epistemology naturalized and pragmatism

8/3/2019 Epistemology Naturalized and Pragmatism

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Pragmatic Commitments to Naturalized EpistemologyAuthor(s): Hangqing Cong, Xiaodong Cheng, Haidan ChenSource: Frontiers of Philosophy in China, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Sep., 2006), pp. 477-490Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30209983 .

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Front.Philos. China(2006) 3: 477-490DOI 10.1007/sl 1466-006-0020-9I xLIRRJL4rIR IlI1l

Cong Hangqing, Cheng Xiaodong

Pragmaticommitmentso naturalizedpistemology

x HigherEducationPress andSpringer-Verlag006

Abstract This essay exploresnumerous and complicatednaturalizedepis-temology againstthe backgroundof pragmatism.We distinguishthreepro-grammesof naturalizedepistemology:strong,moderate,and weak. By con-sidering commitments of pragmatismon which differentprogrammesde-pend,we pointout the close-knitrelationshipbetweenpragmatismand natu-ralized epistemology.We also illustratethe essential origin of today's con-troversyovernaturalized pistemologyandpredictthe uptrendof naturalizedepistemology.Keywords epistemology,naturalism,pragmatismThere is immanent connection between naturalizedepistemology andprag-matism. As the most widely known and influentialschool of philosophy inAmerica,pragmatismsettles on the theoreticalkeynote and backgroundofnaturalizedepistemology. By analyzing the theoretical commitments af-fordedby different ypes of pragmatism o naturalized pistemology,we canbetter understand he differenttypes of naturalizedepistemology and clarifytoday's controversyover naturalizedepistemology, and accordinglybetterpredictthe uptrendof naturalized pistemology.I Threerogrammesf naturalizedpistemologyWe can hardly give a brief and clear definitionto naturalizedepistemologyTranslatedfrom Zhexue YanjiuW Tr]FffxPhilosophical Studies), 2005 (10) by CongHangqing, Cheng Xiaodongand Chen HaidanCongHangqings), ChengXiaodongDepartmentof Philosophy, ZhejiangUniversity, Hangzhou310028, ChinaE-mail:[email protected]


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478 Front. hilos.China2006)3:477-490because naturalismwould be an attitudeand approachrather han a systemor doctrine:t's aphilosophicalmethodologyndprojectnnature.Randall,pp. 121-140)Usually,naturalizedpistemology ppears s a methodologyoraninquiry pproach/programme,hose ntension ndextension renot asstraightforwards traditionalpistemology.Therefore,we will not badgerwithconceptualssues of naturalizedpistemologyn dispute,but we'rego-ingto presentts methodology nd essentialviewpoint ia clarifyingdiffer-ent types of naturalizedpistemology.We can see that althougha goodmanyscholarsnowadays oost naturalizedpistemology,here'sstill broaddivergence n somefundamentalssues.Nowwe list three uchfundamentalissueswhich can be used as measurementsf classifyingdifferentypesofnaturalizedpistemology.These issues centralizeon the relationship e-tween raditionalpistemologyndnaturalizedpistemologyhatalltypesofnaturalizedpistemologyffront.Lookatthe Table1belowfirst:Table 1

Types Parameter : Parameter : Parameter :of naturalized pistemology epistemology is a natural science is traditional epis-disciplineof science the only source of temology can beepistemology supersededStrongprogramme1 (Si) + + +Strongprogramme (S2) + - +Moderateprogramme1 (M1) + + -Moderateprogramme (M2) +Weakprogramme1 (W1) - + -Weak programme (W2) - - -

We treat three fundamental ssues as parameters.The basic viewpoint orstandpointof different ypes of naturalizedepistemologistsis affectedby thevalue "+" and "-" of these parameters.Accordingto the divergenceshownin answeringthe three fundamental ssues, we compartmentalize aturalizedepistemologyinto threeprogrammes. n each programme, here are two dif-ferent forms accordingto intension.For instance, S2 is weaker than Si.Dif-ferent programmes correspondto differenttypes of naturalizedepistemol-ogy.

