Z-AI84 12-3 TERRORISM - A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE(J) ARMY MAR COIL t/1CARLISLE BARRACKS PA S R GWdIN 21 MAR 87

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NATION L BUREAU F STANDARD, 1A63 Ai

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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the views of theDepartment of Defense or any of its agencies. Thisdocument may not be released for open publication untilit has been cleared by the appropriate military service orgovernment agency.

TERRORISM - A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

BY

STEPHEN R. GWIN DT[CS ELECTESEP 0 3 987 Ucy D

DISTRIBUTION STATEIENT A: Approved for public

release; distribution is unlimited.

21 MARCH 1987

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE 'When rlata Fnfered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE RE-ORE COSPLETTNG FOR

1. REPORT NUMBER 12. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3 ' ECIPIENT-'S CATALOG NU BERf

4. TITLE (and Subtitle) 5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED

Individual ' ss avTerrorism - A Global Perspective

6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHOR(.) 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)

Stephen R. Gwin

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASKAREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS

US Army War College

Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPORT DATE

Same 21 March 198713. NUMBER OF PAGES

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20. AS T-RACT Con-traue a revera se ft rreceeary md Identify by block number)

The trends in international terrorism point toward an escalation through the

remainder of this decade and into the 1990's. Increases will be reflected in

*" both the number and the lethality of attacks, mostly is a result of the

availability and use of sophisticated technology bv terrorist groups. The

exporting of terrorism has been a major factor in Europe the last few vears and

is probably a foreboding of what the -'S can anticipate. The trend tow,,rd the

use of high technolog. and a confluence of other factors indicate -n increased

probability of eventual nuclear terrorism. in combating terrorism, the world

JON 1473 EDITION OF I NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

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20. commun it, will realize success onil through a w, 2 coordina.td I' ohil

pro.,ram. Such a program wil 1 require a un ivers I1v 1ccL,'ptal dC fin it ion oterrorism; ont. which c]eIlrlv distinguishes between terrorism and illegal 1orm.,

of warfare. A close study of pro il, es on terrorist 1 eaders such is thu infi7,I,.

Carlos, providas clear distinction between terrorists and fr.d,,dom ii.:hters.In addition to the coordinated global effort, a sustained victory in the waragainst terrorism will require an adjustment of international political struc-tures to establish a "planetization" perspective by all the states of the wor'd

community.

'.-.

S. E, 5" I Y .?- ,7,

, , % %

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P-: __S. sr

le-3

ABST RACT

AUTXDR: Stephen P. Owir, CIA

TITLE: Terri>s - A Gimbal Perspecti-:e

FORMAT1: n~v~a.EssaW

DATE: 21' r'arch 17 8 PAGES: JE

.fle t~.s- ternatlcr-al terc-sT p:..'t tz-a-t anes.-:alatic- thz ."-t-e rara~.er cF ti7-s -:--za'ec a-t i-zt

!9 -" . ~ e se -I be 7 le ted - ~* 's -- 6 ~th-e :eth~a~it, attacl s, mcs-, as a r-s,-ffte

av: ~it~a-t -se =E scp>-:stizatet e e77=izggr-s P-e e-pz-t:-- cF te-r-s- '--as beer- a r-a':r- Fatz

:- Z-7pe t i-e last Efe- I ears an d is pzbtatl, a cFwhat th-e -,S ca- a?--tzizzate. T!he t:-erz! tz-ar-t tle -se c

~;~- ~lc;~, cc-a z-ELerze zF z-'- Fectors :r-t-zae

arbt: i- eeas-, =t the-t cF zrJ t-- -:-ize

s~ccess c-I-', x~ a -~ell zz.-t~ glcta- ~-V ~a p-c~ga . eq-- -,re a B:::caZ. aez, at~- '

orne .itcla st irg--shes tet..ee- t e-rr-s- a-t>le~lE--s cF .a-,Fa-e. n ls E~z .a c"te=-', late~s 5-c' as t- e i-Fa-c.s C-a7lzs, .ea

* --- tie a a-ast ter-cris- an:

II

a~~tzst-~~t zf :er-Q:Atx-l lta tra -zerzec::e:~ ~etzatc'-'- ll he yazz f

TEPRCRISM - GLCEPL PEPSFECT:&_E

.6~ ~~z.~ 'e a general a55ss57s-6-t =Ft~sr

trra5i ti-e F:-st 7a!F cf t -e 1980s. a-t

~:z-s F ~z~ be a zicipatet r-~:~ es'~

ssa sF a-: i -Se te-~S -- 7E-

as E- -ES_ ZF ----- c-- te'- ~-lt: a

asse s-E- z--' ---- :-Z

a-L as - '-as " _E z

'Z7?a gLeas fz: ;:aa- attassi.-; a- J

t ,ZE Z:IsI-a-

ch ara:e :-' t'e e-e-, especial.' t'e ieaters .Fr ,-

Wc~jr e-e%, Is a z ,ee:siste Fc- te~eat_ ,- -

ap 5 ;e-e -. -_e- -L ;h*zltal ~ -ez s~ - 7::_ thie F_:st

--a5 ~:-e 1-_7Es 'as tee- eszala4tzr t:_ ' e _-ted States

* ~~~ ~ ~a ~ she's-

1%, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l or ?s~** ~

al." domestic terrorism. That is niot to saW that FArnerlca and

Amrericars are 7ct the favorite target oFf terrcrsts

overseas, Ffor theyi most certainl. are. Scme aspects Of th7e

trend oFf the B05 suiggest a" end to th-is "sa-zt-ary" stat'.s

for th!---'e-tE with-- the ac!.ent ;Ff state s...ppcrted

terrcrisn a-t terrorlst aczess to ;-:zh'z;, possbI

te--aet sor'- a---'t~ a- ala7r'>-'1* %1l-t _Z~:

- -oo-7se. -5 a as-

tZse: a ~ zae

e- - -- --.

5/. .- zs~ £2 E7 -z2-al a?' a5S -Zas

S 1_tles --2"a-set27zrz7_s. eaz'

as -- e as-2z

z--- t7L -E ?.----:.------20 ;5 -f .LzIE c>.

Z; E: !I . Zr Z_ - Z Z

- :- -:e ea -;2 o2 -L -L 3 r

