a history & blueprintmtolliday.weebly.com/uploads/2/4/9/3/24933340/...(cochinchina), center...

a History& Blueprint

CWA 4.1 - Origins of the Vietnam War ( of 6)

Instructions: On each page, first, underline the dotes and time markers (for example, "In the same year...") in the text below.Next, write a chronological list of the dates and include a one-sentence description of its importance and answer thequestions posed. The first page is done for you.

Regional HistoryIn ancient history. Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam

were connected to one another through the

exchange of culture and religion. They alsoengaged in trade, as well as fought one anotherover territory. China bordered these threecountries on the north. While they traded withChina, they each had a history of conflict withChina too. For nearly 1000 years, China heldpower over Vietnam before Vietnam achieved itsindependence in 939 under the rule of King NgoQuyen.

VietnamSouth Asia

andVietnam

Detail Map,CIA

Factbook.Source:

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List two time markers with explanation (what happened and when):• Ancient history: Cambodia, Loos, and Vietnam connected through culture & religion; region traded and

fought with China• Approximately 200 BC - 939: China controlled by Vietnam• 939: Vietnam achieves independence

SouthClWaSua

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CHINA

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Page 9Cold War America Lesson #4: The Vietnam War

Copyright © 2013, The Regents of the University of California, All Rights Reserved

^ History^Blueprint

CWA 4.1 - Origins of the Vietnam War { of 6)

While the primary motivation for colonialism, the system by which colonies are maintained, was economicexploitation, each of the countries within French Indochina experienced colonialism differently. Frenchpresence was especially strong in Vietnam where it had set up administrative centers in the South(Cochinchina), Center (Annam), and North (Tonkin). The Vietnamese faced economic oppression, such ashigh taxes and monopolies on salt and trade. French dominance permeated throughout all of Vietnam'scultural, educational, and political institutions.

French ColonialismIn modern history, many Europeans countries

seized areas of Asia and Africa and madethem into their colonies. A colony isestablished when native land or territory isruled by a distant country. France violentlytook over Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in

the mid-1800s. By 1893, France re-organized

these countries as colonies under onename— "Indochina." Determined to "civilize"

the people of Indochina, the French imposedupon the Southeast Asians Western culture,

religion, language, and government. Manyendured forced labor in the production of tin,pepper, coal, cotton, rice, and rubber.

Group of children, with baskets, posed under palm tree, Saigon,South Vietnam, ca. 1890 -1923. Source: Library of Congress,h ttp://www. loc. aov/pictures/item/98507284/

List two time markers with explanation (what happened and when):

What is a colony?

What was the primary motivation for French colonialism in Southeast Asia?



ri History^Blueprint


Rebellions and Revolution

From the very beginning, the colonized people wanted to befree of French rule. Over the years, there were many anti-

colonial uprisings and rebellions throughout all of SoutheastAsia. World War II (1939-1945) was a turning point in thestruggle for independence.

When Germany invaded France in 1940, France was forced togive up control of Indochina to Japan, an ally of Germany.Busy with their war efforts, Japan appointed local governmentleaders. Taking advantage of French military and politicalweakness at the time and in protest against Japaneseoccupation, anti-colonial movements flourished. Seizing on

this opportunity, the Viet Minh is formed in 1941, a nationalistmovement who called for Vietnamese independence, led byHo Chi Minh. Japan removed the French from Vietnam inMarch of 1945. Six months later, the U.S. drops two atomic

bombs on Japan, ending WWII, when Japan surrenders to theAllies on August 14. By August 19, Viet Minh revolutionariesseized power in Hanoi, in what becomes known as the August

Revolution. On August 25, the emperor of South Vietnamturned over control to the Viet Minh. In the North, Ho ChiMinh declares the establishment of the Democratic Republicof Vietnam (DRV) in September. Despite the AugustRevolution, Vietnam did not have peace. France returned to

re-colonize Vietnam in 1946.

Time Marker What happened? Why is this important?1940

1941

March, 1945

August 14,1945

August 19,1945

August 25,1945

September, 1945

1946

What was the effect of Japanesesurrender on Vietnam?



