8000 marine firefighting plan 8100...

Tampa Bay Area Contingency Plan – 2012 Revision ___________________________________________________________________________________________

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8000 Marine Firefighting Plan

8100 Introduction As Florida’s largest deepwater seaport, Tampa Port handles 3,700 vessels each year and 47 million tons of cargo. Cargo types range from Anhydrous Ammonia to Liquefied Petroleum Gas to Passengers. Tampa Bay’s main players consist of the Tampa Port Authority, St. Petersburg Port Authority and Manatee Port Authority. An average of four commercial vessel fires occur each year in the Tampa Bay area. Since 1989, significant shipboard fires within the Tampa Bay Area included, the Tug BEVERLY ANDERSON/BARGE MARY TURNER and the Tug SEAFARER/BARGE OCEAN 255. A short narrative of these events is given below. On April 16, l992 the Tug BEVERLY ANDERSON/BARGE MARY TURNER caught fire while in Gadsden Point Cut in Upper Tampa Bay. Coast Guard Group St. Petersburg requested Sector St. Petersburg to contact the Tampa Fire Boat for assistance and for the COTP to secure the navigation channel. The Tampa Fire Department was contacted and requested to send the Tampa Fire Boat to assist in fighting the fire. The COTP closed Gadsden Point Cut Channel to all non emergency vessel traffic. Several tugs, commercial vessels and Coast Guard 41472 arrived on scene. Once on scene, it was apparent that only the Tug BEVERLY ANDERSON was involved with the fire. The barge was an empty coal barge and did not pose a HAZMAT or fire exposure hazard. The Chief Engineer was reported missing, prompting on-scene personnel to advance fire-fighting efforts into the tug without approved body or respiratory protection. Other supporting vessels began a water search for the missing crewmember. The Chief Engineer was located 1 hour and 31 minutes after the report of fire was received. He had sustained 3rd degree burns on 38% of his body and was Medivaced to Tampa General Hospital's burn unit. Fire fighting efforts were hampered by the on scene weather conditions. Fifteen to twenty knot winds and four-foot seas hampered the effective application of foam. The integrity of the foam blanket degraded after application. The tug's engine room fire was extinguished and a re-flash watch was set. Then, small fires in other parts of the vessel were extinguished using the tug crew and Tampa Fire Department personnel. After the fires were extinguished, the tug was taken in tow by two tugs to Big Bend Channel. This incident required operations in five separate areas simultaneously. They were waterborne search for a missing crewmember, airlifting of a burn victim, fire fighting, logistics coordination and communication among assets. On August 10, l993 at 0548Q, a three-vessel collision occurred near the entrance to Tampa Bay. The M/V BALSA 37 collided with the TUG SEAFARER and its tank barge OCEAN 255, then collided with the TUG CAPT FRED BOUCHARD and its barge B-155. The collisions resulted in a massive explosion and fire aboard the tank barge OCEAN 255, which was a clear sign to the marine community that this incident would not be a "routine" vessel fire. The barge was engulfed in flames and the TUG SEAFARER was in danger of being engulfed. The tug's crew quickly abandoned ship but only after grounding the barge just off Mullet Key. The first fire fighting units on scene were 41 foot UTB's from Station Cortez, Sand Key, and St. Petersburg. Arriving thereafter was the Tug GULF COAST, the Tampa Fire Department Fire Boat, the Sarasota Fire Department Boat and the Cutters SITKINAK, POINT STEELE, and VISE. Since all initial efforts with the available limited quantities of AFFF had no effect on the fire, the on scene units applied water to help keep the barge's hull as cool as possible to avoid catastrophic hull failure. At times the fireboats, cutters and UTB's were within 10 feet of the barge. By mid afternoon of the first day, CGC DECISIVE was placed under CCGF Tampa's operational control. CGC DECISIVE eventually relieved CGC SITKINAK as On Scene Commander and helped keep all units operating in harmony. A Tampa Fire Department pumper truck and AFFF trailer were placed aboard a U.S. Army Landing Craft and ferried to


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the scene. Eventually the combined efforts of the Tampa Fire Department's AFFF and other units keeping the hull cool were successful in extinguishing the fire. In an effort to better support and develop the salvage and marine firefighting plan a working group charter was established and can be referenced in Section 8700.

8110 Authority

Among the provisions of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA) (33 U.S.C. 1221 et seq.) is an acknowledgment that increased supervision of port operations is necessary to prevent damage to structures in, on, or adjacent to the navigable waters of the U.S., and to reduce the possibility of vessel or cargo loss, or damage to life, property, and the marine environment. This statute, along with the traditional functions and empowers of the Coast Guard to render aid and save property (14 U.S.C. 88(b), is the basis for Coast Guard firefighting activities. 42 U.S.C. 1856-1856d provide that an agency charged with providing fire protection for any property of the United States may enter into reciprocal agreements with state and local firefighting organizations to provide for mutual aid. This statute further provides that emergency assistance may be rendered in the absence of a reciprocal agreement, when it is determined by the head of that agency to be in the best interest of the United States. 33 USC 1251 et. seq. Under the Clean Water Act, as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, whenever a marine casualty in the navigable waters or exclusive economic zone of the U.S. has created a substantial threat of pollution due to discharge or imminent discharge of large quantities of oil or hazardous substance from a vessel. The Coast Guard may coordinate and direct all public and private efforts to remove or eliminate such threat and summarily remove and, if necessary, destroy the vessel. 33 USC 1471 et. Seq. The Intervention on the High Seas Act extends the USCG authority to take preemptive or corrective action upon the high seas, i.e. beyond the three mile territorial seas boundary, to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to the coastline from pollution or threat of same by oil following a maritime casualty which may reasonably be expected to result in harmful consequences. This authority rests with the Commandant. Any recommendations to take such action should be relayed through the District Commander to the Commandant. 42 USC 1856-1856(d) This statute provides that an agency charged with providing fire protection for any U.S. property may enter into reciprocal agreements with state and local fire-fighting organizations to provide for mutual aid. It further provides that emergency assistance may be rendered in the absence of a reciprocal agreement, when the head of that agency determines it to be in the best interest of the U.S. Section 4202 (OPA 90) (Public Law 101-380) Mandates that the Coast Guard maintain an Area Contingency Plan of pollution response (including firefighting equipment) within each port.

8120 Purpose And Objectives

The adequate protection of the ports of the Gulf Coast of Florida from fire, explosion or other similar incidents is essential to the continued well-being of our community. To assure such protection, adequate marine disaster response capability should be available and utilized under well-conceived disaster contingency plans. This document provides for a coordinated response by the U.S. Coast Guard and other federal, state, local, and civilian forces to major fires on board vessels or waterfront facilities. It provides policies, responsibilities, and


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procedures for coordination of on scene forces. It is designed for use in conjunction with other state, regional, and local contingency plans. The Marine Firefighting Plan is a part of the St. Petersburg Area Contingency Plan (ACP). The ACP is prepared by the Area Committee. It is to be implemented with the National Contingency Plan and the Regional Contingency Plan to address removal of oil and hazardous substances. The ACP was implemented by the government to rectify the problems encountered during the response and recovery of the EXXON VALDEZ spill in Alaska.

8130 Scope

This document is the primary firefighting instruction for St. Petersburg Area Contingency for fires at facilities and/or on vessels. This plan further describes the responsibilities of all agencies involved. It is to be used to coordinate agency response and action. This plan also sets forth a command structure and a list of resources. This document is not intended to be a marine firefighting technical handbook. This regional contingency plan has the following major objectives:

• To protect lives and property in the COTP St. Petersburg Zone and to assure the free flow of maritime commerce.

• To secure a relationship among responsible federal, state and local municipalities and commercial facilities, so that resources may be employed to effect a swift, well coordinated response to vessel and waterfront fire emergencies.

• To identify and clarify lines of authority and response within the port community. • To identify jurisdiction. • To promote safety for firefighting personnel and the port community. • To protect the marine environment and the community from damage or disaster.

This plan promotes the establishment of a coordinating relationship among federal, state, local and commercial interests within the COTP St. Petersburg zone as discussed in 33 CFR 3.35-10. Throughout the United States there have been incidents where prompt and effective response to shipboard fires was inadequate. A contributing factor has been the lack of understanding as to who fights a shipboard fire. Jurisdiction, command and control are a concern. Likewise, the question of who pays for resources committed to fire fighting is also a concern and has delayed response. Unfortunately, any delay will probably allow for the escalation of the fire. Existing State/County/City disaster preparedness organizations, including their fire departments, are well suited to deal with non-marine fires and other emergency conditions. However, shipboard and waterfront fires add several dimensions. Most fire departments have never fought a shipboard fire, and ship peculiarities are unfamiliar and dangerous to fire fighters. Often, it is difficult to assemble knowledgeable personnel and the resources that are adequate to handle the emergency; many must travel across political and jurisdictional lines. Mutual aid requests coordinated by county and state emergency management agents (EMA's) will facilitate the response of these fire fighting related resources. But some personnel and organizations with the necessary marine expertise are not within the normal fire fighting community, and firefighting organizations are not familiar with them.


