe ) theoryunder Mao himself (Zhao, 2009: 397).The very existence of the Chinesearsenal had forced BeijingÕs enemies tothink twice before launching a nuclearassault. Furthermore, the history of the1969 Sino-Soviet nuclear confrontationdemonstrated that ChinaÕs Òminimumretaliation meansÓ in fact did functionto deter Moscow from launching a sur-gical attack against China, and Maoknew it.9 Nevertheless, for most of theDeng Xiaoping era, from 1977 to 1997,the military spoke only of the limitednuclear retaliation as dictated by theno-first-use policy and the SecondArtilleryÕs ÒlimitedÓ nuclear arsenal.

The commitment to the no-first-usepolicy, of course, reflected the realityof ChinaÕs small and highly vulnerablenuclear arsenal. One source puts it thisway: ÒThe small number of [our coun-tryÕs] nuclear missiles cannot destroyan enemy stateÕs nuclear counterattackforces. The launch of nuclear assaultswould no doubt provoke unbearablenuclear retaliation. Judging from thislogic, the assumption that China wouldlaunch nuclear assaults [first] is abso-lutely incredibleÓ (Research Society,2011). A decision to launch first would

have been tantamount to suicide. In thepolemics with Moscow and Washingtonin the 1960s and thereafter, Òno-first-use,Ó of course, had a better ringto it than Òavoiding self-destruction.Ó

By the latter half of the 1990s, how-ever, Chinese officials and security spe-cialists used the ever-increasingacademic exchanges with Westerncounterparts to distance themselvesfrom MaoÕs dicta and to incorporatedeterrence into their strategic lexicon(Research Society, 2011; Teng, 2011).Moreover, their nuclear arsenal was nolonger so limited and vulnerable, and thearsenal was growing within a new, lessthreatening strategic security environ-ment. The time had come to add nucleardeterrence to the search for a modernnuclear strategy.10

It was not until 2006, however, thatChinaÕs defense white paper did finallyconnect deterrence to the nationÕsnuclear forces and officially endorsethe terms nuclear deterrent force (heweishe liliang ) and strategicdeterrence (zhanlu¬e weishe ). Itdeclared, ÒThe Second Artillery Forceaims at progressively improving itsforce structure of having both nuclearand conventional missiles, and raisingits capabilities in strategic deterrenceand conventional strike under condi-tions of informatization. . . . Its funda-mental goal is to deter other countriesfrom using or threatening to use nuclearweapons against China. . . . It endeavorsto ensure the security and reliability ofits nuclear weapons and maintains acredible nuclear deterrent forceÓ (StateCouncil of the PeopleÕs Republic ofChina, 2006: Sect. II). Nuclear deter-rence had come of age in China.

Under the CMC leadership of JiangZemin, from 1989 to 2004, and Hu

Lewis and Xue 49


Jintao, from 2004 to 2012, the Chinesemilitary added new content to thetheory, though its essence remainedunchanged. In the Jiang Zemin years,the theory was routinely described asÒcombining multiple means,Ó includingnuclear and conventional ones (hechang jianbei duozhong shouduanpeihe Ò Ó), tostrengthen the deterrent. Jiang high-lighted the relationship between theÒconventional swordÓ and the ÒnuclearshieldÓ as ChinaÕs unique dualdeterrent.11

In 2006, Hu Jintao authorized furtherchanges that reflected the growing influ-ence of Sun Zi in the military, advocatinga self-defensive nuclear strategy in orderto Òsubdue the enemy without fighting abattleÓ (buzhan er qu ren zhi bing

). Thereafter, Hu urgedthe Second Artillery to build a stream-lined and effective strategic forcefor nuclear deterrence and conven-tional strikes (jinggan youxiao he changjianbei de zhanlu¬e daji liliang

) if needed, butprimarily for self-defense and warprevention.

Strategic guidelines evolve

Coinciding with the official adoption ofnuclear deterrence and its increasingsophistication, the basic military stra-tegic guideline simultaneously began tochange. After his return to power in 1977,Deng Xiaoping reexamined the securitythreat to China. As Sino-US relationsimproved in the 1980s, the Soviet threatalso began to ebb, and DengÕs first con-clusions were that war would be neitherglobal nor imminent. The United Statesremained mired in a global stalematewith the Soviet Union, and American

power had met its match in Vietnam.At the same time, he could foreseeChinaÕs own coming clash withVietnam and, perhaps, with India atsome far distant point. In 1984, basedon DengÕs strategic calculus, the CMCbegan to embrace a new strategic guide-line of preparing for local wars and lim-ited conflicts (youxian chongtu

) and even considered abandon-ing the still-hallowed Maoist guidelineof preparing for Òan early war, an all-out war, and a nuclear warÓ (Wang,1999: 276). DengÕs guideline promptedthe military to start research and devel-opment on sophisticated conventionalweapons for limited local conflicts.Faced with an inferior and difficult-to-modernize air force and navy, the CMCwould rely on the Second Artillery for aquick fix with the introduction of con-ventional missiles (Ge, 2008).

