consti case digests bernas case book

CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113

CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.3/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113!

People vs. Gozo | 53 SCRA 476, October 26, 1973

Facts: Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity on the pretext that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she in effect seek to emasculate the State's sovereign rights by the assertion that the latter cannot exercise therein administrative jurisdiction. Issue/s: Whether or not the State can exercise administrative jurisdiction within the naval base leased by the Philippines to the American armed forces. Held: The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional lights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express provisions of the treaty." There was a reiteration of such a view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of it sovereignty." Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its

sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.' A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." 16 The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not it appearance. The words employed follow: "Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory."



CO KIM CHAN vs VALDEZ TAN KEH, 75 Phil 113, 1945 November 16

FACTS: Plaintiff Co filed motions in a Japanese-controlled court in Manila to recover property from the defendant. Although Manila was still under Japanese control, the Commonwealth government had been reestablished a month ago, and plaintiff was surely aware that the liberation of Manila was imminent. ISSUE: WON judicial processes during the Japanese occupation are valid after the Commonwealth government was already reinstated. HELD: Yes. RATIO: Under international law, specifically the Hague Conventions, the functioning of courts and municipal laws remain valid during occupation. The acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. This reduces the harm done to the people of the occupied territory, and reversing judicial processes strips parties, without due process, of vested rights acquired under these processes. Only legislative, constitutional and administrative processes are affected, and these are the processes MacArthurs proclamation was construed to refer to. Motion for reconsideration denied.

OPOSA VS FACTORAN Facts: This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 34

children, through their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of inter-generational responsibility and inter-generational justice. The minors filed the action for themselves as representing their generation as well as generations yet unborn.

Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,

seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements.

The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae (parent of the nation).

The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law-- and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation."

The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts. In the lower court, the government argued that no legal right of the petitioners had been violated and that the issue of whether to grant or not to grant timber licenses was not a matter for the courts to decide but for political departments, namely Congress and the President.

The case was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. Issue: Did the children have the legal standing to file the case? Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to file the case based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility, their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. The Court, on the basis of Section 16 linked with the right to health, recognized a right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public welfare.

Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections [GR 161872, 13 April 2004] En Banc, Tinga (J): 12 concur



Facts: Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on 17 December 2003. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to Pamatongs Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution 6558 dated 17 January 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include Pamatong as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy. On 15 January 2004, Pamatong moved for reconsideration of Resolution 6558. The COMELEC, acting on Pamatongs Motion for Reconsideration (SPP [MP] 04-001) and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution 6604 dated 11 February 2004. The COMELEC declared Pamatong and 35 others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for Pamatong. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired. Pamatong filed the Petition For Writ of Certiorari, seeking to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, Pamatong argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. Pamatong likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared

by the COMELEC. Pamatong claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidates bio-data and his program of government.

Issue: Whether there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly, to seek the presidency.

Held: There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly, to seek the presidency. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties." Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." The provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the



imposition of a clear State burden. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution 645210 dated 10 December 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. Herein, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

GARCIA vs COMELEC | Initiative and Referendum

FACTS:

In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg 10, Serye 1993, The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act 7227.

On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg 10.

The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days. Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991.

Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, wrote a letter to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productivity, and futility.

COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance.

ISSUE: WON Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative

HELD: Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg 10 is a propoer subject of an initiative

RATIO:

The constitutional command to include acts (i.e. resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act 6735 entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor

o Section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions (3 systems of initiative: initiative on the Constitution, initiative on statutes, initiative on local legislation)

o Section 16 states any proposition on ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified, or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom

COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2300 entitled In Re Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct on Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum, on National and Local Laws

o Section 5, Article 1: The power of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution or to enact a national legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance



Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 did not limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone.

o Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX Book 1 of the Code cited by respondents merely defines the concept of local initiative as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.

The provision clearly does not limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances, but to all subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact, which includes resolutions

Eastern Shipping Lines v Philippine Overseas Employment Administration | Non-delegability

FACTS:

The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000 by the POEA for the death of her husband, Vitaliano Saco, who was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris and was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan.

The widow filed a complaint under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA.

The petitioner argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but the Social Security System. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and ruled in favor of the complainant.

The petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Order No. 2 itself as a violation of non-delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE: WON the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delagation of legislative powers

HELD: The issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is not a violation of non-delation of powers.

RATIO:

The authority to issue the said regulation is provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797 which states that the POEA shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration.

Administrative bodies have the power of subordinate legislation, which is the power to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute.

o With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.

Tablarin v Gutierrez | Non-delegability

FACTS:

Petitioners argue that Section 5(a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 (Medical Act of 1959) violates non-delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education.

o Section 5. Functions. The functions of the Board of Medical Education shall be:

! (a) To determine and prescribe minimum requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;

! (f)To promulgate and prescribe and enforce necessary rules and regulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing functions

ISSUE: WON Section 5(a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 is a violates non-delegation of legislative power by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate

HELD: Section 5(a) and (f) of RA 2382 does not violate non-delegation of legislative power.

RATIO:

The standards set for subordinate legislation may be either expressed or implied.

o The standard does not have to be spelled out specifically. o It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act

considered as a whole. The necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical

Act: the standardization and regulation of medical education and in Section 5(a) and 7 (admission requirements) of the same Act, and the body of the statute itself.



Free Telephone Workers Union v Minister of Labor | Non-delegability

FACTS:

Petitioner claims that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 is an undue delegation of legislative power.

o The provision empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter decide it or certify the same to the National Labor Relations Commission.

ISSUE: WON the issuance of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 violates the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power.

HELD: The issuance of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 does not violate non-delegation of legislative power.

RATIO:

Power should be delegated where there is agreement that a task must be performed and it cannot be effectively performed by the legislature without the assistance of a delegate or without an expenditure of time so great as to lead to the neglect of equally important business.

Delegation is most commonly indicated where the relations to be regulated are highly technical or where their regulation requires a course of continuous decision.

A rigid application of the non-delegation doctrine would be an obstacle to national efforts at development and progress.

Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., In. v Secretary Drilon | Non-delegation

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage by 10 pes os per day for private sector employees, and 11 pesos per day non-agricultural workers outside Metro Manila.

The Secretary of Labor issued an Implementing Order which prohibits the employer from crediting CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with RA No. 6640.

ISSUE: WON an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement

HELD: The Implementing Order cannot provide such prohibition.

RATIO:

RA No. 6640 does not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases.

Implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement.

Administrative regulations should be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law cannot be expanded by such regulations.

An administrative act cannot amend an act of Congress.

Tatad v Secretary of Energy | Non-delegation

FACTS:

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes, and E.O. No. 372, which implemented the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry through E.O. No. 372.

Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180: " Petitioners claim that the phrases as far as practicable, decline

of crude oil prices in the world market, and stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar are unclear and inconcrete in meaning.

" They claim that these phrases do not provide the determinate or determinable standards which can guide the President in his decision to fully regulate the downstream oil industry.

E.O. No. 372: Petitoners claim that E.O. No. 392 is void for it illegally considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor.

ISSUES:



WON Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power

WON E.O. No. 372 misapplied R.A. No. 8180

HELD:

Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 does not violate the constitutional provision on undue delegation of power

E.O. No. 372 misapplied R.A. No. 8180.

RATIO:

Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 can pass both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test

" Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it.

" The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of deregulation before the end of March 1997.

" Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President:

a. When the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining

b. When the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable

" The dictionary meanings of the words as far as practicable, declining, and stable are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence.

E.O. No. 372 misapplied R.A. No. 8180. " Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 only enumerated two factors to be

considered: stability of crude oil prices in the world market and stability of the exchange rate of the peso to dollar.

" Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation.

" By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. No. 8180.

People v. Dacuycuy | Non-delegability

FACTS: Petitioner assails Sec 32 of RA 4670 (penalizing those who willfully interfere

with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights) which states that the penalty of imprisonment is in the discretion of the court. No prescribed term or period for the imposable penalty of imprisonment was specified.

ISSUE: WON a judicial determination of the penalty is an undue delegation of legislative power

HELD: The judicial determination of the penalty in Sec 32 of RA 4670 is an undue delegation of legislative power. The penalty of imprisonment provided in Sec 32 is unconstitutional.

RATIO: It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. The exercise of judicial discretion by courts is not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the administration of justice and application of existing laws, however, the law must specify and designate the limits to fix the length of service or term of imprisonment.

