58877906 consti case digest

Ishmael Himagan vs People of the Philippines & Judge Hilario Mapayo

1Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010

Category : Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence, Political Law

Tags: case brief, case digest, Constitutional Law, equal protection, himagan vs

people,Jurisprudence, Political Law, scra, Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies

“Equal Protection” – Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies

Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the

murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger

brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension

pending the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or

information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies

where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall

immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall

be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from

arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD

807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He

claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil

Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the

Constitution.

HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from

ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of

the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall

last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination

of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be

terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first

sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of

suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of

persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on

preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the

law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought

out in the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post

while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to

constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in

uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47

of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal

protection of the laws.

Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the

suspension of accused be lifted?

The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word “shall” before the phrase

“be terminated within ninety (90) days”, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the

preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that

period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without

justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases

where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed

without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not

without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to

dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or

mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.

Read full text here.

Howard Chan is the Founder of Case Digests for Law Students, a website which

provides reliable case digests for law students and researchers who may not have

the time to read lengthy Supreme Court decisions.

Imelda Marcos vs Court of Appeals, Manila RTC Judge Guillermo Loja Sr., et al



Tags: case brief, case digest, Constitutional Law, equal protection, Jurisprudence, marcos vs

ca, Political Law, scra

“Equal Protection”

Marcos was charged for violating Central Bank Circ 960 which banned residents, firms,

associations and corporations from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad w/o

permission from the CB. The circular was issued in 1983. Any violation thereof constitutes a

criminal offense. In 1991, 8 informations were filed against Marcos accusing her of

maintaining a foreign account in Switzerland from 1968-1991. On 21 Dec 1991, 14 more

informations were filed against Marcos, Benedicto and Rivera for the same offense. In

January 1992, 11 more informations were filed. The RTC consolidated the cases and Marcos

was arraigned in Feb 1992. During the pendency of these cases, CB Circ 1318 and CB Circ

1353 (Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulations) were issued which basically

allowed residents, firms, associations and corporations to maintain foreign exchange

accounts abroad but the circulars have a saving clause excepting from the circular pending

criminal actions involving violations of CB Circ 960. Marcos filed a Motion to Quash based on

the new circular. The RTC denied the Motion so did the CA hence the appeal. Marcos averred

that her right to equal protection has been violated, among others, as the new circular was

purposedly designed to preserve the criminal cases lodged against her.

ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda’s right to equal protection had been violated by CB Circ 1353.

HELD: The SC ruled against Imelda. The SC said “Her lamentations that the aforementioned

provisions are discriminatory because they are aimed at her and her co-accused do not

assume the dignity of a legal argument since they are unwarranted conjectures belied by

even the text of the circulars alone. Hence, as respondent appellate court correctly

concludes, the foregoing facts clearly disprove petitioner’s claim that her constitutional right

to equal protection of the law was violated. Should she nonetheless desire to pursue such

objection, she may always adduce additional evidence at the trial of these cases since that

is the proper stage therefor, and not at their present posture.”





People of the Philippines & HSBC vs Judge Jose Vera & Mariano Cu Unjieng


Category : Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, Jurisprudence, Political Law, Remedial Law

Tags: case brief, case digest, case digest. case brief, Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, equal

protection, Jurisprudence, people vs vera, Political Law, probation law,Remedial Law, scra

Equal Protection – Probation Law

Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was

elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While

awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he

was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation

Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by Cu

Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging

that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec.

11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the

power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated

that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only

provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional

because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law

provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation

of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the

executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as

in pardon.

ISSUE: Whether or not equal protection is violated when the Probation Law provides that

“ony in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the

salary of a probation officer” may the probation system be applied.

HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in

a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set

standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system

of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the

constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of

equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11

which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective

provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than

those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the

Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only

means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer

may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that

convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of

their right to probation. The SC declared the old probation law as unconstitutional.





Roma Drug & Romeo Rodriguez vs RTC of Guagua, Pampanga et al



Tags: access to medicine, case brief, case digest, Constitutional Law, equal

protection,Jurisprudence, Political Law, roma drug vs rtc, scra

“Equal Protection” – Access to Medicine

Roma Drug, owned by Rodriguez, was raided by the NBI upon request of Smithkline – a

pharmaceutical company (now Glaxo Smithkline). RD is apparently one of 6 pharmacies who

are directly importing 5 medicines produced by Smithknline from abroad. RD is not

purchasing those medicines via local Smithkline – the authorized distributor of Smithkline in

the Philippines. Smithkline Phil avers that because the medicines were not purchased from a

Philippine registered counterpart of Smithkline then the products imported by RD are

considered as counterfeit or “unregistered imported drug product” - as defined by RA 8203

“Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs.” Notwithstanding RD’s motion for reconsideration, the

provincial prosecutor recommended that Rodriguez be tried. Rodriguez assails the

constitutionality of SLCD averring, among other things, that it has violated his right to equal

protection as it banned him access from such medicines.