II StrongprogrammendQuine'sommitmentsAccording to Table 1, naturalizedepistemology is mainly considered asstrong programme S1 or S2 ) and the criticismto naturalizedepistemologypoints at the strong programme.This is because Quine, as the symbol ofnaturalizedepistemology, is the proponentof the strong programme.Thecriticism of naturalizedepistemologyis mainly associated with Quine's per-


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Front. hilos.China2006)3:477-490 479spective.In order o showthe basicstandpointf his strongprogramme,et's firstanalyzeQuine'sperspective nd then ook at the close association etweenQuine's trongprogrammend his ownpragmatichoughtso illustratehemain commitments r theoreticalupporto strongprogrammeuppliedbyhis scientificpragmatism.Most of today'snaturalizedpistemology riginatesromQuine's"Epis-temologyNaturalized".his seminalpaperbringsabout"thenaturalistse-turn"andvigorousdevelopment f naturalizedpistemology.n thepaper,Quine aid:

Epistemology,rsomethingikeit, simply allsintoplaceas a chapter fpsychologyand hence of natural cience.It studiesnatural henomena,that s, aphysicalhuman ubject.Thishuman ubjects accorded certainexperimentallyontrollednput-certainpatterns f irradiationn assortedfrequencies,or instance-andin the fullnessof timethesubjectdeliversas output descriptionf the threedimensional orldand tshistory.Therelation etween hemeager nputand orrentialutputs arelationwe arepromoted o study for somewhat he same reasonsthat have alwayspromptedpistemology.Quine,pp.82-83)Here,Quineapproves f P1 valueof "+") n the firstplace.He treats heobjectof epistemology s a naturalphenomenon, nd calls for an experi-mentalmethodnthestudyof epistemologyo "providen account f a cer-tain naturalphenomenon, amely, knowledge tself."(Komrnblith,. 161)Accordingly,raditionalpistemology an no longerstandas "firstphiloso-phy"andall epistemologicalssues can be settled n anexperiential ay,sotraditionalpistemologyan be eliminated rreplaced.Quine'sapproval fP1 s destined o his approval f P2.The response o P2lies in how we interpretcience.Quineappears o"take orgrantedhattheproduct f naturalizationas enough n commonwithtraditionalpistemologyo its name," Houkes,p. 254) andhe almostidentifiesepistemologywith psychology.Furthermore,n Quine'ssense,psychologys almostnatural cience.So Quine'sresponseo P2 s alsoposi-tive. However, ome otherproponents f strongprogrammehink hat sci-ence is not equal o naturalcience,andtheyvalidate he methodof social

science n thestudyof epistemology.Althoughit seems that Quine hesitates at P2,his main idea is to identifyknowledge with Si as a kind of physical phenomena.This Quinean stand-point is called "physicalschool",representativesof which include R. Giere,P. Thagardandso on. They all claim thattraditionallyepistemological ssues


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480 Front. hilos.China2006)3:477-490can be settledby use of the latestproductsof modernscience, and then con-fine science to physicalscience.Therefore,mostof them construct piste-mologicalmethodology n the basis of productsand standard f physicalscience.However,proponentsf S2,includingM. W. Wartofsky, . Fullerand S. M. Downes,advocate pistemologicalnquiry romsocial,historicalandcultural imensions.Theyconsiderknowledge s a cultural henomena,thusgainthe name"culturalchool",whodisagreewith thephysicalschoolonP2.It is noted hat here s no fundamentalisagreementsetween hephysi-cal schoolandcultural choolbecause heybothbelong o strongprogramme.Althoughhephysical choolclaims hat heepistemologicalccountmodelshouldbe constructedy normal orm of physicalscience,they do not en-tirelyexclude ocialandhistorical actors ndvice versa.Andthestandpointof thephysicalor cultural choolcanbe changed nderdifferent ackgroundcommitments. or nstance, ecauseof attention nfactorsof normativenessandvalue,L.Laudan eems o slidefromS2 o themoderate rogramme,ndH. Komblith, ue to his socialaccountunder cientisticbackground,inallyslides frommoderateprogrammeo S2.Strongprogrammeas a close-knit elationship ithQuinean ragmatism.WhetherS1or S2,it obviously presentsscientisticinclination,which accordswith Quineanpragmatism.Given the theoretical ommitmentsy Quineanpragmatism,trongprogrammeomes down withstrong cientistic nclina-tion. Quineanpragmatism ot only suppliesbackgroundor strong pro-gramme, ut alsorepresentsommon tandpointsf thedifferent choolsofstrongprogramme.Accordingto the characterof Quineanpragmatism,we call it "ScientisticPragmatism" SP) for the moment. Commitmentsof Scientistic Pragmatism(CSP) to strongprogrammemainlyinclude:CSP1: Commitment of ReductionTraditional eductionism s of foundationalism,but Quine's reduction s akind of "linguisticbehaviorism".Firstly,Quine "regardsstimulus-responsecorrelations as the only available evidence for the state of the subject andtreat the subjectitself as a black box." (Houkes,p. 255) He uses the "stimu-lus-response" model to account meaning, and reduces the complicatedprocess of cognition to the initial stage of meaning. Then, our language ispartitioned into "occasional sentence", "standing sentence" and "eternalsentence" accordingto the extent of their correlationsto intense stimulusfrom close to distant. So logic and mathematicpropositions,which are notconfrontedwith commonexperience,can be reducedto occasionalsentences,which bear the meaningof intense stimulus.Therefore, his commitment s aprecondition or experimental cience to replacetraditional pistemology.


