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Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School

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A Framework for UnderstandingNaturalized EpistemologyAmirah Albahri

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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY

By

AMIRAH ALBAHRI

A dissertation submitted to the Philosophy department

In partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of

Doctorate of Philosophy

Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2011

ii

Amirah Albahri defended this dissertation on November 7, 2011

The members of the supervisory committee were:

Michael Bishop

Professor Directing dissertation

Michael Kaschak

University Representative

Michael Ruse

Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and

certifies that the dissertation has been approved in accordance with university requirements.

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To, My Mother (Mariam, Mero, Dai Marwan) Shafi, Tareq and Yaser. Saying ‘thank

you’ is not enough. I owe you everything. You have always been there for me, and I will always

be there for you.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. vi List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. viii Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ix 1. CHAPTER ONE ......................................................................................................................1

1.1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................1

2. CHAPTER TWO ...................................................................................................................10

2.1 A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY ................................................................................................................10

2.1.1 Defining Naturalized Epistemology ...............................................................10 2.1.2 Classifying Naturalized Epistemology ............................................................11 2.1.3 Types and Subtypes of Naturalized Epistemology ..........................................11 2.1.4 Main features of Naturalized Epistemology ....................................................12 2.1.5 Constructing the Framework and Criteria Used to classify Naturalized Epistemology ...............................................................................................................15

3. CHAPTER THREE ...............................................................................................................18

3.1 REPLACEMENT NATURALISM .............................................................................18 3.1.1 Main Features of replacement Naturalism .......................................................24

4. CHAPTER FOUR .................................................................................................................25

4.1 SUBSTANTIVE NATURALISM ..............................................................................25 4.1.1 Primary Epistemology .....................................................................................26 4.1.2 Scientific Epistemology ...................................................................................38 4.1.3 Epistemics .......................................................................................................53 4.1.4 Main Features of Substantive Naturalism ........................................................61

5. CHAPTER FIVE ...................................................................................................................62

5.1 COOPERATIVE NATURALISM ..............................................................................62 5.1.1 Stich’s Pragmatic Naturalism .........................................................................64 5.1.2 Strategic Reliabilism .......................................................................................84 5.1.3 Kornblith’s Natural Kind Theory.....................................................................95 5.1.4 Main Features of Cooperative Naturalism ....................................................110

6. CHAPTER SIX ...................................................................................................................112

6.1 WHY COOPERATIVE NATURALISM? ................................................................112

7. CHAPTER SEVEN .............................................................................................................120

v

7.1 CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................120

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LIST OF TABLES

1. Traditional Epistemology- Relation Between Traditional Epistemology and Empirical Science ........................................................................................................................................129

2. Main Features of Traditional Epistemology ....................................................................129

3. Applying the Six -Question Criterion Classifying Naturalized Epistemology- Replacement Naturalism- substantive naturalism- cooperative naturalism .....................130

4. Applying the established Six- question criterion to classify theories of naturalized

epistemology- replacement naturalism ............................................................................132

5. Relation Between Empirical Science and Replacement Naturalism ...............................133

6. Stages of Substantive Naturalism’s Subtypes: Primary Epistemology-Scientific epistemology- Epistemics ................................................................................................134

7. The Relation Between Empirical Science and Primary Epistemology of Substantive

Naturalism ........................................................................................................................135

8. Six -Question Criterion Classifying Naturalized Epistemology- Traditional epistemology and Primary Epistemology of Substantive Naturalism ....................................................136

9. The Relation Between Empirical Science and (Scientific Epistemology – Epistemics)

Accounts of Substantive Naturalism ................................................................................137

10. Six -Question Criterion Classifying Naturalized Epistemology- Traditional epistemology and Scientific Epistemology of Substantive Naturalism .................................................138

11. Six- Question Criterion Classifying Naturalized Epistemology- Traditional epistemology

and Epistemics of Substantive Naturalism ......................................................................139

12. Main Features of Substantive Naturalism: Primary Epistemology-Scientific Epistemology- Epistemics ...............................................................................................140

13. Six- Question Criterion for Classifying Naturalism— Substantive Naturalism and

Cooperative Naturalism ...................................................................................................141

14. Relation between empirical science and subtype of cooperative naturalism: Stich’s pragmatism - Kornblith’s natural kind theory .................................................................142

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15. Six -Question Criterion for Classifying Naturalism—Traditional Epistemology and Cooperative Naturalism- Pragmatism ..............................................................................143

16. Relation Between Empirical Science and Strategic Reliabilism of Cooperative

Naturalism ....................................................................................................................................144

17. Six- Question Criterion for Classifying Naturalism— Traditional Epistemology, Cooperative Naturalism: Strategic Reliabilism ...............................................................145

18. Six- Question Criterion for Classifying Naturalism— Traditional Epistemology,

Cooperative Naturalism: Natural Kind Theory ................................................................146

19. Main Features of Cooperative Naturalism .......................................................................147

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LIST OF FIGURES

1. Epistemology Classified- Traditional Epistemology and Types and Subtypes of Naturalized

Epistemology …………………………………………………………………………………. 148

2. The Six- Question Criterion Used to Classify Naturalized

Epistemology……………….......................................................................................................149

3. Subtypes of Substantive Naturalism: Primary epistemology- Scientific Epistemology-

Epistemics………………………………………………………………………………………150

4. The Relation between Ameliorative Psychology and Strategic Reliabilism ..........................151

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ABSTRACT

When reviewing the literature of epistemology, we find that very few papers discuss the

topic of naturalized epistemology as a unified domain. The field of naturalized epistemology

does not get the attention it deserves. Therefore, my main aim in this dissertation is to establish a

framework and criterion that enables us to define, explain, and classify theories of naturalized

epistemology in order to present naturalized epistemology as a well-organized and unified

domain. In addition, I aim to select and argue in favor of one type of or approach to theories of

naturalized epistemology that will be considered the right and successful theory that should

replace other types and approaches.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

My main aim in this dissertation is to fill a gap in the literature of epistemology by

establishing a framework and a criterion to enable us to define, explain, and classify theories of

naturalized epistemology in order to present naturalized epistemology as a well-organized and

unified domain. We can then use this structure in order to argue in favor of one type of theory or

approach to replace the other types.

Epistemological theories in the literature of epistemology refer to the term naturalized

epistemology and discuss the debate between traditional epistemology and naturalized

epistemology without presenting an accurate definition or precise explanation of what they mean

by this term. The reason could be that it is very hard to come up with one definition that can both

contain and explain theories of naturalized epistemology with great precision. Even naturalists

themselves disagree about the topic, definition, and methods used in the field of naturalism. Each

naturalist exerts an individual effort to defend his theory’s aims, methods, and results against

other approaches of epistemology, whether traditional or naturalistic. Further confusing the

situation, some traditional epistemologists present objections to and criticisms of the entire

practice of naturalized epistemology by denying or rejecting a single naturalistic theory. In other

words, because of the lack of the framework and a criterion to define, explain, and classify

theories of traditional epistemology, some traditional epistemologists mistakenly deny the entire

practice of naturalized epistemology. They do not realize that naturalized epistemology contains

a variety of distinct theories and approaches.

The common standard definition for naturalized epistemology in the literature specifies

employing empirical science in epistemological theories. Defining naturalized epistemology by

associating epistemological theory with empirical science is not an effective way to explain this

domain because this definition entails placing all naturalist theories without distinction in one big

category, which is too general and imprecise. Another reason this is ineffective is that this

definition does not consider the differences and distinctions between those naturalist theories.

As a result, no accurate definition or clear criterion is currently available to demonstrate these

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differences and organize this field. My dissertation is an attempt to fill this current gap in

epistemology by establishing the missing criterion. My anticipated criterion will help clarify the

ambiguity concerning the field of naturalized epistemology. And once this criterion is formed we

can employ it to classify and organize naturalized epistemology by showing the basic features of

epistemology’s theories and their relations to each other. With this structure in place we can

choose and argue for one theory or approach to replace the others.

In fact, my anticipated framework and criterion for classifying naturalized epistemology

have multiple benefits. My criterion can help in many ways. For example:

1. They can define, explain, and clarify the domain of naturalized epistemology itself by

demonstrating and identifying the basic properties of its theories and classifying those

theories into categories and sub-categories. From the basic properties of the theories

we can infer the main features of their host category. Consequently, we can form a

clear framework and structure of naturalized epistemology that reflects an accurate

relationship between its theories.

2. They can add clarity and precision to every discussed naturalistic theory, and

consequently dissolve many of the inaccurate misconceptions and assumptions

ascribed by traditional epistemologists to the domain of naturalized epistemology. For

example, by explaining the basic features of naturalistic theories, my criterion can

debunk traditional epistemology’s accusation that theories of naturalized

epistemology dismiss employing intuitions completely. I will demonstrate in my

dissertation that every discussed naturalistic theory in fact does employ intuitions,

albeit not in the same manner practiced by traditional epistemologists. Naturalists do

not consider intuitions a priori like traditionalists. As a result, intuitions are

employed in the naturalistic theories in a way like the way they are employed in

empirical science. As a result, in most naturalistic theories intuitions are not used as a

final referee to evaluate the resulting theories.

3. My criterion can explain and classify the current naturalistic theories and can also

accommodate future epistemological theories; any epistemological theory has to

respond to my criterion’s questions.

4. They make good grounds and bases for evaluating established categories and their

subtypes in order to choose one type and argue in its favor.

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In order to achieve my aim in forming the right framework and criterion to define, explain,

and classify theories of naturalized epistemology, I will be organizing my dissertation following

this scheme:

In Chapter 2 of my dissertation, I will present a brief, general definition for naturalized

epistemology that can be accepted by most naturalists. I will define naturalized epistemology as

“a cluster of views according to which epistemology is closely connected to natural science”

(Feldman, 2001). Then I will start constructing my theoretical framework and criterion by

drawing a comparison between the two major rivals in the current debate in epistemology and

their theories of traditional epistemology and naturalized epistemology. I will be following these

steps in order to establish the comparison.

1. I will demonstrate the basic features of traditional epistemology.

By investigating theories of traditional epistemology, I will extract and explain the

following main features. The first feature is the primary topic and main aim of epistemology,

which includes two main topics: defining epistemological concepts such as finding the necessary

and sufficient conditions for knowledge and justification and responding to the argument of

skepticism. The second feature is that epistemology is an a priori domain and must proceed

independently from empirical science to avoid circularity. The third feature is that a priori

conceptual analysis is the main tool and method employed in constructing epistemological

theories. The fourth feature is that common sense intuitions are employed as a final referee in the

evaluation of epistemological theories. The last feature is normativity in theories of traditional

epistemology, which is based on semantic considerations.

2. From these basic features I will infer the questions used to construct my criterion for

classifying theories of naturalized epistemology. Every question of my criterion

corresponds to a basic feature of traditional epistemology.

These questions are the elements of the comparison I make between theories of

traditional epistemology and naturalized epistemology. The point of establishing this comparison

is to identify the basic features of the theories of naturalized epistemology and distinguish them

from those of traditional epistemology. These questions can be stated as follows: What is the

primary topic and main aim for epistemology? What is the relation between empirical science

and this theory? Does this theory employ conceptual analysis? What is the role ascribed to

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epistemic or common sense intuitions? What is the source of normativity? And finally, what is

the relation between this naturalistic account and traditional epistemology?

3. The answers to these questions will form the criterion used to define, explain, and

classify theories of naturalized epistemology.

In order to organize and unify my study I will limit my research to naturalistic theories

associated with different theories of empirical psychology. Each epistemological theory will

have to respond to each question in the criterion of classification. The answers presented by each

epistemological theory will determine its type and membership in a particular category of the

major groups of naturalized epistemology. By applying this criterion to theories of naturalized

epistemology, I will establish three major categories for naturalized epistemology. Also, by

employing this six-question criterion I will be able to classify these three major groups into

several sub-groups.

By employing the previously established six-question criterion, I will classify naturalized

epistemology into three major types: replacement naturalism, substantive naturalism, and

cooperative naturalism. I will also divide those major types into subtypes. Substantive

naturalism will be divided into primary epistemology, scientific epistemology, and epistemics.

Cooperative naturalism will be divided into Stich’s pragmatism, Bishop and Trout’s strategic

reliabilism, and Kornblith’s natural kind theory (See Figure1 in Appendix B).

4. After classifying theories of naturalized epistemology according to their answers to the

six -question criterion, I will be able to infer the basic properties shared by these theories.

Then from these basic properties I will able to infer the basic features of the category that

contains those theories.

In Chapter 3, I will discuss replacement naturalism. This category includes only one type

of naturalistic theory: the one associated with W. V. Quine. Accordingly, the basic features of

replacement naturalism will be based on his theory’s responses to the six-question criterion.

Answering the six-question criterion demonstrates Quine’s confirmation that there is no

demarcation between empirical science and epistemology. Both have the same aims, tackle the

same questions, and employ the same methods. According to Quine, epistemology should not try

to investigate the foundations of science. On the contrary, the main aim for epistemology should

be providing an explanation for the relationship between our beliefs and our evidence for those

beliefs, which is sense data. In other words, the main aim and primary topic of epistemology

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should be obtaining the truth. Because empirical science can achieve this successfully,

epistemology has lost its main function. As a result, epistemology has no choice but to be

reduced and subsumed into psychology.

Following Quine, the main features of replacement naturalism can be narrowed to 1) the

complete elimination of the a priori methods and tools of traditional epistemology, 2) the

dismissal of normative questions of epistemology and their replacement with descriptive and

normative questions of empirical science, 3) finding the source of normativity for replacement

naturalism in obtaining truth presented by scientific theories, and 4) the limited use of intuitions

by empirical scientists when forming their theories. It is important to note that intuitions are

never employed as a final referee or criterion to evaluate resulting theories.

In Chapter 4, I will discuss substantive naturalism. Substantive naturalism contains three

different theories which happen to be produced by the same philosopher: Alvin Goldman. I will

discuss each of those theories by applying the six-question criterion. Then I will consider the

common properties shared by those subtypes of substantive naturalism in order to form the basic

features of the larger category itself.

I will start with primary epistemology. Primary epistemology responds to the six-question

criterion by confirming that the primary topic and main aim for epistemology are to form

epistemological theories that capture and explain our pre-theoretical intuitions. Primary

epistemology achieves this aim by forming the theory of justification named process reliabilism

using a priori conceptual analysis. Then primary epistemology applies process reliabilism

empirically by employing theories of cognitive psychology. I argue that in primary epistemology

we can have two interpretations, shallow and deep, of the role played by empirical science in

forming and applying process reliabilism. Most commentators would argue in favor of the

shallow interpretation, which confirms that empirical science is employed in process reliabilism

to identify belief-forming processes and their actual reliability. However, I will argue that in

primary epistemology, empirical science plays a bigger role than the shallow interpretation

suggests. I will argue that empirical science is employed to provide the link between establishing

a theory of justification attribution and establishing a theory of justification per se. When

empirical science has confirmed this link, process reliabilism transforms from a theory of

justification attribution into a theory of justification per se. However, I will argue that

Goldman’s attempt is unsuccessful.

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In addition, I will show that although primary epistemology is a naturalistic theory, it is

very similar to traditional epistemology in many respects. For example, like traditional

epistemology, primary epistemology employs a priori conceptual analysis to form its theory. It

also uses pre-theoretical intuitions as a final referee. Finally, it presents a semantic source for

normativity.

After exploring primary epistemology I will investigate scientific epistemology as

another subtype of substantive naturalism. In scientific epistemology, Goldman modifies and

improves process reliabilism in order to save and maintain his theory. Goldman considers the

objections to his process reliabilism and accordingly modifies and improves this theory. He

argues for scientific epistemology to form epistemological theories that empirically discover and

improve our conceptualizations. I argue that he also integrates traditional epistemology’s

conceptual analysis with empirical tools of cognitive psychology and employs the exemplar

approach to concept representation in forming and applying his theory. To support my argument,

I will demonstrate this empirical methodology, which is borrowed from cognitive science. I will

also explain how it is an empirical and a posteriori analysis and a product of combining the

empirical tools of psychology and the a priori tools of traditional epistemology. Finally, I will

demonstrate Goldman’s loyalty to traditional epistemology by showing how he sticks to its main

properties, such as employing scientific intuitions as a final referee to evaluate the resulting

theory and grounding epistemological normativity on semantic bases.

After discussing scientific epistemology I will discuss epistemics, the last subtype of

substantive naturalism. I will argue that, like scientific epistemology, epistemics is based on

empirical analysis, but unlike scientific epistemology, the resulting theory is evaluated

instrumentally. Evaluating the resulting theory instrumentally takes epistemics farther away from

traditional epistemology and closer to naturalism. Changing the source of normativity from

semantic considerations to evaluating the theory in light of its ability to achieve other aims,

either intrinsically or instrumentally valuable, is a drastic change. Scientific intuitions are

employed in forming the theory; however, the resulting theory is evaluated instrumentally.

At the end of Chapter 4, I will consider the common properties of the naturalistic theories

that are the subtypes of substantive naturalism. From these common properties I will infer the

basic features of substantive naturalism. For example, practicing conceptual analysis, either a

priori or a posteriori, is one of the common properties shared by the three subtypes of

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substantive naturalism. Accordingly, I will consider employing conceptual analysis (either a

priori or a posteriori) as a main method and tool in pursuing epistemology to be one of the basic

features of substantive naturalism. Another example: the main aim and topic of substantive

naturalism is investigating epistemological notions and concepts, whether they were discovered

by a priori analysis, like in the primary epistemology account, or empirical experimentation, like

in the scientific epistemology and epistemics. I will include more examples and more detail in

the full text.

In Chapter 5, I will investigate cooperative naturalism. I will employ the same

methodology, applying the six-question criterion, to each subtype to discover their common

properties. From these common properties I will construct the basic features of the whole

category of cooperative naturalism. I will start with Stich’s pragmatism as a subtype of

cooperative naturalism. I will demonstrate Stich’s argument for pragmatism, which is supported

by his rejection of the topic, aims, and methods of traditional epistemology and his criticism of

other types of naturalist theories. Then I will demonstrate the basic properties of his account,

which are represented by limiting the topic of epistemology to include evaluating the methods of

enquiry. In addition, I will clarify that Stich keeps the distinction between empirical science and

epistemology regarding the types of questions investigated by each domain: empirical science

discusses descriptive questions while epistemology deals with normative ones. But Stich does

not demarcate between the two domains regarding the tools and methods employed. He does not

place any restrictions on employing empirical methods in epistemology. However, I will argue

that, in spite of his previous assertion, his pragmatism suffers from an unclear relationship with

empirical science. I will also explain Stich’s solution for the normativity problem in

epistemology by grounding it in human desire. I will demonstrate his theory’s transition, which

is replacing the employment of intuitions as final referee for evaluating the resulting

epistemological theory with evaluating the theory instrumentally.

I will move next to discuss Bishop and Trout’s strategic reliabilism. I will demonstrate

their account by following the same pattern. I will start with their argument for naturalism,

which is based on their objections to and criticisms of traditional epistemology. Then I will

explain their view concerning the relationship between epistemology and empirical science.

Bishop and Trout dismiss the demarcation drawn by traditional epistemologists between

empirical science and epistemology. They argue that some types of empirical science often does

8

investigate normative questions and provide normative claims. Accordingly, their theory regards

empirical science as traditional epistemologists regard common sense intuitions. Traditional

epistemologists construct epistemological theories as an attempt to reveal the theoretical

framework underlying their normative claims, which are based on their common sense intuitions.

In contrast, Bishop and Trout argue for constructing epistemological theories by investigating

and revealing the framework underlying the normative claims of science instead. Consequently,

their theory, strategic reliabilism, is the theoretical framework underlying the normative claims

of ameliorative psychology in particular. In addition, I will explain the account’s most

distinguished feature, which is not shared with other naturalist accounts. Strategic reliabilism

serves two main functions. Besides its instrumental value, which consists of providing positive

advice to improve individuals’ reasoning processes, strategic reliabilism turns back to

ameliorative psychology in order to help solve its normative disputes.

After this, I will investigate the last member of cooperative naturalism: Kornblith’s

natural kind theory. Following the same pattern of analysis, I will explain Kornblith’s argument

for naturalism and the basic features of his theory. I will demonstrate Kornblith’s view of the

relationship between epistemology and empirical science. I will clarify that although Kornblith

shares Stich’s views concerning the relationship between epistemology and empirical science,

his account does not suffer from a vague, unclear relationship with empirical science like Stich’s

account does. Then I will demonstrate Kornblith’s argument for knowledge to be considered as a

natural kind and how it can be investigated empirically in light of this point.

Finally, after defining the common features of these naturalistic theories as members and

subtypes of cooperative naturalism, I will be able to infer and determine the basic features of the

larger category itself. For example, from analyzing the tools and methods employed by the

subtypes of cooperative naturalism, I will able to determine that rejecting the employment of

conceptual analysis and replacing it with the empirical methods and tools of science in

constructing epistemological theories is one of the basic features of cooperative naturalism as a

category. Similarly, I will argue that the basic features of cooperative naturalism are as follows.

First, cooperative naturalism argues for empirical science as the starting point for

epistemological investigation. Second, cooperative naturalism emphasizes establishing applied

epistemology by evaluating methods of inquiry and reasoning strategies in order to provide

positive advice to help improve cognizers’ reasoning strategies concerning epistemological

9

issues. Third, cooperative naturalism rejects limiting epistemology in investigating

epistemological concepts such as knowledge, rationality, and so on. Fourth, because of this,

normativity is never grounded on semantic considerations. Fifth, intuitions cannot be a priori;

they are always a posteriori. Intuitions are necessary for forming and applying epistemological

theories; however, they are never used as a final referee for evaluating the resulting

epistemological theories. Finally, the resulting theories are evaluated instrumentally (i.e. in light

of their consequences).

In Chapter 6, I will employ the above framewrok of naturalized epistemology to choose

and argue for one type of naturalistic theory or approach to replace the other types. In order to

achieve my aim, I will first set the criterion for determining the right candidate as the most

successful naturalistic theory that can and should replace other types of theories. Then, I will

apply this criterion to the above structure of naturalized epistemology. Finally, I will choose and

argue for the naturalistic theory that satisfies this criterion to replace other types of

epistemological theories.

In Chapter 7, which is the conclusion, I will restate my thesis and reaffirm the importance

of achieving my aim in my dissertation. Then, I will provide a brief summary of my project that

will be followed by an analysis for my framework and criterion employed to investigate theories

of naturalized epistemology. In addition, I will discuss the current main advantages of the

established framework and criterion. Finally, I will suggest further possibilities for future

research involves employing the current framework and criterion.

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CHAPTER TWO

A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING NATURALIZED

EPISTEMOLOGY

Naturalized epistemology is such an interesting and controversial topic because it defies

easy definition or characterization. Even self- described naturalists disagree about what this field

is or should be. One rough attempt at a definition holds naturalized epistemology to be: “a cluster

of views according to which epistemology is closely connected to natural science” (Feldman,

2001 p. 1). Nevertheless, its full meaning remains contested by many naturalists, due to the

differing kinds of empirical sciences they consider relevant to epistemological questions. They

disagree about the kinds of methods employed to investigate epistemology, about the type of

questions it should investigate, about their theories on the relationship between empirical

sciences and epistemological questions, and about the degree to which epistemology should

employ empirical sciences when formulating its theories (Wrenn, 2006).

My main task in this dissertation is to fill a gap in the epistemological literature by

constructing a framework and criterion that enable us to define, explain and classify theories of

naturalized epistemology. This will organize into a unified domain. In addition, I aim to employ

this resulting structure to select and argue for one type of naturalistic theories or approaches to

replace all the others.

Defining Naturalized Epistemology

I define naturalized epistemology initially as a theory of knowledge and good reasoning

that accentuates the application of methods, results, and theories of empirical science. Several

kinds of empirical sciences—such as biology, anthropology, sociology, psychology, etc.—are

relevant when discussing epistemological questions. However, I am limiting my research to

psychology as the science most relevant to epistemology for several reasons. The first reason is

to maintain a theoretical unity to my enquiry. The second reason is to add profundity and depth

to my analysis. Also, by surveying the literature of naturalism we can find that most influential

naturalists are already relating psychology to epistemology, and I agree with their motivation in

11

doing so. In investigating knowledge, epistemologists need information about the two main

elements in acquiring knowledge, humans acquiring knowledge, and the context of the world

they live in. The main motive is that in order to investigate knowledge and other epistemological

phenomena we need to know how humans, as subjects acquiring knowledge, reason. Also, we

need information about how the world works as a context for our knowledge. However, I will not

be able to include other domains of empirical science, which may be equally important to

empirical psychology, to preserve the quality of the analysis provided to the investigated

naturalistic theories.

Classifying Naturalized Epistemology

Few articles in the literature have discussed naturalized epistemology as a unified domain

and attempted to classify it to several types. However, the criteria employed to perform such

classification were not clear.1 In contrast, in my dissertation I try to establish the theoretical

framework of clear criterion for making the suggested classification. Before introducing my

criterion, I must first explain its source of origin. My criterion consists of six main features.

These six features are composed from the comparisons and contrasts I draw between traditional

epistemology and naturalized epistemology. The elements of the comparisons and contrasts

between traditional epistemology and naturalized epistemology are exactly the same features I

use to form my criterion then classify naturalized epistemology into three major types and their

subtypes. To grasp the contrast we must become familiar with the main features of traditional

epistemology. Therefore, in the next section I will explain these main features. Then, I will able

to introduce my criterion and apply it to the three major types of naturalized epistemology,

enabling me to distinguish one type from another.

Types and Subtypes of Naturalized Epistemology

Given that I limit my research in investigating naturalized epistemology to psychology,

naturalized epistemology can be classified into three main types: replacement naturalism,

substantive naturalism, and cooperative naturalism (Feldman, 2001). These types differ in the 1 Read for example, Stich (1993) and Feldman (2001). An exception to this is Cong and Cheng, “Pragmatic Commitments to Naturalized Epistemology” (2006), because they specify clear criteria for their classification. The criteria used for the classification is the relation between the type of naturalized epistemology and the pragmatic account involved.

12

way that they interpret the relation between empirical science and epistemology. Replacement

naturalism is the first and most extreme version of naturalized epistemology. Agreeing with

Richard Feldman, I associate this type with W.V.O. Quine, who argues for eliminating

traditional epistemology and reducing epistemology to the natural sciences, such as psychology.

However, as I shall explain later, I disagree with Feldman about including Stephen Stich and

Hilary Kornblith in this category. I believe these two naturalists are cooperative naturalists.

Substantive naturalism is the second and more moderate kind of naturalism; in fact, it

can be considered middle a ground between traditional epistemology and naturalized

epistemology because it combines the tools of traditional epistemology with the tools and

methods of empirical science. Unlike Feldman, I provide a different definition for substantive

naturalism which classifies it into three subcategories. The first one is primary epistemology

which forms a theory of justification that combines a priori conceptual analysis with empirical

tools of science. The second one is scientific epistemology, which reforms the theory of

justification by employing a posteriori conceptual analysis. And the third one is epistemics,

which investigates other epistemological notions by a posteriori conceptual analysis.

Cooperative naturalism is the third type of naturalized epistemology. It asserts that

empirical results of psychology are necessary to answer the evaluative questions pursued in

epistemology. It also commences the philosophical investigation from a starting point provided

to us by the best scientific theories and discoveries available to us. Therefore, epistemologists

need input from empirical science in order to make progress in answering evaluative and

epistemic questions. Unlike Feldman’s, I provide different definition for this category.

Accordingly, I classify cooperative naturalism into three subcategories: strategic reliabilism,

which is associated with Bishop and Trout, pragmatism, which is associated with Stich, and

natural kind theory, which is associated with Kornblith. (See Figure 1 in appendix B)

Main Features of Traditional Epistemology

When investigating traditional epistemology, we will notice it contains five primary

distinguishing features that provide unity and coherence to the practice. These five features are:

13

First, the primary subject matter of epistemology includes two main topics: finding the

necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, and answering the skeptic2. Concerning the

first project, large amounts of the literature is concerned with exploring knowledge and how it

can be differentiated from mere true belief. In order to achieve this aim, many epistemologists

involved in providing analysis for the concept of knowledge and other relevant epistemological

concepts such as rationality, justification etc. Second, concerning answering the skeptic, a great

amount of the literature of traditional epistemology is dedicated to answering the argument for

skepticism. Skeptical arguments grant that we can have evidence or justification for our beliefs

about our sense experience, however, our only evidence for our beliefs in material objects and

external world come from our beliefs about sense experience. Also, our beliefs about sense

experience are not necessarily caused by the external world. Our beliefs might be caused by evil

demon or mad scientists who have caused us to be brain in a vat. Consequently, skeptical

arguments demand evidence and justification for our beliefs about the external world (Klein,

2004).

Second, epistemology is a priori domain, and it must proceed independently from

empirical science to avoid circularity. Traditionalists deny any relation between epistemology

and empirical science; i.e., epistemologists accentuate the demarcation between epistemology

and science regarding the questions and methods employed by each domain. While empirical

science deals with descriptive questions regarding how things are, epistemology deals with

normative questions regarding how things should be. In addition, empirical science employs

empirical methods such as making observations, collecting data, forming hypotheses, and testing

them empirically. In contrast, epistemology must employ a priori methods such as conceptual

analysis based on logical inferences and commonsense intuitions, which are considered a priori

by traditionalists (See Table 2 in Appendix A). The main reason for this belief is that

2 Some epistemologists such as Stephen Stich argue for including evaluating reasoning strategies and methods of

inquiry as an aim and task of traditional epistemology. In fact, in (1993a) he asserts that several traditional epistemologists engaged in evaluating reasoning processes in order to correct and replace faulty and defective reasoning strategies and bad strategies of inquiry with their accounts of good reasoning and affective strategies of inquiry. His list includes epistemologists such as Descartes, Bacon, Mill, and Popper. Some traditional epistemologists such as Richard Feldman would contend that epistemology is not as broad as human knowledge. Also, he would add that epistemology should be limited to answering philosophical questions about knowledge and justification (2001, p. 6). In addition, Ernest Sosa would object and contend that epistemology should limit itself with finding the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge and answering the skeptic only. Also, he argues that epistemology is a theoretical enterprise that should not concern itself with providing any positive advice about how to accept, deny, or revise any beliefs we have (Sosa, 2005).

14

traditionalists consider epistemology an inquiry to validate the foundations of science. As a

result, they argue that epistemology should not use the methods or results of empirical science

because it will lead to circularity. In other words, we cannot achieve the aim of traditional

epistemology which is validating the foundations of natural science by employing natural science

that we are trying to validate. Accordingly, employing theories and methods of empirical science

is prohibited in traditional epistemology. The result is that all traditional epistemologists agree

that epistemology must be a priori.

Third, conceptual analysis is the main tool in order to investigate several topics of

traditional epistemology. It is used as an attempt to provide a definition for epistemological

concepts by breaking down epistemological concepts such as knowledge, rationality, and

justification, etc. into their basic components to have a better understanding of those concepts

and their relevant epistemological topics (Beaney, 2009). For example, knowledge has long

being analyzed as justified true belief. Also, knowledge’s constituents such as truth, belief, and

justification were analyzed into more basic components and so on.

Fourth, common sense intuitions are employed as a final referee in the evaluation of

epistemological theories. According to Bealer, this methodology is called the standard

justificatory procedure in philosophy (1998). And it is pursued by traditional epistemologists in

order to investigate the structure of knowledge and justification. It consists of, first, constructing

an account or theory of knowledge and justification. Then it is followed by creating thought

experiments with several stipulations in order to examine the proposed account against our

common sense intuitions. To clarify, we use our pre-philosophic intuitions as criteria or as a final

referee to modify, accept, or reject the proposed account. We must also leave most of our

epistemic intuitions largely unchanged.

Fifth, epistemological normativity is to be explained in terms of the semantics of

epistemological language and concepts. In other words, traditionalists consider epistemic notions

evaluative because they carry their source of normativity within their meaning. For example,

epistemic notions such as knowledge, rationality, and justification are evaluative, and for

simplicity we may call them good, proper, and valuable because their meanings imply so.

Therefore, the meaning of the epistemic term determines its normativity. When traditional

epistemologists construct a theory that implies X belief to be justified, they are in fact asserting

that X belief should be accepted because it is good or valuable. When one wonders why is X

15

valuable, the answer will be because by definition X’s meaning implies it. (See Table 1 in

Appendix A)

Constructing the Framework and Criteria Used to Classify Naturalized Epistemology

The foregoing main features of traditional epistemology enable one to extract questions

that they can use to classify different types of epistemological theories. Each question

corresponds to a specific feature of traditional epistemology. The answers for these questions can

work as features of a criterion that enables us to categorize theories of naturalized epistemology

into different types and subtypes (See Figure 1 in appendix B). These questions can be stated as

follows: what is the primary topic and main aim for epistemology? What is the relation between

this theory and empirical science? Does this theory employ conceptual analysis? What is the role

ascribed for epistemic intuitions? What is the source of normativity? And finally, what is the

relation between this naturalistic account and traditional epistemology? Any naturalistic theory

or account must respond to these questions. Accordingly, its answers will determine its type.

I have included a question investigates the methods and tools employed in the target

naturalistic account to answer epistemological questions. However, I have replaced this question

with another one that investigates whether or not the target naturalistic account employs

conceptual analysis. The reason for this change is that the question regarding investigating the

relation between empirical science and the target naturalistic theory will already explain the

theory’s approach in employing the empirical tools and methods of science. Therefore, to avoid

redundant and repetition I have placed this modification to identify the relation between the

target theory and conceptual analysis, which is the main tool and method of traditional

epistemology. As a result, the answer for these two questions will determine the methods and

tools employed by the target naturalistic theory to investigate epistemological questions. In order

to explain how to apply the criterion on theories of naturalized epistemology, I will present a few

brief examples:

Question 1: What is The Primary Topic And The Main Aim of Epistemology?

Traditional epistemology has defined the primary topic of epistemology to be mainly one

of two projects: finding the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, and answering the

skeptic. Theories of naturalized epistemology give several different answers. Those different

16

answers can enable one to classify naturalized epistemology into different groups. For example,

one group of naturalized epistemology suggests dismissing the usual normative questions of

traditional epistemology and replacing them with questions concerning investigating the relation

between theories and their data and evidence. Other group of naturalized epistemology responds

to this question by adding a further project for epistemology, which is providing positive advice

for how to improve our reasoning strategies.

