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PATROLffiNGGround ReconnaissancePrinciples and Training

by Lt. Gol. Bex Applegate(U.S.A.-Ret.f


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SCOUTINGANDPATROLLINGby Lt. Col. Rex Applegate(U.S.Army - Ret.)

In our present era ofthe electronic bat-tlefield, it is wise to realize that someaspects of warfare are unchanging. Scout-ing and Patrolling is concerned withground reconnaissance principles that havechanged little in the past 200 years. RichardRodgers, leader of the famed Rodgers'Rangers during the French and IndianWar, first laid down the tenets of scoutingand patrolling for his elite group of guer-rilla fighters. These tenets are still the keyto winning battles, particularly in the smallbrushfire conflicts taking place in thirdworld areas.Col. Rex Applegate originally createdand compiled this book during WW IL Hedid so after realizingthat our armed forceslacked a field manual explaining scoutingand patrolling methods. It is interesting tonote that the U.S. Army has since incorpo-rated some of Scouting and Patrolling intotheir present FM 2l-75. However, theyneglected to include many of Col. Apple-gate's most valuable philosophies, observa-tions, and training exercises.

Chapter titles include:o Individual Training - An introduc-tion to scout selection which identifies thetraits a prospective scout must have, suchas personal confidence and leadership .qualities. Also gives basic training princi-ples for scouts.o Terrain Appreciation - Explains whyterrain, and not enemy tactics, is usuallythe determining factor in battle strategy.Covers terrain evaluation in terms of ob-servation, fields of fire, concealment andcover, obstacles, and communications.o Observation - Stresses the necessityfor observation superior to that of theenemy. Covers the proper selection, man-ning and operation of observation posts.Other topics analyzed include artilleryobservation posts, range estimation, andcommunication.o Patrolling - An army on the offensivefunctions in direct proportion to its patrol-ling skill. Tells how to select and trainpatrol members, and choose which patrolformation is best for various purposes,such as ambush and reconnais"^.1 A,lsodetails the scouting an' '"g1t$AFsl' :h-niques of the WW II Br' Zltrermaru rtal-ian. and Japanese armie

C0ntinued on"hock flap


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SCOT]TINGANf)PATROLLING


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...-...-___-___


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SCOUTINGANDPATROTTINGGround ReconnaissancePrinciples And Training

byLt. Col. Rex Applegate(U.S. Army - Ret.)


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. copy.iir,t 1980 by Lt. Col' Rex Applegate (U'S'A'-Ret')All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be."proirr""d in any form without the prior written consentof the coPYright holder.Published by Paladin Press, a division of PaladinEnterprises inc., PO Box 1307, Boulder' Co' 80306'rsBN 0-87364-184-1.Printed in tfre U\ States of America'

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TABLE OFCONTENTSPublishers Forward .... viiIntroduction... ... ixI: IndividualTraining .......1II: Terrain Appreciation . . .. ..12III: Observation ...21IV: Patrolling.. ........38V: Lectures ......84VI: Exercises .. ...99


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PUBLISHERS' FORWARD"Although the basic principles qf scouting andpatrolling are unchanging, it is recognized thatthis is the era of the electronic battlefield."

Scouting And Patrolling was originally sched-uled for publication near the end of World War II. Atthat time, our combat experience and intelligence dataindicated that there was a lack of basic training data andtactical techniques in the Army scouting/patrollingmanuals then available. This book was written to amendthat situation. But the sudden end of the war, and apredicted loss of interest in military texts caused thepublishers to cancel the project.An examination of the current U.S. Army man-ual FM 2l-75 reveals that some of this material has beenincorporated into Armf doctrine . However, it is felt thatthis book contains important information and tactics stillnot found in any other current manual; hence the justifi-cation for publishing this manuscript, 35 years after itwas written.Although the basic principles of scouting andpatrolling are unchanging, it is recognized that this is theera ofthe electronic battlefield. Satellites, lasers, helicop-ters, all-terrain vehicles, superior night vision sights anddevices, advanced aerial photo techniques, and sophisti-cated ordnance are now commonly in use among majorinternational armed forces of the world. Yet there are stillcountless small "brushfire" conflicts and military actions

occurring throughout the world today that are foughtbetween poorly-equipped ground forces. Such forcesespecially are in need of the basic tactics as used byRodgers' Rangers, over 200 years ago.The information and techniques presented herewere developed and taught to intelligence officers at theU.S. Army Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie,Maryland from 1942 to 1945. Colonel Applegate com-manded a training section there consisting of 27 officersand ranking enlisted men who were veterans of recentcombat in all theatres of war. This elite group of menstudied the scouting and patrolling techniques of theenemy, allies, and our own forces, then formulated theinstructional courses presented here.Some of the authorls references to weapons andevents may seem a bit outdated to the casual reader. Butthe publishers feel strongly that Scouting And Patrollingis a timeless and important work, and that recognition ofthis fact is long overdue. Any officer responsible fortraining or leading his men in scouting/patrolling opera-tions should welcome the addition of this book to hislibrary.

vu

The Publishers


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INTRODUCTION"An intelligent man of good physique, who iscon/ident, aggressive, and self-reliant, is the bestraw material from which scouts and patrolmembers are made."

The modern military commander has many aidsfor the gathering of information about the enemy, such asthe photo-interpretation team, the interrogation team, thecounter-intelligence detachment, and the usual exchangeof information between higher, lower and adjacentheadquarters. Even with these outside aids, thecommander is still mainly dependent upon his ownintelligence and ground reconnaissance agencies. Oftenthey are the only means of obtaining or confirming enemyinformation. The personnel of these intelligence sectionsand reconnaissance agencies must be especially trained intheir duties, a great portion of which will be scouting,pagolling and observation.- Once in contact with the enemy, No Man's Land,whether it be 100 yards or 100 miles broad, must be keptunder continuous observation and control by friendlypatrols. Never should a state of exhaustion of troops orcommand result in neglect of this observation orreconnaissance.Unfortunately, observation alone is not alwaysenough. Too often a particular area of enemy activity ishidden from even the best of aerial photographs or groundobservers. To confirm previous reports or to gainadditional information, the scout or patrol must be used.Since enemy information will not always come easily, thecommander must have scouts or patrols capable of goingout to get it and of bringing it back.The scout or patrol member must be a speciallyselected solider who has undergone intensive training

before he can properly perform his mission in combat. Hecannot be replaced by any basic private should he becomea casualty. An intelligent man of good physique, who isconfident, aggressive, and self-reliant, is the best rawmaterial from which scouts and patrol members are made.When the unit commander or his S-2 gives such menproper training, their usefulness to him will be greatlyincreased.Active training in scouting and patrolling, whichcan never be acquired entirely from training films or fieldmanuals, should be given in the field under conditions assimilar to actual combat as possible. The training programrnust be specific and realistic. Only those men with combatexperience, who have seen the value of such training, willapply themselves wholeheartedly.Scouting and patrolling is a subject which even thebest men will not learn without a continuous, rigidlysupervised training program. Americans are generally toomechanized by machine-age habits to appreciate thenecessity of getting down on their bellies and crawling.It is hoped that this material, which containstraining hints and information gathered from a multitudeof manuals, combat reports, enemy and allied publicationsand individual experiences, will be an aid to instructingofficers in the training program.Special training exercises, directed againstpersonnel dressed as the enemy, using enemy organization,tactics and equipment will be discussed later. In some unitsthese facilities may not be available to the training officer,

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but he can train his men against American troops andorganizations with but little change in the discussedtraining program and achieve the desired results. Basically,scouting and patrolling principles are the same in allarmies. Some of the training methods suggested areidealized, such as might be practiced in a special school,but the individual training officer can easily adapt them tohis own situation.Although this book has been written primarily asan aid to training officers of intelligence andreconnaissance units, its use is not limited to them alone.Company grade infantry officers will find this material ofspecial interest, since they are often called upon to furnishand lead patrols for specific intelligence and combatmissions.Enemy and allied armies assign specially trainedscouts and observers to their basic infantry units. TheMarine Corps has used somewhat similar plans inassigning specially trained groups of scouts to differentheadquarters as the situation demands. Army directivesand memoranda have suggested similar procedure for ourinfantry units. A special group of selected and trainedscouts iould be allotted each rifle company and battalion.These units could be used for reconnaissance patrols andas special covering detachments for forward security inapproach marches.

