Bulletin of Portuguese - Japanese Studies

ISSN: 0874-8438

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Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Portugal

Mihoko, Oka

A great merchant in Nagasaki in 17th century. Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência

Bulletin of Portuguese - Japanese Studies, núm. 2, june, 2001, pp. 37-56

Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Lisboa, Portugal

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A GREAT MERCHANT IN NAGASAKIIN 17TH CENTURY

Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência

Oka MihokoResearch Fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science,Kyoto University

Introduction

In the last few decades, many articles have been devoted to the study ofthe Nagasaki merchants and their relationship with ports all over the world.But only few attempts1 have so far been made for other commercial cities inJapan involved in overseas trade, for example Sakai and especially Hakata.Hakata is located on the northern top of Kyûshû Island and flourished as animportant port for overseas trade with China and Korea from ancient times.In the Middle Ages, a group known as Nengyôji, consisting of some electedcitizen including great merchants, had an autonomous power in town politics.In other words, Hakata had been “the city of commerce” in Japan.

However, in the missionary documents and letters of 16th century and17th century, the name of Hakata or Facata do not appear as frequently asNagasaki or Nangasaque, as they were often written then. The first reason isthat Hakata did not accept Christianity as much as Nagasaki2, and fewerChristians were living there than in other parts of Kyûshû. However, as mer-chants, people in Hakata must have been interested in the communication withpeople who were coming from Europe because they knew that it bore a largeamount of money. In order to understand the way the merchants in Hakatainvolved themselves trade with the Portuguese, it is worth examing the life ofa merchant in Nagasaki, Suetsugu Heizô, and his strategy of management.

BPJS, 2001, 2, 37 - 56

1 See, for example, Okamoto Yoshitomo, Nichiô Kôtsushi no Kenkyû (Tokyo, Hara Shobô, 1974),João Paulo Oliveira e Costa, Hino Hiroshi (trans.), Portugal to Nippon – Nanban no Seiki – (Lisbon,INCM, 1993).2 See Takeno Yôko, Hakata no Gôshô (Fukuoka, Ashi Shobô, 1980), pp. 48 – 49.

The story of Suetsugu Heizô is one of personal politics in 17th centuryJapan. Heizô II served as the governor of Nagasaki and was directly involvedin mediating trade between Japan and the Portuguese. He capitalized on isposition in politics to improve his financial wealth, proving himself to be ashrewd businessman. His personal motives were clear when he switched alle-giances to the Dutch when the economic system of loans to the Portuguese col-lapsed under the weight of respondência or high interests on loans.

In spite of the perception of 17th century Japan as a state controlledcountry, individuals involved in economics and politics still had power tonudge events in their favor. The impact of specific personalities in the historyof Japanese foreign trading partners becomes clear. After exploring Heizô II’sidentity and rise to power, I will introduce the concept of respondência or highinterest loans. Following this, I will explore Heizô II’s investments in Macaoas well as the devasting effect the respondência eventually enacted in foreigntrade between Japan, Portugal, China and Netherlands, I will provide a pic-ture of Heizô immediate involvement in the affairs of the time and the per-sonal gains from this.

1. The identity of Heizô II

The name of Suetsugu Heizô is known rather as that of the Nagasakigovernor (Daikan3) than that of a great merchant. I should emphasize fromthe beginning that the name “Heizô Suetsugu” is attributed to four men,Suetsugu Heizô Masanao (I), Suetsugu or Shigefusa Heizô Shigesada (II),Suetsugu or Shigesada Heizô Shigefusa (III), and Suetsugu Heizô Shigetomo(IV). That is, “Suetsugu Heizô” stands for four governors in Nagasaki whowere direct descents and this name was taken by them as a hereditary one.

Heizô Masanao is known as the usurper of the position of the NagasakiDaikan from António Tôan (Murayama Tôan4) who was a Christian. HeizôMasanao himself was also a Christian having the baptismal name João5, buthe re-converted to buddhism around 1620 and became a persecutor ofChristianity which he lead in Nagasaki. Though he abandoned his interests inChristianity he kept intense contacts with Portuguese merchants. Heizô I had

38 Oka Mihoko

3 Toyotomi Hideyoshi setted this position in 1588, Murayama Tôan was appointed the first as nonsamurai. The Bakufu followed this system, and the main role was levying land tax.4 He seemed to be a clerk in the house of Suetsugu Kôzen (Masanao’s father). After his independence,he made a fortune in Nagasaki and was appointed to Nagasaki Daikan. For further details of the dis-pute between Tôan and Heizô II, see C. R. Boxer, The Christian Century in Japan, 1549 – 1650(Manchester, Carcanet Press, 1993, first printed 1951), pp. 333 – 334.5 On this subject, seem RAM, 9 – 2679, f. 27.

great influence on this trade and his wealth might have been decisive for asmooth ongoing of the commerce between Macao and Nagasaki. He had astrong relationship with Hakata because his father, Suetsugu Kôzen, was fromHakata and Heizô I’s brother Suetsugu Sôtoku was one of the most influentialmerchants in this city. Without this background, he would not have beensuccessful in Nagasaki.

After Heizô I died in 1630, his son succeeded the heritage and started toemploy his power in the management of trade. However, when researcherstried to analyze the activities of Heizô II, they were confronted with the pro-blem, “who would be this Heizô II”. The reason why it is so important tomake the figure of Heizô II identified is that he worked in the Macao-Nagasaki trade as one of the most important persons. In several local andhistorical descriptions, such as Nagasaki Zushi6 and Nagasaki NenpyôFuroku Jûi7, Heizô II appears as Shigefusa8. However, Kawashima Motojirô9

has revealed that according to the record (kakochô) of Shuntokuji Temple10

Heizô II must have been Shigesada. Kawashima’s research can be summarizedin the following way. (1) The post mortem name characters of Shigesada (oku-rina) were carved into the bell of Shuntokuji Temple in 1650; (2) Shigesada’sdeath is inscribed as 1647 in kakochô and on his gravestone at the abovenamed temple; (3) the bell of Suwa Shrine11 was made in 1651 by the contri-bution of Shigesada. Judging from the above points, it is very clear thatShigesada must have been dead before 1650, and in 1651 Shigefusa held thetop position at Suetsugu house in Nagasaki.