Question 2: What is The Relation Between Empirical Science And The Pursued

Epistemological Account? And More Specifically, What is The Type of Empirical Science

Employed, And How is it Employed in This Account?

In my research, I am limiting my theorizing to include naturalists associating

epistemology with psychology. However, naturalists also disagree about the kind of psychology

employed in their theories. Each group argues for using different types of empirical psychology.

For example, some argue for relating epistemology to behaviorism. Others argue for relating

cognitive psychology, etc. In addition, naturalists disagree about the extent by which they

employ natural science in their theories. More clearly, they disagree about the role that empirical

science plays in forming and applying their theories. For example, one group suggests replacing

philosophical theorizing entirely with scientific investigation. Another group suggests starting

our practice by philosophical theorizing then, following it with using help from empirical

science. Also, some naturalists suggest starting their inquiry with empirical science as first step

then building their epistemological theories based on the theories of empirical science.

Question 3: Does This naturalistic Theory Employ Conceptual Analysis?

As I have explained before, this question is a modification for the former question

concerning the tools and methods employed by the naturalistic theory to investigate

epistemological questions. Traditional epistemology respond to this question by confirming that

conceptual analysis is the primary tool employed to investigate epistemological topics.

Conceptual analysis is concerned with breaking down epistemic terms into their basic

constituents in order to define them and to provide a better understanding of them. Most

naturalistic accounts refuse to limit their philosophical work to applying conceptual analysis.

Some naturalists eliminate conceptual analysis entirely and replace it with empirical methods and

17

tools of empirical science. Others integrate conceptual analysis with empirical science and form

an empirical conceptual analysis.

Question 4: What is The role Ascribed for Common Sense Intuitions?

In traditional epistemology, employing conceptual analysis and commonsense intuitions

as a final referee are essential elements of pursuing epistemology. Without them epistemology

ceases to exist. On the contrary, most naturalists reject philosophical intuitions to be used as a

final referee. They do not require their theories to capture people’s intuitions. They replace this

demand with other types of evaluations. One group for example, argues for evaluating their

epistemological theories instrumentally. I mean by that evaluating the theories on light of their

ability to achieve other intrinsically or instrumentally valuable aims. Another group maintains

the authority of semantic intuitions as a final referee to evaluate the resulting epistemological

theories. Accordingly they maintain employing conceptual analysis. However, they argue for

employing educated and updated intuitions by the best scientific theories.

Question 5: What is The Source of Normativity?

Some naturalists maintain the semantic source of normativity for epistemology. Others

ground semantic normativity on human desires or the claims of empirical science itself.

Question 6: What is The Relation Between This Naturalistic Account And Traditional

Epistemology?

Some naturalistic theories reject completely the aims and methods traditional

epistemology. Other are considered an update of traditional epistemology. For example, the

former group suggests replacing the aims of traditional epistemology into entirely different aims

and goals. The latter group maintains the aims and the tools of traditional epistemology but

changes the employed tools to achieve those aims. (See Table 3 in Appendix A)

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CHAPTER THREE

REPLACEMENT NATURALISM

1. Replacement Naturalism

Having explained the six-question criterion of my classification, I will apply it to

different kinds of naturalized epistemology. First, I will discuss the extreme version of

naturalized epistemology: replacement epistemology. As the name suggests, this view invites us

to replace or absorb epistemology into psychology, and it was first suggested by W.V. Quine in

his landmark article “Epistemology Naturalized,” which initiated the contemporary approach to

naturalistic epistemology in general (1969). Quine is the prototypical representative of extreme

replacement naturalism (Feldman, 2001). This kind of naturalism is least-favored by traditional

epistemologists, for obvious reasons; it is also unpopular among naturalists themselves. (See

Table 4 in Appendix A)

Question 1: What is The Primary Topic and Main Aim for Replacement Naturalism?

Quine does not make a sharp distinction between philosophy in general and epistemology

in particular and empirical science. He argues for radical change and modification for the

demarcation placed between the questions and methods of both empirical science and

epistemology. The first feature to characterize replacement naturalism, which is determining the

topic of epistemology, can be concluded from the next quotes. In his article, Quine argues for

eliminating epistemology and for considering it to be a “chapter of psychology” (1969, p. 82).

He also argues for considering both epistemology and psychology as containing and restraining

each other. Quine asserts: “The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody

has to go on, ultimately, in arriving at this picture of the world. Why not just see how this

construction really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology?” (1969, p. 82). In another passage,

Quine declares:

Epistemology still goes on, though in new setting and clarified status. Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., and a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded with certain experimentally controlled input—certain patterns of radiation in assorted frequencies, for instance—and in fullness of time the subject

19

delivers as output description of the three dimensional external world and its history. The relation between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted epistemology; namely, in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one’s theory of nature transcends any available evidence. (1969, p. 83)

Quine seeks to replace traditional epistemology with psychology. Therefore,

epistemology should not try to validate the foundations of science; instead, it should use science

itself to provide a better understanding of how we come to understand the world. More

specifically, we should use psychology to describe and explain how we form our theories about

the world, the torrential output, based on our sense perceptions, the meager input. For example,

when a cognizer forms a belief that “This is a brown table,” all that epistemology must do is

examine and describe the relation between this belief and its underlying theoretical framework

involving colors, material objects, and furniture, and the sense data supporting this belief. By

sense data, I mean all the perceived perceptions, such as visual perceptions, perceptions of touch,

etc.1

Question 2: What is The Relationship Between Empirical Science And Replacement

Naturalism? And More Specifically, What is The Type of Empirical Science Employed and

How is it Employed in Replacement Naturalism?

First, what is the type of empirical science related to replacement naturalism?

Concerning the kind of science to which Quine was referring, when he discusses dissolving

epistemology into a natural science, Quine clearly asserts that he means psychology (1969). But

what kind of psychology is he considering? When Quine published “Epistemology Naturalized”

in 1969, behaviorism was the field of psychology currently in vogue. In fact, Quine was

influenced deeply by the writings of psychologist B.F. Skinner (Malon, 2001). Behaviorism is a

branch of psychology that believes an organism’s actions, thoughts, and feelings can all be

regarded as behaviors. This behaviorist school of thought maintains that behaviors, as such, can

be described scientifically, without referring to internal physiological events or hypothetical

constructions like the mind (Graham, 2007).

1 Many commentators argue that Quine has less extreme views about epistemology in later papers. However, for the

sake of the argument I only focus in his most extreme view in his early epistemology.

20

Second, how is it employed in replacement naturalism? Without engaging in empirical

investigation or referring to any empirical theory, Quine presents two main arguments to justify

replacing or reducing epistemology with psychology.

Arguments Relating Psychology to Epistemology

The First Argument

The first argument involves Quine’s doubts concerning the analytic-synthetic distinction

(Quine, 1951). Due to the influence of logical positivists, philosophers have distinguished

between analytic and synthetic statements. Analytic statements are defined as those statements

that are “true in virtue of meaning” and, therefore, necessarily true. In contrast, synthetic

statements are defined as those statements that are “true in virtue of fact” and, therefore,

contingently true. The former “analytic” truths are the proper domain of philosophy; the latter

“synthetic” truths are the proper domain of empirical science. But Quine takes issue with this

distinction. On one hand, he suggests that all statements are, in principle, accountable to

experience. On the other hand, all statements can be maintained in the face of experience, as long

as we adjust other parts of our picture of the world. There are some statements we are unlikely to

give up in the face of empirical evidence, and others we are quite willing to give up when

empirical evidence conflicts. Thus, Quine concludes that there is no real distinction between

analytic or synthetic statements, or between “necessary” and “contingent” truths (Quine, 1951).

Philosophy is a domain of analytic statements. And science is a domain for synthetic statements.

Given that there is no distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, there should be no

distinction between philosophy and science as well. Quine argues that all statements, including

analytic ones, are revisable due to experience.

The Second Argument

Quine’s second argument for replacing epistemology with psychology is based on his

doubts about foundationalism, more precisely, Cartesian foundationalism, which is the quest to

validate the foundation of science (Quine, 1969). According to Quine, epistemology can be

pursued only in one of two ways: foundationalism or naturalism; and because foundationalism

has completely failed, we have no choice but to pursue naturalism. The foundationalism project

he objects to is the Cartesian foundationalism which classifies beliefs into two kinds: basic

21

beliefs, which are impossible to be doubted, as they are derived from our own sensory

experiences; and non-basic beliefs, including the rest of our beliefs about the world, which can

be doubted and require justification. Therefore, we use our basic beliefs as foundations to justify

our non-basic beliefs. Consequently, Quine demonstrates that the foundationalists’ quest—to

determine basic beliefs and how they can justify the reminder of our beliefs—is in fact a lost

cause. Furthermore, Quine argues that foundationalism offers the wrong topic for

epistemological study, which is investigating the logical relation between theories and their

evidence. Epistemology topics should involve investigating the causal and not the logical

relation between theory and its observational evidence; and this can be obtained only through

natural science—namely, psychology. Psychology demonstrates how people produce theoretical

output from sensory input. This is the correct topic for epistemology—hence, the need for

naturalism (Quine, 1969).

The role played by empirical science in replacement naturalism. Quine denies the

demarcation between science and philosophy in general and epistemology in particular.

According to him, philosophy and science tackle the same themes and questions, but philosophy

deals with them on a more theoretical and abstract level. Thus, the difference is simply a matter

of degree and not a real distinction in principle. Both science and philosophy attempt to clarify,

simplify, and improve our understanding of the world and the language of science. Truth is the

main objective for both philosophy and science according to Quine (Kornblith, 2002).

Consequently, there is no such thing as first or a priori knowledge, and the a priori traditional

epistemology does not have any privileged status. Without a field of analytic truths, it is not clear

why philosophical reflection has any special value. Given that all statements are revisable in

principle, in light of empirical evidence, we should let empirical science investigate all these

questions.

Question 3: Does Replacement Naturalism Employ Conceptual Analysis?

Quine argues for replacing the a priori tools and methods of traditional epistemology

with the empirical theories and methods of empirical phycology. The Quinean attack on

traditional epistemology has consequences for the traditional philosophical pursuit of conceptual

analysis, and this is the third feature distinguishing replacement naturalism. The conclusion that

replacement naturalists draw from all this is that philosophy must proceed in step with empirical

22

science. There is no room in Quine’s epistemology for conceptual analysis based on

introspection that is independent of empirical science. Quine also denies the other possibility, of

having conceptual analysis based on the theories of psychology. As I have mentioned before, the

topic of replacement naturalism is discovering the relation between our theories and their

evidence, which eliminates any need for conceptual analysis.

Question 4: What is The Role Ascribed to Common Sense Intuitions?

We can’t discuss conceptual analysis without referring to epistemic intuitions. As we

have seen, the two go hand in hand as the main tools of traditional epistemology. And this leads

to the fourth main feature distinguishing replacement naturalism, which is the role ascribed to

epistemic intuitions. After eliminating traditional epistemology altogether and replacing

epistemic questions with science, what is left for Quine to say about humans’ common sense

intuitions? Of course, Quine does not totally diminish intuitions in his naturalist theory. On the

contrary, he does not consider scientific knowledge to be different from our ordinary knowledge

of the world; rather, scientific knowledge is an effort to advance and expand our ordinary

knowledge. According to Quine, “science is not a substitute for common sense but it is an

extension of it” (1957, p. 229). And he adds: “the scientist is indistinguishable from the common

man in his sense of evidence, except that the scientist is more careful” (1957, p. 233). At the

same time, he does not consider our common sense intuitions to be a final referee for evaluating

the resulting epistemic theories. For Quine, intuitions are important in investigating the relation

between our theories and their evidence; however, we test our theories against reality and not

against our common sense intuitions.

Question 5: What is The Source of Normativity for Replacement Naturalism?

Quine’s determination that “the truth” is the source of normativity for his natural

epistemology is another reason to put replacement naturalism in a separate category. As I have

mentioned before, in traditional epistemology the source of normativity is based on semantic

considerations. This means that epistemological terms derive their normative force and value

from their meaning. Therefore, epistemological terms such as knowledge and justification are

normative or valuable because their meanings imply so. Commentators are divided into two

groups regarding Quine’s normativity. One group, with which I disagree, denies the normativity

23

in replacement naturalism, given that it is based on descriptive science and therefore we cannot

get normative “ought ” from descriptive “is” in this case (Godfrey, 2003). I agree with the

second group, who argue that Quine determines truth to be the source of normativity for his

epistemology (Kornblith, 2002).

Naturalization of epistemology doesn’t jettison the normative and settle for indiscriminate description of ongoing procedure. For me normative epistemology is a branch of engineering. It is the technology of truth seeking. Or in more cautiously epistemological terms, prediction…there is no question here of ultimate value, as in morals; it is a matter of efficacy for an ulterior end, truth or prediction. The normative here, as elsewhere in engineering, becomes descriptive when the terminal parameter is expressed. (Quine, 1986, p. 664)

The previous passage declares Quine’s view about the source of normativity for his

natural epistemology. According to him, both science and epistemology attempt to clarify,

simplify, and improve our understanding of the world and the language of science. Truth is the

main objective for both philosophy and science according to Quine. Because getting to the truth

is the aim for both science and epistemology, the gap from descriptive to normative ought to be

bridged by saying that the way we form our theories of the world is the way we should be

forming our theories of the world. Science reveals the truth about the relation between our sense

perceptions and theories based on them. Epistemology aims at nothing but finding the truth that

science provides for us, and this is the source of normativity. When someone asks “Why should I

care or accept belief X?” the answer is because it is true.

Question 6: What is The Relation Between Replacement Naturalism and Traditional

Epistemology?

The relation between replacement naturalism and traditional epistemology is the last

feature distinguishing this type of naturalism from other natural accounts. As its name suggests,

replacement naturalism aims to replace traditional epistemology with a kind of naturalism that is

dissolved into psychology. It completely rejects the topic, tools, and aims of traditional

epistemology and replaces them with a completely different topic, tools, and aims.

Main Features of Replacement Naturalism

24

The previous analysis for Quine’s replacement naturalism enables us to conclude the

main features for replacement naturalism to be:

1. Epistemology aims to obtain truth. And because empirical science in general and

behavior psychology in particular achieve the same aim, there is nothing left to

epistemology to do.

2. No demarcation between empirical science and epistemology. Both have the

same aims, tackle the same questions, and employ the same methods (See Table

5 in appendix A).

3. The answer for normative questions of epistemology is supplemented from the

answer of descriptive questions of empirical science. This means that

epistemology and empirical science are containing each other. And each one can

be dissolved into the other. Accordingly, replacement epistemology, which is

empirical science, provides an account of how evidence should relate to the

theory from the theories of behavior psychology that already explain how

evidence relates to theories in reality.

4. Replacement naturalism eliminates a priori methods of traditional epistemology

and replaces it with empirical methods of behaviorism of psychology.

5. Intuitions are employed as much as empirical scientists employ their intuitions in

constructing their theories. As a result, intuitions are not eliminated entirely nor

employed exclusively as a source of evaluation. Accordingly, they are not used

as final referee to evaluate resulting theories.

6. Obtaining truth presented by scientific theories as the ultimate aim and goal for

their practice is the source of normativity for replacement naturalism.

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CHAPTER FOUR

SUBSTANTIVE NATURALISM

In this chapter I will discuss substantive naturalism, a version of naturalist epistemology

associated with Alvin Goldman.1 I will first define substantive naturalism and then classify it

into three subtypes. I will then explain and examine these three subtypes to distinguish them

from other types of naturalized epistemology by using my criterion composed of six main

questions (See Figure 2 in Appendix B). Finally, I will present the basic features of substantive

naturalism.

Compared with replacement naturalism, substantive naturalism offers a more moderate

middle ground between traditional epistemology and radical versions of naturalist epistemology.

Thus, most traditional epistemologists prefer it over replacement naturalism because they find it

most generally applicable to their practices of conceptual analysis. Yet, it remains a form of

naturalism because it uses help from empirical science. This approach is pursued by Alvin

Goldman, who distinguishes three subtypes, or accounts, of substantive naturalism. The first

subtype is named primary epistemology (Goldman, 1986) and it is concerned with a priori 2

conceptual analysis.3 The second subtype is concerned with empirical a posteriori conceptual

analysis,4 and Goldman refers to it as scientific epistemology (1992). The third subtype is also

concerned with empirical a posteriori conceptual analysis, and Goldman refers to it as epistemics

1 Goldman presents two types of epistemology: individual epistemology and social epistemology. In this chapter, I

will focus exclusively on individual epistemology, for reasons mentioned previously in chapter two. According to

Goldman, individual epistemology can be classified into two kinds: primary and secondary epistemology. Primary

epistemology is concerned with the individual cognizer and his cognitive system. Secondary epistemology is

concerned with psychological methodology and addresses special problems of particular sciences. However, both

types of epistemology are part of the philosophy of science (Goldman, 1978).

2 The phrases ―a priori‖ and ―a posteriori‖ are Latin for ―from what comes before‖ and ―from what comes later,‖

respectively. I use them here to mean ―before experience‖ and ―after experience.‖ 3 Goldman‘s account of a priori analysis can be found in “What is a Justified Belief?‖ (1979), and Epistemology and

Cognition (1986).

4 Goldman‘s account of a posteriori analysis can be found in his papers ―Psychology and Philosophical Analysis‖

(1988), ―Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology‖ (1992) and ―Epistemics; the Regulative Theory of

Cognition‖ (1978).

26

(1978). These three sub-types of substantive naturalism are shown in figure 3 in appendix B. I

will begin my analysis of substantive naturalism with primary epistemology.

1. Primary Epistemology

Questions 1: What is The Topic and Main Aim of Primary Epistemology?

According to Goldman, epistemology‘s goal is to investigate epistemic notions such as

knowledge, justification, and rationality. Such investigation involves explaining and describing

our common sense and pre-theoretical epistemic notions. Additionally, epistemology aims to

formulate and create epistemic norms and principles that capture our pre-philosophical intuitions.

Goldman further elaborates on these ideas:

The aim of this essay is to sketch a theory of justified belief. What I have in mind is an

explanatory theory, one that explains in a general way why certain beliefs are counted as

justified and others as unjustified. Unlike some traditional approaches, I do not try to

prescribe standards for justification that differ from, or improve upon our ordinary

standards. I merely try to explicate the ordinary standards… (1979, p. 340)

As a result, I agree with those who criticize Goldman for deviating from the true purpose

of epistemology. Some critics argue that instead of exploring the nature of justification, or how a

belief can be justified, Goldman has focused on the conditions by which we consider a belief

justified (Kornblith, 2002). The former is a proper theory of justification, while the latter is only

a theory of attribution, whereby Goldman has simply constructed an account of justification

attribution (2008). Later in my paper I argue that Goldman believes that his theory of

justification attribution is relevant and useful for constructing a theory of justification per se

(Goldman, 2008). I argue further that Goldman‘s attempt to connect the two topics –justification

per se and justification attribution- is a failure. Process reliabilism, as constructed in primary

epistemology, attempts to describe how people judge a belief to be justified, but he considers

those judgments true by taking them at face value. Unfortunately, people‘s intuitive judgments

can be faulty—and Goldman‘s account does not depart from, modify or improve such

judgments.

27

Question 2: What is The Relationship Between Empirical Science and Primary

Epistemology? And More Specifically, What is The Type of Empirical Science Employed

and How is it Employed in Primary Epistemology?

First, what is the type of empirical science related to primary epistemology?

Regarding the type of empirical science related to primary epistemology, clearly, cognitive

science is the kind of empirical science that Goldman is concerned with, since cognitive science

aims to explain the architecture of the human mind/brain. When relating epistemology to

science, Goldman uses the terms cognitive science and cognitive psychology interchangeably.

He emphasizes that he uses these terms neutrally, and not ideologically, to include any scientific

approach to cognition (1986, p. 7). As a sub-discipline of psychology, cognitive psychology has

two main features. First, it accepts the employment of scientific methods and commonly rejects

introspection as a legitimate method of investigation. Second, it explicitly accepts the existence

of internal mental states such as belief, desire and motivation (Thagard, 2010).

Second, how is cognitive psychology employed in primary epistemology? In order to

explain the relation between primary epistemology and empirical science, I need to explain

Goldman‘s theory of justification, which he calls ‗process reliabilism‘. First, I will define

Goldman‘s theory. Second, I will present Goldman‘s main arguments for naturalism in primary

epistemology. I will then explain the process by which he constructs this theory. In addition, I

will explain the theory‘s two stages: - the ―norm-formation stage,‖ or the formation stage, in

which Goldman constructs the theoretical framework for process reliabilism; and the ―judgment

and attribution stage,‖ or the application stage, in which Goldman applies the theory to reality

(Goldman, 2008). In addition I will explain the relation between these two stages. Finally I will

demonstrate the role that cognitive psychology plays in primary epistemology.

In primary epistemology, Goldman constructs his theory of justification known as

process reliabilism. Process reliabilism asserts that a belief is justified only when it is produced

by a belief-forming mechanism that is reliable, i.e. one that tends to produce more true beliefs

than false ones (1979 & 1986). He presents two stages for this naturalistic account.5 In the

formation stage, Goldman uses pure a priori conceptual analysis to construct the theoretical

5 In Epistemology and Cognition Goldman constructs his account of justification named process reliabilism in a

complex three-stage process. In my paper I am deviating from Goldman‘s classification and presenting my own two-

stage account for Goldman‘s process reliabilism for two main reasons. The first one is to make the account simpler

and easier to grasp, and the second reason is to explain the progress made by Goldman to his account of process

reliabilism by modifying primary epistemology to scientific epistemology.

28

framework for his theory. In the application stage, Goldman then uses cognitive psychology in

attributing normative judgments to his process reliabilism account (2008). Thus, this stage takes

the account formed in the first stage and empirically applies it to reality. More explanation for

each stage is presented in table 6 in appendix A.

Arguments for the Role of Cognitive Psychology in Primary Epistemology

The First Argument

In the first argument, Goldman writes that ―epistemology should be a multi-disciplinary

affair and not province of pure a priori philosophy‖ (1986, p. 1). Unlike Quine, Goldman does

not consider epistemology a part of science; instead, he believes that science can serve

epistemology without replacing it. Given that epistemological concepts like knowledge and

justification appeal to psychological processes, epistemology can benefit from cognitive

psychology. According to Goldman, investigating epistemological questions requires both a

priori philosophical analysis and the application of scientific results. Therefore, for Goldman,

science plays just as important a role as logic in explaining his primary epistemology.

The Second Argument

The second argument for relating psychology to epistemology is to discover if knowledge

and/or justification are actually possible in practice. According to Goldman, ―psychology is

needed not merely to tell us whether we do know, but whether it is humanly possible to know‖

(1986, p. 57). Process reliabilism shows only that it is in principle possible for beliefs to be

justified. Therefore, it is logically possible for a cognizer to have true justified beliefs. However,

the question of whether anyone possesses justified beliefs depends on the subjects‘ cognitive

processes and on how reliable those processes are—and this is where cognitive psychology can

be most useful (Wrenn 2003).

Stages of Primary Epistemology

The Formation Stage

29

In the formation stage, Goldman constructs the theoretical framework process reliabilism

based on pure a priori philosophical conceptual analysis. Process reliabilism holds that a belief is

justified if it was produced by a reliable process. A reliable process is a process that ―tends to

produce more true than false beliefs‖ (1979, p. 344) Goldman believes the main goal of

epistemology is to provide a conceptual analysis for epistemological terms in order to construct a

proper theoretical framework for knowledge and justified beliefs. He presents an analysis of

justification by considering belief forming processes. Goldman contends that the justificatory

status of a belief must be related to its genesis (Goldman, 1986).

Accordingly, he investigates several beliefs‘ geneses to discover what they have in

common. From this he identifies several examples of faulty belief formation processes, including

wishful thinking, confused reasoning, guesswork, and hasty generalization. Then, Goldman

declares that their commonality lies in the fact that they tend to produce false beliefs most of the

time; in contrast, other belief-formation processes—like introspection, memory, perception, and

rational intuition—tend to produce true beliefs most of the time. Consequently, Goldman

intuitively evaluates these reliable and unreliable belief-forming processes as epistemic virtues

and vices, respectively.6 Epistemic virtues include reliable belief-forming processes like

introspection, memory, perception, and rational intuition. Epistemic vices include unreliable

belief-forming processes like wishful thinking, confused reasoning, guesswork and hasty

generalization (Goldman, 1979; and Steup, 2008).

In this way, Goldman bases his justificational reliabilism on pure philosophical

introspection, whereby a belief is only justified when it is produced in a suitably reliable way—

one which has a tendency to produce more true than false beliefs. Goldman‘s process reliabilism

ultimately avoids circularity by accounting for justification in non-epistemic terms. And since

the justificational status of a belief depends on how it is caused or causally sustained, this status

necessarily corresponds to the reliability of the belief-forming process itself. Finally, the

reliability of the belief-forming mechanism is similar to the notion of justification itself.

6 Goldman provides a long and detailed analysis of epistemic evaluation that includes four connected domains. They

are: 1) domain of evaluation; 2) terms or dimensions of evaluation; 3) standards of evaluation; and 4) styles of

evaluation. Accordingly, he distinguishes between deontic evaluation and non-deontic evaluation. Goldman defines

deontic evaluation as terms that have a system of rules associated with them, such as right and wrong, or permitted

and forbidden. He defines non-deontic evaluation as terms that merely appraise certain qualities relative to some

suitable dimensions, such as careful, original, virtuous and vicious. In evaluating the list of belief forming-

mechanisms, Goldman uses non-deontic evaluative terms. So he evaluates reliable belief-forming processes as

epistemic virtues, and unreliable belief-forming process as epistemic vices (1986, p. 25).

30

Goldman requires the belief-forming process to be at least 50% reliable to justify the

correspondingly produced belief, although he also admits that this may be an arbitrary

determination (Goldman 1986, p. 103).

The Application Stage

In this second stage, by employing theories of cognitive psychology, one applies the

previously formed theory to reality. So this is where naturalism, in Goldman‘s epistemology,

begins. Goldman declares: ―It is appropriate for primary epistemology to actually specify the

approved processes, not simply to lay down a criterion they must meet‖ (1986, p.96). That is one

of the main advantages of the primary epistemology account. Unlike other epistemological

theories, primary epistemology not only establishes the criterion of justification but also

identifies the belief forming processes that conform with this criterion too. This means that after

laying down the criterion of justification in the first stage of the theory, the second stage of the

theory applies that specific reliability criterion to the methods of enquiry and reasoning strategies

that actually meet the reliability criterion.

After being investigated empirically, cognitive processes are divided into the

epistemological virtuous ones and vicious ones according to their reliability. A list of these

epistemological virtues and vices is produced and then used to evaluate actual beliefs. One

determines whether a specific belief is justified by considering the target belief‘s genesis, and

then matching the belief-forming process to one of the ―epistemic virtues‖ or ―epistemic vices‖

of the ―mental list‖7 of the theory (Goldman 1986, p. 25). If that belief-forming process matches

an epistemic virtue from the list, then the belief is considered justified; if it matches an epistemic

vice from the list, then it is unjustified. This stage uses a matching process to form normative

judgments of whether or not a belief is justified; for this reason, it may also be called the

matching stage (Goldman, 2008) (See Table7 in Appendix A).

Consider a student‘s belief: ―I got an A on my exam.‖ In order to determine if this belief is

justified, according to process reliabilism, one must first identify the student‘s belief- genesis.

For example, let‘s assume this belief was the result of wishful thinking. By checking the process

7 Goldman believes that the epistemic evaluator has a mentally stored set or list of epistemic virtues and vices (1992,

p. 25). Apparently, he considers this list to be an innate idea that all cognizers will eventually share. And this

assumption is compatible with the method employed in constructing the theory by a priori analysis based on self-

reflection on one‘s own intuitions without consulting theories of cognitive psychology.

31

reliabilism list of epistemic virtues and vices, one discovers that wishful thinking falls under the

category of epistemic vices, because it is unreliable belief-forming mechanism. Accordingly, the

student‘s belief that ―I got an A on my exam‖ is not justified. In contrast, let‘s consider that the

student‘s belief was based on their professor‘s own testimony that they got an A on their exam.

In this case, since the professor‘s testimony falls under the epistemic virtues category, the belief

would be justified according to Goldman‘s process reliabilism, A third possibility is to allow that

this belief was formed by a process that is included in neither the epistemic virtues nor epistemic

vices category; in this case, the belief would be classified as non-justified (Goldman, 1992).

The Relationship Between The Two Stages of Primary Epistemology Account

So far, the relation between primary epistemology and empirical science is clear.

Empirical science is not employed in the first stage of the theory. And it is only employed in the

second stage of primary epistemology to discover and assess cognitive processes. As a result,

one can perceive the relation between primary epistemology and empirical science to be that

empirical science is employed to apply the theory process reliabilism on reality. However, I

believe that empirical science plays a bigger role than that because Goldman is aiming toward a

greater utility. Goldman‘s ultimate intention is to transfer his theory process reliabilism from

being a theory of justification attribution into being a theory of justification per se. By

justification attribution, I mean the investigation of how and when people judge and consider a

belief to be justified. In contrast, by justification per se, I mean the investigation of the truth of

the actual conditions and standards of justification.

An explanation for the relation between the two stages of process reliabilism formed in

primary epistemology will help clarify my point. Goldman argues that the main aim of primary

epistemology is to capture and explain our common sense intuitions and not to improve or go

beyond them. As a result, a possible problem may occur. When there is a conflict or

contradiction between our common sense intuitions employed in the first stage of the theory of

process reliabilism, and empirical science employed in the second stage of the theory, which one

should have priority in constructing the final form of process reliabilism? For example, if

theories of cognitive psychology employed in the second stage contradict and reject some

common sense intuitions captured by process reliabilism formed in the first stage, what should

we do? Do we revise and modify the theoretical framework of process reliabilism by making it

32

correspond to the theories of empirical science? Or do we deny and ignore those empirical

theories, or some of their aspects, and accept only the ones that correspond to process

reliabilism? For example, if the list of epistemic virtues and vices constructed by empirical

science in the second stage of primary epistemology conflicts with the mental list constructed

based on our common sense intuitions formed in the first stage of primary epistemology, which

list should we use in evaluating the justificatory statues of actual belief?

In fact, such a problem does exist. In the mental list constructed in the first stage,

Goldman intuitively places introspection as a reliable belief forming process and he considers it

an epistemic virtue (1979, p. 345). As a result, an actual belief resulting from introspection

evaluated using this list should be considered justified8. In contrast, theories of cognitive science

present some evidence that suggests that introspection is not a reliable belief-forming process.9

Accordingly, the scientifically accurate and empirically constructed list in the second stage of

primary epistemology should list introspection as an epistemic vice. As a result, one should

evaluate actual belief resulting from introspection as unjustified because introspection is an

epistemic vice for being unreliable belief-forming process. We need a clarification from

Goldman to solve this conflict.

We are actually facing a dilemma here; on the one hand, we don‘t need empirical science

in the first place if we choose our common sense intuitions and prefer them to empirical science.

On the other hand, if we choose empirical science and prefer it to our common sense intuitions,

then we are trying to improve and go beyond our intuitions, and this violates the main aim of the

primary epistemology account. Primary epistemology must capture our commonsense intuitions

according to Goldman, so we cannot prefer empirical science to our pre-theoretical intuitions.

We cannot revise and modify process reliabilism by making it correspond to theories of

cognitive psychology because if we did, then process reliabilism would no longer capture or

8 Goldman didn‘t employ theories of cognitive psychology in process reliabilism of 1979, but he did so in 1986. He

has investigated other reasoning processes. But he didn‘t investigate the reliability of introspection empirically. In

fact, Goldman was criticized for his choice of topics of second part of his book Epistemology and cognition (1986).

For example, from his perspective as a practicing investigator for cognitive psychology, Daryl Bruce has criticized

Goldman by saying: ―The motivation for the selection and discussion of cognitive processes in part two are entirely not clear. It is not that the topics are unrepresentative of contemporary cognitive science. It is just that one would be

as well off reading any undergraduate textbook of cognitive psychology and focusing on whatever happens to be

appealing as reading the second half of Goldman‘s book‖ (1989, p.168).

9 For more information about the unreliability of introspection, please see Kornblith‘s Knowledge and its Place in

Nature (2002, p. 111).

33

correspond to our pre-theoretical intuitions. This means that primary epistemology will no longer

achieve its aim, which is capturing and explaining our pre-theoretical intuitions. Accordingly we

cannot evaluate actual beliefs by using the list of epistemic virtues and vices constructed by

empirical science in the second stage.

In other words, in order to preserve process reliabilism we have to reject theories of

cognitive psychology that contradict or do not correspond to our theory. Accordingly, the second

stage of primary epistemology, which is responsible for specifying the correct and actual belief-

forming processes and their reliability, should be abandoned. And this violates Goldman‘s

argument for naturalism and for linking epistemology with psychology, and consequently makes

us fall back into the methods of traditional epistemology to which Goldman objects. Also, it

violates Goldman‘s argument for the role he ascribes for empirical science, which is that ―the

principal way that cognitive psychology can contribute to epistemology, I claim, is to identify

basic belief- forming, or problem solving, processes‖ (1986, p. 181). Accordingly, we are not

allowed to employ the list constructed in the first stage of primary epistemology to evaluate

actual beliefs. If we cannot employ either lists of epistemic virtues and vices to evaluate actual

beliefs, then we cannot make any normative judgments in the first place to determine the

justificatory status of actual beliefs.

Goldman doesn‘t respond explicitly to this objection because, as it seems, he is not

considering such a possibility.10

Still, we can infer that Goldman is not considering a possibility

of conflict or contradiction between the two stages of his theory. For example, he is postulating

that the list constructed by empirical means in the second stage is identical to the list constructed

by a priori conceptual analysis in the first stage.11

Accordingly, there is no conflict between the

two lists. Or more clearly, there shouldn‘t be any disagreement between the two lists. And as a

result, we don‘t face the dilemma of having to choose between the list of epistemic virtues and

10

Goldman responds to other types of objections, (the evil demon world) presented by traditional epistemologists to

deny the necessity of reliability for justification (1979) & (1986). My objection shares the same spirit and causes

almost the same threat to process reliabilism as those objections. Goldman tried to respond to those objections by

classifying justification into two types: weak and strong types of justification (1988). However, his attempt was not

very successful. Therefore, he has revised and modified his account process reliabilism in ―Epistemic Folkways and

Scientific Epistemology‖ of (1992), (Goldman 2008).