A provision whereby these special allotments oftrained scouts and observers can be provided to variousheadquarters is very desirable. Such groups could also beutilized as replacements or used in situations where normalreconnaissance agencies are not sufficiently trained or lackthe numerical strength to accomplish the desired missions.Ranger units have been attached to infantry organizationsto perform necessary patrol and scouting tasks. Somedivisions have organized provisional units locally, callingthem "battle patrols." These specially trained units havesuccessfully operated on specific reconnaissance missionsbecause of their selected personnel, aggressiveness andindividualized training.Scouting and patrolling is comparable to riflemarkmanship. All members of infantry units must be ableto fire a rifle. Similarly, all must be able to performnormal scouting and patrolling missions. Outstandingriflemen are given extra training and equipment andbecome snipers. In the same way, specially selected andqualified men or units must be trained to perform specialreconnaissance and patrolling missions.This text includes all the source material,instructional methods and references necessary to trainindividuals and units in foot reconnaissance.


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CHAPTER IINDIVIDUAL TRAINING

"In the military sense, the natural bornscout does not exist. He can onlY becreated by proper selection and training."

A military scout must learn to do, throughpactice and training, the things animals do by instinct. Inaddition to the animal traits of patience, silent movement,ad the instinctive utilization of cover and concealment,tlrc scout must also master many other special skills toenable him to fulfill his combat role.

The word "scout" is in itself an all-inclusive term,and conjures up visions of the skilled plainsmen of ourfrontier days. But to designate a soldier as a scout does notautomatically endow him with all of the desirableattributes of our Indian-fighting ancestors. Because we aredecades removed from our pioneer days and because ourarmies are largely recruited from thickly populated areas,.we must place special emphasis upon the selection andtraining of the military scout. This training must be aboveand beyond that received in basic military training, inorder to produce the ideal reconnaissance scout, observeror patrol member such as manuals describe.The military importance of the scout in modernwar is such that all the special attributes demanded of himno longer come from his environment alone, but can onlybe acquired by careful selection and training. The rawmaterial of a machine age from which good scouts must bedeveloped is plentiful, but it must be carefully selected andproperly trained. The veneer of civilization has practicallyeliminated the inherent characteristics of our pioneerancestors which are so desirable. In other words' we muststart from "scratch" in the selection ofthe reconnaissancescout. Beyond the basic qualifications of good physical

condition, unimpaired vision, keen hearing and a highmental standard, the desirable traits to make an ideal scoutmust be developed by training.Standards of selection must not be too rigid.Generally, however, an appraisal of the age, civilianbackground and emotional characteristics of the soldierwill help. Often the very young are lacking in judgmentand patience, making them too impulsive or too ready fora fight. Older, more mature men who have spent thegreater part of their lives outdoors in the fields and forestsmake much better basic scout material. In addition tobeing more at home in the field, they are usually morereliable, possess greater patience and exercise betterjudgment at critical moments. The qualities of leadershipand personal confidence are often better developed. Thisshould not be construed to mean that a young soldier or acity-bred soldier will not make a good scout, but normallysuch men will need more training.In combat, certain men will stand out asindividuals and show other desirable qualities, such asaggressiveness and personal courage. They will often takegreat personal pride in their fieldcraft and ability tooutsmart the enemy, and will desire to operate alone onscouting missions. Men of this type make ideal scouts andshould be given every opportunity by the commandingofficer to exploit such natural tendencies. Suchindividuals, however, are not usually present in sufficientnumbers to assume the entire reconnaissance burden ofmodern armies. The old concept of the individual scout


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operating alone in the face of the enemy depends largelyupon the presence of such men in sufficient numbers in allunits. Nowadays, two and three man patrols mustassume the responsibility for "sneak" reconnaissance.Recent combat has revealed that for operational, psycho-logical and security reasons the two man scout team orpatrol,(3 men) will best perform the bulk of sneakreconnaissance missions. Although it is true that mostsneak reconnaissance missions will be executed by smallpatrols, the qualities of the individual scout must still be ashigh as when he was used singly on missions. Trainingmust be directed toward making him the well schooled,self-sufficient soldier that the name "scout" implies.After basic infantry training, the scout's initialinstruction in scouting and patrolling must be centeredaround three basic points, camouflage, movement, andsound.

No matter how thoroughly the scout (or anysoldier) is schooled in maps, compass, weapons,observation, etcetera, his value in the field is nullified untilhis training in the basic principles of movement, sound andcamouflage has been completed. If a soldier cannot takeadvantage of terfain, moving properly, invisibly andquietly, he is not a scout. Regardless of his other specialskills, he is not of much value as a reconnaissance agentunless he has mastered himself and his movement overterrain under the eyes of the enemy. He must be able to goout and gel enemy information and bring it buck.The scout must be well-trained in the use ofartificial concealment aids such as camouflage suits, nets,paint, and other field expedients, but an understanding ofthe principles of natural camouflage and the proper use ofterrain features and foliage must be his principal means ofconcealment.Proper movement in the field not only involvesthe correct utilization of terrain and camouflage but it alsodemands silence while moving and at a halt. Silentmovement over all types of terrain is essential. Too manysoldiers advance headlong into enemy territory withoutavoiding brush, tile, and various other noise-producingobstacles. The scout must be taught to utilize quiet areas,or to silently cross unavoidable noise-producing obstacles,man-made and natural.Once enemy contact has been established,daytime missions are usually restricted by enemyobservation and counter reconnaissance screens.Consequently, most reconnaissance missions will beundertaken at night when the enemy must rely mainlyupon his ears to detect the presence of the scout or patrol.For these reasons, every scout should receive thoroughtraining in silent movement, particularly at night. Eachtraining officer should use a silent movement course in histraining program, similar to the one described in theexercise section.The basic elements of courage, initiative,resourcefulness and perseverance should be part of the

makeup of all scouts. All of these, however. will be of littleuse without the trait of patience. Lack of patience leads tocarelessness, which is tantamount to suicide whenoperating under the eyes of the enemy. Patience is not aproduct of the machine age, nor is it a trait which isnaturally found in too much abundance in the Americansoldier. It is a quality which should distinguish allintelligence personnel. Reconnaissance demands patience;a scout is often betrayed by a lack of it.Many reports from various theatres of waremphasize the necessity for patience in all actions, large orsmall. A vet from WW II's Guadalcanal told a story of aday's combat; not a battle of wits, strength or courage, but, a battle pitting the patience of a Japanese against thepatience of an American soldier. For several hours eachwaited for the other to move and disclose his position. TheJapanese moved first, and the American fired. He did notmiss. From WW II to Vietnam, all too often Americansoldiers have lost these battles of patience.If patience is not naturally present in the makeupof the scout it must be developed during the trainingprogram. If it cannot be ingrained into an individualduring training, the probabilities of the success of thatparticular soldier as a military scout are greatly lessened.After the soldier has developed through trainingthe ability to move invisibly and silently in the face of theenemy, he must achieve proficiency in many other thingsbefore he can become a scout. Where, how, and what tosee must next be covered in his training.

He must be something of an engineer to judge thecorrect load of bridges and roads; he must know how torelay information by semaphore or wire. His training mustinclude hours of compass work, both day and night; hemust be very proficient at map reading and he must knowhow to make planimetric, panoramic and contouredsketches. His knowledge of booby traps, mines, anddemolitions must be superior to that of the ordinarysoldier. He must know his own army as well as that of theenemy, both as to organization, equipment and tactics.It is easy enough to see that the demands on themodern scout are considerably greater than those madeupon scouts of the past. Present day warfare has made itmandatory that he be trained not only in Indian lore butalso in many of the complexities of modern battle.When the imposing list of subjects necessary forthe scout's military education are surveyed it is evident thatthe ideal reconnaissance scout cannot be trained "on theside," in addition to his regular duties. His trainingprogram is such that he must be taken aside and givenspecial intensive training.In the unit, the amount of training emphasis puton reconnaissance agencies by the commanding officer willbe directly reflected by the success of his reconnaissanceelements in combat. Many unit commanders have realizedthe necessity for the extra training of their scouts, andsome have organized provisional reconnaissance groups inaddition to their regular assigned personnel to participate

2


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Figure 1. Tbis is concenlment.


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Figure 2. This is deception. Figure 3. This is cover.

in such training programs. Special privileges, highstandards of selection and freedom from routine dutieswill help to build an esprit de corps which is so importantin organizations of this kind. Such an approach to thesolution of his reconnaissance problem by a commandingofficer will pay off in battle.