In addition to the arguments shown by Kawashima, the rebuilding ofShuntokuji Temple in 1643 is a good example that illustrates that Heizô II wasShigesada. The articles about this event appear in several historical and local notessuch as Nagasaki Zushi12, Nagasaki Jitsuroku Taisei13 and Nagasaki Nenpyô14. Inthese notes, Shigesada Heizô contributed a part of his wealth to rebuilt the tem-ple. It should be therefore concluded, that Heizô II must be Shigesada.

39Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência

6 JTN eds. Nagasaki Zushi reprinted edition, Nagasaki, JNT, 1991, p. 154.7 The author has not seen.8 About the books supporting this explanation, see Yamamoto Hirofumi Quan – ei Jidai (Tokyo,Yoshikawa Kôbunkan, 1989), p. 49, p. 55. Idem. Sakoku to Kaikin no Jidai (Tokyo, Azekura Shobô,1995), p. 61.9 Shuinsen Bôekishi (Osaka, Naigai Shuppan, 1921), pp. 560 – 561.10 This temple was reconstructed with the money of a contribution by Suetsugu. Suetsugu had been arepresentative of supporting members of this temple.11 Heizô III contributed to construct main building in this shrine.12 JTN eds. Nagasaki Zushi (reprinted edition, JTN, 1991, pp. 124 – 125.13 Kyoto University Library, 5 – 15 // na // 23, Vol. 12.14 Kanai Toshiyuki eds., Nagasaki Nenpyô (Ibun Kaisha, 1988), p. 14.

2. The bonds of Respondência and Heizô

Kume Kunitake has collected several maritime financial bonds from thehouse of descendants of Suetsugu and Shimai in Hakata and assembled themin one library of the Univ. of Tokyo15. These bonds show that the families ofSuetsugu and Shimai16 lent out a large quantity of silver to red-seal Ships(licensed ships of early Tokugawa days), junks from China and “the greatships from Macao”. In the Suetsugu Documents, six of these bonds show thedebit and credit between Japanese merchants and the Portuguese, and they arewritten in Portuguese, besides Chinese characters. A letter from a Portugueseto Suetsugu Heizô is also included in this collection. Space constraints pre-clude a discussion of the Shimai Documents, so I would like to concentrate onthe Suetsugu Documents (from here, S.D.).

An important point to note is these documents had been handed downin the family of Suetsugu in Hakata. In the time of Heizô IV, Shigetomo, theSuetsugu family was destroyed, because of his involvement in smuggling forCambodia in 1676. The property was taken away and a part of the familywhich was involved in this illegal trade was exiled to tiny islands. As this time,a large quantity of documents and bonds were supposed to have been burnedor been lost17. Now we can see the traces of flourishment of this family onlyfrom several local and historical documents about Nagasaki. And also, S.D. isa precious material to examine the Suestsugu house in Nagasaki.

(1) “Digo eu Rodrigo Sanchez de Paredes cazado e morador em Macao quehe verdade que eu tomei a responder ao sor. Suyetçugu Sotucu moradorem facata sete mil e quinhentos taes de prata de barras por preço detrinta por cento, os quais vão correndo daqui pera macao, o Risco nonavio capitania nossa Senhora da guia a metade, e a outra a metade nonavio conceição em que vai o feitor do povo repartido ygualmente e demacao para esta cidade de nangasaque vira o risco repartido ygual-mente em todos os navios em que se fizera viagem seginte que do portode Macao partirem iuntos em hum dia, e lhe farei ou mandarei fazerpontual pagamento do proprio e respondencia não vindo porque muyerminha fazenda e cargo, e não avendo viagem o anno por algum

40 Oka Mihoko

15 The Historiographical Institute, The University of Tokyo.16 This family is famous not only as great merchant, but also as promoter of contemporary culturelike tea ceremony (cha no yu).17 Because of the fire broke out in 1697 in Nagasaki, the mansion of Suetsugu had burnt completelyand it is said that all documents had been lost.

acontecimento, lhe pagarei mais a des por cento como he costume edeclaro que esta prata vai a entregar a Cidade18 por via de feizodono eque se ella a tomar mandar a fazer este pagamento pello feitor dopovo19 com a devida pontualidade, e ficando em meu poder o farei eucomo asima me obrigo em fe do que me asinei nesto em nangasaque ojesinco de novembro de seiscentos e vinte e sete annos

Ro. Sanchez de paredes[endorsement] Cto.20 De sete mil e quinhentos taes que Ro. Sanches tomou aResponder a Suyetcugu a Rezão de trinta por cento.” 21

Regarding de concept “respondência”22, Takase Kôichirô describes thatrespondência means “high interest rates beyond proper interest23”. According tothe bonds contained in S.D., it is possible to regard this tern as part of the eco-nomic vocabulary in use at that time in the case of debit and credit without hav-ing so strict a meaning. However, I will use Takase’s interpretation and refer torespondência as a care concerning overly high interest rates. These bonds, calledthe nagegane shômon (bond) in Japan, were written in several languages andhave mostly the same written form. This term, nagegane, appears in a histori-ography of Hakata24 and of Sakai25 with some examples bonds. The word is notactually contained in any bonds, but the authors of those historiographiesdescribe that the vocabulary had been used until the middle of the Edo era. Alsoin some places of Saikaku Ihara’s work, as in Nihon Eitaigura, this term appearswith the meaning of “large speculation.” Several articles have been devoted tothe origin of nagegane, including the connection with the system of bottomry.However, much still remains to be investigated. It is not the point of question toargue actually whether respondência and nagegane have the same significance.

41Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência

18 In this term itself, it is not clear that it means Nagasaki or Macao. I interpreted from around sen-tences and the structure of this document.19 This position means a person next to the Capitão, and he treats negotiation directly at pancada(official market rate of raw silk).20 Conhecimento. It means bond.21 This document is contained in Suetsugu Tsurumatu Shi Shozô Monjo (TDSH, 4171 – 91 – 36), ff.2 – 3.22 Many articles have been devoted to analyze this system. For example, C. R. Boxer, The Great Shipfrom Amacon (Lisbon, Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1963), Shiba Kentarô “Nageganetoha Nani, Kaijô Kashitsuke ka Commenda Tôshi ka”, Keizaishi Kenkyû, Vols. 45 – 47 (Tokyo, 1933).Idem. “Nichi – Ô Bun Nagenane Shômon no Kôsatsu”, Keizaishi Kenkyû, Vols. 17 – 1, 17 – 2 (Tokyo,1937).23 Takase K., Hino H. (trans.) “Actividades Económicas dos Jesuitas no Extremo Oriente dos SéculosXVI e XVII. Especialmente em torno da Usura”, Ryûtsû Keizai Daigaku Ryûtû Jôhô Gakubu Kiyô,Vol. 2, Nº 2 (Saitama, 1998), pp. 174 – 181.24 Tsuda Genko, Sekijôshi, (Fukuoka, Chikushi Shidankai, 1921, reprinted edition), p. 126, p. 137, p.156, pp. 194 – 198.25 Shigen Kôshi, Zen Sakai Shôshi, (Kyoto, Kôbundô, 1985, reprinted edition), pp. 111 – 113.

Let us return to the main subject, the role of Heizô in this kind of debitand credit.

In the above document (1), Heizô plays the role of mediator between aPortuguese and a Japanese merchant. Both principle and interest were paidthrough Heizô. Heizô’s brother Suetsugu Sôtoku invested the original capital,and here we get a first glimpe of the blood relation involved. As to the fiveother bonds, written in Portuguese, the investors were also relatives ofSuetsugu in Hakata. From this point it is not too difficult to conclude thatthere was indeed a kind of blood-related group organizing investments, andHeizô involved himself into this group. With the exception of document (1),the others were written after 163226, so “Heizô” had changed from Heizô I,Masanao to Heizô II, Shigesada.

The investments of Hakata merchants in Portuguese vessels are con-firmed from an earlier time. A document (2) kept in the Arquivo Distrital deÉvora gives evidence to this. The text reads:

(2) “[...] he bem notorio e pello conseguinte a V. M. em como nos demoscantidade de dinheiro a responder a fernão Dorrias por então não sertam prohibido este trato de respondencias como o he oje. E he tambemasas notorio como elle por perdas que teve e a que todos os mercadoresestamos sugeitos nos não mandou pagar porque se ve imposibilitadopara o poder fazer. Pedimos a V. M. o consinta vir a japão pera asim teralgum remédio e nos esperança de algum tempo sermos pagos, e damosa V. M. nossa palavra de não bulirmos com elle nem lhe pedirmos quenos pague senão quando elle boamente puder, antes o ajudaremos como que pudermos pera que assi elle seja remediado e nos pagos [...]Nangasaqui a 3 de Abril de 1626 [...].”27

Seven Japanese signatures by Chinese characters have been inserted afterthese sentences; six are of merchants of Hakata ant the other is one personfrom Hirado. This document was drafted in 1626, and it is clear that this kindof investment and exchange between Portuguese and Hakata merchants hadbeen utilized frequently.

Let us now return to the role of Heizô and look at another document (3)which is supposed to be related with bond (1).

42 Oka Mihoko

26 The years noted in bonds are 1632, 1637 and 1638.27 BPADE, Cód. cxvi / 2-5, ff. 274.

(3) ”O Sr. Suyetcugu feizosama[...] Eu determinava passar este anno a Japão servindo a Cidade mascomo por sua ordem fui mandado com outros cidadoins ao tutão destaprovincia e nos ditenerão a lhe [até?] agora por não se ter dado fim emeio aos negócios que são trabalhosos, não pude fazer a viagem; ficoporem com a esperança de pera o ano ir ver a V. M. e servilo como sonobrigado, e como eu não tenho amigo de quem possa esperar mais quede V. M. lhe peço me façam de procurar por mim e acudir a minha hon-rra para que a prata que devo ao s.or Sotocodono visto não poder esteano pellos rezoins ditas dar lhe satisfação, e rezao de mim queira quepera o anno lha pague com mais des por cento que será melhor quedescobrir minhas faltas, [...]Cantão a 20 de julho de 638 annos de V. M. servidora) Ro. Sanches de paredes” 28

This is contained in S. D. and its structure of investor: Sôtoku, interme-diator: Heizô, debtor: Rodrigo Sanchez de Paredes is the name as that of docu-ment (1). In this letter, Sanchez asked Heizô confidently for the mediation con-cerning a debt which had not been cleared off. The structure means documents(1) and (2) were related, the debt in 1627 might have been delayed to pay backfor more than 10 years. Around the end of the Portuguese trade in Japan, theproblem of a large amount of unrepaid silver lent at respondência was consi-derable. This question will be discussed in the next chapter. At any rate, it isobvious that Heizô played an important role in the commerce between theSuetsugu family in Hakata and Portuguese merchants.

The direct investment by Heizô is not clear in the S. D. As I have men-tioned before, these documents had been preserved in the Suetsugu house inHakata. It may seem natural that Heizô’s role is only intermediary in theserecords, but it seems reasonable to consider hat the merchant who involvedhimself in others’ investments may have been interested in increasing his ownwealthy position.

43Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência

28 TDSH, Suetsuguke Monjo.

3. The investments by Heizô II to Macao

Two variations of the same letters sent by Heizô II to Macao exist in theReal Academia de la Historia in Madrid29 and in the Biblioteca da Ajuda inLisbon30. C. R. Boxer31 and Takase Koichirô32 have mentioned the letters inthe Biblioteca da Ajuda, but I confirmed that they were written copies whilethe two in Madrid were originals. Unfortunately, when I found out about thedocuments in Madrid, they were being prepared for restoration, and it wasimpossible to get a reprint or a microfilme. Consequently I have relied on themanuscripts in the Biblioteca da Ajuda. These letters are initially concernedwith the prohibition of the passage of people related to the missionaries orChristianity. They then turn their attentions to the silver which Heizô II hadinvested in the foregoing years and the quantity of silver for investment in1634 and 1635.