Three Japanese oilers burning in Camranh Bay,Indochina. TBM's from the US Hornet (CV-12)which delivered the fatal bombs fly overhead, ca.January 12, 1945. Department of Defense.Department of the Navy. Source: NationalArchives, ARC Identifier: 520865.

^History^Blueprint

CWA 4.1 - Origins of the Vietnam War ( of 6)The Cold War

Ho Chi Minh, 1946. Cropped version Source:Wikipedia Commons, Vietnamese PublicDomain,

http://commons.wikimedia.ora/wiki/File:Ho ChiMinh 1946 and sianature.jpg

Unlike WWII, which was fought between the Axis (Germany,Italy, Japan) and the Allies (U.S., Soviet Union, Britain), theCold War saw the United States and Soviet Union onopposite sides. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union viewedVietnam as strategically important. Ho Chi Minh madeseveral requests for U.S. support for Vietnameseindependence in the 1940s. He even modeled theVietnamese Declaration of Independence (September 2,1945) after America's. However, Ho Chi Minh was acommunist and the U.S. and France were long-time allies.

France had lent its support of America's Marshall Plan in1947 to rebuild Europe economically. The United States wascommitted to this containment policy. France sought andreceived funds from the U.S. in its campaign to retake

Vietnam. In 1950, the U.S. established the U.S. MilitaryAdvisory Group-Indochina. In the same year, the Soviet

Union and the People's Republic of China officiallyrecognized the DRV and sent aid to Ho Chi Minh. From1950-52, the U.S. spent $50 million in military and economicaid to support nation-building and fight the communists inSouth Vietnam. Elsewhere in Asia, the Korean War was

fought from 1950-1953. The U.S. sent troops to fight onbehalf of South Korea against communist-led forces inNorth Korea, which was supported by China. The Koreanpeace treaty made permanent the division of Korea alongthe demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Time Marker What happened? Why is this important?1940s

Sept. 2.1945

1947

1950

1950

1950-52

1950-53

Why did the U.S.refuse to help HoChi Minh?

Page 12 Cold War America Lesson #4; The Vietnam War


c4 Historyg'Blueprint


First Indochina WarFrom 1946-1954, Southeast Asians fought the FirstIndochina War in a war of independence from Frenchreoccupation. On May 7, 1954, Ho Chi Minh's forces

finally defeated the French in the battle of Dien BienPhu. The Geneva Accords, the peace treaty, called for

the French to withdraw and give independence toCambodia and Laos. Vietnam was more complicated.

The country was divided between North and South atthe 17th parallel, known as the demilitarized zone(DMZ), until 1956 when reunification would be decidedby a presidential election. North Vietnam would becommunist, governed by Ho Chi Minh. South Vietnamwould be anti-communist. To give South Vietnam

international recognition as a new country, the United

States, along with France, Great Britain, New Zealand,

Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan formedthe Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO, inSeptember 1954; South Vietnam was signed on as aformal member. SEATO existed to prevent the spreadof communism in Southeast Asia. The U.S. installed a

pro-western leader, Ngo Dinh Diem as the president of

the Republic of Vietnam in the South in 1955. Thesame year, with U.S. assistance, South Vietnam forms

the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).

President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State JohnFoster Dulles (from left) greet South Vietnam President NgoDinh Diem, Washington National Airport, May 8.1957. Dept. ofDefense, Dept. of the Air Force. Source: National Archives, ARCIdentifier: 542189.

Time Marker What happened? Why is this important?1946 - 54

May 7,1954

1954

1955

1955

What did the GenevaAccords mean forVietnam?

What was thepurpose of SEATO?

Page 13Cold War America Lesson #4; The Vietnam War


IjgghrtCWA 4.1 - Origios of the Vietnam War ( of 6)

The Vietnam WarAn election never took place in Vietnambecause the two opposing sides—South

Vietnam supported by the U.S., and North

Vietnam supported by China and Russia—could not agree on the terms of thepresidential election. The U.S. believed thatHo Chi Minh would win the election, becauseof his popularity. North and South Vietnamwere positioned to fight a civil war todetermine which government would rulepost-colonial Vietnam. Both sides built uptheir armed forces and engaged in battles.

