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L&T HYDROCARBON ENGINEERING LTD

HAZID STUDY REPORT

PAGE No. : 2 of 17

CONTRACT No.: 116029CNT

PROJECT : MB PLATFORM AND

PIPELINE PROJECT

DOC. No.: BGEP-LNTH-P117-MBXX-SA-08-188-0002-D

REV. No. : 0

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION 3

1.1 OBJECTIVE 3

1.2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 3

1.3 BACKGROUND 4

1.4 EXISTING FACILITIES AND INTERFACE PROJECTS 5

2 DEFINITIONS 6

3 ABBREVIATIONS 7

4 HAZID METHODOLOGY 9

4.1 PREAMBLE 9

4.2 HAZID PROCESS 9

4.3 CONDUCTING THE HAZID SESSIONS 9

4.4 GUIDEWORDS CONSIDERED FOR THE HAZID STUDY 10

5 RECOMMENDATIONS 14

5.1 HAZID STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS 14

6 REFERENCES 16

7 ANNEXURES 17

I. HAZID Attendance Sheet 17

II. HAZID WORKSHEET 17 III. TOR FOR HAZID WORKSHOP 17


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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 OBJECTIVE

The objectives of the HAZID study are to:

Identify potential hazards and reasonably foreseeable accident events which could lead to

escalation, injuries to personnel or fatalities, asset damage and environmental impact;

Identify engineering and / or procedural safeguards already incorporated into the design that will

help reduce the likelihood or the severity of consequences related to the identified threat; and

Identify any actions required to help reduce the risk from the threat identified if it is found that the

engineering controls are insufficient relative to the severity of the threat.

1.2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The scope of work is to conduct HAZID study for the proposed “MB Platform and Pipeline Project” in

accordance with documents / drawings (such as layout, design basis, PFD, etc.). Facilities include in the

project scope are:

MB Wellhead Platform

Pipelines between MA Platform and MB Platform

Pipelines between MB Platform and PPA Platform

Modifications at MA Platform

Modifications at PPA Platform


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1.3 BACKGROUND

Oil & Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), Reliance Industries Ltd (RIL) and BG Exploration and Production

India Limited (BGEPIL) are joint operators of the Panna-Mukta offshore oil & gas production field

situated in the Arabian Sea, off the west coast of India near Mumbai. The Mukta Field is located about

120 kilometres offshore northwest of Mumbai, India.

Following sketch provides overall view of Panna and Mukta field.

The Panna field has eleven wellhead platforms (including PL) and the well fluid is routed to central

Process Processing Platform (PPA). PPA is bridge connected to PA wellhead platform, PQ living quarter

platform and PFP flare platform. Mukta field currently has one platform MA with its well fluids sent to

PPA via PA and processed along with Panna crude.

The MB wellhead platform will have nine (9) production slots in approximately 63 m of water depth. The

Mukta field is located west of the Panna and MB wellhead platform is located approximately 25 km west

of Panna Processing Platform (PPA).

As existing MA-PA pipeline is not operational, it is planned to evacuate MA production through new MB-

PPA pipeline and also MB will supply gas lift to MA.


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1.4 EXISTING FACILITIES AND INTERFACE PROJECTS

PPA is the main processing platform. The other unmanned wellhead platforms connected to main

processing platform PPA via subsea pipelines are PB, PC, PD, PE, PF, PG, PH, PJ, PL & MA. PA Wellhead

platform is bridge linked to PPA. PQ Platform which is a living quarter is also bridge linked to PPA and

PFP Flare platform is bridge connected to PPA. MB Wellhead platform is a new unmanned platform being

built as part of the MB Platform and Pipeline project and will be connected to PPA via subsea pipelines.

The normal means of access to the MB platform shall primarily be by helicopter and alternatively, in

extremely rare occasions, by supply boat. Operators are not required to be present on the platform to

log any process parameters or perform well tests. This can all be carried out remotely.

Key design features of the new MB wellhead platform are:

It is normally unmanned wellhead platform.

The wellhead platform will be designed for automatic operation with minimum intervention by

operations personnel.

The facility control and safety system is to provide monitoring, control, safe operation and

shutdown functionality of the platform in line with BGEPIL unmanned and minimum facilities

philosophy.


