82d division - summary of operations in wwi

82D DIVISION

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

IN THE

WORLD WAR

PREPARED BY THE

AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

PRINTING OFFICE

1944

Foreword

THE AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION was created by Congress in 1923 for the purpose of commemorating the services of American forces in Europe during the World War. In the accomplishment of this mission, the Commission has erected suitable memorials in Europe and improved and beautified the eight American cemeteries there. It has also published a book entitled "American Armies and Battlefields in Europe" which gives a concise account of the vital part played by American forces in the World War and detailed information regarding the memorials and cemeteries.

In order that the actions of American troops might be accurately set forth, detailed studies were made of the operations of each division which had front-line battle service. In certain cases studies of sector service were also prepared. It is felt that the results of this research should now be made available to the public. Therefore, these studies are being published in a series of twenty-eight booklets, each booklet devoted to the operations of one division.

In these booklets only the active service of the divisions is treated in detail. The accounts, however, are comprehensive enough to be of general interest and establish a great body of fact concerning the operations. For the military student, they provide an excellent background for tactical studies and present an extensive list of sources upon which further study can be based.

AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION

s/John J. Pershing, Chairman

PREFACE

IN READING the booklets of this series it should be borne in mind that they are based on historical studies which were prepared by the American Battle Monuments Commission primarily for the purpose of determining the front line of each American division for each day of its active operations. Consequently, they were essentially front-line infantry studies. The operations of other arms, movements of reserves and other phases of the operations were covered only in sufficient detail to afford a complete understanding of the infantry action.

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The preparation of these studies was begun soon after the Commission was created, and every precaution was taken to insure that the research would be conducted with the utmost accuracy and thoroughness. A number of officers from the Regular Army as well as from the Marine Corps were selected and detailed to the Commission from time to time to carry on the work. All records of the War Department pertaining to the subject were exhaustively examined, as were the French, British and German documents which had been collected by the Army War College. From these sources, the daily front lines of each division were determined and plotted on large-scale maps, and brief accounts of the operations were prepared. The maps and accounts of operations were then referred to officers of the divisions concerned for comment and additional information. They were normally sent to officers of all ranks down to and including company commanders. In cases of doubtful or controversial points, the reference was carried further. The replies received were carefully studied, evaluated and used to correct and amplify the original studies. In this way, the Commission was able to secure and preserve valuable data which otherwise would have been lost.

In these booklets, it has not been the purpose to go far beyond the scope of the original studies. However, casualty and strength tables have been added and enough other material

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has been included to present connected histories of the division from their organization until the conclusion of their service it

Europe, and to portray their actions in proper relationship to the operations of the corps and armies with which they served.

In order to indicate to the reader the areas in which the divisions served, a general map of France and Belgium has been included in each booklet. This map shows the principal cities and the battle lines of July 17 and November 11. In addition it shows, by special symbol, certain localities of particular interest to the division concerned.

All dates are 1918 unless otherwise indicated and are inclusive for example, October 9-11 includes the three days, October 9, 10 and 11. Dates in the headings of chapters dealing with operations, and in the titles of accompanying maps, are in general the dates between which one or more infantry regiments of the division have been awarded battle honors by the War Department. In certain cases infantry regiments, as well as other elements of the division, have been awarded battle honors for dates other than those indicated. The dates on the battle line of the maps include the period during which the division held command. The lines are as of midnight unless otherwise indicated; for example, October 9 indicates the line held at midnight, October 9.

The operation maps are reproductions of maps commonly used by American forces during the World War. In a great number of cases it was necessary to use parts of two or more

sheets of the wartime maps to make one operation map, which accounts for the different treatments of topographical detail often found on the same operation map. Names which appear on the maps in the abbreviated form are spelled in full in the text. A table of abbreviations with the French equivalent and English translation appears in the front of each booklet. Names of certain topographical features which are well known, and are frequently referred to, appear in the text in the Anglicized form for example, Argonne Forest rather than Fort d'Argonne, Marne River rather than Marne Rivire.

The casualty figures are based on the official casualty records of The Adjutant General. Tables of casualties have been prepared, however, only for the periods of active operations. The

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purpose is to show the casualties which occurred under the division command during specific

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actions. Therefore, casualties of elements which were detached during the actions are not included, while casualties of elements of other divisions which were attached have been included. It will be noted that, in the majority of cases, the dates in the casualty tables cover longer periods than those in the chapter headings or on the maps. This was found necessary in order to include all casualties incident to entering or leaving the line.

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CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

A. E. F.American Expeditionary Forces Chau. (Chteau)Chateau excl.exclusive Fme. (Ferme)farm G. H. Q.General Headquarters incl.inclusive Min. (Moulin)mill Mon. (Maison)house Rau. (Ruisseau)brook Rav., Rin. (Ravin)ravine Riv. (Rivire)river Tr. (Tranche)trench

1

Organization, and Service from

FOREWORD iiiPREFACE vABBREVIATIONS xORGANIZATION, AND SERVICE FROM ARRIVAL IN THE A. E. F. UNTIL AUGUST 16

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Organization of the Division-Authorized StrengthMap of France and BelgiumArrival in EuropeEarly ServiceLagney and Lucey Sectors.

ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE AND MARBACHE SECTOR 5Marbache Sector, August 17-September 11St. Mihiel Offensive, September 12-16Marbache Sector, September 17-20Casualties.

MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE AND SUBSEQUENT SERVICE 15Meuse-Argonne Offensive, September 29-November 2Subsequent Service, November 3, 1918-June 1919Casualties.

APPENDIX 55Table of Organization, Infantry Division, November 11, 1918Strength of 82d DivisionGeneral Table of CasualtiesSources.

INDEX 63OPERATION MAPS [Omitted]

Pocket Marbache Sector, August 17-September 11, St. Mihiel Offensive, September 12-16 and Marbache Sector, September 17-20. Meuse-Argonne Offensive, September 29-November 2.

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Arrival in the A. E. F. until August 16

THE 82D DIVISION, National Army, was organized at Camp Gordon, Georgia, in August 1917. The original personnel was composed of selective service men from Alabama, Georgia and Tennessee. These men, however, were practically all transferred to other divisions during October 1917. Replacements were received largely from New England and the Middle Atlantic States. [1] 1

The principal units of the division were:

163d Infantry Brigade 325th Infantry Regiment 326th Infantry Regiment 320th Machine-Gun Battalion

164th Infantry Brigade 327th Infantry Regiment 328th Infantry Regiment 321st Machine-Gun Battalion

157th Field Artillery Brigade 320th Field Artillery Regiment (75-mm guns) 319th Field Artillery Regiment (155-mm guns) 321st Field Artillery Regiment (75-mm guns) 307th Trench-Mortar Battery

Divisional Troops 319th Machine-Gun Battalion 307th Engineer Regiment 307th Field Signal Battalion Headquarters Troop Trains [1]

The details of organization of the American infantry division were changed from time to time during the World War. Under the tables of organization which were in use in the American Expeditionary Forces on November 11, 1918, and which, in general, were in force during 1918, the maximum authorized strength of the division was 991 officers and 27,114 men. Its

1 The figures in brackets at the ends of paragraphs refer to the sources on which the statements in the paragraphs are based. All sources are listed in the appendix (p. 57).

The Front Lines July 17, 1918 and Nov. 11, 1918

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principal armament was 24 155-mm howitzers, 48 75-mm guns, 12 6-inch trench mortars, 260

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machine guns and 16,193 rifles. Further details concerning the composition of the American infantry division appear in the table on page 55. The divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces seldom attained the maximum authorized strength shown above. The actual strength of the 82d Division on certain dates is shown in the table on page 56. The approximate strength of the division for other dates may be obtained by applying to these figures the battle losses which appear in the casualty tables following the accounts of battle operations. [197]

On April 10, 1918, the 82d Division moved via Camps Mills, New Jersey, and Upton, New York, to the ports of Boston, Brooklyn and New York City, en route to Liverpool, England. The advance detachment sailed on April 16, followed by the remainder of the division during April, May and June. The last unit arrived in England on July 10. After a brief stay in rest camps, the troops embarked at Southampton for Le Havre. [1]

Following its arrival in France, the 82d Division, less the artillery, engineers and field signal battalion, proceeded to the St. Valery-sur-Somme training area. Here it trained with the British 66th Division until June 15. The artillery brigade, upon its arrival in France on June 4, proceeded to La Courtine for instruction. The engineers and field signal battalion arrived at Le Havre on June 3-4. [1]

On June 15 the division moved to the area of the French Eighth Army in the vicinity of Toul, where the detached units, except the artillery, rejoined. It was assigned to the French XXXII Corps on June 22, and two days later moved to the Wovre front. From June 25 to July 17 the division, less artillery, was affiliated with the French 154th Division, and participated in the occupation of the Lagney Sector on the south face of the St. Mihiel salient. On July 18 the sector was reduced in extent, redesignated the Lucey Sector, and command given to the 82d Division. The division was relieved in the Lucey Sector on August 10 by the 89th Division, and moved to the vicinity of Toul. [1]