Thus began the Second Indochina War,known to Americans as the Vietnam War. It is

called the Second Indochina War by historiansbecause fighting also took place in Cambodiaand Laos.

Vietnam. Vietnamese army personnel training in the jungle, May, 1962.U.S. Dept. of Defense, Department of the Army. Source: National Archives,ARC Identifier: 530607.

Why did the Second Indochina War start in 1956?

Why did the U.S. get involved in this conflict?

Why do historians call it the Second Indochina War?



CWA 4.2 - Southeast Asia Map

The Vietnam War

-History^Blueprint

China

Thz':irc

Cambodia

Phenom NgoDinh DiemPenh SaigonV

Tet Offensive 1968Fall of Saigon 1975

GutfofJ haffand South

* Major Batr'es

A Major U.S. Air Bases

Guff ofTonkin

! Rsraliel

Map of Vietnam War,Sonali Dujari, for

California History-Social Science

Project. Copyright ©2013 Regents of the

University ofCalifornia, All Rights

Reserved.



Ijg^gntCWA 4.5 - The Tonkin Gulf Resolution (Page 1 of 7)

Directions: The United States first became involved in Vietnam in the early years of the Cold War, but significantmilitary involvement didn't begin until 1964, following the passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution by Congress.The resolution, which gave President Lyndon Johnson the power to wage war against communist North Vietnam,came as a result of a controversial series of incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the northeastern coast of NorthVietnam. To better understand how the US went from South Vietnam's sponsor to fighting a war, first read aboutthe events of early August, 1964, then listen to taped phone conversations between Johnson and DefenseSecretary Robert McNamara. Finally, in your groups, prepare an investigative editorial report, that answers the

following: Why did the U.S. begin fighting the Vietnam War in 1964? How was escalation of the war justified?

Historical Context. Part 1: On August 2, 1964,the U.S.S. Maddox was collecting evidence

while patrolling in international waters in theGulf of Tonkin, off the eastern boarder of NorthVietnam. Also in the Gulf were SouthVietnamese gunboats, which had just launcheda clandestine raid on the North Vietnamesecoastline as part of Operations Plan (OPLAN) -34A, a covert intelligence operationcoordinated by the United States. The Maddoxreported being fired upon by North

Vietnamese torpedo boats. In the battle thatfollowed, two DRV (North Vietnamese) shipswere sunk, but the Maddox sustained no

losses. When word reached Washington,

President Johnson and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, along with other senior advisors began to discuss

how the US should respond and what information should be shared with Congress and the public at largeabout the incident.

On August 3, at 10:30 pm, McNamara and Johnson discussed the incident on the phone. You may listen totheir discussion and/or follow along using the transcript except below. Consider the following questions todiscuss with your group:

1. What did McNamara and Johnson want Congress and the public to know about what happened in theGulf of Tonkin on August 2?

2. Why do you think Johnson and McNamara were so worried about controlling what the public heardabout the incident?

**Note: LBJ and McNamara reference a number of congressional leaders, including Speaker of the House John McCormick,Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, and Minority Leader Everett Dirksen, as well as U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Atthe end of the call, they mention Goldwater, in reference to Barry Goldwater, the conservative Republican who challengedJohnson in the 1964 presidential election, George Boll, an American diplomat who opposed the U.S.' increasing involvementin Vietnam, George Reedy, Johnson's Press Secretary, and Walter Jenkins, a longtime Johnson aide.