~~~sz~~~~ .- .~a~ .~e .... .~o .. .o : .o

thess~~~~~ N '. %~os S2- '~-

gr-o"ps to modiF6 thei7 behavior cr pc'''-ies. 1

Such definitions ma~i be adequat.e .'or gener-al app1-catcin

b, a7- _,rtiv.dal ognization in dag to taj talings with

terroism, buit Vthe6 zverlook essential elements off effective

pr-oblem ovig i.e., th'e abstract:=n or, :,slatlcr of' thle

Problem. 1F th e worit =nmm~ni4 ,, is tc- ccnem- a-! act

etffct~el~again~st tercrism, ther it m_,st haea zlear, an!

oc-s.sta-t teFii tic. will . act --

----- 7= "lc .ei:tmate" violence r-egar-tlSss :cf' t e

-ta-' atcn~=er-spectiv.e. Dre apprcac!7 to th7is c t t

-.se targst selezticn as th!e speziFfizc i':era For

~s--* - ;act's -__cr.s. enthne ta:-e':s =7

E E.--- a 'az - .- -sa_' -a er z

t=I77s zae'-ccve, the ent-:ts as e-e-. cr;c

llar- - ts:.-.-~s ashe atta s a e tasron _r

a -: -ca:Fc. _-:71t sa.~ tia ac-

ca te-.. -a e t'.... - --.- s eve.t a-- l_ a: -,.

7a-7- E' l~ s~a. t -7cEns-a ta

N. N.. taNtot:o e~~~ o cs :o"'U.N

attacks fit the criteria off "non- :nternatiznal armed

conflIcts" addressed urder the accords of the Senev.,a

Conventionrs.

Protocol TT, added to the Conventions in 1577, was

specifficall, :ntented" to provide pr-otectlon frthe victimns

of ncr-irterrationa1 conflicts. Tn !P-3, TheIntat-na

Ccmmittee of Pet ross .niil. d-~tl o~-cz' 0n

thl-e tasls oFf several ooncepts Incliding:

ta 0s;"---7- ap-zlg to allI zonflics to. onct ta',e -lace tetween states, cld L; ars _-F7-atI z:nal I lbe r ati crn.

-ta a lat~vel- hi, leVel =Ff p7oteCo_:7sholdI be garantee:d, not cnlti to the= o-. 11aP op"latlcn ant persons in th7e ooe: ff anoth7er.

pat"t 'e onfob~talso to combatan.tS,_ "~ Se off ehd and means off co'az.

- th'at th ese ;arne s"=hoIt b~e ;asites off s"--! conflicts zo7 a blasIs ofco' lo

-at

1:s -'z -z -a. a i- z -a=- z-

z - - , a c c -r-4s s -_ I ' C .

a-dt 7 oc-2:ir azos -tI;. s agaratos eTsz-

refferrec to ar.a. I are a'-d sh-all ea-Orolblteda-,a ti.me and :.7- a7, p~aoe

(a z' enze tc the " 'fe, hea1.: andz ph" s.zcal or-e-ta' zeIbI ff persons, ' rtclrmdr

as e_ as or-el' treatm7ent 5-c!- as tortre,~~~t: ~ ~ ~ C atoo z omofcrporal p-set

(b) collective punishments.

(c) taking of hostages.

Cd) acts, of terrorism.

(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particularhumiliating and degrading treatment, rape,enforced prostitution and any form of indecentassault.

(f) slavery and the slave trade in all theirFOrms.

(g', pillage.

Ch. threats to commit any of the foregoirg

acts./

Organizatiors which ccndulct attacks suc - as th-e lre

barracks bombing a.so ma,, be involv.ed in aircraft !h:.-acl:i.rgs

ancl other "terrorist" atrccities. Eut it is not the actor-s

bu-t the acts of terrorism that we are attempting to isclate

thrrcu-h. teF-17itlcr. Althcu~gthes actors I-ave clear',

zlemo'-stratedl thleir7 contempt for the principles of hu.maritg

ard =cpassion or Gho h eneva converticns are tased-, a

oc-te --at!Z- OF thIe! .r ats e th-e rrs o the,

rCzverti-crs will, at least, precld:e ar6 cla7'ozlegti-ac,

bt, the perpetr.ators.

The terr orsm proble7 -i'I rot be sc-'- ef -. atr

Vthe US or anto other gzove-r,-re-t.. Or s-ioess t"e u ar

agair'st terrism L~' be realized houht-!

efforts of the entire tcl omu~~ ased z: a commn~

understati- of - hat ccrstitites a tErrorist __t The

"targe ro"dfit~r~~~dpod t'hE requ;site

cc--c- i-ter-nat:c-al Fcc-s or th-e prc-.. e- a-z 7e-c - "e

-S--

pr-ospects For deFinitional disputes. Its acce-tance ccuLd

cc .'-ter the diver-gent perspectives on terrcr-:sm at large in

the world communitW; in its absence, we are ho-Istage to the

reF'rain commcn-Ig heard in Eu-rope, Latinm America, and the

Middle East that "Ore man's Freedom fig"ter is ancther mar's

terrorist."

Tlhs international varlatle In conceptu--al iz-n;

-as grap '-1. il-strated- in a t:s=css=cr bet-eer

Sezrezaz-, zf" 5tate 3eor-;e S'-,-'ltz and gol Iaf:-

i-' ste7 FaiF >dn.of~ 4 I the Cctte 'E55

* te:=or sn adt t--," ;;e agai-st ob . ag;essicn

a -f nacis7" a-d: a -'e- s;7ealr-;- of' 2:-.esn-s-:

a~sc ve ec-e

Tcs tete n e. - en -c

FZ -4-",E- .- - -- -

tisi-gis tea---ee-- 7efocso I t-E ft

--------------------------- z-:e --

z7 7g-e t~e, are 7esist- . st.-s

terr=--st are p a aga .nst rK0: aO

selectef zen sc-s onprcper , -it"e -te-t fb-ns

ateti; -z a-a-se' a-f pn-ess.--; zr n.. the

gz e7--e-t :o7 pc-e7 ~e are z:si-g. n- ass-----

-6L,

inherent to this deFinitica. prccess is that a Frec

fighT-ter may sometimes commit an act of terrcrism and,

conversely, a terrorist may sometimes Fujnct,,-on as a

legitimate Freedomn Fighter. Again, It 15 th7e :ndividu.al

acts that must be speciFlcallg at.iresset .. ust as the hercic

performance oF a scld-ier in battle sh7c-,1z have no effect on

the Ju~dlcial processing of chiarges against the sanre

:n~::~alf'or raping a r-efigee woman after the tattle.