Employees Confederation v. National Wages Commission

FACTS: Emloyers Confederation of the Philippines is questioning the validity of Wage Order NCR-01-A of the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board of NCR promulgated pursuant to the Wage Rationalization Act (RA 6727).

ISSUE: WON the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards being in charge of prescribing minimum wage rates is constitutional and inviolative of the non-delegability of legislative power

HELD: The Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards being in charge of prescribing minimum wage rates is constitutional and inviolative of the non-delegability of legislative power.

RATIO: The Congress may delegate the power to fix rates as long as sufficient



standards are supplied. Art. 124 provides standards that impressed the court in the light of the floor-wage methods failure.

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC || Party-List

GR No. 136781, October 6, 2000

FACTS:

In the May 1998 elections, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national elections. On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House. Other party-lists followed through Motions of Intervention seeking the same relief as PAGASA. On October 15, 1998, the COMELEC through a Resolution granted the petition of PAGASA. The Resolution also held that "at all times, the total number of congressional seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives disregarding the 2% requirement under Section 11 of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up."First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage the multi-party system. The petitioners contend the said resolution for being invalid and unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of the

Constitution is mandatory or merely a ceiling. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation should be filled up completely and all the time.

2. Whether or not the 2% threshold requirement and three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional.

3. How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined.

HELD:

For issue #1: Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. In the foregoing, the Constitution does not require all such allocated seats to be filled up all at the same time and under all circumstances.

For issue #2: The two-percent requirement is precise and crystalline (constitutional).

For issue #3: Step One- to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each receive; all parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each, only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats

Step Two- determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties

Step Three- solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitle to, based on proportional representation

RATIO:

R.A. 7941:

Important note: the court held that the COMELEC violated the legal parameters set by the Constitution and RA 7941 therefore the resolutions are declared invalid and unconstitutional for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC.

Four INVIOLABLE (Legal) Parameters:

1. Twenty percent allocation. Combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives



2. Two percent threshold. Only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives

3. Three-seat limit. Regardless of the number of votes actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats

4. Proportional Representation. Additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes

For issue #1: The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.

For issue #2: Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having sufficient number of constituents deserving or representation are actually represented in Congress. The two percent threshold is consistent with the very essence of representation. To have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. In addition, the three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.

For issue #3:

Six percent bench mark: If the proportion of votes received by the first party WITHOUT ROUNDING IT OFF is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats. If the proportion is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, the first party shall have one additional seat.

Why other qualified parties are allotted less additional seats than the first part:

1. The ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1

2. The formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat

Criticism: Formula being too strict

-Court held that the formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematica; equation, no more no less.

Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC || Party-List GR NO. 147589, June 26, 2001

FACTS:

At the onset of the 2001 election, the COMELEC received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. The COMELEC issued Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 granting the accreditation of 154 parties and denied the others. The Akbayan party-list and other party-lists as well filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of the respondents. Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition before the Supreme Court on April 16, 2001. This petition assailed COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

ISSUES: (there are actually 4 issues, but only three (2nd, 3rd, and 4th) are relevant as in the case book)

1. (2nd) Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

2. (3rd) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.

3. (4th) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

HELD:

For issue #1: Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system. Therefore, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.

For issue #2: The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Therefore, the Court held that it cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and



prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented.

For issue #3: From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the COMELEC failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. It seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system. The COMELEC committed grave use of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

RATIO:

For issue #1: The reason behind the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in Congressional district elections in winning a seat in Congress. Practically, they have no voice in the Assembly. But in this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts.

Party: (according to Section 3 of RA 7941) is either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties

Political Party: an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office

For issue #2: The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will enable the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,

1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and

2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must

factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies.

Proportional representation: refers to the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented (e.g. labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous communities, etc.)

Guidelines for Screening Party-list Participants: (as listed in the case book)

*there are 8 points in the original case, the third one was omitted.

