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The Asset Management Industry:A Growing Gap Between the Winners and the Also-Rans
October 2006Copyright McKinsey & Companywww.mckinsey.com
This report is solely for the use of client personnel. No part of it may be circulated,quoted, or reproduced for distribution outside the client organization without priorwritten approval from McKinsey & Company.
At first glance, the asset management business hardly seems to be in need of
any serious retooling. On average, things are about as good as they’ve ever
been – assets under management are growing at a double-digit rate and
earnings performance remains rock-solid. Meanwhile, compensation for
industry professionals is escalating at a robust pace. And for good reason: The
results of the most recent benchmarking study by McKinsey and Institutional
Investor’s U.S. Institute reveal that asset managers generated an average pre-
tax margin of 31 percent in 2005, an impressive 5-year high.
But averages, of course, can hide as much as they reveal. And in this case, the
averages are concealing an entirely different picture when it comes to the
individual firms themselves. In fact, while the asset industry as a whole may be
incredibly healthy, the profit gap between winners and losers is both dramatic
and growing – our research shows that a full 41 percentage points of operating
margin now separates the top- and bottom-third players, a disparity that has
widened significantly over the past 3 years. Moreover, an increasing proportion
of asset managers are now earning margins under 20 percent, as the bottom-
tier performers fall further behind the rest of the pack. Unless these players
move quickly to revamp their business models, the profit gap is almost certain
to expand even further.
Indeed, the warning bells have already begun to toll for many traditional firms
not willing to depart from their business-as-usual approach. Our benchmarking
shows, for example, that both demand and pricing for a host of traditional
products are now in sharp decline – in some cases, by more than 10 percent in
2005 alone – as flows quickly polarize towards “true” alpha and “cheap” beta.
Meanwhile, the need for scale is intensifying, with those firms failing to achieve
it experiencing an ever-worsening drag on profits. Add a surge of merger activity
into the mix, and it becomes quite clear that bottom-tier players are now facing
considerable pressure either to shore up their operations or face the risk of
consolidation. For everyone else, staying one step ahead of these powerful
forces will be crucial to sustaining profit growth.
The Asset Management Industry: A Growing Gap Between theWinners and the Also-Rans
1
We base these assertions on recent findings from the most in-depth annual
study of the economics of the U.S. asset management business. McKinsey
and Institutional Investor’s U.S. Institute annually benchmark the financial
performance of more than 80 firms that collectively manage over $8 trillion in
assets, or more than one-third of the industry total. Our study includes a
balanced mix of players in terms of size, asset mix and client segments served
– as such, it provides a truly comprehensive view into the industry’s financial
performance.
Our research points to conclusions in three major areas:
• We have identified five major pressure points that are now spurring change
in the asset management industry. While the industry overall remains highly
profitable, firms that are unable to alleviate these pressure points will have
a particularly hard time maintaining future growth and profitability.
• Being a winner in the asset management business entails two fundamental
components. The first is choosing the most appropriate business model to
leverage scale, either at the overall firm or product level. The second
involves executing superbly against key levers that account for a noticeable
margin difference between winners and losers – most notably, product
management, pricing and cost discipline.
• Against this backdrop, senior management teams should be actively
developing responses to these key issues. In the process, they should be
debating, at a minimum, a management agenda that addresses the key
issues of business model choice, product development, and executional
performance.
2
Five Major Pressure Points Spurring Industry Change
While the asset management industry as a whole continues to remain extraordinarily
healthy, the profit gap between winners and losers – regardless of size or customer
segment served – continues to widen. We have identified five key pressure points
that are now playing a particularly influential role in creating that disparity.
1. A dwindling ability to gather assets
In recent years, the traditional asset management business has produced a striking
dichotomy: one of the most lucrative industries in the financial services sector is,
nonetheless, virtually incapable of collecting new money from its customers. And
2005 was no exception: average profit margins hit 31 percent, a 5-year high and an
increase of nearly 11 percent from 2004. Meanwhile, long-term assets under
management (excluding money-market funds) swelled by 10 percent – a seemingly
robust increase. But that AuM growth was driven almost entirely by market
appreciation, not new money; in fact, net new long-term flows as a percentage of
beginning-of-year assets increased by only 2 percent in 2005 (Exhibit 1). To put that
amount in perspective, it was only half the growth rate of the overall economy.