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The CG COTP will be the agent that works as the coordinator, in the unified command structure, with the fire incident commander, the maritime experts, and the other agencies that are not accustomed to working together in order to control the emergency. In marine fire fighting, COTP St. Petersburg historically has maintained the official posture that the Coast Guard will provide "assistance as available". While the Coast Guard has an interest in assuring port and environmental safety, this interest does not extend to preemption of local responsibility and authority for shipboard and waterfront facility fire fighting pursuant to the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 (PL 93-498). The Coast Guard intends to maintain this "assistance as available" posture, while emphasizing the development of a regional plan and inter-agency cooperation as the viable and lawful solution to marine fire fighting needs. This regional plan recognizes that there is a lack of resources and trained personnel maintained by any one fire department in the area, that no one fire department or agency is in a position to assume the burden of marine fire fighting alone, and that the impact of a marine fire disaster on the community can be severe. Therefore, the plan will rely heavily on the continued negotiation of locally derived mutual aid agreements within counties and across county lines. It is not intended for existing mutual aid to be superseded; this plan is intended to compliment and encourage expansion of mutual aid agreements. It will assist communities in the development of the inherent capability to respond to marine fires within their jurisdiction in concert with other fire departments and agencies using available equipment, including commercial resources on a contract basis or other federal or local resources on a consumable reimbursement basis.

8140 Reserved

8150 Policy

8151 Federal Policy

Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974(pl 93-498) states that fire prevention and control is and should remain a state and local responsibility, although the Federal government must help to reduce fire losses.

8152 Coast Guard Policy

Coast Guard firefighting policy is established in the Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual Vol VI, chapter 8. It states that, where an organized fire department exists, the local Fire Chief is in charge of the firefighting operations on vessels and at facilities. The Coast Guard will render assistance as available, equal to each unit’s level of training and adequacy of equipment. This is not intended to convey the impression that the Coast Guard is prepared to relieve local Fire Commanders of firefighting responsibilities.

8153 Sector St. Petersburg / Captain of the Port Policy


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The Coast Guard Policy on firefighting does not relieve the Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) of the responsibility for the overall safety of the port. It also does not restrict the lawful authority of the COTP to act in the best interest of the safety of life, property and the environment. Federal law gives the Captain of the Port authority to take full or partial control or direct the operation of any vessel within the territorial waters of the United States under his jurisdiction. This is done whenever it appears to the COTP that such action is necessary in order to secure such vessel from damage or injury, or to prevent damage or injury to any vessel or waterfront facility. The COTP, or his representative, will respond to assist as necessary, with waterside traffic control, minimum waterside firefighting assistance, and personnel familiar with shipboard construction, layout, common firefighting systems, and stability.

8154 State Policy

The emergency management structure in the state of Florida is guided by Florida Statute Chapter 252 which sets up an organizational structure with four levels of intervention (local, county, state and federal). The basic concept is for the lowest level of government to have initial responsibility for disaster response and relief. The said level will attempt to mitigate the situation with the resources available to it. Requests for assistance from the next higher level of government will be made when the magnitude of the disaster either exceeds the resources of the local level of government or the resources needed are not available at the local level. Under Chapter 252, -- each county government is to operate a Division of Emergency Management for the purpose of coordinating disaster relief efforts in that county. Upon exhaustion of resources at the County level, requests for State assistance will be made to the State Division of Emergency Management (DEM). Rapid Impact Assessment Teams (RIAT) will be sent to evaluate the damage and the assistance needed through the State. Based on this information, the Governor may declare a state of emergency to exist in the area, and direct state resources into the affected area. The State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) would be activated at this time and provide direct coordination to the County EOC to liaison State resources into the affected area.

Chapter 252 of the Florida Statutes (State Emergency Management Act, as amended) directs the establishment of county emergency management agencies in each county of the State of Florida and authorizes such agencies in the cities of the state. The Act provides for the rendering of mutual aid among political subdivisions, authority for the formation of local disaster preparedness plans, and for authority to utilize the resources necessary to cope with a disaster emergency. The State expects local and city authorities to initially respond to a marine fire casualty, while keeping the Florida Division of Emergency Management (DEM) informed of the situation. When local resources are inadequate to cope with a marine fire, the DEM or Governor may be called upon to coordinate State and/or Federal assistance. The State of Georgia policy for marine fire emergencies is to defer to the expertise of local municipal agencies.

State Agencies will provide resources to local governments according to the functional responsibilities outlined below. These functions are referred to as Emergency Support Functions (ESF). For each function, one State agency will have primary responsibility and will provide resources and leadership relating to the disaster. The Governor will request assistance through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The request will be based on State and local damage reports. When the President declares an emergency or a major disaster, federal assistance would then be authorized to assist the State government.


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DEM has been designated as the State agency responsible for coordinating assistance received through federal programs.

8155 Local Policy

Fire Departments will respond to all shipboard fires within their jurisdictional boundaries. Local fire departments are participants in the State of Florida Fire-Rescue Disaster Response Plan. This plan is intended to provide for the systematic mobilization, organization, and operation of Fire-Rescue resources throughout the State in assisting local agencies in mitigating the effects of disaster. Most local fire departments have limited response capabilities for shipboard fires. Some fire departments have fire boats. Offshore ship fires are a rescue priority. Land based Fire Departments will be involved at their Chief's discretion as the situation and location dictates.

Additionally the municipalities would be contacted after the initial 911 call information is forwarded to the state warning point and Florida Fire Chiefs Association in Tallahassee to authorize their responses, regardless of jurisdictional boundaries they would still be required to initiate a response.

8156 Responsible Party Policy

The Responsible Party (RP) vessel master or designee will maintain control over the vessel, crew and passengers. The presence of local firefighters does not relieve the master of command or responsibility of overall safety on the vessel.

The master should not countermand any orders given by the local firefighters in the performance of fire-fighting activities, unless the action taken or planned clearly endangers the safety of the vessel or crew. The RP will assign a representative to the Command Post and Command Center. His designee should be thoroughly familiar with the ships systems and be a command level officer. The RP may also hire a commercial fire-fighting company to extinguish the fire.

8160 Boundaries

8161 Geographic Boundaries

The Coast Guard COTP St. Petersburg, Fl zone is defined by 33 CFR 3.35-35. The operational area of Sector St. Petersburg, with its office in St. Petersburg, Fl, is comprised of the area starting at the intersection of the Florida coast with longitude 083 50’W (30 00’N, 083 50’W) at the mouth of the Fenholloway River, thence due north to a position 30 15N, 084 45’W; thence due west to a position 30 15’N, 084 45’W; thence due north to the Florida/Georgia border at longitude 084 45’W. The boundary then follows the Georgia/Florida border easterly to a position at longitude 83 00’W; thence southeasterly to 28 00N, 081 30’W; thence due south to 26 00’N, 081 30’W; thence southwesterly to the tip of Cape Romano, Fl. The westerly offshore boundary of the COTP Tampa zone is a line bearing 199 degrees true from the Florida coast at 30 00’N, 083 50’W, at the Fenholloway River to the extent of the EEZ. The eastern offshore boundary is a line bearing 227 degrees true from 26.00N, 081 30’W, through Cape Romano to the extent of the Exclusive Economic Zone.


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Generally, the land area is described above is bounded by the following: Beginning in the northwest, the Florida/Georgia state line from 4 miles east of Chattahoochee to 7 miles east of Jennings. Then an imaginary line running southeasterly 7 miles west of Columbia, 8 miles west of Gainesville, 2 miles west of Ocala to a point 12 miles southwest of Haines City. From there southward to and including Everglades City, then northward to Stake Point at the mouth of the Fenholloway River. From there a line running 20 miles north, then 57 miles due west, then 32 miles north to the state border.

8162 Coastal Jurisdictions

The Tampa Bay area and adjoining coastal areas are located within jurisdictions shared with several counties that lie in the ICW and Tampa Bay area. For the purpose of clarity, Hillsborough County jurisdictional boundaries are outline below in legal description. However, all the counties that have coastal boundaries that adjoin and extend to coastal shoreline also have jurisdiction along that shoreline to a point to extend three leagues or 9 nautical miles outward from that shoreline. The counties do in fact enjoy the same extent of jurisdiction as that of the states which extends to a point 9 miles off the coastline. The counties have this jurisdiction with respect to their appropriate county lines and shorelines. Law Enforcement agencies can assist on-scene to: Control crowds; Limit access to fire area; Provide security for staging areas; Enforce safety zones, Provide Highway Patrol escort for vehicles carrying Fire Fighting personnel and resources.

8163 Hillsborough County Boundaries

The boundary lines of Hillsborough County are as follows: Beginning at the northeast corner of section one in township twenty-seven south, range sixteen east; thence east on the north line of township twenty-seven south to the line between ranges twenty-two and twenty-three east; thence south on said range line to the line between townships thirty-two and thirty-three south; thence west on said township line to the south bank of Tampa bay; thence in a direct line to a point midway between Egmont and Passage Keys in the Gulf of Mexico; thence westerly to the boundary of the State of Florida; thence northerly on the boundary of the State of Florida to a point in the Gulf of Mexico due west of the northern shore of Mullet Key; thence due east to a point one hundred yards due west of the northernmost shore of Mullet Key; thence in a line one hundred yards from the shore line around the southern portion of Mullet Key to a point one hundred yards due east of the easternmost shore of Mullet Key; thence due north to a point due east of the northernmost shore of Mullet Key; thence due east to the middle waters of Tampa Bay; thence in a northerly direction through the middle waters of Tampa Bay and Old Tampa Bay to a point where the range line between ranges sixteen and seventeen east strikes said shore; thence north on said range line to the place of beginning.