Page 22 Cold War America Lesson #4: The Vietnam War


PhoSoA NH 45611 North Vicmamesc motor lorpcilo boats aitacking USS Maddux, 2 Aug 1964

Photo #; NH 95611, Tonkin Gulf Incident, August 1964, Source; OfficialU.S. Navy Photograph, Naval History & Heritage Command,http://www. history, navy. mU/Dhotos/sh-usn/usnsh-m/dd731-k.htm

CWA 4.5 - The Tonkin Guff Resoiutson (Page 2 of 7)

Clip 1: Telephone conversation between PresidentLyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert

McNamara, August 3, 1964,10:30 EST.*

*Source for transcript and audio recording: the National Security Archive atGeorge Washington University:http://www.gwu.edu/~nsorchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/topes.htm

President Lyndon B. Johnson: Now I wonder if you don't think it'dbe wise for you and Rusk to get Mac, uh, the Speaker and Mansfieldto call a group of fifteen to twenty people together eh from theArmed Services and Foreign Relations to tell them what happened.A good many of them are saying to meSecretary Robert McNamara: Right I've been thinking about thismyself, and I thought that uhPresident Johnson: They're going to start an investigation

Secretary McNamara: Yeah.

President Johnson: if you don't.

Secretary McNamara: Yeah.

President Johnson: And you got Dirksen up thereSecretary McNamara: Yeah

President Johnson: and he's saying you've got to study it further,and say to Mansfield, "Now the President wants us, you, to get the proper people." And we come in and

you say, "They fired at us. We responded immediately. And we took out one of their boats and put theother two running. And we kept our..., we're puttin' our boats right there, and we're not running on in."

Secretary McNamara: And it's hard to destroy.

President Johnson: That's rightSecretary McNamara: Right. And we're going to, and I think I should also, or we should also at that time,

Mr. President, explain this Op Plan 34-A, these covert operations. There's no question but what that had

bearing on. And on Friday night, as you probably know, we had four TP [McNamara means PT] boatsfrom Vietnam manned by Vietnamese or other nationals, attack two is lands. And we expended, oh, a

thousand rounds of ammunition of one kind or another against them. We probably shot up a radarstation and a few other miscellaneous buildings. And following twenty-four hours after that, with thisdestroyer in that same area, undoubtedly led them to connect the two events.

President Johnson: Well say that to Dirksen.Secretary McNamara: That's what I know he'll like.

President Johnson: You notice Dirksen says this morning, that "we got to reassess the situation, do

something about it." I'd tell him that we're doing what he's talking about.

Secretary McNamara: Well, I, I was, I was thinking doing this myself in personal visits. But I think yourthought is better. We'll get the group together. You want us to do it at the White Flouse or would yourather do it at State or Defense?



Lyndon B. Johnson, head-ond-shouldersportrait, facing left, June, 1964.

Source: Library of Congress,http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/96522661

CWA 4.5 - The Tonkin Gulf Resolution (Page 3 of 7)

Advisors; Secretary of Defense RobertMcNamara, 02/08/1968, President JohnsonWhite House Photographs. Source: NationalArchives, ARC Identifier # 192540.

President Johnson: I believe it'd be better to do it uh up on the Hill.Secretary McNamara: All right.

President Johnson: I believe it'd be better if you say to Mansfield,"You call"

Secretary McNamara: Yup

President Johnson: Foreign RelationsSecretary McNamara: Yup, OK.

President Johnson: Armed ServicesSecretary McNamara: OK. OK.

President Johnson: and get Speaker to do it over on his side [i.e.,

within the House of Representatives, as opposed to the Senate].Secretary McNamara: We'll do itPresident Johnson: And just say it's very, I'd tell him awfully quiet,though, so they won't go in and be making a bunch of speeches. Andtell Rusk that a, that's my idea.

Secretary McNamara: Great..

President Johnson: And he's in New York, so I don't know whether he's got back.

Secretary McNamara: Well I just talked to George Ball a few minutes ago, and I'll have George arrange it. Or atleast I'll tell him that, and then I'll call the Speaker and Mansfield himself.President Johnson: Now I wish that uh you'd give me some guidance on what we ought to say. I want to leave

an impression on the background in the people we talk toover here that we're gonna be firm as hell without sayingsomething that's dangerous. Now what do you think? Uh, uh,

the people that are calling me up, I just talked to a New Yorkbanker, I just talked to a fellow in Texas, they all feel that theNavy responded wonderfully and that's good. But they wantto be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they

want to be damned sure that we're firm. That's what all the

country wants because Goldwater's raising so much hell

about how he's gonna blow 'em off the moon, and they say

that we oughten to do anything that the national interestdoesn't require. But we sure oughta always leave the

impression that if you shoot at us, you're going to get hit.

