b - amundson,r.(1983) - the epistemological status of a naturalized epistemology
TRANSCRIPT
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The pistemological Status
o
a
Naturalized pistemology
Ron Amundson
University
of
Hawaii, Hilo
Philosophically inclined psychologists and psychologically inclined
often hold that the substantive discoveries
of
psychology can prov
foundation for epistemology.
n
this paper it is argued that the am
epistemology empirically faces certain unnoticed difficulties. Emp
concerned with knowledge-gaining abilities have been hist
or
ically
specific epistemological views such that the epistemology gives pr
to the substantive theory, while the theory empirically supports th
Theories attribute to the subject just those epistemic abilities whi
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Ron
mundson
standard text in the history of psychology. Typically about a
volume s devoted to pre-scientific (i.e. pre-Wundt) psycholo
of
this refers to classical philosophical epistemologists.
Contemporary epistemology shows strong interest in rel
mology to the substantive discoveries
of
psychology. This in
from several influences.
One
important influence s many epi
loss of the Cartesian ambition to provide an epistemologica
for non-philosophical (including scientific) knowledge.
s
lon
was epistemically to support the sciences, we would be begg
were we
to
use the results of scientific inquiry in constructi
foundation. Such circularity s not encountered in the ta
describing human epistemic processes. This kind of descripti
a part,
but
only a
part
,
of
classical epistemology.
The
othe
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the substantive theories from these observations. I will argue a
position. I will suggest that empirically based epistemolog
common in the history
of
the cognitive sciences. I will argu
that this congruence of epistemology and substantive theory (1
the rational support of any naturalized descriptive epistemol
s to some extent counterproductive to progress in the cognit
t is widely recognized that the cognitive scientist s himse
cognitive systems which are the object of his study. This dual
scientist, as investigator and as exemplar
of
cognition , opens th
that, as his science advances, he will increasingly come to und
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336 Ron
Amundson
discovered facts about cognition. The epistemologist can trust
because, it
s
supposed, if it weren t based on a good epi
would have produced results which would have shown the
to be in error. Perhaps this is enough. Perhaps not.
Consider scientific theory T and the epistemology E with
developed. The following
s
a General Significance Criterion
A theory
T
based on epistemology
E
s
significant to th
it is possible for
E
together with some observations to
T
in conflict with
T
This trivial criterion requires only that a theory must have m
content
than
its ancestor epistemology. Any theory, cognitive
fails this criterion ought
not
to be considered a substantive
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generated from within the theory s cognitive paradigm. The
and the substantive theory seem to come in a package, an
mology s rejection occurs only through a paradigm change
the theory along with the epistemology. (Cases to be noted
epistemologies/methodologies of the cognitive sciences se
exerted powerful constraints on the epistemological specifics o
ated
th ori s
constraints which protect the epistemology agai
attack. Again, the problem
is
not that
no
empirical discoveri
that nothing surprises the scientists working within the paradig
is only that there are no epistemological surprises. The desc
temology which comes out of a cognitive paradigm is very, ve
the one which went in. Ideally, one would expect to find a
psychologist discovering that the facts of cognition show his ep
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Ron mundson
as motives, desires, anxiety, and so on. But: A disturbance
is
not explained by relating it to felt anxiety until that anxiet
been explained.
10
Skinner surely does not intend this pri
universally applied -
ll
explanations would await the expla
Big Bang. The reason anxiety cannot serve as an explanans w
being an explanandum
is
that anxiety
is
not an observed fe
world.
On
Skinner s view, an explanation of behavior mus
deducibility of a behavior (or behavior-probability) from prio
conditions. This is an epistemological principle, guiding Skinn
endeavors.