(4) “[...] Os dez mil taes que mandei por Feitor Agostinho Lobo, dos quaisrecebi cinco mil taeis empregados em seda conforme o conhecimento eeste anno queria mandar tão bem os dez mil taeis do meu Bague, maspor não arriscar em hum navio tanto por isso me determinei de mandara mestres como de feito mando e assim me farão V. M. merce de entre-gar a Bertolameo da Rocha, em sua auzença a Rodrigo Sanches deParedes e na de ambos a Antonio de Oliveira Aranha para o emprego.Este anno tive pouco ganho por ser o emprego ruim e estes cinco miltaeis mandarão V. M. a Bertolameo da Rocha que empregue em sedachapi boa, porque não quero nem hum so cate de seda corrente, e esteemprego de cinco mil taeis me farão merce de mandar no navio ondevier o Capitão Mor, e o emprego dos cinco mil taeis do anno passadono navio onde vier o Feitor do povo [...].”33

It becomes evident that Heizô II had invested 10,000 taels in 1633, andhe received half of the return in silk in 1634. One may speculate about the riskhe undertook in 1634 with his total investment of 10,000 taels. What needsattention with this kind of bond is who would take the risk for capital andcargo. The study of the respondência can also be seen from the perspective ofinsurance studies. In other bonds of Suetsugu, it is the investors who took the

44 Oka Mihoko

29 RAH, 9 – 7239, f. 145, ff. 169 – 170.30 BAL, Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–11, ff. 615 – 617, ff. 599v. – 601.31 C. R. Boxer, The Great Ship from Amacon, pp. 326 – 330.32 Takase K., “ On the Consignment Trade between Macao and Nagasaki” Shigaku, Vol. 49 – 433 BAL – Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–11, ff. 615 – 617.

risk in these negotiations. Assumption of the risk was one of the fundamentalelements in the structure of respondência.

(5) “[...] Entreguei ao Feitor sete mil taeis em prata de soma, e trez mil emprata corrente, peço a V. M. que como sempre a mandem entregar aBertolameo da Rocha, e Rodrigo Sanches comprando como elles sedachali a melhor que houvem ma mandem pelo feitor da viagem seguintecom o risco na galeota igualmente nos dous navios em que vierem ocapitão e feitor.Se Bertolameo da Rocha e Rodrigo Sanchez por alguma cauza nãopuderem comprar a sobredita seda, peço a V. M. a comprem, e ma man-dem em nome dessa cidade. [...]Ainda que acimo escrevo, que mando sette mil taeis em prata de soma,com tudo, porque a não pude haver a mandei em corrente, que montaoito mil seiscentos e cincoenta taeis34 os quais com os outros trêz milfazem a quantia de onze mil setecentos e cincoenta taeis, peço a V. M.que mos mandem empregar como acima digo. 25 de outubro de 1635.”35

This letter was written on October 25th 1635, the year following thedocument (4). The main contents of both do not differ much, but anxietyabout the use of the money and expectations for the Macao government totake responsibility for the loan had increased. Here the name of RodrigoSanchez appears again, which indicates a confidential relation between HeizôII and him. In addition to the intense commercial relation shown in the docu-ment (3), the above letter indicates the possibility that Sanchez could be arepresentative of Heizô II in Macao.

It is worth asking what was the role of the Macao government. It hadworked not only as a medium in charge to treat the silver, but also as the mainorganizer of the transaction. Figures as Rodrigo Sanchez and Bartolomeo daRocha were only organs serving Heizô II’s negotiation while the main organof investment was the Macao government. Heizô II lent silver not to a singleperson, but the government of Macao, trusting the Portuguese to take respon-sibility in any case of trouble. When we return to the Hakata merchants’bonds in S. D., this becomes clear. It seems that the Hakata merchants hadinvested their money in individuals who were supported by the Macaogovernment. The tables 1 and 2 indicate this clearly.

45Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência

34 We can see the ratio of the value of soma silver and current silver; 1. 2:1.35 BAL – Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–11, ff. 599v. – 601 V.

46

Table 1: Debtors of Suetsugu Bonds36

Nº Lessees

1 Rodrigo Sanchez de Paredes

2 Agostinho Lobo

3 Tristão Tavares, António Maneio

4 Pedro Fernandez de Carvalho

5 Leonard Ferreira, Pedro de Castro

6 João Pereira

Table 2 : Capitão-mor in Portuguese vessels from Macao in the Quanei Period38

1624 Agostinho Lobo

1625 Agostinho Lobo

1626 Luís Paes Pacheco

1627 No Voyage

1628 António Monteiro

1629 António de Oliveira Aranha

1630 No Voyage *Envoy of Dom Gonçalo da Silveira

1631 Lourenço de Lis Velho

1632 Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho

1633 Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho

1634 Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho

1635 No Voyage *Envoy of Dom Gonçalo da Silveira [sic]37

1636 Dom Gonçalo da Silveira

1637 Dom Francisco de Castelo Branco

1638 Dom João Pereira

1639 Vasco Palha de Almeida

Agostinho Lobo came to Japan as capitão-mor in 1624 and 1625, and in1632 as feitor. Tristão Tavares had been a secretary in the Macao Parliamentand he seems to be a relative of Manuel Tavares Bocarro, who made a big for-tune with weapons. Pedro Fernandez de Carvalho was feitor during the lastvoyage from Macao to Nagasaki in 1638 and the capitão-mor was Dom João

Oka Mihoko

36 TDSH, Suetsuguke Monjo and Suetsugu Tsurumatu Shi Shozô Monjo.37 In 1635, there was the voyage to Nagasaki with three galeotas and actually Silveira worked as theCapitão Mor in place of António de Távora Pinto. - C. R. Boxer, The Great Ship from Amacon, pp.141 – 142.38 BAL, Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49 – IV – 66, ff. 41v. – 42.