1. The political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identifies in Section 5 of RA 7941

2. While even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives

3. A party or organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941

4. Party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government

5. The party must not only comply with the requirements of the law, but must also comply with Section 9 of RA 7941 (Qualifications of Party-List Nominees)

6. Not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees

7. While lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

Section 9, RA 7941: Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least



ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY ET.AL. V. COMELEC, ET. AL GR NO. 147589, June 25,2003 Panganiban J. FACTS: Various party-list participants filed for motions for proclamation. They raised the question Aside from those already validly proclaimed pursuant to earlier Resolutions of this Court, are there other party-list candidates that should be proclaimed winners? The Motions for proclamation contend that the disqualification of party-list organizations has reduced the total number of votes cast for the party-list elections. Because of which, the 2% benchmark required law has now allegedly attained by movants. Thus, they pray for their proclamation as winners. ISSUE/S: Whether Labo v. COMELEC GR Nos. 105111 and 105384, July 3, 1992 and Grego v. COMELEC, 340 Phil 591, June 19,1997 and related cases should be deemed applicable to the determination of winners in party-list elections. Whether the votes cast for parties/organizations that were subsequently disqualified for having failed to meet the eight-point guideline contained in June 26, 2001 Decision should be deducted from the total votes cast for the party-list system during the said elections. HELD: Having obtained at least 2% of total valid votes cast, BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS, ABANSE! AND PINAY are declared elected with one nominee each. COMELEC shall proclaim these winners and their nominees thereby lifting TRO dated May 9, 2001. For issue #1: Labo vs. Comelec and Grego vs. Comelec are not applicable to the determination of winners in party-list elections. In Labo, the Court declared that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority and defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

The pronouncements in Grego refer to regular elections for local offices and involved the interpretation of Sec. 6 of RA 6646. They were not meant to cover party-list elections, which are governed by RA 7941. For issue #2: Sec. 10 of RA 7941 can be made to apply in this case. It clearly provides that a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or a coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted. In short, the votes cast for a notoriously disqualified candidate may be considered stray and excluded from the canvass. Subtracting the votes garnered by disqualified party-list groups from total votes cast will reduce base figure and 2% threshold can be more easily attained by the marginalized and under-represented groups. RATIO: RA 7941 is a special statute governing the elections of party-list representatives and is the controlling law in matters pertaining thereto. The Court answered by citing June 26, 2001 Decision that enumerated the eight-point guideline and four unique parameters of Philippines party list system. Four unique parameters of Philippines party list system

1. 20% Allocation (combined number of party list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of total membership in House of Representatives

2. 2% threshold (only parties garnering a minimum of 2% of total valid votes cast for party list systems are qualified to have a seat in House of Representatives

3. 3-seat limit (each qualified party is entitled to a maximum of 3 seats) 4. proportional representation additional seats shall be computed in

proportion to total number of votes.

BANAT v. COMELEC GR No. 179295, 21 April 2009 Carpio, J. FACTS: COMELEC applied the Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula upon the completion of the canvass and party-list results, thereby proclaiming 15 party-lists to have obtained 21 seats in Congress. Barangay Association for



National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a petition to proclaim the full number of party-list representatives (all 55 seats have to be proclaimed) provided by the Constitution before the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC denied the said petition, stating that it had already become moot and academic. Issues:

1. W/N the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional.

2. W/N the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional.

3. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? 4. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from

participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

HELD: Petition is partially granted. The COMELEC resolutions dated Aug. 3, 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 and July 9 2007 in NBC No. 07-60 are set aside. The two-percent threshold in the distribution of additional party list seats is declared unconstitutional. Allocation of additional seats under the Party-list system shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections.

ISSUES AND RULING: 1. W/N the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional. YES. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. 2. W/N the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional. NO. In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the 2% threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. The Court finds that the 2% threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the 2% threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives

shall consist of party-list representatives. The Court strikes down the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941.1 The 2% threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives. 3. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of RA 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: (1)The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (2) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. (3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than 3 seats. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in RA 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. 4. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections? 1 Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed: (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.