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St. Mihiel Offensive and Marbache Sector MARBACHE SECTOR, AUGUST 17-SEPTEMBER 11 ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER

12-16 MARBACHE SECTOR, SEPTEMBER 17-20

FROM THE TIME that the American Commander-in-Chief arrived in France, he bent every effort toward organizing an American army under American command at the earliest possible moment. To accomplish this would normally consume considerable time because it would first be necessary to transport a large number of troops to Europe, provide for their supply and complete their training. The organization of this army was further deferred by the critical situation created by the German offensives launched in the spring and early summer of 1918. These offensives so depleted the Allied reserves that the Allies faced almost certain defeat unless they received immediate support. In this crisis the American Commander-in-Chief postponed for the time being the concentration of American divisions for the formation of an American army, and made all American combatant forces available for service with the British and French armies. With this assistance, the Allies were able not only to stop the German offensives before they gained a decisive victory but, on July 18, to launch a successful counteroffensive against the Germans in the Marne salient. On July 24, while this offensive was still in progress, a strategic offensive plan was agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief which included a mission for an American army. The immediate purpose of this plan was to reduce the salients which interfered with railroad communications which were essential to further offensive operations. One of these was the St. Mihiel salient. [9, 196]

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The American First Army was organized on August 10, and directed to reduce this salient. [9]

The St. Mihiel salient was roughly triangular in shape, with its angles near Pont-A-Mousson, St. Mihiel and Verdun. It was approximately 35 kilometers across the base, extended about 25 kilometers into the Allied lines, and was important in that it cut the Verdun-Toul railroad and allowed the Germans to interrupt traffic on the Paris-Nancy railroad with artillery fire. It also covered the permanent fortifications of Metz, protected the Briey iron basin, and would seriously threaten the flank of any Allied operations which might be undertaken in the Meuse-Argonne region. [9, 196]

The St. Mihiel salient had been formed during the operations of 1914 and, although the French had launched strong attacks against it at various times, the lines had not been materially changed. From the heights of the Moselle north of Pont-a-Mousson, the German front line extended westward across the Wovre plain to the heights of the Meuse, ascended these heights, included the town of St. Mihiel and again descended to the plain southeast of Verdun. Within the salient proper, there were two principal defensive zones or positions. The first included the outpost positions, except in the area north of Les Eparges. In this area it was withdrawn some distance into the plain because the Allies held the dominating heights of the Meuse. The second position lay from 4 to 8 kilometers in rear of the first, and generally parallel to it. Across the base of the salient was the third position. This position, known to the Germans as the Michel Stellung, formed a part of their great defensive system, popularly called the Hindenburg Line, which ran from the vicinity of Metz to the North Sea. The outposts of this position extended along the general line, Prny Bois de Grand Fontaine Rembercourt Dampvitoux Jonville Harville Etain. The first position was well organized with a dense network of wire, deep well-constructed trenches and numerous concrete dugouts and machine-gun emplacements. The second position was also well protected by wire but had few trenches. The third had not been entirely completed but had a good system of wire entanglements and numerous concrete strongpoints. [9]

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It was originally planned that the attack on the St. Mihiel salient would penetrate the hostile third position, and be exploited to the fullest extent. On September 2, however, it was decided that the First Army would launch the Meuse-Argonne Offensive later in the month. The St. Mihiel Offensive, therefore, was limited to clearing the salient only so far as was necessary to insure the safety of the later operation. The army plan, as finally approved, provided only for the penetration of the first and second positions and the establishment of a defensive line across the base of the salient in front of the hostile third position. This was to be accomplished by three coordinated attacks; a principal attack, by the I and IV Corps from right to left, against the south face, a secondary attack against the west face by the V Corps and a holding attack against the tip of the salient by the French II Colonial Corps. In preparation for the offensive the First Army assumed command of the front from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle River, to Watronville, 11 kilometers southeast of Verdun, on August 30. The operation was to begin at 1 a. m., September 12, with an artillery preparation. The main attack was to be launched at 5 a. m.; the secondary attack at 8 a. m. [9]

The following paragraphs, in italic, are a synopsis of the service of the 82d Division in the St. Mihiel Offensive and Marbache Sector. This synopsis is designed to make the principal facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.

On August 19 the 82d Division relieved the 2d Division in the Marbache Sector. On September 12, as the right division of the I Corps and of the First Army, the 82d Division conducted aggressive raiding and patrolling along its entire front with the mission of exerting pressure on the enemy's left flank, but made no permanent advance. The French 125th Division was to the right, and the American 90th Division to the left. The 328th Infantry, west of the Moselle River, advanced north of Norroy on September 13 to protect the right of the 90th Division. From this position, the regiment

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moved forward on September 15

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to the general line, Vandires Cote 327, to cover the advance of the 90th Division. On September 16 the regiment withdrew to the high ground south of Vandires. The elements of the division west of the river were relieved by the 90th Division on September 18.

East of the river, active patrolling continued from September 13 to 16, but no advance was made.

The St. Mihiel Offensive merged into sector service on September 17. On September 20 the division was relieved in the Marbache Sector by the French 69th Division.

Aug. 17- Sept. 11

After the relief of the 82d Division in the Lucey Sector, it had returned to the vicinity of Toul, where it remained for one week. It was still assigned to the French XXXII Corps, French Eighth Army. As part of the concentration of the American First Army for the St. Mihiel Offensive, the division, less its artillery, began to relieve the 2d Division in the Marbache Sector on August 17. It completed the relief and assumed command of the sector on the morning of August 19. The sector extended from La Renaissance, inclusive, about 2 kilometers southeast of Port-sur-Seille, to Pont-a-Mousson, thence to a point approximately 1,200 meters west of the Moselle River and about 2 kilometers northwest of Pont-a-Mousson. To the right of the division was the French 32d Division, which was relieved by the French 125th Division on August 20. To the left of the 82d Division was the American 1st Division. The 82d Division occupied the sector with infantry brigades abreast, the 163d Infantry Brigade on the right. The order of infantry regiments, from right to left, was 325th, 326th, 327th and 328th. The 328th occupied that part of the sector west of the Moselle River. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade, 2d Division, remained in the sector in support of the 82d Division. [2, 3, 4, 5]

On August 22 the French XXXII Corps was relieved by the American I Corps, and the Division passed to the tactical control of that corps, becoming its right division. On the same day the 157th Field Artillery Brigade, less two battalions, which remained detached until the end of the month, joined the division and relieved the 2d Field Artillery Brigade. [6,7]

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The 90th Division relieved the 1st Division, to the left of the 82d Division, on August 24. [8]

The First Army had issued its field orders for the St. Mihiel Offensive on September 7. These orders established the following principal objectives:

For the I and IV Corps.

First-phase line: Fort du Bois le Prtre Viville-en-Haye Essey Bois Rat.

First-day line: Fort du Bois le Prtre Bois Grard Jaulny Nonsard Bois Rat.

First-phase, second day: Fort du Bois le Prtre Bois Grard Jaulny St. Benoit Bois de Vigneulles.

For the V Corps.

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First-day line: crossroads 2 kilometers south of Dommartin-la-Montagne Herbeuville Trsauvaux.

For all corps.

Army objective: Fort du Bois le Prtre Bois Grard Jaulny St. Benoit Hattonville Thillot Trsauvaux.

Exploitation line: Norroy Bois de Grand Fontaine Rembercourt Dampvitoux Wol Trsauvaux.

The I Corps, with the 82d, 90th, 5th and 2d Divisions in line from right to left, was to pivot on the 90th Division and advance its left to the first-phase, second-day line, and penetrate the hostile second position in the vicinity of Thiaucourt. The IV Corps, with the 89th, 42d and 1st Divisions in line from right to left, was to drive hard toward St. Benoit and Vigneulles. It was to penetrate the hostile second position on its entire front, and push on to the first-phase second-day line without further orders. Upon receipt of orders from the army commander, it was to drive on to the army objective. The V Corps, with the American 26th Division, the French 15th Colonial Infantry Division and one brigade of the American 4th Division, in line from right to left, was to push forward aggressively to the first-day line. Upon orders of the army commander, it was to pivot on the French 15th Colonial Infantry Division, swing to the northeast and advance to the army objective, with its right at hillot. The French II

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Colonial Corps was to conduct deep raids at the hour of attack and carry out local operations during the opening phase of the attack to cover the exposed flanks of the IV and V Corps. It was also to protect the right of the V Corps in its advance to the army objective. Lastly, the French II Colonial Corps was to advance in the direction, St. Mihiel Hattonville, and occupy the army objective between the IV and V Corps. All corps upon reaching the army objective were to organize it for defense and push strong reconnaissance detachments to the exploitation line. The attack was to be strongly supported by artillery and aviation. Tanks were assigned to the I and IV Corps. [10]

The I Corps issued field orders on September 8 which provided that only that portion of the corps west of Bois de Presle would attack. Troops in that wood and between the wood and the Moselle River were directed to hold the front they then occupied. The mission of the 82d Division was to exert pressure on the enemy and maintain contact with him by deep and continuous patrolling. [11]