8164 The Tampa Port Authority, St. Petersburg or the Manatee Port Authority

Will provide a representative to the Unified Command Center. The Port Authority will make recommendations to the COTP to ensure proper control of vessel movement into and out of Tampa Bay. For vessels tied up at berths situated close to the fire, the Port Authority may recommend movement of those vessels to appropriate anchorage/mooring sites.


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8170 Fire Fighting Operations

In the event of a Marine Fire involving a Vessel or Facility of magnitude or an incident that escalates beyond the fire fighting abilities of the vessel or facilities resources available it may become necessary to form and ICS organization. This is initiated by the first arriving agency. When the Coast Guard is the first responding agency, they will assume command of the incident. The IC can and should be passed at an operational level when, and as soon as is practical to do so. For example, a CG 41 footer responds to a barge or tank ship fire that is beyond the scope of the vessels crew or their own abilities. The 41 may conduct initial fire fighting operations while reporting via radio the need for additional resources. Once Tampa Fire Department arrives on scene command can be passed and Tampa Fire Department will establish IC for the Fire fighting operations. If the incident exists as or escalates to a level that it is of a threat to safety, the port and waterways, vessel traffic, or the marine environment then a Unified Command may be established. Under this Unified Command, Tampa Fire Department becomes a sector as part of the Operations Branch of the Unified Command. A second example involves a marine facility located in the Port of Tampa, such as GATX. In such an event that a fire or hazardous release at a marine facility escalates or is beyond the abilities of the facilities own fire protection or hazardous response, Tampa Fire Department would respond most likely as a result of a call placed to 911. The first arriving unit would either take command or pass command to the next arriving unit. If the incident escalates then the IC would escalate also. A Unified Command may again be necessary if the incident escalates or is such that warrants a threat to safety, the port and waterways, vessel traffic, or the marine environment. Both Tampa Bay towing companies are pre-designated Fire Fighting platforms. Additionally, in the event of a marine fire incident or emergency Tampa Fire Rescue has an agreement with the Tampa Port Authority to utilize a ro-ro barge as a Fire fighting platform, which should be used as a last resort resource. The Coast Guard’s primary concerns during a marine fire fighting response are safety, the integrity of the involved vessel or vessels, mitigation of environmental impact, vessel stability and protection of the environment. It is not the Coast Guards intent to be the lead agency at an operations level in Marine Fire fighting activities.

8180 Responsibility

8181 USCG COTP St. Petersburg Responsibilities:

The COTP exercises primary federal responsibility for the safety and security of the port. This responsibility is discharged by enforcing dangerous cargo regulations, marine terminal safety regulations, and pollution prevention regulations. In emergencies, the COTP may control the movement of ships and boats establish safety zones and provide on scene forces.

Responsibilities of the COTP include: Coordinate firefighting activities with the Incident Commander (IC).


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Assume Incident Commander for burning vessel underway or at anchor when: The fire department with jurisdiction is unable to respond, No fire department has jurisdiction. Coordinate all Coast Guard forces and equipment responding to the incident. Coordinate harbor safety and harbor traffic management with the Incident Commander. Control harbor traffic as necessary in the incident area to minimize the adverse impact of the fire on marine traffic and to facilitate firefighting operations. Establish safety or security zones as necessary. Provide information on the involved waterfront facilities. Provide information on the location of hazardous materials on the vessel or facility, if available. Provide technical data on ship’s construction and stability. Respond to oil or hazardous materials discharges. Actual removal may be delayed until the firefighting operations are complete. Coordinate tugs to assist in relocating moored or anchored vessels. Alert owners/operators of terminals or vessels at risk.

8182 Local Fire Department

Local fire departments are responsible for fire protection within their jurisdictions. Fire department Responsibilities include:

Assume the position of Incident Commander. In this capacity, exercise overall control of firefighting operations for the incident. Establish an Incident Command Post. Establish and maintain communications between the Incident Commander and all participating units. Request necessary personnel and equipment, and appropriate medical aid. Determine the need for, and request mutual aid. Make all requests to move vessel through Coast Guard COTP. Make all requests for Coast Guard/federal personnel, equipment, and waterside security through the COTP.


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Establish liaison with police department for landside traffic and crowd control (scene security and evacuation).

8183 Vessel Master

This plan is not intended to relieve the Master of his command nor restrict his authority concerning normal shipboard operation. However, it must be recognized that the local fire chief normally has more experience in the art of fire fighting. In addition, the fire chief has the responsibility for the safety of his firefighters, equipment and to the community to contain and extinguish any fires. The success of the operation is contingent on one person being in charge of all the fire fighting aspects. In the case of shipboard fires, the local fire chief will be the person in charge of the fire fighting operation. The master plays a very important role in lending his experience and assisting the fire chief to insure a successful operation. The presence of the fire chief in no way relieves the master of command of his vessel. However, the master shall not countermand any orders made by the fire chief in the performance of the fire fighting operation. The master, officers, and crew of the vessel shall assist in the fire fighting operation. The master shall be liaison between the fire chief and his crew. He shall furnish, if possible, the fire chief with any information requested. He should provide the fire chief with members of his crew to act as guides. The master shall control the actions of his crew. In the absence of the Master, the Chief Mate or Chief Engineer is expected to represent the vessel.

8184 Joint Responsibilities

The Coast Guard and local fire departments will cooperate and assist each other: In carrying out their respective duties. This includes, but is not limited to, sending representatives of both organizations to meetings and other functions relating to marine firefighting within the port area. Annually review the Marine Firefighting Plan maintained by USCG COTP St. Petersburg. Provide input as necessary to update and revise this plan. Coordinating a periodic operation to exercise components of the Marine Firefighting Plan.

8190 Procedures for Reviewing, Updating, and Exercising

8191 Responsibility

To ensure the validity of this plan, the Readiness Coordination Group will appoint a working group to periodically review all arrangements, jurisdictional relationships, and information contained within the plan. Coastal fire departments will review the plan and provide input as necessary to update and revise this plan.

8192 Exercises

Drills will be conducted to test the adequacy of the plan. The working group will propose a scenario for each drill, as well as a timetable for drill events. The exercise will, at a minimum, test response communications and pose challenging situations, which might prove to be major problem areas. Possible scenarios might include a passenger vessel fire involving the evacuation and medical treatment of a large number of people; a fire on an LPG vessel; a fire


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on a vessel at anchor; and drills on less accessible facilities. Exercises shall be conducted generally during the day, but nighttime exercises will be considered. The exercises and real-life events will be the basis for updating of this plan, generally through a post-event critique.

8193 Fire Department Training

Each fire department, which is responsible for fighting shipboard fires, should establish a training program within their unit. To the extent possible, familiarization training and exercises should be conducted on vessels that call on the port. Sector St. Petersburg should coordinate familiarization training in conjunction with routine vessel inspections to allow fire department crews to tour vessels and become familiar with various vessel layouts.

8200 COMMAND

8210 Introduction

A major waterfront or shipboard fire will probably involve response teams from federal, state and local agencies. The nature of the fire will be the deciding element in determining which agency assumes overall command or lead agency in a unified command. Overall command or lead agency must be determined as early as possible in the incident to ensure the effective and safe use of personnel and equipment. The below are specific descriptions to the Marine Firefighting Plan. For a more general description of the Incident Command Structure and position responsibilities, refer to the Area Contingency Plan, Sections 2000 through 6000. An example of an Incident Action Plan (IAP) may be located Section 9300. Additional Incident Command System information can be found at: http://homeport.uscg.mil/mycg/portal/ep/home.do

8220 Command and Control

Under the Incident Command System (ICS), the Incident Commander assumes overall command and control of the incident response. Other responding agencies will, within limits of operational capabilities and internal policy, provide support to the Incident Commander by providing personnel, equipment and technical expertise. The location of the fire will be the primary determining factor in determining who shall be Incident Commander or the lead agency in a unified command. If the fire is at a facility, or on a vessel at a facility, the local fire department shall be Incident Commander or lead agency. If the vessel is underway or at anchor, Incident Commander is the Coast Guard COTP, until such time the vessel is brought to and secured at a pier, then Incident Command shall shift to the local fire department with concurrence between COTP and the fire department. If a vessel at a pier is subsequently moved, Incident Command shall shift from the fire department to COTP, or to the receiving fire department, again with concurrence between COTP and the fire departments.

8230 Unified Command

In instances when several jurisdictions are involved or several agencies have a significant management interest or responsibility, a unified command with a lead agency designation may be more appropriate for an incident than a single command response organization. Generally,

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a unified command structure is called for when: The incident occurs within one jurisdiction but involves several agencies with management responsibility for it due to the nature of the incident or the resources needed to combat it. Such a circumstance would pertain for almost any fire at a facility or a vessel at pier side or anchorage in this area because of the similar responsibilities of fire departments and the Coast Guard for the protection of public health and safety. The incident is multi-jurisdictional in nature because it effects or has the potential to affect several jurisdictions. Shifting a burning vessel from one jurisdiction to another is such an example.

8240 Coordination of Special Forces

State and local special forces, including Mutual Aid responses, shall normally be requested by, and report to the Incident Command. Federal special forces shall normally be requested through the COTP, and shall come under direction and control of the COTP and fire department Incident Commander.