Secretary McNamara: Well I think you would want to instructGeorge Reedy this morning at his news conference to say thatyou you personally have ordered the, the Navy to carry on the

routine patrols uh off the coast of North Vietnam, uh to add an additional destroyer to the one that has beencarrying on the patrols, to provide an air cap, and to issue instructions to the commanders to destroy any uh

force that attacks our force in international waters....

Sec of Defense Robert McNamara pointing to a map ofVietnam at a press conference, Marion S. Trikosko,Photographer, US News & World Report Magazine

Photograph, April 26,1965. Source: Library of Congress,http://www. loc. aov/pictures/item/2004666288/



CWA 4.5 - The Toiikio Golf Resolution (Page 4 of 7)

Historical Context, Part 2: Two days later, on August 4, 1964 the U.S.S. Maddox, and another US ship, the C.

Turner Joy, were in the Gulf of Tonkin together. Both ships were on high alert, following the reported August 2attack. That day, both ships recorded a number of sonar and radar signals they assumed to be from hostileDRV torpedo boats. In addition, naval personnel confused North Vietnamese radio signals actually sent onAugust 2 as new orders from Hanoi to attack the American ships. In this confusion, the ships radioed toWashington that they were under attack. The local commander, Captain John D. Herrick, quickly questionedthis initial report, but the head of the Pacific fleet andWashington moved forward as if the initial confused reportswere accurate.

On August 4, at 9:43 am, McNamara and Johnson discussed

the incident on the phone. As you listen to or read theirdiscussion, consider the following questions to discuss withyour group;

1. Why did President Johnson and Secretary McNamarawant to believe the early reports which erroneouslyclaimed that the U.S. was attacked by North Vietnamon August 4?

Secretary McNamara:.... I've talked to Mac Bundy [national ^

security adviser] a moment ago and told him that I thoughtthat was the most important subject we should consider H|

today, and, and be prepared to recommend to you a |

response, a retaliation move against North Vietnam in £ iw Official White House Photo. Source: Lyndon Baines Johnsonthe event this attack takes place within the next six to Presidential Library, Serial # 313-4-WH64nine hours. And we

President Johnson: All right. Now we better do that at lunch. There's some things I don't want to go in withthese other, I want to keep this as close as I can. So let's just try to keep it to the two....

Secretary McNamara: Now, thirdly, Sharp recommends that, that, uh, the, uh, task force commander be

authorized to engage in hot pursuit beyond the eleven-mile limit in as far as the three-mile limit, which we [i.e.,

the United States] accept as the definition of territorial waters. At present the instructions to the commanderare: do not pursue an attacker, uh, closer to shore than eleven miles. Uh, Sharp recommends that that eleven

mile limit be shifted to three miles. I've talked to Dean about this; he agrees, uh, as far as air pursuit isconcerned. Pursue by air as close as three miles to shore. Do not pursue by sea closer than eleven miles... The

air power is likely the most effective power anyhow. And I would, therefore, recommend that we accept Sharp's

recommendation but limit it to air.President Johnson: All right. OK....



ci History^ Blueprint


Report on the Gulf of Tonkin Incident (August 4, 1964)*Lyndon Baines Johnson

Source for transcript and video recording: Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and the Lyndon Baines JohnsonPresidential Library (http://miUercenter.ora/president/speeches/detail/3998)

Directions: Despite questions about the accuracy of early reports detailing a second attack in the Gulf ofTonkin, President Johnson addressed the nation late on the night of August 4. As you watch his address (andread along using the transcript below), be prepared to discuss the following with your group:

• What actually happened in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2? On August 4?• What does LBJ say happened in the Gulf? Is this report accurate? Why or why not?• Consider Johnson's argument that military action will promote peace and freedom in Southeast Asia.

Why does Johnson use this language and what does that reasoning have to do with American efforts tocontain communism?

My fellow Americans:

As President and Commander in Chief, it is my duty to theAmerican people to report that renewed hostile actionsagainst United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf ofTonkin have today required me to order the military forcesof the United States to take action in reply.