A lo;:cal e-x.ten-sion cF th-e ef aiio ;f poie S a-

assessmert -- c.ts Impcrtance. 17 other- ucrts. ho w

S: grlf Icant is th-e th reat of- ter. Scme aal=',sts =--

govern7me-7t EFficials are =I thie Zp:n-:C7 that th7e etr

worIt :.s cvCra'e

to pla, a rnumtbers game anc' pzoint to h elt.e small

n-'.ter- CF cas'-altles rs't-gf ntr- v-:

co:rpare: to-, sa, at-oeao~o r sa77 oe zo F

ti-e. a-zot"e7 s"Ccl Cf " -ho --h potes-----zz

1mage oF spcllef ohlr->Kcig h 7 eels ::- th'e Cloozr

wuhe- th-e tt hei tL-- -a L Cae-ts ~orf~et

takle esosbltthese pzz ps'2ohC-Olg~sts of,: th e

o~wer~----~s cc- -~ sugges' at --f,-

In a S'uPe7F .Cial ar'al',e.s oF the terroriS- t e

casualt, ubr alon-e oetanl o nt :.n,-Jioate a str-ateg-'Z

threat, a7n it migh-t be saiz! th-at a moth-er's grieF is no

more or- less inte'-se For. a ch-ilz lost i- an a-tomobile

accite-t th-a for a chlc-lz lost :o a t stzbmb. W e

must, however, look begond the numbers to estatlish7

preciselg the impact of terrorism and assess th7e thr7eat.

Issues that must be addressed include: the effezt of

terrorism on public morale or the soc-ops~cholcg-lcal effect,

the effect on zdcmest--c and internatiloral pclitical arenas,

the ezzncmic effect and the resultin; Problems relative to

world orer" the opinion of mang political ana!,yst s, it

,.'as te-rrr-sm T. ter-mirated th7e D-ar-ter- prese-4=-:6 a--zi

Feaga-'s political posrttcn has certa:-1- s-"

s:;-I~cI-t.cfr- ter.ror-Isrr r.elated- ev'e-ts. T C- a hd

cf a-atlzs zarn .s= terrsm tc :Freth~e

;7zzees 1r-th -teatt s C7~ aZ crota-at.=r

--".te -z7rld s -tcsth-en th!e thr7eat taltes z

accect ef tefK - ticn CEf t "rcr-n h .:tChase 1

F~eZ -t1' the source cf ZrcrS7 is deflned4 -r cau-sa-

te-'- lke pcverlt = oppress-cn7, andt regional PCIlIical" or

religious truec. However, again applyging the pragmatic

approach7 of creative problem solvig, the source of

terrorisT is b--est deFlnec! as the terrorist. AFter all,th

object :;e is to attli the procblem- of' ter-rcr-,sn and if the

-a, = t ach7iew.e th7at ob iectiv-e is to sclve povert, ant

-R-

bnol: and go home. The ter-rrst is th-e so-7ZE zr'-

problem, and he -ses appeali-%- -7ete..ts t

Fazcade of legitl.macg.

Ar impctar.t eiernert of an, -ar ;z- sae;

knowing as mutch as possible abc-t th-e e-e-, 5s. CF

course, ir-!,--dHes the "sual Itellige-ze C

~n~,capabti tes, et .; bt- 1=

io~~~~esas sz-e z'rf: o h

rtzor-2- ze=7tst Fi- es t ee- ~~-~-zo-

i -ge :: a .-a7es E=orio. -- s ,- ; s a a-L

th'ese sel*f azpo: tet :tause c'-ase:-s t a e !SS-E

deszr- co a --e th1-e %i a I as a - az: s . zo z!o z z-

---- a'-id --- - ~ ese a E -.

q-s:=.-s ,.e -eet to a-s.wer- atbo~t c-.- e~emt, the te77z7rst-s.

us. sz. of:nt::~.a' terror:sts -ho h7ave r-se -ct

;='-z-s Za-Saes"-.'P :- the te--rrorst -e.... -

a vaIzo ota aoVro".ts, p7.1itios, rsnlos

ao-t.~HouLew'er- there ar-e a-sz some st;>i. g

m:;: h:-:,From a aor u of povert anT ppesson

striki-n; o-'z at the souro7e ofl thel.r miser,,.

Cleal~,slt~atic-s suich as th-e Palestinia- refugee

camps are treetirj groundts For h'ate a-i fa-'atio sin,

a.n an e-. lrcnmen -zconiuo~zve cFs ter~ng terrorist

IJ9-

Si ?

reit a! t:es. rian'l =F th-e pawns oE terrorlsn, the little

g-, .- c tlc- thiemsei.'es up wit), their victims, cc~e Frcm

th:.s ttpe cF envircrmert, bu-t not their leaders. The major

fig~res ir tersm, the comnmanders and cr=!-estratcrs oF

the i-te77at =ral terror networkc, Fe--,je~tl emnerge From a

backgcz-dt cf ~el ant p-est-'ge. Sia~';:accrnc Feltr-el1i,

th-e Ft -er c-17 tha ::-aliar Red Brigade, was tor- tz znS zF

te~c ~taz2.: ~and cc;na :Kz roF alest.---

~ ~ hc~efcz-h7 -.- C' -f

* ~ ~ z -. e:z-t '!a-.::>st. hais a~rda as'fct '

real esz, e-~ a F-amtc,'-- ::--".-e~

zzzl~a .+ '7

PS -- s'= ~started, aoe-rr2.st .-a, sz~et§-es fc

se z:- - a~- -,-.s onnat

see- o :~a fora the' aphr-re-. a ~-

S '-Zro--e. Th-at :.s to sa,, the do't pars-e so- -- z* th7e

7evzo tz - e: se. b se the veh.:ole o~f th.e r .~-t

displa., chr spe=o-al perverse s2ls

~- an--a'c- o t E~Rof.I fth .=m~str 2s

-10--7B-CSterZrS

Ilic!7 Ramnirez Sanchez .alias: Carlos-. will serve t3

Illuistrate se='e oF the Foregoing assessments. Bcrr. in

Venezuela in !94±9 tc a wealthw rancher and attcrney, Carlcs.