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ICS Structure

SafetyJoint Information

Fire Dept ICOwnerCOTP

OPERATIONS

Suppression

PLANNING

Technical

Staging Traffic Control

FINANCE & LOGISTICS

Documentation

Planning EMS

Stability/Salvage

8250 Termination of Response Actions

Once response operations have begun, they shall not be terminated until the fire is extinguished and the situation is under control. Termination of resources shall be by mutual agreement between fire department Incident Commander and COTP. Should there be a pollution incident, or threat of one, along with the fire, fire department resources may be released once the fire is extinguished and their assistance is no longer needed. This termination should also be a mutual agreement between IC and COTP.

8300 OPERATIONS 8310 Vessel Actions

The four main concerns for a vessel experiencing a fire on board while in port are injury to personnel, extinguishing the fire, vessel sinking, and the fire spreading to other ships or facilities. Basic shipboard firefighting theory is to contain, cool adjacent spaces (including above and below), and extinguish. This theory is considered valid by many firefighters, especially when dealing with fires on passenger vessels or other vessels with a large number of compartments. The following action should be taken (this list is not all inclusive):

Sound crew alarm. Summon crew to scene with emergency equipment. Commence firefighting operations as warranted by the situation.

Alert passengers, if any on board. Make announcement on public address system. Commence evacuation of passengers.

Stop all ventilation, mechanical and natural, as well as air conditioning units. Close and seal all ports and other openings which may create a draft. Close all unneeded open side ports.


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Close all or selective fire screen doors. Close all watertight doors. Set up fire watch in compartments adjacent to the space on fire. This should

include the spaces above and below the affected area. Close all fire dampers to ducts which may transmit flame, heat or smoke to other

compartments. Shut down all electrical systems to affected area prior to the use of water and/or

other electrical conductive matter. Evacuate unnecessary personnel (while having regard for the possible necessity

of backup firefighting teams). Make announcement for persons not to use elevators. Account for the whereabouts of all passengers and crew members as soon as

possible to determine if there are injured or trapped persons on board. Send out search parties IF APPROPRIATE.

Activate fixed firefighting systems. INSURE COMPARTMENT IS EVACUATED AND SEALED BEFORE ACTIVATION!

Notify local fire department and provide the following information: Na me a nd te le phone numbe r of pe rs on re porting. Na ture of the eme rge ncy/e xte nt of fire . Loca tion of the incide nt. Exa ct loca tions of the fire , by compa rtme nt a nd de ck. Whe the r or not the re is a nyone trapped or injured. De ta ils a s be s t a s pos s ible a s to cla s s of fire (wha t is burning? ) Is the re a ny ha za rdous ca rgo in or ne a r the fire ? Wha t, if a ny, fire fighting e fforts a re in progre s s ? Wha t is the ve s s e ls ca pa bility to ma ne uve r? Amount a nd type of bunkers. Notify Coa s t Gua rd/Ca pta in of the P ort.

8311 Entry Restrictions

Any vessel at sea experiencing a fire on board while under the jurisdiction of the COTP St. Petersburg is not allowed to enter the navigable waters of the United States unless prior permission is granted by the COTP.

8312 Salvage Companies

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 33, Part 155.4030 require vessels owners and operators of tank vessels and other vessels greater than 400 GT to hold an up to date Vessel Response Plan listing Salvage and Marine Firefighting resources available to the vessel owner /operator. The Tampa Bay Salvage Response Plan for Sector St. Petersburg is available in the St. Petersburg Port Directory in Homeport at http://hompeport.uscg.mil under the Safety and Security section, then the Area Contingency Plan header. The following companies are available:

1. Need-A-Diver Marine Services Inc. One Barge Place Tampa, FL. 33601 Telephone: (813) 247-1146 2. Commercial Marine Services 4708 Idaho St.

http://hompeport.uscg.mil/


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Tampa, FL. 33616 Telephone: (813) 831-2891, Fax: (813) 831-9274 3. Seahawk Deep Ocean Technology 5102 S. Westshore Blvd Tampa, FL. 33611 Telephone: (813) 832-4040 4. Underwater Enterprises Inc. 1810 67th St. Court E. Bradenton, FL. 34208 Telephone: (941) 746-2564 5. Sea Sub Systems, Inc. PO Box 1204 Indian Rocks Beach, FL 33785 Telephone: (727) 460-4896 / Fax (727) 391-2698 www.seasubsystems.com 6. Eason Diving & Marine Construction 2668 Spruill Ave. Charleston, SC 29405 Telephone: (843) 747-0548 / Fax (843) 747-2728 www.easondiving.com 7. T&T Salvage, LLC 8717 Humble Westfield Rd. Humble, TX 77338 Houston Office: (281) 446-4010, www.ttsalvage.com Heavy Lift Capabilities: 1. Resolve Marine Group 1850 SE 17th St, Suite 204 Ft. Lauderdale, FL. 33316 Telephone: (954) 764-8700 / Fax (954) 764-8724 www.resplvemarine.com 2. Titan Maritime, LLC 700 NW 33rd Street, Suite 290 Pompano Beach, FL 33064 Telephone: (954) 545-4143 / Fax (954) 545-4552 www.titansalvage.com 3. T & T Bisso Response 11311 Neeshaw Drive Houston, TX 77065

Telephone: (713) 534-0700 www.ttbisso.com

8320 Sector St. Petersburg Notifications

Once Sector St. Petersburg receives a report of a fire, the following agencies shall be notified: Appropriate Fire Department Florida Department of Environmental Protection – oil pollution

http://www.seasubsystems.com/

http://www.easondiving.com/

http://www.ttsalvage.com/

http://www.resplvemarine.com/

http://www.titansalvage.com/

http://www.ttbisso.com/


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Tampa Bay P ilots Tampa Port Authority Vessel/Facility Owner/Operator Local Police agencies Seventh Coast Guard District Any other agency deemed necessary by IC or COTP.

8330 Coast Guard Initial Actions

On receipt of this information, the COTP will notify and consult with other interested parties, determine the movement of the vessel to be allowed and initiate a plan of action. The COTP's duties will include the following:

Continued overall safety of the port. Continuous monitoring of the entire incident. Provide a liaison or On-Scene Commander, in order to coordinate efforts with

the fire chief and provide the necessary assistance. Provide a source of portable means of communications, i.e. MX300 hand held

radios, cellular phones, etc.

8340 Fire Department Actions

Upon arriving at the scene, the fire chief assumes charge of all aspects of the firefighting operation. This action does not relieve the master of his command of his vessel. However, the master shall place himself and his crew at the disposal of the fire chief. At no time shall the vessel's crew or other agencies or groups, either from shoreside or waterside, engage in independent firefighting activities without the consent of the fire chief. The fire chief's duties include the following as appropriate:

In charge of all firefighting operations, both from the shoreside and waterside. Formulate a plan for fighting the fire that also addresses the safety of personnel

and property. Procure needed firefighting equipment, material and manpower. Direct the activities of all personnel and equipment engaged in firefighting. Obtain damage control plans, damage stability data and stability information

from the vessel. Request assistance from local police for traffic and crowd control. Request assistance from the local bridge authority to control bridge openings

during the transport of injured persons. Request assistance of local hospitals and doctors for medical requirements. Request assistance of Red Cross units for aid to survivors. Request ambulance service, and activate mass casualty plans as appropriate. Consider the adverse effects to the vessel’s stability due to the introduction of

firefighting water into the vessels interior. Establish a workable communication system with units engaged in firefighting

operations, police department, civil defense and other agencies directly engaged in the overall operation.

8350 Firefighting Alternatives

A major vessel fire may occur at anchor, away from the resources necessary to combat it. On the other hand, a vessel fire may get out of control and endanger the facility where it is moored.


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Vessels, other than those aground or involved in a collision, may be maneuvered away from further damage or brought to a location that will optimize access for firefighting equipment. It is prudent to consider as a planning step, the selection of several areas to fight a vessel fire. Both marine terminals and anchorages should be considered so as to cover the possibility of a vessel fire getting out of hand, necessitating the moving of the vessel to an isolated area. The Captain of the Port is the controlling authority for permitting or directing the movement of a vessel and will, when feasible, work with impacted municipalities on positioning burning vessels within the harbor.

8360 Initial Fire Response Checklist

The following checklist is not all-inclusive. It should be used as a guide for initial considerations at an incident. Establish a identify Command Post location. Establish Incident Command System (ICS). Establish security perimeter (waterside and shore side).

De te rmine if ha za rdous ma te ria ls a re involve d Identify and communicate Offensive or Defensive tactical considerations.

Offensive Plan: Fire ca n be controlle d or e xtinguis he d Fire ca n be confined to pa rt of the ve s s e l P rope rty ca n be prote cte d or saved on the vessel Live s ca n be s a ve d, pe rs ons ca n be re s cue d on the ve s s e l Defensive Plan: Fire out of control Incide nt s itua tion dra s tica lly cha nge s a nd force s a move to De fe ns ive P la n: Explos ion, ra pid fire s pre a d Ha za rdous Ma te ria ls involved Dra s tic s ta bility s itua tion De a th or s e rious injury to re s pons e pe rs onne l S urround a nd drown Le t incide nt s ta bilize its e lf Move ve s s e l to a le s s impa cte d loca tion Be a ch, ground or s cuttle ve s s e l - consult Coast Guard, Corps of Engineers

Identify Objectives. Rescue endangered persons. Perform actions to keep incident from enlarging, and protect exposures. Stop cargo transfer, bunkering or dangerous cargo operations. Contact responsible persons for information and assistance.

