A Behavioral Framework for Managing Massive Airline Flight Disruptions through Crisis Management, Organization Development,and Organization Learning Dr. Tulinda LarsenDoctorate of Management University of Maryland University Collegewww.tulindalarsen.com

March 20131

• This study argues that by considering massive flight disruptions through a crisis management lens and layering organization development (OD) interventions with organization learning (OL), airlines can improve the management of events that result in massive flight disruptions to improve passenger satisfaction, reduce costs, and mitigate additional government

intervention.

Airlines continue to mismanage massive flight disruptions, despite government intervention, impacts on customer service, and related costs.

Problem Statement

2

Behavioral approach

Research Question:

How can airlines adapt

organization development (OD) interventions and organization learning (OL) processes

to better manage massive flight disruptions to increase passenger satisfaction, minimize costs, and mitigate

government intervention?

3

Methodology

Evidence Based Research (EBR) and Systematic ReviewEvidence Based Research (EBR) and Systematic Review

• Management research approach adapted from health care industry

• A systematic review and analysis of existing research to identify gaps and to produce new knowledge

– Scholarly research, case studies, white papers, dissertations, etc.

• Four primary steps:

1. Establish research questions

2. Identify literature on the selected topic

3. Filter the resulting literature based on criteria, and

4. Evaluate the selected literature

• I supplemented EBR through discussions with airline operations experts and visits to airline operations centers

4

The missing management perspective

• Previous research needs a real-world management perspective

• Massive flight disruption literature falls into four dimensions:

– Economics and financial cost(Ball, et al., 2006; Jenkins, 2010)

– Tactical decision management (methods and tools)(Irrgang, 1995; Rogers & Hoyme, 2000; Zang, 2006; Jenkins, 2010; Hoyt, et al., 2010: Bruce, 2011)

– Robust schedule planning and recovery(Baker, 1995; Clark, Lettovsky & Smith, 2000; DeArmon, Wanke, Beaton, & Miller, 2000)

– Impact on the travelling public (Ball, et al., 1995; Mether & Rospenda, 2000, Marks & Jenkins, 2010; OIG 2000, 2001, 2007, 2008, 2010; GAO, 2011; U.S. Senate JEC, 2008)

• This study focuses on behavioral dimensions to the airline management of massive flight disruptions.

– Disruption management is a human process based on judgments in Ops Center and technology based decision-making tools

5

Multiple stakeholders are involved

• The FAA is responsible for air traffic control in the U.S.

– Controls aircraft from departure movement area to arrival

– FAA, airports and airlines manage aircraft on the ground

– Boundaries can be gray between FAA, airport and airline jurisdiction, particularly during massive flight disruptions

• Airlines can manage how their operations prepare for, and react to, reduced airspace system capacity resulting from weather and congestion

• Despite sophisticated decision support tools, no single model has solved the complex operational issues at the time of massive flight disruptions

– Airlines poorly manage massive flight disruptions

– Excessive cancellations vs. prolonged recovery

6

What are flight disruptions?

7

There is little consensus about the definition of massive disruptions

GAOFlight disruptions include delays, cancellations, long tarmac delays, and denied boardings.

Office of Inspector General

A flight is considered delayed if its actual gate arrival time is 15 or more minutes after its published scheduled arrival time.

United AirlinesIrregular Operations occur when unplanned flight disruption requires involuntary itinerary change [not] requested by passenger. IRROPS take place with little or no advance warning.

American Airlines“[A]nything not on-time, even a single flight. But typically it means some amount of flights or portion of the network that is experiencing non-routine operations such as ATC, weather, security, labor, or mechanical issues.”

Airports Council International

Extraordinary events, not falling under an Emergency Operation Category (e.g. crash, hijackings, bomb threat) which disrupt optimized flight schedules and negatively impacts the normal flow of passengers.

My definition of massive disruption

A disruptive event that results in multiple flights being delayed, diverted to another airport,

or canceled throughout the airline route network.

These events are weather or natural disaster related and include snowstorms, thunderstorms, hurricanes, tropical storms, and volcanic eruptions. Does not include Emergency Events, such as crash, terrorism, highjackinsg, bomb-threat, etc.