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2 DEFINITIONS

In this document, the following definitions apply:

Term Definition

Company BGEPIL

Engineering Contractor Larsen & Toubro Limited

Safety Consultant DNV GL


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3 ABBREVIATIONS

In this document, the following acronyms and abbreviations apply:

Abbreviations Definition

AFP Active Fire Protection

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

ANSI American National Standard Institute

API American Petroleum Institute

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineering

BGEPIL BG Exploration and Production India Limited

BS British Standards

CAA Civil Aviation Authority

CR Control Room

DBB Double Block & Bleed

EEMUA Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

EMERA Escape, Muster, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis

EMS Environmental Management System

ENVID Environmental (Hazard) Identification

ESD Emergency Shutdown

FERA Fire & Explosion Risk Analysis

FGS Fire and Gas System

FWHP & FWHT Flowing Wellhead Pressure/Temperature

HAZID Hazard Identification Study

HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study

HMI Human Machine Interface

HRA Health Risk Assessment

HSSE Health, Safety, Security & Environment

IALA International Assoc. of Lighthouse Authorities

ICSS Integrated Control and Safety Systems

IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health

IEC International Electro-technical Commission

IMO International Maritime Organization

IP Institute of Petroleum

IR Infra-Red

IRPA Individual Risk Per Annum

IS Indian Standards

ISO International Standards Organization

LEL Lower Explosive Limit


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Abbreviations Definition

LED Light-emitting Diode

LP Low Pressure

MAE Major Accident Events

mg/l milligrams / liter

MMSCFD Million Standard Cubic Feet / Day

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

OISD Oil India Safety Directorate

ONGC Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PA Panna A Wellhead Platform

PCS Process Control System

PFP Passive Fire Protection

PH Panna H Wellhead Platform

PJ Panna J Wellhead Platform

PK Panna K Wellhead Platform

PL Panna L Wellhead Platform

PLL Potential Loss of Life

POB Person on Board

PPA Panna Processing Platform

PPM Part Per Million

PQ Panna Living Quarter

PSD Process Shutdown

PSV Pressure Safety Valve

RIL Reliance Industries Ltd

SDV Shutdown Valve

SIMOPS Simultaneous Operations

SIL Safety Integrity Level

SOLAS Safety of Life At Sea

TR Temporary Refuge

UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply

USD Unit Shutdown

UV Ultraviolet

VHF Very High Frequency

WHP Well Head Platform


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4 HAZID METHODOLOGY

4.1 PREAMBLE

The HAZID study was conducted using the conventional guideword approach. The principle of HAZID is

that accidents occur when operations are conducted under conditions that deviate from the desired

intentions. Therefore, HAZID technique starts by understanding the design intentions of a particular line

or a vessel and finds out meaningful deviations that can occur in the process. The process then is to

understand these deviations and the consequences of these deviations, and detect which of these

consequences will result in a major hazard.

It is used to examine the upcoming MB Platform and Pipeline Project in order to identify and evaluate

problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation.

4.2 HAZID PROCESS

The guidewords relevant to MB platform are generated using BG standards. The possible causes are

listed together with the consequences with respect to hazards. The existing protection or safeguard to

reduce the possibility of undesirable deviations occurring or to limit the severity of the consequences

are considered by the team to determine what actions to recommend, if any, to improve the safety of

the process system. All aspects are discussed by the team and recorded in the worksheet.

4.3 CONDUCTING THE HAZID SESSIONS

The guideword was examined systematically by an expert team comprising experienced Process

Engineer, Project Engineer, Instrument, Client(s) Representatives, HSE Engineer/representative, Piping

Engineer, Electrical Engineer, Civil Engineer, Mechanical Engineer, chaired and scribed by DNVGL). The

examination was conducted on the relevant layouts and queries raised systematically on every part of it

to discover how deviations from the intention of the design can occur and determine whether these

deviations can give rise to hazards and whether further protective measures, altered operating

procedures or design changes were required.

The questioning was focused around a number of guide words which were derived from method study

techniques. The guide words ensure that the questions posed to test the integrity of each part of the

design explored every conceivable way in which the operation could deviate from the design intention.

Some of the causes were deemed unlikely and hence the derived consequences could be ignored. Some

of the consequences were noted to be trivial and were not considered further. The potential problems

were then evaluated for existing safeguards and requirement for remedial action. The HAZID team took

note of a fact that immediate solution to a problem was not always obvious and could need further

consideration and clarification.

The HAZID studies were conducted under the presence of a Chairman who launched the questions and

guided the discussions. All decisions taken were recorded by the secretary in the form of worksheets.


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4.4 GUIDEWORDS CONSIDERED FOR THE HAZID STUDY

The selection of the guideword was made based an understanding of the system, on past experience

and engineering judgment and the operations to be conducted. The relevant guidewords & Hazardous

event considered are summarized below. These have been further expanded during the HAZID session.