3
EXHIBIT 1
A highly profitable industry, but struggling to gather assets
Although profits are at a 5-year high . . . . . . market appreciation, not new money, is driving long-term AuM growth
Profit margin – industry averagePercent
2526
31
2728
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
2003
2
2
2
1
8
10
18
-7 2002
2004
2005
Long-term net flows as a % of beginning-of-year AuM
Long-term market appreciation
%
Source: McKinsey / Institutional Investor U.S. Institute Asset Management Benchmarking Survey
In essence, the lifeblood of the traditional asset management industry is now
market returns – clearly, an unstable foundation on which to move forward. A
key reason for this state of affairs is the continuing encroachment of new
competitors into the traditional long-only arena. Not only are hedge funds and
other alternative providers active in this space, but a host of “outside” players,
including insurance companies, investment banks, and private equity firms are
now playing much broader roles for retail and institutional investors alike.
Insurers, for instance, are taking direct aim at the 77 million baby boomers now
headed for retirement, with a slew of new principal-protection and risk-mitigation
products. Investment banks, meanwhile, are developing structured product
solutions to help pension plan sponsors deal with their funding issues.
To be sure, the most successful asset managers have been able to increase
their flows despite these challenges. But the implications for most traditional
players are clear: either cultivate new sources of growth, or roll the dice on
future market appreciation – and hope it will be enough to fuel profits.
2. Rapid polarization of flows arising from alpha-beta separation
If the prospect of wagering future profit growth on market appreciation isn’t
unnerving enough, our benchmarking research offers an even more compelling
reason for firms to take a hard look at their current product offerings: alpha-beta
separation is ramping up, and traditional core/active products are rapidly losing
ground as a result.
The concept of alpha-beta separation is, of course, not new to the asset
management world. Indeed, many sponsors of defined-benefit pensions are
now actively constructing their portfolios with the aim of achieving specific risk
and return objectives, using alpha and beta as the building blocks. What is
surprising, however, is the speed at which the separation of alpha and beta is
polarizing flows away from traditional core products toward “truer” sources of
alpha or cheap beta (Exhibit 2).
In 2005, higher-alpha strategies captured 20 percent of overall AuM; at the
other end of the spectrum, cheap beta garnered 24 percent of assets. In both
cases, this represented growth rates in the range of 20 to 30 percent, far
outstripping the industry average. These gains, naturally, came at the direct
4
expense of traditional core/active products; particularly hard hit were long-only
equity and balanced funds, which plunged into negative-growth territory in 2005,
shrinking by 2 and 5 percent respectively.
Looking at the flows by segment, worsening pension deficits and an uncertain
market environment continue to change the way defined benefit sponsors
evaluate and pay for performance. As a result, higher-alpha and cheap beta
products accounted for more than 50 percent of institutional AuM in 2005,
about double the share we observed in our survey only 2 years ago. On the
retail side, efforts by alternatives manufacturers to make their products more
accessible to affluent and even mass-affluent customers are likewise skewing
growth to higher-alpha strategies. In 2005, for instance, alternatives grew by
21 percent, more than triple the average growth rate in the retail market. At the
other end of the spectrum, quantitative active ballooned by 47 percent.
3. Pricing under pressure
For asset managers, alpha-beta separation carries not only important product
development implications, but also serious pricing ramifications. For starters,
5
Higher-alpha strategies
Traditional active/core
“Cheap beta”
Alternatives/others
Equity
Balanced
Fixed Income
Money market
QA
Pure index
International
AuM growth2004-2005,%
27
-2
-5
10
5
34
0
17
EXHIBIT 2
As the trend to separate alpha and beta speeds up, traditional core/active products are losing ground
32
5
25
15
8
9
Share ofAUM, %
6
8
Share of AuM, %
13
29
2
16
17
16
8
7
AuM growth2003-2004, %
23
11
3
8
-11
29
12
19
Source: McKinsey / Institutional Investor U.S. Institute Asset Management Benchmarking Survey
as performance becomes more transparent, customers are switching to
cheaper forms of beta exposure. At the same time, traditional long-only
managers who are unable to generate true alpha are finding it more difficult to
sustain their fees. Indeed, our survey reveals that retail asset managers in
particular continue to face unrelenting pressure on the pricing front, while
changes in institutional pricing remained more nuanced (Exhibit 3).