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Front.Philos.China2006)3: 477-490 481CSP2: Commitment f FallibilismFallibilism ndthe "stimulus-response"odel areimpartible. ccordingto Quinean ragmatism,pistemic rocesseshatdevelop eliableknowledgevia several nput-outputoursescannotbe finishedatonetime.Onlyby in-creasing nputof experience anwe avoidfalsityandacquireruth.Alongthisway, Quineclaimed he fallibilityandrevisability f experimentalci-ence and admittedhevalidityof historicalactorand evolutionist ccount.Thiscommitmentustifies hecredibilityf theexperimental ethod.CSP3: Commitment f CausationismDifferent rom ogicalempiricism,Quine'scausationisms external, s henot only rejectsmakingcausal nferenceby logic functionn analyticphi-losophy,but also denies hecausal nferencemodel of syllogism.Quinees-tablishes ausation n therelationbetweenexperientialnputandepistemic

output.He thinks hat if we can insureenoughexperientialnput,credibleknowledgemustbe acquired. o whatwe shoulddo is tryhard o improvethe condition f causal nference nd avoidfallacy,butnot to finda prioriarguments.This commitment makes it possible for strong programmeofnaturalizedpistemologyo deny all the a priorideductionof traditionalepistemology.CSP4:ConfirmationHolismAftertraditionalositivismwas attacked y critical ationalism, hetherknowledge anbeconfirmed r notbecamea question.Quine ecognizeshelimitationof positivismand applies experiential olism to confirmation.According o confirmationolism,all the propositions an be understoodwithinthe conceptual ystem,so as to avoid the limitation f inductiveordeductivenference.WithinQuineanpragmatism,he credibility f knowl-edge rests on the validityof linguistic expressionsand the relativityofphysical ensesystems, o if we understandraccepta language,we under-standor accept ts conceptual ystem.Thiscommitments necessaryo an-swer the doubt hatstrongprogrammeannotbe justified,although omevagueness till exists.It's clear hatQuine'scommitmentsbove ay a theoreticaloundationorstrongprogramme.urthermore,urrent riticism f strongprogrammeanfinally attribute o these four pragmatic ommitments. or example,W.Houkesconsiders hatQuine'scommitmentsf reduction eviate rom hecontentsand goals of traditional pistemologicalnquiry,as the goal ofQuine'snaturalizedpistemologys just "clarifyinghe relationbetweensensory nputandverbaloutput,betweenevidenceand heory". Houkes,p.257) D. Davidson thinks that althoughrelationshipbetween stimu-lus-observationsentences is causal, it cannotbe justified in an experientialway. JagwonKimalso criticizesCSP3, e argues hatknowledges a norma-


