7 - 1 - 6.1 the afrobarometer [19 min]

7/30/2019 7 - 1 - 6.1 the Afrobarometer [19 Min]

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In the previous lecture, we examined whatpolitical culture is, different theoriesabout political culture.And its scope, an endurance, its nature,its impact.and we began to look at some recentevidence from regional barometers ofattitudes and values towards democracy.With particular reference to East Asia.Today I want to examine in much greaterdetail some recent evidence from twoother regions of the world.Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world,North African and Middle East.So let's begin by examining the evidencefrom Sub-Saharan Africa, which comes froma survey.that's been done in now more than twodozen African countries called theAfrobarometer.Fortunately, must of the data from theAfrobarometer, at least at an aggregatedlevel, is available on their website.

and, can be analyzed by going to this,particular Web page,afrobarometer-online-analysis.com.So, we'll be drawing on their reportedevidence and some of the data that can bedownloaded.And analysed from that website to try anddetermine what Africans think these daysabout politics.How they view the role that people likethemselves should play in the politicalprocess.how they view their institutions.

What they think of as the right or moralor best form of government.In other words what are their views aboutthe legitamacy or desirability ofdifferent types of political systems.The Afrobarometer has been a conducted infive waves beginning in 1999.when it was conducted in 11 countries.And we're first going to examine evidencefrom the first four waves which tookplace between 1999 and 2008.In each wave the barometer would be donewith in a year or two in terms of time.

in a large number of different Africancountries, and there's different researchteams in each of these African countries.Local research teams that conduct thepublic opinion.Survey research, and of course draw andanalyze, national representative, randomsamples.So we return to the question.that is, widely used around the world as


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one very useful indicator of support fordemocracy or belief in the legitimacy ofdemocracy.The three part question that asks people,which statement is closest to their ownopinion.That democracy is always preferable.That in some countries a non-democraticform of government can be preferable, orthat it's all the same.So we can examine for the 19 Africancountries that were surveyed by theAfrobarometer in 2008.What the level of support for democracywas in that year as measured by thisquestion.?Do you think democracy is always the bestform of government.And for those who think that support fordemocracy is not likely to be high.in African countries, because of theirlow levels of income, the data mustindeed be very surprising.We see that for these 19 countries, on

average, 70% of the public supportsdemocracy, prefers democracy to any otherform of government.And this support ranges from a high of 85in Botswana.Which is the only Sub-Saharan Africancountry on the continent of Africa thathas been continuously democratic sinceindependence.To 83% in, Zambia, higher than average inmost of these countries here, including,Benin, Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, andMali.

And then somewhat lower, below 70% inSouth Africa, Zimbabe where the data for2005, the Namibia and so on.Now if we go a to this a next slide wherewe aggregate the data two kinds of datafor four waves of the Afrobarometer.and those are 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008.so we're looking at the trend lines for11 countries, for which we havecontinuous data going back to 1999.And we're looking at two types ofmeasures of democratic legitimacy.One is direct support for democracy.

People who say yes, I'd I, I preferdemocracy rather than that sometimes anauthoritarian government can bepreferable.And then the percentage of the publicwho, when they're asked aboutauthoritarian options.instead of the current system, whether itmight be better to get rid of parliamentand have a strong leader make all


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decisions.Or get rid of opposition parties and haveonly one party allowed to contest.Or invite the military to come in.this survey and others that have beendone ask the question of whether peoplewould prefer each of those authoritarianoptions.And then we can aggregate those and askwhat percentage of the public, rejectsall authoritarian options that are put tothem.And finally we can combine these twomeasures.And, ask, to what extent do people have avery robust, manifestation of or embraceof the legitimacy of democracy.So first in terms of support fordemocracy by that one measure.We see that for these African countries,it was high in 1999.68% on average, in these 11 Africancountries, said democracy is always best.The percentage fell down to 61% in 2005,

but rose again to the highest level ever,72% in 2008.A number, that again, must be verysurprising to pure theorist ofmodernization theory who argue that thereis a strong relationship.Between a political culture that embracesdemocracy, and the level of economicdevelopment.If we look at the rejection ofauthoritarian options, again the sametrend, declining from 56% to 51% and thenrising to 58%.

If we combine these and say, how manyAfricans in these 11 countries meet thedemanding test of expressing directsupport for democracy?And a rejection of all authoritarianoptions?The percent in 1999 was 44%, it then felland rose to 47% in 2008.It could be said well this isn't a veryimpressive expression of support fordemocracy.But keep in mind this is a prettyrigorous test of, an individual's

commitment to democracy.asking them whether they supportdemocracy and whether they positivelyreject all, three authoritarian options.And, usually we don't see numbers over50%, except in long and well-established,democracies.And we see a lot of equivocation in otherdemocracies around the world.So 47% is a very I would suggest strong.


