a brief history of safeguards implementation in iraq prior to the gulf war iraq was an original...
TRANSCRIPT
SAFEGUARDS CASE STUDIES OF THE 1990’s
R. HooperMonterey, June 2012
IRAQ
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION IN IRAQ PRIOR TO THE GULF WAR
Iraq was an original signatory of the NPT (July 1968) and became a party prior to NPT entry-into-force
Their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement entered-into-force February 1972
Israeli 1981 destruction of the 40 MW Tamuz I research reactor being constructed by the French at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center
Iraqi response – the Tuwaitha “berm” and other measures against low altitude attacks
Ikonos satellite image of Tuwaitha
HISTORY CONTINUED
In the years prior to the Gulf War, safeguards were implemented in four installations designated to be facilities at Tuwaitha
IRT 5000 research reactor 0 power Tamus II research reactor an away from reactor fresh fuel store a pilot fuel fabrication facility
inspector access was limited to “strategic points” at each of those four locations as specified in facility attachments
1034
24
N
19
21
33
2320
35
22
32
78
26
25
29
36
3130
27
2811
1
2
3
6
9
5
39
40
68
72
6970 71
73C
73B
73A
74
66
3837
12
41
65
64
13
14
67
76
7577
63
7978
80
54
49
4648
4
1716
47
44
4243
45
51
86
57
5315 50
59
61
56
58
52
55 87
83
82
62
81
84
60
85
89
88
18
90
IT
TUWAITHABuildings declared by Iraqto IAEA before 1991 aredisplayed in red
FuelFabricationLaboratory
IQC
Tammuz 2Reactor
IQB
IRT 5000Reactor
IQA
THE GULF WAR AND THE UNSCR 687 INSPECTIONS
The Gulf War ended in March 1991 with Iraqi acceptance of UNSCR 687 – cease fire and disarmament of Iraq
UNSCR called for the “destruction, removal and rendering harmless” of Iraqi WMD and associated infrastructure
IAEA was given a qualified mandate re nuclear disarmament. The remainder – missiles, chemical and biological – was the responsibility of the newly created UNSCOM
UNSCR 687 INSPECTIONS CONTINUED
First IAEA UNSCR 687 on-site inspection occurred mid-May 1991
Mapping the Iraqi clandestine program
“chase the disc”, IAEA 2 “the parking lot”, IAEA 6 the Haider Chicken Farm documents
Destruction, removal, rendering harmless
The nuclea
r- related sites in
Iraq
SOUTH AFRICA
--A CASE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT-
SOUTH AFRICA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
The program existed for at least 20 years (1969-1989)
The white South Africa government was motivated by a deep fear of a black uprising and of communism
South Africa possessed sufficient indigenous technical capabilities and materials
The key was the capability to enrich uranium; the facility was located at a nuclear research installation at Pelindaba near Pretoria
The South Africa AEC produced sufficient highly enriched uranium for 7 gun-type nuclear weapons
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE NPT
South Africa began discussions pursuant to signing the NPT in 1987
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, amid heavy international pressure and an imminent change of government, South Africa signed the NPT on 10 July 1991
South Africa’s comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency entered-into-force on 16 September 1991
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS
At the 1991 General Conference, a group of African States pushed through a C resolution requesting the Board to instruct the DG to verify the completeness of South Africa’s initial report
-This was a first-
The DG’s “completeness team” began its work in South Africa a couple of months later
IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS (CONT.)
The focus, of course, was the uranium enrichment activities the pilot plant (Y plant), and the semi-commercial plant (Z plant)
a unique enrichment process and the availability of extensive operating records covering the Y Plant operating history
in March 1993, South Africa formally acknowledged the former existence of a nuclear weapons program and the completeness exercise took on a disarmament dimension
IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS (CONT.)
in 1994, the Agency concluded that the HEU declared and presented – largely material recovered from dismantled weapons – was consistent with what reasonably could have been produced, and
that there was no indication that all nuclear weapon components, designs and related infrastructure had not been destroyed or otherwise rendered harmless
DPRK
DPRK’s NUCLEAR PROGRAMME AND IN’TL SAFEGUARDS (1)
The programme dates to a 1959 nuclear cooperation agreement with the USSR
The USSR supplied an IRT 5000 Research Reactor and an isotope production laboratory that became operational in 1965
Safeguards were first implemented at the RR under an INFCIRC/66 type of agreement
DPRK AND IMPLEMENTATION OF IN’TL SAFEGUARDS (2)
Across the 1980’s, DPRK constructed and operated
a 5 MWe natural uranium fueled, graphite moderated, gas cooled reactor
conversion/fuel fabrication facility reprocessing facility
DPRK acceded to the NPT in 1985, but did not meet its Article III obligation to conclude a CSA until 1992
DPRK AND IMPLEMENTATION OF IN’TL SAFEGUARDS (3)
Entry-into-force of DPRK’s CSA occurred 10 April 1992, the submission of their initial report followed quickly
(4 May 1992)
Ad hoc inspections to verify the correctness and assess the completeness of the initial report began immediately
The DPRK pledged a high level of cooperation with “anytime, any place access”
THE AD HOC INSPECTIONS
There were 6 ad hoc inspections during the remainder of 1992, inconsistencies between inspection data and DPRK declarations regarding the operational histories of the 5 MWe reactor and the reprocessing facility soon developed
In broad terms, the DPRK declared that the core of the 5 MWe reactor was the original core and that there had been one “hot” reprocessing campaign involving a mixture of damaged, lightly irradiated fuel and fresh fuel
PRINCIPAL INCONSISTENCIES
The waste declared and presented as having resulted from the single reprocessing campaign was not compatible with inputs and the Pu product
Environmental samples taken in the Pu finishing area contained
Pu isotopically different from the declared Pu product
The ingrowth of Am in Pu particle indicated three points in time when Pu separations were done, not one
SATELLITE IMAGERY
leading to a request for a special inspection, which has never happened
DPRK AND STRENGTHENED SAFEGUARDS
Provided added impetus to efforts to strengthen safeguards
Provided additional evidence of the power of environmental sampling
Tacit acceptance by the Board that the Agency would accept and make use of third party information