Night SightScouting and patrolling operations will be mostlyundertaken at night, consequently, emphasis on night

vision, proper sound identification and use of the earsmust be great. There are many mert who have poor nightsight. This deficiency should be ascertained by tests and itmust be corrected or such men should not be used on nightmissions. An individual with normal eyesight can increasehis powers of night vision by training and the use of a fewsimple precautions.Generally, night vision is inaccurate because onlyoutlines, not details, can be distinguished. Many timeseven outlines will be indistinguishable, but regardless ofthe degree of night vision, the mere fact that the eyes areopen means an aid to the individual in maintainingbalance, sense of direction, and silent movement.Consequently, even though sometimes the eyesare not useful in identifying objects they are still animportant morale factor. If you put a blindfold over an

individual's eyes, he immediately loses confidence andsense of direction. (See blindfold pen in exercise section).When any degree of light is present, however, the properuse of the eyes will greatly increase the effectiveness of thescout. By following proven rules, the value of night sightas a supplement to hearing are greatly increased.Basically, proper preparation means theconditioning of the eyes by shielding them from brightlights from thirty minutes to an hour before departure onthe night mission. The sudden transition of the eyes frombright light to darkness temporarily places the soldier at adisadvantage. In close proximity to the enemy hisusefulness may be over before he gains his night vision.Even if he has gained night vision, any exlosureto light, even for a moment, will result in a decrease in hispowers of night vision. The more intense the light, thegreater the amount of night vision lost. Flares, grenades,mine and artillery shell explosions and the use offlashlights will all affect his degree of vision on the nightmission. Unavoidable exposure of the eyes to suchconditions should result, if possible, in a period ofinactivity while the eyes are readjusting themselves.Fatigue, certain vitamin deficiencies, as well as lack ofpreparation, will cause an increase in night blindness.Anyone who has had the experience of goingfrom a brightly lighted street into a darkened theater canappreciate the meaning of the development of night vision.


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Figure 4. Everything around you is light or dark, or atone between these extremes. What shade are you? Inmedium light, you are a middle tone: "A." In shadowor with light behind you, you appear dark: "B." Indirect sunshine you are light in tone: "C,"


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SILHOUETTE

-t-t--

Figures 5 through 12. Do not be a member of asuicide patroMn battle, basic principles of camou' flage, cover, concealment, and movementalways be observed. Violate them and you die!


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The best way to see something at night is toexamine it from the corner of the eye. The individual mustlook at things from the corner of his eye; learning tocontrol his eyes by never looking directly at the object hewishes to see. He must learn that when his eyes are drawninesistibly to an object - and many times this will happen -he must force them to slide over to the other side, and lookagain at the object from the other corner of his eye. Innight observation, he should never try to sweep the sky,ground or horizon. Objects cannot be easily distinguishedwhile the eyes are moving. Patience becomes a vitallyimportant factor in night observation. Many times a faintobject may not be discernible until after manyexaminations.Any one who has hunted quail in the earlymorning or watched deer in the dusk will know that he canlook directly at such a naturally camouflaged animal for along time before he sees it. In darkness such an object iseven harder to distinguish, because it cannot be seen ifstared at directly. The soldier must look at the object againand again, first one side then the other, until it takesdefinite shape and is identified by its outline.

Precepts of Better Night Sight(l) Protect the eyes from strong light.(2) Use the corners of the eye while observing,moving from point to point in quick jerky movements.Short pauses are better than long, sweeping movements

and long pauses.(3) Be thorough, patient and systematic whileobserving.(4) Learn to identify your own and enemy objects

by silhouettes because details will not ordinarily be visible'(5) Don't eat too much before night work.

SoundThe scout must depend on his ears as well as his

eyes, especially when he operates at night. He must be ableto distinguish and identify various sounds. The commonnoises of troops in the field should indicate to him theiractivity. He should be able to distinguish the click of a riflebolt from the snapping of a twig. The rate of fire, andother distinctive sounds of combat, should indicate to himwhether it is his own or the enemy's weapons. The stlccessof his mission will often depend on his skill in interpretingsounds in the field.In the jungle, where snipers hold their fire untilthe enemy is within extremely close range, Americansoldiers have learned to listen for the sound of theenemy operating the bolt of his rifle. For instance, duringthe WWII Solomon Island Campaign, our soldiers lo-cated many Japanese snipers from the sound of theirArisaka rifle bolts snapping shut, enabling our troops toeliminate these enemy snipers.

False sounds can be used to deceive the enemy.Jericho is reputed to have been taken by a few men armedwith trumpets. In a like manner, a twig can be broken orother noise can be made to draw enemy fire, thus enablingother observers to locate enemy positions. A loud soundcan be used to mask other sounds thus concealing certainactivity to the enemy.Sound can be used to estimate distance. It is aknown fact that sound travels at approximately 1080 feetper second. If the flash of a cannon is observed and twoseconds elapse between the flash and the report thedistance from the cannon to the observer is 720 yards.(Two seconds x 360 yards per second.)To locate objects, the ear is not as skillful as theeye. The ears, nevertheless, can be very effective iniietermining the position of sound. If a repeated sound isfamiliar, so that the man knows its approximate distance,he can quite accurately locate the position of the noise-making object. He will notice sometimes that the sound islouder in one ear than in the other; he should then turn hishead so that the sound registers equally in both ears andhis nose will point in the general direction of the sound. Bystationing two men at different points, using intersection,a position can often be quite accurately determined.

,Precepts of Good Hearing

(l) Keep the ears free of wax, else they may bedeafened, particularly in hot weather. Wax should beremoved by a medical officer whenever possible.(2) Avoid colds and keep physically fit. If youhave a cold, it may be disrupting to subject your ears to agreat change of pressure, such as is experienced whentaking off and landing in aircraft. A cold is apt to close thetube from your mouth to the middle of the ear, to anextent that pressure on the inside of the eardrum cannot beequalized to the outside pressure. Unequal pressures candeafen. (3) Avoid exposures to loud sounds, such asheavy gun fire, if you want to be able to hear faint sounds.The effects of loud sounds may easily last for half an hour,sometimes even for a day, Protect your hearing withcotton as you protect your eyes with goggles.(4) If you do not want to be temporarily deafenedby your own rifle fire, plug your left ear with cotton. It isthe one that gets the explosion from the muzzle of yourgun. (5) If you are in the midst of loud noises and wantto hear speech, plug your ears with ear-plugs, cotton, oreven your fingers.(6) Listen attentively when you know what kindof sound to expect. On patrol and reconnaissance keepquiet and listen.(7) The steel helmet and the liner definitely limitthe hearing ability of the soldier. On patrols and guardduty at night, they should not be worn if the most is to beexpected of the ears.


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Figure 13. Progressive steps in camouflage. Figure 14. Camouflage background the same.

Figure 16

Figure 17. Movement, bowel or otherwise, attracts attention. Figure 18. Don't be an ostrich!


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Figure 19. Death. Figure 22. Life.

Kill that shine or it will kill you. Figure 23. Use grease, cork, and mud.

#,

Figure 24. Utilize shadows, don't make them.


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(8) Get interested in sounds. You can learn torecognize many different noistls when you have trainedyourself by constant practice. Some men can distinguishthe difference between makes of airplanes by the sound oftheir motors. They cannot describe the difference verbally,but they inherently recognize it. Trained woods and junglefighters quickly learn the differences between sounds ofhuman and animal movements in the undergrowth,though such noises are similar to the untrained ear.(9) In cold weather all sounds are amplified andcarry much further.

To avoid ear injuries caused by loud sounds thefollowing precautions should be taken:(l) Use ear plugs or cotton when they will notinterfere with the distinguishing of commands, and whenthose who give commands are using such precautions. Putyour fingers in your ears and open your mouth wide whena nearby gun is about to be fired. Our helmets protect theears from blasts but not from loud sounds. Some helmetsactually distort the localization of sounds.(2) Keep your ears away from areas where thesounds from gun discharges are greatest. Keep away fromany position ahead of the gun muzzle. Face the directionfrom which the sound will come, turning neither ear intoit. When you shield one ear, you are generally exposing theother, unless you protect it with the pressure of a finger.(3) Hunt for objects to screen the ear. Keepbehind walls orother protective barriers when anexplosion is imminent. Otherwise, lie down in a hollow,because the explosion generally rises from the ground. Youare better off in a prone position.(4) Open your mouth wide when an explosion isdue. Doing so helps equalize the pressure on both sides ofthe eardrum and may save you from having the drumruptured.(5) Anticipate the explosion, since, if you areprepared for it, your middle ear muscles set themselves toresist. These muscles are very differently attuned inlistening for a faint sound and anticipating a loud one.

Kill or Get KilledThe mission of the individual scout is to getenemy information and to get it back. If he is properlytrained and takes the necessary precautions, he normallywill not have to fight. However, on those occasions when

he is projected into unexpected combat, he must be able toprotect himself and the information he has concerning theenemy. By necessity, he carries few weapons, but heshould be trained to utilize any weapon which comesreadily to hand. He should be able to use enemyequipment as effectively as his own when forced intocombat. The soldier's natural fighting ability should bedeveloped to a point where he can kill quickly andeffectively in all close-quarter combat with or withoutweapons.