11

It is true that Goldman has employed theories of cognitive psychology to investigate cognitive processes

empirically in (1986). However, his choice for those topics suffered several criticisms- see note 8 mentioned

previously.

34

vices constructed by our commonsense intuitions and the other list constructed by empirical

means.

It seems that Goldman is counting on a hidden premise in forming his argument. This

hidden premise asserts that our epistemic judgments are infallible because they are based on

reliable and infallible intuitions. Accordingly, the criterion of justification and the list of

epistemic virtues and vices constructed in the first stage by a priori analysis are both true and

accurate. More clearly, Goldman seems to be arguing that the reason why one considers wishful

thinking to be an unreliable belief-forming process is because, in fact, wishful thinking is an

unreliable belief forming process. And this implies that empirical science must and will confirm

our intuitions that wishful thinking is an unreliable belief -forming mechanism. As a result, there

cannot be a conflict between the list of epistemic virtues and vices constructed in either stage of

the primary epistemology account.

Still, if this interpretation is true, we do not need empirical science in the first place as

long as the two lists are completely identical. Also, it seems that empirical science is not

important and, indeed, merely redundant for the results we have already established by our

common sense intuitions in the first stage of the primary epistemology theory. In this case, why

do not we just count on a priori analysis given that we have reliable and infallible intuitions that

can inform us with the correct sources of our beliefs and their reliability?

Besides investigating the reliability of cognitive processes, there is a deeper reason why

Goldman employs empirical science in his process reliabilism theory. The reason is to

empirically prove and confirm the infallibility of our epistemological judgments, which are

based on our reliable and infallible pre-theoretical intuitions. This proof is very important to

establish the link between a theory of justification attribution and a theory of justification per se.

The infallible intuitions and epistemic judgments create this link.

The true purpose of Goldman‘s ―what is a justified belief?‖ (1979) is to discover the

actual conditions and standards of justification. In fact, Goldman is aiming for primary

epistemology to be a theory of justification per se and not a theory of justification attribution.

However, I believe also that Goldman tries to discover the standards of justification through

analyzing our common epistemological intuitions and judgments because he believes that our

35

epistemological judgments and intuitions are correct and in fact do reveal the truth of the actual

conditions and standards of justification. 12

As a result, we cannot eliminate the need for employing empirical science in primary

epistemology accounts because empirical science is used to confirm that our intuitions and

epistemological judgments are in fact infallible. How can empirical science achieve this aim?

Empirical science can achieve this aim by showing the agreement and consistency between the

two stages of the theory. Empirical science used in the second stage can confirm the results of

the first stage of our theory. And by confirming the results of the first stage, we are confirming

the infallibility of our intuitions as a reliable belief -forming process employed in constructing

the framework of the process reliabilism theory. So employing empirical science in the second

stage is intended to explain our normative judgments by confirming that those judgments are

compatible with the results of empirical science. In other words, we make the epistemic

judgment that introspection is a reliable belief-forming process and that the belief resulting from

introspection is justified because empirical science confirms that introspection is in fact a reliable

belief-forming process. Thus, the beliefs resulting from introspection are justified. When both

lists of epistemological virtues and vices constructed by different methods in the theory are

identical, we confirm the infallibility of our epistemological judgments and intuitions.

Question 3: Does Primary Epistemology Employ Conceptual Analysis?

We cannot overlook conceptual analysis because it is an essential feature of Goldman‘s

naturalism. Conceptual analysis is concerned with the decomposition or breaking down of a

concept into its basic constituents in order to reveal its logical structure. Accordingly it will

results in providing a specification of the necessary and sufficient conditions of the concept‘s

correct employment. In this way, conceptual analysis enables a better understanding of the

particular philosophical issues with which the concept is involved (Beaney, 2003).

Goldman constructs process reliabilism in primary epistemology by the standard format

of conceptual analysis. He distinguishes between two kinds of conceptual analysis: first, the

analysis of sentences or statements; and second, the analysis of key epistemic terms such as

knowledge and justification. Also, he emphasizes his interest in the second type of conceptual

12

In ―Reliabilism‖ of (2008), Goldman distinguishes between theory of justification attribution and theory of

justification per se. Also, he confirms that the former is relevant and informative in constructing the latter.

36

analysis in constructing process reliabilism. He adds that he is not entirely opposed to the first

type of conceptual analysis; he only mentions that he has some reservations against it (Goldman,

1986). In fact, he defends employing conceptual analysis as a productive tool in pursuing

epistemology in several places when constructing process reliabilism in his primary

epistemology account: ―It is hard to do much in epistemology ( or other branches of philosophy)

without feeling constrained to do something like conceptual analysis‖ (Goldman, 1986, p.36). In

addition, he defends employing conceptual analysis to form an effective response to skepticism:

―Any adequate response for skepticism must involve, or presupposes, analysis (or accounts) of

key epistemic terms like ‗knowledge‘ and ‗justification‘‖ (Goldman, 1986, p.36).

Question 4: What is The Role Ascribed to Common Sense Intuitions?

One of the main features of primary epistemology involves employing common sense

intuitions as a final referee for evaluating the resulting epistemological theories. Goldman is very

loyal to traditional epistemology in his adherence to its main tools of conceptual analysis and in

his use of epistemic intuitions as the final referee to evaluate the resulting accounts.

Consequently, Goldman consults his pre-theoretical semantic intuitions and considers them a

valid criterion for accepting or rejecting any proposed epistemological theory. He follows

traditional epistemology in its methodology. First he constructs process reliabilism based on an a

priori conceptual analysis. Then Goldman presents several counterexamples—in order to

improve and modify his account, based on those counterexamples—to make the account

correspond to his epistemological intuitions. As Goldman himself asserts:

The strategy I endorse is best expressed by the Goodman-Rawls conception of

―considered judgments in reflective equilibrium13‖. We examine what rule systems would likely be generated by each candidate criterion. We reflect on implications of these rule

systems for particular judgments of justifiedness and unjustifiedness. We then see

whether those judgments accord with our pre-theoretic intuitions. A criterion is supported

to the extent that implied judgments accord with such intuitions, and weakened to the

extent that they do not. (1986, p. 66)

Then, empirical science is introduced to construct the list of epistemological virtues and

vices employed to evaluate actual beliefs when applying the theory to reality. And this is where

process reliabilism departs from theories of traditional epistemology. It is true that theories of

13

Reflective equilibrium asserts that a rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; and an

inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend‖ (Stich, 1993, p.77).

37

traditional epistemology appeal to contingent facts when applied to reality. However, there is a

major difference between Goldman‘s primary epistemology account and theories of traditional

epistemology. Primary epistemology appeals to contingent facts that are discovered by empirical

science. In contrast, traditional epistemology appeals to contingent facts that are not discovered

by empirical science but rather to facts that we can introspect. For example, when

foundationalism, as a theory of justification, is applied to reality, it appeals to contingent facts we

can introspect about our beliefs and their relations. For example, if belief B1 is suitably related to

basic belief B2, then B2 is justified.

Does that mean Goldman is ascribing fewer roles to common sense intuitions than

traditional epistemologists? The answer is no. As I have argued before, Goldman is employing

empirical science to confirm the reliability of common sense semantic intuitions. The reason, as I

have shown before, is to establish the link between establishing process reliabilism as theory of

justification attribution to a theory of justification per se. Accordingly, Goldman is placing more

emphasis on common sense semantic intuitions than traditional epistemology to establish this

required link.

Question 5: What is The Source of Normativity in Primary Epistemology?

Goldman declares his view about the source of normativity for the primary epistemology

account of substantive naturalism by saying: ―Traditional epistemology has a strong normative

evaluative strain. I aim to preserve this strain‖ (1988, p. 3). Agreeing with traditional

epistemology, Goldman presents a semantic source for epistemological normativity. It is true that

Goldman relates empirical science—or, more precisely, cognitive psychology—to his

epistemology, but he does not consider empirical science to be the source of normativity. As in

traditional epistemology, the meaning of an epistemological notion is the source of its

normativity, in Goldman‘s view. Epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification, and

rationality are normative by their nature—i.e. they are valuable, appraised, and proper—because

their meanings imply so. In Goldman‘s process reliabilism, for example, a justified belief, which

is produced by truth-conducive processes, is necessarily good and valuable.

Question 6: What is The Relation Between Primary Epistemology And Traditional

Epistemology?

38

In many respects, Goldman‘s naturalism is almost identical to traditional epistemology.

First, it employs individual conceptual analysis, the main method and tool of traditional

epistemology, in constructing the theoretical framework of process reliabilism. Second, it uses

pre-theoretical intuitions as the final referee to evaluate the resulting theories and their norms in

primary epistemology. Third, it grants a semantic source for epistemic normativity.

On the other hand, Goldman‘s primary epistemology of substantive naturalism departs

from traditional epistemology in two main aspects. First, it shifts the aim and topic of

epistemology from constructing a theory of justification into constructing a theory of justification

attribution. I argue that his main aim in process reliabilism is to construct a theory of

justification per se. However, I also argue that he has employed an unsuccessful maneuver to

achieve his aim. Eventually, due to his unsuccessful scheme, he has ended up establishing a

theory of justification attribution instead of establishing a theory of justification per se. Second,

Goldman departs from traditional epistemology by relating cognitive psychology to

epistemology. Most epistemologists argue that Goldman employs empirical science in order to

apply the theory in reality by evaluating actual beliefs. I argue that he has ascribed more roles

than that to empirical science. (See table 8 in appendix A)

As I mentioned earlier, Goldman seeks a middle ground between radical forms of

naturalized epistemology and traditional epistemology. However, I see him as being closer to

traditional epistemology than to naturalist epistemology when constructing process reliabilism in

primary epistemology. Goldman does not dismiss traditional epistemology explicitly or

implicitly. In fact, I consider his naturalism a minor upgrade for traditional epistemology.

2. Scientific Epistemology:14

Now I will explain Goldman‘s scientific epistemology, the second subtype of substantive

naturalism, by applying my six-question criteria classifying naturalized epistemology (See

Figure 2 in Appendix B).

Question 1: What is The Primary Topic And Main Aim of Scientific Epistemology?

Goldman‘s second type of substantive naturalism, scientific epistemology, is considered a

modification of and improvement upon his process reliabilism formed in primary epistemology.

14

This theory can be found in Goldman‘s ―Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology‖ (1992).

39

Process reliabilism, formed in primary epistemology, has faced many objections and criticisms,

and Goldman has considered most of these objections while modifying his theory. As a way to

save process reliabilism, he has modified his employed methods in forming this theory while

preserving its spirit. Therefore, in scientific epistemology Goldman aims to maintain process

reliabilism and confirm the necessity of reliability for justification. As a result, and similarly to

primary epistemology, process reliabilism constructed in scientific epistemology asserts that a

belief is justified only if it was produced by a reliable belief-forming process that – a belief

forming process- tends to produce more true beliefs than false ones. Both primary epistemology

and scientific epistemology are concerned with discovering and investigating epistemological

concepts by providing an explanation and description for those concepts. However, there are

main differences distinguishing these two theories from each other.

Comparison Between Process Reliabilism Constructed in Primary Epistemology And

Scientific Epistemology

The best way to explain process reliabilism formed in scientific epistemology is by

comparing and contrasting it with process reliabilism constructed in primary epistemology. The

comparison includes these aspects: (See table 6 in appendix A).

1. Both primary epistemology and scientific epistemology accounts of substantive

naturalism consist of two stages.

2. Process reliabilism constructed in primary epistemology was formed by traditional

and a priori conceptual analysis. In contrast, process reliabilism constructed in

scientific epistemology is constructed by a posteriori conceptual analysis.15

By a

posteriori I mean his epistemology proceeds by performing empirical conceptual

analysis by employing the ―exemplar approach of concept representation‖ (Goldman,

1992, p. 158) borrowed from the methods and theories of cognitive psychology (A

detailed explanation for this method will be provided later).

3. Process reliabilism is considered a theory of justification attribution in both, primary

epistemology and scientific epistemology. However the second stage of process

15

Goldman‘s switch from a priori analysis to a posteriori analysis can be identified in his group of papers:

―Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition‖ (1978), ―Psychology and Philosophical Analysis‖ (1988), and ―Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology‖ (1992).

40

reliabilism formed in scientific epistemology is concerned with when a belief is

justified as opposed to when we judge a belief to be justified16

.

4. Process reliabilism constructed in primary epistemology employs empirical science in

the second stage only. Process reliabilism constructed in scientific epistemology

employs empirical science in both stages of the theory.

5. In primary epistemology, there is no consideration to the possible tension and

conflict between process reliabilism and empirical science. In contrast, such

possibility is considered for and acknowledged in scientific epistemology.

6. Conceptual analysis still plays major role in constructing process reliabilism in

scientific epistemology. Also, intuitions are still the final criteria to evaluate the

resulting account in both subtypes of substantive naturalism, primary epistemology

and scientific epistemology. Nonetheless, in primary epistemology the intuitions

employed are pre-theoretical and commonsensical intuitions. In contrast, in scientific

epistemology pre-theoretical intuitions are employed in the first stage only of process

reliabilism. Nevertheless, scientific intuitions that are informed and updated by the

best empirical science available to cognitive psychology are employed in the second

stage of process reliabilism.

Question 2: What is The Relationship Between Scientific Epistemology And Empirical

Science? And More Specifically, What is The Type of Empirical Science Employed, And

How is it Employed in Scientific Epistemology?

First, what is the type of empirical science related to scientific epistemology? Similar

to the primary epistemology account, scientific epistemology agrees that cognitive science is the

primary science that should be employed in epistemology.

Second, how is cognitive psychology employed in scientific epistemology? (See table

9 in Appendix A).To answer this question, I will repeat the same methodology I have pursued in

explaining primary epistemology. Furthermore, I will explain the main aspects of scientific

epistemology in order to explain its relation with empirical science. First, I will present

Goldman‘s argument to link cognitive psychology with scientific epistemology. Second, I will

16

See (Goldman, 2008).

41

demonstrate the stages of scientific epistemology account. Finally, I will be able to explain the

role that empirical science plays in constructing scientific epistemology.

Arguments For Relating Psychology to Scientific Epistemology

The First Argument

In scientific epistemology, Goldman employs empirical science in the first stage of

process reliabilism. He replaces the a priori conceptual analysis with empirical methods of

cognitive psychology. Goldman doesn‘t state explicitly his reasons for applying this change.

However, from reflecting on the objections presented to Goldman‘s process reliabilism of the

primary epistemology account and, from the set of refinements and modifications that Goldman

has applied to it, one can conclude the main reason for applying this change.

Goldman employs empirical methodology in the first stage of scientific epistemology to

answer the objection of idiosyncrasy of his account. This objection was presented by Stephen

Stich (1990). It implies that process reliabilism formed in primary epistemology is constructed

based on a traditional a priori conceptual analysis for Goldman‘s own common sense intuitions.

Accordingly, those intuitions can be idiosyncratic and not universal or shared by everybody else.

As a result, those intuitions shouldn‘t be trusted as a basis to establish a normative account of

justification.17

I contend that Stich‘s objection alerted Goldman to the eccentricity of his process

reliabilism account. And as a result, it motivated him to add the modification in question.

Subsequently, Goldman‘s solution for this problem is to borrow the empirical methods of

cognitive psychology, specifically the exemplar approach of concepts representations in

constructing the scientific epistemology account. Accordingly, he changes the method of

constructing process reliabilism from a priori analysis for his own pre-theoretical intuitions into

empirical analysis for the folk notions of several subjects within the same linguistic community.

By ―folk notions‖ Goldman means ordinary and common sense epistemic concepts and norms

(1992, p.155).

17

This objection includes more details than I have discussed in this part of my paper. For simplicity, I am going to

avoid presenting the whole argument. Currently, I will present a simple version of this objection by discussing only

the relevant parts for my point. The objection will be considered in deeper treatment and more details elsewhere in

the dissertation.

42

The Second Argument

Goldman argues that theories of cognitive psychology are relevant also for the second

stage of forming process reliabilism.18

The reason according to Goldman is that the main

function of epistemology is the ―formulation of more adequate, sound and systematic set of

epistemic norms in some ways transcending our naïve epistemic repertoire‖ (1992, p. 156). And

this function can be achieved by inserting psychology into the second stage of constructing

process reliabilism. Similar to primary epistemology, cognitive psychology identifies the actual

belief-forming processes (1992, 2008).

Stages of Scientific Epistemology (See Table6 in Appendix A)

Descriptive Scientific Epistemology

This is the first stage of constructing the theoretical framework of process reliabilism of

scientific epistemology. Goldman argues for employing the exemplar approach to concept

representation to form process reliabilism. This empirical approach is borrowed from cognitive

psychology, and according to Goldman it helps in the investigation of epistemological concepts

like justification and rationality by empirical means. Goldman does not present a thorough

explanation for this procedure. Accordingly, I will provide an explanation for this approach

based on my research of the theories of cognitive psychology.

First, I need to explain some notions that will help in understanding this approach. Most

philosophers would agree about considering concepts as constituents of thoughts. Accordingly,

concepts are essential to many psychological processes such as categorization, inference,

memory, learning and decision-making (Margolis & Laurence, 2011). Human brains do not store

information randomly. They classify and categorize this information into groups and categories.

Concerning concepts and categories as models for storing and organizing information, a category

can be compared to a box containing similar objects that are grouped according to their similarity

and it labeled with common properties and other general information pertaining to the category.

Our brain not only memorizes specific examples of members of a category, but also stores

18

Goldman argues that his account for reliability is not a necessary condition for naturalizing epistemology. He

argues for naturalism, meaning that psychology is relevant to epistemology, regardless of the epistemological theory

in question (1992, 169).

43

general information that most members have in common. Thus, a category can be defined as

follows:

A category is a term used to describe and refer to class of similar things that mostly exist

objectively in the world that share essential core. Concepts more often are used to refer to mental

representations of those existing categories. So, concepts can be described as mental

representations of objects or events (Galotti, 2010, p.203).

Cognitive psychology presents a few theories about the nature of concepts. The exemplar

approach to concept representations is one of those theories. It implies that concepts include

representations of individual instances of the concept. Researchers think that typical instances of

a concept are more likely to be stored as exemplars. For example, a concept ―pants‖ can be

stored in one‘s mind by its representative example such as blue jeans (Goldman, 1992, p.158). In

addition, cognitive psychology classifies these theories or approaches investigating concepts into

two types. The exemplar approach of concept representation belongs to the first type, which

considers concepts as being similarity based. According to this type, categorization is based on

the similarity of an instance to the concept. The similarity based approaches tend to emphasize a

focus on superficial, perceptual information about an object when forming concepts (Galotti,

2010), (Margulies & Laurence, 2010).

In addition, regarding their structure, concepts can be classified into three kinds:

nominal, natural, and artifact. I will explain the nominal kind because it is associated with the

exemplar approach of concept representations. According to the nominal kind theory, a concept

has definitional structure and can be broken down into smaller concepts that express necessary

and sufficient conditions for falling under the concept in question. For example, the concept

―bachelor‖ has a definitional structure that can be analyzed into smaller constituents ―unmarried‖

and ―man‖. In other words, the basic constituents of concept have clear definitions that include

information on necessary and sufficient features of this concept (Galotti, 2010) & (Margulies &

Laurence, 2011).

Employing the exemplar approach at the first stage of scientific epistemology account

changes the nature of conceptual analysis employed from being a priori to being a posteriori.

Accordingly, process reliabilism is not constructed based on individual introspection as in

primary epistemology. On the contrary, it is based on reports and testimonies of many typical

subjects. So, Goldman replaces individual introspection and self-reflection with research that

acquires testimonies and reports from many subjects belonging to the same linguistic

44

community. However, we have to keep in mind that he is not considering samples from other

cultures or languages.

Goldman is employing this approach to discover the definition of the concept

justification, i.e. finding out its basic necessary and sufficient conditions, from the typical

subjects engaged in this hypothetical experiment. Therefore, he is building this hypothetical

experiment on a main assumption and hypothesis--that subjects have a ―mentally stored‖ (1992,

p.157) list of epistemic virtues and vices. Goldman defines epistemic virtues or vices by linking

them to his notion of reliability. As a result, beliefs produced by belief-forming processes that

tend to produce more true than false beliefs, such as vision, hearing, memory, and good

reasoning are called epistemic virtues. In contrast, beliefs produced by belief-forming processes

that tend to produce more false than true beliefs, such as guessing, wishful thinking, and ignoring

evidence are called epistemic vices.

Goldman doesn‘t clearly determine whether the mental list of epistemic virtues and vices

he is ascribing to the subjects in this hypothetical research study arises from innate ideas or not.

Also, he agrees that this list can be partly inherited from other subjects within the same linguistic

community. For this hypothetical experiment to work, Goldman forms another hypothesis which

asserts that the subjects‘ classification of epistemic virtues and vices is due to their eventual

evaluations for reliability As a result, for Goldman‘s research study is founded on two main

hypotheses:

1. Subjects have a ―mentally stored‖ list of epistemic virtues and vices (1992,

p.158).

2. Subjects‘ classification of epistemic virtues and vices is tied to their notion

of reliability.

Goldman is very committed to the traditional epistemology‘s main methodology, which

is conceptual analysis. Also, to avoid the problem of eccentricity, he employs empirical methods

of science. 19

As a result, Goldman constructs his hypothetical experiment by integrating

conceptual analysis, which is the basic tool of traditional epistemology with the exemplar

approach of concept representation, which is an empirical method of cognitive psychology.

19

I will show in the next chapter of ‗cooperative naturalism‘ that empirical methods of science, in fact, discover and

confirm the eccentricity of people‘s concepts by suggesting the diversity in epistemological intuitions among

different cultures (WNS, 2001).

45

Accordingly, by combining both tools together, we can say that Goldman is constructing process

reliabilism in scientific epistemology based on a posteriori conceptual analysis.

In this hypothetical experiment, Goldman doesn‘t introduce the subjects to process

reliabilism as theory of justification because he aims to infer the framework of this theory from

the reports and testimonies of those subjects. As a result, he constructs the survey or

questionnaire to which the subjects in the hypothetical experiment will respond based on his

theory of justification, process reliabilism. In this hypothetical experiment, subjects in the

research study are introduced to all representative examples of the concept justification.

Goldman then asks his subjects to evaluate the justificatory statues of different examples of

beliefs in different thought experiments. Those thought experiments consider possible examples

of different belief-forming processes. This means that Goldman is investigating concept

justification by presenting some of its representative examples to the subjects in this experiment.

So, basically, the hypothetical experiment involves presenting thought experiments to the

subjects and asking them to evaluate those hypothetical examples. The representative examples

can be what he considers as cognitive virtues and vices such as perception, memory, guessing,

and wishful thinking etc.

Goldman is generalizing his own thought process by which he constructed process

reliabilism in primary epistemology onto the subjects in this hypothetical experiment.

Accordingly, he predicts that subjects will make their evaluations based on this type of

reasoning.

1. Subjects will consider the belief-forming process producing each targeted belief.

2. They will then match the belief forming process with their list of epistemic virtues

and vices.

3. If the belief-forming process matches the subject‘s epistemic virtue, the subject will

evaluate the belief as being justified.

4. But if the belief-forming process matches the subject‘s epistemic vice, then the

subject will evaluate the belief as not justified.

5. And if the belief-forming process doesn‘t match any epistemic virtue or vices on the

subject‘s list, then the subject will evaluate the belief as neither justified not

unjustified. The belief will be evaluated as non- justified.

46

The exemplar approach of concepts representation allows us to infer the definition of

justification or, more clearly, the basic necessary and sufficient constituents of the concept

justification from the subjects‘ testimonies. Goldman is trying to construct process reliabilism as

the theoretical framework underlying the epistemological judgments and intuitions of the

subjects participating in the hypothetical experiment. Subjects‘ testimonies and their evaluation

of the belief -forming genesis reveals the extension20

of the term justification. And from the

extension of justification determined by the subjects we can infer the intension,21

which is the

description for the necessary and sufficient conditions of justification. From the subjects‘

evaluations and normative claims we can infer the basic structure of process reliabilism as theory

of justification. The next step is to start forming the theoretical framework of the theory. And this

is how, according to Goldman, we can build a theory of justification that captures our common

sense semantic intuitions by empirical methods.

We need to notice that subjects participating in this hypothetical experiment are engaged

in evaluating the hypothetical examples without using any information from reality or

psychology. The whole process of the hypothetical experiment is based on the subjects‘ intuitive

understanding for reliability and justification and their intuitive understanding of the way the

world and human cognition operate.

Goldman confirms that process reliabilism constructed at this stage need not be

scientifically accurate or match reality. For example, the subjects in the research study may have

different views about the reliability of cognitive processes. As a result, they may disagree about

the list classifying epistemological processes into epistemological virtues and vices. Therefore,

their lists also may not correspond to the theories of cognitive psychology. This is not a problem

because the descriptive scientific epistemology aims to describe only the subjects‘ judgments.

Consequently, a minor disagreement among subjects is not worrisome because the first stage of

Goldman‘s account is only descriptive for ―folkways‖ epistemic concepts and notions. It is the

mission of the second stage, the normative stage, to form explanations of epistemic concepts,

norms and principles that improve on our naïve intuitive concepts and norms. Consequently,

20

Concept‘s extension can be explained as referring to the set of actual things the concept describes or the set of

things the concept extends to, or applies to (New World encyclopedia, 2008).

21

Concept‘s intension can be explained as a concept definition or the logical and definitional conditions that specify

the set of all possible things that a concept describes (New World encyclopedia, 2008).

47

folkways understanding of belief-forming processes and their reliability need not be

scientifically accurate. Creating an accurate structure for epistemic concepts and principles is a

mission for the normative stage of the theory (Goldman, 1992).

There are no records indicating that Goldman has executed such an empirical

experiment.22

In fact, I think that Goldman is arguing for his scientific epistemology account by

a priori means, which doesn‘t seem compatible with his theorizing.23 One may assume that

Goldman didn‘t perform the first stage, the descriptive stage, because it is not very important for

constructing process reliabilism. Actually this explanation seems very tempting to me. I do not

see the significance of constructing process reliabilism in the first stage, especially since

Goldman acknowledges that the theory in the first stage is only a description for the folk‘s

epistemic notions that can be fallible. Also, he acknowledges that it is only an initial version that

will be improved by the second stage when we test it against the theories of cognitive

psychology. Accordingly, I believe that we may just start the theory form the second stage and

save some time by skipping the first stage. Personally, I would dismiss this step and go directly

to the theories of cognitive psychology to build a correct and scientifically accurate theory of

justification.

However, this suggestion will not work for Goldman. The insignificance of the first stage

of the theory cannot be the reason for Goldman's refraining from empirical experimentation for

the first stage of the theory. In fact, Goldman emphasizes the significance of this stage of

constructing process reliabilism to keep the link between common sense intuitions and scientific

intuitions. Otherwise we are changing the topic of epistemology. According to Goldman, if we

didn‘t keep this link, we wouldn‘t know what we are discussing and analyzing (1979, 1986).

There must be other reasons causing Goldman to refrain from engaging in empirical

testing for the first stage. The second suggested reason could be, as I have mentioned before, that

Goldman seems to be generalizing his own reasoning processes by which he has constructed

process reliabilism in primary epistemology into other subjects. Accordingly, it seems obvious

for him to predict the reasoning strategy of the subjects engaged in the hypothetical experiment

22

Read Goldman‘s bibliography in his website. There is no indication that he has engaged in such empirical

method.

23

We have to keep in mind that his paper might be meant to be concerned with meta-epistemology. Still, I believe

that he has made many assumptions that need to be tested empirically.

48

and the results as well. So, there is no need to perform the hypothetical experiment empirically

by gathering the testimonies of other subjects because we can predict them.

In other words, Goldman is confirming the main hypotheses of his hypothetical

experiment by his own observation without performing the experiment empirically in the first

place. The main hypotheses of the research studies are that, first, subjects have a ―mentally

stored‖ list of epistemic virtues and vices; and second, that the subjects‘ classification of

epistemic virtues and vices is tied to their notion of reliability. For example, Goldman affirms

that subjects tend to hold a ―trait of categorical conservatism‖ (Goldman, 1992, p.160).

Therefore, they convey some kind of uniformity in expressing epistemic concepts and norms.

Without performing any experimentation, Goldman states his observation of the

universality of the subjects‘ epistemological intuitions. Also, he states his observation of

subjects‘ agreement especially in the normative domain. I disagree with Goldman‘s

methodology. He is begging the question by confirming the hypotheses of his hypothetical

experiment of process reliabilism without performing empirical testing. As a result, we can

consider his (1992) paper as a construction for the structure and guidelines of the real empirical

experiment that should take place in reality. But we cannot consider it by itself a final version for

the empirically constructed process reliabilism.

Normative Scientific Epistemology

What Goldman means by scientific epistemology really begins to take shape in the

second stage of his theory. In fact, the title of the article ―Epistemic Folkways and Scientific

Epistemology‖ can be considered as a clue to help us understand the process of forming and

constructing process reliabilism in scientific epistemology. Goldman classifies his scientific

epistemology into two stages: descriptive and normative scientific epistemology. In the

descriptive stage of scientific epistemology, Goldman constructs the theoretical framework of

process reliabilism by empirical means. Still, process reliabilism constructed in this stage is a

theory of justification attribution because it is constructed based on typical people's intuitive

understanding of reliability and justification. As the first part of the title ―Epistemic Folkways‖

suggests, this stage is concerned with constructing the theory based on common sense intuitions

In contrast, the normative stage can be considered responsible for constructing the scientific

epistemology. The second stage of cognitive psychology is used to correct and modify process

49

reliabilism formed in the descriptive stage. Consequently, the second stage is responsible to form

the scientifically accurate list of epistemological virtues and vices based on the theories of

cognitive psychology.

Goldman employs theories of cognitive psychology concerning the assessment of

cognitive processes in order to improve the initial draft of process reliabilism constructed in the

descriptive stage. The main aim of the normative stage is to construct the scientifically accurate

version of process reliabilism by making it compatible with cognitive psychology. The second

stage, which is normative scientific epistemology, detects the flaws and inaccuracies of the initial

version of process reliabilism. The account is then modified and improved with help from

theories of cognitive psychology by forming the scientifically accurate list of epistemological

virtues and vices. However, the link between our common sense intuitions and scientific

intuitions must be preserved. What is the best way to achieve this aim according to Goldman?

Goldman asserts that the main aid cognitive psychology can provide is to correct and

modify our ―conceptualization‖ (Goldman, 1992, p.165) of the kinds of cognitive mechanisms

relevant for process reliabilism. Does this mean that we test and evaluate the previously

constructed process reliabilism against the theories of cognitive psychology? The answer,

according to Goldman, is no. What Goldman is suggesting is that we educate our intuitions with

the most recent psychological theories. Then we use those scientific intuitions as a referee to

correct and modify any faulty parts of the previously constructed process reliabilism. The

modification is not applied into the theoretical framework of the theory directly. We should

apply any modification to our common sense intuitions (Goldman, 2008).

Question 2: Does Scientific Epistemology Employ Conceptual Analysis?

Similar to primary epistemology, conceptual analysis is an essential element in scientific

epistemology. Goldman states clearly his stance toward conceptual analysis as an important

method in constructing epistemological theories: ―I would hold that one proper task of

epistemology is to elucidate our epistemic folkways‖ (1992, p.155). Goldman believes that the

main aim of epistemology is to reveal the meaning of epistemological notions and concepts. And

conceptual analysis is the best way to define epistemological concepts to reveal their meanings:

―The basic approach is, roughly, to identify the concept justified belief with the concept belief...‖

(1992, p.157). Improving and transcending our epistemic concepts and norms is another task

50

ascribed to epistemology by Goldman, who elaborates by saying: ―An initial phase of the

undertaking is to sharpen our conceptualization of the types of cognitive unites that should be

targets of epistemic evaluation‖ (1992, p.165).

Question 4: What is The Role Ascribed to Common Sense Intuitions in Scientific

Epistemology?

Goldman is very loyal to traditional epistemology by adhering to its main tools of

conceptual analysis and using epistemic intuitions as a final referee to evaluate the resulting

accounts. Consequently, Goldman still consults his epistemic intuitions and considers them as a

valid criterion to accept or reject any proposed epistemological theory. In the first stage of the

process reliabilism Goldman tests the established account against a naïve and pre-theoretical

intuition. By contrast, in the second stage of the theory only educated and illuminated intuitions

are employed to evaluate the resulting account.

Consequently, if we have a conflict between our common sense intuitions and science

when evaluating specific epistemological accounts, the solution is to resolve this conflict by

modifying our intuitions by science. Then we must use the updated intuitions as a final referee to

evaluate the resulting epistemic theory or account. We don‘t test the epistemic account against

reality alone or naïve intuitions alone; we use one, empirical science, to correct the other,

common sense intuitions, and we combine both as a final referee. In other words we modify and

upgrade our naïve intuitions by theories of empirical science and turn them into scientific

intuitions. Then we use those scientific intuitions as final referee to evaluate our theories.

For example, our common sense intuitions imply that introspection is a reliable source of

beliefs. Theories of cognitive psychology provide evidence that suggests that introspection is not

a reliable source of beliefs. How do we resolve this conflict? According to Goldman, not by

considering intuitions alone; for on that account introspection is reliable. Also, not by

considering science alone; for on that account introspection is not reliable. We resolve the

conflict by correcting the misconception of our intuitions and informing ourselves that

introspection is not a reliable source of beliefs. Then we use those updated intuitions as a final

referee to evaluate our epistemic accounts. Consequently, our epistemological theories must

capture our ordinary or folkway understanding of epistemological notions, keeping in mind that

those folkway notions were modified to correspond to the most recent scientific theories. Also,

51

our epistemological theories must accommodate any departure from commonsense intuitions that

science may imply. So we have to update our intuitions with the most recent scientific theories,

and then use them as a final referee to evaluate the resulting epistemological theories. The main

point is that it is essential to preserve the link and the continuity between our folk notions and

scientific notions (Goldman, 1992). And the only way to do that is to educate our intuitions and

then to use them as a final referee24

.