To carry out this mission, the division made no change in the disposition of its infantry regiments. On September 10 it ordered the 163d Infantry Brigade to establish mobile combat groups near La Seille Rivire in the direction of Port-sur-Seille, Morville-sur-Seille and Cheminot. The 164th Infantry Brigade was directed to push similar groups north of Pont--Mousson on both sides of the Moselle. One company in each regiment was ordered to be held in constant readiness for deep patrol action. [12, 13]

Sept. 12

Early on the morning of September 12, patrols of the 325th Infantry pushed toward Eply and Cheminot, and gained contact with the enemy. [14]

At 3:50 p. m. the division ordered the 163d Infantry Brigade to put a company in Bois de la Voivrotte, if practicable, and to hold the northern edge of the wood. The 163d Infantry Brigade reported at 8:25 p. m. that the 326th Infantry had reached Bois de la Tte d'Or and Bois de la Voivrotte, but had been stopped by enemy fire and had been unable to gain the northern edge of Bois

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de la Voivrotte. [15, 16]

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During the morning, patrols of the 327th Infantry advanced to Bois de la Tte d'Or and entered Ferme de Bel-Air, but in the late afternoon were driven back to their lines. [17]

West of the Moselle, patrols of the 328th Infantry raided the enemy position at Maison Gauthier, shortly after noon. These patrols established posts at that place and in trenches 400 meters to the west and northwest, but were subsequently withdrawn. [17]

The front line of the division remained unchanged at the close of the first day's fighting. [18]

Sept. 13

The attack of the First Army on the 12th had been highly successful. At the close of the day, it had reached the first objectives of the second day on most of its front. Reports from aviators and ground troops indicated that the enemy was withdrawing from the salient. The army commander, therefore, directed the IV and V Corps to push strong detachments forward to Vigneulles during the night of September 12-13. These detachments advanced across the front of the French II Colonial Corps, and effected a junction in the vicinity of Vigneulles early on the morning of September 13, thus closing the salient. [9]

The 163d Infantry Brigade continued its patrol activities on September 13. At 6 p. m. two companies of the 327th Infantry raided Ferme de Bel-Air and the southern edge of Bois Frhaut. [19, 20]

West of the river, the right regiment of the 90th Division was engaged in mopping up Fort du Bois le Prtre and the quarries about Norroy. To cover the right flank of the 90th Division, which had become exposed during the morning, the 164th Infantry Brigade, at 1 p. m., ordered the 328th Infantry to advance its 2d Battalion to Tranche de la Moselle and Tranche de la Courberie. At 5:45 p. m. the 82d Division notified the 328th Infantry that the right of the 90th Division was then 350 meters northwest of Norroy, and ordered the regiment to establish contact with the 90th Division at that point. After dark, and under severe hostile fire from the east bank of the river, the 2d Battalion advanced through Norroy and gained the high ground beyond the town without meeting infantry

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resistance. The right flank was refused for protection against possible attack from across the Moselle. The left flank was in contact with the 90th Division northwest of Norroy. [2, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]

Sept. 14

East of the Moselle, patrol actions continued on September 14. [18]

West of the river, the 164th Infantry Brigade, at 8:30 a. m., ordered the 328th Infantry to maintain close contact with the 90th Division and to advance with it. The 82d Division confirmed this order, and directed the 164th Infantry Brigade to avoid undue exposure to fire from the high ground east of the river. [27, 28]

As the right of the 90th Division made no advance during the day, the 328th Infantry continued to hold its position north of Norroy. [20, 29]

Sept. 15

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East of the Moselle, the situation remained unchanged on September 15. [29]

The relief of the 2d Battalion, 328th Infantry, by the 3d Battalion, was begun during the night of September 14-15 and completed during the early morning of the 15th. [30]

About 7 a. m. the 90th Division, covered by its patrols which had spent the night on the southern slope of Cote 327, advanced its right across the valley of Le Trey Ruisseau to the crest of Cote 327, and sent patrols east to the river. [2, 31]

At 11:50 a. m. the 164th Infantry Brigade, acting on division orders, directed the 328th Infantry to advance its 3d Battalion to the ridge northwest of Vandires, and gain contact with the 90th Division. The 1st Battalion, which was in support, was ordered to occupy the positions vacated by the 3d Battalion. [32, 33]

The 3d Battalion, 328th Infantry, advanced at 1 p. m., passed through Vandires and established positions east of the town and on the hill 400 meters to the northwest. Having suffered heavy casualties from artillery fire from the north and northeast, the battalion withdrew from its exposed position after midnight, September 15. [2, 34, 35]

Sept. 16

There was no change in the situation east of the Moselle on September 16. [36]

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West of the river, the 1st Battalion, 328th Infantry, relieved the 3d Battalion in the front line during the early morning and, to secure better cover, organized new positions on the high ground south of Vandires. The battalion maintained contact with the 90th Division by patrols, and controlled Vandires and the west bank of the Moselle as far as the canal. There was no further change in the front line of the 82d Division on September 16. [36, 37]

Sept. 17-20

The St. Mihiel Offensive merged into sector occupation on September 17. On the previous day, the I Corps had directed the 90th Division to relieve those elements of the 82d Division west of the Moselle River during the night of September 17-18. This relief was accomplished as ordered, and command of this portion of the sector passed to the 90th Division during the morning of September 18. The new boundary between the divisions was the Moselle River. [9, 38, 40]

On September 17 orders were issued covering the relief of the 82d Division in the Marbache Sector by the French 69th Division. Command was to pass at 8 a. m., September 20. [39]

The IV Corps relieved the I Corps at noon, September 18. The situation remained unchanged on September 19, and on the 20th, the division was relieved by the French 69th Division and assigned by the First Army to the I Corps. Later in the day, the field orders of the First Army for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive placed the division in army reserve, and directed that it be held in readiness to move to the vicinity of Clermont-en-Argonne, to take part in the attack west of the Meuse River. The division moved to the vicinity of Marbache on the 20th. [1, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46]

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CASUALTIES, ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE AND MARBACHE SECTOR

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Aug. 17-Sept. 11 Sept. 12-16 Sept. 17-22

82d Division

325th Inf W 34 76 12DW 1K 5

326th Inf W 14 104 23 DW 3 4 K 2 4 3

327th Inf W 6 116 7DW 1 10 K 2 22 1

328th Inf (1st Bn DS Sept. 12-14)

W 14 253 44DW 8 2K 1 35 2

319th MG Bn W DW K

320th MG Bn W 11 DW K

321st MG Bn W 2 61 7DW 3 K 8

319th FA(DSAug.17-21; 1st Bn DS Aug. 22-28)

W 1 7 6DW K

320th FA W 1 5 DW K

321st FA (DS Aug.17-21, 1st Bn DS Aug. 22-31)

W 1 23 DW K 4 1

307th Engrs W 6 44 11DW 2 K

Others W 8 16 17DW 1 2 5K 1 4

Total 105 816 146 Attached Units

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W=wounds not mortal; DW=died of wounds; K=killed in action; DS=detached service

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Meuse-Argonne Offensive and Subsequent Service MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 29-NOVEMBFR 2 SUBSEQUENT SERVICE,

NOVEMBER 3, 1918-JUNE 1919

WITH THE REDUCTION of the St. Mihiel and other salients the immediate purpose of the strategic offensive plan of July 24 had been accomplished, and it became possible to undertake the great converging offensives which had been agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief early in September. These offensives included an American attack to be launched on September 26 between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest, supported on the left by the French Fourth Army between the Argonne and the Suippes River; a renewal on September 27 of the British-French attack between the Oise and Scarpe Rivers; and a combined Allied attack east of Ypres on September 28. Between these principal offensives, secondary operations were to be undertaken. [9, 47, 48, 198]

The Meuse-Argonne Offensive of the American First Army was to be directed against the principal German lateral line of supply, the Carignan Sedan-Mzires railroad, which, at Sedan, lay 53 kilometers from the front. The severing of this artery would render the German positions to the west and northwest of Sedan untenable. [9]

Protecting this vital supply line, the Germans had, during the previous four years, constructed a strong system of field fortifications. On the Meuse-Argonne front, there were four distinct defensive positions. The first lay close behind the front line. The second included Montfaucon and traversed the Argonne south of Apremont. The third, which was known to

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the Germans as the Kriemhild Stellung, formed a part of the Hindenburg Line. This position extended from Bois de Fort, across the heights of Cunel and Romagne, to include the high ground north of Grand-Pr. The fourth position included the heights of Barricourt, and extended westward to Buzancy and Thnorgues. The first three positions had been thoroughly organized, and numerous intermediate positions constructed between them. These defenses, together with the natural military strength of the terrain, presented a formidable obstacle to an attacking army. The importance of the communications protected by this front made it certain that the Germans would resist here to the last

12th FA (2d Div) (Aug.19-22)

W DW K

15th FA (2d Div) W 1 DW K

17th FA (2d Div) (Aug.19-22)

W DW K

Total 1 Aggregate total 106 816 146

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extremity. [9]