Intensive close combat training is a valuableadjunct in the training or reconnaissance personnel. Ithelps to instill sely'co nfidence and an offensive spirit, whileat the same time it develops the individual's fighting abilitywith or without weapons. A personal feeling of confidencein his own ability and in training are indispensableprerequisites for any soldier, but it is much moreimportant for the reconnaissance scout to develop suchconfidence. There is a direct relationship between c/osecombat training which increases self-confidence andincreased aggressiveness by scouts and patrols.

The average soldier operates against the enemy inbattle with other soldiers and group psychology plays agreat part in how he conducts himself in battle. Thereconnaissance scout, on the other hand, is an individualistwho must operate in many situations without moral orphysical support from his fellow soldiers. He must haveself-confidence as well as personal courage.Prior to and during any training program forreconnaissance personnel, physical conditioning is ofutmost importance. Long hikes, mountain climbing, andother hardening processes in all-weather conditions shouldhave their place in such a training program.. Practical close combat training, rigorous physicalconditioning, and continuous field exercises are requisitesof all Commando and Ranger units. Consequently, suchorganizations produce excellent scouts and reconnaissanceor combat patrols. The doctrine of the offense must bestressed at all times, and aggressiveness and tenacity in theindividual must be developed to a point where they reflectin his performance of combat missions.Although the psychology of hate and the killerinstinct must be fostered in training all soldiers forcombat, the reconnaissance scout must never lose sight ofhis primary mission, the gathering of information.Nevertheless, he must have the ability and the confidenceto take care of himself when the fulfillment of his missionis endangered.The following subjects should be taught in anytraining course on close combat*:

Unarmed OffenseDisarmingStrangulations(Sentry Killine)Knife Fighting andDisarmingCarbine, Pistol, SMG(Combat Firing

Total

VlHrs6 Hrs4 Hrs6 HrsZ.Hrs

64 Hrs

* The text material can be found in Rex Applegate's book,Kill or Get Killed, available from Paladin Press, PostOffice Box 1307, Boulder, Colorado 80306.l0


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The subjects listed and the number of hourssuggested are ideal. This instruction can be given at regularperiods throughout a training program and can becombined with the general physical conditioning program.In the conditioning program, it is best to inject asmany games and exercises as possible which have theelement of body contact. This type of program will helpdevelop aggressiveness and the offensive spirit which is soimportant. Too much cannot be said about the value ofclose combat training and physical conditioning.The use of obstacle courses, stalking courses,battle courses and other types of conditioning must becontinuous. If the scouting is to be done in the mountains,use the mountains for conditioning. The value in aprogram of this kind is most apparent when it iscontinuous. A gradual hardening process then takes placewhich will pay dividends in combat, for no matter howmuch physical punishment the troops take in maneuversand training, they will take still more in combat.A study of the racial and fighting characteristicsof the enemy and his fighting methods will add value and

interest to training. The methods of operating enemy smallarms, grenades and munitions should be coveredthoroughly. If available, captured enemy wqrpons shouldbe studied and used for instruction. Emphasis should beplaced on the loading and firing of these enemy weaponsinstead of the field stripping, nomenclature approach.The remaining chapters of this book completely coversubjects which should receive the major training emphasis.However, any local training program must includeemphasis on the following subjects.(l) Mines and booby traps and their tacticalemployment (own and enemy).(2) Sniping and its tactical employment.(3) Means of communication (visual, voice andmessage writing).(4) Organization, equipment and tacticalprinciples of the U.S. Army, including capabilities andlimitations of the various weapons and an emphasis onintelligence agencies.(5) Organization, tactics and equipment of theenemy army.ll


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CHAPTER IITERRAIN APPRECIATION

"To understandwhat the enemy

Terrain, not any extraordinary enemy tactics, isusually the determining factor in battle strategy. Terraindetermines our tactics and it molds the enemy's tactics aswell. If a soldier can analyze the terrain, he can analyze thepossible action of the enemy.A real appreciation of terrain and its influence onthe character of operations is of prime importance to theindividual scout or patrol leader. Without it, he cannotsafely and intelligently perform his mission. With it, hischances of success are multiplied many times. Allreconnaissance personnel should be well versed in theprinciples of terrain analysis.Instructors and students in scouting, patrollingand observation should concentrate on the principles ofterrain appreciation as they can be applied to theimmediate problems confronting the S-2 or unitcommander in his individual sector. No attempt should bemade to enter into the grand tactical and strategicalpicture. The prime purpose of instruction in terrainappreciation of this type is to teach the evaluation of thearea concerned from the viewpoint of local reconnaissanceoperations. Secondly, it is to determine the effect of terrainon the lines of action open to the enemy.The topographical character of an area oftenexercises a decisive influence on the course of a battle.Through an analysis of the terrain the course of localmilitary operations can be evolved, and, concurrently, linesof action open to the enemy can be partially determined.Any study of military history will bring out examples in

the terroincon plan." is to know

which the commander, after learning of the terrain fromground reconnaissance, was able to utilize his knowledgeto defeat the enemy.Well-known to the American schoolboy is theBattle of the Heights of Abraham, at Quebec, during theFrench and Indian War. It was here that General Wolfe,commanding the British forces, was able to score a decisivevictory over the forces of the French general, Montcalm.The British forces had twice attacked the citadel of Quebecand were repulsed. The French were in a strong positionon the Heights which were over 300 feet above the banksof the river at their base. Heavy losses had occurred infrontal attacks against this terrain obstacle. Furtherupstream an unguarded trail was discovered leading to thetop of the Heights. After a diverting action, Wolfe wasable to send a large part of his forces up the trail and theFrench were met on even terms on the Heights anddefeated. Although the chance Wolfe took was hazardous,he had a better knowledge of terrain than his enemy andvictory was won.In our WW II Tunisian campaign, our troopswon a decisive victory at El Guettar by outflankingstrong enemy defenses. Reconnaissance and knowledge ofthe area procured from local inhabitants enabledAmerican troops to cross undefended mountain terrain,considered impassable by German and Italian defenders,so that the American flanking action directly resulted in aswift victory. Thousands of casualites were saved when theposition fell without the necessity of a frontal assault.

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It is not enough to study a hostile area and pickout an ideal route through which to performreconnaissance in the area. Consideration must be given towhat the enemy will do to prevent such reconnaissancefrom being effective. The limitations and capabilities ofvarious infantry arms on the terrain must be known.Comparable weapons of all armies are relatively the same.Basically, the principles of their use are alike. If a scout,for example, knows the general tactical employment of anAmerican mortar, he will be better equipped to locateenemy mortar installations. In other words, if he knowswhere various weapons would be used taking advantage ofthe terrain by our army, he can reasonably expect that theenemy will make the same general use of their weapons.This automatically limits the scope of his reconnaissanceand it becomes that much easier.

Evaluution of the TerainNo matter what type of ground and no matter

what the tactical situation, terrain can always be evaluatedin terms of five factors: (l) Observation, (2) Field of Fire,(3) Concealment and Cover, (4) Obstacles, (5)Communications.Observation is protection against surprise.Observation of the ground on which a fight is taking placeis essential in order to bring effective fire to bear upon theenemy. Observation affords inforrnation on what theenemy and the commander's own troops are doing and

makes it possible for the commander to control operationsof his own troops. The value of cover and concealment isbased on denial of observation to the enemy. Defiladeareas free from observation should be used by the scout.

Fields of fire are essential to defense. A good fieldof fire is prerequisite for the most effective employment offirearms. The best field of fire is that over level oruniformly sloping open terrain - terrain over which theenemy can be seen, and over which he has little or noprotection from the effective range of infantry weapons.Upon the scout's knowledge of enemy weapons and theiridentification by sound, and their use in respect to terrainlimitations, depends the success of the mission. Theperfect field of fire for all weapons is rarely obtainable.The scout must be able to recognize readily the bestpossible fields of fire for the enemy weapons and thosezones where the enemy is limited in his coverage by terrainirregularities. Once he recognizes these danger areas he canplan his actions accordingly.

Conceqlment means invisibility from the air andground and may afford protection only when the enemydoes not know that the natural or artificial feature isoccupied. Cover includes both concealment and theprotection from fire provided by favorable peculiarities ofthe terrain, natural or artificial. The ideal position fordefense provides concealment and cover for the defenderswith neither cover nor concealment in front to aid anattacking enemy. Attack is favored by terrain that offersgood concealment or cover to approach the enemy and it is

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THE SllYLlllE is notaluaus ur top of arrUob..It mbu 6e onth{si& o/a hi//.1this type of terrain that favors the approach of the scout orpatrol.