spent most eF 1-15 chailtheoo traveling arc-nd Sz-,th America

and the :aribbean withi h-,s motther. He -as prcv-ited a t,,tzr

while travell-; a~z st.diet the larg~age5 zF t -e cc-7tries

visited. Ae7 egirni-"-'-is Fcrnal et_-ac-Z at t"e

Ze.-i Ferml-- Tzrz, Earlcs bezams ev~:~c s-,4-

demcnszrat _cr5si -Pp= oF t ''e-z.ei a7~.~ s

sport tee- t-gef 't t.e gc.as. -ffts F=~zz

- - -i-'.-- e

- he a~.t s ceat. _ s. _ Z.eceZ

Fite as:rcs secret serv.ice a77f f_ . tcteY t,.7."e

* -as _.st --". z:~ F !-is g:-at~ate _=; ~ - -

_S - -,.--- =S

E:.;: s Eec~ las 7 : s ear7 .Z t IS Zs _z'- ~a: E --a

"~rc-cat~e a .ties. :tSx..c'- te ei -c

e>:P_ .--- , i.s c;e ZoF t~-e so an~ard -EE: "Zts ziS

9an age-t i~t th-e

.f er a. t!7e SC.v..et jr~- a. ctzcc. a guide t r

CF th.e ':error7 z1-t East~' Ge7a-, tcZ -est ELrpe,

ard the "' ddl.e East. He met -it"- ard was trieFet or- t!he

activities OF moSt OF the rna,,r crga-_-zato'=s oF th-e terror

network, irc.'"t-.n the Baader-r"eir -oF gang a-t tie PFLP

(Pop~lar Front for the Liberatic- OF Pales-t.ie. Since .Ihen

Car-los appears to have evolved as a ma~or ooor: natcr For

the global. terror retuicrk. He has personali tirected

numerous terrorist acts, incluidlng the kidnapping of' the

OPEC "i':sters i- )ienna in December 197S. As the CSPEC

episcte un_ folded, th7e worid was giver a more precise prcFie

of thIe -ct~vatiors and psgchologioal malye~p of me-bers of

the terror C-1t. TIe CFEC kidrapp~r; was orohestrated- tt,

Z:arlzos a-t t1-'e Baade7-'1ei7nhoF -an;, btti the hours7

imretiatel,, Folloc~i~ the se-,z-Te of the oartel -i-istars it

teza-ne ver_, o:lea-. that Carlos as zompletel, i oharge. In

the i-ta seiz-re, Carlos _:lle-4 Yo,.sef 'sm-rr: a re-te-

of th-e Uit,,a- elt~ b., s-1oo:t_-; h iv tines, o*-e of

th-e t-ll'ets pass.- :ro.; :s-irli's tod, a- : ao-d

7embe7 of' t'e zuat elegat ic-. at almost t"e Same

i-sta-t 2'abr ele Kroezhe7 Tiete-a7-, a 23-,ea7-cit -et7z

the Eao: e-o a--, >.illst, --- zo

t Fe fe a-f t_ e ot--er i- th-e taz of thes -al, e

st~le. abtee a E san e -,_ - -'at, -"z "at r .

be-arrestedt a-t se-'te-*oe:! to ei~t: ,e ar7-s rso :o

1972 tel' a- oe ~J'otnzl,- ao ~

had tee- released a-d Flor. to So,..th >e- as oart of th-e

rarsc- ;-a_-t for t'e release of Pete- Lzz. w.est Berlin's

Chr~s~a~ 'oort~o art lead er, .-- -ac' tee-Y n~di

J6I Ow

*a Baader-"einhicf spi--cf'F grm~ p as thie Secrt F ---

Car2.cs ice-~tfet -is gr-oLp as "T!7e Ar- =F the Arab

Revcl.'t.tz-" a't presertet hi;s demants ir the t ,pical

rI hetor-c exc ;-ted bj ,/ar-:,cLs facticTns oF th--e ! 7ab Reject.='

Frcr~t, i1cltl~ thIe tsmartlene-t, rF the 2ic-zst aggresszcr

state CF ':sae1. Hzt.r reccz~s th e =r:~t. Ff t17

Iet~te:-7a-ea- e~~~1~ ter"-rati-g -iera "e:e th-e

te7=_?sts -e.-e cra-tet pltic.al as4'- s t."e t.=-+s

.':Iet. nstr.ia- c-K-=a-'s, as as the hzst.ages

tea~~acte: ts pezeteratc~s. ~ ~ t~ea

Er-t .~s.. -z -eg;ztiatet :ia a Tetiatz= .:th 2

ta-e- z-s, Kae- s ta_ -tls fac th'at arlc'-,ee

aZ i-ztat 'te t azt that theI =lC- Y=ie

a .et '--- 'e7 -eest -e7, that;hetsth

are I1a.;hI-;- a_11i-- th-e peztE, the, a7-e E.: E

4 ref1ezt~ t~-: "teta s a :er- tee-,t~t. 1 ~ att th.esE4r

pezpa. tzzri. ; t:theht~ta~e. :- t ~17

ov'er the rietiterranean, Carlos ha'~det z,-t a~to.ra;-s a'd!

bragged cF other terrorist e>piz:ts and the fact th-at h-e h-ad

developed the OPEC attack -1- himselF to sec-7e existence of,

a Palesti-.ia state. Y)alentin. Hernan dez Aczsta, the

Uenez..ela'- oil mirister, sald "he acted like a -'ovie

star . "/9

While Carlcs is prcbat.'6 one ofr th-e none zF-o~~o

the co'~tenpcrar, terrorists, he disp1a~soaaoe ~s a-nd

moti-,ations tpizal oF' the oth-er o narta' ts oF --"= trate.

rC-eci-t~s th-e sal :e-t Feat.7es z-1 the CFEI attac=z t:o-

ihistat~e f' th-e terror:st t-ic- abaa-t Inai

'- r -:- - I~ e r e Fl a -# I:::- - -

order. a-t th e KNE1 zc'-eztio-. -he sc-es: terzr-S

ia s--"'ezt o-:cr! cfr a--'~-

ItSelF -r -- t t sat. .. a: t =--t

Left slzdc of thIe zlto.speoz- hae, -o

eoe~to-, ezeived tra~--; a-f -tc

Ec ict -:z or Sc, et s-rrzgats -a:.o7-s -'oe7- --"

of, -h ~3.Tere are, 2:f, :oc-se, c :;-

oharacoeristizs a-t s,-trzes. ."ee,

terronlst g~lo-.Ps are ozt as elfe-tl.e Con-c; c as

theIet-~-~Fazotizcs B-Z t .S arrear-S in a

matter of ta~- a-t -es:c--cs.

eP.~ a. e 7 -e:- : a~7

- t~nrs-n-en*Y~ :E~ a§%

provide some consisten-t patterns mi~h-a6 i~ticate 2-7at w.e

can expect through the remainder cF this decate ant i-tz t~-e

1990s. Genera1IW the trends pcirt to cornt -'et escalation

into the Foreseeable F~t~re, with increases :i' the number,

tyipes, and 1et -a.litj of terrorist incide-ts. There is

evidence that th1e gecgraph-ical reach- oF var-c-s terrcrst

fact =-s, especia'"I "~ineast groups, L111 _ncrease as 1

th-e~r calIz-sess i- target:-.g randc- cza- it--s.