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482 Front. hilos.China2006)3: 477-490tive concept tself,butQuine'scommitment f causationisms aboutelimi-natingnormativity.Currently,o muchcriticismof CSP endangers trongprogramme ndeven the whole naturalizedpistemology.For example,B. Stroudand E.Sosaargue hatQuine'snaturalism oesnot answer he centralquestionoftraditionalpistemology,.e., the doubt hat if scientific heorycan reachfacticityand ndicate xternal eality, o CSPis helpless n thefaceof skep-ticism.Accordingly,Houkesargues hat he contentsof (strong)naturalismare quite different from that of traditionalepistemology so it cannot be thesuccessor of traditionalepistemology or at least it is not worth the name"epistemology". oukes'suggestions that,onlywhenwe change henameof naturalizedpistemology an we settle its status. n this sense,S. Stichevenblithelypredictshatepistemologywill end.(S. Stich,p. 89)III ModeraterogrammendDewey'sommitmentsStrongprogrammef naturalizedpistemology ncountersmore and morecriticism,ome of whichcomesfrommoderate rogramme. hebiggestdif-ferencebetween hemoderate rogrammend hestrongone is thatalthoughthe formeracknowledges he validityand necessity of the experientialmethod in epistemic inquiry, it refuses to deny or discard concepts andmethods of traditionalepistemologyat all. To be brief, moderateprogrammedisagreeswith strong programmeaboutP3.R. Feldman's view is a representativeof moderateprogramme'sattitudesand standpointson P3. He calls traditionalepistemology "armchairepiste-mology", which begins at hypotheticpropositions and puts forwardsomeanalyses andprinciples,and then revises them in the light of potentialcoun-terexamples. So the prominence of traditionalepistemology is analyzingepistemological concepts and formulating epistemic principles. He callsmodem epistemology "methodological naturalism",which holds that allpsychological resultsrelated to humancognition andreasoningare essentialorhelpful to the process of epistemic inquiry.Feldmanoppugnsthe status of the strongprogramme.In his opinion, wecannot take naturalized epistemology (strong programme) for granted.Firstly, he points out that what naturalism concerns and what traditionalepistemologydoes aredifferent,only if epistemologyis as broad a disciplineas "the study of humanknowledge", empiricalstudy advocatedby natural-ism is relevant and legitimate. Second, the introduction of psychologicalconcepts cannotjustify naturalizedepistemology, for in fact psychologicalconcepts are always being used in epistemology. Feldman argues that, al-


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Front. hilos.China2006)3: 477-490 483thoughmore andmorepsychological onceptsenterepistemology,t doesnot follow thatpsychological esults mplysuchtheoryor thatepistemolo-gistsmustuse suchresults o supportheir heory; omeepistemic heory anjustifyitself,which can makesense withoutusingresults romnatural ci-ence ikepsychology.Accordingly,Feldman's onclusion s that"someprojects ome wouldcall epistemological,uch as the studyof humanknowledgeandreasoningortheeffort o help people o reasonbetter,undoubtedlyo require mpiri-cal input. n spiteof argumentso the contrary,here'snot muchreason othinkthatpsychological esultswill play any significant ole in effortstoconstruct eneral bstractheories boutoranalysesof knowledge nd usti-fication."Feldman, . 184)Onthe onehand,he considers mpiricalciencehelpful o epistemology;n the otherhand,he triesto makeroom for con-ceptual analysesand theoreticalabstraction f traditional pistemology.Feldman pposesKornblith'snalogyof knowledge ndnatural henomena,andemphasizes r highlightshe particularityf knowledge.So his view-pointtowardsP3 s that somepropositions f epistemology annotrestonempiricalinformation,and traditionalepistemology cannot be replaceden-tirely.J. Cappsholds a similarviewpoint. By comparingQuineanandDeweyanpragmatism,Capps suggests a return to Deweyan pragmatism,which notonly contains the minimal commitments of a naturalizedepistemology, butalso provides a response to objections to such an approach.According toCapps,moderateprogramme an trace back to Deweyan pragmatism.The characterof Deweyan pragmatism s consistent with moderatepro-gramme, so his pragmatismcan give essential theoretic evidence or back-ground commitments.Dewey uses the concept "situation" o set inquiryconditions and denies epistemic reduction and scientism of strong pro-gramme.TherebyDeweyan pragmatism anjustify naturalizedepistemologyin a minimalisticway.Dewey's centralnotion is "situation",which at least containspsychologi-cal and social factors: as a resultof biological and cultural ramework,prob-lems for inquiryarise, are classified and solved. Althoughthe situation de-pends upon our own doing, it also carries certainfactorsthat cannot be re-ducedentirelyto subjectivepsychologicalandsocial factors.It seems thatDewey anticipated he crux of Quine early. Dewey sets twoconditionsof inquiry theory:first, all kinds of inquirydiffer only in degree,not in kind;second, logic formsoriginatefrom the process of solving certainor material ndeterminacy.Theformer s the basic commitmentof naturalism,while the latterprevent Deweyan naturalism rombeing a "chapter" f natu-ral science or descriptivescience.