The plan of the First Army contemplated an initial advance of 16 kilometers and a penetration of the hostile third position. This penetration would force the enemy to evacuate the Argonne Forest, and insure the junction of the First Army with the French Fourth Army at Grand-Pr. A further advance of 16 kilometers was then to be made to the line, Stenay-le Chesne. Such an advance would outflank the enemy's position along the Aisne River, in front of the French Fourth Army, and clear the way for an advance on Mzires or Sedan. These operations were to be supplemented by an attack to clear the heights east of the Meuse River as far as Bois de la Grande Montagne. [9]

In preparation for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the front of the First Army was extended from Watronville to the west edge of the Argonne Forest on September 22. It attacked at 5:30 a. m., September 26, with the III, V and I Corps in line from right to left. West of the Argonne Forest, the French Fourth Army attacked in conjunction with the American forces. Elements of the First Army east of the Meuse did not attack during the opening days of the offensive. [9]

By September 28 the First Army had made a maximum advance of about 11 kilometers, and had reached the general line, Meuse River Bois de la Cte Lmont Bois de Brieulles Nantillois Apremont Champ Mahaut Moulin de l'Homme Mort. At this time it was confronted by three strong positions in the German line; Cunel heights, Romagne heights and the

17

eastern edge of the Argonne Forest near Chtel-Chhry and Cornay. [9, 196]

Following its relief in the Marbache Sector on September 20, the 82d Division moved to Marbache, and on the 24th, proceeded to the vicinity of Triaucourt and Rarcourt, south of Clermont-en-Argonne. It was in First Army reserve when the Meuse-Argonne Offensive commenced on September 26. [1]

The following paragraphs, in italic, are a synopsis of the service of the 82d Division in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. This synopsis is designed to make the principal facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.

Prior to the entry of the 82d Division into line in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, elements were used from September 29 to October 3 to support the 28th Division, and on September 30, to stiffen the lines of the 35th Division near Baulny.

On October 7 the 82d Division, less one infantry brigade, and in conjunction with the 28th Division to the left, attacked the east flank of the Argonne Forest in the vicinity of Chtel-Chhry. By nightfall an advance of about 1 kilometer had been made. The attack continued on October 8. On October 9 the remaining infantry brigade of the 82d Division passed through the 28th Division, and executed a turning movement to the north, while the brigade on the right attacked north.

On October 10 Martincourt Ferme and Marcq were occupied. One battalion relieved elements of the 1st Division east of the Aire.

On October 11 the division attacked on both sides of the Aire. By night the ridge southeast of St. Juvin had been consolidated; and on the left, the railroad north of Martincourt Ferme had been reached. The town of St. Juvin was transferred to the zone of action of the 77th Division on the 11th.

On October 14 the 82d Division advanced its line to the St. Georges - St. Juvin road. A determined hostile counterattack was broken up on October 15. On the left, the line was advanced about 500 meters.

Pagina 13 di 43


The extreme right advanced on October 16. On October 18 lines on Cte 182 were taken over from the 78th Division and an out-

18

post was established west of the Agron River. During the succeed-ing days the line was extended on Cte 182, the outpost withdrawn from west of the Agron and the center of the line advanced.

From October 22 to 30, the line remained unchanged. During the night of October 30-31, the 82d Division was relieved by the 80th and 77th Divisions.

Sept. 29- Oct. 6

Under authority of the First Army, the I Corps detached the 327th Infantry from the 82d Division on September 29. The regiment took position west of Varennes in reserve of the 28th Division. Under orders of the latter division, the 2d Battalion entered the front line of the 35th Division on September 30, and took up a position on the ridge northeast of Baulny. The 1st Battalion held a position near Charpentry in support of the 2d Battalion. These two battalions returned to the vicinity of Varennes on October 1, after the 35th Division had been relieved by the 1st Division. The regiment reverted from reserve of the 28th Division to control of the 82d Division on October 3. [49, 50, 51]

On October 2 the First Army released the 82d Division from army reserve, and placed it at the disposal of the I Corps for the purpose of relieving the 28th Division when the relief of that division should become necessary. The 82d Division, less the 157th Field Artillery Brigade, was assembled in the vicinity of Varennes by October 3. The artillery brigade joined the division on October 6. [50, 52, 53, 54, 55]

At this time the front of the I Corps was held by the 1st, 28th and 77th Divisions from right to left. The V Corps was to the right; the French Fourth Army to the left. [59]

By October 6, the advance of the I Corps had been stopped on a general line, Flville Apremont le Chne Tondu Binarville, by strong positions in the Argonne Forest and on the heights near Chtel-Chhry and Cornay. From the latter positions, the enemy delivered destructive flanking fire on both the 1st and 28th Divisions. [56, 57, 58]

In order to reduce the positions about Cornay and Chtel-Chhry, and force the evacuation of those confronting the 77th Division in the Argonne Forest, the First Army ordered

19

the I Corps to attack westward on October 7. The corps was to protect its right flank from north of Bois de Boyon and advance to the objective, Flville (excl.) Cornay (excl.) thence west to the crest of the main ridge in the Argonne Forest thence south along the crest of this ridge to the right of the 77th Division. [59]

The I Corps issued its field orders at 6 p. m., October 6. The attack was to be launched at 5 a. m., October 7, on the front then held by the 28th Division. The first objective was the line, Flville (excl.) Cornay (incl.) Hill 223 (incl.) Cote 244 cemetery on Le Chne Tondu, 1,500 meters south-west of Apremont. The corps objective was the same as the first objective to Cornay, thence the line, point 151, 500 meters west of Cornay la Viergette, 2 kilometers southwest of Apremont. Divisions were to advance to the first objective without regard to the progress of the divisions to the right or left, and be prepared to advance to the corps objective three hours after the attack was launched. The corps objective was to be organized for defense and held at all costs. [60]

Pagina 14 di 43


The 82d Division, less one infantry brigade, was to be placed between the 1st and 28th Divisions, and was assigned the following boundaries:

Right: Flville (excl.) point 151. Left: Ferme des Granges la Forge chateau north of Chtel-Chhry horizontal grid line 79.8.

The infantry of the 82d Division was to relieve that of the 28th Division on the front, Flville (excl.) la Forge, before midnight, October 6. The leading elements were to cross the Aire by the bridge at La Forge and by improvised foot-bridges between Flville and La Forge, form along the railroad track west of the Aire and cover their front by active patrolling. One infantry brigade of the 82d Division was to remain in corps reserve. To the right of the 82d Division, the 1st Division was to hold its line and continue exploitation. To the left, the 28th Division was to attack to the westward. The 77th Division, to the left of the 28th, with its right resting on Le Chne Tondu, was to hold its front and be prepared to advance upon receipt of orders. [60]

20

In order to obtain the advantage of surprise, the corps directed that great care would be taken to conceal preparatory dis-positions from the enemy and that the corps artillery would con-tinue its normal interdiction fire. The fire of the division artillery of the 28th and 82d Divisions was to be coordinated under the chief of corps artillery. There was to be no artillery preparation; but the attack was to be covered by a rolling barrage, and artillery fire concentrated on known enemy positions as the advance progressed. Two 75-mm guns were at-tached to each leading infantry battalion as accompanying guns. The corps also directed that front-line infantry battalions would not be reinforced, but would be passed through by support battalions when definitely slowed down by enemy resistance. [60]

At 9:30 p. m., October 6, the 82d Division issued field orders designating the 164th Infantry Brigade as the attacking brigade. These orders directed combat liaison detachments, each consist-ing of one rifle company and one machine-gun platoon, to maintain contact with the 1st Division near the bridge at Flville, and with the 28th Division to the left. [61]

The 164th Infantry Brigade issued its field orders at 10:45 p.m., October 6. The 327th Infantry, on the right, was ordered to take Cote 180, Cornay and the high ground to the east of that place. The 328th Infantry, on the left, was to capture Hill 223. Both regiments were directed to advance from the first objective to the corps objective at 8 a. m. Companies from the support battalions were given the flank-liaison missions prescribed by division orders. [62]

The infantry regiments deployed as follows:

Oct. 7

The 164th Infantry Brigade marched from Varennes to its zone of action during the night of October 6-7. Troops of the

328th Infantry 1st Battalion 2d Battalion

327th Infantry 1st Battalion 2d Battalion

Brigade Reserve 3d Battalion, 327th Infantry 3d Battalion, 328th Infantry

[50]

Pagina 15 di 43


21

28th Division holding the bridge at La Forge, and machine-gun units of that division which covered the ground east of the Aire by fire from Pleinchamp Ferme, stood relieved as soon as elements of the 82d Division passed their positions. [2, 50, 51, 63, 64]