Pereira. The debtors who appear in the bonds are important persons not onlyin the Macao-Nagasaki trade, but also in the Macao government.

In the case of Japanese red-seal Ships and Chinese junks, in both casescontracts were made between individuals. One should then ask why thegovernment was involved in the case of the Portuguese. First, it must be under-stood that the trade with Chinese junks was equivalent to smuggling. Thegovernment was out of matters even if it knew actually about the transactions.Second, due to the uncertainty of arriving Portuguese vessels and negotiationsin Canton and other ports, it was more suitable to invest in a larger commu-nity than to individuals in order to protect one’s own benefits. In the case ofHeizô II, there is another reason for his strong trust in the Macao government.When Heizô II assumed his father’s heritage, an intense relationship betweenthe Portuguese and Suetsugu had already been established39. Furthermore,Suetsugu had been the governor in Nagasaki, a position with the strongestpower and was the terminal organization in this city. There were many bene-fits for Macao to maintain good relations with Heizô II, and it is natural toconsider that Heizô II’s investments were actually a case of public trade withthe Macao government rather than private trade with Portuguese entrepre-neurs.

The years when these letters were written marked the end of the Macao-Nagasaki trade. There was not only the strict prohibition of Christianity andthe passage of missionaries from overseas, but by now the behaviour of thePortuguese in Nagasaki was regulated. Though the trade business was stillworking, rumours that this trade would soon come to an end were spreadingover the city and other commercial cities in Japan. As a result, the price of rawsilk had risen all over Japan, and this caused the price rise of other products,too. In 1635, the price of qualified raw silk was fixed as 260 taels/pico inNagasaki, but is was traded as 480 taels in Kyoto40. There was the chaos onthe Japan market. In 1634 N. Couckebacker, the Chief of the Dutch Factory,mentioned “Portuguese have received loans from Japanese merchants for thepast 12 years and the unreturned silver amounts to 150,000 taels. They mustpay one third in this year and the rest of the silver has to be paid 2 years fromnow. The interests on the loans are incredibly high and I do not know howthey can pay such an amount of money41.” This description indicates that a

47Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência

39 The relationship is apparent in the documents of footnote n. 34.40 TDSH (comp. and trans.), OSN, Vol. 1 –2 (Tokyo UP, 1975, Japanese edition), p. 38, p. 69.Nakamura Tadashi, Kinsei Nagasaki Bôekishi no Kenkyû (Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kôbunkan, 1988), pp.120 – 121.41 Ibid., pp. 50 – 51.

large part of the silver which had been borrowed at respondência (high inte-rest) had not been paid back. In this situation, the rumours about the end ofthe trade caused some tragedies. In 1637 a group of Japanese merchantsattacked the envoy of a Portuguese debtor who was sent to negociate late pay-ment42.

The role of Macao government played regarding their responsibility forthe debt due to respondência is important. Seeing the wretched situation of thePortuguese in Nagasaki, the Macao authorities had to quickly find solution tothe large debt of the Portuguese.

4. Respondência and the Macao Government

As I mentioned above, it is clear that the Macao government involveditself in the economics at respondência between Japanese and Portuguese. Theauthorities were forced to consider the best way to make up for the ruin in thistrade which was caused by debtors. Although the best way to repair good rela-tions would have been to pay off the total amount of debt, the Macaogovernment hesitated to carry out such a plan, because there were conflictsaround the respondência problem.

In 1610 the Vice Roy of India, Ruy Lourenço de Távora orderedPortuguese officials not to accept any silver at respondência from Japan forMacao. This order declared that those who received silver under these termsfrom Japanese merchants would be punished with excommunication.

(6) “Trata da prata dos Japoes que elles costumão mandar a Macao[...] o assento que tomou ao Reverendo Bispo da China D. Fr. João Pintosobre se tornara mandar a seos donos os cabedaes que vierão de Japão aMacao que lhe forão denunciados por excomunhão e que as que sobre elles... [sic] tomadas, desembargos que forão feitos se levantão e os ditos cabedaesse enviem a seos donos a Japão sem se fazer emprego algum no proprio din-heiro em que vierão de Japão. Notifico assim todas as justiças de SuaMagestade da cidade de Macao para que cumprão e guardem e a todos osmais capitães das viagens, officiaes e pessoas a que pertencem e lhes mandoque assim cumprão, e guardem, e promptamente fação cumprir e guardar demaneira que se neste contem, sem duvida, nem embargo algum [...]”.43

48 Oka Mihoko

42 Ibid., Vol. 3 –1, pp. 90 – 92.43 BAL, Jesuítas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–3, f. 28, Cód. 49–V–5, ff. 84 – 85.

Okamoto44 describes the reasons for these instructions as follows. Thefirst reason was to protect the benefits of fazenda real (the national treasuryof Portugal) by official trade and the second reason was to prevent Japanesemerchants from intervening in the negotiations directly. Though this strictorder had been passed to the Macao government from the Vice Roy in Goa thereceipt of silver from Japan still continued and we can confirm these transac-tions, for 1613, 1615 and 1617.45 The reason why this system was continuedis closely related to the position of the receivers in Macao. As we have seenabove, people involved in the respondência were situated at the top of theMacao government and had important roles in the China – Japan trade.Connection to private trade might be one of the most “useful” ways to makea fortune. After all, this situation had not been changed since 1623 when DomF. Mascarenhas was sent from Goa to legitimate Macao’s administration.

It is clear that there was a conflict between the Macao governors con-cerning respondência as the following letter illustrates. Mascarenhas sent it tothe King of Portugal informing him of trouble in Macao after his arrival.