List of HAZID study Guidewords

Guideword Hazardous Event Description

Natural and Environmental Hazards

Earth quake

Erosion

Subsidence

Weather

Process Hazards

Drilling

Shallow Gas

Production

Work Over/Wire Line

Wellhead & Process

Start-up/ Shutdown

Process release( un-ignited )

Process release( ignited)

Well Blow out

Effects of one module to another

External to Modules

Flare/ Vent System

Chemical reaction

Overpressure/ Vacuum

Overfill

Corrosion

Erosion


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Pipelines

Pig launchers/ Receivers

Risers

Flow-lines/Pipelines

Utilities

Power - Solar Power

Power - wind Power

Battery

Power - DG set.

Fuel Gas

Plant Air/ Instrument Air

Heating Medium

Refrigerant

Produced Water

Diesel Fuel

Aviation Fuel

Inert Gas

Drains

Other Hazardous Chemicals

Radioactive

Toxic

Asphyxiant

Corrosive

Explosive

Biocide

Impact & Collision

Supply Boats

Standby Boats

Diving Vessels

Well Service Vessels

Drilling Rig


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Flotel

Fishing

Mud-level

Aircraft

Helicopter

Military

Falling Objects

Cranes

Drilling Derrick

Others

Missiles

Rotating machinery disintegration

Explosion due to air ingress into flammable systems

Explosives

Bursting of pressurized system

Structural Design Failure

Foundations

Structure

Flare Tower

Drilling Derrick

Cranes

Joints failure in Jacket

Drawdown

Human Error

Operation

Maintenance

Construction

Mobile/Floating Installation

Foreseen Combined Operation

Loss of Position

Mooring failure

Dynamic positioning system failure

Stability control


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Leg collapse / Punch through

Others

Communication Failure

Power supply failure

Process Control Failure

Diving

Combined Operation

Confined space entry

Adverse weather condition

E & I Evacuation

Vessel Entry


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5 RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 HAZID STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS

Below table presents a summary of the recommendations from the HAZID workshop review.

HAZID Study Recommendations

S.No. Action Action By Safety

Priority

1. Facility assessment for MA & PPA to be carried out in view with

project activities. BG

2. HAZCON / Constructability review to recognize the soil

subsidence aspect. L&T Yes

3. Review/ ensure wind speed consideration for different objects

as per design basis through the procurement phase. L&T / BG Yes

4. HAZCON / Constructability/SIMOPS/Drilling review to recognize

the effect of extreme weather. L&T Yes

5. HAZCON / Constructability/SIMOPS to recognize the effect of

extreme weather. L&T Yes

6. Check design of Caisson pump & motor (Physical barriers),

locate start/stop switch at sub-cellar deck. L&T Yes

7. HAZCON & SIMOPS to address the crane operation during

installation. L&T Yes

8. Provision for secondary retention device to be made for light

weight equipment. L&T / BG Yes

9. Review need for lightning arrestor. L&T Yes

10. Review requirement of automatic CO2 system L&T Yes

11. FERA study to establish the requirement for passive fire

protection & explosion protection. L&T Yes

12. EMERA & FERA to confirm adequacy of egress route. L&T Yes

13. Check/ update SOPs for addressing pyrophoric iron. BG Yes

14. Method statement, JSA to be carried out in advance with

appropriate project definition for retrieval & installation. L&T Yes


appropriate project definition and preparation of bridging and

interface document.

L&T Yes


appropriate project definition L&T Yes

17. HAZCON/Constructability review to address Handling of

radioactive materials. L&T Yes

18. F&G detector layout to be reviewed based on Gas Dispersion L&T Yes


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S.No. Action Action By Safety

Priority

study. ( For brownfield scope, ensure adequacy for MA & PPA)

19. Check adequacy of safety measures for injected chemicals to

be in line with MSDS. L&T Yes

20. Any diving operation will be carried out by project specific JSA

and the diving vessel confirms to BG standard and marine

assurance requirement.

L&T Yes

21. Dropped object study to cover due to crane / heavy lift

operations envisaged with the facility. Required safety

measures to be identified subsequently.

L&T Yes

22. Ensure VHF is able to cover approximate 25 KM L&T Yes

23. Procedure to facilitate vessel entry L&T Yes

24. E&I room to be provided with internal door release for quick

evacuation L&T Yes

25. Ensure vessel entry and positive isolation is in line with BG

requirement and all internal section are capable of cleaning

and inspection

L&T Yes

During workshop, 25 recommendations were recorded out of which 24 action items are identified as

critical actions which require immediate attention for design.

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