Obstacles are of special importance in modernwarfare because of mechanized units. In general, they aredefined as effective obstructions to any military force.Some of the natural military obstacles are mountains,rivers, streams, bodies of water, marshes, steep inclines,and heavily wooded terrain. Mountains which are parallelto the direction of advance limit or prohibit lateralmovement and protect the flank. When perpendicular tothe advance they are an obstacle to the attacker and an aidto the defender. Rivers are similar to mountains in theireffect on forces moving parallel or perpendicular to them.In addition, rivers flowing parallel to the advance may beused as routes of supply. Marshes frequently provide moredelay to an advance than do bodies of water, because it isgenerally more difficult to build sruseways than bridges.Mechanized vechicles can be restricted in movement bydense woods, marches, steep inclines, gullies, stumps,large rocks, and bodies of water three or more feet indepth. Consciousness ofthese obstacles and their effect onmilitary action makes the scout better able to act as the"eyes" of his commander.Routes of communication allow the movement oftroops and supplies to the front. These communicationroutes are roads, railroads, and waterways. Because theyare indispensable to units in both defense and offense, theyare of particular concern to the terrain analyst.

APPRECIATION BY SCOUTS AND PATROLSBecause terrain appreciation is nowhere moreimportant than to the patrol, an efficient and successfulpatrol must master the terrain before and during theoperation. Patrotleaders, patrol members and scouts mustknow the irregularities of the ground and understand howit effects and limits their operations.The scout who seeks out the enemy must knowwhere to look for him, where to expect him. He mustknow what terrain objectives attacked by ground forcesare usually located near the enemy artillery area. Oneobjective may be a terrain feature affording commandingobservation; another, a critical point in the hostilecommand system or an essential supply route, and a third,an obstacle to armored forces.

The scout must know the military value of terraincompartments especially in regard to their influence uponthe disposition of the enemy. When the terrain featuresinclosing the area prevent direct fire and groundobservation into the area from positions outside, the areais called a compartment. Upon its location, size, and shapedepend its suitability for tactical use. The field manualsays: "A compartment whose longer axis extends inthe directions of movement of a force or leads toward orinto a position is called a 'corridor'; while compartmentsextending across or oblique to the direction of movementof the force or its front are designated as cross or lateral,or oblique, compartments." In general, a corridor favors

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the attacker, and a cross compartment favors thedefender. Therefore, as far as the scout is concerned, anunderstanding of our tactical principles can be put to bestuse in applying this knowledge to determining the enemy'slines of action. Tactical knowledge with this end in viewmust be emphasized.Every scout should know the principles ofinfantry weapon employment. If he knows about theAmerican principles of employment, he will be betterequipped to locate comparable enemy dispositions' He willlook for mortars in a defiladed area and on the reverseslope of a hill. By knowing this in advance, his scope ofreconnaissance will thus be limited, and his reconnaissancemade that much quicker and easier. Needless waste of timesearching for mortar positions on forward slopes of hillsor on flat terrain is automatically eliminated'The scout should know how mortars, mines andlight and heavy automatic weapons are employed' If he-n, u.ros one machine gun, he should know that there isin all probability another supporting machine gun not faroff. He will expect to find machine guns in partialdefilade, though not necessarily. He will realize thatterrain commading tlre flanks will likely hold machineguns, since flanking fire is a cardinal tenet in machine gunImployment. That terrain facilitating the use of grazingfire is a" obvious indication of a machine gun set-up andthat interlocking fire is basic to all defensive positions mustalways be kePt in mind'

If the scout knows fundamental tactics, he knowsthat antitank guns are placed at the heads of avenues ofapproach and to cover road junctions. He will look forthem on the enemy's front lines, as well as on the firstterrain feature back. When he locates a mine field, he canexpect it to be covered by anti-tank guns and machineguns and search for them accordingly. It is the scout,sound in the knowledge of tactical principles, who bringsback accurate enemy information satisfactorily - andsafely, too, for he is not likely to blunder into obviousfields of fire or enemY mine fields.. Patrol leaders and scouts must know the terrain inorder to select good routes. A preliminary survey of theterrain to be reconnoitered must be made. Once a route isselected for a daylight patrol, the use of this terrain duringthe mission means not only concealment, but hours ofhard work in the daylight in selection of routes which haveeasily recognized landmarks. Prominent terrain features,power lines, walls, houses and roads picked out in daylightcan serve to guide the patrol at night. Yet, it must beremembered that most terrain features look vastlydifferent at night from what they do in the day. This mustbe borne in mind whenever making a daylight reconnais-sance prior to a night patrol - and making such areconnaissance or making a thorough terrain study by useof aerial photos is a must before all night patrol actions'Maps and photos can be taken on the patrol mission as ameans of orientation if desired. The making of marks and

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notations on these maps and photos that will violatesecurity in case of capture should be avoided.Situation permitting, the patrol leader shoulddivide the area to be covered on the mission into sectors.Near his own lines at a point of forced passage, or wherethe first elements of enemy organizatons have beenrecognized, the patrol can travel quickly. The closer hegets to the enemy, the slower he must proceed. Officerswho overlook this fact in assigning patrol missions findthat a green patrol wastes too much time in a safer zone.As a result they are late in coming back, or hurry in thedanger zone to make up time - in this way betraying theirpresence to the enemy. Scouts and patrols are too oftenexpected to bring back enemy information in thirtyminutes when actually hours are necessary because of the sdifficult terrain and dispositions of the enemy. Timeanalysis of the mission is of major importance. Scouts andpatrols must be allocated enough time by the dispatchingofficer to prepare for and complete the mission.The following zones are generally recognizable inthe terrain after study in the sector where the patrol is tooperate: l. A safe zone is usually removed from enemyobservation where men can move quickly and in looseformation near their own lines.2. An alert zone where more cautious tactics arerequired, but speed is to be maintained whenever possible.3. A zone of approoch where the patrol mustwork cautiously, creeping, crawling, crouching, moving bysound bounds, always ready for the ambush and combat.Ambush points, especially in the case of night patrols, canbe fixed by knowning enemy habits, terrain, and the timerequired to reach a certain point from the point ofdeparture. These must be explored by scouts beforecommitting the patrol.

TERRAINFEATURESIt is very necessary that there be standardizationof terms describing terrain features. The description ofterrain features and the recognition of these ground formswhen they are named must be such that there is no lack ofunderstanding between the message writer and recipient asto their meaning.Actual classroom instruction, followed byoutdoor exercises is necessary to enable scouts and patrolmembers to describe and report terrain featuresaccurately. The following standard definitions of terrainfeatures may be used:l. Valley - Tract of land situated between rangesof hills, ridges of mountains. May be traversed by a river.This feature is sometimes referred to tactically as a"compartment" when the features enclosing the valley(ridges) prevent direct fire and ground observation into thearea from positions outside. Terrain compartments areclassified in accordance with the direction of the largerdimension in relation to the unit utilizing the terrain. Thusa compartment whose longer axis extends in the directionof movement of a force or leads toward or into a position

is called a "corridor"; wide compartments extendingacross or oblique to the direction of movement of the forceor its front are designated as cross, lateral, or obliquecompartments.2. Clearing - an open spot cleared of timber orjungle. It will usually be different or unique in appearance,compared with surrounding woods.3. Gentle Slope - A gradual incline or slantupwards or downwards.4. Cut - A surface excavation made in theconstruction of a roadbed or path.5. Peak - The sharp pointed summit or juttingpart of a mountain or hill; greatest height; apex.6. Draw - A natural fold in the ground betweentwo small hills, lowJying ground running between twohills or ridges. A small valley or drainage line.7. Road Center - Themiddle of a road.

8. Saddle - A depression across the summit of aridge. A low depression along a ridge line or between twoadjacent hills.9. Ravine - A long deep hollow worn by action ofa stream.lO. Crest of a Ridge - The top edge of a ridgesimilar to the top of an animal's back.. ll. Road Fork -Thebranchcausedbyajunctionof two roads.' 12. Skyline - The line where the land appears tomeet the sky.13. Cliff - A sheer, high rock or bank. Aprecipice that may overlook water.V. Bluff - A high, steep bank, usually withflattened front rising steeply and boldly.

15. Abrupt Slope - The steep incline of a hill,road or bank.16. Culvert - A closed channel, such as a pipe,used to carry drainage under and across a road or railroad.