The initial attack on the destroyer 'Maddox, on August 2,was repeated today by a number of hostile vesselsattacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. The

destroyers and supporting aircraft acted at once on theorders I gave after the initial act of aggression. We believeat least two of the attacking boats were sunk. There were

no U.S. losses.

The performance of commanders and crews in this

engagement is in the highest tradition of the United StatesNavy. But repeated acts of violence against the ArmedForces of the United States must be met not only with alertdefense, but with positive reply. That reply is being given asI speak to you tonight. Air action is now in executionagainst gunboats and certain supporting facilities in NorthViet-Nam which have been used in these hostileoperations.


Copyright © 2013. The Regents of the University of California, All Rights Reserved

Photograph of President Lyndon B. Johnson's Midnight Addresson Second Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 08/04/1964, White HousePhoto Collection. Source: LBJ Presidential Library, National

Archives, ARC Identifier 192482.

CWA 4.5 - The Tonkiri Golf Resolutiori (Page 6 of 7)

In the larger sense this new act ofaggression, aimed directly at our

own forces, again brings home toall of us in the United States theimportance of the struggle forpeace and security in southeast

Asia. Aggression by terror againstthe peaceful villagers of SouthViet-Nam has now been joined byopen aggression on the high seasagainst the United States ofAmerica.

The determination of allAmericans to carry out our full

commitment to the people and tothe government of South Viet-

Nam will be redoubled by thisoutrage. Yet our response, for the

present, will be limited and fitting.We Americans know, although

others appear to forget, the risks

President Lyndon B. Johnson signs (Gulf of Tonkin) resolution. White House Photo spreading conflict. We Still seekCollection, August 10,1964. Source: LBJ Presidential Library, no wider war.

Serial # 313-3-WH64

I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position totally clear to friends and to adversariesand, indeed, to all. I have instructed Ambassador Stevenson to raise this matter immediately andurgently before the Security Council of the United Nations. Finally, I have today met with the leaders ofboth parties in the Congress of the United States and I have informed them that I shall immediatelyrequest the Congress to pass a resolution making it clear that our Government is united in itsdetermination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace insoutheast Asia.

I have been given encouraging assurance by these leaders of both parties that such a resolution will bepromptly introduced, freely and expeditiously debated, and passed with overwhelming support. Andjust a few minutes ago I was able to reach Senator Goldwater and I am glad to say that he hasexpressed his support of the statement that I am making to you tonight.

It is a solemn responsibility to have to order even limited military action by forces whose overallstrength is as vast and as awesome as those of the United States of America, but it is my consideredconviction, shared throughout your Government, that firmness in the right is indispensable today forpeace; that firmness will always be measured. Its mission is peace.



d History^Blueprint


II. J. Res, 1145 HUjSLIC LAW 38-t/og

Zijjhtg-rijghtt) Congress of the Unitrd States of americaAT THE SECOND SESSION

id fudd at the City of !Fnshinglon on Tuesday, the seventh day oj January,one thousand nine hundred and sixty-four

Joint "RcsolotionTo jtruinolt iBcnuliilfOHncooJ lulfru.llnu.l pen-* "ih! ~-curUj In Hnnbmiist A»l«.

Wiwivas naval unita of the Cooiiiiunisl regime in Vietnam, in viola-lion of the principlfs of the Charter of the United Nations and ofinternlitiolin! law, have deliberately and repeatedly nliackod UntiedSlates mv«} vessel a law fully pn-scnt in inteniational waters, andhave thereby ereuted a seriona thrMkt to iniefuationttl pearcj «tvd

Whereas tliese attacks are part of u deliberate and svntemntjc cara-ttaign of itggre»iion thai the Communist regime iu North Vietnamhas been waging against its neighbors aikd the nations joined withthem in the collective defense of tlteif freedom j and

Whereas the United Stales is assisting the peonies of souUtdfcSl Asiato protect their freedom and has no Urritorial, mililarv or political(unottions In that hivu, but deairea only that these peoples should boleft in peace to work nut their own destinies in their own way: Now,therefore, be itfi'rxoti'ed Uy the Sr.tuUt and House of liepresentatims of the IJrated

.Stateit of Amerira in Conqren* ilaHMbud, That the Congrefis apprpveamid aitpjioite the dvteniiinntion of the President, as Comiiiiinder inChief, to take*11 MnersMV nieaaures to repel any armed atiack apsinst,the fomaof the United .Sintea and to prevent fmther aggression.