As demonstrated in ChinaÕs short butdisastrous war with Vietnam in 1979,Beijing concluded that the PLA couldnot fight as an integrated force in alocal war, and, in 1987, its security theor-ists stepped up research on joint oper-ations (lianhe zhanyi ) usingadvanced technologies.12 By 1988, it hadbecome clear that a new military stra-tegic guideline was needed to preparefor a possible future war. No longer fear-ful of foregoing MaoÕs legacy, the com-mission formally decided to switch thestrategic guideline to preparing for localwars and Òsudden incidentsÓ (tufa shi-jian ) (Ge, 2008: 295).

But this was only the beginning. In itsdecisive victory in the 1991 Gulf War, theUnited States carried out a so-calledÒrevolution in military affairsÓ byintegrating modern information andcommunications systems, intelligencecapabilities, space technology, futuristic



aircraft, and advanced tactics. Within ashort period, moreover, Beijing reactedto Taiwanese President Lee Teng-huiÕsalleged attempt to move Taipei awayfrom the one-China policy.

In November 1992, CMC ChairmanJiang Zemin authorized General ZhangZhen, JiangÕs deputy within the CMC,to conduct research on the feasibilityof adopting a new guideline to adapt tothe Òswift development of the inter-national situationÓ and the global mili-tary revolution (Ling, 2005: 18”20). InJanuary 1993, Jiang told his generals toadopt a guideline of winning Òhigh-techlocal warsÓ focused on ChinaÕs southeastcoast, that is, the Taiwan Strait (Jiang,2006a: Vol. 1, 285). The elements of anew military strategic guideline werebeing put in place.

This guideline redefined the centralmilitary mission of the PeopleÕsLiberation Army, identified ChinaÕsÒimagined enemies,Ó and set the scaleand type of future operations. Fightinga high-tech local war was listed for thefirst time as the PLAÕs priority mission,and the new guideline formally helpedcast off the historic burden of preparingfor a land invasion (Peng, 2002). Thenext imagined enemies were Taiwanseparatists and their nuclear-armed USsupporters, though BeijingÕs overallnational strategy still gave priority topeace, stability, and development whilepreparing for the predicted high-techlocal war.

The Chinese military has continued toadd new elements to the military stra-tegic guideline. In 1999, the CMC revisedit to winning local wars under condi-tions of informatization and nucleardeterrence, and on December 27, 2002,Jiang, a former minister of electronics,put ever-greater emphasis on the

relevance of the information era anddeleted any reference to nuclear deter-rence. His new guideline would Òswitch. . . from preparation for local wars undergeneral conditions to the winning oflocal wars under conditions ofinformatizationÓ (Jiang, 2006b: Vol. 3,584). By this time, the need to deter aUS nuclear response had become farless pressing, though nuclear deterrencestill remained viable. And these changescontinued under Hu Jintao, who inMarch 2004 promoted the concept ofscientific development for ChinaÕslong-term growth, including themilitary.

Conventional missile programs

As early as 1984, the Ministry ofAstronautics Industry assigned theFirst Academy (for building missilelaunch vehicles) to develop a conven-tional tactical missile primarily forsales abroad. In October 1985, the acad-emy started work on the missileÕs overalldesign. The ministry code-named themissile M-9, but internally called it theDF-15. This single-stage missile had a600-kilometer range and could be fittedfor either a conventional or a nuclearwarhead. Stored in semi-hardenedlaunch sites, its mobility and solidrocket propulsion would help solve theincreasing vulnerability of the missileforces to detection and destruction.13

Beginning in the latter half of the1980s and for years thereafter, PLA strat-egists pondered the question: ÒWhat canthe [nuclear-armed] Second Artillery dowhen waging a conventional local war?Ó(Wang, 1989; Lewis and Xue, 2006). Atthat time, China was facing growingmilitary challenges from its neighbors,especially Vietnam, India, and Japan,

Lewis and Xue 51


three countries that had begun introdu-cing advanced conventional weaponsinto their order of battle. The contentionfor control of the Spratly Islands in theSouth China Sea further added to theperceived threat. The PLA had neitheraircraft carriers nor in-flight refuelingcapability and could not dominate theair over the Spratlys should war breakout. As a makeshift measure, the CMCturned to another of its missiles underdevelopment, the medium-range DF-25.

The CMC then had to decide where toput these new short-to-medium-rangemissilesÑeither the regular armedforces or the Second ArtilleryÑand astrong debate erupted. These missileswere to supplement the short-range tac-tical missiles long stationed in selectground forces units. As a SecondArtillery deputy commander recalled,the case for the missiles to go to theSecond Artillery was overwhelming.Only the strategic rocket forces had theproven leadership, management, andlogistical systems needed for fully andquickly constructing and running theconventional missile launch sites andsupport facilities. Despite the obviousrejoinderÑonly the regular ground,naval, and air force units were taskedto fight a conventional war, and theyalready possessed older tactical mis-silesÑthe CMC accepted the SecondArtilleryÕs arguments because of theadvantages of its Òlow investment andquick work resultsÓ (Ge, 2008: 295).

The Second Artillery accelerated thepreparations for forming a unit underBase 52, the main missile complexopposite Taiwan, and the base receivedits first DF-15s in April 1992. One yearlater, as the missiles were still arriving,the CMC formally commissioned thefirst conventional missile brigade and

ordered it to be ready to launch withinone year (Ge, 2008; Modernization,2009).