Net revenues for retail firms continued to shrink, from 59 basis points in 2001
to 48 basis points in 2005. Fees declined across a broad swath of
traditional/core products – hardest hit were balanced funds, which saw prices
drop by 11 percent in 2005 alone. Though institutional net revenue yields
managed to rise modestly in 2005 to 37 basis points, several traditional/core
products also faced serious price erosion. For example, net revenue yields for
tax-exempt and midcap-equity products fell by 14 and 10 percent, respectively.
Given the increasing polarization of flows to higher-alpha and cheap beta
products, we believe that recent price declines in traditional core products are
likely to continue. The implications for the asset management industry, which
6
Institutional – overallNet revenue yield, b.p.
2003 2004 20052001 2002
5953 54
5148
Retail – overallNet revenue yield, b.p.
EXHIBIT 3
Pricing power is eroding among many traditional core/active products
Product Strategy
Net revenue yield, b.p.
Price change2004-2005 %
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
33 34 36 35 37
Taxable fixed income 42 2
Large-cap equity 54 4
Balanced 50 11
Mid-cap equity 64 2
Share ofAuM, %
7
27
4
6
Tax-exempt 13 141
International equity 44 44
Taxable fixed income 18 014
Large-cap equity 41 510
Source: McKinsey / Institutional Investor U.S. Institute Asset Management Benchmarking Survey
has enjoyed consistent annual price increases for most of the past two
decades, are profound: our benchmarking shows that for a typical firm, a 10
percent decline in price would decrease pre-tax margins by 20 percent.
4. Productivity stalling
In most industries, increased pricing pressure typically serves as a wake-up call to
improve productivity. That does not seem to be the case in the asset management
business. In fact, industry-wide productivity has shown practically no improvement
over the past year – our research shows that for each additional dollar in assets
under management, there is practically no associated cost benefit.
Firms, essentially, are not becoming more efficient in their core processes. This
is particularly true in the areas of headcount and compensation, the latter of
which accounts for about two-thirds of a typical firm’s overall costs. Our
benchmarking shows that in 2005, industry productivity (as measured by AuM
per employee) grew at the same rate as AuM. But after stripping away the
effects of market appreciation, firms upped their headcount at the same rate
as they brought in net new assets (Exhibit 4).
7
Productivity and AUM growth 2004-2005
Growth in headcount 2004-2005
Increase in number of employees
2%
Growth in productivity(AUM /employee)
Growth in AUM
Net new long-term flows
11%
9%
2%
Market appreciation
11%
Data for same firms in 2004 and 2005 surveys:
EXHIBIT 4
Firm productivity is not improving, with headcount increasing at the same rate as net new flows
Source: McKinsey / Institutional Investor U.S. Institute Asset Management Benchmarking Survey
Over the history of our benchmarking research, we have found that the asset
management industry in general has not been as rigorous at driving operational
efficiency improvements as other financial services firms which face much
greater profit pressures. For instance, leading brokerages have been driving
productivity gains by migrating less profitable customers to more cost-effective
service models, such as call centers. At the same time, they have been
consistently driving down their average cost per trade. As overall conditions
become more challenging for traditional asset managers, productivity will
continue to play an increasingly crucial role in separating winners from losers.
For instance, our research shows that in 2005, the most profitable firms
managed about $1 billion in assets per investment professional – more than
double the $470 million managed by bottom-tier firms. The gap is more
pronounced when it comes to institutional sales productivity. Here, winning
firms averaged about $1.2 billion per sales person – more than triple that of
the least profitable firms.