Ma ster/Chief Mate/Chief Engineer Ge ne ra l a rra ngement of ve s s e l ca rgo s itua tion s ta bility ope ra tion of s hip’s sys te ms fire prote ction equipme nt a nd s ys tems fue l/ba lla s t ta nks utility s hutoffs ge ne ra tors de wa te ring

Te rmina l Manager/Owner Obtain sources of information about the vessel.

Fire P la n (found ne a r top of ga ngwa y in wa te r-tight container or in


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Master’s/Chief Mate’s office) Ge ne ra l Arra ngement P la n Ca pa city P la n Da nge rous Ca rgo Ma nife s t (found ne a r bridge or in Chief Mate’s office) Ca rgo S towa ge P lan Trim a nd S ta bility Bookle t S ta bility a nd liquid ca rgo compute r programs Cre w a nd pa s s e nge r lis ts Ma te ria l S a fe ty Da ta S he e ts for Ha za rdous a nd Da nge rous Ca rgo Ve s s e l Re s pons e P la n

Investigate fire and gather needed information to deal with the incident. Determine life hazard situation. Determine if stability, flooding or related damage control problems exist. Determine fire situation. Determine status and condition of ship’s fire protection systems and equipment

Fire Ma in Inte rna tiona l s hore conne ction a nd ma nifold loca tion S upple me nt s hip’s fire ma in s ys te m with s hore s ide wa te r a nd pre s s ure Fire s ta tion loca tion a nd equipme nt (type s of couplings /thre a ds ) Compa tibility with fire de pa rtme nt’s equipment Fire pumps

Wate r s pra y or s prinkle r s ys te ms Foa m s ys tems HALON loca lize d a nd tota l flooding s ys tems Ca rbon Dioxide loca lize d a nd tota l flooding s ys te ms Dry Che mica l s ys tems , twin a ge nt s ys te ms S te am smothe ring Fixe d monitors Emergency gear and Damage Control lockers and contents He a t de te ction s ys te ms , S moke de te ction s ys te ms Fire ra te d bulkhe a ds , zone s , doors Ide ntify loca tions of control va lve s , a ge nt s tora ge conta ine rs De te rmine me thods of ope ra tion of fire protection systems Re mote wa te r-tight and fire doors Ine rt Ga s s ys tems Take control of ship’s fire protection systems. Determine status and take control of ship’s other systems (Ventilation,

propulsion, cargo) Contact outside additional resources for assistance and expertise. Review cargo considerations, if applicable. Expand Incident Command System as needed to handle incident. Continually reevaluate operations and make changes as required.

8370 Firefighting Operations

Establish water supply to vessel Set fire boundaries Use minimum amount of water to accomplish task Take actions to remove/dewater firefighting water Continually investigate all areas of fire boundary for fire spread Consider using thermal imagers and taking temperature readings Secure ventilation and all openings to fire area


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Secure utilities, electrical and any fuel supplies to fire area Install floating booms around vessel or incident scene to contain debris and

pollution Monitor vessel stability throughout incident Note changes in draft marks, inclinometers, etc.

Be wa re of la rge a ccumula tions of wa te r a bove ve s s e l’s wa te rline S e cure ope nings in hull to pre ve nt wa te r e nte ring ve s s e l s hould lis t occur Obta in te chnica l a s s is ta nce to de te rmine s ta bility s itua tion a nd recommend corrective actions Begin a dequate dewatering operations

Mobilized and position sufficient personnel and hoselines, appliances, and extinguishing agents to control and extinguish fire

Coordinate ventilation of fire area with fire attack Provide for sufficient rotation of personnel to maintain continuous extinguishing

effort Beware of pressure buildup in secured spaces and maintain escape routes Begin necessary salvage operations When possible, set fire watch and begin overhaul and fire cause investigation

8380 Machinery & Engineering Space Fire

These types of spaces and compartments usually have extensive amounts of fuel piping, lubricating oils, and electrical systems and wiring. There are also numerous sources of ignition and reigniting. These spaces also may have large, open areas that can encompass several decks.

Determine cause of fire Le aking fue l Ele ctrica l Othe r

Shut off all fuel flow to the space Secure electrical power to the space Close and secure all doors, hatches, ventilation ducts, dampers, and other

openings to the space Determine fire conditions Interview the crew Visual indicators Actual investigation Quick Attack: fire is small enough to extinguish with portable extinguishers, large

fixed extinguishers and/or 1-2 hoselines. Conditions include minimum smoke, heat, and adequate visibility.

Fire too large for Quick Attack: Re s cue a ny tra pped pe rs ons , if pos s ible S e cure a ll ope nings to s pa ce until minima l smoke is e s ca ping Es ta blis h prima ry a nd s e conda ry fire bounda rie s Activa te Fixe d Fire Extinguis hing S ys tem for involve d s pa ce , if available:

Ca rbon Dioxide , HALON, Foam, Sprinklers, etc. Ma y involve s e ve ra l va lve s in diffe re nt loca tions to dis cha rge the agent Us e a ve s s e l-engineering officer, if available, or other experienced person from marine community to activate the system


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If a ny smoke is e s ca ping from the involved space, so will the extinguishing agent Cons ide r s upple menting the fixe d s ys te m with s hore-side supplies of extinguishing agent

8400 PLANNING 8410 Tampa Bay Specific Scenarios

A vessel fire can be very dynamic, but there are aspects which will remain constant. The unknown and constantly changing factors are what bear watching. On scene emergencies are to be expected and will be handled according to local protocol. When an incident requires resources exceeding those of the local fire department, mutual aid can be requested through normal protocol procedures. When it becomes apparent that local resources are not adequate for the situation the IC can request additional equipment and personnel through the State of Florida Division of Emergency Management. This will activate the Florida State Disaster Plan and resources from across the state will be organized and sent to the incident site. Responding units will be issued an incident action plan which will identify operational radio frequencies and location of staging areas. The decision to allow a burning vessel to proceed into the port will be decided on a case-by-case basis. This decision is made by the COTP with recommendations from the port authorities, the local fire departments, and harbor pilots. The Tampa Port Authority has designated berths 208 and 209 as docks available fire-fighting purposes. Manatee County Port Authority has designated berth 6 for this purpose. A temporary explosive anchorage area is also available. The area is referenced by a triangulated point. The point is located south of Gadsden Point, north of Cut G and north of Gadsden Point Cut. After a fire has been extinguished, overhaul is initiated to insure complete extinguishment and to clear the atmosphere of toxic fumes. During this phase of operation all personnel will be required to wear respiratory protection (self-contained breathing apparatus, SCBA). No one will be allowed to remove this gear until the atmosphere has been tested and certified as safe. This will be accomplished by either the fire departments HAZMAT Team or a certified marine chemiSt. This is an OSHA requirement and will be strictly adhered to. When a clean atmosphere has been determined the Operations Branch Director will be notified as well as the IC.

The following are some examples of what might happen during a marine fire incident:

• Waterfront Facility

An explosion was heard by Sector St. Petersburg personnel who visually observe smoke at the CATT facility in the Port of Tampa. The watch-stander is notified and, in turn, calls the 911 operator and requests the Tampa Fire and Tampa Police Departments. The 911 operator tells the watch-stander they've received a call from CATT-Corporation reporting an explosion and fire at the shore-side facility and the Tampa Fire Department and Tampa Police Department are enroute. The watch-stander briefs the Port Management Officer regarding the situation. The Port Management Duty Officer notifies the USCG Sector Command Center (SCC) of the situation. The watch-stander contacts CATT and is informed that the fire and explosion occurred at a pipeline manifold due to a welding and cutting operation. A call from the Tampa


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Fire Department requests Coast Guard assistance because of severe explosions and fire on the CATT facility. The COTP closes the Port in the vicinity of CATT redirecting vessel traffic and issues an Urgent Marine Information Broadcast (UMIB). The watch-stander notifies D7 (cc/m), FMP, Tampa Bay Pilots and the Tampa Port Authority of the situation. Sector St. Petersburg dispatches response team members. Upon arrival, unit personnel are briefed by the TFD District Chief on the status of the fire. The District Chief states he is the Incident Commander and the fire is under control. A Coast Guard Small Boat patrols the safety zone and reports to the SCC that no pollution is observed. CATT personnel deploy precautionary boom around their facility to suppress any pollution that may occur. Subsequently, the Tampa Fire Department reports the fire is out. Coast Guard Personnel report no pollution has entered the waterway. The COTP lifts restrictions and reopens the port. Coast Guard personnel return to the unit after an on scene debrief with the Tampa Fire Department Incident Commander. Sector St. Petersburg debriefs D7, FMP, Pilots and Port Authority. Sector St. Petersburg cancels the UMIB and releases a sitrep one and final message. Debriefing of Sector personnel is conducted by the Port Management Duty Officer. Sector's Public Affairs Officer issues a press release. Lessons Learned meetings are held later and the Sector St. Petersburg Marine Fire-fighting Response plan is updated from lessons learned agenda items. The After Action report is completed and mailed to D7(m).