Since the mid-1990s, the number ofBase 52Õs conventional brigades andnew, more accurate ballistic missileshas steadily increased, even as the polit-ical changes on Taiwan clearly reducedthe so-called separatist threat, and thesequick-action Òfist unitsÓ (quantou budui

) have proliferated throughoutthe coastal areas opposite Taiwan(Ge, 2008; Modernization, 2009).Moreover, according to a 2008 USdefense report, a large number of land-attack cruise missiles, the DH-10, hadbeen deployed in a southern missilebase in Yunnan, and, in just a fewyears, several nuclear bases had alsobecome nuclear- and conventional-cap-able under a newly evolving commandstructure (Second Artillery ArmamentsDepartment, 2008; United States Officeof the Secretary of Defense, 2008: 56).

The merger of missile forces intothe general war plan

As short- and medium-range conven-tional missiles were being deployed,ChinaÕs prevailing doctrine on com-bined-arms operations allowed only theintegration of the combat capabilities ofvarious units within a single service; theground forces played the decisive rolewith the backing of other services (thatis, the navy, air force, and SecondArtillery). Truly joint operations, bycontrast, would combine the capabilitiesof several services and prioritize themaccording to perceived combat require-ments. The Second Artillery com-manders would now have directbattlefield responsibilities for the firsttime. But making this adjustment



would take time, and even now the rulesof engagement are still being rewrittenand repeatedly tested in exercises in theeffort to prove fully joint war-fightingcapabilities. As joint operations arenow envisaged, the Chinese groundforces no longer automatically enjoythe dominant position; the three servicesand the conventional missile forceshave equal status in the command-and-control chain (Fan, 1998).

It should be noted that, at first, theCMC deemed conventional missilesonly as a range-extending weaponssystem. Its senior officers, however,soon maintained that a Òhuge psycho-logical impact on the enemyÓ wouldresult from a conventional missileassault and that the threat of that attackcould Òdeter the outbreak of a conven-tional local war in time of peace and con-tain the expansion and escalation of aconventional local war after it hadbroken outÓ (Wang, 1989: 298). Nowthe Second Artillery could act bothduring crises and local wars.

At the same time, BeijingÕs leadersworked to keep the Second ArtilleryÕsconceptual world in line with changesin the military strategic guideline. TheCMC labored to place the PLA com-mand-and-control mechanisms andtraining programs on a ÒscientificÓbasis, which first seemed more like aslogan than a genuine improvement onJiangÕs demand for ever greater depend-ence on information technology. OnJune 27, 2006, Hu elaborated on the con-cept of ÒsystemsÓ (tixi ) by usinginformation technologies to integrateall of the PLA services and their sys-temsÑor what the Chinese call the Òsys-tem of systems.Ó Hu said: ÒA local warunder conditions of informatization is aconfrontation among systems, and its

basic form is the integrated joint oper-ations. Joint operations need joint train-ing. We must attach importance to theenhancement of integrated jointcombat capabilities and place stress onjoint trainingÓ (Hu, 2006). In March 2012,Hu then urged the PLA to take the Òsys-temsÓ to a new level by strengtheningcapabilities for Òsystems confrontationÓ(tixi duikang ) with potentialenemies (Wang and Cao, 2012: 1).

More and more training wouldconcentrate on winning the informa-tion-technology battle under combatconditions. For the Second Artillery,HuÕs Òsystems confrontationÓ wouldrequire streamlining command and con-trol for deterrence, crisis management,and war-fighting. As one SecondArtillery commander stated, the stra-tegic rocket forces would be enteringinto a new stage. This stage, he said,would be characterized by Òdouble[nuclear and conventional] deterrenceÓ(shuangchong weishe ), Òdouble[nuclear and conventional] operationsÓ(shuangchong zuozhan ), andÒdouble [nuclear and conventional]commandÓ (shuangchong zhihui

) (Ge, 2008: 300; Yuan, 2009:294). While some considered the threeÒdoublesÓ no more than slogans, theefforts to test and refine these conceptsin multiple and increasingly realisticexercises suggest otherwise. Both Òsys-tems confrontationÓ and the threeÒdoublesÓ now play a key role in thesearch for a complete strategy that sup-ports the most recent military strategicguidelines and deterrence theory.

For the CMC, systems coordinationrequired a focus on senior person-nel assignments in support of intelli-gence sharing, interoperable combatcommunications, and transparent

Lewis and Xue 53


command-and-control mechanisms.Coordinating the conventional missileforces and the other PLA services intheater joint operations posed amyriad of novel and complex chal-lenges. To meet them, the GeneralStaff designated groups at threelevels. In the first one, the SecondArtillery dispatches a ÒcoordinatinggroupÓ (xietiao zu ) to joinsimilar groups from the other servicesat the theater joint operations head-quarters. These groups participate informulating the procedures for thegeneral war plan, and together theycoordinate the conventional missilebrigades with the combat units ofthe other services. When authorizedby the theater commander, theSecond Artillery group then issuesorders to the missile brigades, super-vises their implementation, and helpsupdate the joint operations.