I don‘t see the difference between Goldman‘s suggestion of updating our folkways or

common sense intuitions by the most recent theories then using those updated intuitions as a

final referee to evaluate epistemological theories, and using science alone as a final referee. As I

see it, both methods produce the same results. It seems to me that Goldman‘s suggestion is a

long and indirect way to evaluate our resulting epistemic theories. If science has the upper hand

over our pre-philosophical intuitions, then why do we need to use those intuitions as a final

referee? Why not just settle for testing the resulting epistemological theories against reality? I

would skip the whole first stage of the theory. Then I would start forming process reliabilism

empirically in one step by evaluating the normative claims of psychologists and specialists in

theories of cognitive psychology. This new methodology will lead to form the same final version

of process reliabilism suggested by Goldman‘s method. However, my methodology is more

practical, easier and saves time and effort. I think this method is a faster and better shortcut.

However, Goldman rejects this possibility because it is essential for his account to

preserve the continuity between our common sense intuitions and science intuitions. Otherwise

we are changing the subject of epistemology (Kornblith, 2002).

Epistemology… should have its roots in the concepts and practices of the folk. If these roots are utterly rejected and abandoned, by what rights would the new discipline call itself

‗epistemology‘ at all? (Goldman, 1992, p. 155)

Question 5: What is The Source of Normativity For Scientific Epistemology?

Similar to primary epistemology, semantic considerations are the source of normativity

for scientific epistemology. It is true that Goldman relates empirical science, or, more precisely

cognitive psychology to his epistemology, but he doesn‘t consider empirical science as the

source of normativity. Taking his cue from traditional epistemology, he considers the meaning of

24

Goldman suggests separating between these two stages of scientific epistemology (2008, p. 13). Accordingly, I

cannot explain the relation between these two stages. Also, I cannot determine for sure which mental list is

employed to evaluate actual beliefs.

52

the epistemological notions as their source of normativity. However, in scientific epistemology

the meaning of those notions was discovered by empirical psychological experiments. This

means that epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification, and rationality are by their

nature normative, which means valuable, appraised, and proper because their meanings imply so.

In accounts of substantive naturalism, primary epistemology and scientific epistemology

normativity is grounded on semantic considerations regardless of the way the epistemological

concepts and terms were investigated and explained.

Question 6: What is The Relation Between Scientific Epistemology And Traditional

Epistemology?

Scientific epistemology departs from the methods of traditional epistemology more than

primary epistemology. Scientific epistemology and traditional epistemology disagree in these

main aspects: First, traditional epistemology employs a priori conceptual analysis and does not

use help from empirical science when constructing its epistemological theories. Scientific

epistemology employs empirical and a posteriori conceptual analysis and empirical methods of

cognitive psychology when constructing process reliabilism. Second, traditional epistemology

employs naive and pre-theoretical intuitions as a final referee to evaluate the resulting

epistemological theories. Scientific epistemology employs educated and modified intuitions that

are informed by the best theories of empirical science-―scientific intuitions‖-as a final referee to

evaluate the resulting epistemological theories, especially in the second stage.

Still, there are many similarities between traditional epistemology and the scientific

epistemology account of substantive naturalism. Traditional epistemology and scientific

epistemology agree about these aspects: First, both have the same primary topic and source of

normativity. Second, both employ conceptual analysis in constructing their theories. However,

scientific epistemology uses empirical means in its analysis. Third, both use intuitions as a final

referee in order to evaluate the resulting theories and their norms. In the first stage of scientific

epistemology, naïve and pre-theoretical intuitions are employed. In contrast, the second stage of

scientific epistemology employs scientific intuitions that are informed and updated based on the

most recent scientific theories.

As a result, Goldman‘s scientific epistemology account can still be considered a middle

ground between radical forms of naturalized epistemology and traditional epistemology. But we

53

can say also that Goldman‘s account is getting closer to naturalism and farther away from

traditional epistemology than primary epistemology. In addition, we can say that Goldman‘s

account can be considered a modification of and improvement upon traditional epistemology and

not entirely a dismissing of traditional epistemology either explicitly or implicitly (See table 10

in appendix A).

3. Epistemics

In order to explain Goldman‘s epistemics as a third subtype of substantive naturalism, I

will continue the same pattern employed before. I will apply my six-question criterion

classifying naturalized epistemology to Goldman‘s epistemics (See figure 2 in appendix B).

Question 1: What is The Primary Topic And Main Aim of Epistemics?

Goldman argues that he aims to construct empirically a scientifically accurate

epistemological theory that discovers and improves our epistemological concepts such as

rationality, reasoning and intelligence, in order to employ the resulting epistemological theory to

give positive advice in intellectual matters and improve our reasoning strategies.

As with his scientific epistemology, Goldman aims for epistemics to be a theory of

rationality or intelligence attribution. However, he adds an additional aim to epistemics, which is

producing normative advice and recommendations to eliminate the flaws in our reasoning and

consequently improve our reasoning strategies (1978).

We have to keep in mind that unlike other types of substantive naturalism, Goldman‘s

epistemics does have a full detailed epistemological theory. He only presents a basic structure

and outline of a naturalist epistemology that aims to investigate epistemological concepts and

norms by empirical means in order to construct an epistemological account with instrumental

value, i.e. help cognizers achieve their intrinsic aims and goals. Therefore, Goldman is only

elucidating the basic structure of epistemics that can be developed and improved by further

research. It would be much easier to explain epistemics if it was concerned with process

reliabilism or had a detailed account of rationality or intelligence, for example. But unfortunately

epistemics, unlike primary epistemology and scientific epistemology, does not yield to simple

analysis.

54

Second, What is The Relationship Between Empirical Science and Epistemics? And More

Specifically, What is The Type of The Empirical Science Employed, And How is it

Employed in Epistemics?

First, what is the type of empirical science related to epistemics? Like primary

epistemology and scientific epistemology, epistemics affirms that cognitive psychology is the

proper empirical science employed in epistemology. Indeed, all the three subtypes of substantive

naturalism agree about the kind of empirical science employed.

Second, how is cognitive psychology employed in epistemics? As in the formulation of

scientific epistemology, theories and methods of cognitive psychology are employed to construct

the scientifically accurate epistemological theory (See table 9 in appendix A). Also, just as in

scientific epistemology, the epistemics proposed by Goldman expresses the relevance of

cognitive psychology in pursuing conceptual analyses for epistemic concepts and norms in

constructing the theoretical framework of the target theory. Goldman declares in ―Psychology

and Philosophical Analysis‖:

It is often said that philosophical analysis is an a priori enterprise. Since it prominently

features thought experiments designed to elicit the meaning, or semantic properties, of

words in one‘s own language, it seems to be purely reflective, requiring no observational or empirical component. I too have sometimes acquiesced in this sort of view. While

arguing that certain phases of epistemology require input from psychology, and other

cognitive sciences, I have granted that the more ‗conceptual‘ stages of epistemology are strictly philosophical and (hence) non empirical (Goldman,1986). In this paper I want to

qualify this position. I shall suggest that psychological theories can have a bearing on

philosophical analysis (Goldman, 1988, p. 195).

Goldman doesn‘t assert clearly that he is employing an exemplar approach in concept

representation in forming his epistemics. However, he surely implies that in the next quote:

The more proper method would (arguably) consist of eliciting verbal responses from

informants, not only oneself but other competent speakers of the language. There is no

great gap, then, between traditional philosophical methods and empirical cognitive

sciences (Goldman, 1988, p. 196).

As a result, I conclude that Goldman argues for employing the exemplar approach in

concept representation in forming the target theory. Furthermore, Goldman assigns additional

roles for empirical science that correspond to the additional aim ascribed by Goldman to his

epistemics. Goldman argues for epistemics to provide cognizers with positive advice in

55

intellectual matters. Therefore, empirical science is necessary to achieve this aim. The additional

roles ascribed to empirical science can be identified from Goldman‘s argument relating empirical

psychology to epistemology.

Arguments For Relating Cognitive Psychology to Epistemics

In addition to the necessity of employing empirical science in constructing

epistemological theories, Goldman confirms the importance of employing cognitive psychology

when applying the resulting theory into realty. Goldman presents three main arguments to

establish the role of empirical science in applying epistemics empirically.

The First Argument

According to Goldman, traditional epistemology has always employed, intuitively but

mistakenly, an over-simplistic view of our cognitive structures. He finds the conceptual

classification of traditional epistemology to be poor and weak. For example, the concept of belief

is too simple to fully capture our cognitive complexity; as he says, this ―sort of mental

classification, referring to traditional epistemology, is too coarse-grained…cognitive psychology

can provide more fine –grained concepts‖ (Goldman, 1978, p.511). Cognitive psychology can

add richness and breadth to epistemology‘s classifications and, consequently, to the concepts

being investigated. Cognitive psychology describes different strengths of memory storage and

degrees of memory accessibility, along with complex and diverse types of beliefs, such as

occurrent and dispositional beliefs. In contrast, traditional epistemologists have disregarded the

complexity of memory storage and retrieval. Consequently, they have missed the distinction

between different kinds of beliefs and end up investigating oversimplified traditional beliefs.

Employing empirical science prevents the occurrence of such problems (Goldman, 1986, 1978).

The Second Argument

Goldman confirms that advice in intellectual matters should consider cognizers‘

capabilities. Consequently, epistemic theories must produce rules and advice that can be

executed and performed. Goldman argues that cognitive psychology is relevant to applying the

epistemological theory to reality because it can provide information about the abilities and

limited capacities of cognizers. Traditional epistemology has not concerned itself with such

56

information, possibly for two reasons. Either traditional epistemology is targeting ideal subjects,

or it is producing rules and norms without considering their feasibility. Consequently, traditional

epistemology has produced ideal and useless rules. Among the many presented examples of

inapplicable rules are deductive closure and (non) inconsistency. These rules affirm that, in the

case of deductive closure (DC), one should believe all the consequences of that belief; and in

(non) inconsistency (INC), that one should reject all parts of an inconsistent set of propositions.

We understand, intuitively, that DC is non-executable because any given belief has infinitely

many consequences. However, people are unable to have infinitely many (occurrent) beliefs.

Therefore, DC is non-executable. It follows that INC is non-executable too because there is no

effective method to determine inconsistency. People cannot do anything to assure compliance

with INC. Therefore, it is also non executable. Epistemics can avoid such problem because it

contains all the needed resources to consider humans abilities. As a result, epistemics uses

theories of cognitive psychology in order to produce epistemic rules and realistic

recommendations that can accommodate human capabilities (Goldman, 1978).

The Third Argument

Goldman argues that using theories of cognitive psychology in applying epistemics to

reality is necessary for offering positive recommendations and advice on intellectual matters. In

this light, epistemological theories should focus on the cognizers‘ reasoning flaws and

deficiencies in order to improve their reasoning and intellectual abilities. Goldman illustrates this

point with an analogy to tennis. In order to improve the player‘s performance, a tennis coach

must concentrate on the player‘s flaws and poor habits; this will allow the coach to provide

specific recommendations designed to improve the player‘s performance. Similarly, cognitive

psychology can be used to distinguish the flaws and shortcomings that cognizers may be prone to

in order to make recommendations for resolving these flaws and improving their intellectual

performance. Epistemics can accomplish such aims by applying the theories and methods of

cognitive psychology (Goldman, 1978).

Stages of Epistemics

The Formation Stage of Epistemics

57

In this stage epistemics uses help from theories and methods of cognitive psychology,

especially the exemplar approach in concepts representation in order to construct a scientifically

accurate epistemological theory of epistemological concepts such as intelligence, reasoning, and

rationality etc.

The Application Stage of Epistemics

This stage is concerned with forming normative judgments by applying the resulting

epistemological account, epistemics, to reality, that is, by applying epistemics empirically to

evaluate actual examples of beliefs. And according to Goldman, employing methods and theories

empirical science in this stage is essential to forming reality-based normative judgments. As I

have mentioned before, Goldman specifies three main arguments/reasons to employ empirical

psychology when applying epistemics empirically. The first reason is considering the complexity

of epistemological concepts when evaluating actual beliefs. The second reason is considering

typical subjects‘ capabilities and limitations in order to prescribe humanly possible

recommendations. The third reason is detecting the subjects‘ flaws in order to produce positive

advice that aim to eliminate these flaws (Goldman, 1978) (See Table 6 in Appendix A).

The relation between epistemics and empirical science. Now I can explain the role that

empirical science, and cognitive psychology in particular, plays in epistemics. Most importantly,

cognitive psychology provides epistemics with the exemplar approach in concept representation

as a method to form the theoretical framework of the target epistemological theory. In addition,

empirical science is used to apply the target theory empirically. So, empirical science is

employed in both stages of epistemics. (See table 9 in appendix A).

Question 3: Does Epistemics Employ Conceptual Analysis?

As I have explained earlier in discussing scientific epistemology, the exemplar approach

of concept representation can be considered integration between empirical methods of cognitive

psychology and conceptual analysis of traditional epistemology. Accordingly, it can be described

as a posteriori conceptual analysis. Goldman employs this methodology in the formation stage of

epistemics. Therefore, we can say that Goldman employs a posteriori conceptual analysis in the

first stage of his theory. In contrast, Goldman employs empirical theories of cognitive

58

psychology when applying epistemics to produce normative advice in intellectual matters. In this

stage he doesn‘t engage in performing any type of conceptual analysis.

We cannot discard conceptual analysis in epistemics because conceptual analysis is one

of the most important features of Goldman‘s naturalism. As in Goldman‘s scientific

epistemology, the main aim of his epistemics is to discover the correct and scientifically accurate

definition of epistemological concepts and judgments. So the association with conceptual and

linguistic analysis is inevitable. Goldman dismisses the possibility of considering the objects of

analysis in epistemics to be natural kinds: ―It is dubious that knowledge or justification status are

natural kinds‖ (Goldman, 1988, p.195). Therefore, he confirms that the primary task for

epistemics is to discover and reveal the correct meaning of epistemological concepts rather than

their metaphysical essence, hence determining the lexicalist aim for epistemology: ―My

conception of philosophical analysis is expressly lexicalist" (Goldman, 1988, p.195). Goldman

doesn‘t define what he means by ―lexicalist‖ explicitly, but the context suggests that he means,

"related to meanings and definitions," which implies that conceptual analysis is the best way to

investigate epistemological concepts to reveal their meanings. ―I shall not argue here for the

lexicalist approach, except to say that it seems appropriate for the class of epistemological

examples that primarily concern me here‖ (Goldman, 1988, p.195).

Question 4: What is The Role Ascribed For Common Sense Intuitions in Epistemics?

As with scientific epistemology, the formation stage of epistemics employs intuitions as a

final referee to evaluate the resulting theory. As I have explained in scientific epistemology, in

the first stage of constructing the theory, the exemplar approach of concept representation

employs naïve and pre-theoretical intuitions to capture the folk understanding of epistemological

concepts. However, unlike scientific epistemology, this stage is considered only initially and a

starting point for the true anticipated epistemological theory. Therefore, in the second stage of

constructing the theory, educated and scientific intuitions are used as a final referee to evaluate

the resulting theory based on the example approach of concept representation.

Question 5: What is The Source of Normativity For Epistemics?

In epistemics Goldman deviates from his previous arguments, which present a semantic

source for epistemological normativity. He argues in epistemics for evaluating the resulting

59

theory instrumentally. This implies that we should evaluate the resulting theory in light of its

ability to achieve its anticipated aim.

Epistemics assumes that cognitive operations should be assessed instrumentally: given a

choice of cognitive procedures, those which would produce the best set of consequences should

be selected. This means, however, that epistemics must identify a relevant class of ―intrinsically valuable‖ consequences and establish a rank –ordering of different sets of these consequences

(Goldman, 1978, p520).

Accordingly, it seems that the source of normativity here is linked to the instrumental

value for the epistemological theory. So if the subject contends about following the

recommendations or the normative advice presented by epistemics, the answer will be that the

subject needs to accept this advice or this theory because it will help the subject achieve their

intrinsically valuable aims.25

Question 6: What is The Relation Between Epistemics And Traditional Epistemology?

As a type of substantive naturalism, epistemics is the closest account to naturalism and

the farthest away from traditional epistemology than primary epistemology and scientific

epistemology. Traditional epistemologists argue for the intrinsic value of their epistemological

theories and do not consider their instrumental value. They don‘t discuss employing their

resulting epistemological theory to achieve any other relevant aims. In fact, some traditional

epistemologists, such as Ernst Sosa,26

reject ascribing the task of providing cognizers with

positive intellectual advice as a recommendation for epistemological theories. He considers such

a task out of the domain of traditional epistemology and a violation for its principles.

When we say a belief is justified, epistemically justified, or even amounts to knowledge,

are we issuing a normative verdict that this is a belief one should form or sustain? Might there

not be more valuable or important things that we might be doing with our time than forming a

belief on that question? (Sosa, 2005, p16).

25

This quote makes Goldman seem very close to pragmatism. Also, in the same paper, he leaves determining the

intrinsically valuable aims as an open question after investigating several examples of possible intrinsically valuable

aims. However, I believe that he is closer to reliabilism than pragmatism. The reasons justifying my belief are that

first, as I will explain in the next chapter, Stich presents several objections against Goldman‘s reliabilism. Second, Goldman has always argued for reliabilism in his papers. So, by considering the context, ascribing reliabilism to

Goldman seems more plausible and consistent with his previous views.

26

Read Ernest Sosa ―A defense of the use of Intuitions in philosophy‖ (2005).

60

As a result, arguing for the instrumental value for the resulting epistemological theories

by providing normative advice that can help cognizers achieve their intrinsically valuable aims is

another departure from the aims and methods of traditional epistemology. And this, in addition to

employing cognitive psychology in forming and applying the resulting epistemological theory,

takes epistemics farther away from the domain of traditional epistemology. Emphasizing the

instrumental value for epistemological theories transfers the criteria of evaluation from

epistemological intuitions, whether naïve or scientific, into evaluating the theories due to their

consequences, i.e. ―consequentialism‖.27 As a result, the source of normativity in epistemics has

also shifted from the semantic grounds of traditional epistemology, at least for the application

stage of epistemics, into another source of normativity such as truth, for example.

It seems that Goldman starts to realize the importance of the instrumental value of

epistemological theories. As a result, he argues in epistemics for employing his epistemological

theory in achieving other aims. In the former types of substantive naturalism Goldman was

emphasizing the intrinsic value of the epistemological theories. Accordingly, he neither

considered nor argued for employing the resulting accounts to achieve any other aims. On the

contrary, in epistemics he argues for employing the resulting account to achieve other aims such

as obtaining our intrinsically valuable goals. This means that Goldman starts to aim higher by

arguing for epistemics to go further than just constructing a scientifically accurate theory.

However, epistemics is still relevant, and closer to traditional epistemology than the

theories of cooperative naturalism, for two main reasons: First, the construction of the theoretical

framework of epistemics, in the formation stage of the theory, must be concerned with

investigating epistemological concepts similar to the theories of traditional epistemology. As a

result, conceptual analysis is the main methodology used to construct the theory. The exemplar

approach of concept representation as an example for a posteriori conceptual analysis is

employed. And second, intuitions are employed as a final referee and criterion of evaluation for

both epistemics and traditional epistemology. In epistemics, both types of intuitions, pre-

theoretical and scientific, are employed as a final referee when constructing the theory. However,

scientific intuitions are employed as the final referee for the final version of the target theory in

epistemics. In contrast, traditional epistemology employs only naïve and pre-theoretical

27

Consequentialism is the view that normative properties depend only on consequences (Armstrong, 2006). This

view can be applied to different domains. For example, when we apply consequentialism on epistemology it

becomes the normative properties of epistemological theories depend on the consequences of those theories.

61

intuitions when constructing the theoretical framework of the theory (See table 11 of appendix

A).

Basic Features of Substantive Naturalism

After presenting all the subtypes of Goldman‘s substantive naturalism, we can explain the

main features of substantive naturalism:

1. The main purpose of substantive naturalism is, among other aims, investigating

epistemological notions and concepts, whether they were discovered by a priori

analysis, as in the primary epistemology account, or empirical experimentation, as in

scientific epistemology and epistemics.

2. Substantive naturalism employs conceptual analysis, either a priori or a posteriori, as

a main method and tool in pursuing epistemology.

3. Substantive naturalism grounds normativity in semantic considerations, except for in

epistemics where the instrumental value of the theory is its source of normativity.

4. Substantive naturalism employs intuitions, whether naive intuitions as in the primary

epistemology account or scientific intuitions in both scientific epistemology and

epistemics, as a final referee to evaluate the resulting epistemological theories.

However, in application, epistemics is evaluated instrumentally when employed

empirically to evaluate actual beliefs.

5. Substantive naturalism applies empirical science, theories and methods of cognitive

psychology, in pursuing epistemology. (See table 12 in appendix A)

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CHAPTER FIVE

COOPERATIVE NATURALISM

Cooperative naturalism is the third and final type of naturalized epistemology. It asserts

that empirical results obtained via psychology are necessary to meet the evaluative ends of

epistemology. Cooperative naturalism also begins its philosophical investigation using the best

scientific theories and discoveries available at the time. As a result, epistemologists who

subscribe to this school of thought need input from empirical science in order to make progress

in answering evaluative and epistemic questions.

Points of overlap do exist between cooperative naturalism and substantive naturalism,

especially primary epistemology and scientific epistemology accounts, because both use theories

of cognitive psychology to carry out their philosophical investigations. However, there are three

distinct differences between them:

1. Substantive naturalism uses educated and illuminated epistemic intuitions as the final

criteria and referee in evaluating the resulting epistemological theories. Cooperative

naturalism does not use epistemic intuitions as a final referee. Instead, it evaluates

resulting theories instrumentally. This means that epistemological theories are

evaluated in light of their consequences and their ability to achieve other intrinsically

valuable aims.

2. Substantive naturalism uses conceptual analysis as its primary analytical tool.

Cooperative naturalism eliminates conceptual analysis and draws from a wider

spectrum of methods.

3. Substantive naturalism grounds normativity in semantic considerations while

cooperative naturalism opposes such a limited approach and provides other bases for

establishing epistemological normativity (See Table 13 in Appendix A).

Thus, although the two philosophies may appear similar upon first glance, there are critical

systemic differences between them. Accordingly, their theories occupy separate categories of

naturalized epistemology.

I will need to fully explicate each subtype of cooperative naturalism in order to discuss

the main features of whole category. Unlike Feldman, I divide cooperative naturalism into three

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subcategories: pragmatism, which is associated with Stephen Stich; natural kind theory, which is

associated with Hilary Kornblith; and strategic reliabilism, which is associated with Michael

Bishop and J.D. Trout. I will begin my analysis with Stephen Stich‘s pragmatism, move on to the

strategic reliabilism of Bishop and Trout, and conclude with Kornblith‘s natural kind account. I

will be following the same pattern used in previous chapters. I will explain each subtype of

cooperative naturalism by applying my six-question criterion for classifying naturalism to each

of the subtypes (See Figure 2 in Appendix B). After this criterion has been applied to cooperative

naturalism, I will conclude by fully delineating the main aspects of this type of epistemology.

1. Stich’s Pragmatic Naturalism

Question 1: What is The Primary Topic And Main Aim of Stich’s Pragmatism?

When discussing the literature of analytic epistemology, Stich argues that traditional

epistemology has primarily been engaged in three main goals:1 First aim is evaluating reasoning

strategies. Examples of philosophers pursuing this aim include Francis Bacon, Descartes, Mill,

Carnap, Popper, and Goodman. Also, investigating knowledge and distinguishing it from simple

opinions and true beliefs is a second aim. Philosophers working toward this goal can be divided

into two subgroups. One group investigates knowledge as a natural kind; this category includes

Plato, Kornblith, and others. The second group is concerned with defining the term knowledge

and providing logical analysis of that concept. This category includes most twentieth-century

philosophers of traditional epistemology. The final aim is answering the skeptic who demands

evidence to prove that knowledge and/or certainty are possible. Most analytic epistemologists

have worked toward this goal, including as Descartes and Moore (Stich, 1993a).

In contrast, Stich‘s naturalism is concerned with evaluating modes of reasoning and

discovering better ways for individuals to construct their doxastic2 houses. He is clear that the

latter task is especially important to him and that he is dedicated to discovering ―which ways of

building and rebuilding one‘s doxastic house—are the good ones, which are the bad ones, and

1 Some analytic epistemologists would disagree with him. For example, Ernest Sosa argues that epistemology is a

completely theoretical enterprise that does not aim to provide subjects with recommendations regarding accepting or

rejecting any beliefs (Sosa, 2005).

2 Doxastic means related to or pertaining to belief.

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why‖ (Stich, 1993a, p. 1). He is not concerned with the other two tasks of traditional

epistemology. In fact, he believes that providing conceptual analysis of epistemological concepts

is a ―boring task‖ and that answering the skeptic is a ―waste of time‖ (1993a, p. 3). If one accepts

these claims, then it stands to reason that epistemology should be engaged in evaluating

reasoning strategies (Stich, 1993a, p. 3). Stich‘s pragmatism asserts that ―in evaluating systems

of cognitive processes, the system to be preferred is the one that would be most likely to achieve

those things that are intrinsically valued by the person whose interests are relevant to the purpose

of evaluation‖ (1993a, p. 131).

Question 2: What is The Relationship Between Stich’s Pragmatism and Empirical Science?

And More Specifically, What is The Type of Empirical Science Employed And How is it

Employed in Stich’s Pragmatism?

First, what is type of empirical science related to Stich’s pragmatism? Stich does not

clearly state what kind of empirical science he considers to be most relevant to his pragmatism.

However, from following his reasoning and reflecting on his thought process in constructing his

pragmatic account, we can infer that cognitive psychology, social science, anthropology,

cognitive anthropology, and ethnology are the empirical sciences most relevant to the pursuit of

naturalism (Stich, 1993a). My main concern in this project is the relationship between

epistemology and psychology. As a result, I emphasize the relevance of cognitive psychology

and cognitive anthropology to epistemology.

Second, how is empirical science employed in Stich’s pragmatism? Stich‘s

pragmatism asserts that ―in evaluating systems of cognitive processes, the system to be preferred

is the one that would be most likely to achieve those things that are intrinsically valued by the

person whose interests are relevant to the purpose of evaluation‖ (1993a, p. 131). Ultimately, as

I will demonstrate below, Stich's argument must be seen as the correct mode of epistemological

investigation. Multiple methodologies are available to those who wish to pursue epistemology,

including analytic epistemology, reliabilism, and replacement naturalism. However, according to

Stich, each of these is limited by inherent shortcomings, including incorrect relation with

empirical science and fallible source of normativity. In contrast, pragmatism is able to overcome

65

these limitations and thus is a preferable mode of epistemology. The validity of these claims will

be established in the following section.

Stich’s Arguments

Stich's thesis is based on a two-step argumentative process: he first discredits alternative

approaches to epistemology by showing their deficiencies and then argues for pragmatism by

explaining its inherent worth and the ways in which it overcomes the issues that undermine the

other approaches. Accordingly, I will demonstrate Stich's argument in two steps. In the first step

I will present Stich‘s arguments against the alternative epistemological approaches. I will start

with Stich‘s argument against analytic epistemology. Then I will explain his transition from

using a priori standards to using consequentialist methodology to evaluate methods of inquiry.

After that I will present his argument against reliabilism. Finally, I will present his rejection of

Quine‘s replacement naturalism. This will conclude the analysis of the first part of Stich‘s

argument.

In the second step I will present Stich‘s simple and concise argument for pragmatism, I

will begin this section by discussing the main features and basic structure of Stich‘s pragmatism.

Next, I will demonstrate the practical methods of employing pragmatism empirically. Finally, I

will be able to explain the role that empirical science plays in Stich‘s pragmatism.

Stich’s Argument Against Analytic Epistemology

Stich demonstrates two main problems with the methodology and aims of traditional

epistemology. The first problem is that the a priori tools and methodology of analytic

epistemology produce counterintuitive results. In other words, the methods of analytic

epistemology prevent the approach from achieving its necessary end of capturing our common

sense semantic intuitions. To demonstrate this, Stich presents the work of Nisbett and Ross

(1980), researchers in experimental social psychology. This research is concerned with

discovering the reasoning strategies of several bright and educated subjects by presenting

ordinary problems for them to solve and then recording the ensuing process. The study found

that the majority of the well-educated subjects reasoned poorly. As a result, researchers define

the results as ―bleak‖ because they show that intelligent subjects have poor reasoning capabilities

(Stich, 1993a, p. 4). One of the main criticisms levied against this study was that the researchers

66

never defined the criterion employed to evaluate the subjects‘ reasoning strategies. Accordingly,

critics pointed out that it may have been the researchers themselves who reasoned poorly rather

than the subjects. The only way of overcoming this issue is to establish a valid criterion with

which to evaluate the reasoning strategies under question (1993a).

Stich tried to confront and solve this problem by using the methods of analytic

epistemology, mainly by evaluating theories through a priori means. To do this, he employs

Nelson Goodman‘s reflective equilibrium as the evaluative criterion. Goodman‘s project is an

ideal model for Stich because it is an exemplar of analytic epistemology that captures the

essential spirit of its methodology. Goodman‘s reflective equilibrium is a test or process that

aims to examine the rationality of and justification for different systems of inferential rules as a

means of constructing a normative theory of cognition. The system is considered rational or

justified if it passes the Goodmanian reflective equilibrium. However, it is considered irrational

if it fails to pass the Goodmanian rule. Reflective equilibrium maintains that ―a rule is amended

if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; and an inference is rejected if it violates a

rule we are unwilling to amend‖ (Stich, 1993a, p. 77). In other words, reflective equilibrium

attempts to justify rules and their inferences by bringing them into agreement with each other.

Also, reflective equilibrium evaluates the resulting account by squaring it with our common

sense intuitions. Stich applied reflective equilibrium to the results of the empirical research of

Nisbett, a process that produced conclusions that justified counterintuitive inferences and which

can only be described as counterintuitive and illogical. For example, the gambler fallacy3 passes

the reflective equilibrium test and thus should be considered rational and justified by anyone who

subscribes to Goodman‘s rule. Stich describes attempting several modifications of reflective

equilibrium in the hopes of preserving it as a valid method of constructing normative accounts of

cognition. Unfortunately, all these attempts were unsuccessful. This failure caused Stich to

abandon reflective equilibrium and argue in favor of searching for other sources of evaluation. It

3 The gambler fallacy can be defined as a logical fallacy that occurs when a subject believes that in a sequence of

chance events the probability of one event increases with the number of times another event occurs in series. This

line of reasoning is false because past events do not change the probability of the future events. For example, if one

tosses a coin several times and heads comes up repeatedly, then a person subject to the gambler fallacy will

mistakenly believe that the previous flips will increase the chances of tails appearing in the future (Tversky &

Kahneman, 1971).

67

also forced him to consider whether or not the analytic methodology itself may ultimately be at

fault for the failure, a process that led to his second concern about analytic epistemology.

The second problem Stich presents is more serious than his first concern and poses

serious challenges to the entire practice of analytic epistemology. He contends that analytic

epistemology's dependence on evaluating epistemic theories according to their correspondence to

our epistemic concepts lacks validity. This conviction grows from his discovery that Goodman‘s

project validates the set of rules and their inferences that captures our ordinary concepts of

rationality and justification. According to Stich, for this to be valid, our common sense semantic

intuitions have to be universal and univocal. The problem, of course, is that the universality of

semantic intuitions cannot be known a priori. However, this hypothesis was assumed without

evidence throughout the entire history of analytic epistemology. As a result, Goodman‘s project

specifically and the entire practice of analytic epistemology generally are conditioned to and

connected to empirical facts (1993a).

Throughout his extensive investigation into the theories of cognitive psychology,

anthropology, and social science4, Stich shows great concern for the cognitive diversity that

exists between people of different cultural backgrounds. This concern leads to Stich's second

objection to traditional epistemology. He explains that analytic epistemology evaluates its

resulting epistemological theories by their correspondence to our ordinary common sense

semantic intuitions. In other words, our common sense semantic intuitions, which are embedded

in and produced by our everyday language, work as a referee by which we accept or reject

epistemological theories. An epistemological theory that captures our concept of rationality or

justification will be accepted and those that do not do so will be rejected. Therefore, the inherent

diversity between epistemological semantic intuitions from different cultures will necessarily

produce a plethora of individualized epistemological accounts. This is because other cultures

may have different standards for what makes a belief justified. For example, in one culture a

justified belief may be A&B&C while in another culture that belief is X&Y&Z. According to

Stich, there is no criterion, besides epistemic chauvinism, that enables one culture to consider its

epistemological notions to be superior to those possessed by other cultures (Stich, 1993a, p.94).

4 Stich does not clearly discuss these resources. However, he mentions them in his notes: these resources include

Gladwin (1964), Levi-Strauss (1966), Colby and Cole (1973), Gellner (1973), Cooper (1975), and Hutchins (1980).

68

Stich’s Transition to Consequentialism

After confuting the methods of analytic epistemology previously used to evaluate

competing cognitive systems, Stich offers an alternative. His alternate theory is a form of

consequentialism, which evaluates cognitive systems in terms of their consequences. The basic

belief of consequentialism is that people should evaluate cognitive strategies by employing the

same ends-oriented approach that they use to assess tools, technologies, and practices (Stich,

1993a, p. 131). The first intuitive aim of any epistemology is to establish truth, and reliabilism is

the epistemic account associated with obtaining truth. Thus, the primary intuitive category of

consequentialist accounts is reliabilism. Reliabilism can be defined as the belief that ―the

normative statues of cognitive process is at least in part a function of how well it does in

producing true beliefs‖ (Stich, 1993a, p. 21). In other words, reliabilism implies that the

evaluation of reasoning processes corresponds to their ability to produce true beliefs. The

reasoning strategy that tends to produce true beliefs is considered reliable. But the reasoning

strategy that tends to produce false beliefs is considered unreliable. While reliabilism takes a

variety of forms, they all share the same core aim of producing true beliefs, an aim that Stich

shares. However, he ultimately rejects reliabilism as an alternative to analytic epistemology.

Argument Against Reliabilism

The main reason Stich rejects reliabilism as an alternative to analytic epistemology is that

he believes truth has neither intrinsic nor extrinsic value. Stich explains intrinsically valuable as

"X is valued for its own sake, not because it produces something else" (1993a, p. 118). He also

establishes a clear definition for instrumental values: ―Y is instrumentally valuable means that Y

is valued because it produces something else that is valuable (instrumentally or intrinsically)‖ (p.