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484 Front.Philos.China2006)3:477-490We can see thatDewey considers resultsof certainactivity as some com-mon sense, which provides evidence for abstractionof scientific theories,accordingly ispragmatisms characteristicf commonsensicalnclination.So Dewey'scommitmentso moderate rogrammean be called "Commit-mentsof Commonsensicalragmatism"(CCP):CCP1:Commitment f CommonSenseAccording o Deweyanpragmatic, ommonsensicalealism, he use ofeffective anguage mpliesa basic"theory f the world".Ourcommon ensecan insure hat inguistic xpressions likely o develop heoriesof theworld.Undergenericcommon ense,we all canexpress he relationship etweenrealityandtheoryvia language, ndthen ranslatehingsoutside he humanbody ntoobjectsof knowledge.CCP2:Commitment f TheorizingAftertesting he relationof objectandtheoryby common ense,Deweyprovides ommitmentotherelation f theoreticalctivityand tsresults.Hethinks hatsome"theory f the world" s necessarily rior o, andcontinuouswith,moresophisticatedormsof theorizing.timplies hat heoreticalormsare natural results of theoretical activity, which also embodyself-developmentndself-completionf theory.CCP3:Commitment f ContinuityNow that he"theory f the world"s continuouswith moresophisticatedformsof theorizing, pistemologys to be regarded s continuouswith sci-enceor as a chapter f science.Accordingo Deweyanpragmatism,ertainresults of activityprovideendless motivation or abstraction f scientifictheory,so we can find continuitybetweenthem.In this sense, Dewey'scommitment f continuityanbe appliedo all aspectsof human nowledge:There s continuity etweenphilosophy ndscience,epistemology ndsci-ence,traditionalndnaturalizedpistemology,tc.From he view of the moderate rogramme,thercommitments reun-necessary, ndbasic commitmentsf thestrongprogrammereunnecessaryfora defenseof naturalizedpistemology.Undercommitments f the mod-erateprogramme,aturalizedpistemologys neither"thereplacementhe-sis",nor "the ransformationalhesis",while it doesn'tdiscriminategainstvarious kinds of science. Naturalizing epistemology under this minimalmanner clears the way for approachingquestions of truth andjustificationfrom a fresh direction,without making an unwarranteddetourthroughre-

ductionism andfoundationalism,as otherprogrammesof naturalismdo.Of course, for the sake of epistemic justification, Deweyan pragmatismcontains certainmethodologicalpresuppositions.Althoughthis remediesthestrongprogramme'sgnorance fjustification ndnormativeness,t opensaconvenientdoor for the moderateprogrammeo slide to the weak pro-