(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast!for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, that those !garnering more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in !proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, that each party, !organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three seats. NO. Political parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, RA 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and RA 7941. Furthermore, under Section 9 of RA 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee wallow in poverty, destitution, and infirmity as there is no financial status required in law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. According to Chief Justice Punos dissent, the party-list representatives are no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena; and that if major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list system electoral process, the voices of the marginalized would be surely suffocated, and that the democratic spirit of the Constitution would be betrayed. He cited the 2001 party-list elections where the major political parties figured in the disproportionate distribution of votes. 8 Justices concurred. Additional Note: Justice Nachura concurs with Justice Carpio and further adds that the 2% threshold vote required for entitlement by a political party-list group to a seat in the HR in RA 7941 is unconstitutional because, according to him, there will never be a situation where the number of party-list representatives will exceed

50, regardless of the number of district representatives. He then submits the standard of proportional representation and the adoption of a gradually regressive threshold vote requirement, inversely proportional to the increase in the number of party-list seats. He proposes this new formula for the threshold: 100% (total number of votes cast for party-list) --------------------------------------------------------=1.818% 55 party-list seats And that the minimum vote requirement should gradually lessen as the number of party-list seats increases. Doctrines: A Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters: 1.20% allocation. The combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list; 2.2% threshold. Only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives; 3.Three-seat limit. Each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats; 4.Proportional representation. The additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes. In declaring the 2% threshold unconstitutional, the Court does not limit the allocation of additional seats to the two- percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats (the difference between the maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the guaranteed seats of the two-percenters). The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, one party-list seat is assigned to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. Finally, the three-seat cap is applied to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.



The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.

TOBIAS v ABALOS || Apportionment

FACTS: Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted yes whereas 7, 911 voted no.

Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.

Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:

As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election.

Petitioner's first objection to the R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes Constitutional rule of "one subject-one bill" for embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) as said RA would increase the members of the House Of Rep beyond that provided in the Constitution, and (4) of the Constitution, since said RA was not made pursuant to any census

ISSUE 1: WON RA 7675 violates the one-title one subject rule. HELD: No.

RATIO: The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion, and not a subject separate and distinct from it. Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one

subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.

ISSUE 2: WON RA 7675 preempts the right of the Congress to reapportion legislative districts HELD: No.

RATIO: There is no mention in the assailed law of any census but nevertheless enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. It was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right, which pertains to itself.

ISSUE 3: WON the present limit of 250 members is absolute. HELD: No.

RATIO: The limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law."

MARIANO v COMELEC || Apportionment

FACTS: Petitioners assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati as unconstitutional.

It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba, who are suing as taxpayers. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati, the rest are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig.

Petitioners claim that said RA did not identify the territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, as required by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Said RA is also claimed to be an attempt to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials. Petitioners also claim that thee addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

ISSUE 1: WON RA 7854 in failing to use metes and bounds, and technical description in identifying the Makati district is unconstitutional and violative of the Local Gov Code. HELD: It is not unconstitutional.



RATIO: The uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units which will consequently sow conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers what the Local Government Code seeks to address in requiring that the land area of a local government unit be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. However, Congress deliberations show that metes and bounds with technical description were not used in RA 7854 because of an unsettled territorial dispute between Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio at the time. The Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Also the territorial jurisdiction in this case was reasonably ascertained by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities.

ISSUE 2: WON Sec 51, provisions on the officials of the city of Makati, of said RA is unconstitutional for colliding with Sec 8 of the Constitution

HELD: It is not unconstitutional.

RATIO: Petitioners say that RA 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. This however merely poses a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.

ISSUE 3: WON the addition of another legislative district in Makati through a special law is unconstitutional


RATIO: To hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. Reapportionment through a special law is constitutional as in the case of Tobias v. Abalos.

ISSUE 4: WON it is unconstitutional to add another legislative district in Makati given its population of 450,000


RATIO: Section 5 of Art VI provides that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000).

MONTEJO v. COMELEC

FACTS: Cirlo Montejo, representing First District of Leyte pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation. Petitioner seeks to transfer Tolosa from his district to Leytes Second District, which Sergio Apostol, representing the second district opposed

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in exercising the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment

HELD: Yes the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion.

RATIO: The COMELEC has power only to make minor adjustments as in the case where a municipality in between is forgotten but is still in the territory of one district or when there is an error in the correct name of a municipality. The COMELEC cannot change the allocations per district. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution does not authorize COMELEC to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another.

BAGABUYO v. COMELEC || Apportionment

FACTS: ! Petitioner insists that R.A No. 9371 converts and divides Cagayan de Oro City as a local government unit. ! It does not merely provide for the Citys legislative apportionment.