118). According to Stich, people mistakenly link intrinsic and extrinsic value with truth and true

beliefs. He contends that this is incorrect because truth has neither intrinsic nor instrumental

value and then provides two main arguments in support of his claim. In the first argument, he

explains why true beliefs cannot be intrinsically valuable. In the second argument, he rejects the

idea that true beliefs can possess extrinsic value.

Denying intrinsic value for true beliefs. Stich explains that most people do not have a

clear understanding of truth despite the fact that they place a high value on it. This is because

people unknowingly misuse a popular scientific metaphor that conceives of beliefs as pictures,

69

maps, or mirrors. When taken literally, this metaphor leads to a skewed understanding about the

nature of beliefs. This issue is further complicated by the fact that the philosophical canon does

not provide an adequate account of true beliefs. Without such an account, people cannot decide if

true beliefs actually possess intrinsic value. Because the issue is integral to his project, Stich

attempts to create an account that is able to address this lack. He prefaces his argument by

explaining that once he presents his account of true beliefs, there will no longer be any reason to

ascribe value (either intrinsic or extrinsic) to truth or true beliefs. His account of true beliefs is

very complicated, and for the sake of expediency, I will not go into all the details. Instead, I will

focus only on that which is significant to the aims of this project.

Stich calls his account of true beliefs the causal functional theory (1993a, p. 161). Though

complex, this theory can be understood through four major points.

1. Stich calls the account of semantic properties of mental states (i.e. true beliefs) the

―causal functional interpretation account‖ (1993a, p. 106). To establish his account,

he first defines beliefs and then explains how they can be true. He defines beliefs as

real complex psychological states or neurophysiological states (p. 103). Notably, his

account endorses the token identity hypothesis, which confirms that each instance of

belief (token) is identical to some neurophysiological state. In other words, belief-

state tokens are brain-state tokens5.

2. According to Stich then, beliefs have semantic properties, which means that they

have the truth value of being either true or false. In other words, beliefs, which are

also brain states or neurophysiological states, can be either true or false by being

linked to a proposition or a content sentence. According to such logic, a true belief is

a belief or neurophysiological state that is mapped or linked to a true proposition, and

a false belief is a belief or neurophysiological state that is linked or mapped to a false

proposition. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that we already have a non-

circular account that determines the truth value of propositions.

5 The type-token distinction is a metaphysical and ontological distinction that separates a general from an abstract

concept, or in other words a nonphysical entity that does not occupy space and time from its particular concrete

instances that occupy space and time (Wetzel, 2006). For instance, the particular chair in the house is a token of the

type of thing known as ―the chair.‖

70

3. The link or mapping between beliefs and propositions needs a criterion, and Stich‘s

casual functional theory provides one. The goal of the theory is to explain and capture

our common sense intuitive concepts. As Stich explains, his argument is concerned

with ―attempting to explicate and explain well entrenched preexisting intuitive

concepts‖ (Stich, 1993a, p. 105). Therefore, capturing our common sense semantic

intuitions and concepts is the criterion and standard for governing the mapping and

linking that occurs between beliefs and propositions.

4. The main problem with the above account is that it is intuitively sanctioned.

Consequently, the maps or links it establishes between beliefs and propositions are

arbitrary, limited, and idiosyncratic. Stich does not deny people the right to ascribe

intrinsic value to true beliefs while simultaneously acknowledging that they are

limited and idiosyncratic; however, he argues that it is an inherently conservative

practice.

Stich considers the interpretation account limited and idiosyncratic. It is limited because

the set of beliefs (brain states) linked to the world by functions is a small and restricted subset of

a massive domain of beliefs that are not linked to the world by any causal chain. Accordingly,

these mental states have no interpretation or function assigned to them (i.e. they cannot be linked

to any propositions). He contends that the set of beliefs is idiosyncratic because the domain of

mental states mapped to propositions by a function is inherently small and restricted while other

possible functions not only exist but would yield substantially different mappings. Furthermore,

these possible functions do not fail to take hold as a result of some intrinsic lack, but because

they do not capture our intuitive concepts. Interpretation account approves of only one function

that has captured our intuitions, which, as noted above, is a process that is largely determined by

our language and culture. According to Stich, it is not clear why anyone would prefer a function

that produces True belief rather than True* or True** belief.6

Denying extrinsic value for true beliefs. According to Stich, true beliefs can only have

extrinsic worth if they enable us to achieve what we intrinsically or extrinsically value. In other

6 One should conceive of true beliefs as beliefs or mental states that are linked to propositions by an intuitive

function and True*, True **, or True *** beliefs as beliefs or mental states that are linked to propositions by

counterintuitive functions.

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words, they have extrinsic worth if they function as tools for achieving our goals. This argument

is composed of two parts:

First, in order to determine whether or not true beliefs have such value, we need to

compare them to other kinds of beliefs. Some may contend that such a comparison can only

show that true beliefs are superior to false beliefs because they can help us achieve our goals.

However, this is an incorrect view to take. A critical comparison is much more nuanced and

avoids the trap of functioning in an over determined binary by working with many different

types of beliefs, such as false, True*, True**, True***, and neutral beliefs. As noted above,

True*, True**, True***, etc. beliefs are beliefs that are the product of functions that do not

correspond to our common sense semantic intuitions. Neutral beliefs are those which exist

outside of the domain of the interpretation account. This means that they have no function that

causes them to be mapped to propositions, and because of this, no truth value is assigned to them

(i.e. they are neither true nor false). False beliefs are, of course, the beliefs linked to false

propositions. It is only possible to determine the superiority of true beliefs by simultaneously

comparing this array of belief types. Furthermore, it is only after this has been accomplished that

one can determine whether true beliefs have extrinsic and instrumental value (1993a).

Stich next posits that when an individual has two competing functions, he or she will

choose the function that produces the most desirable outcomes rather than making the decision

based on some inherent truth-value. For example, if function A provides a person with true

beliefs that capture his or her semantic intuitions and function B provides him or her with True*

beliefs that fail to do so, that person will tend to choose function A. However, if function B

provides him or her with True* beliefs that have better consequences, meaning that they help the

person achieve what he or she intrinsically values while the true beliefs of function A do not,

then the person will prefer function B. True beliefs, then, do not necessarily enable us to achieve

what we want, and in fact, false beliefs sometimes are better suited to help us reach our goals.

To illustrate this fact, consider this example from the research of cancer patients, disaster

victims, and ordinary people in crisis (Taylor, 1989). This research confirms that medical

patients who hold optimistic false beliefs (or as Stich calls them, ―True* beliefs‖) about their

conditions have better survival rates and recover faster than those who hold ―true beliefs‖ about

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their conditions7. This trend becomes even more pronounced when the likelihood of a negative

outcome is high. In such cases, patients with false beliefs about their conditions, such as being

overly optimistic about their chances of recovery, tend to have a better survival rate and recover

faster than those who hold true beliefs about their conditions. In this sense, medical practitioners

prefer patients to have ―True* beliefs.‖ Stich concludes that when we have many functions with

true or True* or True** or True*** beliefs, we should not choose the function that captures our

semantic intuitions but should instead pick the function that leads to the best outcomes and

achieves what we intrinsically value. Thus, when the issue is viewed critically, it is obvious that

individuals do not really prefer truth to Truth*. Furthermore, the above example also reveals that

true beliefs are not really superior, in terms of their instrumental value, to True*, True**, or even

false beliefs8 (Stich, 1993a).

Thus far Stich has argued against analytic epistemology and reliabilism. However, it is

unclear whether or not alternative epistemologies can be used to eliminate the paradoxes noted

above. What about other kinds of naturalism, such as replacement naturalism or natural kind

theory? Can these be an alternative to analytic epistemology? While Stich does not discuss

natural kind theory, which is associated with Kornblith, he does argue against Quine‘s

replacement naturalism and considers it a non-starter for epistemology (1993b).

Argument Against Quine’s Replacement Naturalism9

As noted above, this type of epistemology is associated with Quine. Stich strongly argues

against Quine's replacement naturalism, deeming it not only a ―non-starter‖ (1993b, p. 3) but

largely incoherent. He contends that Quine has erroneously replaced normative questions of

7 Readers should note that I have replaced Stich's airplane crash example with the example of the recovery rates of

medical patients presented by Shelly Taylor (1989) because the latter example is much more efficient in terms of its

clarity and validity. Taylor draws on decades of research with cancer patients, disaster victims, and ordinary people

facing crises to explain how mental and physical well-being can actually be enhanced by unrealistic optimism about

oneself, the world, and the future.

8 Stich argues that truth's lack of both intrinsic and extrinsic value is not limited to accounts that contain

environmental factors that parallel the variables that dominate his demonstration of the causal functional

interpretation account. He maintains that any interpretation account will lead to the same consequences (Stich,

1993, p. 124).

9 This argument can be found in Stich‘s ―Naturalizing Epistemology: Quine, Simon and the Prospects for

Pragmatism‖ (1993).

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epistemology with descriptive questions of psychology. For example, Quine dismisses normative

epistemological questions like "How should we form our beliefs and build our theories?" and

replaces them with descriptive psychological questions like "How do we form our beliefs and

our theories?" and "How do people in reality relate theories to their evidence?" (1993b, p. 3).

The problem with this approach, according to Stich, is that the premise on which it is based is

incorrect. It falsely assumes that all people are the same when forming their beliefs and related

theories. In reality, people form their beliefs and theories in many different ways. To elucidate

this fact, Stich discusses the theories of cognitive studies that have determined that individuals

express their inferences and relate evidence to their theories in a diverse manner that resists over-

reduction (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). In addition, Stich

discusses other studies that explore the role of a priori education and training in the reasoning

strategies of different individuals (1993b).

According to Stich, Quine‘s account is a nonstarter because it does not specify which

human subjects we should consider when investigating reasoning processes. Epistemology

should not investigate any human subjects randomly. People reason—or in Quinian terms, relate

evidence to theory—in many different ways; some can be good and some can be bad. What we

need to know are the modes by which evidence is related to a theory in human subjects who are

effective at performing this task. Quine‘s account does not and cannot provide us with this

information, and it is because of this that Stich concludes that the account is a nonstarter (1993b).

Quine‘s replacement naturalism is also limited by the fact that it can only describe how

people actually reason in reality. It can reveal information about the differences between and

variations in their reasoning strategies. However, it cannot evaluate those reasoning strategies or

judge which ones are better and which ones are worse because replacement naturalism does not

have a criterion for doing so. Consequently, it cannot construct a normative account of how

individuals should reason. As a result, the aims and questions of Quine‘s replacement naturalism

cannot replace those of analytic epistemology (1993b).

Stich is presenting inaccurate interpretation of Quine‘s theory. As I have explained

before, Quine didn‘t eliminate epistemological normativity completely. Instead he grounds it on

claims of science. Irrespective of Stich‘s inaccurate claims, some types of empirical psychology

provide normative claims. And Quine is arguing for considering those normative claims of

empirical psychology. However, Quine is eliminating the need to engage in a philosophical

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theorizing to analyze those scientific normative claims in order to identify the theoretical

framework underlying them.

Stich’s Argument for Pragmatism

It is after presenting his evaluation of the above epistemologies that Stich is able to move

on to present his argument in favor of pragmatism. His evaluation above begins by critiquing

analytic epistemologies' reliance on a priori methods of evaluating cognitive systems and

reasoning strategies. He also argues against reliabilism, which studies cognitive systems by

evaluating their consequences but limits itself to the task of obtaining truth. Stich agrees with

reliabilism‘s consequentialist means but takes issue with the notion that the search for truth

should be the ultimate aim of an epistemology because he does not believe that truth has any

intrinsic or extrinsic value. He posits pragmatism as an alternative to reliabilism; pragmatism

shares the strengths of reliabilism while avoiding its limitations. Stich asserts: ―I try to show why

this sort of pragmatic account of cognitive evaluation is suggested by the shortcomings of other

accounts‖ (1993a, p. 24). As noted earlier, his argument for pragmatism is very simple and

straightforward. Pragmatism is the best alternative to replace other accounts because it can avoid

the flaws and shortcomings inherent in other approaches to epistemology. More explanation of

this idea will be presented in the next section (1993b).

Thus far, this chapter has been concerned with presenting Stich‘s argument for

pragmatism. Having completed this, I will now move on to the second part. This section will

achieve three objectives: first, I will demonstrate the main features of Stich‘ pragmatism. Then, I

will explain how it can be applied in pursuing epistemology and consequently to reality. Last, I

will present my conclusion explaining the role that empirical science plays in Stich‘s

pragmatism. With this accomplished, I will have already answered the second question of my

criteria classifying naturalized epistemology concerning the relation between Stich‘s pragmatism

and empirical science.

The Main Features of Stich’s Pragmatism

Stich begins by explaining that he is presenting a primary structure for pragmatism. In

other words, his pragmatic account is designed to be a work in progress. Still, he presents a

strongly-worded account of pragmatism, asserting that pragmatism should evaluate methods of

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inquiry and cognitive processes in terms of their consequences (i.e. in terms of how they help us

achieve what we intrinsically value) (Stich, 1993a, p. 131). Stich confirms that all cognitive

value is instrumental or pragmatic in his account of naturalized epistemology. His pragmatism

also asserts that cognitive systems and reasoning strategies should be evaluated in the same

manner as tools, technologies, or practices that can be used to achieve a variety of goals (1993a,

p. 24, 131). Accordingly, an evaluation of reasoning strategies and cognitive systems should be

based on their ability to help individuals achieve their aims (1993a).

Stich demonstrates that his pragmatism acknowledges descriptive cognitive pluralism,

which is the belief that different people go about the business of cognition, forming and revising

beliefs and other cognitive states in significantly different ways (1993a, p. 13). In addition, his

pragmatism denies descriptive monism, which holds that all people use similar cognition

processes (1993a, p. 13). Consequently, his pragmatism confirms normative cognitive pluralism

and maintains that there is no unique system of cognitive processes that people should use

because different systems of cognitive process may all be equally effective at a given task

(1993a, p. 13). Additionally, his pragmatism rejects normative monism, which is the main

principle of analytic epistemology; normative monism argues there is only one good way to go

about the business of reasoning (Stich, 1993a, p. 13).

In addition, Stich confirms that pragmatism leads to relativism for two reasons. First,

people have different intrinsic values. Some of these values are widely shared, such as placing

importance on the health, happiness, and well-being of one's children. Other values, such as truth

or fitness, can be more idiosyncratic. Second, since people exist in a host of unique

environments, each of which can subject individuals to very different stressors, the success rate

of a given cognitive mechanism will not be consistent over space and time. Stich asserts that ―An

account of cognitive evaluation is relativistic if the assessments of cognitive systems it offers are

sensitive to facts about the person or group using the system‖ (1993a, p. 136). Stich then

explains that relativism will not be a problem for his account: ―Relativism in the evaluation of

reasoning strategies is no more worrisome than relativism in the evaluation of diets or investment

strategies or exercise programs‖ (1993b, p. 8). In other words, relativism does not prevent us

from distinguishing good and bad types of reasoning from one another. On the contrary, Stich‘s

pragmatism enables us to evaluate different cognitive systems and reasoning strategies according

to their ability to achieve desired aims and goals (1993 a, b).

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How does pragmatism proceed in pursing naturalized epistemology? Stich explains

that his account of pragmatism functions as a four-step process when employed in pursuing

epistemology:

1. The first step is to determine the aims and goals that will be used to evaluate the

systems of cognition and reasoning strategies under question. These aims can vary.

For example, they can include the goal of leading to truth, of capturing our common

sense semantic intuitions, of obtaining what we intrinsically value, etc. Accordingly,

to construct our epistemological theory we need first to define its instrumental value

by determining its intrinsic aim(s) and goal(s). Stich argues that this step is essentially

normative, and while empirical science may help to establish these aims, ―science

alone will not tell you what your goals are‖ (1993b, p. 8).

2. The second step is to analyze people who have determined their aims and who are

successful in achieving them.

3. The third step is to discover the reasoning strategies that successful people employ to

achieve their aims.

4. The fourth step is to move beyond simply recording the strategies that successful

people employ by devising ways of improving those strategies. As Stich explains, this

step is essential because it would be unproductive to simply assume that these

reasoning strategies are the best available or that they already exist in their optimal

form (1993b).

By following these four steps, naturalists can construct the theoretical framework of their

epistemological theories and then apply those theories in reality to achieve their anticipated aims.

The relationship between Stich’s pragmatism and empirical science. The above four-

step pragmatic process forms the theoretical framework of Stich‘s account. However, the role

played by empirical science in Stich‘s pragmatism remains obscure and can only be determined

by carefully considering these steps from a few perspectives.

To begin, it should be noted that the role of empirical science in Stich‘s suggested project

is clearly provided for in steps two through four. The methods and theories of cognitive

psychology are necessary for studying people who are successful in obtaining their aims. These

methods and theories are also necessary to identify the reasoning strategies that enable successful

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people to be so effective. Improving these reasoning strategies is also a task in which empirical

science can play a significant role.

It is difficult to determine the role that empirical science plays in step one of Stich‘s

pragmatic account. As outlined above, this step determines the aims and goals that will be used

to evaluate the systems of cognition and reasoning strategies under question. Accordingly, it is

concerned with normative questions of epistemology, such as how we form the criterion by

which we evaluate and choose from different cognitive processes. In other words, it seeks to

discover the methodology used to set the criterion for evaluating methods of inquiry and

cognitive processes. Determining this methodology will enable us to define the role that

empirical science can play in this stage.

Stich classifies naturalism into two kinds: strong and weak naturalism (1993b). On one

hand, both kinds share a core idea: epistemological questions need help from empirical science.

Specifically, they maintain that the methods and theories of the natural and social sciences are

necessary to investigate and solve epistemological problems. On the other hand, strong and weak

naturalism differ in the degree to which empirical science is applied. Strong naturalism, which

Stich associates with Quine, implies that all legitimate epistemological questions are not distinct

from scientific questions. If one agrees with this concept, then epistemology should be reduced

to or replaced by empirical science. In contrast, weak naturalism, which Stich associates with

reliabilism and pragmatism, affirms that epistemological questions are distinct from empirical

questions. Although some epistemological questions can be solved by empirical science, others

are fundamentally normative and cannot be solved by empirical science alone. This is why Stich

claims that pragmatism and reliabilism are versions of weak naturalism. Both weak and strong

naturalism use the methods and tools of empirical science to investigate epistemological

questions; the demarcation between scientific and epistemological questions is what

distinguishes them from one another (Stich, 1993b) (See Table 14 in Appendix A).

We can conclude that there are no constraints that limit the ways in which methods and

strategies of empirical science can be used in epistemology. Instead, the constraints are applied

to the type of questions that science can solve. According to Stich, science cannot solve or

answer normative questions. An example is his explanation of reliabilism, which consists of two

steps: normative and descriptive. The normative step ascribes special cognitive value to truth and

considers it to be the aim and criterion by which we evaluate our reasoning strategies. The

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descriptive step comes from empirical science. Empirical science can tell us which subjects are

doing a good job of making true beliefs and what types of reasoning strategies enable them to

produce these true beliefs. Stich concludes that science is unable to ―either confirm or disconfirm

the initial normative step. Science can‘t tell us by what standard strategies of reasoning should be

evaluated. The critique of the project that I offered in the previous section was aimed entirely at

the normative component‖ (Stich, 1993b, p8).

Here, Stich is referring to the primary epistemology account of substantive naturalism

which can be classified into two main stages. The first stage is responsible for constructing the

theoretical framework for ―process reliabilism‖ and the second stage is responsible for applying

the theory to reality. In the first stage, there is no use for empirical science. For example,

Goldman constructed his account entirely through a priori conceptual analysis by reflecting on

his own epistemological intuitions. Employing empirical science starts in the second stage when

we apply the theory to reality, and this is where naturalism starts in Goldman‘s process

reliabilism in primary epistemology. We have to keep in mind that Goldman applied many

changes and modifications to his primary epistemology account when it was met with criticism

by other philosophers, including Stich himself. In an attempt to save his process reliabilism and

answer his critics, Goldman constructed scientific epistemology, which employs empirical

science in its both stages.

It seems as though Stich is arguing that pragmatism must follow the lead of process

reliabilism regarding when it should make use of empirical science. While he does not clearly

explain how this process should occur, his established analogy between pragmatism and process

reliabilism suggests that it should take place at a very specific point within the four-step process

that comprises his account. The first step of Stich‘s account is to determine the aims and goals

that will be used to evaluate the systems of cognition and the reasoning strategies under

examination.

This process is begging one critical question: if empirical science is not used in the first

step of naturalism, how is this step constructed? In other words, how do we construct the

normative part of our theory, such as process reliabilism and pragmatism, without the aid of

science? Stich‘s answer is not very clear. He implies that we have only two options in regards to

how we construct the normative part of our theory; however, he does not clearly assert which

method he is using in constructing his pragmatism. These two options are:

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1. We can construct the normative part of our theory by employing empirical science.

2. We can construct the normative part of our theory using a priori analysis and

reflection on our intuitions.

As I see it, neither option provides a viable way of establishing a valid criterion by which

we can evaluate methods of inquiry. In fact, Stich cannot go with these two options. The reason

is that he clearly argues against Quine‘s thesis. Therefore, he cannot go with the first option.

Also, he cannot go with the second option because he argues against the a priori methods of

traditional epistemology. Accordingly, I will consider a third possibility which is more

compatible with Stich‘s theory. It seems that in forming the normative part of his theory stich has

engaged in some kind of introspection and deep self-reflection in order to figure out what one

really wants from life. Accordingly he was able to determine the normative part of his theory

from his own intrinsic values. Therefore, he did not need to engage in conceptual analysis to

determine that. However, he did not engage in empirical experimentation to identify the

intrinsically valuable aims for other people as well. I think this third option is more compatible

with Stich‘s methodology in forming his Pragmatism. Still, I do not think it will save him from

the former dilemma.

Finally, I can conclude that the relation between Stich‘s pragmatism and empirical

science can be something like this: on one hand, it is hard to determine the methodology

employed by Stich to form the standards and the criterion by which he evaluates methods of

enquiry. As a result, the role that empirical science plays in forming the normative part of his

theory in the first step of his pragmatic account is not clear. On the other hand, it is easy to

determine the role that empirical science plays in the remaining steps of the account. After

determining the main aims and goals in the first step of the account, empirical science is

employed in the second step to analyze people who are successful in achieving similar

determined aims. Empirical science is also employed in the third step of the account to discover

the reasoning strategies and methods of enquiry employed by the targeted successful exemplars.

Finally, empirical science is relevant to improving and advancing those determined reasoning

strategies and methods of enquiry. As a result, the four steps cooperate together by employing

empirical science to construct the final form of the targeted epistemological theory.

Consequently, this scientifically established epistemological and pragmatic theory can be applied

to reality by employing empirical science as well.

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Question 3: Does Stich’s Pragmatism Employ Conceptual Analysis?

Stich rejects practicing conceptual analysis in his pragmatism. More precisely, Stich

denies the idea that discovering the meaning of our epistemological concepts is a legitimate goal

or aim of epistemology: ―The project of analyzing epistemic terms seems so wrongheaded‖

(1993b, p. 3). He limits the primary topic of pragmatism to evaluating reasoning strategies and

methods of inquiry. Accordingly, Stich dissociates himself from Goldman and his method of

engaging in semantic or conceptual analysis in order to form epistemological theories. Stich

declares that understanding and defining epistemological concepts should not be the main topic

for epistemology.10

According to Stich, the main topic of epistemology should be evaluating the

methods of enquiry and reasoning strategies, and in order to achieve that we should not engage

in semantic analysis, either a priori or a posteriori, of epistemological concepts.

Question 4: What is The Role Ascribed to Common Sense Intuitions in Stich’s

Pragmatism?

Stich argues against employing semantic intuitions as a final referee for evaluating

epistemological theories. In other words, he rejects evaluating epistemological accounts based on

their ability to capture our linguistic and semantic intuitions. ―Most people will not find it

intrinsically valuable to have cognitive states or to invoke cognitive processes that are sanctioned

by the evaluative notions embedded in ordinary language‖ (1993a, p. 89). Stich argues for

employing his consequentialism, or more specifically his pragmatic account, as a criterion to

evaluate epistemological theories. Therefore, epistemological theories should be evaluated

instrumentally as tools and methods that enable us reach our intrinsically valuable aims.

Stich cleverly presents two arguments against employing common sense semantic

intuitions as a referee for evaluating epistemological theories.11

The first argument is directed to

10

Stich does not present an argument for dismissing understanding knowledge entirely. In fact, he clarifies (1993a,

p. 2) that the literature of epistemology demonstrates two methodologies employed in order to understand

knowledge. The first method investigates knowledge as a natural kind and the second method investigates

knowledge by presenting definitions for the concept of knowledge based on semantic analysis. In his investigation,

Stich presents extensive objections and arguments against the conceptual and semantic analysis of the concept of

knowledge. However, he does not present any objections or arguments against other methods employed to

understand knowledge as a phenomenon. Still, he dismisses the task entirely and calls it ―dreary‖ (1993, p. 3). 11

Stich would disagree with my interpretation for his approach. In fact, he clearly disqualifies his first argument

presented in (1993a) and considers it invalid argument and a form of skepticism (Stich, 2007). Also, he considers his

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the proponents of traditional epistemology. Following their methodology, Stich presents a

theoretical counterexample and the logical possibility of epistemic diversity among different

cultures. Stich asserts that an exotic culture has different cognitive systems and different

epistemic notions embedded in their thoughts and language. Their cognitive processes

correspond to their epistemic notions, just like our cognitive processes correspond to our

epistemic notions derived from our language and culture. As a result there is no clear criterion

for favoring one set of cognitive processes over the other. ―Unless one is inclined towards

chauvinism or xenophobia in matters epistemic, it is hard to see why one would much care that a

cognitive process one was thinking of invoking accords with the set evaluative notions that

prevail in the society into which one happened to be born‖ (1993a, p. 94).

This line of reasoning will not convince proponents of naturalism such as Stich himself.12

Accordingly, he has engaged in empirical experimentation to prove his thesis of epistemic

diversity among different cultures. The second objection presented by Stich follows the a

posteriori and empirical methods of naturalism. In ―Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions‖

(2001), Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (WNS) present a possibility for the diversity of intuitions

by arguing that epistemic intuitions vary systematically among cultures. In their research,

Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich present several examples to their subjects in order to examine their

reasoning patterns and philosophical intuitions. Their philosophical experiments include

examples for anti-reliabilism cases and Gettier counterexamples.

Here I will focus only on the Gettier counterexamples. Concerning knowledge, Plato‘s

―The Theaetetus‖ (369 BC) has led traditional epistemology to maintain the tripartite account for

knowledge as a justified true belief. The tripartite analysis of knowledge is applicable only to

propositional or factual knowledge, called knowledge-that, which takes the form ―S knows that

P‖ where S is the knowing subject and P is a declarative sentence stating some proposition

(Bernecker & Dretske, 1999). In Edmund Gettier‘s short article entitled ―Is Justified True Belief

Knowledge?‖ (1963), Gettier posts a challenge for the tripartite analysis of knowledge as

justified true belief. He argues that some cases of justified true belief are not cases of knowledge.

Here is one of Gettier‘s cases. Suppose Smith has overwhelming evidence for the false

second argument, presented in his empirical experiment (WNS, 2001), the real knock-down argument against the a

priori methodology of traditional epistemology.

12

See the previous note number (11).

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proposition that Jones owns a Ford. Smith‘s evidence might be that in the past Jones has offered

him a ride while driving a Ford. Consequently, Smith kept in his memory that Jones owns a

Ford. In fact, Jones does not own a Ford; he currently drives a rented car. Therefore, Smith infers

these three propositions:

1. Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston.

2. Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.

3. Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.

Logically, the proposition ―Jones owns a Ford‖ entails the three other propositions. Since Smith

realizes this, he is justified in believing these propositions. However, suppose that Brown is by

chance indeed in Barcelona. Therefore, given these assumptions, we may say that when Smith

believes (2), he holds a justified true belief. However, Gettier believes intuitively that this is not

a case of knowledge although the three conditions are met (Gettier, 1963).

In other words, Smith‘s knowing by chance is not really knowledge although it meets the

three conditions of the tripartite account of knowledge. Since the publishing of Gettier‘s paper,

epistemologists have thought that the traditional analysis for knowledge had been destroyed. As a

result, some have tried and are still trying to save the three conditions account of knowledge by

adding a forth condition that can preserve the standard view of knowledge as a justified true

belief and rule out Gettier cases. Consequently, knowledge has been defined as de-gettierized

justified true belief (Matthias, 2001, p.4).

In their study of (2001), Stich and his fellow authors examine two sets of students

belonging to two different cultures: American and East Asian. For each group, they present a

case of Gettier counterexamples, among many other examples, and then they ask their subjects to

evaluate these cases as to whether they consider them cases of knowledge or mere beliefs. The

researchers offer the following Gettier counterexamples to their subjects.

Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years. Bob therefore thinks that

Jill drives an American car. He is not aware, however, that her Buick has recently been stolen.

And he is also not aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, which is a different kind of

American car. Does Bob really know that Jill drives an American car, or does he only believe?

(WNS, 2001, p. 4).

After reading the case, subjects were given two choices: ―Really Knows‖ and ―Only

Believes.‖ Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich found that their subjects gave systematically different

answers. The majority of Western students, namely Americans, chose the option ―Only

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Believes,‖ which corresponds to the standard response in the literature of traditional

epistemology. In contrast, the majority of East Asian students chose the option ―Really Knows.‖

The authors explain the results of this study as an indication of the diversity of the epistemic

intuitions among different cultures. From this they argue that epistemic intuitions vary among

different cultures and different socioeconomic groups (WNS, 2001).

Question 5: What is The Source of Normativity for Stich’s Pragmatism?

Stich asserts that his account can explain normativity. This is an advantage that other

approaches to epistemology do not possess. For epistemic theories to have normativity, they

need a normative force, and Stich grounds normativity on human desire. When our

epistemological account produces a norm or a recommendation that X reasoning strategy is

justified, it is in effect asking the subject to use this type of reasoning strategy. If an

epistemological theory were to say that Y reasoning strategy is not justified, it would in effect be

asking the subject to abandon this reasoning strategy. So when a subject contends against such a

recommendation, Stich‘s pragmatic account has a good defense. Stich would argue that it is in

the interest of an individual to abandon Y reasoning strategy because this abandonment will

enable him them to achieve what they desire or intrinsically value. And because all people have

desires or valued things, they will care about having the tools or instruments to acquire what they

intrinsically value. One can assume that this appeal is likely to be effective, and it is because of

this that human desire functions as the force of normativity for Stich‘s pragmatic naturalism.

Question 6: What is the Relationship Between Pragmatism and Traditional Epistemology?

Stich defines analytic epistemology as ―any epistemological project that takes the choice

between competing justificational rules or competing criteria of rightness to turn on conceptual

or linguistic analysis‖ (1993a, p. 91). The above analysis of Stich‘s naturalism clearly confirms

the idea that Stich‘s pragmatism and analytic epistemology cannot coexist (See Table 15 in

Appendix A). Stich is largely dismissive of analytic epistemology. He disagrees with analytic

epistemology‘s conception of the primary topic and aims of epistemology (1993, p. 3). In

addition, he argues in favor of replacing the methods and techniques of traditional epistemology

with empirical methods. Furthermore, he rejects grounding normativity on semantic

considerations in analytic epistemology. Instead, he argues in favor of grounding normativity on

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human desires. Especially that his empirical experiment (2001), which suggests that there is

diversity between cultural epistemological intuitions, causes a major threat to the theories of

traditional epistemology concerning their source of normativity. The reason for that is the source

of normativity for normative claims of theories of traditional epistemology depends on the

assumption concerning the agreement in people‘s epistemic intuitions. When constructing an

account of knowledge or justification, epistemologists examine the proposed account against

their common sense intuitions. However, as long as people have different sets of intuitions, each

group will end up with different epistemic theories. The authority of epistemic intuitions rests on

their universality. Without universality, epistemic intuitions lose their authority as a referee for

evaluating epistemic theories (WNS, 2001). Accordingly, the meaning of epistemological

concepts cannot be a good source of their normativity. In summation, I can confidently assert

that Stich‘s pragmatic naturalism cannot co-exist with analytic epistemology. Pragmatic

naturalism must replace analytic epistemology because it can avoid the deficiencies that inhibit

analytic epistemology.

2. Strategic Reliabilism

I will continue my investigation of cooperative naturalism by analyzing the second sub-

type of cooperative naturalism, strategic reliabilism or SR, which is associated with Bishop and

Trout (henceforth referred to as B&T). Following my previous pattern, I will demonstrate the

strategic reliabilism account by applying my six-question criterion for classifying naturalized

epistemology to SR (See Figure 2 in Appendix B).

Question 1: What is The Primary Topic and Main Aim of Strategic Reliabilism?

B&T's naturalism and Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) disagree about what the

ultimate objective of epistemology should be. While SAE is concerned with exploring the

justificatory statues of beliefs by presenting accounts of knowledge and justification, SR

investigates reasoning processes and how they produce beliefs. As a result, SR is not concerned

with finding the necessary and sufficient conditions that underwrite various epistemological

terms, such as knowledge and justification. Instead, it is engaged with evaluating cognitive and

reasoning strategies and is based on the results of Ameliorative Psychology (AP). AP is a branch

of cognitive psychology that provides positive advice about reasoning excellence and how

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people can use their findings to improve their reasoning capabilities (B&T, 2005). Accordingly,

B&T's naturalism aims to articulate the epistemic generalizations that guide the prescriptions of

ameliorative psychology. SR‘s essential feature is that it is a theory of rationality and reasoning

excellence that provides positive advice to improve reasoning strategies.13

SR asserts that

―epistemically excellent reasoning is efficient reasoning that leads in robustly reliable fashion to

significant, true beliefs‖ (B&T, 2005, p. 71).

Question 2: What is The Relationship Between Empirical Science and SR? And More

Specifically, What is the Type of Empirical Science Employed And How is it Employed in

SR?

First, what type of empirical science is related to SR? B&T consider epistemology to

be a branch of the philosophy of science that takes cognitive science and other related domains

such as psychology, statistics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence as starting points for

its inquiry. This starting point is dubbed Ameliorative Psychology (AP); its essential feature is

providing positive advice about reasoning excellence and methods to improve reasoning

strategies.