A large chart should be prepared which shows alandscape with the following terrain features: draw,clearing, crossroads, bluff or cliff, road fork, gentleslope, fill, military crest, ravine, cut, valley, saddle,skyline, topographical crest, road junction, peak, steepslope, ridge, hollow and culvert. Each one of thesefeatures should be numbered and the key printed on theside of the chart. This key should be covered with a paperstrip. The instructor, after explaining the necessity forstandardization of terms describing terrain features andcovering the above material by using a chart, can conducta short test. This can be done by having the student writethe correct name as the instructor points to each numberedterrain feature on the chart. After the test, the instructorremoves the strip of paper from the key and the studentscorrect their papers.

The students should then be taken to a previouslyselected piece of terrain where all of the above features arevisible. Here the instructor should call on various studentsl8


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AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHYIn recent years the interpretation of aerial photos,both vertical and oblique, has become so accurate thatcapabilities of the enemy can be deduced with uncannyprecision. Intelligence of the enemy's organization,disposition, activity and equipment which once took apatrolling mission many hours or days to ascertain, canoften be gathered in a very few minutes and with aminimum of danger, by air photograhy. From large scaleverticals (l/1000), detailed information of enemy gunpositions, mine fields, trenches, road blocks, material,reconnaissance of routes, assessment of bomb damage,selection of artillery and bomb targets, measurements ofgradients, the spans of rivers, and height of their banks,the rate of flow of the water, the levels of possibleairfields, etcetera, can all be determined by rather simplecomputations and with relatively simple equipment. Fromsmall scale verticals (l/16,m0) topographic informationfor existing maps may be derived, and in certain types ofterrain these photomaps can be used as map substitutes.With the WW II innovation of the "floating line" method,the relative visibility from different heights can be seen at aglance. This method is used as a reliable means ofestablishing OP's.Because all this information can be gatheredwithin so much less time, with so much less danger, and inmost cases, with so much more accuracy, there has been a

change in some theaters in the function of scouting andpatrolling in the sphere of reconnaissance. Rather thanargue over the merits of air versus ground reconnaissance,it should be realized that the two complement each other.There is no doubt about the fact that thedevelopment of aerial photography has eliminated theneed for much daylight reconnaissance and thus hasgreatly eliminated the danger of disclosing to the enemy,by intensive patrolling in a certain area, possible plans ofimpending operations.Regardless of the accuracy and usefulness ofaerial photography there is still no substitute for directpersonal observation by trained scouts and patrols.Patrolling will often have to verify things that photos canonly'suggest and in many cases ground reconnaissance willhave to cover all areas concealed from the photo byweather conditions, dense vegetation and camouflage.This is particularly true in jungle areas.

Along with the above mentioned aids to terrainstudy the use of th oblique aerial photo can be useful asinterpreted by unskilled personnel, because it representsthe ground from a more familiar point of view than thevertical photograph. It gives some indication of differencesin the height of the ground without the use of specialequipment. Larger areas can be covered with obliques andat times they are considerably easier to obtain. They areuseful for detailed study prior to the mission and can beused to pinpoint definite areas when the scout or patrol isinterrogated at the end of the mission.

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The vectograph type of aerial photo which gives athree dimensional picture of terrain so that any novice canstudy it is another useful recon tool. Great use can bemade of vectographs on patrol actions, and should becarried on a patrol mission for constant reference in muchthe same manner as a maP.

Previous to the patrol's starting out, selection of aroute hidden from enemy observation can be facilitated byapplication of two methods. The first is that of profiling'This is a means of determining the visibility or the defiladeof points or areas from any selected point on a map' Inprofiling, the ground on the map is constructed so as toior- " profile - a cross-section of the earth's surface - andin this way the slope of any line is shown. By picking out ,possible enemy OP positions and profiling the terrain fromthat position to our lines, we can determine which routestoward the enemy will be hidden from his view' Even if theexact location of the enemy OP is not known, its probableposition on commanding ground can be fairly accuratelyplott.d, and a route selected accordingly' Combatixperience has served to point out the fact that prominentterrain features in enemy territory are likely to containOP's. Profiling is only possible with accurate maps andinvolves a gleat deal of tedious work.A more accurate route selection method relies on theuse of aerial photos, and the floating line technique' Thismethod may be used to excellent advantage'The technique is simple. Select from an aerialphoto or ground observation a piece of commandingground held by the enemy. Locate on this commandinglround probable enemy observation post sites' From theseprobable locations draw lines toward the position of yourr'rnlt to corresponding points on both photographs of a

stereo pair. (These lines must be carefully and accuratelydrawn.) When viewed stereoscopically the line will eitherfloat in the air or merge into terrain features and cover' Ifthe line floats, it means that the enemy has observation tothat point. If the line seems to penetrate an object,observation beyond that point is masked' By intelligent useof this method, defilade areas may be plotted on a mapthat are free from enemy observation. This knowledge ofdefilade areas can be used in determining general routesfor reconnaissance missions- tt also can be used forpicking future observation points for our own troops andto a certain extent it will help to determine fields of fire forflat trajectorY weapons.Although use of either of these methods will showareas concealed from enemy observation and will helpplan probable patrol routes it must be remembered thatitt. "n.-y also knows they are defiladed. Recognizing this'it will be farily certain that such areas will be covered byenemy MG gun emplacements or will be probably placesofambush. Points on ground he can see can be covered byartillery or mortar fire. His blind spots he will protect byother means. This knowledge will aid in localizing the areain which to look for his forward dispositions.' The study of terrain must be furthered by use ofmaps, photos, and actual eye-witness familiarity. All helpincrease knowledge of the ground. Anything to develop orincrease this knowledge should be used if available' Thesubject is so important to military operations that localinhabitants should be used as guides when securitypermits. Terrain appreciation is as important to the scoutor patrol leader on his mission as it is to the general in hisstrategy.

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CHAPTER IIIOBSERVATION

"The importance of observation superiorto thqt of the enemy cannot be overemphasized."

Observation is a military art which is engenderedduring war and neglected in peacetime maneuver. Theproper selection, manning, and operation of theobservation post is all important to the success of battleoperations and continuous observation is essential to thesuccess of every unit, whether a rifle platoon or an armycorps. The successful commander maintains continuousground and aerial observation making use of planes,observation posts, and patrols to obtain maximuminformation covering the movement and disposition ofthe enemy. Members of ground reconnaissance agenciesmust be trained in observation and recognize that it ispimory to the successful fulfillment of their scouting andpatrolling missions.Because good observation is so necessary forsuccess in battle, it must be obtained by any meansregardless of the obstacles or cost. If a lone tree or buildingis the only place from which ground observation can becarried out, it must be used, even though the use of suchan OP site is in tactical violation of principles laid down inmanuals. The use of aircraft to supplement limited groundobservation has greatly alleviated situations where animpossible terrain has limited the use of the OP, but theobservation post must be established and mannedwherever and whenever the situation and terrain permits.Observation from the ground or air should always beconfirmed by ground reconnaissance, if possible. Areasdenied or concealed to the observer should be investigatedby scouts or patrols.

The OP, no matter how well located,camouflaged or equipped, will not give maximum serviceif the personnel manning it have not been carefully selectedand trained. Reliable and trained men are necessary for thejob. Intelligent men with good eyes and ample patience,who will be attentive to details, are the ideal raw materialfrom which trained observers are made.Under battle conditions the average soldier cannot be trusted to give a reliable and accurate report ofenemy activity, especially when he has not been trainedand tested in observation. In operations, somecommanders have accepted at face value the reports ofuntrained and untested scouts and observers. Many timesthese reports have decisively influenced their course ofaction. Serious losses have been incurred in some instancesbecause no attempt was made or could be made to confirmsuch reports.The individual tendencies of each man must beconsidered on scouting and observing missions. If thepersonal characteristics of the individual are known, thecredence of his reports can be better evaluated.