Massive flight disruptions negatively impact customer service, create additional costs for airlines, and have led to government intervention.

8

It all began in Detroit 1999

•In early January 1999, a blizzard blanketed the Detroit airport.

•Thousands of Northwest Airlines passengers found themselves stranded on planes for hours -- some without food, water or functioning lavatories

•The House and Senate conducted hearings and the Office of Inspector General investigated the customer service issues

•Congress, the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the industry worked together to implement a voluntary program known as the Airline Customer Service Commitment

9

The 1999 Detroit snowstorm kick-started airline

mismanagement of massive flight disruptiona – and triggered

regulatory intervention.

Voluntary programs did not prevent passengers from being stranded on aircraft:

10

Date Airline Description

December 29, 2006 American100+ flights from DFW were diverted due to severe weather.

Flight diverted to Austin exceed airport capacity. Passengers trapped.

February 14, 2007 JetBlueIce storm at JFK caused 355 canceled flights and 6 divert flights.

10 aircraft were frozen to the ground and passengers were trapped

December 22, 2008 AlaskaSnowstorm in SEA caused massive flight cancelations

and stranded 9,000 passengers.

August 25, 2009 ExpressJetThunderstorms and tornados in Midwest caused

flight diversion to airport with no Continental support.

December 24-28, 2010 SystemMassive snowstorm causes flight cancelations and

shut airports in the Northeast.

May 29, 2011 American EagleBad weather in Chicago caused 15 flights with 608 passengers

to be held for 3+ hrs, resulted in DOT Fine under new rules.

October 29, 2011 JetBlue, AmericanEarly snowstorm forced flights to be diverted to Hartford

where JetBlue and American Airlines passengers were trapped on aircraft for more than 7 hours.

More examples of massive flight disruptions:

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Date Airline Description

October 28–30, 2012 System Hurricane Sandy shut down 9 airports and resulted in massive flight disruptions with more than 20,000 flights cancelled.

November 7, 2012 American, Delta, United, US Airways, and JetBlue Airways

Nor’easter dumped snow on NY, NJ, CT, Boston and Philadelphia, disrupting operations and causing more than 20,000 flight disruptions.

December 26, 2012 American Airlines, Delta Air Lines,

United Airlines, and US Airways

Snowstorm Euclid disrupted travel in the Midwest and Northeast, and 2,100 flight cancellations.

Mismanagement drove DOT intervention

12

• Contingency plan for lengthy tarmac delays– Air carriers will not permit an aircraft to remain on the tarmac for more than three hours.– For all flights, assurance that the air carrier will provide adequate food and water no later than two hours

after the aircraft leaves the gate or lands.– For all flights, assurance of operable lavatory facilities and medical attention, if needed– Assurance of sufficient resources to implement the plan– Assurance that the plan has been coordinated with airport authorities– Retention of records related to lengthy tarmac delays for two years– Customer Service Plan– Meet customers’ essential needs during lengthy tarmac delays– Self auditing of plan and retention of records with results made available to U.S. Department of

Transportation– Notice and Contract of Carriage– Contingency Plan for Lengthy Tarmac Delays must be included in Contract of Carriage with air passengers

• Response to Consumer Problems– An employee is to be designated the advocate for passengers’ interests and is responsible for monitoring

the effects of flight delays, flight cancelations, and lengthy tarmac delays on passengers. This employee is to be included in the decision-making at the time of Massive flight disruptions as to which flights are cancelled and which will be delayed the longest.

• Unrealistic or Deceptive Scheduling– Chronically delayed flight means any domestic flight that is operated at least10 times a month and arrives

more than 30 minutes late, including cancelation, more than 50 percent of the time during that month.– Chronically delayed flights are considered unfair or deception practice, an unfair method of competition,

and are subject to enforcement.