At the second level, a designated mis-sile base and the theater headquartersof other relevant services exchangeÒcoordinating and liaison groupsÓ (xietiaolianluo zu ). Each group reportsto its own headquarters on ordersassigned from its counterpart services,provides feedback on the requirementsfor actions to be taken by other services,and submits requests for actions to betaken by the other services on behalf ofits own headquarters.

Finally, in theater joint operations,each missile base must strengthencoordination among its engaged missilebrigades and the combat units ofother relevant services. To do this, itmust set up a Òtheater coordinatingteamÓ (zhanchang xietiao xiaozu

) responsible for suchactions as reporting launch positionsand maneuver routes of missile

battalions, warning on the timing andtrajectories of missiles to be launched,and submitting requirements for sup-port. Missile brigades can also dispatchbattlefield teams to the combat units ofother services as ad hoc assignments(Zhou, 2002).

According to the war plan, the con-ventional missile forces, in contrast toother major military units, mostly playa supplementary role in theater jointoperations. But they have the principalrole in striking against the enemyÕs tar-gets in strategic depthÑincluding air-fields, naval ports, missile launchbases, and command-and-control cen-ters. Moreover, the worsening cross-strait relations in the 1990s openedthe way for the conventional missileforces to play a part in emergingcrises. The increased threat ofTaiwanÕs independence had alreadyaccelerated the growth of the conven-tional missile arsenal and broughtchanges to the military strategic guide-line and the theory of deterrence.These missiles could now be used ina limited Òfirst strikeÓÑthat is, a justi-fiable self-defensive first use of mis-siles launched from a once all-nuclearbaseÑfor war-initiation or presumedcrisis-control purposes.

In July 1995 and March 1996, conven-tional missiles from Base 52 were tar-geted against the waters close toTaiwan as a warning to TaipeiÕs inde-pendence-minded leaders. How muchtheir use aggravated rather than moder-ated the crisis is still open to dispute.14

Yet, for Beijing, the missiles had hit theirintended political targets: Taiwanesepublic opinion and US defense policy.As one Chinese source states: ÒOn theday after the launches of six missiles[in July 1995], over 6,000 Taiwanese



people held a demonstration against theindependence forces. The stock marketin Taiwan twice crashed right after themissile launchesÓ (Li et al., 2000: 56).Despite the strong US military response,which had now been exposed for theCMCÕs future planning purposes,Beijing had found a useful tool forÒmaintaining pressureÓ (baochi yali

) on TaiwanÕs separatists toÒreadjust their strategy for independ-enceÓ (Zhu, 2000: 166). For their part,the Second Artillery commanders havecontinued to argue that the missileslaunched in the mid-1990s Òdid containthe ÔTaiwan independenceÕ forcesÕ arro-ganceÓ (Jing and Peng, 2008: 8).

Applied strategic principles

In the six-tier hierarchy that definesthe role for ChinaÕs nuclear weaponswithin the overall war plan, appliedstrategic principles and operation regu-lations directly govern the SecondArtilleryÕs training, exercises, and, inwartime, combat operations. Theapplied strategic principles summarizethe main conceptual elements withinthe first four tiers of the six-tier stra-tegic hierarchy and as action state-ments dictate the formulation andexecution of operational regulations.They are also called Òapplied oper-ational principlesÓ (zuozhan yunyongyuanze ) and have separateversions for nuclear and conventionalmissile units.

In pursuit of the so-called corenuclear strategy of Òdeterrence of anuclear war and limited nuclear retali-ation,Ó five applied principles governthe nuclear force. These are consistentwith the conceptual elements of the firstfour tiers and, while repetitious, are

more detailed. They are (Li, 2008:29”31; Second ArtilleryÕs, 2006):

. Oppose nuclear blackmail (fanheÕezha ): Deter the enemyfrom starting a nuclear war, andthwart and neutralize the enemyÕsnuclear deterrent and blackmail.

. Gain mastery by striking only afterthe enemy has struck first (hou fazhi ren ): At no time bethe first to use nuclear weapons,and, if the enemy strikes, authorizeonly limited nuclear retaliation.

. Centralize command (jizhongzhihui ): The CMC alonehas the power to decide on anddirect the employment of nuclearmissiles. The Second Artillerymust carry out the CMCÕs ordersstrictly and correctly.

. Strictly protect the missile units(yanmi fanghu ): Ensurethe survivability of the missilesneeded for the counterattack.

. Strike only key targets (zhongdianfanji ): Choose only stra-tegic targets in the enemyÕs home-land for effective nuclearretaliation.

While nuclear weapons have predomin-antly political and war-prevention ordeterrence uses, conventional missiles,as we have seen, are deemed premierweapons for preemptive strikes in ahigh-tech local war. The CMC thus hasadopted eight more-detailed appliedoperational principles for those missileunits:

. Concentrate firepower (jizhongshiyong ): Only the CMCcan authorize the use of theSecond ArtilleryÕs conventional

Lewis and Xue 55


missile and determine the scale ofoperations. Those operations mustconcentrate rather than scatter themissilesÕ firepower.

. Employ weapons for preemptiveuse (xianji zhidi ): Launchthe missile assaults first to seize thecombat initiative.