The 327th Infantry reached its line of departure along the railroad west of the Aire, east of Cote 180, in time to attack at 5 a. m. as ordered. The 1st Battalion, with Companies D and C in assault, from right to left, attacked without artillery support, and about 6 a. m. reached the crest of Cote 180. Here a short halt was made before advancing on Cornay. Company D did not at once execute the change of direction to the north, and Company B, from support, replaced Company D in the assault echelon. Adjustment was soon made, however, and Com-pany B returned to support. Upon crossing the crest of Cote 180, hostile machine-gun fire was encountered and, about 8 a. m., Company C was forced to return to Cote 180, after having reached the Cornay Chtel-Chhry road. Soon afterward, heavy hostile fire forced Company D also to return to Cote 180. About 9 a. m. Company H was sent forward from support, and took position to the left of Company C. During this attack Company F, with machine-gun support, formed a combat-liaison group connecting with the 1st Division to the right. This company, while attempting to advance north from Ruisseau d'Exermont, received such heavy fire across the flats of the Aire and from Flville that it could not cross the stream. [2, 65]

During the afternoon, the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, dug in on the military crest of Cote 180, with outposts on the northwestern slope of the hill, and in the ravine of Ruisseau de Boulasson. The line at night was held by Companies D, C, A and H, from right to left. There was liaison across the Aire with Company F, which in turn maintained liaison by patrols with the support elements of the 1st Division, but not with its front line. The left of Company H, 327th Infantry, maintained contact with the 328th Infantry across the saddle between Cote 180 and Hill 223. [65]

The 328th Infantry, having in the darkness missed the guides

22

of the 28th Division, arrived in the vicinity of La Forge about 4:30 a. m. There was a heavy fog. Companies A and C formed on the open ground west of the woods of Ferme des Granges; Companies B and D formed in the woods. Companies A and C were partially disorganized by hostile shelling which forced the men to take cover in shell holes. At 7:25 a. m. the 164th Infantry Brigade ordered the 328th Infantry to attack Hill 223 at 8 a. m. This message was relayed by the 328th Infantry to its 1st Battalion at 8:20 a. m. Companies B and D, from right to left, were formed for the attack under cover of the Ferme des Granges woods. After passing through Com-panies A and C, which were then re-formed and followed in support, they attacked across the Aire about noon. [ 2, 50, 63, 66, 67, 68]

The delay of the attack of the 328th Infantry caused the right flank of the 28th Division, on the hill west of Chtel-Chhry, to become exposed. To protect its right, troops of that division occupied the southern slopes of Hill 223, pending the arrival of the 328th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 328th Infantry, reached the crest of Hill 223 shortly after 12:30 p. m. without encountering infantry resistance. The troops of the 28th Division on the hill withdrew, and the assault companies of the 328th Infantry commenced to organize the position. About 5 p. m., the Germans launched a counterattack which was repulsed. The line across the crest of the hill was held during the night, with contact to both flanks. [64, 69, 70, 71]

At 9:45 p. m. the 164th Infantry Brigade issued field orders stating that the Commander-in-Chief had ordered a powerful thrust to be made for the purpose of cutting the road and rail-road about 2 kilometers west of Hill 223, and that this mission had been assigned to the 164th Infantry Brigade. The order directed that the support battalions of both infantry regiments should cross the Aire during

Pagina 16 di 43


the night and be prepared to make the final drive to the corps objective before noon, October 8. The division machine-gun battalion was placed at the disposal of the 327th Infantry. The 328th Infantry was charged with the duty of driving hard, straight west, to cross the railroad at the nearest point. A rolling barrage was provided for, which

23

was to advance at the rate of 100 meters in three minutes until the railroad was reached. The barrage was then to stand 300 meters beyond the railroad until ordered to stop. This order designated the hour of attack as 5 a. m., October 8. [72]

At 10:30 p. m. the I Corps ordered the attack resumed at 6 a. m., October 8, and assigned as right boundary of the 82d Division, the Baulny St. Juvin road, and as left boundary the line, Hill 223 (incl.) point on narrow-gauge railroad 1 kilometer southwest of Pylne Marcq (excl.) thence north to the Aire. An advance was ordered to the line Flville (excl.) Cornay (incl.) la Besogne. This line was to be organized for defense with outposts pushed forward to the Aire. It was further announced that the ist Division had passed to the V Corps. The right boundary thus became both the divisional and the corps boundary. [73]

The 82d Division issued no field orders on October 7; but at 11:35 p. m. notified the 164th Infantry Brigade, in a field message that, under I Corps orders, the hour of attack was postponed to 6 a. m. The 164th Infantry Brigade amended its field orders accordingly, and at midnight, October 7, issued orders changing the mission of the 327th Infantry to conform to that specified in corps orders, which included the taking of Cornay. At 1:25 a. m., October 8, the 82d Division forwarded the corps orders to the 164th Infantry Brigade, with the addi-tional information that one company of IS tanks had been assigned to that brigade for the attack. [74, 75, 76, 77]

At 11:20 p. m. the 164th Infantry Brigade attached the 3d Battalion, 328th Infantry, to the 327th Infantry; the 3d Battalion of the latter remained in brigade reserve. This battalion did not join the 327th Infantry until 2 p. m., October 8. [78, 79, 80]

Oct. 8

The 327th Infantry ordered its 1st Battalion to attack at 6 a. m., supported by the 3d Battalion, 328th Infantry. The 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry, was directed to cross the Aire before daylight, and take positions on Cote 180 to cover the right flank. [2, 51, 65]

The 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, attacked westward about 6 a. m., but about 6:30 a. m. was ordered by the 327th

24

Infantry to attack Cornay. The change of direction was made, and the battalion advanced slowly northward. About 3 p. m. patrols of Company A reached the south edge of Cornay, and about 4:30 p. m. the battalion attacked the town. Cornay was entered before dark, and during the evening, groups of Company C, 327th Infantry, and Company I, 328th Infantry, commenced mopping up the village. Shortly before midnight these troops withdrew to the south and east of the town, and organized a line north of the Cornay Croix de Bayle road. This portion of the line was not in liaison with units across the Aire, nor with the 328th Infantry to the left. Company F, 327th Infantry, which had crossed the Aire during the morning to take up positions on Cote 180, recrossed the river later in the day, and reoccupied its old positions along Ruisseau d'Exermont, where liaison was secured by patrols with the 1st Division, covering a gap of about 500 meters. Two com-panies of the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry, in support on Cote 180, maintained contact with the 328th Infantry to the left. [2, 50, 51, 65, 81, 82]

Pagina 17 di 43


The 2d Battalion, 328th Infantry, crossed the Aire during the night of October 7-8. It passed through the 1st Battalion, 328th Infantry, on Hill 223, and attacked at 6 a. m. as ordered. By 9 a. m. the leading companies, in spite of machine-gun resistance, had reached a line about 1 kilometer west of the line of departure. About 2 p. m. Company D, 328th Infantry, was sent forward as reinforcement, and was placed on the left of the line. During the morning the I Corps ordered that the advance be pushed; a renewal of the attack was therefore planned for the afternoon. The 164th Infantry Brigade assigned the 3d Battalion, 327th Infantry, then in brigade reserve, to the 328th Infantry for the afternoon attack, but shortly thereafter notified the 328th Infantry that it was retaining two companies of this battalion as brigade reserve. The latter message did not reach the 328th Infantry until after the attack had commenced. [2, 63, 83]

It was originally planned to launch a joint attack at 3:30 p. m. The 3d Battalion, 327th Infantry, was to advance from Hill 223 to the road on Champrocher ridge west of Cornay.

25

It was to be assisted on the left by the 2d Battalion, 328th Infantry, reinforced by Companies A and D, 328th Infantry. The attack was to be supported by artillery. The available artillery, however, proved to be insufficient for the execution of this plan. Therefore, the 3d Battalion, 327th Infantry, was ordered to make the attack alone. The assault companies, I and M, advanced at 4:20 p. m. with weak artillery support, and by 6 p. m. had gained the objective. In the meantime, the remaining companies of the 3d Battalion, 327th Infantry, K and L, had reverted to brigade reserve and were not available to support the troops on the objective. Later in the evening, Company G, 328th Infantry, was sent forward to the new line, but the position was found to be untenable. Shortly before midnight, the companies on Champrocher ridge withdrew to the line of departure, and organized a position on the north-western slope of Hill 223. A small detachment of Company M, 327th Infantry, remained on Hill 263 until October 9. Liaison was secured with support elements of the 327th Infantry to the right, and with the 2d Battalion, 328th Infantry, to the left. There was a gap of about 600 meters between the left of the positions of the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, southeast of Cornay, and the right of the line on Hill 223. There was also a gap of 1 kilometer between the positions on Hill 223 and the right of the 2d Battalion, 328th Infantry. [2, 70]

In the meantime, the 2d Battalion, 328th Infantry, had continued its advance. Elements of the battalion reached the objective, the light railroad and road 2 kilometers west of Hill 923, about 5 p. m. The right was refused to give protection from the north, and the line organized for the night. The position was held by Companies E, F, G and D from right to left. To the right, liaison was established with the positions on Hill 223. The left gained contact with the 28th Division, which advanced to this line about 9:30 p. m. [2, 63, 84]

At 8 p. m. the I Corps issued field orders directing the resumption of the attack at 8:30 a. m., October 9. The objectives were the same as those given in corps orders of October 7. The 163d Infantry Brigade was released from corps reserve, and