5. Persistently high outflows
Given the growth, pricing, and productivity trends already described, the ability
of firms to retain assets once they have captured them is of paramount
importance. But here again, the industry faces a challenge: outflows (net of
money market) have remained stubbornly high over the past several years, with
our latest survey showing a 21 percent annual outflow rate. Moreover, while
investment performance is clearly an important driver of new flows, it is hardly
enough to keep assets once they’re in the door. In fact, our research shows
that almost half of all top-tier investment performers still experienced above-
average outflows in 2005 (Exhibit 5). And this phenomenon held true across
both retail and institutional markets.
At the other end of the performance scale, our research shows that even when
investment returns are less than stellar, asset managers excelling in client
service and retention management are often highly successful in retaining
assets in both retail and institutional settings. For example, firms with an
above-average spend in client service experienced outflows in 2005 that were
a full 5 percentage points lower than those firms with a below-average spend.
At the bottom of the bear market, that gap was even wider, at 10 points.
8
9
EXHIBIT 5
Outflows remain stubbornly high and are not correlated to investment performance
2224
2021
2002 2003 2004 2005
Long-term outflows as a percentage of beginning-of-year AuM
Survey overallPercent
Outflows as a percentage of beginning-of-year AuM
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
020406080100
Weighted average Lipper 3-year investment performance percentile rankings
BestWorst
Almost half of all top-tier investment performers experienced above-average outflows
Source: McKinsey / Institutional Investor U.S. Institute Asset Management Benchmarking Survey
Winning in the Asset Management Industry
Our benchmarking research reveals the presence of a significant – and growing –
profit gap between the asset management industry’s best and worst performers.
In 2005, that gap was 41 percentage points, up from 32 points only 2 years ago.
So what exactly separates the winners from the losers? In short, the most
successful players have figured out how to stay one step ahead of the five major
pressure points now bearing down on the industry. The ability to stay ahead, in
turn, has two fundamental components: choosing the right business model to
drive scale, and executing superbly against key tactical levers.
Driving scale through choice of business model
Our research shows that a defining characteristic of winning players in the asset
management industry is their ability to use scale as a competitive advantage.
But not all firms employ scale in the same way – firms pursuing any one of three
business models have been, and will likely continue to be, almost twice as
profitable as those that aren’t (Exhibit 6).
10
Winning business models
Average profit margin by business modelPercent, 2005
At-scale competitors
Focused asset class
Multi-boutiques
Stuck-in-the middle
At least $100 billion in AUM
At least two-thirds of assets in equities, fixed income, or index/QA
Above-average assets per strategy
Operate as a parent company to a collection of independent money managers
All other firms
35 37 37
20
2003
2004
2005
32
38
41
Profit gap between top-third and bottom-third firmsPercentage points
EXHIBIT 6
As the profit gap between winners and losers has grown, three “winning business models” have emerged
Source: McKinsey / Institutional Investor U.S. Institute Asset Management Benchmarking Survey
With the profit gap between winners and losers growing wider, the unique
attributes that characterize each of these three winning business models is
becoming ever-more important. Within each model, the leaders use scale in
different ways to create competitive advantage (Exhibit 7):
At-scale firms – those with $100 billion or more of assets under management
– have, on average, consistently produced profit margins topping 35 percent
since 2001. Firms in this segment use their large overall size to drive volume
through distribution reach, product breadth, and brand. Their sheer size allows
them to generate a cost advantage that more than offsets the burden of
maintaining a corporate center to manage the enterprise.
In 2005, the average cost-per-asset for firms employing this business model
was 19 basis points, or about 40 percent lower than that of the least profitable
firms. And that cost advantage was present in every function, including
investment management, sales, operations, and technology and general
management expenses. For instance, at-scale players spent an average of 7
11
At-scale players Focused players
Average firm sizeAuM, $ Billions
$228 $79 $49 $52
2,048
Institutional sales productivity*$ Millions
1,062IM productivity*$ Millions
1,180
AuM/product strategy$ Millions
1,773
957
1,315
2,467
998
827
Stuck-in-the-middle firms
362
467
978
65Cost/revenuePercent
31Revenue/AuM B.p.