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Front. hilos.China2006)3:477-490 485gramme.Anotherdeficiencyof Dewey's commitmentss thatDewey cir-cumvents kepticismrom he view of commonsensicalragmatism,ut hisnon-foundationalapproachmakes it doubtful that naturalizedepistemologyis able o answerquestions osedbytraditionalpistemology. eweytries oavoid reductive cientismof the strongprogrammen the one hand,andavoid oundationalism,oherentismndothermoremainstreampproaches,whichhuntaftercertainty, n the otherhand.Thismakeshis commonsensi-cal evidencesnot able o do as well as he wishes.Inthe face of thispredica-ment,Deweymustconfess hat"wemaybase ourexpectationsn whatoc-curs n morescientific ields."(Capps,. 657)To sum up, although here are some difficultiesof the moderatepro-gramme nderCCP, t's still the case thatmoderate rogrammes moreac-ceptable hanstrongprogramme. ecently,manyscholarsof epistemologyshouted out the slogan of "return o Dewey", for they think that not only is itable o clarify he basiccommitmentsf a naturalizedpistemology, utalsomakes hepoint hatnothingmore s necessaryn order o makesenseof ourepistemic ndscientificpractice.IV Weak rogrammendPeirce'sommitmentsWithinnaturalizedpistemology,he most drastic riticism o Quine'sap-proach s from heweakprogramme.WhetherW1or W2, ts disagreementswith the strongprogrammebout undamentalssues areprodigious. f wetreat trongprogrammes anextreme,henweakprogrammean be readasanother xtreme. f it'sthe case that he radical ttitude f strongprogrammerenders t to be misunderstoodas post-modernism, hen the drasticdegreetowhich the weak programmecriticizes the strongprogrammedisplays a cer-tain a prioriflavor.The proponentsof weak programmedo not deny the role of empiricalscience in epistemic studies, but they disagree drasticallywith the strongprogrammeabout P1. They refuse to treat naturalizedepistemology as acommondiscipline of science, rather hey try to defend epistemology as theguide of science. Therefore, they drastically reject elimination of logic,mathematicand metaphysicpropositions.Not only do they confess the va-lidity of some concepts and propositionsout of experience, but they thinkthese conceptsandpropositionsconstitute he so-called "apriori knowledge",which is beyondthe studyof empiricalscience.G. Rey is a representativeof weak programme.Firstly,he claims to be anaturalisthimself, and confesses the necessity and validity of empiricalmethods in epistemic inquiry.However, Rey also finds some ambiguityin


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486 Front.Philos.China2006)3: 477-490Quine'spragmatic ommitments,specially he commitment f fallibilismand confirmation olism.Accordingly,he arguesthat naturalized piste-mologycannotget rid of a prioriknowledge, orthereare no fundamentaldifferencesbetween traditionalogic, mathematics, r metaphysicsandphysics,biologyordaily-lifebelief,theyarerevisableaccordingo experi-ence.Rey's strategy s advocatinga priorivia experience.He claims that"whether r not there s a prioriknowledges an empiricalssue","itmaywell turnout to be a naturalisticactthatwe humans ossessaprioriknowl-edge in a number f areas."Rey,p. 25) As a matter f fact,the a priori nRey's sense is a certainstrategyof justification, ust similarto Kuhn's"paradigm".o the a priori anbe revised n lightof experience,which canbe considered s advancementather handenialof the a priori,ustlike thechangeof the normal ormposedby Einstein's paceandquantum hysics.Accordingo this a priori ustification,Reycanreasonably ivenegative e-sponse oP1andP3.It is clear hatRey'sconceptof aprioris different rom hatof traditionalphilosophy. ust n thissense,M.Devitt hinks hatReyis not a naturalist tall, because"using he empiricalmethod romtimeto time does not makeyou a naturalist."Devitt,p. 47) We can see that,accordingo ourcommonunderstandingf naturalizedpistemologyviz. Si), a naturalist asno al-ternative uttheempiricalmethod.H. Fieldargues hat ogicis apriori.His reason s clear: norder o reasonanythingby evidence,we have to use logic; logic licensesthe inferencesfromevidence o conclusion ndso mustcome first. Devitt,p. 57) Fromhisperspectiveof pragmatism,we do have reason to use logic knowledge,which s theapriorin thisweaksenseaccordingo Field'sdefinition.While he moderate rogrammeeliberatelyisinterestsheresponseo P2,the weakprogrammeeems obepartitionednto"physicalchool"(M1)and"cultural chool"(M2)in the light of differentresponsesto P2. The commonpointof M1andM2is advocating prioriknowledgehroughmpirical tudyso as to resist strong programmeor moderateprogramme.For instance, D.Cummins,who seems to belong to the "physical school", asserts that "wepredictthatpriorknowledge concerningalternativepossibilitiesto the causalscenarios describedby causal conditionalswould influence people's inter-pretationsof the conditions." Cumminset al., p. 276) In comparingnatural-istic epistemology with HermeneuticEpistemology, K. Lennon advocatesreplacing a priori with immanence while admitting that "reason has re-mained immanent or transcendent" Lenon, p. 257). Accordingly we thinkLenonbelongs to the "cultural chool".Comparedwith Quine's and Dewey's commitments of pragmatism,the