ISSUE: Misunderstanding of the constitutional concepts of apportionment of legislative districts and division of local government units. HELD: No requirement of plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision. RATIO: ! Legal apportionment (Blacks law dictionary): the determination of

the number of representatives which a State, country or other subdivision may send to a legislative body.It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts.



! Reapportionment: realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

- DISTINCTION ON REQ. of PLEBISCITE

Article VI, Section 5 Article X, Sec. 10 authority to act vested in the Constitution ! means to make a

legislative district sufficiently represented so that the people can be effectively heard. ! equalize population and voting power among districts. ! Mandates reapportionment as soon as the given standards are met.

! speaks of how local government units may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered. ! 2 specific standards: 1. criteria established in

LGC 2. approval of majority of

votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

-

GALLEGO v. VERA || Residence Qualification

FACTS: ! Pedro Gallego native of Abuyog, Leyte . He was elected mayor last December 1940 elections with 800 votes against Vicente Verra. ! He was defeated at first try and because of it he decided to look for a job and ended up in sitio Kaato-an, Malaybalay Bukidnon on June 20, 1938 as a nurseryman in chichona plantation of the Bureau of Forestry, ! He returned to Leyte on July 30 for he was offered a job but he decided to go back again in BUkidnon on August 23,1938 until September 1940. ! During his stay in Bukidnon, his family stayed in Abuyog, Leyte. He visited in August of 1938 and 1940. ! He never availed of the offers of the Government (land, house etc.) ! He registered as a voter in Bukidnon on October 1, 1938. He didnt fill up the blank, which requires his length of stay in Bukidnon. ! In January 20, 1940, he paid for his residence certhe stayed in Bukidnon for a year and a half.

ISSUE: WON Gallego had been resident of Abuyog for at least one year prior to DECEMBER 10, 1940 elections.

HELD: Petioner did not lose his domicile of origin. He reacquired it more than one year prior to December 1940

RATIO: ! Residence (election law) is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence. ! 1. Residence or bodily presence in new locality 2. intention to remain (indefinite time) animus manendi 3. intention to abandon old domicile ! Vivero v. Maurillo: mere registration in a municipality in order to be an elector therein does not make one a resident of said municipality. ! Larena v. Teves: prima facie evidence of fact of his residence is required in order that he could register himself as a candidate. Not conclusive. ! PURPOSE of Law in fixing a residence qualification: is to exclude a stranger or newcomer who is not familiar with the needs of the community.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMELEC || Residence Qualification

FACTS: ! Imelda Marcos filed her COC for Representative of the 1st district of Leyte on March 8, 1995. ! Private Respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo (incumbent Rep.) filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification of Marcos on the basis of she lacks he constitutional requirement of residency. ! Marcos entered seven months in her COC, she changed it to since childhood She said it was an honest misinterpretation, since she always maintained Tacloban City as her Domicile or residence.

ISSUE: WON petitioner was a resident, foe election purposes of the 1st district of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of May 9, 1995 elections.

HELD: Petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualification to run for office. Petitioner held various residences for different purposes during



the past four decades. And none of those point to her intending to abandon her domicile in Leyte.

RATIO: ! Article 50, CC: domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence. ! Ong v. Republic: Domicile=permanent home; Domicile: physical presence and animus manendi. ! Fact of residence should be decisive in determining the constitutional requirement of residency. ! The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study, or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. (Despite the fact that she lived outside metro manila) ! DOMICILE OF ORIGIN is not easily lost except when (needs a clear and positive proof): 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence

and establishing a new one. 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose ! Art. 110 CC: concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing, which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husbands choice of residence upon marriage.

Art, 110 : The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should lie abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

Aquino v. COMELEC | 1-year Residency Requirement G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

FACTS:

The Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy in the Second District of Makati City for the 1995 elections.

Petitioner leased a condominium unit in the area. The terms in the leasing agreement is 2 years but his intention was really for only 1 year, because he has other residences in Manila and Quezon City.

COMELEC en banc found in the petitioners Certificate of Candidacy for 1992 elections that:

o he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992, o he was resident of the same for 52 years immediately

preceding that election, o he was a registered voter of the same district, and o his birth certificate places Conception, Tarlac as birthplace by

his parents Benigno and Aurora. It was clear and unassailable that is domicile of origin of record up to

the time of filing of his most recent Certificate of Candidacy was in Conception, Tarlac.