19Cost/AuMB.p.
64
35
22
61
36
21
80
39
30
Multi-boutiques
Competitive advantagespecific to business modelCompetitive advantagespecific to business modelWinning business model
Profit margin, % 35 37 37 20
* Assets per IM and sales professional
EXHIBIT 7
Leading players use scale in different ways to generate a winning edge
Source: McKinsey / Institutional Investor U.S. Institute Asset Management Benchmarking Survey
basis points per asset on investment management in 2005, compared to 11
basis points for firms with less than $25 billion in AuM. Moving forward, the
cost edge attributable to all at-scale players will place them in a strong position
to endure the effects of intensifying pricing pressures, especially in an era of
commoditizing products.
The multi-boutique model is not only a highly profitable model – firms following
it reaped margins of 37 percent in 2005 – but it has also been emerging as a
preferred model for absorbing and integrating acquisitions. With the pace of
M&A acivity picking up, we believe this model will continue to grow in
prominence.
• Multi-boutique players exploit the product scale advantages present in each
of their constituent firms and enjoy the high sales and investment
productivity that comes with focusing on a limited set of products. In 2005,
these firms had $1.3 billion in AuM for each sales professional, more than
triple the amount for the average losing firm. Indeed, over the course of our
benchmarking research, the institutional sales productivity of multi-
boutiques has consistently been more than 50 percent better than that of
the average similar-size firm.
Focused-asset providers – firms with at least two-thirds of their assets in either
fixed income, equity, or index/quantitative active and above-average assets per
strategy for their size – use the scale and expertise they possess in specific
investment strategies to drive distinctive performance. In 2005, these players
managed, on average, an impressive $2.5 billion per product strategy –
considerably more than firms pursuing any other business model. These
players have successfully balanced the need to grow into new products and
client segments with smart product-mix management to maintain that scale
advantage. The result: above-average profitability throughout the cycle, with
average margins of 37 percent in 2005.
• As the separation of alpha and beta continues to take hold, we expect many
of these focused-asset firms to emerge as leading “alpha engines.” And like
the multi-boutiques, they will also continue to enjoy many of the productivity
advantages associated with product focus.
12
As for the losing firms in the asset management industry? The overwhelming
majority do not successfully pursue one of the three business models described
above. These “stuck-in-the-middle” players, as we call them, are neither large nor
focused, possessing assets under management of just over $50 billion on average
and about $980 million per product strategy – less than half that of the industry
norm. They must spread their resources across a diversified set of asset classes,
resulting in higher costs and lower productivity than their peers.
Looking ahead, we believe that these stuck-in-the-middle firms are likely to be
the most logical candidates for mergers and acquisitions activity, particularly as
increased pricing pressures and rising costs continue to squeeze margins.
Moreover, for small and mid-size asset managers there are real benefits to
acquiring scale: our benchmarking shows that the cost per asset of the
industry’s smallest players far exceeds that of their larger competitors across a
range of functions (Exhibit 8).
13
Investment management
Management, administration, and other
Sales and marketing
Technology and operations4 4 3
6 54
97
6
11
9
7
<$25 billion $25 bn to $100 bn >$100 billion
Firm size
29
25
19
Cost per assetB.p.
EXHIBIT 8
For small and mid-size players, acquiring scale can result in significant cost savings across a range of functions
Source: McKinsey / Institutional Investor U.S. Institute Asset Management Benchmarking Survey
Execution against key tactical levers
Choosing the right business model with which to leverage scale is a crucial
element to being a winner in the asset management industry. But it’s not
enough. Indeed, one-quarter of firms with a “winning” business model
nonetheless turn in bottom-tier profitability. For these players, the missing link
is superb execution – an absolute must in the rapidly changing asset
management industry.
Our benchmarking reveals that best-in-class execution against seven growth
and profitability levers continues to differentiate winners: asset and client mix,
sales management, retention management, pricing, product management, firm
scale, and cost management. While the importance of each those lever varies
by business model, we have found that three in particular – pricing, product
management, and cost management – consistently drive above-average
profitability for players across the board.