.^c. If- The United States regards as vital to its tiHtional interestmid to world peace the mainicnunce of internal ional jM-iiee and recuritym sputUeaNi Asia. Gonaonmit with the Conwiluhon of the UnitedSuites and the Charter of the United Nations and in aecordanoe withits obligations under the Soniheast Asia Collective flefense Treaty, theUnited Stales is, therefore, piepared, as the President detcnnineit, totake all nereaoiry steps, including the use of armed force, to sssist anymember or prwocol state of the Southeast Asia Collccliva DefenseTrtaty reotieBting nssihlnncp in defense of its fiecdom.

Ski, 3. I'liis resolution rtiall expire when the I'residini slmll de-ttirmino thai, the peace mid security of tlie area is rvoswutbly assuredby internaiional condiiions created by action of the United Nations orotherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by wmcnrrwit reso¬lution of the Congress.

Joint Resolution for theMaintenance of Peace andSecurity in Southeast Asia,08/10/1964. Source:National Archives, ARCIdentifier 2803448.



a History^Blueprint

CWA 4.8 - A War of Attrition (Page 1 of 5)

American Military StrategyThe United States, for example, hoped to defeat North Vietnamthrough massive bombing campaigns, such as Operation RollingThunder. Starting in early 1965, American planes began to dropwhat would eventually total 4.6 million tons of bombs onto NorthVietnam, as well on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a supply line that the

communists used to Two bombs tumble from a Vietnamese Air Force A-1ESkyraider over a burning [Viet] Cong hideout near

Cantho, South Viet Nam, U.S. Air Force, 1967.Source: Library of Congress,

httoV/www. loc. aov/oictures/item/2001699982/

transport people andgoods from thenorth to the south.

American commanders intended the campaign to demoralize theCommunist soldiers and compliment U.S. grounds troops. When

President Richard Nixon took office in 1969 he employed a secretplan to end the war, which expanded the American air campaign.

He began a secret bombing campaign in the neighboringcountries of Laos and Cambodia, sovereign nations separate from

Vietnam, in an effort to attack the communist forces hiding inthese border nations.

The war in Vietnam was not fought on traditional battlefields withclearly identified soldiers seizing new territory. Instead, the warwas fought with different weapons, markers of success, and

consequences than previous wars. Military planners on both sidesof the conflict initially hoped to achieve quick success throughstrategic attacks on the enemy. While initial operations did inflictdamage on their opponents, both sides ultimately settled into awar of attrition, a series of relatively small battles designed todeplete the resources of the enemy, weaken their morale and

reduce public support for the conflict so that they were willing tosurrender.

Photograph of a Marine Landing at Danang, Vietnam,08/03/1965. Source: National Archives. ARC Identifier595865.

On the ground, American troops conducted "search and destroy

missions," to seek out the enemy and kill them to increase the

body count, one measure of American success or failure in the

conflict. Helicopters, a new military asset, quickly transportedsoldiers in and out during these missions. Soldiers burned to theground many villages that contained suspected communistsympathizers. This displaced many civilians leaving them withoutfood or shelter. (To see search and destroy missions in action, visitThe History Channel website to see a three-minute video clip

Page 32 Cold War America Lesson #4; The Vietnam War


History^Blueprmt


(http://www.historv.eom/t

opics/vietnam-

war/videos#search-and-

destrov ) to hearinterviews with Vietnamveterans and archival

footage of the war. You

will see graphic images ofsearch and destroymissions. As you watch,

listen to the soldiersdescribe the purpose ofthese missions and therole that they or othersoldiers played. What aretheir perspectives of thiswar strategy?)