Source: USDOT Final Rule Enhancing Airline Passenger Protection (2009)

The stakes are high - $27,500 per passenger

• ORD May 2011: massive disruption that resulted in government fines

• Textbook case of airport gridlock and management disarray

– Aircraft held at gate, arriving aircraft had no gate, flight crews trapped on in-bound aircraft

• Hefty $900K fines imposed by DOT on American Eagle

13

Operations decision-making flow begins with whole airline involvement

14

Vision, Objectives, Goal Setting

Management Science Approach

Models and SimulationProgrammed Decisions

Individual Decision Making Rational/ Bounded Rationality

Decision MakingJudgment / heuristics

Intuition

Aircraft Dispatch/Flight Following

Crew DispatchMaintenance Coordination

Airport Ramp ControlAirport Staff/ServicesPassenger Services

Operations Center Mgr.

Top ManagementCEO/COO/CFO/CMO

SVP Operations

Organizational Level Examples of Decisions

Flight Operations and Management

Maintenance Control SystemCrew Scheduling

Load PlanningCustomer Service servicesAirport/Ramp Operations

Network Operations

Flight trackingCrew tracking

Maintenance trackingGround services coordination

Passenger routings

Management Science ApproachOperations Research

Programmed Decision MakingNon-programmed Decision Making

Decision Support Tools

Decision-Making

Day-Of

Operation style, e.g. Mainline, Low Cost, Regional, Charter

Network Carrier versus Linear Route System

Domestic versus InternationalFleet Planning

Schedule Planning & Scheduling

(at lower level in Marketing)

48 hours prior to

Departure

6 Months Prior To Departure

Flights are planned 6 months prior to departure, then handed over to Operations Center

15

Massive flight disruptions become responsibility of Operation Center

• Airlines are multifaceted

• Extremely complex operations

– A “symphony orchestra” (Baker)

– Numerous individuals performing interconnected tasks

– Requires a combination of technology and human decision-making

• Interconnected factors resulting from massive flight disruptions include:

– Passenger misconnects

– Crew members out of place or limits

– Aircraft in the wrong place

– Disruption to maintenance

– Impact to subsequent flights

Airline Flight

SchedulesMarketing

Aircraft Available

Pass

enge

rsMarketing

Finance

Maintenance

AirportsAir T

raffic

Control Disruption

WeatherNatural Disaster

Airline Disrupted

Flight Schedules

Marketing

Aircraft RepositionedPass

engers’

Trave

l

Disrupted

Lost Revenue;

Increased Costs

Maintenance

Delayed

Airports/ Ground ServicesCrew

Rescheduled

Crew

16

Operations Center is focused on day-of-operation

17

Operations Center

Aircraft Scheduling

Aircraft Scheduling Station

Operations Control Center

(SOCC)

Station Operations

Control Center (SOCC)

Preplanned Schedule

Preplanned Schedule

Crew SchedulingCrew Scheduling

Passenger and Payload Flow

Passenger and Payload Flow

Maintenance Operations

Control Center (MOCC)

Maintenance Operations

Control Center (MOCC)

Airlines have different names for Operations Centers

• American is transitioning to Integrated Operations Center (IOC), renovating existing DFW infrastructure to include maintenance, currently in Tulsa

– Operations center is moving to back-up facility January 2013 during construction

• Delta recently renovated the Operations Control Center (OCC) in Atlanta following the merger with Northwest

– State-of-the-art facility employing best practices of both airlines

• United recently opened its Network Operations Center (NOC)

– 52,000 sq. ft. facility in Chicago’s Willis Tower

– Moved Continental’s operations to Chicago

• US Airways Operations Control Center (OCC) is in Pittsburgh

– Will be moved to Dallas following merger with American

18

Recovery from massive flight disruptions should not be solely Operations Center responsibility

19

Massive Flight

Disruption

Calm in Other Departments

Stress In Ops Center

Massive flight disruptions qualify as crises

• Crisis is “any situation that has the potential to affect long-term confidence in an organization or product, or which may interfere with its ability to continue operating normally”

• Despite differing definitions of crisis, there is consensus on its major characteristics. These include:

– Events that have low probability of occurring, but have a major potential impact on an organization and individuals both inside and outside the organization

– There is uncertainty about resolution; and

– There is a limited time in which to act.