Second, how is empirical science employed in SR? In order to explain this relationship

I will first present B&T‘s argument for naturalism. Next, I will demonstrate strategic reliabilism

(SR), their epistemological theory. Then I will explain the process they use to achieve their aim

of relating empirical science to epistemology. Finally, I will demonstrate the relationship

between SR and empirical science.

B&T’s Arguments for Strategic Reliabilism

B&T’s Argument for Naturalism

B&T present a clear argument that relates empirical science to epistemology. They

maintain that Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) suffers from severe flaws and deficiencies

because it does not have an appropriate relationship with empirical science. Since SR has the

proper relationship with empirical science, it stands to reason that it will be able to avoid the

13

A reasoning strategy can be defined generally as a repeatable pattern of reasoning that is instantiated by cognitive

processes (B&T, 2008, p. 1050).

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shortcomings of SAE and is a more viable epistemology. Accordingly, B&T begin their

argument in favor of SR by critiquing SAE and showing its main shortcomings. Their analysis of

SAE is a critique that exposes the flaws inherent in the aim, methods, and consequences of this

type of epistemology. They then explain the advantages of SR and how it is able to avoid these

flaws and shortcomings and function as a more efficient replacement model. B&T consider SAE

only in their analysis and do not refer to other types of naturalized epistemology, such as

replacement naturalism, pragmatism, or natural kind theory.

B&T’s Argument Against SAE

B&T construct their argument against SAE using the same grounds as Stich‘s argument.

However, B&T go further by extending the objection to cover new dimensions. B&T affirm that

the defective aims and methods of SAE are beyond repair. Like Stich, they argue that SAE holds

that the main goal of epistemology is to provide a theory of knowledge and justification that

captures our epistemic semantic intuitions. The resulting theories are evaluated according to the

stasis requirement, which asserts that ―epistemic theories should leave our epistemic situation

largely unchanged‖ (B&T, 2005, p. 9). This means that SAE epistemologists employ their

intuitions as a final referee for evaluating epistemic accounts. B&T contend that the stasis

requirement is a fundamental factor inherent in the methods of SAE; SAE epistemologists can

only pursue their inquiry through an inherently flawed process:

1. Epistemologists construct their accounts of knowledge or justification by employing a

priori conceptual analysis based on introspection.

2. In order to evaluate the resulting account—accepting, rejecting it, or modifying it—

epistemologists present several hypothetical counterexamples for the targeted account.

3. The target account is defended and modified according to Goodman‘s reflective equilibrium,

which asserts that ―a rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept, an

inference is rejected if it violated a rule we are unwilling to amend‖ (Stich, 1993a, p. 77).

Basically, reflective equilibrium implies that mutual adjustments and modifications between

rules and their inferences must be made until both are brought into an agreement with each other.

In SAE, the goal is to bring the targeted account and our intuitions into agreement.

4. Therefore, according to the stasis requirement, if accepting the targeted account requires

making radical modification to our epistemological judgments, then we have to reject the

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account. This is because a successful epistemological theory or account must preserve most of

our epistemic judgments or semantic intuitions. For example, if we have two competing accounts

of justification, the stasis requirement prescribes choosing the one that makes the least changes

to our epistemic judgments or intuitions (B&T, 2005).

B&T are uncomfortable with the outcomes produced by the methodology of SAE. They

explain two main problems; first, they object to its conservative slant, arguing that it prevents

one from making any progress in epistemology. To demonstrate the serious nature of this issue,

they create an analogy in which they employ the conservative stasis principle in other domains,

including empirical science. When applied to science, the stasis principle prevents one from

making any progress or improvement because it forces them to reject any potentially successful

theory that proves to be counterintuitive when it is first advocated. This would include notable

theories like Darwinism, Relativity, Quantum Mechanics, and Copernicanism, which profoundly

disturbed the common sense intuitions of their respective times (B&T, 2005).

Second, B&T also take issue with the fact that SAE is a descriptive enterprise that lacks a

sufficient source of normativity. This is an interesting argument because SAE has always

criticized naturalized epistemology for being a descriptive form of enquiry that lacks a source of

normativity due to its reliance on empirical science as its starting point. However, B&T argue

that SAE suffers from the same flaw. Like naturalists, traditional epistemologists need to do a lot

of work to establish normativity and bridge the ―is-ought‖ gap. They need to argue for a

sufficient source of normativity in their theories instead of ascribing normativity based on

intuitive postulations, which were simply taken for granted for many years. B&T counter that

ameliorative psychology, the starting point for B&T naturalism, provides a source of normativity

that is superior to that which can be obtained via traditional epistemology (B&T, 2005).

Contrary to what SAE proponents would have us believe, B&T argue that, unlike the

common belief, SAE is a descriptive inquiry that bases its epistemic intuitions on the

introspection and self-exploration that has been conducted by a small number of idiosyncratic

and highly specialized Western philosophers (2005, p. 107). By detecting the methodology and

process by which SAE obtains its theories, B&T are able to conduct an exploration of the

theories‘ descriptive core:

1. Like empirical scientists, traditional epistemologists construct their theories using the

following model: account/counterexample/revision. In science, the resulting theories

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are tested empirically, but in philosophy, they are tested against philosophers'

common sense intuitions.

2. B&T have three problems with this method:

i. The thinkers who perform this strategy (traditional philosophers) are a small

and idiosyncratic sample of people with highly specialized educations and

training, which profoundly affects the manner in which they think about the

world. As a result, they do not represent average people, who tend to lack

even basic philosophical training and who may disagree with the epistemic

concepts and judgments of philosophers as a result. Also, no criterion exists

that can explain why we should prefer philosophers‘ judgments to those made

by average people. Their philosophical training cannot be the criterion used to

do this unless one is able to present a reasonable justification for making such

a choice. For example, one might argue that philosopher lead a successful and

flourishing life as a result of his or her training and then use this fact to

explain why his or her opinions should be valued at a higher rate than those of

the average person. However, no studies exist that indicate that there are clear

and consistent differences between the existential well-being of philosophers

and average people.

ii. The intended aim of these theories is simply not sufficient. Philosophers who

adhere to these theories do not find the necessary and sufficient conditions of

knowledge itself, but they end up describing their own epistemic concepts and

judgments.

iii. Even if we granted epistemology the aim of describing philosophers‘ concepts

and judgments, the tool SAE uses to achieve it is not sufficient. As noted

above, SAE depends on the armchair anthropology of philosophers who

document their current intuitive judgments towards particular epistemological

cases. Instead of investigating what knowledge and justification should be,

they describe what they think knowledge and justification are. B&T believe

that psychology can offer empirical methods of constructing a descriptive

account of epistemological concepts that is far more effective than the

reflective and introspective methodology of SAE.

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3. B&T explain that the descriptive nature of SAE can be further revealed

and critically undermined by applying the findings of ―Normativity and Epistemic

Intuitions,‖ a research study conducted by Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001).

B&T argue that SAE‘s jump from the descriptive into the normative is unjustified, and

SAE‘s viability ultimately depends on its ability to answer this charge. One attempt that SAE has

pursued is to claim that theories of SAE essentially analyze normative concepts, such as

knowledge, justification, rationality, etc. If one accepts this claim, then he or she must accept

that although SAE is engaged in a descriptive enterprise, it is still normative because it is

analyzing already existent normative concepts. B&T respond by reminding traditional

epistemologists of WNS‘ findings which, as noted above, suggest that epistemological intuitions

and judgments vary across different cultures.

These results threaten the aim and methods of SAE because they suggest that SAE is

analyzing the wrong concepts. SAE is placed in the difficult position of providing a criterion that

explains why they prefer the epistemological concepts and judgments of Western culture over,

for example, Eastern ones. Otherwise, they have to accept that SAE is relativistic and decide

whether or not this undermines their epistemology. Furthermore, they must confront the fact that

armchair a priori conceptual analysis based on introspection is an inadequate methodology. As

explained above, B&T expose this by constructing an analogy that compares the methodology of

SAE with that used in the empirical sciences. Using SAE‘s methodology would lead empirical

science into presenting intuitive but wrong analyses of their concepts and principles. For

example, when applied to the field of physics, subjects dependent on a priori analysis for their

intuitive judgments end up presenting folk theory of Aristotelian physics in spite of their

knowledge of Newtonian mechanics (B&T, 2005).

As a result, B&T effectively expose the flaws inherent in the aims, methodology, and

consequences of SAE and move towards advocating SR as an alternative model that can avoid

these shortcomings and provide a better method for establishing normativity. I will present an

extensive explanation of SR as a means of detailing the approach‘s advantages.

B&T’s overview of SR. B&T explain that one of the goals of their naturalist account of

SR is to articulate the theoretical epistemological framework that guides AP recommendations as

a means of enabling their project to adequately deal with actual problems. They also hope to use

the guiding framework of AP to solve normative disputes within ameliorative psychology itself.

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The framework of SR affirms that ―epistemic excellence involves efficient allocation of

cognitive resources to robustly reliable reasoning strategies applied to significant problems‖

(B&T, 2005, p. 71). In other words, SR affirms that the epistemic quality of a given reasoning

strategy is a function of the interaction of three central elements:

1. Robust Reliability: The reliability score of a cognitive process is its ratio of true to

total judgments within the limit of its expected range of problems. Robust cognitive

reasoning is reasoning that is reliable within a wide range of environments.

Robustness is a matter of scope and consistency. Scope can be defined as the extent to

which the reasoning process is applicable to a broad set of problems. And the

consistency of cognitive processes can be determined by the reliability of the

cognitive process across various discriminable partitions in its range (B&T, p.2005, p.

75).

2. Strategy Tractability: This asks how difficult it is to employ a given reasoning

strategy. This can be detected by comparing the costs of, resources exerted in, and

benefits of believing significant truths and of employing the reasoning strategy under

question. Evaluating the costs and benefits can be tackled by measurable proxies; a

proxy of time corresponds to the costs of a reasoning strategy while the proxy of true

beliefs or reliability corresponds to its benefits.

3. Significance of the Problems it Tackles: The benefit of good reasoning is not true

belief in its own right, but the creation of true beliefs about significant problems. For

those who accept such a view, people who reliably reason about significant problems

are better than people who reason reliably about insignificant ones (B&T, 2005,

2008).

Strategic reliabilism asserts that there are only four ways to improve reasoning:

1. Adopt a more reliable but less expensive reasoning strategy. This always results in

better consequences.

2. Adopt a more reliable but more expensive reasoning strategy. This sometimes leads

to better reasoning.

3. Adopt a less reliable and less expensive reasoning strategy.

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4. A fourth option, which is based on the concept of resource allocation, is different

from the other possibilities because it does not involve adopting a new reasoning

strategy but modifying the one currently being employed (B&T, 2005).

The relationship between SR and empirical science. Unlike other naturalistic

epistemologists, B&T do not distinguish between descriptive questions concerning how things

are (empirical science) and normative questions concerning how things should be

(epistemology). In fact, they argue that like epistemology, empirical science (especially AP) also

deals with normative questions. They also argue that empirical science often makes normative

claims. B&T treat empirical science the same way traditionalists treat common sense intuitions.

Traditional epistemologists construct their epistemological theories by investigating their

normative judgments based on their common sense semantic intuitions. This means that the

resulting epistemological theory is believed to be the theoretical framework underlying

traditional epistemologists‘ normative claims and common sense semantic intuitions. Similarly,

by investigating the normative claims of AP, B&T are trying to discover the theoretical

framework underlying those normative claims of empirical science.

In addition, unlike other epistemologists, either traditionalists or naturalists, B&T use

their constructed epistemological theory to improve empirical science. After extracting the

theoretical framework of SR from the theories of AP, B&T employ SR again to solve the

problems of AP. This means that B&T begin their naturalism by reflecting on and drawing from

empirical theories of cognitive science, especially AP. They then use these theories to infer and

construct the theoretical framework of their account of SR, which is based on the theories of

cognitive psychology. After accomplishing this, they apply their well-established account of SR

to reality and use it to solve actual problems. They also apply SR back onto AP as a means of

solving its normative disputes. As a result, SR has two overarching objectives:

1. Solve actual problems in reality: For example, SR tries to present advice that is

practical and positive. It maintains that when a person is presented with a diagnosis

problem that has a probability format, he or she should replace the probability format

with a frequency format.14

14

For more information about this topic, see (B&T, 2005, p. 138-153).

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2. Solve normative disputes in psychology: For example, SR can be used to help solve

the aforementioned argument against Nisbett and Ross (1980) about how to establish

standards to evaluate reasoning strategies 15(See Figure 4 in Appendix B).

Question 3: Does Strategic Reliabilism Employ Conceptual Analysis?

B&T are not interested in providing an analysis of epistemological concepts. As a

result, SR does not provide explanation of or definitions for our epistemological concepts. The

main aim of strategic reliabilism is evaluating reasoning strategies. When evaluating cognitive

processes and reasoning strategies, SR does not depend on analyzing epistemological concepts or

terms in the same way that, for example, Goldman‘s epistemology does.

Question 4: What is The Role Ascribed to Common Sense Intuitions in SR?

B&T do not entirely dismiss intuitions. They employ them in the same manner as

scientists who are engaged in empirical research. They simply refuse to use common sense

intuitions as a final evaluative criterion. Instead, like empirical scientists, they test their accounts

against reality.

Question 5: What is The Source of Normativity for Strategic Reliabilism?

SAE has always used semantic considerations as the definitive source of normativity for

its theories. In contrast, SR contends that certain components of psychology (AP) are inherently

normative. B&T argue that ameliorative psychology is descriptive and normative at the same

time. Although SR has a descriptive core that depends on the findings of AP, B&T argue that AP

is normative in the sense that it implicitly and explicitly provides positive advice to guide

people‘s reasoning. For example, one of the findings of AP is that Statistical Prediction Rules

(SPRs) are more accurate and reliable than human experts. Accordingly, AP provides us with

this normative epistemic advice: when making predictions in cases like school admissions, credit

risk assessments, and psychiatric diagnoses, people ought to use SPRs instead of counting on

human experts16

(B&T, 2005).

15

For more information about this topic, see B&T (2005, p. 119-137). 16

Many other examples can be found in B&T‘s Epistemology and Psychology of Human Judgment (2005).

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It should be noted that the approach detailed above does risk succumbing to the threat of

circularity. For example, if we begin with a set of empirical findings acquired through AP and

then try to infer normative prescriptions from these findings, how do we know which findings to

employ? In other words, how do we know which empirical findings are epistemologically

justified or well grounded? Furthermore, how can we draw normative prescriptions from

descriptive empirical findings? The answer is that we cannot do any of this unless we already

have an a priori theory that defines what is epistemologically positive and we are able to

confidently use it to infer epistemological judgments about the empirical findings obtained

through AP.

B&T respond that they can overcome this problem by employing the Aristotelian

principle to bridge the ―is-ought‖ gap. The Aristotelian principle asserts that ―In the long run,

poor reasoning tends to lead to worse outcomes than good reasoning‖ (B&T, 2005, p. 20). The

basic premise here is that good reasoning strategies generally lead to successful outcomes while

bad reasoning strategies generally lead to unsuccessful outcomes. For example, SPRs are a good

reasoning strategy because they lead to better outcomes than human experts. One might also

understand this concept by considering a simple medical analogy. When using medicine to treat

an illness, a good medicine is one that successfully treats the disease. In this sense, the

medicine‘s ability to effectively treat the disease is an indication of its quality, and this is the

criterion upon which any given medicine will be judged. The same is true when it comes to

evaluating the effectiveness of reasoning processes; the processes that effectively solve a given

problem are deemed to be good and vice versa.

Question 6: What is The Relationship Between Strategic Reliabilism and Traditional

Epistemology?

B&T demonstrate that a healthy epistemological structure must consist of theoretical,

practical, and social aspects. As a result, they consider their epistemic theory, SR, to be better

than SAE because SR embraces all three components while SAE deals with only one:

1. Theoretical: SR is the theoretical framework extracted from the recommendations

of AP. As such, its recommendations are compatible with the recommendations of

AP. SR is also used to explain AP, or in other words, to explain why some

reasoning strategies are epistemically better than others. SR accomplishes this by

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drawing attention to the fact that good reasoning tends to yield good outcomes.

This enables it to not only solve challenges to its own framework, but also loop

back and solve disputes within AP.

2. Practical: The practical aspect is concerned with the applied component of

epistemology, which is engaged in solving reasoning problems. Ameliorative

psychology is the science of applied epistemology because it is primarily

concerned with providing advice to help people more effectively reason about

their world. Thus, SR‘s practical component is concerned with improving

reasoning processes using the recommendations of AP.

3. Social: It is possible for SR to satisfy social demand (i.e. to be a well-ordered

social system that communicates its practical recommendations to the public).

While B&T do not provide a detailed scheme showing how this can be done, they

do suggest two main conditions that can help SR reach this goal. First, SR should

be organized in a way that allows it to be efficiently presented to a broad swath of

society. Secondly, an extensive set of empirical tests should be applied to the

findings of SR to prevent it from inflicting unintended harm on the public.

In contrast, B&T claim that SAE contains only a theoretical component and lacks the

other aspects of a healthy epistemology. The epistemology of SAE is not easily applied to

society. For example, the theories of SAE, such as Foundationlism, Coherentism, etc., do not

provide us with positive advice about what beliefs to accept17

or how to solve intellectual

problems. The theories of SAE are also not meant to be addressed to the public. Instead, they are

meant to be published and circulated among philosophical conferences and journal because they

are very complex and highly specialized, and as a result, they can be comprehended only by

advanced philosophers (2005).

Another major difference between SR and SAE is that SAE is engaged in evaluating

beliefs while SR is concerned with evaluating reasoning processes that eventually yield beliefs.

However, the two approaches cannot coexist because they will tend to produce conflicting

prescriptions—that is, if we agree that SAE yields any prescriptions at all. SAE needs to be

replaced by strategic reliabilism because, as B&T explain, the aims, methods, and consequences

of SR are far superior to those of SAE (2005) (See Table 17 in Appendix A).

17

See Ernest Sosa‘s ―A Defense of the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy‖ (2005).

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3. Kornblith’s Natural Kind Theory

I will now present the third and last type of cooperative naturalism: Kornblith‘s natural

kind theory. I will explain Kornblith‘s natural kind theory by employing my six-question

criterion for classifying naturalized epistemology (See Figure 2 in Appendix B).

Question 1: What is The Primary Topic And Main Aim of Kornblith’s Natural Kind

Theory?

Kornblith argues that the main aim of epistemology should be understanding the natural

phenomenon of human knowledge and other epistemological phenomena rather than

investigating our concept of knowledge. Kornblith argues that knowledge is a legitimate

scientific category and should be considered a natural kind (2002, p. 29). As a result, Kornblith

argues against the methodology practiced in traditional epistemology, which is primarily

concerned with employing a priori conceptual analysis and using intuitions as the final criterion

for evaluating the resulting theories. The first problem with traditional epistemology‘s

methodology is that it has shifted the primary topic and aim of epistemology from finding out

what knowledge is to discovering people‘s concept of knowledge or what people think knowledge

is: ―In my view…the subject matter of epistemology is knowledge itself and not our concept of

knowledge‖ (Kornblith, 2002, p. 1).

According to Kornblith, when investigating knowledge, we should look outward at the

target phenomenon, knowledge itself, and not inward within our intuitions because our intuitions

and concepts can be corrupt. Consequently, the process of introspection and self-reflection on

our concepts will actually prevent us from correcting any mistaken beliefs we hold about

knowledge or other epistemological phenomena. Kornblith also employs the same argument

against the empirical methodology practiced by other naturalists such as Goldman. Kornblith

argues that Goldman‘s empirical and a posteriori conceptual analysis for epistemological

concepts such as justification in substantive naturalism should be rejected. The reason that this

methodology is flawed because it shifts the main subject matter of epistemology from its original

topic, which is investigating and discovering epistemological phenomena such as knowledge,

96

justification, etc., and transfers it mistakenly into investigating our flawed concepts of these

phenomena (Kornblith, 2002).

Question 2: What is The Relationship Between Empirical Science And Kornblith’s Natural

Kind Theory? And More Specifically, What is The Type of Empirical Science Employed

And How is it Employed in Kornblith’s Natural Kind Theory?

First, what is the kind of empirical science related to Kornblith’s natural kind

theory? Kornblith argues that cognitive psychology and its sub-domain of cognitive ―ethology,‖

the study of animal knowledge, are the main types of empirical science that should be employed

in his naturalism.

Second, how are cognitive psychology and cognitive ethology employed in

Kornblith’s natural kind theory? Kornblith contends that empirical science is the starting point

from which naturalists should begin their philosophical investigations. As a result, methods and

theories of empirical science are used to answer philosophical problems of epistemology. Further

elaboration is needed in order to explain this issue. I will continue my analysis by explaining

Kornblith‘s reasoning strategy in constructing this account. Next, I will present the argument

relating empirical science/psychology to epistemology. Then I will demonstrate Kornblith‘s

naturalist project of investigating knowledge empirically without employing conceptual analysis

either a priori or a posteriori. Finally, I explain his argument that knowledge is a natural kind.

Understanding Kornblith‘s thought process will provide us with a better understanding of

his natural kind theory. He strongly rejects the analytic epistemological claim that epistemology

is autonomous. In order to avoid circularity, analytic epistemologists contend that epistemology

and philosophy in general are a priori enquiries that are not only independent but in fact should

precede any empirical science. Accordingly, they reject naturalism as an a posteriori enterprise

and see it as a thought process that is inherently opposed to philosophy. They believe that if one

accepts the tenets of naturalism, then he or she has rejected philosophy entirely and has fallen

into crude empirical science. Kornblith has a different perspective. He rejects both analytic

epistemologists‘ claim that naturalism and philosophy are incommensurable with one another

and the idea that one must inhabit one discipline or the other: ―Questions about knowledge and

justification, questions about theory and evidence, are to my mind, legitimate questions, and they

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are ones in which philosophy has a special stake….There is no danger that these questions and

concerns will be somehow co-opted by other disciplines‖ (Kornblith, 2002, p. 26).

In addition, he opposes the belief that epistemology and philosophy are a priori and

independent of empirical science. His view of epistemology can be considered a middle ground

between the two established extremes of traditional epistemology and Quine‘s replacement

naturalism. Traditional epistemology emphasizes practicing a priori analysis and dismisses any

employment for empirical science. And in contrast, Quine‘s replacement naturalism dismisses all

normative epistemological questions and the a priori methods of traditional epistemology and

replaces them with scientific and empirical questions and methods. Like Stich, Kornblith has an

intermediary view. On the one hand, he believes that epistemology has its own distinctive

normative questions that other empirical sciences do not consider. On the other hand, he sees

epistemology as continuous with science and holds that it can legitimately employ scientific

methods and theories to solve its philosophical questions. In short, according to Kornblith,

epistemology has its own set of questions and concerns, but it uses the tools and methodology of

empirical science to solve these questions (Kornblith, 2002) (See Table 14 in Appendix A).

Argument For Naturalism

Besides changing the main subject matter of epistemology from investigating

epistemological phenomena into investigating our concepts of these phenomena, Kornblith takes

issue with other aspects of the methodology used in traditional epistemology as well. He

condenses these objections into a three-step critique that outlines the ways in which traditional

epistemology goes astray:

1. Constructing an account based on a priori analysis.

2. Testing the account by hypothetical counterexamples.

3. Modifying the account according to these counterexamples as a means of squaring it with our

pre-philosophical intuitions.

The first problem is that the methodology, which is called the standard justificatory

procedure, can be both too broad and too narrow. It can be too narrow because when one

depends on using introspection to discover imaginary hypothetical counterexamples, one is

prevented from considering other possibilities that could be obtained through serious empirical

investigation. On the other hand, the methodology can be too broad in the sense that many

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imaginable cases are not genuine possibilities and so should not be included in our range of

possible theories (Kornblith, 2002).

The second problem is that intuitions are neither credible nor reliable criteria for

evaluating resulting epistemological theories. They do have important but limited roles during

the process of pursuing philosophical investigation. However, regardless of what traditional

epistemologists claim, naturalists do account for intuitions in their methods and theories because

intuitions have proven to be productive. Still, intuitions should not be given more of a role than

they can bear. For instance, they should not be employed as a final criterion of evaluation

(Kornblith, 2002).

Kornblith believes that our overreliance on conceptual analysis and consulting intuitions

can be traced to two main influences. The first is that we naturally believe that our intuitions are

infallible, and the second is that there is often no source of information available to us other than

our intuitions. However, Kornblith explains that both of these assumptions are wrong for several

reasons. One is that intuitions are not a priori but are theoretically mediated and historically

conditioned. For example, our conceptions of and intuitions about knowledge are not a priori.

Instead, they are a posteriori based on the manner in which knowledge is gained in empirical

science. In other words, our conception of knowledge itself is influenced by the types of

empirical science that dominate our socio-cultural discourse. For example, Descartes‘ view that

knowledge requires certainty is a reflection of the views and scientific intuitions of the empirical

science dominant during that era. Before the scientific revolution, science was based on the

common view that it could only achieve success if it was based on an absolute guarantee.

Accordingly, Descartes demanded certainty in knowledge within his theorizing. In contrast,

current science believes that it can achieve success if its theories have an approximate truth. As

a result, the view that certainty is a requirement of knowledge has been abandoned18

. In short, the

change that has occurred to the way people understand the relationship between knowledge and

certainty is a direct result of the ways in which the perception of success has changed in the field

of empirical science: ―The practice of appealing to intuitions has no non-natural ingredients‖

(Kornblith, 2002, p. 21).

18

It is not clear how Kornblith established such claims about dropping certainty as demand for knowledge. Equally

unclear is the identity of the thinkers to whom he refers. He might be referring to epistemologists or average people

or both. Still, he is not constructing such claims based on any empirical testing. I think such claims need to be tested

empirically because I do not think average people have dropped the demand for certainty in knowledge.

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Even if our intuitions were informed by the best empirical theories, they would still not

be reliable evaluative tools because humans are slow learners: ―It is one thing for the scientific

community to make an important discovery; quite another for that discovery to be common

knowledge‖ (Kornblith, 2002, p. 16). Accordingly, Kornblith firmly rejects Goldman‘s empirical

and a posteriori methodology and its purpose. In substantive naturalism, especially in scientific

epistemology and epistemics, Goldman employs empirical and a posteriori conceptual analysis

to investigate epistemological concepts by employing the exemplar approach of concept

representations.19

This methodology uses educated and well-informed intuitions as a final

criterion for evaluating epistemological theories. According to Goldman, the main purpose of

this methodology is to maintain the link between folk intuitions and scientific intuitions and to

preserve the subject matter of epistemology. Goldman contends that if it were otherwise, we

would not know what we are analyzing. Kornblith argues that there are other, better ways by

which we can preserve the subject matter of epistemology without relying on faulty intuitions.

Kornblith advocates natural kind theory and causal theory of reference as better alternatives,

each of which will be explained later in this chapter (Kornblith, 2002).

Employing Empirical Methods to Investigate Knowledge as a Natural Kind

Kornblith argues that epistemological phenomena such as knowledge, justification etc.,

are natural kinds. Given this, a priori conceptual analysis based on individual introspection

cannot be a legitimate tool for investigating knowledge. Knowledge as a natural kind is an

external phenomenon that is independent of our concept of it. As a result, Kornblith argues that

knowledge should be empirically investigated in the same way that other natural kinds (such as

rocks, aluminum, or gold) are examined in empirical science. The methodology in play here is

similar to that used by the empirical sciences. In order to understand the natural phenomenon of

knowledge, naturalists must collect and examine all the different instances of knowledge, such as

human knowledge and animal knowledge, to determine what they have in common. Accordingly,

their common core—which is knowledge—should be the focus of our study. Notably, according

to this theory, it is the world that determines what knowledge is and not our naive intuitions, and

19

A detailed explanation for this approach is provided in chapter three of this dissertation, which concerns

substantive naturalism.

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naturalists should investigate external phenomena to inform their intuitions, not the other way

around (Kornblith, 2002).

Investigating Knowledge Empirically. How is it possible to investigate knowledge after

rejecting both the tools and methodology of traditional epistemology, such as a priori conceptual

analysis based on introspection and self-reflection, and the methodology of substantive

naturalism, such as empirical and a posteriori conceptual analysis? Kornblith advocates

surmounting this issue by adopting natural kind theory and the tools of empirical science. He

advocates using a three-step process to investigate knowledge empirically:

1. The main job of epistemology is to discover and understand the natural phenomenon

of human knowledge. To achieve this, we have to collect and examine different

examples of knowledge, human and animal knowledge, and find out what they have

in common. As noted above, the investigation of natural kinds is invested in a

methodology that is similar to that which is used in the empirical sciences. In geology

or chemistry, for example, scientists do not have a full theory that defines the target

phenomenon under study. At first, they use their common sense intuitions to collect

what they believe to be rock, aluminum or gold. Judgments at early stages of the

investigation are naïve and fallible and likely to improve as the study progresses.

Also, at the first stages of the investigation, background beliefs play a central role in

judgments. Without substantial empirical investigation to inform our background

beliefs, judgments will be naïve and inaccurate (Kornblith, 2002, p. 10).

2. In the middle of this process, philosophers rely more on empirical investigation and

less on intuitive judgments as they construct their theories. Judgments formed in the

later stages, which are based on theoretical understanding of the phenomenon under

investigation, are far superior to the judgments based on intuitive and fallible

background beliefs that were formed in the first stages of the investigation. As a

theory develops, many examples that were thought to be instances of knowledge in

the early stages of the study will be eliminated while some other instances that had

previously been dismissed will be implemented. ―As theory has advanced here, raw

appeal to intuitions have declined‖ (Kornblith, 2002, p. 15). Our judgments based on

a priori intuitions are useful in the early stages of the investigation because they help

us collect examples of knowledge. But once the theoretical understanding of

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knowledge is formed, those judgments based on a priori intuitions should be

abandoned unless they were preserved within the full and complete theory of

knowledge (Kornblith, 2002).

3. This does not mean that employing intuitions is eliminated after developing and

completing the theoretical framework of the theory. We have to keep in mind that

there are no a priori intuitions, only naïve intuitions. According to Kornblith, ―The

use of intuitive judgments does not disappear in any stage of theorizing. Instead old

intuitions give way to well-integrated theoretical judgments, and, in addition, to new

intuitions about matters not fully captured in explicit theory‖ (2002, p. 20). As a

result, employing intuitions is never eliminated from our process of empirically

investigating epistemological phenomena such as knowledge. We replace naïve

intuitions with empirical intuitions in investigating knowledge empirically.

Nevertheless, those empirical intuitions are never the criteria for evaluating our

resulting theory. The resulting theory can be used to correct our mistaken beliefs and

concepts about the nature or the essence of knowledge, but these beliefs and concepts

are not employed as criteria for evaluating the resulting theory (i.e. the resulting

theory need not correspond to or capture our intuitions) (Kornblith, 2002).

Kornblith’s Argument for Knowledge as a Natural Kind

Kornblith‘s argument can be explained in these steps:

1. Kornblith argues that investigating cognitive ethology will result in A) concluding

that animals have knowledge and B) presenting a reliablist account of knowledge. As

in Goldman‘s account of knowledge, Kornblith defines knowledge as ―a reliably

produced true belief‖ (2002, p. 19, 63, 69).

2. From studying examples of human knowledge and animal knowledge, Kornblith

concludes that knowledge –whatever animal or human- is one natural kind.

3. The theoretical unity between instances of knowledge (i.e. animal knowledge and

human knowledge) enables the definition of knowledge and indicates that knowledge

is a natural kind.

A detailed explanation for Kornblith‘s argument is presented below:

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The First Premise:

A. By investigating cognitive ethology, Kornblith argues that animals have knowledge.

His argument takes these three steps:

1. He begins by asserting that animals have representational states: ―animals have

internal states with informational contents‖ (2002, p. 36). He then discusses desert

ants as a means of validating his claim. When out foraging, these ants are able to

use a process known as ―dead reckoning‖ to return directly to their home in a

straight line without needing to backtrack along the path that they traversed when

they left. Kornblith argues that these ants can only accomplish this because they

can internally represent features of their environment, such as their spatial

position.

2. Kornblith argues that we must attribute intentional states and beliefs to animals

because doing so allows us to explain and predict animals‘ behaviors. For

example, ravens work together to acquire their food. One raven will distract a

hawk while another snatches the squirrel that the hawk recently killed. The best

way to explain and predict the ravens‘ behavior is by ascribing beliefs to them. He

further argues that these are the same things that make us attribute beliefs and

desires to humans.

3. Kornblith next concludes that we must attribute knowledge to animals. Kornblith

argues that ascribing true beliefs to animals does not help explaining some certain

animal behavior. In order to explain those behaviors, animals need more than

beliefs that just happen to be true. Instead, ―the resulting true beliefs are not

accidently true beliefs, they are produced by cognitive capacity that is attuned to

its environment‘ (2002, p. 58). To explain what Kornblith means by ―attuned,‖ he

appeals to the concept of fitness established in the theory of evolution. Kornblith

argues that through the process of natural selection animals have acquired reliable

cognitive capacities that allow them to ―successfully negotiate their environment‖

(2002, p. 57). Such cognitive capacity reliably produces true beliefs. Accordingly,

from investigating cognitive ethology Kornblith concludes that reliably produced

true beliefs are what constitute knowledge.

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B. After investigating cognitive ethology, Kornblith confirms that his account of

knowledge is very similar to Goldman‘s reliability account of knowledge. Kornblith

asserts: ―Knowledge is a robust category in the ethology literature; it is more than

belief, and more than true belief. It requires a reliably produced true belief‖ (2002, p.

69). Also, he adds: ―The account of knowledge I am offering here is a reliability

account‖ (Kornblith, 2002, p. 63). He elaborates by saying that ―I do not wish to

exaggerate my disagreement with him either. After all, the account of knowledge I

endorse is, in the end, a reliability account very similar to the one Goldman himself

offers‖ (2002, p. 19). However, Kornblith‘s empirical account of knowledge

disagrees with Goldman‘s in many other aspects. Most significantly, Kornblith

believes that ―knowledge is a legitimate scientific category and should be considered

to be a natural kind‖ (2002, p. 29). Accordingly, the methods employed to investigate

knowledge as a natural kind are completely different from Goldman‘s. Finally, the

source of normativity of his account does not depend on semantic considerations like

Goldman‘s.