Product management. We have found that the most profitable firms
consistently manage their product lineup through such proactive steps as
pruning sub-scale product strategies and taking a disciplined approach to
introducing new funds. Regardless of size, firms that have done a better job
than their peers in creating a focused product lineup have been more profitable.
For example, among multi-boutiques, those possessing a more focused product
set (in this case, about $2.5 billion per product strategy) generate an
impressive profit margin of 49 percent, more than double those of the bottom-
tier multi-boutiques.
By its very nature, product management affects all facets of the business. For
example, a well-managed product line is both easier for wholesalers to
understand and for advisors to sell, factors which increase the productivity of
the sales team. By contrast, a more complex product line, with a higher number
of vehicles per strategy, increases downstream IT and operations costs.
Pricing. As we’ve noted, pricing pressures are intensifying in the asset
management industry, a trend that we believe will continue in light of several
overarching factors, including alpha-beta separation, increased transparency
14
into investment performance and heightened competition from non-industry
players. But beyond these larger forces, our benchmarking research has
uncovered a striking disparity in pricing practices, much of which we believe is
highly controllable through better pricing discipline. For instance, we continue
to see a wide range of pricing – even among asset managers with similar-size
client mandates (Exhibit 9).
It is hard to overstate the value of improved pricing discipline, given its
enormous leverage on the bottom line – as mentioned earlier, a 10%
improvement in pricing would increase the profit margin of the typical asset
manager by 20%. While investment performance can influence pricing levels –
particularly given the growing use of performance-based fees – salesforce
management is often an even bigger factor. In particular, leading firms rigorously
control their front-line discounting practices, and as a result experience much
less pricing variability between both sales professionals and accounts.
15
Retail Institutional
Realized net revenue yields on assets – selected examplesB.p.
7177
62
4554 54
42
29
41
27 25
8
QA Large cap
Tax FI MM
19
54 53
32
21
73
10
3541
1811
37
3
13
26
104 4
QA Large cap
Tax FI MM Struc-tured products
Pure Index
For a typical firm, a 10% increase in price would increase pre-tax margins by 20%
Pricing dispersions remain, even after controlling for mandate size
Improved pricing management continues to be a key profit improvement opportunity for firms
EXHIBIT 9
Source: McKinsey / Institutional Investor U.S. Institute Asset Management Benchmarking Survey
Cost discipline. As we’ve noted, scale can create major cost advantages and
boost long-term returns. But even among firms of the same size and type, cost
discipline can be a powerful and effective competitive weapon. For instance,
the very best at-scale players had a cost per asset of only 11 basis points in
2005 compared to 25 basis points for the least profitable at-scale firms. At the
same time, we have observed well-run small firms that have managed to keep
their cost per asset down to the same level as the lowest-cost at-scale firms.
In fact, when it comes to the four major spending areas for asset managers, the
most disciplined firms routinely outperform their competitors by a significant
magnitude – between four and ten times (Exhibit 10).
Most asset managers can turn to an array of performance improvement levers
to drive better cost efficiency. For instance, decisions around location strategy
– such as offshore versus near-shore – can dramatically affect overall costs and
scalability. IT costs and effectiveness, meanwhile, can be significantly improved
by focusing on the highest-value projects and optimizing infrastructure
environments accordingly.
16
Within each of the four major spending areas, superior cost discipline gives leading firms a major competitive edge Blended high
AverageBlended low
Blended highAverageBlended low
EXHIBIT 10
Equities firms
Fixed income $ MM
Equities firms
Fixed income $ MM
Cost gap= 5x
Equities firms
Fixed income $ MM
Equities firms
Fixed income $ MM
22
11
34 5
13
Investment management Sales and marketing
Technology and operations Management and admin/other
9 10
1145
128
23 57
8 6
2 34
Cost gap= 10x
Cost gap= 4x
Cost gap = 4x
1
Source: McKinsey / Institutional Investor U.S. Institute Asset Management Benchmarking Survey
A Dashboard for Success
The asset management industry has always devoted an enormous amount of
energy to measuring investment performance - tracking error, Sharpe ratios and
alpha attribution analysis are all regular staples of most management reports.