. Strike preselected key targets(zhongdian tuji ): Fire themissiles against those targets thatwill produce the greatest impacton the battlefield and will mostweaken the enemyÕs threats.

. Take timely protective maneuvers(shishi jidong ): Protect theaccess roads and provide the neces-sary air cover to ensure the safetyof the units and their ability tolaunch.

. Strictly protect the missile units(yanmi fanghu ): Use allprotective means possible, includ-ing camouflage, missile coating,and damage-resistant tunnel fortifi-cations. Set up decoys, provideready air cover, prevent groundassaults, keep the missile unitshidden before launch, and evacuateeach launch site immediately afterlaunching.

. Maintain full readiness (chongfenzhunbei ): Keep theweapon systems and launch sitesin good condition, actively collectintelligence on the enemy, and pre-pare the routes for maximummobility.

. Closely coordinate (miqie xietong): As noted, the General

Staff can create three groups tocoordinate with the other PLA ser-vices and tactical missile units.

. Ensure comprehensive support(quanmian baozhang ):

This principle includes suchcombat support as intelligence,firing data, meteorological updates,reliable communications and elec-tronic countermeasures, engineer-ing backup, and routine logistics.

Operational regulations fornuclear weapons

The sixth and final tier in the control anduse of Chinese nuclear weapons, oper-ational regulations, governs the combatactions of the missile units and the use oftheir nuclear weapons.15 Many of theircontents also apply to the actions ofthe conventional missile brigades.

Compared with those of the other ser-vices, the Second ArtilleryÕs command-and-control procedures for the nuclearunits are more explicit and inflexible.These procedures apply to both thenuclear and conventional missile forcesin accordance with the Òsystem of sys-temsÓ and Òthree doublesÓ requirements.The need for absolute control over thesemissile forces has given ever-higherurgency to improving and validatingthe Second ArtilleryÕs wartime prac-tices, and the unique relationship of theSecond Artillery to the CMC has madethe rocket forcesÕ modernization botheasier and more sensitive than similarefforts in the other services. Butbeyond modernization and readiness isthe ultimate challenge of the nuclearnightmare, the final dimensions ofwhich can never be fully known or ade-quately anticipated.

For Beijing and the still-hauntinglegacy of Mao Zedong, who repeatedlycalled on his troops to Òget organized,Óinstitutionalized procedures are bed-rock. Under the all-powerful CMC, the



General Staff Operations Departmentplays a critical role in the communica-tions chain from the commission to themissile headquarters. The CMC usesthis departmentÕs command center totransmit and monitor all missile deploy-ment and employment decisions. Fortheir part, the missile bases have con-structed command centers in hardenedunderground bunkers that contain com-munications equipment, drainage anddecontamination systems, and powergenerators. Commanders in these cen-ters reportedly believe they could sur-vive and operate for long periods undernuclear, conventional, cyber, or chem-ical attacks. The Second Artillery alsohas created redundant mobile airborneand truck-mounted posts to communi-cate with launch battalions.

By 1998, the General StaffCommunications Department haddeveloped a Òsoftware radio technol-ogyÓ to connect the transceivers usingdifferent frequencies. This technology,PLA sources state, integrated analogueand digital messages. It ensured reliabil-ity and protected Òsystem of systemsÓcommunications between the SecondArtillery headquarters and the CMCÕsfour general departments (staff, polit-ical, logistics, and armaments) andbetween the missile bases and the otherPLA services in joint operations. Earlier,the communications department alsobegan working on a blast- and jam-proof underground communicationssystem capable of penetrating hundredsof meters of hard rock. By the late 1990s,this state-of-the-art equipment in thecommand centers could link the CMCand the strategic missile bases underthe most complex wartime conditions.Short of its total destruction, the engin-eers held, the center could provide

Òcommunications of last resort.Ó Thedepartment then added more secureÒnuclear counterattack communica-tionsÓ equipment to these centers, anda recent authoritative PLA sourcestates that these communications guar-antee the CMCÕs wartime command andcontrol over all nuclear forces (Chenet al., 2009).

Even as it has upgraded its missilesand these command-and-control mech-anisms and tested their readiness, themissile command prescribed a four-stage alert system and a two-levelorder sequence for the launch of nuclearweapons. From the lowest to highest, thefour-stage system consists of StandingWar Preparedness Alert, Class 3 Alert,Class 2 Alert, and Class 1 Alert.

The CMC authorized a two-levelsequence of orders to raise the alertstatus and, in extremis, to launchnuclear weapons: the preparatoryorder (yuxian haoling ) andthe formal order (zhengshi mingling

). A preparatory order nor-mally contains four main parts: a con-cise description of the enemyÕs status;a brief statement of the unitÕs assignedmission; the unitÕs required prepar-ations with a precise schedule; andthe timing and location of the oper-ation. The CMC gives this order to ini-tiate a Class 3 or Class 2 Alert. Inauthorizing the Class 3 or Class 2status, a formal order both would con-firm the preparatory order and set inmotion planning for a higher-stagealert. In a confirmed emergency, theCMC, now operating as the nationalcommand authority, would be able tobypass the preparatory order and dir-ectly tell the General StaffÕs OperationsDepartment to issue the formalorder that initiates a Class 1 Alert.