ISSUE: WON the one year residency of Aquino in the Second District of Makati enough to qualify him as a candidate for Representative of the same. HELD: In order that petitioner could qualify as candidate, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. (COMELEC) RATIO:

The intention of the petitioner was not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing of a condo unit instead of buying one.

The fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condo in Makati, indicate that the sole purpose of Aquino in transferring physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but to only qualify as candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati.

The lease agreement (he entered into) was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as a qualification for his candidacy by establishing a commencement dated of his residence.

[NOTE: The petitioners contention that it legally impossible to impose the 1-year residency requirement in a newly created political district lacks basic logic because the district was not created out of thin air. People actually were domiciled in the area before the district was created.]

Domino v. COMELEC | 1-year Residency Requirement G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999

FACTS:

This case is a petition for preliminary injunction of the Resolution of COMELEC declaring the petitioner (Juan Domino) disqualified as



candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections.

The petitioner alleged that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the 1-year residence requirement.

The petitioner maintains that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997(more than 1 year).

COMELEC disqualified DOMINO on the basis of the ff. findings: o Petioners Voters registration Record is dated 22 June

1997(less than 1 year preceding the election) and his address indicated 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City.

o Petitoner ran for the same position in the 3rd District of QC during 1995 elections.

ISSUES: 1. WON the judgement of Metropolitan Trial Court of QC declaring

petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not QC id final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the COMELEC;

2. WON petitioner has resided in the Sarangani for at least 1 year immediately preceding the 1998 elections;

3. WON COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the disqualification of petitioner.

HELD: 1. The contention of Domino that the decision of MTC of QC in declaring

him a resident of Sarangani and not QC is final and conclusive upon COMELEC cannot be sustained. [reason: held#3]

2. The SC holds in the negative. Not a resident of Sarangani for 1 year. 3. COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition as provided in Sec. 78, Art

IX of the Omnibus Election Code. RATIO: Issue 1 & 3:

1. The judgement of MTC of QC is neither conclusive on the voters political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as voter in any other election because COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition as provided in Sec. 78, Art IX of the Omnibus Election Code.

COMELEC has the competence to determine whether a false representation as facts was made in the Certificate of Candidacy.

The MTC of QZ merely determined the right of Domino to be included/excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within it territorial jurisdiction, and does not preclude the COMELEC in the

determination of Dominos qualification as a candidate to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement.

Issue 2: Record show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos

Sur. Sometime in 1991 he acquired new domicile in Quezon City (as shown in his previous Cert. of Candidacy)

A persons domicile once established is considered to continue and will not deemed lost until a new one is established.

The mere absence of a person from his permanent residence, no matter how long, will not result in loss or change of domicile.

As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile.

Dominos lack of intention to abandon his residence in QC is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in QC (gives rise to strong presumption of residence)

While the fact that the petitioner did the ff. he still fell short of the 1 year residency requirement under Sec.6, Art. VI of the Constitution.

o bought the house he was renting (4 Nov 1997) o sought cancellation of his previous registration in QC (22 Oct

1997) o applied for transfer of registration to Sarangani ( 30 Aug

1997)

Co v. House Electoral Tribunal || Citizenship

FACTS:

The grandfather of the respondent, Ong Te, came to the Philippines from China. Ong Te resided in Samar and was able to obtain a certificate of residence.

The respondents father, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China, but grew up in Samar. He got married to a Filipina and was naturalized as a Filipino citizen when the respondent was nine years old.

The respondent, Jose Ong Jr., studied and worked in Manila. But he frequently went home to Samar, where he grew up. He later on married a Filipina.

The respondent registered as a voter of Laoang, Samar. He voted there during the elections of 1984 and 1986.

In 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the 2nd district of Northern Samar and won.



The respondents citizenship was questioned. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declared that Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of Samar.

Petitioners seek to set aside the decision of the HRET.

ISSUE: WON the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that Jose Ong Jr., is a natural-born citizen and a resident of Samar

HELD: The HRET did not act with grave abuse of discretion because Jose Ong Jr. is a natural born citizen based on Article IV of the Constitution.