• Crisis management is a “systematic attempt” for management to prevent a crisis and mitigate impacts

20

Carole LaLonde Framework

My study adapts LaLonde’s crisis management framework to airline management of massive flight disruptions, combining methods of Crisis Management and Organizational Development

21

Source, Lalonde, 2011

PLANNINGCrisis Management

• Assess capacity to prepare• Risk Analysis

OD Intervention• Integrate into corporate strategy• Include all stakeholders

LEADERSHIPCrisis Management

• Sensitive to external environment• Rapid decision-making and risk-taking

OD Intervention• Leadership development• Coaching & Training

COORDINATION/TECHNO-STRUCTURAL

Crisis Management• Communications• Collaborative structures

OD Intervention• Mainly techno-structural• Networks/Collaboration

CIVIL SOCIETYCrisis Management

• Civic behavior• Role of media

OD Intervention• Community Development

CRISIS RESILIENCE - Individual

- System

CRISIS RESILIENCE - Individual

- System

Four principles of crisis management

• Planning and preparedness– Risk assessment– Triggers– Developing crisis management plan– Prepare and train personnel– Simulations– Allocate resources– After event assessment

• Leadership– Sensitivity to external environment– Adaptive to stages of crisis (pre-,

during, post)– Foster rapid decision making– Courage to take risks

• Coordination– Communication, internal & external– Development of collaborative structures– Development of technology solutions– Crisis cells with multidisciplinary

resources and expertise

• Civil Society– Accounting for citizen and government

involvement, impacts, and responses– Recognizing role of media

22

OD and OL applied to Crisis Management

• Organization development (OD) is a system-wide application and transfer of behavioral science knowledge to planned development, improvement, and reinforcement of the strategies, structures, and processes that lead to organization effectiveness

– Both “culture and operational soundness”

– A set of methods to “address issues of changes, process, and relationships”

– Open systems approach

• Organizational learning (OL) is the process of creating, acquiring, and transferring knowledge, and at modifying behavior to reflect new knowledge and insights

– Integration of the acquired knowledge and lessons learned

– Double feed-back loops to address core issues

– Goal: Avoid repeating same errors and minimize impact

23

This Study Expanded Lalonde Framework

24

RESILIENCE Individual/Controller; Expertise; Innovative; ResourcefulSystem/Airline; Responsive; Focused; Learning

RESULT Improved Customer Satisfaction Minimized costs Mitigated government intervention

Organization Learning

PLANNINGCOORDINATION/

TECHNO-STRUCTURAL LEADERSHIP CIVIL SOCIETY

Organization Development

Crisis Management Principles

P1

P2P3

P4

P5

P6

Propositions

• Proposition 1 Planning– From an OD intervention perspective, planning includes the quantification and assessment of

vulnerabilities using probabilities. From an OL perspective, planning includes identifying trigger events using the review and analysis of previous events.

• Proposition 2 Coordination- Techno-Structure– From OD intervention perspective, coordination includes collaboration across different

departments and the development of technology solutions (e.g., situational analysis). From an OL perspective, coordination includes the creation of a learning environment that fosters innovation.

• Proposition 3 Leadership– From an OD intervention perspective, leadership includes training and coaching. From an OL

perspective, leadership includes fostering a culture of innovation, learning, and knowledge transfer.

• Proposition 4 Civil Society– From an OD intervention perspective, civil society includes improving communications with

passengers, the public, and governments. From an OL perspective, civil society includes learning from customers and complying with governmental rules (e.g., the 3-Hour Tarmac Rule).

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Propositions 5 & 6

• Proposition 5 Resiliency – Adapting OD interventions with OL processes leads to resiliency. Resiliency

for an individual is the ability to leverage his or her expertise by being innovative and resourceful in addressing the issues that result from a crisis or unexpected-yet-recurring events. Resiliency for an organization is the ability to return to normal operations as quickly as possible with the least impact on operations, customers, and resources. The organization needs to be responsive to triggers and changes in the environment, to focus on the situation, and to be open to learning from the event.