Lewis and Xue 57


The sequence of alerts and orderswould involve the following:

. Standing War Preparations Alert(jingchangxing zhanbei zhuangtai

). This routine ornormal day-to-day readiness condi-tion assumes that an enemy attackis possible but unlikely. To orderany higher alert status, intelligencemust indicate a heightened threatlevel.

. Class 3 Operational PreparationsAlert (sandeng zhanyi zhunbeizhuangtai ).Intelligence must indicate that anenemy attack is probable to justifythe initiation of this alert status.Upon receipt of a preparatoryorder from the CMC via the com-mand-and-control systems, theSecond Artillery sends the orderto the missile bases, which acceler-ate preparations for launching theirmissiles. The CMC then issues aformal order to confirm the man-dated preparations in anticipationof going to a higher-stage alert.During the preparations, basesecurity is rapidly upgraded.

. Class 2 Operational PreparationsAlert (erdeng zhanyi zhunbeizhuangtai ). Toinitiate this alert status, intelligencemust confirm that an enemy attackis underway, but the CMC in con-sultation with the PolitburoÕsStanding Committee has not yetdecided on its response. When aClass 2 Alert is sounded uponreceipt of the encoded preparatoryorder, all bases shift to maximumreadiness, and the air defense andground units assigned to missilebases become fully activated.

All further actions await receipt ofthe formal order.

. Class 1 Operational PreparationsAlert (yideng zhanyi zhunbeizhuangtai ). ACMC-issued formal order to theSecond Artillery headquarterswill move specified launch basesto a Class 1 Alert. The precisenature of the threat level requiredto reach this decision remainshighly classified, and the range ofpossibilities and response optionscould be quite complex. For exam-ple, the initial enemy attack couldbe a non-nuclear assault onChinaÕs strategic targets such asthe Second Artillery missile silosor command-and-control installa-tions, and the PLA war planwould dictate the high commandÕspossible responses, includingnuclear retaliation on theattackerÕs homeland. The formalorder raises the combat-readystatus of the designated basesand gives authority to their com-manders to launch a nuclear coun-terattack upon receipt of a firingorder from the CMC in accord-ance with the specific operationalplan. In this alert status, the baseand its launch battalions must beready for firing missiles.

By the time a Class 1 Alert is issued,the Standing Committee of the ChineseCommunist Party Politburo would havemade its decision for a nuclear responseand transferred the national commandauthority to the military commission.16

After the CMC finalizes the relevantoperational and targeting plan with thecommitteeÕs general approval, the CMCpromulgates the firing order via the



General Staff Operations Department tothe Second Artillery and selected launchunits. The firing order also has a two-level sequence: the preparatory orderand formal order. The preparatoryorder includes the precise timing forthe mobile units to enter pre-surveyedlaunch sites far from their storagecaves and for units in hardened silos toperform pre-launch inspections. Thedesignated missile units can launchonly upon receipt of a formal orderfrom the CMC. The content of anyformal order is said to be the coresecret within the nuclear war plan.

Because of its limited number ofnuclear warheads and missiles, theSecond Artillery has selected a list ofpriority targets of the major imaginedenemies and ranked them for their per-ceived value. The criteria for making thetarget list range widely, from inter-national security threats and a potentialenemyÕs retaliatory capabilities to theavailability of specific weapons foruse against high-value targets. Theassessment of each missile systemÕsattack profile (survivability, penetrabil-ity, precision, and destruction poten-tial, for example) and thecharacteristics of each possible targetare also considered.

Using those criteria, the CMC dividesthe targets of ChinaÕs probable enemiesinto five categories, based on:

1. The relationship of strategic andtactical targets to overall waraims. Strategic targets include stra-tegic missile launch bases, navaland air bases, central military andpolitical headquarters, politicaland economic centers, industrialbases, and vital communicationshubs. Tactical targets include

presumed tactical nuclear weaponssites, tank formations, massedtroops, and regional command-and-control centers.

2. The value of the targetÑwhether amilitary, industrial, or transporta-tion siteÑto the enemy.

3. The vulnerability of the target todestruction (i.e., how ÒsoftÓ orÒhardÓ it might be).

4. The difficulty of destroying targetsof different shapes.

5. The difficulty in finding targets andthe maneuverability of mobiletargets.

In formulating targeting policies, theSecond Artillery has adopted the prin-ciple of cost-effectiveness, or use ofthe fewest weapons for maximumeffect. It regularly reruns its scientificcalculations and computer simulationsto test and refine those policies andhas written several tens of operationalplans for the CMCÕs use in a crisis orwar. These plans cover contingenciesfrom warnings and alerts to escalationscenarios and full-scale nuclear war.Given ChinaÕs fundamental vulnerabil-ity in todayÕs nuclear environment,Beijing would activate any of theseplans only as a last resort.

Yet, should the unthinkable nuclearconflict occur, the Second Artillery hascalculated the exact sequence of stepsleading up to launching its missilesunder different conditions. Officers inits Operations Department have cate-gorized and numbered hundreds ofcards that list the key elements foreach type of launch. The crises them-selves are typed, and precise responsesdictate which cards would be used. Atthe onset of a crisis, launch brigadesare directed to select a predetermined

Lewis and Xue 59


set of numbered cards that have beenchosen to achieve the CMCÕs politicaland military aims. When so ordered,the launch commanders must followthe instructions on these cards andstrictly pursue their mandated proced-ures in a Òtimely, precise, and secretÓmanner.