Surprisingly, though, the economic drivers of business performance are not
given nearly the same level of scrutiny. As we've outlined, the importance of
these drivers, in terms of both business model and executional detail, are
critical to maintaining top-tier profitability. At a minimum, five key business
levers should be discussed as part of the regular management review process:
• Operating leverage: Scale is both a difficult and crucially important issue,
and it operates at multiple levels for a typical asset manager. Some costs
– such as marketing and branding – can clearly be leveraged across the
broader scale of a firm. Others are related to particular investment
strategies – and scale can sometimes have a negative impact on investment
performance. To successfully gain operating leverage as a firm grows, senior
management must understand the scale curves unique to the firm, and how
those curves interrelate.
• Productivity: Management should not only have in place regular targets for
broad productivity measures (e.g., revenue per employee) but should also
establish key performance metrics for each of the firm's core processes,
such as account opening and trade clearing. Many other sectors of the
financial services industry have been far more aggressive in driving
productivity through offshoring, outsourcing and core process redesign –
winning asset managers will be those who follow suit.
• Growth and business-mix targets: Moving forward, the major sources of
growth in the asset management industry will clearly undergo significant
change, with such markets as retirement, IRA rollover, international and
alternatives growing at a much faster pace than ever before. It is imperative,
therefore, that management teams set clear targets not only for overall
growth, but also for desired product and channel mix in the years ahead –
and understand the organizational changes that might entail.
17
• Pricing and revenue realization : Given the large disparity in pricing revealed
by our benchmarking research – even across standard product categories –
it is clear that a disciplined regular review of pricing policies, discounting
practices and revenue realization can generate substantial bottom-line
results.
• Return on investment in client service: Our survey shows that investing
intelligently in client service will reap substantial benefits in asset retention
and client satisfaction. Management teams must have a clear
understanding of both the economic benefits that accrue over the lifespan
of a customer and the costs associated with retaining those customers –
and winning firms will have a clear handle on how to strike the right balance
between the two.
* * *
Future winners in asset management will be those players who succeed in staying
ahead of the powerful forces now redefining the industry. For many, staying ahead
will involve a significant retooling of their current business models. While that
sound like a tall order, asset managers choosing to take such proactive steps will
likely be ensuring their future prospects. Those opting to stand still, on the other
hand, are almost certainly facing challenging times ahead.
18
About McKinsey & Company
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Auckland
Bahrain
Bangkok
Barcelona
Beijing
Berlin
Bogota
Boston
Bratislava
Brussels
Budapest
Buenos Aires
Caracas
Casablanca
Charlotte
Chicago
Cleveland
Cologne
Copenhagen
Dallas
Delhi
Detroit
Dubai
Dublin
Düsseldorf
Frankfurt
Geneva
Gothenburg
Hamburg
Helsinki
Hong Kong
Houston
Istanbul
Jakarta
Johannesburg
Kuala Lumpur
Lisbon
London
Los Angeles
Luxembourg
Madrid
Manila
Melbourne
Mexico City
Miami
Milan
Minneapolis
Montréal
Moscow
Mumbai
Munich
New Jersey
New York
Orange County
Oslo
Pacific Northwest
Paris
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Prague
Rio de Janeiro
Rome
San Francisco
Santiago
São Paulo
Seoul
Shanghai
Silicon Valley
Singapore
Stamford
Stockholm
Stuttgart
Sydney
Taipei
Tel Aviv
Tokyo
Toronto
Verona
Vienna
Warsaw
Washington, D.C.
Zagreb
Zurich
McKinsey & Company
The Asset Management Industry: A Growing Gap Between the Winners
and the Also-Rans
October 2006
October 2006Copyright McKinsey & Companywww.mckinsey.com
This report is solely for the use of client personnel. No part of it may be circulated,quoted, or reproduced for distribution outside the client organization without priorwritten approval from McKinsey & Company.