Exercises in observation must be conducted to testthe individual's reliability. A man who fails to rememberor see the things he should, may elaborate his report tomake it look well. Another may use definite terms such as"long", "large", or "body" to describe specific things.Exactness must be cultivated. Enemy troopsshould be reported by number instead of using terms suchas squad, battery, platoon. In order to get reports as

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accurate as possible, tests should bg improvised so that theaccuracy and reliability of each man who will be used as anobserver becomes a known factor.A most important point to emphasize during thetraining of men in observation is that they should reporteverytliing they see or hear. The commander and his staffOo itre evaluating and interpreting, not the observer'Nothing is too insignificant to higher headquarters;sometimes one small fact may be the final clue to enemyaction. For examPle:"In 1918 a regimental observation post reportedthe movement behind the enemy front lines of a fewGerrnans in light gray uniforms with green collars' Thismeant nothing to the observer, but after filtering backthrough channels, it was a most vital identification' It .confirmed other evidence of an impending German attack'These uniforms indicated a reconnaissance by officers ofthe'Jaeger Division' long missing from the front' This wasa first ilass assault division which generally led majorattacks." (S-2 in Action, by Colonel Shipley Thomas)'In another case various apparently unrelatedevents, not one of which alone appeared particularlysignificant to the observer, were tied together by higherhJadquarters to make a very important discovery involvingfuture enemy action. The following example of unrelatedevents properly catalogued by an observer affords aninteresting ixample of a deduction of future enemy actionby a regimental S-2, from what appeared to be a handfuloi inalviauany insignificant events- During the last threeweeks of JulY observers rePorted:

(1) July 7/31, the enemy dropped six to twelveshells on the line near Flirey Railroad Bridge eachafternoon.(2) July 22, enemy planes attacked and destroyedtwo of the observation balloons.(3) Week of July ?A/31 four German officerswere reported observing the lines near the railroad bridgeregularly each afternoon.(4) Night of July 29/30, a patrol learned that theGerman front line was manned somewhat more heavilythan usual, and that they had camouflaged but failed toclose a gap in their wire which had been cut by theAmericans some time PreviouslY.(5) July 29/30, six enemy planes flew slowlyalong the entire front.(6) July 28130, each morning and afternoon thecrossroads to the rear of the American position was shelledby ranging bursts of shraPnel.From these various observations covering a threeweek period, the S-2 was able to foresee a large scaleGerman attack on July 31. His reasoning, based onknowledge of previous enemy action, was as follows:it) fn. few shells landing near the R'R' Bridgewere to determine and to verify the range, probably as aprelude to a large scale artillery barrage'A) The destruction of the balloons was obviouslyto cut off American observation' probably of Germanmovement in the rear.

(3) Items (3) and (5) indicate carefulreconnaissance both by observation and aerialphotograph. The fact that regular patrol reconnaissancewas carried on in the same area indicated preparations formovement on the Part of the enemY.

(4) Both sides knew of the gap in the wire, andunder normal conditions, the gap would have been closed.In this case, it was left open, but camouflaged, indicating agroup movement through the wire or a trap set by theenemy. (5) The shrapnel in ranging bursts wasundoubtedly in anticipation of closing off the road to theAmerican rear, and to prevent bringing up the reserves.

These five deductions resulted in a decision by thecommander to strengthen the sector to oppose an enemyattack. The anticipated attack did materialize and wasrepulsed with heavy German losses.

Accurate information is vital' The trainedobserver will report only what he sees' His personalopinion on what he saw, or his own interpretation of whathe saw must not be confused with the actual facts. Manyuntrained observers report their deductions rather thantheir observations, a practice which must be stopped at its. inception during the training period.An incident as the Germans swept through thelowlands in 1940 illustrates this point. The Belgians heldone bank of the Scheldt River' where they set up OP's toobserve any German action. Suddenly an oil tank on theGerman side went up in flames The OP personnelthought it was sabotage, to reduce the enemy's limited'supply of gasoline. Therefore, they deduced that it wasfavorable to the Belgians, and they did not report i/. Theirinterpretation of the occurrence proved disastrous. Undercover of oily smoke that settled on the water Germanmotor boats carrylng troops crossed to the Belgian side'Here deductions were fallacious. Actual observation, notinterpretation must be reported back by the observer.Too positive identification of objects or incidentscan also be a dangerous habit, especially when the observeris lacking in experience. Many men have a tendency to seean object, a piece of artillery, for instance, and positivelyidentify it as a gun of a certain size and caliber when inreality they do not know what size it is and are justguessing.In some cases such positive identification mayhave to be taken at face value at the command post' Theymay lead to dispositions of troops and changes in tactics tomeet enemy threats based on these positive identifications'There is a great deal of difference between a 37mm ATgun and a 105 mm Howitzer, yet many WW II observerspositively identified 37mm AT guns as l05m Howitzersand vice versa. Whenever uncertainties exist concerning apositive identification of objects, the words such asi'estimated to be", "appears to be", etc., should be usedin reporting it. For examPle:"Enemy arty. piece estimoted to be 105 Howitzerseen at RJ 206."

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WW II battle experience in Tunisia showed theinability of many untrained observers to report accuratelywhat they saw and heard from an OP' Trailers towed bylarge trucks were reported as artillery pieces' haystacksweie mistaken for tanks' and groups of Arabs tendingflocks of goats were called German patrols'On one occasion a vivid imaginationmisconstrued a small fire or candle burning in an Arab hutas an enemy column rnoving west' Checking this' it wasfound to be several lights, which were mistaken forblackout lights on enemy vehicles' Such errors inobservation can only be corrected by training and will notbe uncommon with untrained personnel'Special observation situations such as operationsin the jungle, snow' or high mountains will necessitate,o*. .itun!.s in technique and equipment, but the basicfundamentals covered here will apply in almost all types ofobservation conditions.

Selection of the OP SiteThe proper selection of the observation post is ofprimary importance. It will ordinarily be situated oniom-arrAing ground which affords the best view of theterrain towards the enemy and in the rear of his front lines'In open warfare, where the lines are not fixed' the OP willordinarily be one of temporary nature' The scout or patrolmember will select a point on the terrain where cover andconcealment is provided by natural cover or terrain

irregularities.

In a stabilized situation the OP will be morecarefully selected, camouflaged and constructed for useduring ihat period of the sector's importance' Such an OPwill be constructed to provide all possible cover andconcealment from enemy artillery, small arms fire andbombing. Ideally it will be large enough so that men can becomfortable while observing and it will probably containmore elaborate equipment such as range finders'periscopes, radios, phones, etcetera, than will be used in ai.*potu.y patrol tYPe oP.An observation post site should have goodvisibility, a covered route of approach and be camouflagedand concealed, both from the ground and air' Elaboratecamouflage is usually reserved for permanent observation' posts, buino observation post, whether it is to be used forien minutes or for ten days, can expect to remain inoperation very long if visible or obvious to enemy eyes' Itshould also be recognized that location of the OP by theenemy does not necessarily mean that he will wipe it out atonce. He may wait until an action starts before destroyingit, thus blinding the unit when it needs it's OP most'Concealment from enemy ground observers is notenough, since it is easy to locate an observation post' gunposition, or command post from the air by followingiracks or a beaten path. Such clues stand out on an aerialphotograph like arrows pointing to the hidden post''pttotoltuptt, will reveal OP positions by showing looseOirt, wire tines, paths, and approaches which end at the

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pct. An approach independent of an existing route (pathor trench) must be prolonged past the post or becamouflaged. There must be complete camouflagediscipline. Any breach of this discipline may lead todiscovery.Full consideration in choosing the location for anobservation post must be given to concealment from theeyes of the enemy who will look at the OP from thefront.Many OP's must be chosen at night for daylightobservation. On such occasions particular attention mustbe paid to concealment of the OP. Just because it is darkand little personal concealment is necessary does not meanit will escape detection by the enemy in daylight.Our forces in Tunisia learned early to dig OP's atnight, to make reliefs under cover of darkness and to holdmovement to a minimum throughout the day. OtherwiseGerman artillery soon picked them up, and it wasnecessary either to establish another OP or to doobservation between concentrations.

The Germans and the Japanese always tried todeny observation to their enemies. Within individualsectors or on open flanks they searched by fire or combatpa.trols those positions most logical for opposing OP's.Reports from the European theater stated that the Germansalways searched skylines and military crests for OPpositions. Peaks and high points beyond the scope ofcombat patrols were searched by machine gun and mortarfre. In Tunisia, to establish OP's either on the crest of thehill or on its most prominent peak was found to besuicidal. Enemy counter-measures were successful iffaulty discipline in concealment, camouflage, tracks,refuse, orjust plain carelessness betrayed the presence oftheOP. The enemy must be outsmarted.

The specific location of an OP should be in anarea the enemy believes is unsuited for observation. Op'sshould avoid distinguishing landmarks, such as lone trees,a farmhouse, a sharp crest, towers, summits, paths otherthan the side paths, or a place just below the military crestof the hill. The best positions are inconspicuous, forexample: in a forest or woods, in the midst of an irregularhedge, row, or in broken, irregular ground. There shouldbe a covered route of approach and withdrawal to makethe good observation post site complete.Whenever OP's are sited in exposed areas theyordinarily will not remain in operation long and theirpersonnel may become casualties. Because of this a secondrate OP, placed where it will function during any type offriendly or enemy action, may often be better than onewhich will be overrun or wiped out in the first phases ofbattle. Care should be taken that there is liaison orcommunication established with adjoining OP's especiallyif part of the sector is marked by a hill or ravine. The OPshould be close as practical to the C.P., but it must be farenough away so that fire directed at one will not coverboth. Generally the OP will be located either on theforward or reverse slope of a hill. Both have theiradvantages and disadvantages.