• Tank Vessel

The tank ship NONAME transmits on CH-16 that it is on fire 1 mile northwest of Egmont Key. Lacking resources necessary to combat a major shipboard fire the crew faces a fire which intensifies to catastrophic proportions. Additionally, there exists the threat of a major pollution incident, which could threaten several highly sensitive environmental areas. Sector St. Petersburg Command Center monitors the incident and immediately initiates an Urgent Marine Information Broadcast (UMIB) thereby closing the main shipping channel to vessel traffic. Sector St. Petersburg's Duty Officer gathers incident information and immediately notifies 911 and notifies Sector St. Petersburg's Response Organization. Sector Marine Inspectors, Response Team members, and the Port Management Duty Officer respond to the incident scene. A Coast Guard small boat from Station Cortez reports the tank ship is 30% engulfed in fire and several hundred gallons of JP-8 fuel is in the water. The Commanding Officer, Sector St. Petersburg is designated as the Federal on Scene Coordinator. A Unified Command System is established that includes a State Representative, Responsible Party Representative, and a senior Staff Officer from the lead fire department in addition to the COTP. Safety zones are set up by a COTP order redirecting vessel traffic and maintaining control of waters surrounding the burning tank ship. As the tanker burns out of control, the crew abandons ship. A Coast Guard cutter arrives on scene to act as the forward command post and assist in rescue efforts. The Unified Command requests additional foam supplies from MacDill AFB. The foam is sling loaded onto Coast Guard and Army National Guard HH-60 helicopters and delivered to the designated staging area. USAR Landing Craft (LCM-8) arrive at the staging area and transport fire fighters, foam, and assorted equipment to the scene. Additional tugs with fire-fighting capabilities from Bay Transportation are also requested to assist in fire-fighting efforts. With all agencies working together, the tank vessel fire is finally brought under control and eventually extinguished. Ongoing booming operations have limited any potential pollution problems. Gulf Strike Team Personnel arrive on scene and ensure all products from the damaged tank ship is safely lightered to tank barges.

• Freight Ship


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As another hot and humid afternoon in August passes, the freight vessel JANE SMITH completes her loading and prepares to get underway. A deck hand is making his way forward between the topside bundles of lumber and notices smoke about 200 feet ahead of him in the area of the #1 hold. He retreats to the superstructure to sound the fire alarm and gathers his fire-fighting gear. There is a rapid increase in the amount of smoke, which completely obstructs the bow of the ship. From the bridge, the master orders the fire team to assemble and extinguish the fire. Within a few moments the fire is reported to the Tampa Fire Department and the U.S. Coast Guard. The fire team advances a hand line to the vicinity of the smoke and commences to search for the fire. Moving between the tightly stacked bundles of lumber quickly exhausts their air Supply. It becomes necessary to retreat for a fresh supply of air bottles. Upon returning, they find one bundle on the main deck completely engulfed in flames. The flames have also engulfed the two bundles above it along with ones on either side. The master immediately orders the onboard cranes to remove all the surrounding uninvolved bundles of lumber in order to allow easier access and limit further damage. When the onboard fire crew reports their findings to the master, he orders an additional fire crew to provide exposure protection. The fire crews are making little headway when the fire department arrives and begins setting up for an onboard fire. At this point the fire has been burning for over fifteen (15) minutes. Upon arrival by fire department units, flames are forty (40) feet above the deck level and spreading towards the bow. The Fire Department establishes an Incident Command System and requests a third alarm assignment. An Incident Command Center is established on shore with a Command Post placed on the bridge of the burning vessel. The Incident Commander assigns personnel to the Operations, Planning, and Logistics Sections. Upon request, a Mate comes to the Command Center and a Fire Department Officer reports to the bridge of the vessel. The Port Management Department Head arrives on scene and confers with the Incident Commander. Subsequently, an Urgent Marine Information Broadcast (UMIB) is issued by Sector St. Petersburg. The area surrounding the burning vessel is temporarily closed to all vessel traffic. With the Incident Command System in place, a staging area is designated. Communications have segregated the frequencies into Fire Operations, Air Operations, Marine Operations, Planning, Command, and Logistics/Supply Operations. Emergency Medical Services has set up triage and necessary evacuation. Fire Operations are setting up for a fierce fire attack. The crane operator advises that the center stack of lumber is beginning to lean at the same time the fire crew notices the danger and begins to withdraw from the area. As the crane operator removes a bundle next to the center, the stack topples inboard and the fire intensifies. The Incident Command request another two alarms and orders Logistics/Supply to obtain additional fire apparatus from MacDill AFB and de-watering pumps from the U.S. Coast Guard. The fire continues to rage for several more hours. Through solid leadership, good communications, and the use of proper equipment and supplies, the fire is eventually extinguished. Any loss of life was eliminated due to training, planning, and the quality of participation of those men and women who battled the blaze.


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• Bulk Solid Cargo Vessel A citrus bulk carrier has just completed loading citrus pellets when the dock load master reports smoke coming from #3 hold. The ship's watch-stander sounds the fire alarm bringing the Master to the Bridge and alerting the ship's fire-fighting teams. Two fire-fighting teams muster at the gear lockers and prepare for an attack using a charged hose line. One team proceeds into the hold while the other stands by for any rescue that may be needed. The entry team radios that "there is more than one fire", and another team is requested to assist. The Master orders the second team in while a third team readies for rescue. He orders the two fixed deck monitors to be manned and to standby for further orders. The two entry teams report that they are not making any progress. The fire is deep inside and has spread to several locations. The Master orders the entry teams out and notifies the U.S. Coast Guard that assistance is needed. `The Sector Watch-stander receives the radio report and requests appropriate communications be set up with the Master. He also notifies the 911 operator of the fire and that local fire-fighting units are needed. He requests detailed information from the Master and in turn relays all the information to the Duty Officer. The Duty Officer confers with the SCC. Response personnel are immediately dispatched to the ship. The Fire Department arrives on scene and establishes an Incident Command System. After conferring with the Master and Coast Guard personnel, the I.C. decides to off load all cargo in number 3 hold. Firefighters are instructed to extinguish involved areas, as they become visible during this operation. The hold is emptied within 3 hours and a marine chemist certifies the atmosphere safe to resume normal work procedures.

• Passenger Vessel The passenger vessel MAJESTIC VACATION radios that she is on fire in Port Manatee while passengers are in the process of boarding. The Master immediately orders an evacuation of all passengers; all cabins are checked and marked by designated crew members. The vessel reports that she has a main-space fire in the engine room due to a ruptured fuel hose, which has spewed fuel onto the main electrical generators. Because of the fire's intensity, the crew of the burning passenger vessel is unable to control the blaze. The Chief Engineer orders everyone to evacuate the engine room. The crew evacuates the burning engine room and immediately activates C02 flooding system to extinguish the blaze. Another small explosion rips through the engine room thereby eliminating the total effectiveness of the C02 system, which allows the fire to continue to burn. Sector St. Petersburg SCC gathers all information regarding the fire. Sector St. Petersburg initiates notifications using the Watch Quarter Station Bill and the Marine Fire Fighting Plan, which will activate the response organization. The Sector St. Petersburg Operations watch-stander monitors the situation and immediately initiates an Urgent Marine Information Broadcast (UMIB) temporarily closing the port. The North River Fire Department arrives on scene and initiates the Incident Command System and establishes a Command Center on shore and a Command Post on the bridge of the ship. Fire Department personnel initiate their own search of passenger cabins and report all passengers have been evacuated.

A request for assistance is made to the County Emergency Operations Center. Bradenton, Sarasota County, and Tampa Fire Departments are contacted and respond units within ten


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(10) minutes. All responding agencies have been instructed to have a representative at the Command Center and that each agency will maintain operational control of their personnel with the understanding that overall strategy is ultimately determined by the Incident Commander. The COTP redirects vessel traffic by establishing a safety zone, thus controlling the waters surrounding the MAJESTIC VACATION. A Coast Guard Patrol Boat arrives on scene to assist with water borne operations. The Incident Commander tasks his logistics officer with obtaining de-watering equipment, foam, and transportation equipment. Additional foam is requested from MacDill AFB and, if necessary, from the Atlantic Training Group in Jacksonville. Local tugboat companies that have fire fighting capabilities have been requested to assist. Within an hour, resources begin to report to the staging area. The USCG Auxiliary is maintaining the safety zone in conjunction the USCG’s small boats and FMP. The fire spreads from the engine room to adjoining sections of the vessel. The fire reaches proportions, which are well beyond the crew's control. An order by the ships Master directs the crew to evacuate the burning vessel. The IC orders all fire fighting entities to converge and assist in controlling and extinguishing the blaze. As thousands of gallons of water is poured onto the blaze, Coast Guard P-250 de-watering pumps are activated to pump off excess water, thus maintaining the ships stability. The fire is reported under control, then extinguished. Re-flash watches have been set as overhaul teams proceed to remove debris. When the atmosphere is determined to be safe, USCG Investigators secure the scene and begin investigations into the cause of the casualty.

• Tank Barge The Tug FRED SMITH and Tank Barge B-909 are inbound approaching the Jones Oil Company Dock when the barge separates unexpectedly. Subsequently, the barge collides with the dock rupturing the hull and igniting a large three-dimensional fire. Jones employees place simultaneous calls to The Tampa Fire Department and Coast Guard. The first on scene T~D unit calls for additional units and places 2 master stream devices in service to cool the unburned portion of the barges hull. The Incident Command System is established and a Command Center is designated at the Jones Facility Office. Within a few minutes it is reported that several hundred gallons of fuel has leaked into the water. The COTP, Florida DEP representative, Jones Oil Company manager and a Fire Dept Officer hold their first meeting within 1 hour of the collision. Meanwhile large amounts of fire fighting foam begin to arrive on scene from the Tampa and the MacDill AFB Fire Departments. Coast Guard and Florida Marine Patrol boats are now enforcing a safety zone established by the COTP. With a combined effort from the Tampa Fireboat, MacDill AFB crash trucks and TFD pumpers, the fire is extinguished by a massive foam blanket. Coast Guard personnel supervise booming operations while foam is reapplied every few minutes to ensure re-ignition does not occur. It is two days before all the fuel is of f loaded from the Barge B-909 and cleanup operations are completed by the Responsible Party's pollution cleanup Contractors.