Pr--e z 7ac ctr-e to "e azcess tz -ass -eza

e pzs-7e tz a-traz' as p-hti-c cpio: as =zss~t~c

t~' t-re~ *za.se' ant tz '-- ra ~ir-rre -z

z-targetet gc'er--e-ts. Th-is ge-eral Esz3_at22

;Iczl :e-c s- I7=tat_ c'c a- -cr-:ease

te77z7_s- ~-t'e t c-estiz g--s as _e__' as rzeg

te a zr~ a tz-er, crs ag-ss.> e s , t

at tce _:7eae :zapplirs. c a Ietec c-----t3=e~o

7These tre-zts, P.>s sev-a. zther Factors attresset .ater in

t~is ar-t-ze Po..-: to a- i-zrea5_"g ta'-ger ~f' a- eve'-t.-aI

-_Zrea. a'ttac t' t errosts.

Some a-a-,sts tel-s-e that th e po 2r. z-t a

attaz,. e e- ::': a- e - Iot, t e

ccte:--Sts zte:_ a-t t~-ereIl-

-: -t t -e E 7" sa- .. : a,~ ; ;. s -w .- /*.<%

t6-e rsc,..zes e..per,'zIed t,. a terM-DV~t groC4 tc zt'a_ a-1

eT;:c,~ a -- cl~ear de-= zc=. I be apP.'.e tc przcf-e ~-~

cc'e~.~oaIattazr.s, u2:z o".'t be more attractive tc tl.-e

terror:s:- pla--ers.

Ct"ers a-e t -'at t,-e demorstratet eooo oF man,

terrc~lst Faotizns, espezia?'! t~se e-a-at.-; Fozm

reiics Fa'at:.cis sl-c-s litte zapazil, For

tzao az attrot.-;-rao a-t tis-: _zci f 27±e7.

ott- o t:r, a ae rS oas a~-o~frataoa~

_z e~:~e te~~.ea ~'

* %.oe a _ _s cc eo :zes oe o .e7o.

-"e Fa-t et tC state. e ta:Ile r

-aleEt .- I - t-l e, as a 5

S - -F e _s l: -: : e Z'-s e

* Fmoa: e es -a=Ee- ;=_e7e- s~-ta~a aSt2E eo of t- _seo , 7a

e 7~h~s a,-. S'o~ ~

:: e ..: - eszl l ls ateql o~ '

z.ao -~2t - .- c-c :oa h

-----------------------_;- -t,. -

* S'uPer-e'Plcsives maW be considered a humane Fcr-T$ --F pouwer. B6 viewing the sgstem as inhumane and

immoral, terrorists claim that the mor-e quikl tis destroged the better for humanity--even thoughsome people are killed or harmed in the process.

0 qupe:re: .pbosives mag endow the terrcris't ,ith amgstical1, magical kind of power, useFujl cchar7:-g the a-idience and perhaps creating anapcca:,jpti~aI breakthrough' to a new nLle-~i

As 5zPI-istizated! as moder-7 intellIgence 5sstems ma., be,

.0 ~ t"-e' -t ;Z -is in the terrzrist's mint. N c: lI

_ ' tr'-danlal',s-s or p~~i~;zI~~

st-es -.s tz -at extr-eme a terrorlst l;.

Hoeer ~~tma-e av~ailable c-r' tens t a-d

psozlc-zg -1 te -szs. omb~ned *ith- t'-e ;ene:ral tre-ts

:o-a~t-zre ---ero-s, T'ore soph,-st--catet, rre -.-ozle't

att'az'--. -' b Fzc ':'sh to oper-ate o- ar7.- p:,r-seo:e

_ ~-~S.; ;ests '-at ter=Lo- ss=t

-t...ea7 teisz -Z ot-C t-. tndae press-7e

gz~e --- te-i t-2:ei ti. -;, a-t -c-It zetz-ataE t'-e

nz *- -Z St~e=e 7

cF-te' -o=-ease s vo..a-e.

s'ga.

er.7S.

2U

%A.

*the storing and dep!3Wing oF nuclear weapons --rar-eas oF intense terrvorist activitg;

*an increasing numbe- of potential targ;ets :ncivil njclear pr-ogr-ams -- i.n partoi"-ar faoilltlesart s1-ipmret5 in w 7ich pJ.itonium and. jr-anium, inFzr-ms s~itatle Fo--- "se in weapons, are pr-esent;

*Pctertia1 blaok and gr-ag markLets a. i" lae:;-i;zent art mnater-ials.

The ;- " t as fa-rlIw spez:Fiz zrs.nte

zocs-rpezt zF 'oar te7-r- m:

E..-the -Ltespr-eat tep.1cjment of tacticalo-ZEa:r-eapZ- s. th e Cortln-lng spread oF weapons

Lisatle Fcrrs cf 7-'-ar rnater-12., and the=F applicale to asser-t-I-

F .ssi- eafc- s. the i'te-est o-F te:--7zri-:s, an.t as'-" case -a, te th7ea: spc-sors,inr-zoea7 -,ea ' zz-s, it .-n cear ter-r-r-sm' W '-a

e~e:as teho>,pltoI~ and

~arai .oa.' te i-=Feaset pr-noe-.z inse---g

- te t' sorh :oate pe- uete- tar-Zt

__a - -7z-; s

'cat-a- z~' " fe-oE:; fo-te e~

ter-r-rst os' sta~et Fairl., stea-' ar--: th7e SOO,

pmar-k. earl, 10-82,h3, the Islari: -:.hat bombing off

th-e Ae7-a- E~bas- i-, Beir-t , Lebanon-, VIn 63,

lg-alei tl-e bei7-17 of a zhange in irternatlonal

terrorism. That change appears to include not onig an

increase in the number and violence of events, but also a

trend For exporting terrorism "out of theater," especiallg

from the Mliddle East.