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Front. hilos.China2006)3: 477-490 487weakprogrammeantracedirectlyo Peirce'spragmatism.he a priori la-vor presented by Peirce's pragmatismmake it possible to give backgroundcommitments r theoretic upport o the weak programme. y analyzingPeirce'commitments, e can betterunderstandundamentalharacters ndessential ontents f the weakprogramme.Peirce s honored s the initiator f pragmatism, hoposedanimportantinfluence nDeweyandQuine.As to naturalizedpistemology, wing othediscontentmentndrebound f thestrongprogrammef whichQuine s therepresentative, anyscholarsnowadaysurn o go underPeirce'spragmaticcommitmentsn the hope of constructingaturalisticpistemologyof theweakprogramme.PeircerebuildsKant's ranscendentalogic through emiotics,andgivesnewjustificationf thevalidityof impersonal nowledge.His inquiry ogicis different rom that of Dewey's: Dewey establishesnatural onnectionsbetween onditions ndoutcomes f inquiry,whilePeirceestablishesogicalnecessitybetweenhow to indicateand what to indicate.AlthoughPeirceabandons raditionaldogmatism,he still lays a crediblefoundation orknowledgehroughinguistic"communityf intercourse".It is clear hatPeirce ries to balance raditionalmetaphysics ndmodernscience.Hispragmatismresents n obviousa priori lavor hatwe call "APrioriPragmatism"or the moment.Commitmentsf A PrioriPragmatism(CAP) o naturalizedpistemology remainlyas follows:CAP1:Commitment f FoundationInPeirce'sopinion,althought's hopeless or traditionalpistemologyodevelop crediblefoundationwithin individuals no matterwhetherthisfoundations self-awarenessrlogic laws), t'spossible o findsuchfounda-tion within inguistic"communityf intercourse".ctually, uchfoundationis a certain trategy fjustification,whichreplaces ranscendentaleductionor inductionwith a prioriustification, ccordinglyraditionalpistemologyisjustifiedonceagain nthedevelopmentfmodem cience.CAP2: Commitment f ConsistencyAnother mportant ommitment o defend a priorijustification s thecommitment f consistency.According o Peirce'ssemiotics,such consis-tencyis not only embodied n consistencybetween hingandthingor be-tweensymbolandsymbol,but also embodiedn consistency etweenobjectandsymbol.Of course,as a pragmatist, eircedoes not admitanycorrela-tion between onceptandobject.Histrue ntentionies in thelinguistic on-sistencyexpressedby interpersonalndication f objectrather hanthe ob-jectivecommunity f concept n self-awareness.Apel,p. 96) Such consis-tency s apriori rpreexistent.Within he domainof epistemology,f we treatQuine'scommitmentss


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488 Front. hilos.China2006) :477-490thatof "revolutionist",henPeirce'scommitmentseemto be thatof"royal-ist".By using hestrategy fjustificationf CAP,Peircemakes tpossible oretain hepriority f epistemologyomparedo science,whichprovidesanimpelling heoretic upportor the weakprogramme's enyingPiandthenP3.However,Peirce'sa priori ustifications open:hispragmatismoes notdeny empirical esultsof natural cience,and indeed ries to findvalid ac-countof scienceoutof theempirical omain.UnderPeirce'spragmaticommitments,omeproponentsf themoderateprogrammeften slideto the weakprogrammer even some new formsofmetaphysics.Comparedo Quineanand Deweyan pragmatism,Peirce'spragmatism eepscloser contactwith traditionalhilosophy.Therefore,heboundary etween the weak programme f naturalized pistemologyandtraditionalpistemologys rather mbiguous.nthissense,weakprogrammeis subject o be reproached,venpushedout of the domainof naturalisticepistemology.To be brief,we do not have much reasonto be optimisticabout heperspective f the weakprogramme.V The ptrendf naturalizedpistemologyOutside he domainof naturalizedpistemology,manyscholars riticizeorattack heprojectof naturalizedpistemology rastically.We need to pointoutagain hat he criticismmainly argetshestrongprogramme. f course,such criticism ndangershe common tatusof the differentypesof natu-ralized epistemology at the same time. For instance, it is pointed out thatQuine'sattitudeof reduction r transformationowards raditionalpiste-mologypremisedhis thorough uspicionor denialof traditionalpistemol-ogy. So, Quinedid not refer o any empiricalcience hatcouldsupportheclaim hatconsequences f Hume's hesiscanbe avoided f epistemologysnaturalized,ndhis arguments simply"theargumentromdespair"Shatz,p. 117).Accordingly,A. Kertiszargues hat here s no cleardistinction e-tween Quine'sarguments nd skepticism:"his conclusion hat traditionalepistemologyhouldbe discardeds validexactlyas longas traditionalpis-temologyexists" Kertisz,p. 274).Kertiszcallssuch fundamentalroblem"theparadox f naturalizedpistemology".In fact,why not suchparadoxs also the paradoxof traditionalpiste-mology?The crucialmatter ere s howwe understandhe notionsof "tradi-tional"and"natural". ere we also see the intensereboundof the strongprogrammef naturalizedpistemology.As we cansee inprevious ections,going with pragmatic ommitments, ifferent ypes of naturalizedpiste-mologycan convert o eachother,andsuch a conversions anembodiment