• Principle 6 Sustainable Results – Proposition 6 is essentially the feedback loops within the conceptual

framework moving OL processes back into planning, leadership, technology coordination, and civil society to ensure that the changes driven by crises or unexpected-yet-recurring events that lead to operational disruptions are sustainable.

26

Adapted to airline operations management

• Planning and preparedness– Assess vulnerabilities– Identify triggers– Collaboration across airline– Double-loop assessment

following massive flight disruption

• Leadership– Top management commitment to

fostering collaboration across the airline and innovation

– Crisis cells with multidisciplinary resources and expertise

– Rapid decision-making and risk taking

• Coordination and Techno-Structure

– Integrate decision-making tools (aircraft, crew, airport facilities, passengers)

– Strive for real-time situational awareness for all resources

– Collaboration within Operations Center and with other departments

• Civil Society– Communicate with passengers

• Social media, direct text/email, announcements

– Communicate with media• Social media, direct text/email,

announcements

– Government

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Planning and preparedness

• Quantify and develop a strategic plan based on probabilities of massive flight disruptions

• Develop entire airline strategy around crisis management tools

– Include all stakeholders

• Identify triggers

– FAA System Ops Calls

– Historical analysis of weather patterns

– Action plan based on triggers

– Risk-taking to preempt “heroic” actions

Source: GAO, 2011 Average for 2001-2010

Seasonality of Massive Flight Delays

There are about 60 days a year in the U.S. when flight delays potentially result in massive disruptions.

More than 50 percent of disruptions in flight operations are clustered in 20 days each year

Airlines should adjust planned schedules and resources (aircraft, crew, airport facilities) accordingly

28

Organization Learning through feedback loops

• Collaboration between other departments and Operations Center• Rethink operational models, routines, and cultures – feedback!

Fee

dbac

k Lo

op

Feedbac

k Loo

p

Feedback Loop

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Socio-technical – Integration of technology with human decision-making, including other departments

• Integration of resource decision-making tools

– Aircraft maintenance programs– Crew scheduling– Passenger re-accommodation– Real time situational analysis

Operations Center (OC)

Maintenance Operations Control Center (MOCC)

- Aircraft maintenance restrictions

Maintenance Operations Control Center (MOCC)

- Aircraft maintenance restrictions

Station Operations Control Center (SOCC)

Passengers on-boardGround service availability –

gates, catering, baggage, fuel

Station Operations Control Center (SOCC)

Passengers on-boardGround service availability –

gates, catering, baggage, fuel

Marketing Data - Passenger itinerary and

rebooking- Passenger satisfaction

- Competitive market position

Marketing Data - Passenger itinerary and

rebooking- Passenger satisfaction

- Competitive market position

Finance - Revenue metrics

- Cost metrics

Finance - Revenue metrics

- Cost metrics

Operations - Aircraft and crew

positioning - Crew restrictions

Operations - Aircraft and crew

positioning - Crew restrictions

• Collaborative integration of Operations Center with other departments

– Massive flight disruptions are not just an operations center problem

– Impact entire airline

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Commitment to finding new recovery strategies must start with top management

• Commitment to fostering collaboration across the airline

• Corporate culture to treat massive flight disruptions as a crisis

• Create “Massive Flight Disruption Crisis Cells”

– Draw from across the airline

– Lessons learned from previous massive flight disruptions

– Identify resources for response

– Debrief and learning after event

• Coaching and training on rapid decision making

• Assume some risks

– Use OR resources to respond to triggers and preempt “heroic” solutions once massive flight delays develop

• Learn from airline Emergency Response Programs for catastrophic events, i.e. terrorism, crash, high-jacking, bomb threat, etc.