Europe is currentlW the primarW recipient of

Mideast-exported terrorism. For the Four gear period Fr-cm

1980 throigh 1983, !ideast-generated incidents In West

E-rope ran consistent1W around 40 a ,ear. In l88q,

r1~deast-e: :pcrted terrorist events were up ov;e7 20 perzet i-

w.este-r Eu-rope, and in 1985 th7e nu-mbe- ofl suozh events as

dc-tied the a'-rnal rate For- the First fzour ..ea:-s of th7e

:deoaze. Th~e E-7opea7 states h-,t hardtest bg

Mideast -cor:ratet terr were S reecs, !tal=,, a-:!

the j-1zt K1ngdc. C~prus suffered the largest increase,

w:th- 22 ",iteast-generated :cide-ts in 198L± ant 1985, aftier

Five in the 1980 - 19e8i periot. 3reeoe hat 25

incofe':s .7th~e t-2 bea7 Perlod CF 198Li - 1985S, oo-paret to

a total oF eleve- z1"7-g the pr-ecetdng foujr Wdears. T h-

U-itet Kirnt- h7ad an e:trernel, b-at ear- in 199Li, _ith 13

-ozie-ts after a7 ann-a1 h7i-h of o three art a to :tal of

e:-;-t for the prezetirg four dears. Even reutralist

S_.tzerland hras no immiu.t6 from "izieast-e:,:ported_ ter-ror,

wit"F-;e e :scdes i-1385 after =_1,: tuc i- th7e preoedt.ng

five dears. 12

Aczzr:-tng to tl'e 'S State Cepartre-t, t -:e are a nu mber

of rea5so:s for t i-7cnrease in "iteast terroist act~vItg

i'- ,este-- E-,rope: .

*.ncreased counter-terrorism eFTorts b., .estE~r-opean gover-nmen-ts have res~L.te. in th-eapprehension and imprisonment oF several dcze"M1iddle Eastern terrorists. Cons eetI,,terrori~st orgQanizations, including the Ob NidalGrocup, are attacking West Eu.ropean targets seekingto pressure those governments -1ntc releasi-g theirjailed comrades.

*The accesslbilit, oFf West E urcpea7 =ou-tr .es du-.eto limitet travel restr-ictions and th7e openscciet. provides more vulnerable targets :oha- thesez.red facilities oFf the "iddle East.

Attacoks i-Europe gain worltduite pb~iuh.er-e as th7e standard level of v:clence _- m-ang

E ast zo~tr_,es serves to m~ask a-Ithln-g !:themost spectaz~lar terrorist even7ts.

*West Euro7pean ccun~tr~es host ei grou ps a-tF ormer !eaters that are attractive targets Forregimes, such as t!7ose 4n Llb~a ant :ra-, uho-

do thesitate to: u se terrorist tactics to silencevocal cppoz'ents.

T e_ Ie States h'as e r of a sal CEra

Fro terro~ir- through th~e First half of th)e ISB~s, btt

*global tre-ts suggest that th7is repr: eve ra.: soon: come to a-

ent T"he trend of terrorsm exportation carries spezial

s~gnf~cnceregarding the prospects for Ff tirs terrorsm i

the ' tet States. All of the previcusl. mentinet reason-s

for th e epo:rt oF te-rriSm f:-rmtehd'

E-7peal'so a-pl t t]e !-s. Ofte7 all , L.ha t CCu-r 1n t'-e

wcrld is more azcessible and open thian th.-- '-' zhr a- a

terorst be 7cre assur7ed of complete access to th-e me:Lia

* ~with "p clozse and perso'-al" expos-,re to 300 :1ogo~

at 1S- -te i eral though the :da, P7nd, most

importat, what ionr s more represertative oF the

ph-:I :sc:P" 1 Z1 adtPZ pit 1 Z2 th'em~es to 1 Z' terr St

subcultuires are most likely to be at Odds? A1thoL.gh

domestic terrorism has appeared to be on the decline through,-

the First half of the decade, down from 42 events in 1381 to

seven in 1985, the trend reversed _J7 1385 w--th 17 terrorist

episodes, plu;s 23 planned attacks u~h-ch were interdicted by

the FB. . ,I

Over the past decade '-I c:t'.:zens have been th7e preferred

target -for terror:st attack s abroad. The trends suiggest

th-at ir th-e near F.-t-re u-e Aer-:ca'rs will not have to travel

ov.erseas tc retain7 thi-s djb:cus tdst-notion.

THE -:XNCLC-T7A1 1HREA.T

hephrase ~tcnlgclterr-cr-sm" s;.all-enener

images OF a nLicl'ear, chemical, or blological terrcr-ist

:nzltent. Hcouever-, the applic-ation or potential app1-cat-on

of technccg, tb4 terrorists is not limited to methodts of

mass iet~t~ ~hlg s providing th7e modlern

terrst .ihimprozvet capatbl-,t-es relat-,ve to -obct-t

orga-ization, ant eFFectiveness, as well' as an enhanced

capaclt , For =Ventlcnal destruction. Technolog! rea:

applizatle to th,-e terrorist "misslcn" :ndlu -des the new

s ;nthet-,cs 'plastics and ceramics)- from hohsome f7irearm7s

are belng 7an.Y azt ':-e. These weapc-s ar.e e:-:tre-ei- lght

and have c-'Luj a Few metal components; ccnseq"entl~, th-1e,, are

not easlA zdetected- !:: Y-ra~j screening or- metal detectors,

in arrsorelsewhere. The Austr-an-manuFactured GlocL

1- 1s a 57-ang hi~ 1-, 73_undS- producLjed From one OF

-r.%

I,%

these Composite materials. The GloCk can be purch-ased on

the open7 market in Europe and the US./IS

The mach~ine gun is certalnig not a recent :novation,

but each7 new generation of firearms includes a group cf

machine pistols that are lighter, smaller ".e. more

concealable:, and more lethal. All OF th-ese e- a-Cene-,e

are d-Jreztlg appi11cable to the terrcrist's need s. Thie

FaMCu s :sraell produced Lz: machilne plstol i s st:il-

zznrsizdered an effective weapon, but it is nowL talk:; a tack

seat tc some of thie newer-generation lightweight,

rapit-Flrlng gun7s. Mang of the latter are produ.ced with

s~nth ez:cs fcr th7e purpose of minimizing weight, but also

~nade-tetl~a-zommodating the terrorist's n~eed For- ,,eacns

th~at are tiFFic-lt to detect. Thre West Serman Heckl.er

~Kzc'. 97 7 Faratellum. !P70 au-tomatic: pistcI is t...pical c:F th -s

ge-er-atizccF uaCons . IT is the s~ze ofE a standard sldea7-

E-. ca- be Set- 'tc f!re SeM~autOMa1a1y, 17n three sho3t

b--rsts, cr. a-tz aticalli atL 3- rcnds per seccd--. Te~

:::pzat:ea h s~ntl-etics tez-hnclcgg and c--1:1 ec-

kg; ,It- th e stc ahe. -5n-e arms

-z~:-zctr7act b~ the UCS ,ir Force tc rteve- ' "arg,

rece-ntl prcd~jce:d a ;ueapc= referred- tC aste Lgtgh

PIE le 5bmachIne 3n.- :t is about the size 2F a n-an s

forearm and Offers f1-rep:cWer approachin-g th-at CF the -lCt

assa..lt S~l.;T pecial Forces and ccmnrandc-- troops are

attracted I= these pciuerF.-l light!weight weapons because th-e,

are ver- wfetv he-" the act-cn "-,'p rclcsE; an d

%1.-23-%

personal." Terrorists, however, are impressed wth the

"stealth" features oF the weapons, as well as their

efficiencg For rapid, indiscriminate killing. Other high

tech equipment available to the terrorist includes laser

aiming soopes, night visioin gear, pocket size communications

devices, and a plethora oF electronic track-ing andi

41 moritcr~ng devices.