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And in some ways surprising base of veryfirm commitment to democracy amongAfrican publics.on average, at least as surveyed in these11 countries.Now we can look not only at the demandfor democracy in terms of support fordemocracy.But what Africans perceive, and how theyevaluate the supply of democracy.So how satisfied are they with the waydemocracy is workign in the country.We take a satisfactiion, those who saythey're very satisfied or somewhatsatisfied.And leave out the other two responsecategories, not very satisfied, not atall satisfied.Then we can ask what percent perceivethat there's a nearly full democracy, ora full democracy in the country.So the question asks again.Would you say that the democracy, thepolitical system we have in place in the

country today, is a full democracy?A democracy with minor problems, ademocracy with major problems, or not ademocracy at all?And, this measure here takes the firsttwo response categories.Full democracy, or democracy of minorproblems, as the perception of arelatively good supply of democracy.We see now, in this slide thatsatisfaction with the way democracy isworking, on average among the public.In these eleven African countries

declined rather sharply between 1999 and2005 from 61% to 48%.But it rebounded to 56% in 2008.And the perception of a relatively fulldemocracy again declined a little bit,less dramatically from 58 to 51%, and hadrisen to 63% by 2008.If we combine them, the level ofperception of a good supply of democracy,was 46% in 1999, and fell, but rose tothe same level in 2008.Now we can combine these two perceptionsand preferences.

the demand for democracy as indicated bysupport for democracy.The perception of a relatively fulldemocracy, which is the red bar in theslides here.And then a satisfaction with the waydemocracy is working, the black bar.We have, here, evidence, in individualAfrican countries in the year 2008.Of the extent to which, demand and supply


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of democracy is in a relatively healthybalance.And it is into of the most liberaldemocracies of Sub-Saharan Africa,Botswana the oldest standing democracy onthe continent.And Ghana which has emerged since theyear 2000 as the or certainly one of themost liberal democracies in Africa.By contrast, in two countries that areriddled with electoral fraud and reallyquite severely widespread corruption.Kenya and Nigeria.we see something very striking.There's much higher level of support fordemocracy on average.Around 70% or slightly more.Then there is perception of a supply ofdemocracy, which is hovering around 40%or less in each of these two veryimportant.strategically influential Africancountries.Let's look at four more countries that

were surveyed in 2008, South Africa,Senegal, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.And again in South Africa, where giventhe level of economic development.And the strength of polical leadershiopand the struggle for democracy, thedemand for democracy as I said is alittle bit weaker.Than in many other African countries.It's below that 70% average for 2008.But then, the perceived supply ofdemocracy is even weaker still, under50%.

And in Senegal again, we see a verysubstantial gap between the demand fordemocracy.Which is around the average for thesub-sarahran African countries.And the percieved supply of democracywith satisfaction with the way democracyis working hovering around or less than30%.I might say here that this is at a timein 2008.When the, re-elected and aging presidentof Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, was

increasingly concentrating and abusingpolitical power.And, many of these slides suggest to usthat, Africans, even relatively poor andperhaps completely uneducated, possibilyeven illiterate, African citizens.maybe fairly savy and perceptive inseeing what's going on in their countryand passing judgement on them.We certainly see that again in Zimbabwe.


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Where there is strong support fordemocracy, even if it's slightly belowthe average in 2008.But citizens perceive, correctly, verylittle supply of democracy in a highlyauthoritarian regime.So, much less than a fifth of thepopulation, is satisfied with the waydemocracy is working.Or perceives that there is anything closeto a full democracy in the country.Now, we can ask the question.How do Africans' perceptions of theextent of democracy coincide with theexpert ratings.That are done by independent organizationlike Freedom House.Which rate the level of political rightsand civil liberties of every country inthe world every year.And this the Afrobarometer is done bycalculating simple person correlationcoefficients.Between the aggregate percentages seeing

that their country is a full democracy ora democracy with minor problems.That is, the percentages perceivingsupply and the combined Freedom Houseratings inverting their scores sopolitical rights and civil liberties.the higher the score, the higher thelevel of freedom.and if we look at the correlation betweenthat, measure as, determined by Africansof the extent of democracy.They think they have in their country andthe measure determined by, external

experts.We see that in the year 2000, after thefirst round of the Afrobarometer, thecorrelation was about 0.65, prettystrong.Expert ratings and the Africans' ownratings of their individual countrieswere very much in alignment.Here in, these three, time periods.The beige bar gives us the correlationfor all the countries surveyed then.And the red bar for the original 12countries that were surveyed in the first

round of the Afrobarometer.And continued, continued to be surveyedeach time since.The correlation dropped quitedramatically, particularly for a lot ofthe new countries added to theafrobarometer in 2003, and even for theoriginal 12.But, by 2005 we see quite strikingcorrelations between the subjective


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perceptions of ordinary Africans.And the expert ratings are, if we look atthe figures for all the countriessurveyed in the Afro barometer in 2005,it's 0.80.Very, very high and that suggests to usthat it is possible both for externalexperts and for ordinary again.Maybe even very poorly educated citizensto make meaningful summary judgements.that are relatively robust about thelevel of support for democracy in theircountry.

7 - 1 - 6.1 the afrobarometer [19 min]

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