31

Civil Society

• Passengers

– Gain passenger understanding through communication

– Leverage technologies for direct passenger communications

• Text/email/phone, social media (FaceBook, Twitter)

• Communicate with media

• Stay ahead of the news

– Social media, direct text/email, announcements

• Government and regulators

• Observe regulatory limits

• Situational awareness

• Documentation

32

Summation

33

CIVIL SOCIETY

Passenger understanding through communication

Communication with mediaOperate within 3-Hour

Tarmac Ruler regulatory constraints

LEADERSHIP

Top management commitment to fostering collaboration across

the airline and innovationCrisis Cells, rapid decision

making, risk taking based on OR tools

COORDINATION/TECHNO-STRUCTURAL

Collaborative integration of Operations Center with other

departmentsReal time situational analysis

tools with integration

RESILIENCE

Individual/ControllerExpertiseInnovative

Resourceful

System/Airline Responsive

FocusedLearning

PLANNING

Quantification and strategic plan for vulnerabilities based on

probabilities of massive flight disruptions. Collaboration with

between planning and Operations Center

Improved Passenger

Satisfaction

Minimized costs

Mitigated government intervention

Findings

Crisis is a Catalyst for Change

•Organization development provides tools to implement change

•Organization learning provides culture for sustainable change

Airlines Do Not Address

Massive Flight Disruptions as a Crisis

•Massive flight disruptions are isolated to a single department issue, i.e., operations

•Risk-adverse: Operations staffing have deep operations experience, but no experience across airline departments

Answer to research question

“The resources required to manage massive flight disruptions are enormous and not practical to have on stand-by” (Russ Chew)

Hence the need for a behavioral management approach

•Massive flight disruptions are viewed as an operations problem, but they’re actually a crisis involving the entire airline

– Solution: Collaboration across the airline

– Behavioral approach: Crisis management tools integrate with Organization Development interventions

•SOC staff have deep but narrow experience in airline operations and are risk adverse

– Solution: Develop a culture fostering innovation, which includes other airline departments

– Behavioral approach: Organization Learning interventions

35

For a copy of dissertation:

Tulinda Larsentulinda@tulindalarsen.com

www.tulindalarsen.com

Tel: +1 443-510-3566Twitter @TulindaLarsen

Thank you to Tim Antolovic, AA, Jack Keis, Metron Aviation, Tim Jacobs, US, Stephen G. Smith, US Office of Inspector General, Dr. Darryl Jenkins,

American Aviation Institute, Josh Marks, masFlight, Dr. Carole Lalonde, and my dissertation advisor, Dr. Michael Evanchik for their invaluable support and

guidance in my research and in developing my framework.

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• Bruce, P.J. (2011). Understanding Decision-Making Processes in Airline Operations. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited.• Clark, M. (2012). Journey Management. ASCEND. (1)Sabre Airline Solutions. • Clark, M.D.D., Lettovsky, L., & Smith, B.C. (2000). The development of the airline operations control center. In G. Butler & M. Keller (Eds.) Handbook

of Airline Operations (pp. 131-147). New York: McGraw-Hill.• DeArmon, J. Wanke, C., Beaton, E.K., & Miller, S. (2000). Styles of flight cancelation: airlines’ varying reactions to disruptions. In G. Butler & M. Keller

(Eds.) Handbook of Airline Operation (pp. 223-235). New York: McGraw-Hill.• Hoyt, D., Reilly, C., Rao, H., & Sutton, R. (2010). JetBlue airways: A new beginning. Stanford Graduate School of Business. Case: L-17.• Irrgang, M.E. (1995). Airline Irregular Operations. In D. Jenkins (Ed.) Handbook of Airline Economics First Edition (pp. 349-366). New York: McGraw-

Hill.• Irrgang, M.E. (2000). Airline operational efficiency. In G. Butler & M. Keller (Eds.) Handbook of Airline Operations (pp. 169-192). New York: McGraw-

Hill.• Marks, J. & Jenkins, D. (2010.) Impact of three-hour tarmac delay rules and fines on passenger travel time and welfare. International Institute of

Tourism Studies Aviation Program, The George Washington University. Washington D.C. Retrieved from The Airline Zone http://www.theairlinezone.com/2010/07/tarmac-delay-study/

• Marks, J. (2012). Trends in U.S. airline on-time performance. AGIFORS Operations Conference 2012. Atlanta, Georgia.• National Task Force to Develop Model Contingency Plan to Deal with Lengthy Airline On-Board Ground Delays. (2008) Development of Contingency