Arcthl-er tpe of weapons technologg ava-iable to

teror _:sts and _seF,_l For causing h,-gh-cas~jaIt,, no-zdents :.s

the 7numercous portable missile sgsterns teccm-17g -cmmon stock

she ofth ,-ld's arms mark:ets. P 7nuMter OF

th7ese s~stems, sLoh as th'e LIS "Red E.ye" and the Er::tish

Elo~p~e, an-portatble and shouilder-Fired, h7ave az="rate

nr Fare z opt-zal gu i:danoe s~jstems and represe't a sever-e

: irzraFt appr7Oach:g and depart7ng airports.

a-Cord I-_g to e7 EeddoC OF th-e F-_ T eroiSM SeoZ-,

terois ;-os a:-- believed to0 be i T possessionc of these

_IS-a =y: _,.e >_st Lee- l~% so Far that an r l'e

' - - t e - '- z t t - - ' , a a- E- . zc -

the :otoftrror--; te terrrst becomes h-arder toZ

pree Bt -z "oe lehlrthe ata~.Both of these

-' aSceotS -a' e th-e terrtmor e :.-~en

-a. es "*i' tzlte:- a-d mor;:e aggr-ess~ve. h e-,,e' tm orE e

01l OF --I'- c--'zrgci7 seems horriFio en.=o~: pls

in co"'p ariscn it the prospect oF terror'st. e-plogrment OF

mass test7ructi on weapons. This term-r mass :est:r,coticn

~eap-'si-zl_;des chnemical and bo;oa ae-ts as weIl Ias

d -E23-

% -. ."V k

atomic tevices. Given the premise that a terrcrist

organizatlo7 predisposed to the uise of weapons of mass

destr-t_=o has a choice between the three, it .s likelg he

would chocose the atomic weapon over th-e chemica. or

biological . with t"he chemical or biclogical weapons the

terrorist ujoud!: hav.,e nuL.merous variables tc -cd-t'

the least of5 i~~s the rzsL- of self : =cnta-:at_:Dn.

Prodoto-, storage and handling of ch-emical ar'77t ~ o.

B;Se'ts -rese-t sp:zaa poles The tispersal -et-d

zt=ooodtions, u;lnt, and man6 other- factor-s t

th" zztcI-F th~e terrorist can dlegr7ade th!e ~ ns

of a ohe-ial or ticlo;:ocal agent, even to th7e e to

7 eI-ati",g its effect.

tha 7-iclear, ueapon, even if _t is a rd '-o

08108Ztere are c- t~ elvar_ables; :lI

a-t :F szo h 0z t:-g a ~Iel wiIt zrouoe z th orocess

off E ;a te. _oEthr cd becocr oerh'lg

th.e flssloz-atle -at er.al. B-t, assumng th-e ateril 15

co- t - trrr~t, I'a'aporate, ictal'ert-t

n.Soesca- ;' ear. ~.arlatles s~has ro-

st o~rsa-c -i~o~~t~s~ ll affect the l ee

7 eSlt E: a oa: z~sic-, t~t frocm teterrrc7st 's

perspect_-ve, th-e effect of* these v,.ariables selgbe

since cn-e 1'-.est From a ' Eclea- e::Plczs-cr in a

popL. atet area 'til be 7a-, nag7:.,--es that of a

4..

Wk,.

The thought of' nu-clear terrorsm is so abhorrent thjat

mang, including some officials responsible For p~abllz

saFetg, just don't t!7ink: about it. Fortunatel6, some

government agencies are beginning to stuids the problem and

at least address some prelimrn~ar6 ccntingeno , planning. The

increasing likel:hood of a terrorist grz~p cbtair-i..g a-nd

using an atomic device wias discussed earlier, t t is

important t= emphasize that anal! .sis off trendls a-t

tev'elcpme-.ts throu__ghoct the h. istcr off ter.roris7 s--gst

th-at nt a te c-l,! a matter o-F t-,rne Luntil the rlt is

s.J'azez o a-.oeartercr~t atack. ! =re th- e :.as:h

Force st....~i n th-e proble-m h'as ccld that th-e Fir st

at-l a ~agasa: si7e il more t..-:1.,b - a

te7rrcrist g;ro.p insteadz oF a n'az--.

Some actz ',-has been take- to art rea ;F= th-e

deieot-oc" a-d:trdt~~ cf 7_clear terrcris-. icd.

the zreatic- of the Deparment off E-erg, 's hoer£re:

Search$ Team. Ccnsidlering the pctentlal off a-~ atz-:c

~~at~on n a populat~on centLer, howeve7, leaves --- e

Wc"der g 1F enough- is being d:one. Cnce the thea s:

assessed, is there a pcint of dlminishing .et-- F=

A contingencg planning and allocation of reso.roces tz traii

* ~and preparing emergemcg personnel and facil~tesfra

eventual atomic attack bW terrorists2 ' The Fcllc~i~g ge-eral

scenario is provided to demonstrate the p-,_sia1 eff-ects cF

a nuclear terrorist attack in a metrcpolita' area.

-25-

SOT METHINE TO THNKJY PEOLJT

Onr a s~jnn~ cla in '382, in Wash~ingtz- O. a

nc-eszr~pt va- ~~a to the veh-izles Frezie-'t1~ Ljse:

the street '&e-'tors in the ci, as tc-nsl

Constit-tc n ve--je; s-c!:anl, ilt .ee-e:b c~e7- t--"E a -z!

,I,-- e-oe .id:e : tc a stzp at t~-e base

a-z! t'E s tE:Pp5Oi52az; a .!z

-A --

---- "-s - - h'-

- 3 E E?~~- - : e --- E E S cc--- - ~ -

C ~ .-- ~ C -'-- 2

= - .- tl s - t a ti- LC. * - s-

Os'- a----!s awa Fo-~ t- E-'

pe:::c e ~ S- ae f, tezt CFs -to--' Il-s

a%

wo-t die oF radiat!0n 5!Ckne5S -thir. a Fe- -erE.