A typical launch order is simple andencrypted. It specifies the battalions tobe alerted, the number or numbers ofthe targeting cards to be used, the timeperiod to complete the order, theescape plan for the soldiers afterlaunching its missiles, and otheritems. The numbering and contents ofthe targeting cards are top secret. Theyinclude the names of the targetswith their geographical coordinates,the types and numbers of missiles andwarheads to be used, the typesand heights of the expected explosion,the launch sequence, and theintended effects of the ordered nuclearstrikes.

The increased importance of thethree ÒdoublesÓ concepts, with thecomplicating deployment of large num-bers of conventional missiles, undoubt-edly has forced the CMC and missilecommanders to reconsider and modifysome of the all-nuclear operationalregulations and to test them inrepeated combat exercises.17 Yet, theprofound differences between thenuclear and conventional battlefieldsand the highly fluid and diverse chal-lenges of modern conventional warfaredefy easy generalization or predeter-mined actions written down on littlecards. Alerts and targeting in suchcomplicated and unpredictable warfarewill depend more on traditional mili-tary experience and combat lessons

that have no parallel in the prepar-ations for a nuclear conflict.

The contradictions of doublecommand in a high-tech local war

By the end of the 1990s, ChinaÕs CentralMilitary Commission had changed themilitary strategic guideline to winninghigh-tech local wars and nuclear deter-rence. Years later, the CMC stated that alocal war under conditions of informati-zation Òis a confrontation between sys-tems, and its basic form is the integratedjoint operations.Ó Thereafter, theChinese military began moving in thedirection of enhancing its integratedjoint combat capabilities and jointtraining.18

Because the CMC attaches greatimportance to the dynamic relationshipbetween the nuclear shield and the con-ventional sword, it considers conven-tional missiles to be one of the multiplemeans to consolidate the nationÕs stra-tegic deterrent. The sequential and pos-sibly combined employment ofconventional and nuclear missile bri-gades is deemed a fundamental sourceof political and military strength. It is,however, also the troubling source ofcritical uncertainties. The basicdilemma for the war planners stemsfrom the deployment of the two typesof missiles on the same SecondArtillery bases with fundamentally dif-ferent capabilities and purposes. In thepractice of double deterrence anddouble operations, the nuclear missilesÕessential mission is to deter a nuclearfirst strike on China, and they are onlyto be used in extremis. At the same time,the conventional weapons on the



formerly all-nuclear bases must be readyto strike first and hard.

This unique duality complicates threebasic elements of ChinaÕs nuclear policyand strategy:

. A small, stable nuclear arsenal ishoused with large and increasingquantities of mid-range conven-tional ballistic and cruise missiles.

. No-first-use of nuclear weapons isstated policy, but conventional mis-siles can be fired first from basesthat also contain nuclear missiles,using the same command-and-con-trol infrastructure as would be usedfor a nuclear launch.

. The CMC holds sole authority forthe use of nuclear weapons, but thelaunch of conventional missiles isunder the CMCÕs command author-ity and the coordinated operationalcontrol of the theater jointcommand.

Of the three doubles of Chinesenuclear strategy, double command isthe most complex and unpredictable; itis also the concept about which we knowthe least. A missile baseÕs headquartersexercises command and control overboth its nuclear and conventional mis-sile brigades, but that double commandis governed by the schizophrenicrequirements just described.

Furthermore, the missile forces them-selves do not have self-defensive cap-abilities, even though their missionstatement is defined as self-defense.After all, missiles are essentially offen-sive in nature and must be fired to assuretheir survival. The missile forces alwaysface this use-it-or-lose-it predicamentwhen confronting a stronger and more

aggressive rival. And the air- and mis-sile-defense systems assigned to protectthem would also risk destruction oncombat missions predicated on the stra-tegic guideline of active defense, eventhough China by definition and traditioncannot be the aggressor.

If the CMC authorizes a missile baseto launch preemptive conventionalattacks on an enemy, however, theenemy and its allies could not immedi-ately distinguish whether the missilesfired were conventional or nuclear.From their perspective, the enemyforces could justifiably launch on warn-ing and retaliate against all the com-mand-and-control systems and missileassets of the Chinese missile launchbase and even the overall command-and-control system of the centralSecond Artillery headquarters. In theworst case, a self-defensive first strikeby Chinese conventional missiles couldend in the retaliatory destruction ofmany Chinese nuclear missiles andtheir related command-and-control sys-tems. That disastrous outcome wouldforce the much smaller surviving andhighly vulnerable Chinese nuclear mis-sile units to fire their remaining missilesagainst the enemyÕs homeland. In thisquite foreseeable action-reaction cycle,escalation to nuclear war could becomeaccelerated and unavoidable. Thismeans that the double policies couldunexpectedly cause, rather than deter,a nuclear exchange.