RATIO:

Section 3 of Article IV provides that: " Natural-born Citizens are those who:

a. are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship

b. elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section 1

Paragraph 3, Section 1 of Article IV provides that those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are considered natural-born citizens.

" Under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born with Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens.

" The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against women.

" This provision is curative in nature. It has a retroactive effect anybody who elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution are considered natural-born Filipino citizens.

Petitioners argue that respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship when he reached the age of majority.

" HOWEVER, we have jurisprudence that states that election is both a formal and an informal process. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioners argue that respondents father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen.

" HOWEVER, the respondent traces his natural-born citizenship through his mother, not through his father.

" The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determin WON the respondent elected Filipino citizenship.

Bengzon v. Cruz || Citizenship

FACTS:

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He enlisted in the Unites States Matine Corps and, without consent of the

Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under

Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of

Pangasinan. Petitioner asserts that Cruz cannot run for public office since he can no

longer be considered a natural-born Filipino.

ISSUE: WON the respondent, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship

HELD: The respondent can still be considered a natural-born Filipino.

RATIO:

There are 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

o Repatriation may be had by those who lost their citizenship due to:

1. Desertion of the armed forces 2. Service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World

War II 3. Service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any

other time 4. Marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien 5. Political and economic necessity



o Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry.

o Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. If he was originall a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former statues as a natural-born Filipino.

ALSO, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens.

o Under the present Constitution, there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

o The absence of a separate category for persons who reacquired citizenship means that they are either natural-born or naturalized.

o Respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.

Dissenting Opinion (Sandoval-Gutierrez)

If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen cannot be considered natural-born.

o The term natural-born Filipino citizen refers to those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship and to those who elect Philippine citizenship.

o Repatriation is the resumption of recovery of the original nationality upon the fulfillment of certain conditions.

o Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to become a citizen. o Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is

no room for interpretation. Respondent Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again

become a Filipino citizen (taking of oath of allegiance, registering oath with the local civil registry, renouncing citizenship, executing affidavit of reacquisition).

Valles v Comelec || Citizenship

FACTS:

Private respondent is running for governor of Davao Oriental. Her citizenship is questioned by the petitioner.

Petitioner claims that Lopez cannot run for governor since she has renounced her Filipino citizenship by applying for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICCR), and for having an Australian passport.

Petitioner also claims that if Lopez did not renounce her Filipino citizenship, her dual citizenship disqualifies her from public office, as stated in Section 40 of the Local Government Code which disqualifies from running for any elective local position those who have dual citizenship.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Western Australia. Her father is a Filipino, while her Mother is an Australian.

ISSUE: WON respondent is a Filipino citizen

HELD: Respondent is a Filipino citizen.

RATIO:

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis (child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth).

o Thus, private respondent, having been born to a Filipino father, is a Filipino citizen.

o The laws in force at the time of the private respondents birth were the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law. According to such organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.

On renunciation of Filipino Citizenship o In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such

renunciation must be express. o The mere fact that respondent was a holder of an Australian

passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship.

On Dual Citizenship o The Court clarified that dual citizenship as a disqualification as

used in the Local Government Code refers to dual allegiance (Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution). Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.



o ALSO, the filing of their certificate of candidacy is suffice to renounce foreign citizenship.

" In the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and the he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance.

o Private respondent also executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship and the Australian passport of the respondent was cancelled. These acts are enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Lopez.

Dimaporo v Mitra, Jr. |Term and Tenure FACTS: Petitioner claims that provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress. ISSUE: WON the term and tenure are the same. HELD: Term and tenure are not the same. RATIO: The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be

extended or shortened by the legislature. Tenure (period during which an officer actually holds the office)

may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. Tenure may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the

power of said officer

[NOTE: When an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion]

Farias et al. v Executive Secretary

FACTS:

The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Farias, Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives. The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials. The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law. Also, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed. ISSUE(S):

1. Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act) is unconstitutional

a. Whether or not Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 violates the Equal Protection clause of the constitution

b. Whether or not the passage of the act in the House of Representatives had irregularities

HELD:



1. The court held that the law does not transcend constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power; therefore it is constitutional in its entirety.

a. Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 is not violative of the Equa

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