ISSUE: Whether or not SLCD violates equal protection.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of RD. The SC denounced SLCD for it violated equal protection.

It does not allow private 3rd parties to import such medicines abroad even in cases of life and

death nor does it allow the importation by 3rd parties in cases wherein the stocks of such

medicine would run out. It discriminates at the expense of Filipinos who cannot travel

abroad to purchase such medicines yet need them badly. Nevertheless, the flawed intention

of Congress had been abrogated by the passage of RA 9502 “Universally Accessible Cheaper

and Quality Medicines Act of 2008” and its IRR. This law does not expressly repeal SLCD but

it emphasized that any medicine introduced into the Philippines by its patent holder be

accessible to anyone. It provides that the right to import drugs and medicines shall be

available to any government agency OR ANY PRIVATE 3rd PARTY. The SC noted that this law

provided and recognized the constitutionally-guaranteed right of the public to health.





Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform



Tags: association of small landowners vs secretary of agrarian reform, case digest. case

brief, Constitutional Law, equal protection, Jurisprudence, Political Law, scra

“Equal Protection”

These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act.

Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of

an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program

founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly

or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share

of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by

Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD

27, which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the

compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify

maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring

full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of

still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was

followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program

(CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the

enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on

June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments,

nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its

provisions.

In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also

deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal

protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the

agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed

on the owners of other properties.

The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of

the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due

process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small

farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection

clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and

should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first

distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural

lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they

have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also

become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the

area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the

burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that

they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence

has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been

violated.

Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in

certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it

must conform to the following requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as

arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated

alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not

shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The

argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to

share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial

distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who

will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is

allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded

recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to

the detriment of the Bill of Rights.





What are the Requisites of a Valid Classification?Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010

Category : Constitutional Law, Legal Questions

Tags: Constitutional Law, Legal Questions, requisites of classification, valid classification

The requisites to be complied with are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

** Taken from People of the Philippines vs Cayat.




People of the Philippines vs Cayat2

Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010


Tags: Bar from Drinking Gin, case brief, case digest, Constitutional Law, equal

protection,Jurisprudence, people vs cayat, Political Law, Requisites of a Valid Classification, scra

“Equal Protection” – Requisites of a Valid Classification – Bar from Drinking Gin

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or

any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera,

was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to

pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he

challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated

his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat

them with discrimination or “mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled”

will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-

Christians from Christians.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable

classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have

the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an

indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not

merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or

parentage.” The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or

less capable race.” On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the

public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the

enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be

no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government

has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure

for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with

their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.





Patricio Dumlao et al vs COMELEC1

Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010


Tags: case brief, case digest, Constitutional Law, dumlao vs comelec, eligibility to office,equal

protection, Jurisprudence, Political Law, scra

“Equal Protection” – Eligibility to Office after Being 65

Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has

been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for

the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing

disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class

legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr.

These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a

taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the

elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for

crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after

preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao

invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.

HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have

been merged. Dumlao’s cause is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further,

this case does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are

standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely:

(1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the

party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the

earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in

order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however

that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that

the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already

disqualify them from office as null and void.

The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither

well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational

classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class

can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service,

employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees.

Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger

ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates

should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to

everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor

General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of

younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons

more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for

elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at

ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-

year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a

provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the

same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.





What is the Scope of the Equal Protection Clause?Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010


Tags: Constitutional Law, equal protection, Legal Questions, scope of equal protection,who are

covered under the equal protection clause

WHO ARE PROTECTED

Equal protection is available to all persons, natural as well as juridical. Artificial persons,

however, are entitled to the protection only insofar as their property is concerned.

By constitutional reservation, certain rights are enjoyable only by citizens, such as the rights

to vote, hold public office, exploit natural resources, and operate public utilities, although

aliens are comprehended in the guaranty. Even ordinary statutes can validly distinguish

between citizens and aliens or, for that matter, even between or among citizens only.

**Taken from Arsenio Lumiqued vs Apolonio Exevea et al




What is Equal Protection?Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010


Tags: Constitutional Law, equal protection, equal protection defined, Legal Questions

EQUAL PROTECTION

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be

treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in

other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and

unjustly discriminate against others.

Substantive equality is NOT enough, it is also required that the law be enforced and applied

equally. Even if the law be fair and impartial on its face, it will still violate equal protection if

it is administered “with an evil eye and uneven hand,’ so as to unjustly benefit some and

prejudice others.

The right to equal protection, basic as it is, sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all

the three grand departments of the government and on the subordinate instrumentalities

and subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation

and eminent domain.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to

eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of

real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute

equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances

and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal

protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications.

**Taken from Arsenio Lumiqued vs Apolonio Exevea et al




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