(7) “Sendo informado, como nestes navios tinha vindo muita prata de Japõesa responder, e do muito danno e perjuizo que era ao bem comum destaterra, tirei com V. M. huma devassa do cazo, e por ella me consta queDominguos Carvalho feitor que foi da ditta viagem, avia trasido a ditaprata a responder, a quoal devassa tenho mandado ao senhor Visorrei daIndia, e té sua resposta não poderá o dito Dominguos Carvalho entrar emofficio algum da cidade, por estar creminoso de que avizo a V. M.. E jun-tamente dos des adjuntos convem a saber, Ponceanno de Abreu, PedroFernandes de Carvalho, Pedro Correa Craveiro, António Monteiro Pinto,Pedro Rodrigues Teixeira, Lionel de Sousa de Limma, Manuel Pacheco deLimma, Rafael Carneiro de Siqueira, Rodriguo Sanches de Paredes,Heitor da Mota [Caldeira ?] , os quoais todos se asinarão em humprotesto que me fizerão e intimarão por dous escrivães em que me tinhãodeposto do carguo de Capitão Geral. E tras elle tornarão as armas contrasua Magestade com os mais exssessos de que tenho dado conta ao ditosenhor Visorrei, e a Relação. [...] Macau 28 de dezembro de 1624 annos,a) Dom Francisco Mascarenhas.” 46

49Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência

44 Okamoto Yoshitomo, “Nagegane ni Kansuru Tokushu no Siryô”, Shakai Keizai Shigaku, Vol. 5 –6, (Tokyo, 1935), pp. 87 – 89.45 For a discussion of these events, see, C. R. Boxer “Notes on the Portuguese Trade in Japan duringthe Kwanei Period (1624 – 1643)”, Shigaku, Vol. 12 – 2, (Keiou Gijuku UP., 1933), ValdemarCoutinho, O Fim da Presença Portuguesa no Japão, (Lisbon, Sociedade Histórica da Independência dePortugal, 1999), Takase Kôichirô, “Nihon Iezusukai no Zaisei to Nagenane”, Shigaku, Vol. 43 – 1/2(Keiou Gijuku UP., 1970).46 BPADE, Cód. cxvi / 2-5, f. 238.

It is notable here that the top governors in the Macao administration hadplanned to expell Mascarenhas with reasons based on the respondência pro-blem. This rebellion was amply concerned with the suppression of receivingsilver from Japanese merchants and we can see the governors had much inte-rest in this silver trade. We must pay attention that the respondência problemhad become an official one rather than a private one at this point. As we cansee in the document (7), the Feitor, a position held by an accomplishedPortuguese politician/merchant, was the recipient of Japanese funds. If a rulerwould abolish this system, he would have to reform the whole political consti-tution of Macao, which had a cozy political economic relationship. In orderto separate politics from economics, the Portuguese authority sent a person toMacao.

In the next year, 1625, Mascarenhas gave orders prohibiting the receiptof silver at respondência again47 and it was stricter than ever, stating that thepunishment of disobedience was imprisonment in Goa.

Though these strict orders were put up repeatedly, carrying silver intoMacao did not cease. Even the people who took part in the rebellion againstMascarenhas still continued to work in the trade in important positions, asRodrigo Sanchez de Paredes and Pedro Fernandez de Carvalho.48 Thesewealthy merchants were necessary to run these trading activities because theyknew how to manage the commercial voyage and how to establish a good rela-tionship with Japanese governors and merchants. Next, we should notice theuncertainty of securing sufficient operating funds in Macao as a mediatingport. The Canton market had been unstable for the delay of payments byChinese and the difficulties of acquiring sufficient products like raw silk andtextiles to export. Futhermore, the route from Goa to Macao was constantlyunder the peril of attack by the Dutch fleet and they had to secure their ownfinancial means without support from Portugal or India. The silver even atrespondência was the most useful and ready cash. Portuguese entrepreneurswere not the only ones interested in preserving the respondência system. Thisis clear in document (2)49. Several Hakata merchants required Macao to con-tinue to accept silver from Japan, at least till the Portuguese debt would becleared off.

From the reasons above it seemed to be difficult to give up handling sil-ver in official trade. However, at the declining epoch of the Macao - Nagasakitrade, the problems around respondência had increased, and Portuguese had

50 Oka Mihoko

47 See Ibid., f. 237.48 He worked as a Feitor during the voyage from Macao to Nagasaki in 1638.49 See footnote n. 27 above.

to grapple with the question how to pay back the loan or to ease the ill feel-ing of Japanese merchants.

While various embarrassing situations came up concerning Christianityand South West European people in Japan, the Macao authorities decided tosend Dom Gonçalo da Silveira in the fanction of Capitão-Mor as envoy in1635. He had already visited Japan in 1630 and had been detained inNagasaki with the Capitão-Mor, Oliveira de Aranha, till 1634. The aim of thevisit in 1635 was the same as in 1630: ease the Bakufu’s attitude towardsPortuguese trade. He took the role of Capitão-Mor from the already appoint-ed António de Távora Pinto. The next quotation from a letter in 1636 fromManuel Ramos to the Vice Roy in India may help to understand the reason forhis coming to Japam again.

(8) “[...] se ellegeo o anno passado a Dom Gonçalo da Silveira para hir porCapitão Mor na viagem de Japão, assy por sua callidade, talento, epartes, como pella muita experiencia, que tem daquele reino, foi suahida de grande importancia para os japõens, pello grande respeito quelhe tem, por elle saber autorizar muito, como taobem pera os mesmosportugueses, que como lhe conhecem a natureza, se não atreverão acontinuar em alguas dezordens, que intentaram [...] se conssiderou agrande utilidade, que seria pera a fazenda Real tornar elle a Japão, emdito de Sua Magestade, reputação do nome Portugues e maes segurançadeste Comercio [...].”50

Taking into consideration that Silveira was acquainted with Japanesecustoms and the severe condition in Nagasaki for 4 years, it was natural thathe was elected as the head of the voyage. Additionally, his nobility and statusin India were elements that enabled him to gain the confidence of theJapanese. It may be true, that he was trusted by the Japanese and the necessi-ty for his coming was expressed best by Heizô II when he says “Dom Gonçalocomo esteve tantos annos em Jappão sabe muito bem os costumes desta terra,seus costumes, e modos de proceder são dignos de muito louvor,”51 in his1635 letter. Heizô II mentions his pains to get Silveira back to Macao in 1634.