• Liquefied Gas Carrier The LPG Barge SAMPSON is off loading product at the Bear Petroleum Facility. At approximately 2330 hours, with limited visibility due to fog conditions, an outbound tug strikes the barge. An above deck tank is ruptured and ignites in a large fireball. The loading arm is broken at the swivel joint and fire begins at this location. The crew of the tug and barge escape without injury. The facility calls 911 requesting the Tampa Fire Department. A second call is made to the USCG MSO watch-stander. The barge crew and a Bear Petroleum employee activate two land side water monitors in a effort to cool the adjacent LPG tanks on the barge.


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Tampa Fire Department units arrive on scene and immediately pressurize the facilities main fire system. Additional master streams are placed in service to cool exposures. The facility manager arrives on scene and immediately confers with the Incident Commander on details about the barge and facility piping system. Upon notification from the SCC the COTP issues an Urgent Marine Information Broadcast (UMIB) temporarily closing all traffic to the shipping channel at Rattlesnake point. Subsequently, a Florida Marine Patrol Boat from the Gandy District Office arrives on scene and enforces the Security Zone. Through advice given by the facility manager and barge crew, the product is isolated from the ruptured tank by activating two gate valves and a small fire in the loading arm is allowed to burn itself out. Hose stream operations are continued for several hours as a precautionary measure. After the scene is declared safe an investigation team from Sector St. Petersburg commences an official inquiry to determine the cause of the accident.

• Passenger Vessel II The passenger vessel SILENT SAM is inbound approaching the Sea Buoy at Egmont Channel when a cook reports a kitchen fire to the Master. He directs fire suppression teams to the fire area and orders all passengers to the main deck. Crewmembers search and mark all passenger cabins. The fire-fighting teams are unable to control and contain the fire. The fire spreads into the main dining area. The status of the fire is reported to Coast Guard Sector St. Petersburg. SECTOR ST. PETERSBURG notifies appropriate agencies including area Fire Departments. The Master requests firefighting equipment and personnel be assembled at the Seaport Street Terminal in the Port of Tampa. Subsequently a Coast Guard Patrol Boat arrives on scene and boards the vessel. Coast Guard personnel verify the fire is Out of control and that all passengers are temporarily safe on the main deck. The *COTP orders the Master to divert to Port Manatee because of fire conditions and a need to evacuate passengers expeditiously. Coast Guard patrol boats and a fireboat from the Sarasota County Fire Department escort the burning vessel to awaiting tugs that maneuver the ship into Berth #6. Area fire departments under an Incident Commander from the North River Fire Department begin an emergency evacuation of the ship. All passenger and crew cabins are searched and marked by fire-fighting personnel. Fire-fighting teams from TAMPA and North River locate and extinguish the fire within 3 hours. De-watering equipment is activated and re-flash watches are established. No casualties are reported from the list of passengers, crew, or responding firefighters. Once the onboard atmosphere is certified to be safe, Coast Guard investigative teams board the vessel and begin work on determining the cause of the fire.

• Passenger Vessel III The gambling vessel JIM JONES is inbound, approximately ten miles off St. Petersburg when an engine room fire is reported to the Master. He immediately orders a fire suppression team to the engine room and all passengers to egress areas of the exterior main deck. While the fire-fighting team is fighting the fire, other crewmembers ensure that all passengers are accounted for. The Coast Guard is notified and patrol boats are dispatched to the area. The engine room reports to the Master that a complete loss of power has occurred. Owners arrange for the orderly evacuation of passengers by another company owned vessel. Coast Guard Patrol Boats arrive on scene within thirty minutes. Within forty-five minutes the fire is extinguished. The transfer of passengers occurs within two hours of extinguishment. Subsequently the vessel is towed to the Port of Tampa for repairs.


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• Anhydrous Ammonia Ship Fire

The anhydrous ammonia ship Luigi La Grange is inbound to CFI with 18,000 metric tons of Anhydrous Ammonia (NH3). The Tampa pilot has just reached the bridge when the Captain is notified that a fire has broken out in the engine room. The source of the fire has not been identified, but is spreading rapidly. The Chief Engineer reports that a fire crew has not been able to contain the fire using portable extinguishers, and is evacuating the engine room. He recommends discharging the CO2 flood system. The Master immediately notifies Coast Guard Sector St. Petersburg, confirms that the engine casing is evacuated and orders the CO2 flood system activated. Group St. Petersburg dispatches a 41’ UTB. SCC notifies St. Petersburg Fire/Rescue and Sector St. Petersburg. The Captain has reported his position as Mullet Key Channel approaching marker 23, just west of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge. His on scene weather is sunny, temperature @ 92 degrees, humidity @ 90%, winds SW @ 08 knots, and visibility, 20 miles. Within 10 minutes, the Master notifies Group that the fire suppression system has failed to extinguish the fire, and the fire has spread to the cabin, due to the failure of the engine casing fire door automatic closer. The COTP closes the port and issues an Urgent Marine Information Broadcast (UMIB). The SCC notifies District 7(cc/m), FMP, Tampa Bay Pilots and Tampa Port Authority of the situation, and status of the Port. The COTP orders the vessel to drop anchor west of the Sunshine Skyway until Tugs can arrive to assiSt. The Master indicates that he has lost main engine and electrical power, and is using the auxiliary fire pumps to cool the NH3 tanks. The auxiliary generator is sufficient to run all of the compressors to cool the liquid, and he is directing the crew to attempt to concentrate on re-circulating those tanks closest to the fire. Fire is now visible in the stern of the vessel, from shore. The St. Petersburg F.D. establishes an Incident Command Center at Ft. De Soto, and has dispatched a senior fire officer on board the 41’ UTB to serve as On Scene Commander, until a more suitable vessel arrives on scene. Communications between the OSC and the Master are established using hand held VHF/FM marine radios. It is decided to concentrate efforts on cooling the product tanks using the ship’s fire fighting system and fog monitors on tugs, and abandon major fire fighting efforts. The COTP requests tugs from Bay Transportation, Maritrans and Gulf Coast Transit to assist in fire fighting operations, and move the vessel if necessary. NOAA is requested to provide data and charts on winds and weather projections for the next 72-hour period. The Incident Command Center is established at Pinellas County EOC, and after meeting with the FDOSC and RP, it is determined that the vessel must be moved to the outer anchorage. Four tugs are used to tow the vessel back to the off shore anchorage.

8420 Considerations in Selecting a Shoreside Location to fight a Shipboard Fire

The first consideration should be that the pier is noncombustible. Consideration should also be given to the location, so as to not place adjacent areas in danger. A large area should be available for staging equipment and briefing firefighters. Public access should be easily controllable. The depth of the water alongside the pier should be enough at low tide to allow for the navigation of all vessels involved. The depth should however, not be so deep as to cover the burning vessel’s main deck in the event of sinking. The bottom contour should be level or nearly so, and if possible be of a sandy composition. A sloping bottom may allow a sunken vessel to slide off into deeper water, where it might capsize. Pre-designated locations have not yet been developed but are intended to be in later revisions of this plan. Under the authority of Executive order 10173, the Coast Guard may supervise or control the movement of any vessel within the territorial waters of the United States when such action is necessary to secure a vessel from damage or injury, or to prevent damage to a


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waterfront facility. The Commandant has delegated this authority to the COTP (per 33 CFR 6), who may promulgate orders to move vessels for preventive or reactive reasons. Such orders, if issued, would have to be coordinated with all involved parties, including industry leaders, the Incident commander, the Army Corps of Engineers, and other response agencies. A vessel should not be moved if the risk to personnel, property, and safety of the port would be considered too high or unacceptable. A burning vessel may be moved, however, if a serious risk to people, property, and commerce exists, and it appears that moving the vessel would minimize or eliminate the risk. Prior to moving a burning vessel in port, the following factors should be considered: • Hazards posed to people, property, and commerce at the vessel’s present site, versus

those at a proposed location. • Class and nature of the cargo. • Possibility of Explosion. • Possibility of the vessel sinking, capsizing, or blocking a channel or berth. • Location and extent of the fire. • Route over which the vessel must travel. • Availability of an alternate site. • Maneuverability of the vessel. • Effect on bridges to be transited. • Weather, present and forecasted. • Risk of pollution • Advantages gained by moving the vessel. • Agreement with response agencies and involved parties. • Legal considerations (See below). The Federal Tort Claims Act (28 USC 2671, et seq.) exempts the U.S. government from liability where the loss or damage results from the exercise of a discretionary government function. For example, if a fire causes the government to move a vessel from one location to another, the loss of time or the damage caused by the operation in obedience to the movement order cannot be made the basis of a successful claim against the government. However, if the owner or master of the vessel refuses to comply with the order, and the COTP directs the movement of the vessel to a new location, and the vessel is damaged through negligence in the towing operation, there would be a basis for claim against the Government (See Dalehite et al. v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).

8430 Considerations in Selecting Firefighting Anchorages

The considerations for the selection of a shoreside firefighting location may also be applied to a firefighting anchorage. Additional requirements are that the anchorage be located so as not to constitute a hazard to navigation and so that firefighting resources can reach anchorage. A main objective is to select a location which will be as accessible as possible and will facilitate salvage operations, yet not place port facilities in jeopardy.