26

ordered to relieve the 28th Division on the line then held by the latter. The relief was to be completed before 4 a. m., October 9. The left boundary of the 28th Division was to become the new left boundary of the 82d Division. This was a line extending generally northwest from La Viergette to La Besogne. The division artillery and engineers of the 28th Division were at-tached to the 82d Division. [85]

Oct. 9

The 82d Division issued its field orders at 2:35 a. m., October 9. The 163d Infantry Brigade, less the

Pagina 18 di 43


325th Infantry, was directed to relieve the 28th Division, and to gain the corps ob-jective, the line, Flville la Besogne. The 325th Infantry was designated as division reserve. The 164th Infantry Brigade was ordered to continue its attack. The 53d Field Artillery Brigade, 28th Division, was directed to support the attack of the 163d Infantry Brigade; and the 157th Field Artillery Brigade, 82d Division, that of the 164th Infantry Brigade. The corps objective was to be organized in depth as a line of resistance. Exploitation patrols were to be pushed forward to the Aire. [86]

Presumably acting upon advance notice of the division field orders, the 164th Infantry Brigade had issued its orders on October 8. These orders directed the 327th Infantry to attack between Flville (excl.) and Cornay (incl.); and the 328th Infantry to attack between Cornay (excl.) and the narrow-gaugerailroad (incl.). The 328th Infantry was charged with maintaining combat liaison with the 326th Infantry, which was to go into position to its left; and, as the swing to the north was made, to keep the narrow-gauge railroad as its west boundary. Companies K and L, 327th Infantry, were released from brigade reserve and returned to their regiment. [87]

During the night of October 8-9 and the early morning of the 9th, local actions occurred in and around Cornay. Patrols of the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, and groups from the 3d Battalion, 328th Infantry, attempted to secure the town. Companies K and L, 327th Infantry, had joined the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, during the night in the positions east and southeast of the village. The attack was renewed about 8:30 a. m. by the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, assisted by the 3d Bat-

27

talion, 328th Infantry, and Companies K and L, 327th Infantry. Cornay was taken and cleared of the enemy by 11 a. m. [2, 50, 51, 65, 88]

The German Fifth Army ordered a withdrawal to a line north of the Aire. However, before the order reached the front-line troops, the German 41st Division, which had been reinforced by fresh troops during the night of October 8-9, launched a counterattack. Following an artillery preparation, the Germans advanced on Cornay shortly after noon. Portions of Companies A and D, 327th Infantry, and groups of the 3d Battalion, 328th Infantry, attempted to stem the advance by barricading themselves in houses in the town. Company C, 327th Infantry, counterattacked from the positions of the night before, but was unsuccessful. The troops in the town were confronted by the enemy on three sides, and stiff fighting ensued. A number of Americans were captured, and the remainder withdrew. At 2 p. m. the 327th Infantry ordered its 2d Battalion to attack Cornay, from the vicinity of Cote 180, at 6 p. m. The attack of this battalion was to be supported by the remnants of the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, the 3d Battalion, 326th Infantry, and Companies K and L, 327th Infantry. Under instructions from the 164th Infantry Brigade, the orders for this attack were rescinded in a field message sent at 3:20 p. m. At 10 p. m. the brigade ordered the 327th Infantry to withdraw all troops from the vicinity of Cornay, and organize its line for the night on the southern edge of the valley. The line was organized in virtually the same position as that of October 7. Liaison was established with Company F, which remained in position along Ruisseau d'Exermont. Patrols secured liaison with the 1st Division north of Flville. Contact was effected with the elements of Companies L and M, 327th Infantry, on Hill 223, where the positions had been strengthened by additional machine guns sited to fire across the front of Cote 180. [2, 50, 65, 89, 90]

Between 7 and 8 a. m. the 2d Battalion, 328th Infantry, attacked due north, with its left on the narrow-gauge railroad. On the left, the advance up Champrocher ridge proved difficult. Some troops reached the Champrocher Pylne road about

28

noon. This position could not be held, however, and the ad-vanced elements were withdrawn to a position about 300 meters north of and extending farther east than the line held during the previous

Pagina 19 di 43


night. During the day, contact was secured with the 3d Battalion, 326th Infantry, to the left, and liaison with the 3d Battalion, 327th Infantry, on the northwestern slopes of Hill 223, although the gap across the valley was not actually occupied by troops. [2, 63, 9 1, 92]

After relieving the 28th Division, it was planned that the 326th Infantry would pivot to the right with its right on the narrow-gauge railroad. It was then to advance north in con-junction with the 328th Infantry. [50]

The 326th Infantry, with the 3d and 1st Battalions in line from right to left, and the 2d Battalion in support, advanced through the lines of the 28th Division in the early morning of October 9, and attacked about 8 a. m. The 3d Battalion found little hostile opposition until about noon, when the pivoting move-ment was completed and advance to the north began. From this time on the advance was slow, owing to heavy machine-gun fire. Although a few troops reached the crest of the ridge, the position could not be held, and they withdrew about 4 p. m. -to the reverse slope 800 meters southwest of Pylne. Here a line was established for the night in contact with the 328th Infantry to the right, but without front-line contact with the 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry, to the left. The route of the 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry, northwest from the vicinity of Cote 244, was such as to cause a drift to the left. This battalion, likewise, encountered little resistance until about noon. Ad-vanced elements were able to make their way to the vicinity of La Besogne during the afternoon. These troops could not be supported, however, and a line was formed for the night along the trail running southwest from the vicinity of Pylne, in con-tact with the 77th Division. [2, 50, 93]

At 11 p. m. the I Corps issued field orders which directed that the attack would be resumed at 7 a. m., October 10, for the purpose of driving the enemy beyond the Aire River. These orders established the right boundary of the I Corps, and of the 82d Division, as the line, Baulny (excl.) western edge

29

of Bois de Boyon Sommerance (excl.). The left boundary of the 82d Division remained the same as far as La Besogne. From this point the new boundary was, Marcq (incl.) north to the Aire River. Strong outposts were to be established on the high ground 1 kilometer southeast of Marcq, and on the ridge to the north and northeast of Cornay. The line of resistance, Cornay la Besogne, was not changed. The 82d Division was ordered to relieve elements of the 1st Division west of Bois de Boyon by 5 a. m., October 10. The artillery and engineers of the 28th Division were to be released to their division on the 10th. [94, 95]

In compliance with verbal orders of the division commander, which attached the 325th Infantry to the 164th Infantry Bri-gade, the brigade issued its field orders on October 9. The 325th Infantry was directed to attack at 5 a. m., October 10, and re-gain the corps objective from Flville to the narrow-gauge rail-road west of Cornay. The 2d Battalion was to attack from Cote 180 to the line, Flville (excl.) Cornay (incl.). The 1st Battalion was to attack from the ridge west of Hill 223 to the line, Cornay (excl.) narrow-gauge railroad west of Cornay. The 3d Battalion was to remain in reserve south and west of Hill 223. The corps objective was to be organized in depth. Exploitation patrols were to be sent north to the Aire, which was designated as the limit of the outpost position. The 327th Infantry and the 328th Infantry were to remain in position until further orders. All troops were to be in position for the attack at 4 a. m., October 10. It was also provided that all the artillery of the 157th Field Artillery Brigade would support this attack and, upon the arrival of the infantry on the objective, would be available for harassing and searching fire north of the objective. [96, 97]

The withdrawal, which had been ordered by the German Fifth Army, was carried out during the night of October 9-10. [89, 98]

Oct. 10

Pagina 20 di 43


The 2d and 1st Battalions, 325th Infantry, from right to left, had taken the positions ordered by 4 a. m., relieving front-line Oct. 10 elements of the 327th Infantry and 328th Infantry. The corps postponed the attack until 7 a. m. At that hour the attack

30

was launched behind a heavy artillery barrage, and supported by direct overhead machine-gun fire. Little resistance was encountered and both battalions reached the corps objective. Organization of the position was in progress by 10:20 a. m. Acting under instructions from the corps, the 164th Infantry Brigade, at 10:35 a. m., ordered the enemy driven beyond the Aire. Both battalions passed their support companies through the front line and patrolled to the river. No infantry was en-countered. On the right, Company G and two platoons of Company H established themselves at Martincourt Ferme. The other two platoons of Company H took positions near point 177. These troops established an outpost line and patrolled to the Aire. [2, 50, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103]

Pursuant to orders of the 164th Infantry Brigade, Company K, 325th Infantry, which was then in reserve near Hill 223, was directed to establish a combat-liaison post between the 1st and 82d Divisions. It took up a position near the crossing of the Flville Baulny and the Exermont Chtel-Chhry roads. [100]

There was no front-line liaison between the two platoons of Company H, 325th Infantry, near point 177, and the 327th Infantry, across the Aire. Contact was secured between the elements of the 325th Infantry at Martincourt Ferme and those of the 326th Infantry on the ridge to the west. [2]

On the left, the 326th Infantry attacked at 7:30 a. m. in the same order as on the previous day. By noon the assault battalions, having met little resistance, were on the corps ob-jective west of the narrow-gauge railroad. [93]