Here
is
a question for empirical psychology:
Do
intern
representations of unobserved events play a part in hum
activity? To this question behaviorists answer No and cogn
Here is a question for epistemology: re explanations by
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IV
I would urge on these grounds that the dual aspect
of
the cogn
has reactionary, not progressive, effects. The effects are sim
which methodological commitment has been claimed to h
sciences. They are, if anything, more insidious in the cognit
Among the deepest epistemological debates
are
those betw
positivist, and conventionalist interpretations
of
science. A
to a version
of
one
of
these epistemologies constrains
the
i
one might
put
on a given theory in
the
physical sciences,
bu
dictate theory choice itself. In contrast, an epistemology seem
constrain even theory choice in cognitive science Machian p
not legislate between nineteenth-century physical atomism a
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Ron
mundson
operationalism . Unlike the positivisms
of
Skinner and Ti
allowed logical constructs which were
not
directly observed,
from and defined in terms of observable stimuli and resp
psychological subject. One special feature
of
neobehaviorism
attributed mediating responses to the subject. These were
inferred responses which themselves served as stimuli for furthe
overt responses. Mediating responses obeyed the same laws of
as overt responses. Clearly the logical positivist (and not t
view
of
theoretical terms was necessary to warrant the use
of
th
response concept. ut in addition, consider the application
iorist theory to the behavior of the scientist. The psycholo
construct is defined in terms of his observations (stimuli?) s
involving his active experimentation. This construct sounds
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anti-cognitivism, stripped
of
positivist epistemology,
is
pitiful
to realist/cognitivist criticism. Fodor did not note that, if one
w
a robust behaviorist account
of
the behavior of scientists, re
be a singularly implausible epistemology.
v
My purpose
is
only
to
provide a prima facie case for the n
self-supporting epistemology/ substantive theory paradigm in
sciences. I take it
that the
cases I have mentioned show
congruence between descriptive aspects
of
an epistemology an
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342 Ron
mundson
empirical science. The cognitive scientist s dual aspect
is
not
is a disguised burden.
One
objection to the present view may be that it makes ep
change in the cognitive sciences impossible, or at least inexp
changes
do
occur, and in response to the success or lack
of
s
associated paradigm. This is true, but consistent with the p
Such support (or stimulus for change) is not simply the asserti
of
the
epistemological arm s validity by the substantive arm
o
Such an endorsement
is
a matter of course, and should carr
(As for the possibility of a challenge, I know of no such case
is
not a matter of course
is
the substantive arm s success in th
outside the paradigm. The epistemology may insulate the sub
to some extent, but it cannot fully isolate it from contact with o
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paradigms until we begin to grant the same respect to th
psychology (and other cognitive sciences) which we now grant
of the physical sciences. Until this happens the most reason
for a given epistemological position will come not from its d
logical endorsement, but from its ability to cope with relat
troversial epistemic achievements - for example those which
the physical sciences.
22
NOTES
1 I will use the term cognitive science in a very broad sense, to includ
science addressing as its topic the acquisition of knowledge. These w
cognitivist behaviorist learning theories. Cognitivism will refer to the
psychological schools. I apologize for this terminological puzzle .
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Ron Amundson
of epistemology in the debates of the period are the topic of 'Place vers
epistemology
of
a pseudoproblem' , in preparation.
17 Cf. 0. Mowrer,
Learning Theory and the Symbolic Processes
Wiley, New
C. Osgood, 'Motivational Dynamics of Language Behavior', Nebraska
Motivation 1957, pp. 348-424.
18 Pertti J. Pelto and Greta H. Pelto, Anthropological Research 2nd ed.,
versity Press, New York 1978, p. 13
19
Ron Amundson, 'Science, Ethnoscience, and Ethnocentrism', Philosophy
49
(1982), pp. 236-50.
20
Jerry Fodor,
Psychological Explanation
Random House, New Y
ark
1968;
'Psychology in Physical Language' , reprinted in A
J
Ayer (Ed.), Logical
Press, New York 1959.
21 Bertrand Russell, 'What There Is , reprinted in Robert Ammerman (E
Analytic Philosophy
McGraw Hill, New York 1965, p. 33
22
I owe special thanks to Dudley Shapere, and to participants in his NEH S
during 1980 , for insights on this project. Research was also supported by
the summer of
1981
, and
by
the University of Hawaii Office of Research