8440 Vessel Information

8441 Lay-up Status


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Vessels which fail to depart within the normal time frames and vessels requesting entry to port for repairs or for other reasons not involving cargo operations may be treated as a vessel in a "lay-up" status. Vessels in this category will need the approval of the COTP to remain in port or to enter port. They must meet the requirements for a vessel in a "lay-up" status. The requirements include contingency plans pertaining to firefighting, tugboat assistance and emergency communications plans between shore and shipkeeping crews. Profiles of all vessels that are categorized as vessels in lay-up status are located at Sector St. Petersburg.

8442 Plans and Vessel Data

Passenger ships of over 100 gross tons which have staterooms for more that 50 passengers must have plans available for the following:

Damage Stability, as required by Regulation 7, Chapter II, SOLAS

1960 or Regulation 8, Chapter II-1, SOLAS 1974. Stability Information, as required by Regulation 19, Chapter II,

SOLAS 1960 or Regulation 22, Chapter II-1, SOLAS 1974. Damage Control Plans, as required by Regulation 20, Chapter II,

SOLAS 1960 or Regulation 23, Chapter II-1, SOLAS 1974. Fire Control plans, as required by Regulation 70, Chapter II, SOLAS

1960, or Regulation 20, Chapter II-2, SOLAS 1974.

In all ships, a duplicate set of fire control plans or a booklet containing such plans shall be permanently stored in a prominently marked weather tight enclosure outside the deckhouse for the assistance of shoreside firefighting personnel as required by Regulation 20, Chapter II-2, SOLAS 1974.

8443 International Shore Connection

All passenger ships of 100 gross tones and more and/or more than 250 feet in length, when moored to a berth, shall have sufficient length of fire hose to reach from the ship to the pier. One end of the hose shall be connected to the ship's fire main system at all times and, in accordance with Regulation 55(h), Chapter II, SOLAS 1960, shall be equipped with an international shore connection.

8444 Passenger Ship in Port Fire Watch

The need for prompt reaction to the presence of smoke or fire on board passenger ships requires that critical systems be capable of immediate use. The bridge and engine room control spaces are the main center of communications (internal and external) throughout the vessel. While passengers are on board, the bridge and engine room control spaces will be manned by qualified individuals of sufficient training and experience to initiate a prompt and effective response to the detection of smoke and/or fire on board the vessel which includes the sounding of crew and passenger alarms.


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8500 LOGISTICS 8510 Local Response Resources

8511 General Resources

A complete list of Personnel and Services Directory may be located in Section 9200 of the St. Petersburg Area Contingency Plan. Section 9100 contains a list of Emergency Notifications. Section 9700 supplies a List of Response Resources including Geographic Response Plans, Sensitive Area Information, Chemical Countermeasures, a Field Operations Guide, ICS Forms, and an NCP Product LiSt. An example of an Incident Action Plan can be located in Section 9300. A list of Tampa Bay Area towing companies will be found in the Area Contingency Plan under Section 9240.

8511.11 Captain of the Port

The COTP is responsible for safety of harbor and facilities. The COTP can mobilize Coast Guard resources to control vessel traffic, provide limited planning and hazardous material assessment and conduct stability assessment in the case of a vessel fire. Coast Guard representative will control all Coast Guard forces and maintain liaison with the fire chief. The Captain of the Port is the controlling authority for the movement of a vessel and firefighting activities which may affect the stability of vessel or present a greater threat to the port.

8511.12 Police Department (Law Enforcement)

Local law enforcement is responsible for crowd and traffic control. They are responsible for maintaining law and order as well as assists in shoreside evacuations and shoreside safety zones.

8511.13 Vessel Master

The vessel master is ultimately responsible for the vessel and, as such, must assist the fire department in every way possible. He/she can provide vessels stability information, damage stability data and fire control plans.

8511.14 Terminal Manager

The terminal manager is ultimately responsible for facility, and as such must assist fire department in every way. The Terminal Manager can provide detailed information on layout, location of cargo, and provide additional personnel to assist firefighters.

8511.15 Vessel Agents

Vessel agents are responsible for the arrangement of pilots and tugs, environmental protection, equipment or other assistance when directed by vessel owner or master.

8511.16 Marine Chemist

Marine Chemists are consultants paid for health and safety advice. They have the equipment and expertise to obtain temperature readings, check for the presence and concentrations of gases and, in some instances, provide needed advice to the firefighting forces concerning the nature of chemical related hazards encountered.


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8511.17 Corps of Engineers

The Corps of Engineers is responsible for the maintenance of navigable channels for commerce. A representative will be consulted if planning is made to position a distressed vessel within the harbor. The Corps of Engineers and Captain of the Port will consult in the placement of the vessel so as not to create a hazard to navigation.

8511.18 Naval Architect

The naval architect determines stability and conditions of ship in consultation with the Master, Chief Mate and/or Chief Engineer. When there is a question of stability the Captain of the Port may recommend that operations be curtailed and require the ships master to have the ship inspected by a Naval Architect/Surveyor before allowing resumption of firefighting operations.

8511.19 Pilots Association

Pilotage laws require that a pilot be on board for all large vessel movements. Local pilots associations should be contacted to determine the best method of shiphandling and the possible location for firefighting staging areas, given current weather conditions.

8512 Firefighting Equipment Summary

A complete listing of Firefighting Resources is listed in Appendix 9270 of this plan. 8520 Communications

8521 Marine Communications

All Coast Guard forces employed in support of a firefighting effort, whether afloat or ashore, will be equipped with radios to communicate on VHF-FM channels. Channel 23A will be the primary working channel between Coast Guard units. Channel 23A VHF-FM, primary, and Channel 21A VHF-FM, secondary, shall be used between Coast Guard, Navy, commercial vessels fighting fire, and FD’s Fire boat. Channel 16 will be used to direct general vessel traffic.

8522 Harbor Traffic Control

Coast Guard units will direct vessel traffic on Channel 22A and/or Channel 16 VHF-FM. 8523 Shore Communications

The on scene frequency will be that of the controlling fire department. Inter-department communications will initially result from existing mutual assistance agreements.

8600 Finance 8610 General


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In most cases, each responding agency will be responsible for funding their own efforts. This may include a fire department billing the owners of the vessel or terminal for resources used during the response. In situations where the fire poses a threat or causes a release of oil or hazardous materials, the Coast Guard can access federal funds to mitigate the pollution threat. Depending on the situation, mitigation may include funding firefighting efforts.

8620 Federal Funds

In the event that the fire involves a threat or release of oil or hazardous materials, the Coast Guard COTP, acting in his role as the pre-designated Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC) for oil and hazardous material spills for the coastal zone, may access federal funds to mitigate the pollution threat. Federal funds can be accessed if the FOSC determines that the vessel or terminal owner/operator lacks funding to provide response resources or refuses to fund resources. In such a situation, the FOSC will access the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) for oil or the CERCLA Fund, otherwise known as “the Superfund” for hazardous material releases. Once a federal fund is opened, it can be used to fund other agency efforts. A Pollution Removal Funding Authorization will be established with that agency which will provide them a ceiling amount for the agency to work under. Forms will be provided to the agency for processing billing invoices.

8700 Western Florida Area Committee Salvage and Marine Firefighting Working Group Charter

WESTERN FLORIDA AREA COMMITTEE SALVAGE AND MARINE FIREFIGHTING

WORKING GROUP CHARTER _________________________________________________________________________ WORKING GROUP TITLE: Salvage and Marine Firefighting (SMFF) WORKING GROUP STATEMENT:

• Ensure the ACP supports Vessel Response Plan alignment, as required by 33 CFR 155.

• Develop strategies for effective implementation of SMFF frameworks. • Recommend/coordinate training, drills and exercises that evaluate SMFF

components (i.e., PREP, HURREX, etc.) • Identify and share SMFF best practices, lessons learned and training opportunities.

GOAL: The SMFF Working Group was established to provide expertise and recommendations to the Area Committee regarding SMFF, to include the implementation of the regulatory framework in 33 CFR 155 and SMFF best practices. The SMFF Working Group acts as the AOR's experts who lead SMFF planning, training, drills, and exercises that ensures effective coordination between commercial service providers, municipal firefighters, and Federal, State, and local emergency response organizations.


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NOTE: The establishment of this Working Group does not constitute authority to obligate or spend funds by the Area Committee, the U.S. Coast Guard, State of Florida or any other agency or entity. MEETING FACILITATION AND SCHEDULING: The Working Group meeting schedule is based on the needs and activities regarding SMFF. The date, time, and place of future meetings shall be posted by the Working Group Chairperson. Ordinarily these meetings shall occur every four months. The Working Group will continue to meet and operate as directed until otherwise noted by the FOSC. STATUS REPORTS: The Working Group shall report directly to the Response Resources Subcommittee. After each meeting and real-life or training event, the Working Group Chairperson shall provide in writing a status report to the Response Resources Subcommittee Chairperson. WORKING GROUP CHAIRPERSON: Sector St. Petersburg's Prevention Department Head WORKING GROUP TEAM: To be designated as determined appropriate by the Area Committee. Established in accordance with the Area Committee Charter by the Federal On Scene Coordinator.

G. D. Case Captain, U. S. Coast Guard Federal On Scene Coordinator

8000 marine firefighting plan 8100...

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