About 3:30 p. m. the 2d Battalion, 326th Infantry, then in support, was ordered to cross the Aire River, and take St. Juvin and Cte 182. Both places were reported to have been evacuated. The battalion passed through the front line about 5 p. m. and advanced through Marcq, without preliminary reconnaissance. It was planned to attack with Companies G and E in assault, from right to left, and Companies F and H in support. Company G was to cross the Aire by the highway bridge and nearby fords; Company E by the railroad bridge. Movements along the riverbank drew hostile fire from the

31

vicinity of St. Juvin. After dark, it was discovered that the bridges had been destroyed. Attempts to cross continued throughout the evening, but hostile fire prevented. Before midnight, positions were taken up on the high ground south of the railroad, with outposts along the river. There was contact to the right with the front line of the 325th Infantry at Martin-court Ferme. Contact was established with the 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry, which had occupied Marcq, and with the 77th Division in the northwestern edge of the town. [2, 93, 105]

East of the Aire, the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry, moved forward about noon to relieve elements of the 1st Division north of Flville. The relief was accomplished at 4:10 p. m. Contact was established, by patrols, with the left of the 1st Division on Cte de Maldah, but there was no liaison with the front line of the 325th Infantry west of the river. [22 51, 65, 104]

During the evening, the 164th Infantry Brigade notified the 325th and 327th Infantry Regiments, in field messages, that they were under its command, and that the 326th and 328th Infantry Regiments were under the command of the 163d Infantry Brigade. The 328th Infantry was directed to report to the 163d Infantry Brigade for orders. [106]

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At 8 p. m. the I Corps issued field orders directing the continuation of the attack at 7 a. m., October 11. The following zone of action was assigned to the 82d Division:

Right boundary: Sommerance (excl.) Imcourt (excl.). Left boundary: Marcq (incl.) St. Juvin (excl.) Verpel (excl.).

The line, Imcourt (excl.) Champigneulle (incl.) Grand-Pr (incl.), was assigned as the first objective; two other objec-tives were assigned farther to the north. One regiment of 75-mm guns was to support the attack of each infantry brigade, and at least one gun was to accompany each assault infantry battalion. A group of tanks was designated to operate with the 82d Division. [107]

The 82d Division issued its field orders at 11 p. m. These orders confirmed the information contained in the field messages of the 164th Infantry Brigade, attaching the 328th Infantry to

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the 163d Infantry Brigade, and the 325th Infantry to the 164th Infantry Brigade. The 164th Infantry Brigade was to attack between the east boundary of the division and vertical grid line 98.5; the 163d Infantry Brigade between that grid line and the west boundary. The assault battalions were ordered to cross the Aire before daylight, covered by strong patrols. They were to be formed for the attack by 5 a. m. on the north bank of the Aire, on a line extending west from Sommerance, just north of La Rance Ruisseau, to the Flville St. Juvin road. Combat liaison between infantry brigades, and with the divisions to the right and left, was provided for. The order stated that five tanks would support the attack, deploying across the front of the division as the infantry moved forward. The artillery was instructed to keep harassing and interdiction fire in front of the advancing infantry, and to assign one regiment of 75-mm guns to each attacking brigade. The accompany-ing guns prescribed by the corps were assigned to the leading battalions. [108]

Oct. 11

The 164th Infantry Brigade issued its field orders on October 11. The 327th Infantry was to attack on the right; the 325th on the left. Presumably through a typographical error, the corps west boundary was assigned to the 325th Infantry as the left limit of its zone of action. The boundary between regiments was given as vertical grid line 99.3 until it crossed the St. Georges St. Juvin road, thence to a point midway between Imcourt and Allipont. Each regiment was ordered to attack with one battalion in assault, one in support and one in reserve. The reserve battalion, 327th Infantry, was designated as division reserve; the reserve battalion, 325th Infantry, as brigade reserve. [109]

The 327th Infantry was in position for the attack at 5 a. m. The 3d Battalion, less Company K, which had been broken up and assigned to other companies of the regiment, was to pass through the 2d Battalion. The 2d Battalion was then to follow in support. Just before 5 a. m. instructions were received to postpone the attack to conform to field orders of the I Corps. These instructions were relayed to the advanced troops, who attacked from the Sommerance St. Juvin road at

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7 a. m., without artillery support. No tanks arrived to support the attack. Relatively good progress was made, and the leading elements of the 3d Battalion, which, with both flanks exposed, crossed the ridge southeast of St. Juvin and penetrated the enemy wire northwest of Hill 230. Enemy resistance was too strong, however, for these advanced positions to be held, and a withdrawal to the vicinity of the Sommerance St. Juvin road was ordered about 9:30 a. m. The troops withdrew, covered by machine guns. The 2d Battalion was put into the line along the road, on the right of the 3d Battalion, with all four companies in line. About 11:40 a. m. the 164th Infantry Brigade ordered a withdrawal, under cover of machine-gun fire, to positions which could be held. Further withdrawal was made to

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the positions of the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, south of the road. The movement was completed about 1 p. m. [2, 50, 51, 65, 110]

At 2 p. m. the 82d Division ordered the 164th Infantry Brigade to employ the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, then in division reserve, to regain the ridge southeast of St. Juvin. Pursuant to these instructions, the brigade ordered this battalion to report to the 327th Infantry, which was directed to advance straight north from the patches of woods north of the Sommerance St. Juvin road, regain the ridge and dig in. The 325th Infantry, on the left, was to be instructed to conform to the movements of the attacking battalion. No advance beyond the ridge was to be made. [2, 65, 100, 111]

About 5 p. m. the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, advanced as ordered, passing through elements of the other two battalions and the right of the 325th Infantry, and gained its objective about 7 p. m. Some of its troops withdrew from the summit of the ridge during the evening, but returned before midnight and organized the crest for defense. Units of the 325th Infantry outposted the right of this line. Liaison was secured with those units of the 325th Infantry which were to the left. [65, 112]

The 325th Infantry received the orders of the 164th Infantry Brigade about midnight, October 10. The 3d Battalion, less Company K, was in reserve in the, vicinity of Hill 223.

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Early in the day, Company K had been sent across the Aire to maintain liaison with the 1st Division. Shortly after receipt of the brigade orders, the 325th Infantry directed its 3d Battalion, less Company K, to march via Flville in time to reach the line of departure by 5 a. m. The 2d and 1st Battalions were ordered to withdraw from the outpost position and line of resistance and follow in the order named. [100, 113]

At 7 a. m., the 3d Battalion was marching along the Flville St. Juvin road, with the head of the column about 1 kilometer south of the junction of the Sommerance St. Juvin road. At this point sharp fire was received from the front and from the ridge to the right. Two companies deployed to the right of the road. The third took position in the ditch of La Rance Ruisseau and returned the hostile fire. The battalion soon took up the advance and, with both flanks exposed, reached the objective, the ridge southeast of St. Juvin. By 10:30 a. m. the 2d Battalion had been sent in to strengthen the line. Liaison was secured, to the right, with the 327th Infantry which had fallen back to the Sommerance St. Juvin road. Owing to the withdrawal of the 327th Infantry, the right flank of the 325th Infantry remained exposed for a considerable period of time. [2, 100, 101]

At 11:09 a. m. the 164th Infantry Brigade ordered Companies B and C, 325th Infantry, then in brigade reserve, to reinforce the line on the ridge. About the same time, Companies A and D, 325th Infantry, were sent from brigade reserve to reinforce the 327th Infantry. Since this regiment was withdrawing, it returned the two companies to the 325th Infantry. In the afternoon they joined the remainder of their battalion in the front line on the ridge. During the afternoon the 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry, extended the right of its line to the northern outskirts of Sommerance, and sent Company F to secure liaison to the left. Late in the afternoon, the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, advanced through the right of the 325th Infantry and established itself on the objective. Company E, 325th Infantry, outposted the right of the line of the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, while Company H, 325th Infantry, placed a screen around Sommerance. Company H secured

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liaison by patrols with the 42d Division, which was relieving the 1st Division. Company G, 325th Infantry, remained in support just west of Sommerance. [2, 101]

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In the zone of action of the 325th Infantry, the 1st and 3d Battalions were intermingled along the ridge during the afternoon. Reorganization was accomplished after dark and the 1st Battalion took over the front line, with the 3d Battalion in close support. Company F, 325th Infantry, remained on the left, and during the evening established contact with Company M, 326th Infantry, which had crossed the Aire and moved to the ridge. The position held was generally along the crest of the ridge. [100, 101]

During the night of October 10-11, troops of the 307th Engineers helped repair the bridges in front of the 2d Battalion, 326th Infantry, which was ordered to cross at daybreak and take St. Juvin. [105]

The movement commenced about 5 a.m. No tanks appeared in this area, and there was no artillery support. Covered by a fog, Companies G and E and portions of Company F had crossed by 5:40 a. m. While they were deploying, the fog lifted and very heavy machine-gun fire was received from the direction of St. Juvin. Company G was able to move forward about 75 meters by crawling, but Company E could not advance. The fire was so intense that all troops had to be withdrawn to the south bank of the river. The withdrawal was covered by the fire of Company F, and by an overhead barrage of the Machine-Gun Company, 326th Infantry. A line was formed along the railroad. Contact was maintained with the 77th Division to the left at the same point as on the previous night. Patrols covered the ground to the river and the bridge during the night of October 11-12. [2, 114]