Plans for Lengthy Airline On-Board Delays.• Rogers, W. H., Allen, J.A., & Hoyme, K.P. (2000). The airline operations center dilemma: Solving “day-of-operation” disruptions with greater economic

efficiency. In G. Butler & M. Keller (Eds.) Handbook of Airline Operation (pp. 149-168). McGraw-Hill, New York.• Wu, C.L. (2010). Airline Operations and Delay Management. Surrey, UK: Asgate Publishing

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Airline Operations – Government Studies

• U. S. Department of Transportation. (2009). DOT consumer rule limits airline tarmac delays, provides other passenger protections, US DOT Press Release, DOT 199-09. December 21, 2009 Retrieved from http://www.dot.gov/affairs/2009/dot19909.htm

• U.S. Department of Transportation (2010) Request for comments on carriers ’ temporary exemption requests from DOT’s tarmac delay rules for JFK, EWR, LGA and PHL operations, 75 Fed. Reg. 15765 (Docket No. DOT–OST–2007–0022)

• U.S. Department of Transportation (2011). Consent Order: American Eagle Airlines, Inc. Violations of 14 CFR Part 259and 49 U.S.C. § 41712. Docket OST-2011-000.

• U.S. Department of Transportation, (2007) Enhancing airline passenger protections, advance notice of proposed rulemaking, US Department of Transportation, 72 Fed. Reg. 65233 (14 CFR Parts 234, 253, 259, and 399, Docket No. DOT–OST–2007–0022) RIN No. 2105–AD72

• U.S. Department of Transportation, (2008) Enhancing airline passenger protections, notice of proposed rulemaking, US Department of Transportation, 72 Fed. Reg. 74586 (14 CFR Parts 234, 253, 259, and 399, Docket No. DOT–OST–2007–0022) RIN No. 2105–AD72

• U.S. Department of Transportation, (2009) Enhancing airline passenger protections: final rule, 74 Fed Reg. 68983(14 CFR Parts 234, 253, 259, and 399, Docket No. DOT–OST–2007–0022) RIN No. 2105–AD72

• U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Office of the Secretary, (2000). Interim report on airline customer service commitment (Report No: AV-2000-102)

• U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Office of the Secretary, (2001). Final report on airline customer service commitment (Report No: AV-2001-020)

• U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Office of the Secretary, (2006). Report on Audit of Small Community Aviation Delays and Cancelations (Report No: CR-2006-049)

• U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Office of the Secretary, (2007). Actions needed to minimize long, on-board flight delays (Report No: AV-2007-077)

• U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Office of the Secretary, (2008). Status Report on Actions Underway to Address Flight Delays and Improve Airline Customer Satisfaction (Report No: CC-2008-058)

• U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Office of the Secretary, (2010). New York Flight Delays Have Three Main Cause, But More Work Is Needed to Understand Their Nationwide Effect. (Report No: AV-2011-007)

• U.S. General Accountability Office (2001). Air Traffic Control: Role of FAA’s Modernization Program in Reducing Delays and Congestion (Report No: GAO-01-725T) Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov

• U.S. General Accountability Office (2002). National Airspace System: Long-Tem Capacity Planning Needed Despite Recent Reductions in Flight Delays (Report No: GAO-02-185) Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov

• U.S. General Accountability Office (2008). National Airspace System: DOT and FAA Actions Will Likely Have a Limited Effect on Reducing Delays during Summer 2008 Travel Season (Report No: GAO-08-934T) Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov

• U.S. General Accountability Office (2010). National Airspace System setting on-time performance targets at congested airports could help focus FAA ’s actions (Report No: GAO-10-542) Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov

• U.S. General Accountability Office (2010). Summary of Flight Delay Trends for 34 Airports in the Continental United States, an E-supplement to GAO 10-542 (Report Number: GAO-10-543SP) Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov

• U.S. General Accountability Office (2011). Airline passenger protections: More data and analysis is needed to understand the effects of flight delays (Report No: GAO-11-733) Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov

• U.S. Senate Joint Economic Committee. (2008). Your Flight Has Been Delayed Again: Flight Delays Cost Passengers, Airlines And The U.S. Economy Billions . Washington, D.C. Retrieved from: http://jec.senate.gov

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