(9) “[...] Essa cidade deve de folgar com a hida de Dom Gonçalo de Silveira eAntónio de Oliveira e para ida dos quaes trabalhei na Corte mais de trezannos como elles dirão a V. M.. Havendo couzas que sejão do serviço dessacidade farei com muito gosto e ao diante o que se offerecer não deixarei deo fazer com a mesma vontade [...].”52

51Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência

50 IAN/TT, Livro das Monções, Livro 38, ff. 197v.51 BAL, Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–11, f. 601.52 BAL, Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–11, f. 616v.

The quotation above indicates that Heizô II still had been greatly inte-rested in the trade with Macao and been eager to improve and keep the rela-tion. Nevertheless, when the envoy of Dom Francisco de Castelobranco, inplace of Silveira, went to Edo to greet the Court, the Shimabara Rebellionbroke out in 1637 and they were imprisoned. The situation surrounding thePortuguese was only getting worse, and at this moment Heizô II settled on hisnew strategy towards future associates.

5. The Strategy of Management by Heizô II

Heizô II decided to switch from trading with the Portuguese to tradingwith the Dutch before the Shimabara Rebellion. Around 1634 he started torebuild relations with the Dutch Factory which had been harmed by Heizô Iin the affair of Peter Nuits,53 Heizô II told an interpreter for the Dutch “theworst relation between our house and the Dutch has finished, and I will endthis problem.”54 In the same year, he revealed the different position from hisfather to N. Couckbacker.55 Before these statements the Factory decided to sellthe Erasmus, which was the ship concerning the affair of Peter Nuits, decla-ring “to forget the bad memory about Suetsugu family.” Though both appa-rently started to come close, it is uncertain from his letter to Macao in 1635whether Heizô II had already made up his mind to leave the Portuguese as histrading partner. As the regulations of overseas matters by the Bakufu were get-ting worse for the Portuguese, the relationship between Heizô II and the Dutchbecame stronger.

In 1635 three galeotas (small galleons) led by Gonçalo da Silveira arrivedat Nagasaki and the price of raw silk was decided at public rate (pancada).While the price of the high quality silk was 305 taels/pico, and the second was280 taels/pico, the ordinal was 240 taels/pico. The price of raw silk broughtby Dutch remained around 260 ~ 290 taels/pico.56 It was normal that raw silkfrom Batavia was sold at a lower price than Portuguese silk and F. Caron, aDutch East Indiaman, asked Heizô II if it was “possible to rise the price of rawsilk on Dutch vessels by your power.” Heizô II replied “yes, it is possible, but

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53 In 1626, the crew of the red–seal Ship dispatched by Heizô I, Masanao, and the Dutch quarrelledabout tariffs and some Japanese shipmen died in Taiwan. For revenge, Yahei Hamada, the captain ofthat ship visited Taiwan again; they took hostages each other after the fight. The trade between twostopped for four years because Masanao killed those Dutch hostages by his arbitrary decision. ThoughPeter Nuits was dispatched from Batavia to repair the relation, he had been caught by 1636.54 TDSH (comp. and trans.), OSN, Vol. 1 – 2, Japanese edition, p. 37.55 Ibid., pp. 45 – 46.56 Ibid., pp. 170 – 171, Nakamura Tadashi, Kinsei Nagasaki Bôekishi no Kenkyû (Tokyo, YoshikawaKôbunkan, 1988), pp. 120 – 121.

you, the Factory have to supply more silk than ever to me secretly.”57 As proofof this fact, the amount of raw silk given to Heizô II from the VOC changedsuddenly from 30 pico to 50 pico in 1636.58 While the Portuguese silk couldbe sold only for the selected merchants of five cities (gokasho shônin), Dutchcould conduct business with everyone they wanted, almost freely. It was obvi-ous that Japanese merchants would necessarily concentrate on Dutch raw silkafter the corruption of the Macao trade. This transaction demonstrates theforesight of Heizô II.

Furthermore, to slow how close the relation between Heizô II and the DutchFactory became in this period, it is useful to refer to Heizô II’s lists of goodsbrought by Portuguese galeota to the Factory. Initially, the Factory required HeizôII to provide the lists, but after the first year allowed him to submit them volun-tarily. He passed these lists to the Dutch in the autumn always after the vessels hadarrived, in 1636, 1637 and 1638.59 In 1639, the list contained the goods and theirprices brought by Chinese junks.60 It is clear that the Dutch utilized these listswhen they purchased goods to import from Batavia for the next year. Heizô II’sattempt could have been influenced by the intention of the Bakufu, because of theBakufu demand that Dutch ships would bring more products than before. HeizôII must have thought the Dutch were better partners than the Chinese because ofthe uncertainty of season they came, their number of ships, and the quantity ofproducts brought by them.

It was important that Heizô II played the role of intermediater in the con-nection between the Bakufu and the Factory. There are many articles which HeizôII acted as an agent transmitting demands from the Dutch to representatives of theBakufu in Nagasaki (Nagasaki Bugyô). Although Heizô II’s position, theNagasaki Daikan, was under the Nagasaki Bugyô, two authorities dispatchedfrom the Bakufu depended on Heizô II to govern Nagasaki. He was accustomedto dealing with local matters in Nagasaki while the Bugyô were replaced each afew years. While the Factory needed Heizô II, the Nagasaki Bugyô also made useof him when communicating with the Dutch.