Company M, 326th Infantry, forded the Aire east of Martin-court Ferme, and moved up the Flville St. Juvin road to the positions of the 325th Infantry on the ridge southeast of St. Juvin. The other companies of the 3d Battalion, 326th Infantry, remained west of the Aire. The 1st Battalion continued in support of the 2d Battalion. There was no front-line liaison across the river. [2, 93]

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The 82d Division notified the 326th Infantry in a field message at 8:30 p. m. that direct attacks on St. Juvin would be discontinued. The message stated that movements to the east and north to avoid the town would be ordered. [115]

Oct. 12

At 1 a. m., October 12, the 164th Infantry Brigade notified the 325th and 327th Infantry Regiments that there would be no attack during the day. It directed that reorganization would continue and positions be improved. [116]

The front line to the north of the Aire was consolidated along the ridge southeast of St. Juvin. About 4 p. m. the 42d Division occupied Sommerance and took over the line of the 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry, as far as the divisional right boundary. The battalion then passed to, brigade reserve. Contact was maintained with the 42d Division. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 327th Infantry, were consolidated during the day. This provisional battalion continued to hold the front line on the ridge, with the 1st Battalion in support. The 1st Battalion, 325th Infantry, was relieved in the front line by the 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry. [50, 65, 100, 101]

In the 326th Infantry, the 3d Battalion, less Company M, forded the Aire in the early morning and took up positions in the gully east of Gu Dehamby. One company formed a defensive line facing St. Juvin, while the other two companies supported this line and the positions of Company M on the ridge to the north. West of the Aire, the 1st Battalion relieved the 2d Battalion in the frontline. [2, 93, 117, 118]

At 11 a. m. the I Corps issued field orders announcing an attack on D-day at H-hour for the purpose of supporting the left of the V Corps, which was to attack at an hour to be announced later. In this attack the I Corps, pivoting on its left, was to advance to successive objectives specified in its field

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orders. The 82d Division was to support and protect the left of the 42d Division; the 77th Division was to support and protect the left of the 82d Division. The right elements of the 77th Division were to move into the zone of action of the 82d Division and attack St. Juvin from the south and east. [119]

Oct. 13

During the morning of October 13, the 164th Infantry Brigade

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issued field orders giving advance information of a general attack which was to be made October 14, and stating that the normal organization of the brigades would be resumed. The 328th Infantry was directed to relieve the 327th Infantry during the night of October 13-14 on a 1-battalion front. These orders also provided for preliminary reconnaissance of the front, and other preparations for the attack. At 9:15 a. m. the 164th Infantry Brigade ordered the 325th Infantry to organize in depth, holding its front with one battalion. [120, 121]

The remainder of the morning and the early afternoon were spent in making arrangements for the proposed attack. At 4 p. m., the 325th Infantry and the 328th Infantry reverted to the 163d and 164th Infantry Brigades respectively. About this time, after a heavy artillery preparation, the enemy launched a counterattack, and advanced in open formation over the ridge cast of St. Juvin. The fronts of all three regiments east of the Aire were involved. At 5 p. m. the 82d Division ordered the 164th Infantry Brigade to assume command of the action east of the river. The division also directed the 163d Infantry Brigade, west of the Aire, to furnish any troops requested by the 164th Infantry Brigade. By this time the counterattack was being definitely repulsed. No withdrawals were made, and at 5:20 p. m. the 164th Infantry Brigade report-ed that the counterattack had been stopped on the front of the 327th Infantry, on the extreme right. On the front of the 325th Infantry, the 1st Battalion had just completed the relief of the 3d Battalion when the counterattack commenced. The latter battalion stayed in the forward positions until the action ceased, when it passed to support. At 6:50 p. m. the 82d Division ordered the infantry brigades to resume their normal organization. [2, 101, 114, 118]

During the late afternoon, the 328th Infantry reverted to the command of the 164th Infantry Brigade and moved from Pylne, west of the Aire, to positions in rear of the 327th Infantry. About 10 p. m. the 2d Battalion, 326th Infantry, crossed to the east bank of the Aire at Flville, and took position in support of the 3d Battalion, 326th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry, continued to hold its lines west of the Aire, in contact

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with the 77th Division. Contact with the left of the 42d Division was maintained near the divisional right boundary north of Sommerance. [63, 93, 114, 122]

The relief of the 327th Infantry in the front line by the 328th Infantry commenced during the evening of October 13, and was completed about 2:3o a.m., October 14 [123]

At 2 p. m. the I Corps issued field orders announcing that D-day, referred to in its field orders of October 12, would be October 14. The corps was to support the left flank of the V Corps and, pivoting on its left, advance to successive objectives, as follows:

First objective: Hill 230 Gu Dehamby Marcq (incl.). Corps objective: ridge 1 kilometer north of Moulin St. Georges Cte 182 Chevires (incl.).

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Divisions were ordered to advance from the first objective at H plus 1 hours. It is to be noted, however, that the 82d Division already occupied the first objective except on the ex-treme right. In preparation for, and to assist the infantry attack, lethal gas was to be used in rear areas to the fullest extent possible. Troops were to be in position at 6 a. m., October14. [2, 119, 124]

At 10 p. m. the 82d Division issued its field orders. Bound-aries were not changed. Provisions were made for the movement Of 77th Division troops into the zone of action of the 82d Division for the purpose of attacking St. Juvin from the south and east. Elements of the 77th Division were to relieve the 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry, south of St. Juvin. Upon being relieved, the battalion was to cross to the east bank of the Aire. [125]

There was to be a 2-hour artillery preparation. The artillery was given the special mission of protecting the left flank east of vertical grid line 97, from St. Juvin and Cte 182, by use of high explosive and smoke. A battery of 75-mm guns was assigned each infantry brigade for special missions. The rolling barrage was to continue for 1 hour after H-hour, and conform to the advance of the infantry. It was to be resumed at H plus 1 hours to cover the advance to the corps objective. One 75-mm gun was to accompany each assault battalion, and

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Company E, 1st Gas Regiment, was to support the attack of the 164th Infantry Brigade with smoke and thermite. H-hour was later announced as 8:30 a. m. [125, 126]

The following dispositions were ordered for the attack:

In addition to directing the relief of the 327th Infantry by the 328th Infantry, the field orders of the 164th Infantry Brigade provided that the attack of the brigade would not begin until five hours after the beginning of the attack by the 42d Division. Machine-gun companies were attached to the leading battalions. [128,129]

The field orders of the 163d Infantry Brigade designated the 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry, as brigade reserve, and directed it to move as the rear battalion of the column of its regiment. The 3d Battalion, 326th Infantry, was to move north from the line of departure. The 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry, upon being relieved by the 77th Division at 6 a. m., was to follow the attack of that division to the north bank of the Aire, and then join its regiment as reserve. The battalion was to take no part in the attack of the 77th Division. [100, 127]

Oct. 14

163D INFANTRY BRIGADE 164TH INFANTRY BRIGADE 326th Infantry 3d Battalion 2d Battalion 1st Battalion

325th Infantry 1st Battalion

328th Infantry 1st Battalion 2d Battalion 3d Battalion

Brigade Reserve 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry

Brigade Reserve 327th Infantry

DIVISION RESERVE 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry

319th Machine-Gun Battalion

[114, 125, 127, 128]

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About 8:30 a. m., October 14, the 42d Division came abreast of the right of the 328th Infantry; that regiment then attacked. The 1st Battalion advanced slowly in conjunction with the 42d Division. About 10 a. m. the right of the battalion was im-peded by troops of the 42d Division who entered the zone of action of the 328th Infantry to attack St. Georges from the southwest. Shortly before noon these troops withdrew to

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their own zone of action. About noon a detachment of Company D succeeded in getting through the wire of the Kriemhild Stellung about 800 meters southwest of St. Georges, while portions of Company C were about 500 meters to the south. Dur-ing the early afternoon Company B was placed in line on the left, and attacked across the St. Georges St. juvin road. Upon reaching the ridge overlooking Ravin aux Pierres heavy fire was received, and the advance was stopped about 1:30 p. m. A line was formed along the St. Georges St. juvin road. In the late afternoon the 2d Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion in the front line. The 2d Battalion withdrew its right from the road to gain contact with the 42d Division on the divisional boundary 1 kilometer south of St. Georges. This line was maintained during the night. Contact was secured with the 325th Infantry. [2, 63, 118, 130, 131]

In the center, the 325th infantry attacked about 10 a. m., with the 1st Battalion in assault. By 11:15 a. m. the wire of the Kriemhild Stellung had been pierced but, as heavy fire was received from the right, the troops withdrew to the St. Georges St. Juvin road. At this time the support companies of the 1st Battalion were passing through a gas barrage about 750 meter

82d division - summary of operations in wwi

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