Yet, the reasoning could go the otherway, too, as appears to be the case todayin Chinese military planning circles.Launching conventional weapons fromnuclear bases might deter any directresponse, because the victim of thatattack would fear the consequences of

Lewis and Xue 61


retaliating against bases that havenuclear and not just conventional weap-ons. This fearÑthat a conventionalresponse might trigger a Chinesenuclear counter-retaliationÑcould, inthe eyes of Chinese experts, deter sucha response, preventing escalation.BeijingÕs strategic theorists argue, more-over, that the coordination of systemsthat the Chinese war plan requires con-nects Second Artillery bases to thetheater military commands, therebyconstraining and challenging enemy tac-tics and targeting policies in a high-techlocal war.

Thus, the dilemma for China and anypotential enemy: Both sides, clinging toincongruous assessments, run the risk ofprovoking unanticipated escalation tonuclear war by seeking a quick victoryor tactical advantages in a conventionalconflict. This dilemma is not only real,but perilous.

Editor’s note

This article was first published in Chinese in the June2012 issue of Lingdaozhe (Leaders); the English ver-sion is published by SAGE, with the permission ofLingdaozhe.

Funding

This study was partly supported by the William andFlora Hewlett Foundation and the John D. andCatherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

Notes

1. In the preparation of this study, the authorsrelied heavily on the outstanding works ofother scholars. The following works havebeen especially important: Johnston, 1995/1996; Stokes, 2002; Allen and Kivlehan-Wise, 2005; Christman, 2011; and OÕConnor,2011.

2. For BeijingÕs commitment not to deploynuclear weapons in foreign countries, seeYao, 2007: 349. We recognize that consider-able evidence suggests China did assist

PakistanÕs nuclear program, but Beijinghas always denied the validity of thatevidence.

3. China joined the IAEA in 1984 and pledgedto support the agencyÕs safeguards there-after. It acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in March 1992.

4. This is based on personal interviews con-ducted by the authors.

5. The PLA uses the term Ònuclear doctrineÓonly when discussing Western or Russianmilitary concepts.

6. On these Òmeans,Ó see Lewis, 2007:Chapters 1, 3, and 6.

7. The rest of this paragraph and the nextthree are based on Lewis and Xue, 2011a:66”69; Lewis and Xue, 2011b: 26”28; Shen,2008: 137”143; and Xu, 2006, 303”305.

8. When Deng Xiaoping returned to power in1977, Hua Guofeng was still the party head.In 1981, Deng ousted Hua and became theparamount leader (but without the formaltitle).

9. For detailed information on the cause andeffect of the 1969 Sino-Soviet nuclear con-frontation, see, for example, Lewis andXue, 2006: Chapter 3.

10. For details on the evolution of deterrencetheory in ChinaÕs official nuclear strategybetween 2002 and 2006, see State Councilof the PeopleÕs Republic of China, 2002a and2002b: Sects. II, III; 2004a and 2004b:Chapter III; and 2006: Sect. II.

11. The information in this and the next para-graph is from Zhao, 2009: 397.

12. For an analysis on the Sino-Vietnameseborder war in 1979, see, for example, Lewisand Xue, 2006: Chapter 5.

13. For a comprehensive study on the introduc-tion of conventional missiles into theSecond Artillery order of battle, seeChristman, 2011.

14. For a review of the crisis, see Ross, 2000. Abrief description of the US militaryresponse from WashingtonÕs perspectivecan be found in Tyler, 1999.

15. Unless otherwise cited, the information inthis section is taken from Lewis andXue, 2006: 202”207; it is used with the per-mission of Stanford University Press. TheChinese sources for this section are: Liu,



1994: 404; Wang and Zhang, 2001: 372; Liuet al., 2002: 445; Xue, 2002: 89”392; andLuo, 2004: 9”10.

16. The head of the PolitburoÕs StandingCommittee, the party general-secretary, isnormally the same person as the chairmanof the Central Military Commission.

17. The policies flowing from the threeÒdoublesÓ also apply to the air and navalunits having nuclear arms. See Chen et al.,2009: 236.

18. See Hu, 2006. For rocket forcesÕ joint train-ing programs, see, for example, Wei, 2002,and Zhao, 2002.

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Author biographies

John W. Lewis is the William Haas professorof Chinese Politics, emeritus, and a seniorfellow, by courtesy, at the FreemanSpogli Institute for International Studies atStanford University. During his career, hefounded and directed the Center for EastAsian Studies, the Center for InternationalSecurity and Arms Control (now the Centerfor International Security and Cooperation, orCISAC), and the Northeast Asia”United StatesForum on International Policy (now theShorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center).He currently directs CISACÕs Project onPeace and Cooperation in the Asian-PacificRegion.

Xue Litai is a research scholar at the Project onPeace and Cooperation in the Asian-PacificRegion at Stanford UniversityÕs Center forInternational Security and Cooperation. Hisresearch focuses on global and regional factorsthat could cause armed conflicts across theTaiwan Strait and the impact produced bythe crisis upon the security and stability ofthe Northeast-Pacific region.

Lewis and Xue have published severalbooks and articles on China's military-techno-logical-industrial complex, including ChinaBuilds the Bomb (Stanford University Press,1988).

Lewis and Xue 65