The Second Premise

Kornblith investigates human knowledge as another example of knowledge and argues

that it is not different in kind from animal knowledge. His argument goes like this:

1. Social practices do not provide solid reasons to distinguish between human

knowledge and animal knowledge because ―language is not essential to knowledge,

nor the social practice of giving and asking for reasons‖ (2002, p. 102).

2. Self -conscious reflection on one‘s beliefs and their logical relations does not provide

grounds to distinguish between human knowledge and animal knowledge. Empirical

science has proven that introspection is not a reliable method and it is in fact fallible.

The attempt to distinguish between human knowledge and animal knowledge

concerning reflection will result in a highly demanding concept of knowledge that

cannot be acquired by humans themselves. Accordingly, Knowledge does not require

reflection.

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3. Therefore human knowledge is similar in kind to animal knowledge. From

investigating empirically both instances and discovering what they have in common,

we can identify the core of knowledge.

The Conclusion: Knowledge is a Natural Kind

I will explain some of the key concepts in Kornblith's natural kind account. These

concepts are: homeostatic property clusters, natural kinds. Homeostatic property clusters occur

when objects or entities of a natural kind are connected together by a natural link or bond.

Accordingly, a natural kind can be defined as a natural group and real set of objects or entities

that share natural properties. By natural we mean that it does not depend on humans. More

clearly, a natural kind is a family of entities that possesses properties that are glued together by a

natural law. Chemical elements, such as gold and aluminum, and physical particles, such as

atoms and quarks, are examples of natural kinds. Natural kinds should be distinguished from

artificial groups of things or objects that have been put together in an arbitrary way by an

individual or group of people. For example, items grouped together in a grocery list would not be

considered a natural kind. The constituents or objects of natural kinds share natural properties

that draw them together over time and the force which draws them together is one that more or

less endures. In other words, we can say that the homeostatic cluster achieves self-regulation and

that the properties of the natural kind are preserved in a stable range (Bird & Tobin, 2008).

Kornblith’s Natural Kind Account

Kornblith follows Richard Boyd in defining natural kinds as a set of ―homeostatically

clustered properties, properties that are mutually supporting and reinforcing in the face of

external change‖ (2002, p. 61). For example, water is a natural kind because its components, two

atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen, are glued together by a chemical bond that ensures

the stability of the whole unit. In addition, Kornblith states that his conception of natural kinds

runs along the following lines (Bird & Tobin, 2008):

1. Members of natural kinds have intrinsic natural properties in common. In the case of

water, as a natural kind, the intrinsic properties are the main properties of hydrogen

and oxygen and they are able to cluster together in a chemical bond.

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2. Natural kinds permit inductive inferences. This means that knowing the properties

and characteristics of the constituents and members of the natural kind allows us to

infer the properties and characteristics of other members of the same natural kind. In

case of water as a natural kind, the constituents and members of water at least have

some properties in common. So, knowing the properties of some members of water

allows the inference of the properties of other members of water. Also, from knowing

the properties of the members of a natural kind, one can infer the properties of the

natural kind itself. So in the case of water, from knowing the properties of the

constituents of water one can infer the general properties of water itself. In addition,

once we identify an X object as water, we can infer many truths about it. For

example, we can determine its boiling point and freezing point. Also, we can

determine many of its physical and chemical properties and its reaction with other

objects and elements.

3. Natural kinds participate in the laws of nature because their underlying structure

maintains their regularity and stability. Accordingly they behave regularly and

consistently which enable them to participate in the laws of nature. For example, the

intrinsic properties of two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen are responsible

for forming the natural kind water and for maintaining its stability as well.

The theoretical unity between human knowledge and animal knowledge led Kornblith to

conclude that knowledge is a natural kind. After gathering instances of knowledge, such as

human knowledge and animal knowledge, Kornblith discovered that they have common grounds.

Accordingly, knowledge as natural kind is the result of this theoretical unity and the common

grounds shared by these instances. For example, true beliefs in animal and human knowledge are

linked by the fact that both are produced by reliable cognitive mechanisms. As such, these

reliable mechanisms should be the focus of our study. One may wonder exactly how animal

knowledge, which is the same kind as human knowledge, can be a natural kind in this context.

After investigating cognitive ethology, Kornblith defines knowledge as reliably produced

true beliefs. So its members, which are the mechanisms and processes that produce true beliefs,

share intrinsic natural properties. According to Kornblith, a natural kind is a set of

―homeostatically clustered properties, properties that are mutually supporting and reinforcing in

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the face of external change‖ (2002, p. 61). As explained before, to be a natural kind, a category

must meet three conditions:

First, members of natural kinds have intrinsic natural properties in common. In the case

of knowledge, true beliefs in animal and human knowledge are linked by the fact that both are

produced by reliable cognitive mechanisms. The reliability of these mechanisms and processes is

derived from the intrinsic properties that they have in common. In other words, their reliability is

the glue that sticks the constituents of the natural kind together into unified category i.e.

knowledge.

Second, natural kinds permit inductive inferences. Kornblith argues that animal

knowledge, which is similar in kind to human knowledge, plays an essential role in causal

explanations and successful predictions. The intrinsic properties of knowledge, which are the

reliability of the processes and the mechanisms that produce true beliefs, enable processes and

mechanisms to cluster together in a theoretical unity. This theoretical unity is in turn responsible

for the main characteristics of knowledge and its role in scientific explanation and predictions.

The intrinsic property, which is the reliability of cognitive processes (or as I refer to it, the glue),

provides several levels of stability to knowledge as a natural kind. The first level is between the

members of the natural kind. From knowing the intrinsic properties of some members of the

natural kind we can infer the intrinsic properties of other members of the same natural kind. So

from discovering the intrinsic properties of the reliable cognitive processes that are members of

knowledge we can infer the intrinsic processes of other cognitive processes that are also members

of knowledge. The second level is between the members of a natural kind and the natural kind

itself. This means that by knowing the intrinsic properties of the reliable mechanisms of the

natural kind (i.e. knowledge), we can predict the main characteristic of the natural kind and its

role in scientific explanations and predictions. The concept of animal knowledge explains how

animals have survived across space and time because knowledge enables them to acquire the

behaviors necessary to fulfill their biological needs within a given environment. Last, from

identifying an object X as a natural kind we can determine its basic properties and behavior

accordingly. For example once we identify that the phenomenon under question is knowledge we

can infer that it will behave in certain ways.

Third, natural kinds participate in the laws of nature. This is because the intrinsic

components of a natural kind maintain the regularity and stability of the natural kind itself.

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Accordingly it participates in the laws of nature. Kornblith asserts that ―cognitive ethologists are

interested in animal knowledge because it defines such a well-behaved category, a category that

features prominently in causal explanations, and thus in successful inductive references‖ (2002,

p. 62). Knowledge thus has instrumental value in producing appropriate behaviors that allow

animals to fulfill their biological needs and is ―thereby implicated in the Darwinian explanation

of the selection retention of traits‖ (2002, p. 62). The clustering and gathering of properties is

what explains the behavior of natural kinds. As a result, natural kinds are usually employed in

casual laws.

Question 3: Does Kornblith’s Natural Kind Theory Employ Conceptual Analysis?

Kornblith is against employing both a priori and a posteriori types of conceptual analysis

because they change the topic of epistemology. Kornblith argues against employing conceptual

analysis for two main reasons. First, a priori conceptual analysis employed in the history of

analytic epistemology is based on individual introspection, which is an unreliable reasoning

mechanism. Therefore, a priori conceptual analysis should be abandoned as a tool or method for

investigating knowledge. At this point, some may wonder whether Kornblith is now willing to

advocate employing a posteriori empirical conceptual analysis as a means of investigating

knowledge. The answer is still a resounding no. Furthermore, this rejection reveals the second

reason why Kornblith rejects conceptual analysis: he believes that it has mistakenly shifted the

main aim of epistemology from finding out what knowledge is to elucidating our concept of

knowledge. Epistemology for Kornblith is not about discovering our concepts of knowledge,

which can be incomplete or mistaken. Instead, he contends that the main aim of epistemology is

to investigate natural kind knowledge as an external phenomenon that functions independently of

the concepts surrounding it: ―What makes this category [knowledge] an important one? In my

view, it is not that people in society have the concept; instead, it is that this category accurately

describes a feature of the world‖ (Kornblith, 2002, p. 165). Accordingly, we can conclude that

conceptual analysis, whether a priori or a posteriori, is not the right tool for pursuing

epistemology.

Question 4: What is the role Ascribed to Common Sense Intuitions in Kornblith’s Natural

Kind Theory?

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Intuitions have always been considered a priori in traditional epistemology. In fact,

George Bealer presents an account of intuitions in which he distinguishes between intuitions and

common sense. Common sense, according to Bealer, is an ―amalgamation of various widely

shared...empirical beliefs, practical wisdom, a priori intuitions and physical intuitions‖ (2002, p.

6). In contrast, Kornblith argues that intuitions are not separate from empirical beliefs but are

informed by them. Accordingly, Kornblith argues that there is no such thing as a priori

intuitions. Our intuitions are always mediated by theory and thus empirical.

Kornblith‘s methodology for investigating knowledge empirically neither dismisses

intuitions entirely nor employs them as a final criterion to evaluate the resulting account. In other

words, unlike traditional epistemology, intuitions are not the sole source used to identify

knowledge. On the contrary, our empirical investigation of knowledge as a natural kind informs

and corrects any deficiencies or flaws inherent in our concept of knowledge without needing to

fall back on intuitive concepts as a criterion for evaluating the resulting theory. As previously

noted, common sense intuitions play an important role in the first stage of Kornblith‘s account

because they are employed to gather instances of knowledge. Intuitions are also employed in

every stage of our investigation. ―The use of intuitive judgment does not disappear at any stage

of theorizing. Instead, old intuitions give way to well integrated theoretical judgments, and in

addition, to new intuitions about matters not yet fully captured in explicit theory‖ (Kornblith,

2002, p. 20). However, once a mature account of knowledge has been established, ―raw appeals

to intuition have declined‖ (2002, p. 15).

There is a possible pitfall here: if the resulting theory does not correspond to our

intuitions, how do we determine if the resulting account is actually about knowledge and not

something else? To use Goldman‘s terms, without maintaining the link between our naïve

intuitions and scientific intuitions, how do we know that we did not change the subject?

Kornblith advocates using the causal theory of reference as a means of maintaining the

subject matter of epistemology. The causal theory of reference explains how terms obtain

specific referents. This theory can be employed to determine the referents of both proper names

and natural kinds, and it proceeds according to two main steps. First, in the initial baptism stage,

a name is fixed by an original act of naming or dubbing. For example, when a new baby is born,

his or her parents provide a specific name by which he or she will be known to the world, such as

―Amirah.‖ As a result, the name becomes a rigid designator for the person or object. The term

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―rigid designator‖ is applied when a name refers to the same object in every possible world.20 In

the next step, later uses of the name spread through an appropriate causal chain, a process by

which the referent is maintained and established. For example, after naming their new baby

―Amirah,‖ the parents declare the baby‘s name to their family, relatives and friends. Through this

appropriate causal chain, the relationship between the referential name ―Amirah‖ and the person

is stabilized. Accordingly, the referential name ―Amirah‖ and the person the name is referring to

are maintained regardless of the modifications in people‘s beliefs about the descriptions of the

person ―Amirah‖ (Reimer, 2009). The main advantage of the causal theory of reference is that it

maintains a stable reference to the same object regardless of the changes that occur to our beliefs

about it.

Question 5: What is The Source of Normativity For Kornblith’s Natural Kind Theory?

Kornblith contends that while his account of knowledge is a naturalistic account, it still

has normative force. This is because knowledge attained through empirical methods of

psychology can bridge the gap between the descriptive and the normative. Since knowledge has

descriptive and normative roles, its normative role depends on the causal role it plays in

achieving the aims of people and animals. In short, knowledge is valuable because it helps people

and animals obtain the resources they need to satisfy their biological and existential needs and

desires.

Kornblith‘s conception of normativity bears many resemblances to Stich‘s desire-based

model. For example, Kornblith also grounds normativity in human desire, which limits

epistemological norms and rules to different types of hypothetical imperatives. These

imperatives ―tell us how to acquire our beliefs if we meet certain conditions‖ (Kornblith, 2002, p.

140). This means that, like Stich, Kornblith evaluates methods of inquiry and reasoning

processes according to their consequences.

However, there are two main differences between the accounts of Stich and Kornblith.

Unlike Stich, Kornblith argues that his account is universal and can avoid relativism because it

does not specify particular aims. Kornblith avoids making such specifications; since philosophers

can pursue an innumerable number of goals in their studies, he believes that any attempt to limit

the aims and goals of epistemic activity is a lost cause. Accordingly, Kornblith‘s account aims to

20

The term ‗possible world‘ is a tool and methodology invented by philosophers in order to express modal claims.

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prescribe norms that can be applied to any philosophy regardless of its aim. Another difference

between Stich and Kornblith is that while Stich rejects any intrinsic or extrinsic value for truth in

his pragmatic account, Kornblith argues that ―truth plays a pre-eminent role‖ in his account

(2002, p. 158). In fact, Kornblith contends that Stich‘s pragmatic account is self-defeating

because it excludes truth. He does not argue that truth is the aim of our epistemic activity, but

instead argues that truth has an essential instrumental value because it enables one to determine

what they intrinsically desire, or their aims, and the best methods of obtaining these aims. As a

result, we cannot and should not eliminate truth in our account because it plays an inevitable role

in evaluating reasoning strategies.

Question 6: What is The Relationship Between Kornblith’s Natural Kind Theory And

Traditional Epistemology?

Kornblith argues that traditional epistemology should be replaced with his natural kind

theory. He maintains that his natural kind theory can avoid the faulty aims and methods of

traditional epistemology. Traditional epistemology has always aimed at investigating knowledge

while postulating that knowledge is something socially or biologically built within us rather than

having some sort of independent external existence. This has led to the use of faulty methods of

obtaining knowledge. One such method is conceptual analysis, which stipulates that individuals

should consult their intuitions by presenting examples and counterexamples as a means of self-

critiquing their beliefs. In contrast, natural kind theory correctly acknowledges that knowledge

―has a certain theoretical unity to it, that is, it plays an important causal and explanatory role

within our best current theories‖ (2002, p. 165). As such, knowledge is an external phenomenon

that correctly illustrates the features of the world. Thus, natural kind theory employs the correct

empirical methods that correspond to the true nature of knowledge as an external phenomenon

and as a natural kind. Kornblith does not care whether people have the concept of knowledge or

not because they make use of it regardless. The value of knowledge is embedded in its causal and

explanatory function, not in its definition (See Table 18 of Appendix A).

Main Features of Cooperative Naturalism (See Table 19 in Appendix A).

1. Theories of cooperative naturalism argue for empirical science to be the starting point

for epistemological investigation. They distinguish between epistemological

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questions and scientific questions (except for strategic reliabilism, which denies the

demarcation between empirical science and epistemology concerning investigated

questions and employed methods). However, they argue that the methods and theories

of empirical science can help answer epistemological questions.

2. The main topic of cooperative naturalism is investigating knowledge and other

epistemological phenomena with the appropriate empirical methods of science. It is

also concerned with establishing an applied epistemology by evaluating methods of

inquiry and reasoning strategies in order to provide positive advice help to improve

cognizers‘ reasoning strategies concerning epistemological issues.

3. No conceptual analysis is employed either a priori or a posteriori in cooperative

naturalism. Appropriate methods and tools of empirical science are used instead. A

priori methods of traditional epistemology are dismissed completely.

4. Cooperative naturalism confirms that intuitions cannot be a priori; they are always a

posteriori. It confirms also that they are necessary for forming and applying

epistemological theories. Accordingly, these intuitions must be educated and updated

with the most recent and advanced relevant scientific theories in order to be

employed. However, they are never used as a final referee to evaluate the resulting

epistemological theories.

5. Cooperative naturalism does not ground epistemic normativity on semantic

considerations. Normativity is grounded on human desire, except for strategic

reliabilism, which grounds normativity on the truths and facts of empirical science.

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CHAPTER SIX

WHY COOPERATIVE NATURALISM?

My main aim in this chapter is to employ my previously established framework for

understanding naturalized epistemology in order to argue for one type or subtype of naturalized

epistemology. I want to argue in this chapter that a successful naturalized epistemology must

meet four conditions. I will argue that cooperative naturalism best satisfies these conditions and

this is why I take it to be the best available candidate. The four conditions that a good naturalized

theory of epistemology should meet are as follows:

First, as the name itself suggests,1 a successful epistemology must have the ability to

investigate, explain and employ central epistemological phenomena such as knowledge,

rationality, and wisdom etc. Epistemology is concerned with developing an adequate theoretical

understanding of epistemological phenomena. This condition is implicit in traditional

epistemology. However, the traditional approach pursues this goal using faulty and inadequate

methods. Traditional epistemologists take knowledge to be a conceptual phenomenon that can be

investigated exclusively by a priori analysis. And this has resulted in the investigation into

humans’ concepts of these phenomena and not the phenomena themselves. On the contrary,

naturalists study knowledge qua natural phenomenon. Fortunately, naturalized epistemology has

replaced the faulty methods and tools of traditional epistemology with reliable methods of

empirical science. Accordingly, theories of naturalized epistemology can pursue the same aim

but with the right empirical tools and methods.

Understanding those natural phenomena such as knowledge, justification, and

rationality, etc., is intrinsically valuable. It is akin to understanding the basic forces governing

the universe. Even if this understanding does not give us any practical benefits, it is valuable for

us to satisfy our curiosity about these matters that are important for people.

The second condition a good epistemological theory should meet is being able to clearly

explain its source of normativity. It has long been considered that what distinguishes

1 Epistemology is a Greek term, episteme € knowledge + -o-+ -logy, that means the study of knowledge/

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epistemology from science is that science deals with descriptive questions concerning how things

are. And in contrast epistemology investigates and responds to normative and evaluative

questions concerning how things should be. But what do we mean by that? As I have explained

in pervious chapters, normativity implies that a thing in question is good, proper, or desirable. A

good epistemological theory will discover and identify the source of epistemological

normativity. In other words we need to explain how epistemological norms come to have their

power and force.

Traditional epistemology tried to explain the source of epistemic normativity in terms of

the meaning of the epistemological concepts. In contrast, many naturalists present many

arguments against taking the meaning of epistemic terms to be the source of normativity.

However, only few of them present a good alternative. In fact, some naturalists still agree with

traditional epistemology so they continue grounding normativity on the meaning of

epistemological concepts2. On the contrary, other naturalists provide different sources of

normativity. For example, some grounds normativity on the truths and facts of science.

Accordingly they argue that epistemological prescriptions are normative because they help one

get true belief. This is a good source of normativity but it may not appeal to a wide range of

people. Other naturalists try to avoid this problem by grounding normativity on human desire.

On this view, epistemology is normative because following its norms tends to bring about what

one desires. Unlike truth, grounding normativity on human desire will appeal to broader range of

people.

Third, epistemology must be practical. It should provide positive advice about how to

reason better and what one ought to believe. Epistemology should not limit itself into the

theatrical domain only. Epistemological theories should have practical implications. Our

epistemological theories should have the ability to help us obtain, revise, and maintain our

beliefs in a way that helps us improve our reasoning abilities. Knowledge of epistemological

phenomena and other epistemological topics should be employed in positive way to improve

subjects’ cognitive abilities. The reason doctors study physiology3, pathology4 and

2 Read , for example, Alvin Goldman (1978, 1986, 1988, 1992)

3 The study of human body makeup and structure. 4 The study of illnesses and diseases.

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pharmacology5 is to gain knowledge about these topics then use this acquired knowledge to treat

patients’ illnesses and improve their health. In addition, scientists study their scientific field such

as chemistry, biology, psychology, etc. to understand and gain knowledge about the topics of

their fields which, in turn, enables them to participate in and improve these topics. It is true that

knowledge of the truths and facts of life is an intrinsically valuable aim for many people. Still

employing the resulting knowledge of these truths to participate and control and improve our

lives is another intrinsic aim. Accordingly, epistemological theories should have both intrinsic

and instrumental values. The intrinsic value of epistemological theories is exemplified in their

ability reveal the truth about epistemological phenomena and topics. And the instrumental value

of epistemological theories is exemplified in using this knowledge in improving these topics.

Fourth and finally, a successful theory must have a healthy synergistic relationship with

science by taking input from scientific theories, and providing an output to science in order to

solve its disputes and motivate its progress (B&T, 2005). Philosophy in general and

epistemology in particular have always been influenced by science (Sosa, 2005). However,

having a converse relation in which philosophy influences science is task ignored by many

epistemological theories. Many naturalists argue that epistemology needs help from the theories

and methods of empirical psychology. Similarly, we find many psychologists asking for help

from philosophy in their practice. 6 In fact, they complain of the lack of a proper cooperation

between the two domains.7

Naturalized epistemology is the only candidate to perform this task. Traditional

epistemologists argue for a complete demarcation between epistemology and empirical science.

Traditional epistemology does not provide any help to science, nor does it use input from

science. In contrast, naturalists associate epistemology with empirical science. However, for

most naturalists this association is only a one way road. They take input form empirical

psychology but do not provide an output in return. They employ theories and methods of variety

types of psychology in forming their theories. However, the results of their naturalistic theories

5 The study of medicine. 6 For example, read Stephen Stich about Nesbit and other psychologists in the experimental social psychology (1993). Also, read, Robert Sternberg (1998). 7 Read for example, Daryl Bruce’s criticism for Goldman (1989).

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are limited to the domain of epistemology and aren’t used to provide any help to empirical

psychology.

I will apply these criteria on the theories of naturalized epistemology in order to

determine the right candidate for a successful epistemology. Starting with Quine’s replacement

thesis, it does not represent a good candidate for a successful naturalistic theory. Quine’s

replacement naturalism does not meet the first condition because it does not provide a way to

investigate knowledge. It only investigates the relation between our beliefs and their evidence or

supplementing sense data such as such as visual perceptions, perceptions of touch etc.

Nonetheless, it meets the second condition because truth is the source of normativity of Quine’s

naturalism. However, such a source may not appeal to wide range of people. In addition, Quine’s

theory doesn’t meet the third condition because Quine’s theory does not present any normative

advice beyond what has been presented already by behaviorism. Concerning the last condition,

which is having a healthy synergistic relation with empirical science, Quine’s replacement

naturalism is the empirical science itself without any additions. As a result, Quine does not

engage in any theoretical investigation which may lead to form normative prescriptions that can

motivate behaviorism or solve any of its problems. Therefore, the fourth condition is not met.

Accordingly, Quine’s replacement thesis doesn’t consider a good candidate for a successful

epistemological theory or approach that can replace other types of epistemology.

Goldman’s primary epistemology is a theory of justification attribution, so it doesn’t

actually investigate the phenomena justification.8 It only investigates people’s concept of

justification. Also, it does that with the wrong methods by employing a priori conceptual

analysis. As a result, primary epistemology does not satisfy the first condition of a successful

epistemology. As to the second condition, similar to traditional epistemology, primary

epistemology grounds normativity on the meaning of the epistemological concepts. Considering

the diversity arguments presented by naturalists against this source of normativity, primary

epistemology doesn’t meet the second condition. Third, primary epistemology provides an

account of normative concepts but doesn’t provide positive advice in intellectual matters. So the

third condition is not satisfied. Finally, primary epistemology uses help from theories of

cognitive psychology but it doesn’t give back to it. Therefore, primary epistemology does not

8 Read Goldman (2008).

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obtain the conditions of being successful epistemology and accordingly does not present itself as

a good candidate to replace other types of epistemology.

Concerning scientific epistemology, it is true that it employs empirical means in

investigating justification. However, it investigates the concept justification and not the

phenomena itself. Therefore, it is still a theory of justification attribution9 and accordingly it does

not meet the first condition. As with primary epistemology, scientific epistemology cannot meet

the second and third conditions of successful epistemology. Scientific epistemology does not

have a good source of normativity because it grounds normativity on semantic considerations.

And it does not provide positive advice in intellectual matters. Finally, scientific epistemology

uses resources from cognitive psychology but does not attempt to apply itself to cognitive

psychology. So it doesn’t satisfy the fourth condition. As a result, scientific epistemology doesn’t

represent a good candidate for a successful naturalistic epistemology.

Epistemics resembles scientific epistemology in that it investigates the concepts of

epistemological phenomena and not the phenomena themselves. Therefore, it doesn’t satisfy the

first condition. Goldman does not make clear what the source of normativity is for epistemics.

He emphasizes employing conceptual analysis to investigate epistemological concepts and deny

any possibility to consider those epistemological phenomena as natural kinds. Accordingly, we

may ascribe maintaining the semantic source for epistemic normativity to Goldman. So the

second condition is not satisfied. Epistemics aims to provide recommendations and positive

advice in intellectual matters. So it seems that epistemics satisfies the third condition. Finally,

epistemics lacks a healthy relation with empirical science. While epistemics employs theories

and methods of cognitive psychology, cognitive psychology does not receive in return any help

from epistemics. As a result, epistemics fails to be a good candidate for a successful naturalistic

epistemology.

Finally, I will apply my criterion on the theories of cooperative naturalism. I will start

with Stich’s pragmatism. Stich’s pragmatism evaluates reasoning processes and doesn’t concern

itself with investigating epistemological phenomena. Therefore, it doesn’t satisfy the first

condition. Pragmatism explains the normativity of epistemological recommendations in terms of

their ability to satisfy our intrinsic values. It presents good source of normativity, and so it

9 Read Goldman (2008).

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satisfies the second condition. The third condition, providing advice on intellectual matters, is

clearly satisfied. However, the last condition is not. The construction of Stich’s pragmatism was

motivated by a dispute occurring in the domain of experimental social psychology. However, the

final form of Stich’s pragmatism didn’t have the ability to solve this dispute. To demonstrate this

point, I will present the work of Nisbett and Ross (1980), researchers in experimental social

psychology. This research is concerned with discovering the reasoning strategies of several

bright and educated subjects by presenting ordinary problems for them to solve and then

recording the ensuing process. The study found that the majority of the well-educated subjects

reasoned poorly. As a result, researchers define the results as “bleak” because they show that

intelligent subjects have poor reasoning capabilities (Stich, 1993a, p. 4). One of the main

criticisms levied against this study was that the researchers never defined the criterion employed

to evaluate the subjects’ reasoning strategies. Accordingly, critics pointed out that it may have

been the researchers themselves who reasoned poorly rather than the subjects. The only way of

overcoming this issue is to establish a valid criterion with which to evaluate the reasoning

strategies under question (1993a).

Stich demonstrates clearly that this matter has motivated him to switch from employing a

priori methods of analytic epistemology to pragmatism. The reason is that Stich has failed in

solving this problem even after attempting many unsuccessful modifications to the methods of

traditional epistemology. This failure caused Stich to search for other sources of evaluation. And

after extensive investigation to form pragmatism, Stich admits that his pragmatic account cannot

solve this problem either. Accordingly, he leaves this problem unsolved. “Thus it is an open

question whether people who perseverate are reasoning badly” (1993a, p. 157). So, Stich’s

pragmatism uses help from science, but it is unable to return the favor. As a result, Stich’s

pragmatism is not a good candidate for a successful naturalistic epistemology.

Kornblith’s natural kind theory aims to investigate epistemological phenomena instead of

their concepts. So it satisfies the first condition. Kornblith’s natural kind theory satisfies the

second condition because it grounds normativity on human desires. Third, Kornblith’s natural

kind theory doesn’t satisfy the third condition because it doesn’t provide a positive advice in

intellectual matters. Last, it doesn’t satisfy the fourth condition because it doesn’t give back to

cognitive psychology or cognitive ethology form which it used help in building the theory. As a

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result, Kornblith’s natural kind theory doesn’t fit the criteria to become a successful naturalistic

epistemology

Finally, I will investigate Bishop and Tout’s strategic reliabilism. Strategic reliabilism

does not satisfy the first condition because it is an applied account of the epistemological

phenomena rationality and reasoning excellence and does not provide an explanation for these

phenomena. Bishop and Trout employ empirical theories and methods of ameliorative

psychology to investigate and form their account of reasoning excellence, namely, strategic

reliabilism. Strategic reliabilism aims to provide normative advice that guides subjects’

reasoning to improve these reasoning strategies. However, B&T do not engage in empirical

investigation to provide an explanation and demonstration for the epistemological phenomena

rationality and reasoning like Kornblith does with his natural kind account of knowledge. As a

result, SR is considered an empirical application of the epistemological phenomena rationality

and reasoning. Accordingly, I believe that strategic reliabilism does not meet the first condition.

Also, it does not satisfy the second condition because it does not attempt to explain normativity.

It just assumes that parts of science are normative, but Bishop and Trout do not explain what that

means. The third condition is clearly met because strategic reliabilism is the applied theory of

reasoning excellence. Finally, strategic reliabilism is the only naturalistic theory that applies its

lessons back to empirical science after using its help. In fact, it was able to solve the dispute in

the experimental social psychology concerning the work of Nisbett and Ross (1980) that Stich’s

pragmatism couldn’t solve. Accordingly, the fourth condition is satisfied. Still, we cannot

consider strategic reliabilism a candidate for the successful naturalistic epistemology that can

replace other types of epistemology.

So far it seems that none of the previously discussed types of naturalistic theories is able

exclusively to satisfy my criteria. Therefore, no naturalistic theory can solely be a candidate for a

successful epistemology. Accordingly, I will seek to identify the candidate that is most likely to

be able to satisfy the four conditions after minor refinements and modifications. The most

obvious candidate is strategic reliabilism because it is the only theory with very distinctive

healthy relation to empirical psychology. It also does well on the third condition, providing

normative advice in intellectual matters.

I suggest we conjoin another theory with strategic reliabilism, a theory that can make up

for the deficiencies of strategic reliabilism. Kornblith’s natural kind theory will fit nicely with

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strategic reliabilism. Natural kind theory investigates the phenomenon of knowledge rather than

the concept of knowledge. And so it satisfies the first condition. Kornblith investigates the

normative claims of empirical science especially, cognitive ethology, in order to establish the

framework of these claims. And natural kind theory is this framework. In addition, Kornblith’s

natural kind theory satisfies the second condition by providing a good source of normativity

which is grounded on human desires. Accordingly, it has a convincing answer for subjects’

contentions against following the recommendations of the theory. These two theories are

compatible with each other and in fact complement each other. They employ the same practices

and methods - both seek to extract epistemological lessons from empirical science. And by

combining them, we can have a theory that satisfies all the required conditions for being a

successful naturalistic theory. Therefore, instead of establishing a new theory that satisfies the

four conditions, we can combine strategic reliabilism (about rationality and good reasoning) and

Kornblith’s natural kind theory (about knowledge) to form a most satisfactory hybrid theory.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

My main aim in this dissertation is to select and argue in favor of one type of or approach

to theories of naturalized epistemology that will be considered the right and successful theory

that should replace other types and approaches. Accordingly, I needed to establish a framework

and criterion that enables us to define, explain, and classify theories of naturalized epistemology

in order to present naturalized epistemology as a well-organized and unified domain. When

reviewing the literature of epistemology, we find that very few papers discuss the topic of

naturalized epistemology. The field of naturalized epistemology does not get the attention it

deserves.

While reviewing the literature of epistemology, I only found four rough attempts to

discuss naturalized epistemology. I will present a brief description for each in order to show their

deficiency and to prove the superiority of my established criterion. The first attempt is Richard

Feldman’s paper “Naturalized Epistemology” (2001), which inspired the topic of my

dissertation. In fact, I am using Feldman’s classification as an outline for constructing my

classification of theories of naturalized epistemology. My structure resembles Feldman’s in that

it classifies theories of naturalized epistemology into three major types and copies their titles.

Also, my structure agrees with Feldman’s about placing Quine’s theory under replacement

naturalism. However, my classification does substantially differ from Feldman’s. In fact, except

for the above areas of overlap, my structure disagrees completely with his. Feldman classifies

naturalistic theories into three major types without presenting an explanation for a clear criterion

used for this classification. In my analysis, I provide a clear and extensive explanation for the

criterion employed in forming the structure of this naturalized epistemology. Also, my definition

for each type and subtype differs completely from Feldman’s. I employ clear a criterion that

covers almost all features of naturalized theories. Also, my criterion considers the differences

between different naturalistic theories and accordingly classifies them into subcategories within

the same category.

The second attempt to discuss naturalized epistemology comes from Stephen Stich. In

order to defend his pragmatism, Stich briefly distinguishes between two types of naturalistic

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theories: weak and strong naturalism. He explains that both types employ empirical science in

investigating epistemological questions. The main difference between the types is that weak

naturalism distinguishes between descriptive questions of empirical science and normative

questions of epistemology. Accordingly, he places his pragmatism within the category of weak

naturalism while he places Quine’s theory in strong naturalism.1 Unfortunately, this means his

criterion is imprecise because it investigates only one feature of the naturalistic theories. Also,

Stich targeted specific theories and did not discuss all theories of naturalized epistemology. In

addition, it is surprising that he has chosen this factor to be the basis for distinguishing between

naturalized theories because, as I explained in Chapter 5, his theory faces problems in this area.

In “Pragmatic Commitments to Naturalized Epistemology,” Hangqing and Xiaodong

(2007) classify theories of naturalized epistemology according to their relationship with theories

of pragmatism and generate three specific types: strong, moderate, and weak. However, they

refrain from providing a definition for naturalized epistemology because “naturalized

epistemology appears as a methodology or an inquiry approach/program, whose intension and

extension are not as straightforward as traditional epistemology” (2007, p. 478). Their criterion

detects only one aspect of theories of naturalized epistemology. Therefore, the resulting

classification is too general and might not account for other distinctions among naturalistic

theories. Also, this detected feature might not apply to all naturalistic theories; if so, the

resulting classification may leave many naturalistic theories out. As a result, their criterion is

very limited, not solid, and imprecise. Finally, David Papneau’s paper “Naturalism” (2007)

discusses the factors and circumstances that lead some philosophers into naturalism. But there is

no explanation, definition, or criterion classifying or organizing the field itself.

In order to achieve my aim I have constructed my criterion by drawing a comparison

between theories of traditional epistemology and theories of naturalized epistemology. The

method I have used to achieve my aim involved two steps: first, determining the basic and main

features of traditional epistemology; and second, establishing a set of questions from these main

features where each question corresponds to a basic feature of traditional epistemology.