Reverse Slope: OP Site Advantages(l) Greater freedom of movement is permittedduring the day.(2) It is easier to install, maintain and concealcommunication facilities and installations.(3) It can be initially occupied and sited duringdaylight.(4) It is possible to get greater depth observationinto the hostile area.

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Disadvantages(l) Enemy fire adjusted on the crest of the hillendangers the installation.(2) OP personnel, radio antennaes, etc', aredifficult to conceal as they must come to the crest toobserve. This disadvantage is most apparent when the crestof the hill is sharp and objects are clearly silhouettedagainst the sky. lt is minimized when the hill used blendsinto a larger one in the rear, causing the skyline to be lessdistinct. Forward SloPe: OP Site Advsntages(l) Concealment is easier if a background ispresent, preventing silhouettes.(2) A better view of the hostile area to theimmediate front is possible.(3) A forward OP may be far enough down fromthe crest that enemy fire directed on the crest will not touchit. To neutralize such an OP the enemy will be forced tocover the entire forward slope with fire if he can not pin-point the location. Disadvantoges(l) Signal communication in daylight is difficult'(2) Location change and movement is notpossible in daylight.(3) Must be occupied under the cover of darknessto prevent discovery. The occupation and selection of anOf site under the cover of darkness is difficult and acareful terrain study must be made to insure that it will beusable in daYlight.

Whenever possible, the mission of observationshould never be entrusted to a single OP. At least twoOP's should be established for the following reasons:(1) To insure all around continuous coverage.(2) To check and confirm one another's work.(The men in the OP's will then be able to locate accuratelythe position of weapons by sound and flash or byintersection.)(3) If one is destroyed or neutralized, the otherwill still maintain observation.Alternate OP's must be located and prepared atthe time of establishment of the principal one. Possibilityof neutralization by smoke, fire, raids, or by weather mustbe considered in the selection of the alternate site. Thealternate OP should, like the main one, be so located thatcontinuous observation will be insured regardless of theaction. A covered route from the principal OP to thealternate must be considered when the site is selected.Hasty, poorly concealed evacuation due to enemy actionwill disclose the location of the alternate site to him'If certain areas in an assigned section aredefiladed from the chosen OP site, auxiliary OP's must beset up to cover these areas or observers in other sectorsmust be given the responsibility of covering those areas' hidden from view.EquipmentBasic OP equipment will include: field glasses,compasses, watch, maps, or aerial photos, material forrecording observation such as special OP report forms-overlay paper, message books, pencils, and a means ofcommunication.The OP is useless unless a swift means ofcommunication is available. The field phone is the best allaround means of communication. Often wire will be laidconcurrently with the selection of the site. When wire islaid, it is desirable to lay two separate lines into the OP sothat enemy action will not delay the transmission ofinformation. Consideration must also be given to thelaying of wire to the alternate site so that is can be ininstant use when conditions force its occupation.Flares, pigeons, messengers, radios, panels(reverse slope), and colored smoke grenades (rifle) furnishadditional and emergency means of communication withthe parent unit. Sound signals of various types, dogs,tracers, semaphore, and signal lamps may be used undercertain conditions.OP personnel must be able to defend themselvesagainst enemy action. Small arms and grenades must beready for any emergency. Food, water, and entrenchingtools must also be considered in preparing and operatinganOP.OrganizotionOrganization of a stabilized OP is progressive innature, Immediate observation is established while theexact point to be occupied is selected. As soon asobservation is established, the definite locations of the OPand the alternate are relayed to the parent unit by theswiftest and surest means of communications.

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After initial occupation and communications arecmpleted, the observer establishes a base orientation lineto some easily identified object in his assigrted sector. Arange card is made up showing aximuths and distances toimportant points on the teriain. All photos and maps aremarked accordingly. Once this has been done the observercan quickly locate and report any action in his sector.A panoramic photo can be employed to facilitatebca:ing enemy activity vrl rrlor accurately. Thesepbotos cover the terrain tb the front of the OP and are setrp in the OP's with ranges and azimuths marked on them.A variation is known as the "gridded oblique" which is anoblique line overlap taken at 1,000 to 4,000 ft andmrmally from behind our own lines. Instead of actuallymarking the photo, a special grid is superimposed toprovide a means of referring to points, and of finding theirmap positions and heights.The Germans used panoramic photos in their OPpmitions during the last war, and continue to do so now.Tlreir importance and efficiency is very great. Accuracy asrell as speed in reporting are greatly enhanced.

S-2's and unit commanders must recognize thatdre operation of an observation post is a dull and tediouslrb where it is very easy for a man to become careless,inattentive or to fall asleep, especially if he is battle wearya physically exhausted. Shifts must be changed frequentlyand observers must be given the chance to rest if goodacurate work is to be expected.Men operating the observation post usually workin pairs, one to observe the other to record the informationobtained. These two should alternate every 15 minutes tohalf hour and should always be close enough together topermit conversation in low tones. It is best not to observecontinuously for more than one hour at a time. Longerperiods cause the small details of change, which are soimportant, to be overlooked. Ideally the pair should berelieved every few hours, but if only two men are availablefor this work, they must work in shifts - one observing andrecording, the other sleeping.A ground observer's report sheet can beimprovised to be used by the recorder to set down the time,place, character, etcetera, of all observations. Recurrencesor discontinuances of events recorded on this sheet may beof prime importance. Events of sufficient urgency are sentby the swiftest means to the C.P. Accumulated observersreports are handed in to the S-2 at stated intervals.

Whenever possible, the same observer should beused repeatedly over the same area. He will learn thedetails of his particular area so thoroughly that he willinstinctively notice any change. Therefore, the best plan isto assign the same men to a definite observation sector forthe duration of that sector's importance.The observer locates himself in a position whichaffords steady rest for his glasses and from which he cansecure the best view of his sector. He then mentally dividesthe area included in his sector of observation into a seriesof overlapping zones, the nearest of which takes in theground just beyond the front line of his unit, while the

farthest includes the limit of practical visibility. Beginningwith the zone nearest them, the observer makes a slow andthorough examination of the terrain, searching from oneedge of the zone to the other. Proceeding to theexamination of the next zone, he searches it in the oppositedirection, and he continues in this manner until the wholesector has been examined. He searches for indications ofthe enemy such as trenches, paths, gun positions, OP's,wire, troop movements, etc. If any movement or unusualfeature catches his eye, the point where it occurred shouldbe watched closely at regular intervals.When a definite, well bounded sector has beenassigned for the observer by his S-2 he becomes responsiblefor everything in that sector. If enemy action is observedoutside his zone of responsibility he reports it, but itshould be considered secondary to any activity in his ownsector. If two or more OP's are used per unit, the sectorfor each OP slightly overlaps that of the adjacent OP.Observed incidents and enemy activity should be recordedin a locally improvised ground observers report form.These forms should be turned in when shifts are changed.It is good practice to establish regular routine andtime intervals to report ordinary activity to the parent unit.Negative information should be reported at these times aswell as positive. Enemy action of sufficient urgency will betransmitted at the time it is observed.

In relieving OP personnel a "time overlap" isnecessary so that outgoing personnel can thoroughlyfamiliarize the newcomers with the area, the section that is

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going on, previous action, and enemy concentrations. Newobservers should go out with an experienced observerbefore they take over a sector on their own.Secarity The OP should have security guards wherenecessary. There is, of course, a distinction between thepatrol OP, which must furnish its own security, and thefield or unit OP, which should have personnel assigned forspecific duty as security.In night operations it is usually sufficient if oneman is awake at all times. Generally, OP personnel shouldfall back at night unless they are extremely well concealedor are adequately protected by the infantry. The enemy isusually most active at twilight or dawn and observersshould be especially careful at these times. The enemy willoften dispatch special pelrols to locate and destroyobservations posts.

Besides the commanding officer and his staff whowill frequently make use of an OP for tactical purposes,there are other commanders, higher commanders,observers, visitors and newspaper men who may frequentthe OP. If these visitors are unavoidable, and can beexpected, the OP should be dug or otherwise made large

Figure 38. The scout or observer should divide his assignedsector of observation into sections (100 yards, 200 yards, etc.).Starting in the nearest sector he should observe slowly andcarefully everything within it, moving from one side to the other,He should always overlap, so that no portion of the terrain isunobserved. Activity or other indic

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