As is well known, the Bakufu required the Dutch to cooperate in theattack on peasants during the Shimabara Rebellion. Heizô II took an impor-tant part in informing Bakufu’s intention to the Dutch Factory. This rebellionbroke out in Shimabara, led by ex–retainers of Konishi Yukinaga who hadbeen ruined at the decisive battle between the Toyotomi and the Tokugawa in

53Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência

57 Ibid., pp. 186 – 187, Nagazumi Yôko, “Hirado Oranda Shôkanchô Nikki o Tôshite MitaPancado”, Nihon Rekishi, Vol. 260 (Tokyo, 1970), pp. 84 – 85.58 Nakamura, loc. cit.59 TDSH (comp. and trans.), OSN, Vol. 2 – 1, Japanese edition, pp. 164 – 166, Vol. 2 – 2, p. 130, Vol.3 –2, p. 197.60 TDSH (comp. and trans.), OSN, Vol. 4 – 1, Japanese edition, pp. 183 – 188.

Osaka in 1615, in November 1637 and the rebel army spread to another dis-trict of northern Kyûshû. At first the Bakufu sent a large force commanded byGeneral Shigemasa Itakura to suppress, but he died in the attack in January1638 and the authorities were ordered to concentrate on suppressing therebellion as quickly as possible. On January 18th 1638, the Dutch informedto Heizô II that they would cooperate if the governors required.61 Nine daysafter Heizô II sent a messenger requesting six barrels full of gunpowder, theFactory complied. On February 9th, Heizô II told the Dutch “supplying armsand powders is the best way to show your loyalty at this time and you shouldcomply with everything the Bakufu wants”. Five cannons were taken apartfrom the ship called De Lyp and sent to Arima the next day. On February18th, Heizô II ordered this ship to stay at Hirado port, instead of returning toBatavia. The next day, the Bakufu officialy commanded this ship to sail to thebattlefield.

As we have seen above, the Dutch Factory cooperated with the Bakufuvoluntarily, but it is obvious that their participation was planned by Heizô II.Dutch and Heizô II perceived that the Portuguese would be compelled to leaveJapan and give up their trade.

After the suppression of the rebellion, the Factory received a monopolright of possession in the Japan trade and Heizô II was rewarded by theBakufu in 1640.62 To be honoured by the top of the public hierarchy meansthat Heizô II transcended his status as a private governor of Nagasaki and hebecame an officially recognized politician in the end. We may say that he wassuccessful in business and in raising his status due to his intelligence, while hisfather got the position of the Daikan by force. It should be concluded, fromwhat has been said above, that Heizô II constructed his status and made a for-tune by his sense of business and ability for politics. Although his title wasthat of a politician, it seems to me that he was a man of business rather thanof politics. It may not be too much to say that the political power was only ameans for increasing his wealth. He seemed to enjoy planning his strategy asa merchant involved in the difficulties of overseas trade. Therefore, it was pos-sible to take advantage of the speculation to foreign shipping for him. Hissharp business sense was based on a clear recognition of the world situation.It is notable that he was also a trader who dispatched many red–seal shipsabroad to Taiwan, Siam, Cambodia, Vietnam and other parts os Asia. Hisviews towards other countries were sharper than that of contemporary

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61 Most of the material treated in this section is derived from TDSH (comp. and trans.), OSN,Vol. 3 1, Japanese edition.62 Kuroita Katsumi (ed.), Tokugawa Jikki (Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kôbunkan, 1930, reprinted edition), p.182.

Japanese politicians. During the national isolation, the Bakufu developed themarket and controlled the domestic economy. The beginning of the 17th cen-tury may be the last brilliant time when the great merchants could freely uti-lize their powers and one could suddenly come into wealth in pre–modernages. Heizô II was one of the wise men who survived in such decades.

[Abbreviations]

BAL – Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisboa.BPADE – Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora.INCM - Imprensa Nacional – Casa da Moeda.IAN/TT – Instituto do Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo.JNT – Junshin Joshi Tanki Daigaku, Nagasaki Chihô Bunkashi KenkyûshoRAM – Real Academia de la Historia, MadridOSN – Oranda Shôkancho Nikki (Diaries kept by the heads of the DutchFactory in Japan)TDSH – Tokyo Daigaku Shiryô Hensanjo. (The Historiographical Institute,The University of Tokyo).

55Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência

Abstract

This article is an analysis of a structural aspect of the 17th

century Macao-Japan trade. Focusing on the figure of a Nagasakimerchant, who is known under the name of Suetsugu Heizô, thestructure of respondência and its importance in this trade willbecome clear.

The system of investment had made some Japanese mer-chants wealthy, especially merchants originating from Hataka andNagasaki on the Kyûshû islands, because of the high rate of interestwhich lay around 30%. But the character of Macao as na inter-mediate port brought more profits to the Portuguese in this tradebecause of the value of silver in China and the countries under thecontrol of the Chinese empire. In this article becomes indicated thenonpayment of Portuguese debt by certain bonds left in Japanese mer-chant’s houses. And actually this problem created confusion in theMacao administration in the 1630’s because it could be one reason forthe decision taken by Japanese authorities to fade out the commerce.

I touch only the surface of this economic system and itsperiphery, but this system can be one indicator to measure the eco-nomic structure of the Portuguese seaborne empire in Asia.

Resumo

Este artigo analisa um aspecto estrutural do comércio entreMacau e Nagasaki no século XVII. Atentando na figura de um mer-cador de Nagasaki, que é conhecido pelo nome de Suetsugu Heizô,o sistema da respondência e a sua importância neste comércio torna-se claro.

Este sistema de investimento enriqueceu alguns comerciantesjaponeses, especialmente cidadãos de Hakata e de Nagasaki, na ilhade Kyûshû, devido aos juros elevados que cobravam e que atingiam30%. O papel de Macau com o um porto intermediário trouxe maisproveitos aos Portugueses neste negócio, por causa do valor daprata na China e nos países sob o controlo do Celeste Império. Esteartigo mostra as dívidas que os Portugueses não pagaram, através dedocumentos que ficaram nas casas de mercadores nipónicos. Esteproblema criou dificuldades à administração de Macau na décadade 1630-40 e pode ter sido uma das razões que levaram as autori-dades japonesas a por fim ao comércio.

Analiso apenas aspectos superficiais e periféricos deste negó-cio, mas este pode ser um indicador para avaliar a estruturaeconómica do império marítimo dos Portugueses na Ásia.

56 Oka Mihoko