B-ilti~s SOO~ t00ardis oF thie tlast toIE at _'est

severel'. dia-,ge! -,F not totall, zlestrcjet, -nmost cf L-

portic-s cFtle Cepar nert of --"e:o'1ttie, tl

*a-t l: -'ti. --e Eepa~tme-'t cF2c-e7:e a-t a

-ess Si-l lz-- - -: -s - -,, t -t- -g z-

,a t 7:- ;r z.-i zer-z -:-z -eze- -e ser- - I--;e

-a-= z' tle =: oa-ts r -'et oo -e -"

e - Lz..8:etE

e ---- - -t E -ea--zet as a: as~ t-

Ea- 2t2E ": 1 z:- e

I- a-

a~~~~ t-S ~ oo~o ~ s at t -e

'I epo~~~zs L-, a falo ;ztr tae- to a

be ,c'- t~e :!ap::-tzI b tiin; -elk -t t--"e ?-i

T -e --etiata 7es-'ts -o-ld te catast-z---a, ea'- -t~zot

cors i i- t-e lEong-*tevr eFFects. n-za ."z; 'as e,.e7

-aI ret oo -i- a-con; t'-e a- Iewe esZa~o a-c! t~

.... ..

,'s - cT- Mc Tme~~t c- a b-siess : a za ;;-ess t' at t ' e

ircte-'t tesc~bet abc-ve cx.-' eaeI.1, ~za

the h'-,- rets cF thcsa-ts, es-t7 Fi-e

e s e :e- -- - e -i5 1 - := s z:e-2l ?as

sz. espc2ae ;i e- a -c~e e-~a

ai ast: :W at-z 21 : ISS a-'. ~

= ca- c--- - -z;-

'~~-at tceSe ePa 7at.tz aC 1 3 ~ 5

Z: aa -- s -- e:- - - -

1S~22 ~1S

* -a'-=5s t-at spc-'sc7 cr Ta-pattz It. >Cs e-e E- Es

prfss7c Pltlizal sz>ecze at P-rci.-e r a-"E

pvc!:FiL -7tr2 tl-e s-tect cf- --z-ea7 te77::7 i5m,

adtresses t1--e '-eet Fcr a ;:!a- 22

e-ee a la- c- t iatcis thse e-e-e-ts cfCsz-seea p.i a- zt that a-t -aster

cf i: z' a':- - a-- --::at -. - ap~- -.e za- be-i- tc take ti-s Fstcr I-ast eps tazt, F-.- a F-, .e th-at glc..s as a l

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15. --ecrgetc-- Lve~sitj, Center Fcr St~ategz &,e:-atic-al St- tes. 7-ombating Te=.-sm: A~ Matter

oFf 'L vera-e - A Fame! Repcrt ='- errz-s-r. Washir~;to",:- : - '-- .. , 3'

~as-; P. nst, 19 Eecembe- ISBS, ;:.I ~ 23

Fesearc" 1 x-Iter, Ez1c-'atc . st Press.

1.H=FFfar, EBxze. Terors7 in' the Lr States 2-7:-'r.1.85. Sa'-ta 'lc-..ca, CO: Thne Ram-' 'cr-7atio-., Feb-7arg

tci Wa7. 5a~ta craCA: T7e Rar'd Ecc~ation,%zver-be- 55

2Z. J'emnV-s, ErT.n e:~~ Likeli2,ci zFf 'Jcearerc:snSa~ta 'I'c-ica, :: TP-e Far- E cat- 2-1 l 158.

Te77o: .s'. Sa-ta -!7O ~:Te Pa-i oato-

* 2?. f e~p~ t les , Er a - - h S ' i-af ~

Eeet 188C..

23. 2e--i-s. E '7i . Ta1' I o se~o st.

?-. Kpe7-a-, pztert H. . a-ic 2paz- I :::z~r~ . er" sTZZ n-.--,--- --

-ee-- Fc- Staei a'-ps t a!oeoe-te7 1582.

25. La.er al~e-. Th-e Per:s eate7 :is z -I --En -, " :; : -- tg- - - .--- P- ss

26. 'e-, ?Oce-t K. Th-e Jse off -a~zoo~e

19-B

Task. Force on the F vEento of' N-clea7 TosmWashiingtcm CC: NCI_ Jun e 1985.

2B. CFf'lze of the Yice Presidert oF Th7e Unt States.P.tliz Report: oF the Uic.e Presterts Task Force cEom"battlg Terrorism. uWasI-.imgto-, =: '-, Governme-:tPri-ting COFFice, Fet7ruarg 1885.

29. River-s, c-a~le. The war gairsz Tezror-:st: How; to ,Jin

Pc R-'fe1l.t, -avid amzl Eater, 11a. Th-e -_7tsss oF

-4...z , a z" 129.

1,E3 Fet7a7o 1'a39 18.

3~. '~1z, Seor-;e, Seoz~fStato. L ~ z

- -State, '5 :a7_uar 1885.

- .~ . 81tz,3e-;-=e, Seoretar, of' State.

State, 2L- J§ _ .

The 2Cffe-se

35Ez. Stfel-, Elraha7. Te Tear- ol>-E:ter-r-to-al Zaos.-

35. Ste-t'; C11ast-. Th To-o-eto Toeo-i.

3- .S Depar-:mTert of th-e n7- n7- Peg--a-- z:-Ec-.-te7 i2; Te77o- s- a- Et-er- "a0 tz:-:: s

1.tar- ~ ~ ~ 1 :-sa11t-o-t iS -

__ ~ Ei E-.a7- e-ts of -_-E nr--, ' av.- a- 'ni:- -

38. _'S :Ee-:-ai :-tel1 ie-:oe Oge-oz. Fata-_e-s :7:e. atic-a. Te7=i-s'-. Jait Z -Zs 16

42. _iS -epar-t-e-t of :eFe-.se. e:r-e-t F Thfense

V ~~~~Peszo7:oes nga 1-s:. Ter-r.t~t.i~-~

-. ' -j.2.2 d

LII1 US Department of' State. Patterns of' Elotal errc-rsn:

1983, 198Li, 198S . Wa sb,, rg t 0- ~C, 1585.

42. US Depa~tment oF State. Terrorist AttacV-s on USE.~sinesses Abroad. washingtcn CC, -rlarch' 1986.

4I3 LS Cepartmert oF State. CormbattiT-g Ter-2r-ism.washi.nrtcr CC, September 1982.

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