After I formed the framework and criteria, I applied them to theories of naturalized

epistemology. I was able to classify these theories of naturalized epistemology into three main

categories and their subtypes. The first category is replacement naturalism and it contains only

1 Read (Stich, 1993b).

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one type, represented by Quine’s naturalism. The second category is substantive naturalism and

it is divided into three subtypes: primary epistemology, scientific epistemology, and epistemics.

The third and last category is cooperative naturalism and it is divided into three subtypes: Stich’s

pragmatism, strategic reliabilism, and Kornblith’s natural kind theory (See Figure1 in Appendix

B).

By applying the six-question criterion to theories of naturalized epistemology I was able

to infer the main and basic features of each naturalistic theory. Accordingly, I was able to place

similar naturalistic theories in their corresponding category. From analyzing the common

features and properties shared by similar naturalistic theories within the same category, I was

able to determine the basic features of the category itself.

In constructing my classification I have employed the principle of Aristotelian

essentialism. It affirms that objects or things have essential properties that compose their

essences, so once these properties cease the object itself cease to exist (Robertson, 2008).

Aristotelian essentialism was employed in the formation of the three major types of naturalized

epistemology. Here, the employment of empirical science is the basic property uniting those

types. All the major types of naturalized epistemology (replacement, substantive, and

cooperative in my structure) employ theories and methods from different types of empirical

psychology.

Aristotelian essentialism was also employed in determining the subtypes of each major

type in my structure. For example, the combination of employing conceptual analysis, either a

priori or a posteriori, and empirical methods of science is the basic property shared by primary

epistemology, scientific epistemology, and epistemics. Accordingly, these three theories are

grouped together in one category: substantive naturalism. However, each theory forms a distinct

subtype in substantive naturalism because although these theories share one common property,

they differ from each other in other respects. The differences between those three theories are

responsible for placing them in separate subtypes with the same major type hosting them. To

illustrate, primary epistemology employs a priori conceptual analysis while the other two

theories employ a posteriori conceptual analysis. Accordingly, primary epistemology was placed

in a separate subtype. Also, although both employ a posteriori conceptual analysis, scientific

epistemology is distinguished from epistemics because scientific epistemology ascribes

epistemological normativity to semantic bases while epistemics does not.

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A similar pattern was employed in constructing the classification of the remaining types

and subtypes of my structure. For example, the dismissal of normative questions and their

subsequent replacement with descriptive questions of empirical science is the basic property of

replacement naturalism, which contains only one subtype. Furthermore, a complete elimination

of conceptual analysis, either a priori or a posteriori, and its replacement with empirical methods

of science plus the maintenance and preservation of normative questions of epistemology are the

main properties shared by all the subtypes of cooperative naturalism. However, they were placed

in separate subtypes because of the differences regard other aspects in their theories. For

example, both Stich’s pragmatism and Kornblith natural kind theory reduce normativity to

human desires. However, Kornblith argues for investigating epistemological phenomena rather

than their concepts with the right tools and methods. On the contrary, Stich’s pragmatism

involves in investigating reasoning processes and methods of inquiry instead. Another example

is that, similar to Stich’s pragmatism, strategic reliabilism involves with investigating reasoning

strategies. However, unlike Stich’s pragmatism, strategic reliabilism clearly explains the

empirical theory, i.e. ameliorative psychology, that forms its bases and foundations. In contrast,

Stich denies ascribing normativity to theories of empirical science. And accordingly, the

foundations and methods employed to form Stich’s pragmatism are not clear. Another distinction

between subtypes of cooperative naturalism can be found between Kornblith’s natural kind

theory and strategic reliabilism. Kornblith’s natural kind account is considered a theory of

normative epistemology because it investigates knowledge empirically as a natural kind in order

to define and explain this epistemological phenomenon. But strategic reliabilism is considered a

theory of applied epistemology because it aims to investigate rationality and reasoning

empirically in order to produce normative advice in intellectual matters.

My previously-mentioned criterion enabled me to establish a framework and structure of

theories of naturalized epistemology as a unified and organized field. And that structure enabled

me to infer a definition for naturalized epistemology that aims to contain the naturalistic theories

associated with empirical psychology. Therefore, from this perspective I define naturalized

epistemology as a field of epistemological theories that investigates epistemological phenomena

and their concepts, evaluates reasoning processes and methods of enquiry by employing theories

and methods of empirical psychology, and may combine these theories and methods with

conceptual analysis in order to form epistemological theories that can be employed to achieve

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other aims such as gaining knowledge and producing positive and normative advice in

intellectual matters in order to improve reasoning processes and may by in the long run the

quality of life.

Finally, from the above structure of naturalized epistemology, I was able to establish a

criterion for selecting one type of naturalistic theory which can be considered the most successful

epistemological theory and which can replace other types of epistemologies. This criterion

consists of four elements. First, the right candidate must have the ability to investigate and

explain epistemological phenomena, not just their concepts. Second, it must have a good source

of normativity. Third, it must have a practical aspect exemplified in providing positive advice in

intellectual matters in order to improve subjects’ reasoning strategies and methods of inquiry.

Last, it must have a healthy synergistic relationship with empirical science, taking from and

giving back to empirical science in order to solve its disputes and motivate its progress.

As a result, I have applied this criterion to the above structure of naturalized

epistemology in order to identify the theory that can satisfy this criterion. I was able to conclude

that no single naturalistic theory is able to meet the four conditions of the criterion. Therefore, I

have combined two naturalistic theories that are very similar in their approaches to form the right

candidate to replace other types of epistemology. Together, strategic reliabilism and Kornblith’s

natural kind theory form a hybrid epistemological theory that can satisfy the criterion for a

successful epistemological theory.

In general, it is important to have a criterion and a framework that can produce a clear

structure for naturalized epistemology. Many epistemologists note the shortage in the literature

concerning defining naturalized epistemology as a well-organized domain. They also confirm

that the reason is because it is hard to define such a complex and diverse domain, not because it

is not important to have a definition2. As a result, there is a great need for a framework and a

criterion that can help define, explain, classify, and organize theories of naturalized epistemology

to fill the gap in the literature of epistemology. Having such a framework will benefit many

people, such as undergraduate philosophy students and other philosophy professors who are not

familiar with this topic. It will also serve to clarify the debate between the two rivals in the

literature: namely, traditional epistemology and naturalized epistemology. Employing the

2 Read for example, Papneau (2007), Feldman (2001), and Hangqing and Xiaodong (2007).

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structure of theories of naturalized epistemology resulting from the employment of this criterion

can help introduce such a topic.

Correcting mistaken approaches towards naturalized epistemology is another reason for

having such a framework and a structure. Some traditional epistemologists present objections to

and criticisms of naturalized epistemology without specifying which type they mean. This means

they deny all naturalized epistemology while in fact they are arguing against just one type or

subtype. Having a well-defined and organized structure explaining the relationships between the

many types and subtypes of naturalized epistemology will defend naturalized epistemology

against being denied due to wrong inferences. My established framework and criterion can

provide the structure needed to protect naturalized epistemology because it will commit

traditional epistemology to consider the differences and distinctions among naturalistic theories

as it forms its objections and criticisms. That will consequently prevent traditional

epistemologists from rejecting the whole domain of naturalized epistemology by arguing against

one type only. An established structure will point out such false inferences by showing that such

objections will affect only the theory in question and not the whole domain of naturalized

epistemology.

In particular, my established criterion is advantageous because it has positive effects on

naturalized epistemology. It is also superior to other rough attempts to investigate naturalized

epistemology. My criterion consists of six main questions which were inferred from the basic

features of traditional epistemology. Accordingly, they cover almost all aspects of

epistemological theories and they can contain all naturalistic theories employing empirical

psychology. Also, my criterion is very exact and precise because it covers most aspects of

naturalistic theories and considers those aspects’ similarities and differences. As a result, it

classifies theories of naturalized epistemology into major types and subtypes with great

precision.

In order to limit my research I have considered empirical psychology to be the empirical

science employed in naturalistic theories. My criterion does not account for other naturalistic

theories associated with other kinds of empirical science like biology, anthropology, sociology,

etc. However, this should not be considered a flaw or a sign of weakness in my criterion. On the

contrary, this limitation should be considered an advantage because it enables me to provide

deep and exact analysis for the theories of naturalized epistemology. Broadening the domain of

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my criterion to include all types of empirical science employed by naturalized theories would

negatively affect the efficiency of the performed analysis, because widening the domain of the

criterion would lead to the inclusion of a massive number of theories and consequently a shallow

and superficial analysis that might miss many distinctions among these theories. Eventually, it

would lead to an inaccurate and imprecise classification.

One of the main advantages of my established criterion is that it not only considers the

current existing naturalistic theories but can also accommodate future theories and approaches of

epistemology. Any future epistemological theory will have to respond to the questions

composing my criterion and then can be placed accordingly under one of the main categories or

subcategories of naturalized epistemology. A new category or subcategory can be established

corresponding to any new naturalistic approach, with the new category built according to my

structure. So my established criterion will be a foundation for new categories or subcategories

which can be added to accommodate any new naturalistic theory.

In addition, my criterion corrects some misconceptions about naturalized epistemology.

For example, many traditional epistemologists argue that because naturalized epistemology does

not use intuitions, naturalized epistemology undermines itself. In my analysis I have shown that

none of the theories of naturalized epistemology completely dismisses the employment of

intuitions in forming and applying their theories. However, intuitions in naturalized

epistemology have a different sense; they are a posteriori in most naturalistic theories (excepting

primary epistemology). Also, intuitions in naturalism serve a different purpose: in most of types

of naturalized epistemology, excepting substantive naturalism, they are essential in constructing

the theory but are never used as a final referee to evaluate the resulting theory.

Finally, in constructing my criterion I have considered most aspects of naturalistic

theories. Accordingly, I argue that my six-question criterion is superior to any other competing

framework that might be constructed. Many competing frameworks consider only a few

elements or aspects that do not cover all the basic features of naturalistic theories. For example,

some epistemologists may consider the methods employed by the epistemologists themselves as

an exclusive criterion for determining whether the resulting theory can be considered a

naturalistic theory or not. For example, if the epistemologist has employed the methods of

empirical science in constructing the theoretical framework of his or her epistemological theory,

then the resulting theory can be considered a naturalistic theory; if s/he has not, it cannot be so

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considered. In contrast, my criterion implies that it is wrong to consider this aspect the sole

standard for making our decision. It also implies that we have to consider the content of the

resulting theory in our consideration. In the end, it asks us to try to find a balance between both

the methods employed to form the theory and the content of the resulting theory in order to

determine its essence and nature.

For example, Stephen Stich and W.V. Quine both have argued for naturalism and have

constructed naturalist approaches (pragmatism and replacement naturalism respectively) by

employing a priori means. We can always investigate empirical science to identify the empirical

theories that inspired and motivated them to come up with these naturalistic theories and

approaches. However, Stich and Quine did not themselves specify the particular scientific theory

or theories used to construct their naturalistic theory. Still, Stich and Quine are considered

examples of the most influential naturalists and their theories are considered significant

naturalistic theories because of those theories’ contents and implications.

My established criterion can consider both aspects and can contain both Quine’s

replacement naturalism and Stich’s pragmatism within the domain of naturalized epistemology.

My criterion detects the role empirical science plays in the resulting epistemological theory and

its implications. But it does not place emphasis on the methodology employed by the naturalists

themselves in arguing or forming their theories, and as a result I did not specify a distinct

question in my criteria to investigate this feature in particular. However, I did briefly mention the

methodology employed by each naturalist in my analysis. Also, I have discussed these

methodologies in more detail in my analysis when necessary. For example, my analysis

discusses in detail the methodology by which the naturalists formed the theoretical framework of

their theories whenever there is a conflict or tension between the content and implications of a

theory and the methodology used to form that theory. For instance, Stephen Stich’s pragmatism

has a vague and imprecise relationship with empirical science. Accordingly, an explanation for

the methodology employed by Stich to form his pragmatism is necessary. In other words, my

criterion uses the methodology employed by the naturalists in forming their theories to explain

the theories themselves. Other than that, my criterion does not engage in analyzing this aspect of

these theories because it does not play a direct role in constructing my classification. On the

contrary, my criterion emphasizes analyzing the content and the results of the resulting

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naturalistic theories because such analysis will play a substantial role in classifying those

theories in question.

Another major advantage of my established criterion is the role it can play in future

research and studies. My established criterion forms good bases and foundations for future

inquiries. For example, when constructing my criterion I have considered most of the aspects and

features of these epistemological theories. However, my criterion can be further developed and

improved by adding other aspects and features of epistemological theories that I have not yet

considered. For example, I have not included answering skeptical arguments as an element in my

current criterion. Others can add a new question to address this missing feature in my criterion

and reform and modify the classification accordingly. This addition will result in increased

accuracy and precision in my classification. Still, I do not believe that such additions will change

my classification drastically. Instead of having to dramatically revise my classification, I believe

that future additions will be able to build on my structure’s firm foundations.

In addition, to add depth, accuracy, and precision to my analysis I have limited my

criterion to include naturalistic theories associated with empirical psychology. My criterion

provides a good structure and a foundation for establishing similar criteria for investigating other

types of naturalistic theories. Similar approaches can be employed to investigate naturalistic

theories associated with different kinds of empirical sciences such as biology, anthropology,

sociology, etc. In fact, the six-question criterion itself can be modified to correspond to other

types of naturalistic theories associated with a variety of empirical sciences. It can be applied to a

single type of empirical science, as I have done here, or it can be applied to several types of

empirical science combined.

Finally, one of the major strengths of my established criterion is that it can help thinkers

evaluate categories and subcategories of naturalized epistemology and enable them to argue in

favor of one approach rather than another.

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APPENDIX A

(Table 1) Traditional Epistemology- Relation Between Traditional Epistemology and Empirical Science:

Comparison Empirical Science

Epistemology

Type of Investigated Questions Descriptive questions concerning how things are. For example, how

do people acquire knowledge?

Normative questions concerning

how things should be, such as how should people acquire knowledge?

Type of Employed Methods and Tools

Empirical methods of science such as making observation, collecting

data, gathering testimonies, making hypothesis, testing hypothesis,

experimentation and etc.

A priori methods such as logical inferences and commonsense

intuitions, which are considered by traditionalists to be a priori

intuitions

(Table 2) Main Features of Traditional Epistemology: Criterion

Type of Epistemology

Main Topic

Conceptual

Analysis as Tool

Relation with

Science

Role Ascribed

to Intuitions

Source of Normativit

y

Relation with

Traditional Epistemolog

y

Traditional Epistemology

Finding the necessary

and sufficient conditions

for knowledge; answering the skeptic.

Yes, a

priori conceptual

analysis

Science is irrelevant for epistemology.

But epistemology

should be prior to science

because it is first

philosophy that validates the

foundations of science.

Epistemic intuitions

are used as final

reference

Semantic consideration

s, i.e. the meaning of

the term

Itself

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(Table 3) Applying the Six Question Criteria Classifying Naturalized Epistemology- Replacement Naturalism- Substantive Naturalism- Cooperative Naturalism: Criterion

Type of Epistemology

Main Topic

Conceptual

Analysis as Tool

Relation with

Science

Role Ascribed

to Intuition

s

Source of Normativit

y

Relation with

Traditional Epistemolog

y

Replacement Epistemology

Investigating the

relation between

theories and their data

No

Epistemology is reduced

to Behaviorism

Intuitions are

important but not as

a final reference

Truth, i.e. a justified

belief, is a true belief,

therefore it is valuable

Naturalized epistemology must replace traditional

epistemology

Substantive Naturalism:

1. Primary

Epistemology

2. Scientific Epistemology

3. Epistemics

Capture and explain our pre-theoretical intuitions Discover and improve our intuitions Discover and improve our intuitions in order to provide positive advice in intellectual matters

Yes, a

priori conceptual analysis.

Yes, a

posteriori conceptual analysis

First a priori conceptual analysis then it is followed by Cognitive Psychology

A priori analysis +cognitive psychology= empirical & a posteriori

analysis

Pre-theoretical intuitions are used as a final referee

Scientific intuitions

Scientific intuitions employed

to construct the theory

Semantic considerations: i.e. the meaning of the term

Theory is evaluated instrumentally

A Little update for traditional epistemology

Moving closer to naturalism than traditional epistemology

The closest to naturalism and farthest to traditional epistemology

131

(Cont. Table 3) Applying the Six- Question Criterion Classifying Naturalized Epistemology- Replacement Naturalism- Substantive Naturalism- Cooperative Naturalism:

Criterion

Types of

Epistemology

Main Topic

Conceptual

Analysis as a Main

Tool

Relation with

Empirical Science

Role Ascribed

for Intuition

s

Source of Normativit

y

Relation with

Traditional Epistemolog

y

Cooperative Naturalism:

1. Pragmatism

2. Strategic Reliabilism

3. Natural Kind Theory

Evaluating reasoning processes.

Evaluating reasoning processes.

Investigating

knowledge.

+

Evaluating reasoning processes.

No

No

No

Cognitive Psychology

help forming the

theory

Ameliorative

Psychology is our

starting point

Cognitive Psychology & cognitive

ethology are our starting points

Limited roles for

intuitions. They are not used as a final referee

Human desire

Science

Human desire

Traditional epistemology

should be replaced with pragmatism

Or

Strategic reliabilism

Or

Natural kind theory.

132

(Table 4) Applying The Six- Question Criterion to Classify Theories of Naturalized Epistemology- Replacement Naturalism: Criterion

Types of Epistemology

Main Topic Conceptual Analysis as Main Tool

Relation with

Science

Role Ascribed

for Intuitions

Source of Normativity

Relation with

Traditional Epistemology

Traditional Epistemology

Finding the necessary and

sufficient conditions for knowledge; Answering the skeptic.

Yes, a priori conceptual

analysis

Science is irrelevant for epistemology.

But epistemology

should be prior to science

because it is first

philosophy that validates

the foundations of science.

Epistemic intuitions

are used as final

reference

Semantic considerations,

i.e. the meaning of the

term

Itself

Replacement Epistemology

Investigating the relation

between theories and

their data

No Epistemology is reduced to Behaviorism

Intuitions are

important but not as a

final reference

Truths and facts of science , i.e. a justified belief, is a true

belief, therefore it is

valuable

Naturalized epistemology must replace traditional

epistemology

133

(Table 5) Relation Between Empirical Science and Replacement Naturalism:

Comparison Empirical Science Replacement Epistemology

Type of Investigated Questions Descriptive questions explaining

how evidence relates to the theory. Also provides normative

prescriptions.

Same questions of empirical science; descriptive questions explaining the

relation between theories (our beliefs) and their evidence (sense

data).

Type of Employed Methods and Tools Empirical methods of science

Same empirical methods of science and total elimination for the a priori methods of traditional epistemology

such as the standard justificatory procedure and employing

commonsense intuitions as final referee.

134

(Table 6) Stages of Substantive Naturalism’s Subtypes: Primary Epistemology-Scientific epistemology- Epistemics: Criterion

Type

of Substantive Naturalism

Topic and Aim First Stage:

Descriptive stage

Second Stage:

Normative stage

Primary epistemology: Describe and

explain our epistemic folkways

Employs traditional a

priori conceptual analysis, which led to forming process reliabilism

Employs Cognitive psychology to make normative judgments

Scientific Epistemology:

Discover and improve our

epistemic folkways

Employs empirical and a

posteriori conceptual analysis to construct process reliabilism

Employs cognitive psychology to correct and modify the

theory and form normative judgments.

Epistemics:

Discover and

improve epistemic concepts to

construct an account of reasoning excellence

A posteriori empirical conceptual analysis for

epistemic concepts

Employs cognitive psychology in forming epistemic norms & judgments that provide advice

for reasoning excellence.

135

(Table7) The Relation Between Empirical Science and Primary Epistemology of Substantive Naturalism:

Comparison

Empirical Science

Primary Epistemology

Type of Investigated Questions

Descriptive questions concerning how things are

Normative questions concerning how things should be

Type of Employed Methods and Tools Empirical methods of science

Uses a priori methods, a priori

conceptual analysis, to form primary epistemology

+ Uses empirical methods of science

to apply primary epistemology

136

(Table 8) Six- Question Criterion Classifying Naturalized Epistemology- Traditional epistemology and Primary Epistemology of Substantive Naturalism: Criterion Type of Epistemolog

y

Main Topic Conceptual Analysis as Tool?

Relation with

Science

Role Ascribed

to Intuition

s

Source of Normativity

Relation with Traditional Epistemolog

y

Traditional Epistemolog

y

Finding the necessary and

sufficient conditions for knowledge;

answering the skeptic.

Yes

Science is

irrelevant for epistemology

. But epistemology

should be prior to science

because it is first

philosophy that validates

the foundations of science.

Epistemic intuitions

are used as final

reference

Semantic considerations

, i.e. the meaning of the

term

Itself

Primary Epistemolog

y

Investigating epistemological concepts

Yes, a priori conceptual analysis.

First a priori conceptual analysis then it is followed by cognitive psychology

Pre-theoretical intuitions are used as a final referee

Semantic considerations: i.e. the meaning of the term

Primary epistemology is Traditional epistemology plus Cognitive psychology

137

(Table 9) The Relation Between Empirical Science and (Scientific Epistemology – Epistemics) Accounts of Substantive Naturalism:

Comparison Empirical Science

Scientific Epistemology +

Epistemics

Type of Investigated Questions

Descriptive questions concerning how things are, are important to answer normative questions of

substantive epistemology

Normative questions concerning how things should be, are

supplemented by the answer of descriptive questions of empirical

science.

Type of Employed Methods Empirical methods

Combining the a posteriori tools of empirical science and the a priori

tools of traditional epistemology to form a posteriori analysis used to

construct and apply scientific epistemology and epistemics of

substantive naturalism. A priori analysis + empirical tools =

a posteriori analysis.

138

(Table 10) Six- Question Criterion Classifying Naturalized Epistemology- Traditional epistemology and Scientific Epistemology of Substantive Naturalism: Criterion

Type of Epistemology

Main Topics

Conceptual

Analysis as Tool?

Relation with

Science

Role Ascribed

to Intuitions

Source of Normativit

y

Relation with

Traditional Epistemolog

y

Traditional Epistemology

Capture and explain

our pre-theoretical intuitions

Yes

Science is

irrelevant for epistemology.

But epistemology

should be prior to science

because it is first

philosophy that validates the

foundations of science.

Epistemic intuitions

are used as final

reference

Semantic consideration

s, i.e. the meaning of

the term

Itself

Scientific Epistemology

Discover and improve our intuitions

Yes, empirical and a

posteriori conceptual analysis.

Cognitive Psychology

A priori analysis + empirical tools = a posteriori analysis

Scientific intuitions are used as a final referee

Semantic considerations: i.e. the meaning of the term

Scientific epistemology is Traditional epistemology

+

psychology

+ educated intuition

139

(Table 11) Six- Question Criterion Classifying Naturalized Epistemology- Traditional epistemology and Epistemics of Substantive Naturalism: Criterion

Type of Epistemolog

y

Main Topic Conceptual Analysis

as Tool

Relation with

Science

Role Ascribed

to Intuition

s

Source of Normativity

Relation with Traditional Epistemolog

y

Traditional Epistemolog

y

Capture and explain our

pre-theoretical intuitions

Yes

Science is

irrelevant for epistemology

. But epistemology

should be prior to science

because it is first

philosophy that validates

the foundations of science.

Epistemic intuitions

are used as final

reference

Semantic considerations

, i.e. the meaning of the

term

Itself

Epistemics

Investigate epistemological concepts to produce advice in intellectual matters

Yes, empirical and a

posteriori conceptual analysis.

Cognitive Psychology

A priori analysis + empirical tools = a

posteriori analysis

Scientific intuitions are used as a final referee to construct the theory

Truth

Scientific epistemology is Traditional epistemology

+

psychology

+ educated intuition

140

(Table 12) Main Features of Substantive Naturalism: Primary Epistemology-Scientific Epistemology- Epistemics:

Criterion

Type of Epistemology

Main Topics

Conceptual Analysis

as Tool

Relation with

Science

Role Ascribed

to Intuition

s

Source of Normativity

Relation with

Traditional Epistemolog

y

Substantive naturalism:

1. Primary

Epistemology

2. Scientific

Epistemology

3. Epistemics

Capture and

explain our pre-

theoretical intuitions

Discover and

improve our

intuitions

Discover

and improve

our intuitions in order to

provide positive advice in

intellectual matters

Yes, a priori conceptual analysis.

Yes, a

posteriori conceptual

analysis

First a

priori conceptual

analysis then it is

followed by Cognitive

Psychology

A priori analysis

+cognitive psychology= empirical

& a

posteriori

analysis

Pre-theoretical intuitions

are used as a final referee

Scientific intuitions

Scientific intuitions employed

to construct the theory

Semantic considerations

: i.e. the meaning of

the term

Truth

Primary epistemology is a little update for Traditional epistemology

Moving closer to naturalism

than traditional epistemology

The closest to naturalism and

farthest to traditional

epistemology

141

(Table 13) Six- Question Criterion for Classifying Naturalism— Substantive Naturalism and Cooperative Naturalism: Criterion

Types of

Epistemology

The Main Topic of

Epistemology

Conceptual

Analysis as a Main

Tool

Relation with

Science:

Role Ascribe

d for Intuition

s

Source of Normativit

y

Relation with

Traditional Epistemolo

gy

Substantive Naturalism

1. Scientific Epistemology

2. Epistemics

Discover and improve intuitions

Discover and improve

intuitions in order to provide

advice in intellectual

matters

A priori analysis + empirical

psychology = empirical

& a

posteriori analysis

Carry on a

posteriori conceptual

analysis based on

the empirical methods

and theories of Cognitive

psychology

scientific Intuitions

are the final

referee to construct the theory

Semantic considerations (i.e. the meaning of the term)

The instrumental value of the theory, i.e. obtaining

truth

Getting closer to naturalism

The closest to naturalism

and farthest to traditional

epistemology

Cooperative naturalism:

1. Pragmatism

2. Strategic Reliabilism

3. Natural Kind Theory

Evaluating reasoning processes.

Evaluating reasoning processes.

Investigating knowledge.

+

Evaluating reasoning processes.

No

No

No

Cognitive Psychology

help forming

our theories

Ameliorative

Psychology is our

starting point

Cognitive Psychology

& Cognitive

Ethology is our starting

point

Limited role for

intuitions. They are not used as a final referee

Human desire

Truths and facts of Science

Human desire

Traditional epistemology

should be replaced with pragmatism

Or

Strategic reliabilism

Or

Natural kind theory.

142

(Table 14) Relation between empirical science and subtype of cooperative naturalism: Stich’s pragmatism - Kornblith’s natural kind theory:

Comparison Empirical Science

Cooperative Naturalism Stich’s Pragmatism-

Kornblith’s Natural Kind Theory

Type of Investigated Questions

Descriptive questions, concerning bow things are, are necessary to

answer the normative questions of epistemology. In fact the answer for

the descriptive questions of empirical science is the basis and starting point for constructing the

theories of cooperative epistemology.

Normative questions, concerning how things should be, are based on the answers of descriptive questions

of empirical science.

Type of Employed Methods and Tools

Empirical science uses variety of methods to construct and apply its

theories. Such as making observation collecting data,

experimentation, etc.

Empirical methods of science are

used to form and apply epistemological theories. Total

elimination for the a priori methods of traditional epistemology.

Scientific and a posteriori intuitions are necessary and employed in

constructing and applying epistemological theories. However, they are never used as a final referee

to evaluate the resulting epistemological theory.

143

(Table 15) Six -Question Criterion for Classifying Naturalism—Traditional Epistemology and Cooperative Naturalism- Pragmatism: Criterion

Types of epistemology

The Main Topic of

Epistemology

Conceptual

Analysis as Main

Tool

Relation with

Science

Role Ascribed

for Intuitions

Source of Normativity

Relation with

Traditional Epistemolog

y

Traditional Epistemolog

y

Finding the necessary

and sufficient conditions

for knowledge.

Answering the skeptic.

yes

Science is irrelevant for epistemolog

y, but epistemology should be

prior to science

because it is the first

philosophy that

validates the foundations of science.

Pre-philosophical Epistemic intuition is

used as final referee

Semantic consideration

s: (i.e. the meaning of the term)

itself

Cooperative Naturalism: Pragmatism

Evaluating reasoning processes

No

Cognitive Psychology

is our starting point

Limited role for

intuitions. They are

not used as a final referee

Human desire

Traditional epistemology

must be replaced

with pragmatism

144

(Table 16) Relation Between Empirical Science and Strategic Reliabilism of Cooperative Naturalism:

Comparison Empirical Science

Cooperative Naturalism

Strategic Reliabilism

Type of Investigated Questions

Bothe descriptive questions,

concerning bow things are. And normative questions concerning how

things should be.

Normative questions, concerning how things should be, are based on the answers of descriptive questions

of empirical science.

Type of Employed Methods and Tools

Empirical science uses variety of methods to construct and apply its

theories. Such as making observation collecting data,

experimentation, etc.

Empirical methods of science are

used to form and apply epistemological theories. Total

elimination for the a priori methods of traditional epistemology.

Scientific and a posteriori intuitions are necessary and employed in

constructing and applying epistemological theories. However, they are never used as a final referee

to evaluate the resulting epistemological theory.

145

(Table 17) Six- Question Criterion for Classifying Naturalism— Traditional Epistemology, Cooperative Naturalism: Strategic Reliabilism:

Criterion

Types of Epistemology

Main Topic

Conceptual Analysis as Main Tool

Relation with

Science

Role Ascribed

for Intuitions

Source of Normativity

Relation with

Traditional Epistemology

Traditional Epistemology

Finding the necessary

and sufficient conditions

for knowledge.

Answering the skeptic.

yes

Science is irrelevant for epistemology,

but epistemology

should be prior to science

because it is the first

philosophy that validates the

foundations of science.

Pre-philosophical

Epistemic intuition are

used as a final referee

Semantic considerations

(i.e. the meaning of the

term)

itself

Cooperative Naturalism:

Strategic Reliabilism.

Evaluating reasoning processes

No

Ameliorative Psychology is our starting

point

Limited role for intuitions. They are not

used as a final referee

Empirical science

Traditional epistemology

must be replaced by strategic reliabilism.

146

(Table 18) Six- Question Criterion for Classifying Naturalism— Traditional Epistemology, Cooperative Naturalism: Natural Kind Theory: Criterion

Types of Epistemology

The Main Topic of

Epistemology

Conceptual Analysis as Main

Tool

Relation with

Science

Role Ascribed

for Intuitions

Source of Normativit

y

Relation with

Traditional Epistemolog

y

Traditional Epistemolog

y

Finding the necessary and

sufficient conditions for knowledge.

Answering the skeptic.

yes

Science is irrelevant for epistemolog

y but epistemology should be

prior to science

because it is the first

philosophy that

validates the foundations of science.

Pre-philosophical Epistemic intuition are

used as a final referee

Semantic consideration

s (i.e. the meaning of the term)

itself

Cooperative Naturalism: Natural kind

theory

Evaluating reasoning processes

No

Cognitive Psychology & Cognitive Ethology is our starting point

Limited role for

intuitions. They are not

used as a final referee

Human desire

Traditional epistemology

must be replaced by natural kind

theory

147

(Table 19) Main Features of Cooperative Naturalism:

Criterion

Types of Epistemology

The Main Topic of

Epistemology

Conceptual

Analysis as a Main

Tool

Relation with

Empirical Science

Role Ascribed

for Intuitions

Source of Normativi

ty

Relation with

Traditional Epistemolo

gy

Traditional Epistemology

Finding the necessary and

sufficient conditions for knowledge.

Answering the skeptic.

yes

Science is irrelevant

for epistemolog

y, but epistemology should be

prior to science

because it is the first

philosophy that

validates the

foundations of science.

Pre-philosophic

al Epistemic intuitions

are used as final

referee

Semantic considerations (i.e. the meaning of the term)

itself

Cooperative Naturalism:

4. Pragmatism

5. Strategic Reliabilism

6. Natural Kind Theory

Evaluating reasoning processes.

Evaluating reasoning processes.

Investigating knowledge + Evaluating reasoning processes.

No

No

No

Cognitive Psychology

is our starting point

Ameliorative

Psychology is our

starting point

Cognitive Psychology & cognitive ethology are our starting

points

Limited roles for

intuitions. They are

not used as a final referee

Human desire

Truths and facts of science

Human desire

Traditional epistemology

should be replaced with pragmatism

Or

Strategic reliabilism

Or

Natural kind theory.

148

APPENDIX B

Figure 1

Epistemology Classified- Traditional Epistemology and Types and Subtypes of Naturalized Epistemology

Epistemology

Naturalized Epistemology

Replacement Naturalism

(Quine)

Substantive Naturalism (Goldman)

Primary epistemology

Scientific epistemology Epistemics

Cooperative Naturalism

Strategic Reliablism

(Bishop&Trout)

Pragmatism (Stich)

Natural Kind Theory

(Kornblith)

Traditional Epistemology

149

Figure 2

The Six- Question Criterion Used to Classify Naturalized Epistemology

150

Figure 3

Subtypes of Substantive Naturalism: Primary epistemology- Scientific Epistemology- Epistemics

Substantive Naturalism

Primary Epistemology Traditional a priori conceptual analysis

Scientific Epistemology

A posteriori empirical conceptual analysis

Epistemics A posteriori empirical

conceptual analysis

151

Figure 4

The Relation between Ameliorative Psychology and Strategic Reliabilism.

Strategic Reliabilism (SR)

Ameliorative Psychology (AP)

AP provides the basis for the theoretical framework of SR.

SR is directed to explain AP and solve normative disputes within AP.

SR is used to solve actual problems in reality

152

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156

BIOGRAPHICAL SKECTCH

Amirah Albahri was born in the State of Kuwait on March 23rd of 1978. She joined the

Philosophy Department of Kuwait University in 1998. In 2002, Amirah graduated with a B.A. in

Philosophy. A year later, she received a scholarship from Kuwait University to pursue her

graduate studies in the Philosophy of Science in the United States of America. Amirah joined the

Center of Intensive English studies at Tallahassee, Florida, in 2004. And in 2005, she was

accepted to pursue her graduate studies at the University of Virginia. In the spring of 2006,

Amirah transferred to the Philosophy department at Florida State University to pursue her PhD,

and graduated in 2011. In the same year, she was appointed as a university teacher at the

philosophy department of Kuwait University.