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Front. hilos.China2006)3: 477-490 489of the rebound f the strongprogramme.We sumupthe conversion f dif-ferentypesof naturalizedpistemologys follows:

Strong Moderate WeakProgramme Programme Programme

CCP CAP$1x--x--M1 W

CCP CAP- 2 WFig. 1

Accordingo Fig. 1, thestrongprogrammendmoderate rogrammeanconvert o one another nderconditions f CCPandCSP;similarly,weakprogrammendmoderate rogrammeanbe convertedo one another nderconditions f CCP andCAP;however,owingto theirextremeness,trongprogrammendweakprogrammeannot onvert o one another irectly. tis reasonableo infer hat,as thepressurewithinand outside he domainofnaturalizedpistemologyncreases,bothstrongprogrammend weakpro-grammewill convert o moderate rogrammender onditions f CCP, .e.,naturalizedpistemologyhould onverge n moderate rogramme.f this sright, the notion of naturalized pistemologyn common sense will bechanged,and the pragmaticbackground f naturalized pistemologyasmainstream ill also be shifted.As a resultof that,the basic standpointsgoing o shift romradical omoderate.It is still notable hat heradical tandpointf earlyprogrammeeems tobe necessaryor inevitable o the development f naturalizedpistemology.In order o be clearlydistinguishedrom raditionalpistemology,he markof the decisive urning way rom raditionalpistemologyeemsdoomed obe theinitiation f thestrongprogramme. herefore, aturalizedpistemol-ogy gives us an extremelydestructivempression.Especially, he revolu-tionary haracterresented y strongprogrammeausesmuch criticismorattack.With he strongprogrammeransferringo the moderate rogrammeunder he changed ackgroundf pragmatism,he constructiveignificanceof naturalizedpistemology nrebuilding pistemologyhouldemerge,andit is hopedthatthe controversyover naturalizedepistemologywill be settledinthe future.

ReferencesApel, Karl-Otto,Towardsa Transformation f Philosophy, trans.by Sun Zhouxing and Lu

Xinghua,Shanghai:ShanghaiTranslationPublishingHouse, 1997Capps, John, Quine and Pragmatic Naturalized Epistemology, Transactions of Charles


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490 Front.Philos.China(2006) 3: 477-490S. Peirce Society,32, 1996 (4)

Cummins,Denise; Lubart,Todd;Alksnis, Olaf and Rist, Robert,ConditionalReasoningandCausation,Memoryand Cognition,19, 1991 (3)Devitt, Michael,Naturalismand the A Priori,PhilosophicalStudies,92, 1998

Feldman, Richard,Methodological Naturalism in Epistemology, in John Greco and ErnestSosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology,Oxford: Blackwell PublishersLtd.,1999

Houkes, Wybo, Normativity in Quine's Naturalism: The Technology of Truth-Seeking?Journal or GeneralPhilosophy of Science, 33, 2002

Kert6sz,Andrds,On the De-Naturalizationof Epistemology,Journal or GeneralPhilosophyof Science, 33, 2002Kornblith,Hilary,In Defense of a NaturalizedEpistemology,in John Greco andErnest Sosa

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