Another tactic the U.S.

employed was the use ofdefoliants and herbicideson the Vietnamesecountryside. Hoping toboth deplete the communists' food supply and eliminate their cover from the sky, the US military sprayed, byair and waterways, 12 million gallons of Agent Orange, a variety of defoliants and herbicides, on Vietnam. Thiscampaign destroyed the forests and farmland; millions of Vietnamese and Americans were ultimately exposedto the toxic chemicals. (To see film clips of soldiers spraying defoliant on riverbanks in Vietnam (and what thetrees looked like afterwards), visit the Vietnam Center and Archive at Texas Tech University, "U.S. ArmyNewsfilm V-73-69: Weed Killer Knocks Out VCs Riverbank Ambush Sites," South Vietnam [VC Weed Killer], 8-11 February 1969. Item Number: 987VI0672, Record 85332)

The United States also tried to gain the support of local people so that they would not aid the communists.American soldiers would go into South Vietnamese villages and (1) determine if locals were providing food orweapons to the communists, and (2) if the villagers were not helping the North Vietnamese, solicit theirsupport through food aid or protection from the enemy.

Vietnamese Communist StrategyThe North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet Cong (VC) employed a different strategy, but with the samegoal - consistent pressure designed to weaken American resolve and promote a negotiated peace that favored

their side. Employing a guerilla warfare strategy, NVA and VC forces favored hit and run attacks and surpriseambushes over full-scale military conflict. Although American forces benefitted from more training and

Vietnam. As the second phase of operation "Thayer," the 1st Air Cavalry Division (airmobile) is havingoperation "Irving" in the area 25 miles north of Qui Nhon which lies 400 miles north-northeast of Saigon. The1st Air Cavalry was given the mission of clearing a mountain range where an estimated two battalions ofNorth Vietnam regulars were supposed to be massing an attack on Hammond Airstrip. Troops of "A" Company,checking house during patrol, 10/06/1966. Source: National Archives, ARC Identifier #530612

Mm'



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Vietnam. Vietnamese army personnel training in thejungle, May, 1962. U.S. Dept. of Defense, Department ofthe Army. Source: National Archives, ARC Identifier:530607.

Khe Sonh and the Tet OffensiveLikely the most significant militaryconfrontation of the war occurred in January

of 1968, when American troops faced adetermined and aggressive communist attack.

40,000 members of the North VietnameseArmy (NVA) surrounded Khe Sanh, anAmerican military base just south of theDemilitarized Zone in South Vietnam, home toless than 6,000 Marines. On January 21, 1968,the NVA launched a massive attack againstthe base, driving the Marines intounderground bunkers. The NVA used shells,mortars, and rockets to try to overrun the

base and early on, it looked like they'dsucceed, especially after hitting the base'sammunition storage, which caused an

explosion that killed eighteen, wounded 40,and destroyed 90% of the Marine'sammunition. During the siege, which lasted a

advanced military technology, NVA and VC forces posedsignificant challenges to the Americans. Neither theVC or the NVA wore bright uniforms marking their enemystatus, making it difficult for American soldiers todifferentiate between a civilian and a military combatant.And while many of the VC's weapons were crude incomparison to American firepower, as the war progressed

Communist forces became increasingly proficient in killingand maiming American forces, using home-made booby

traps and mines, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and

machine guns and anti-aircraft artillery imported from theSoviet Union and China. They repurposed the over 20,000tons of explosive material dropped by U.S. planes for thehomemade bombs. The communists also benefitted from a

series of tunnels stretching throughout North and SouthVietnam. The tunnels allowed for safe travel; storedammunition, food, and water; provided sleeping quarters;and hospice for those in need of medical aid. TheCommunists were also aided by many civilians whoprovided safe haven, food, and support in local villagesacross South Vietnam.

U.S. Air Force medical personnel, on detached duty from Da Nang Air Base, movea Marine casualty from the aid station at embattled Khe Sanh to a waiting C-130Hercules aircraft for the flight to medical facilities at the base. Wounded personnelcan be transported from the field to completely equipped hospitals in less than anhour, 01/01/1968



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total of 77 days, Marines were hunkered down, sheltering in rat-infested underground bunkers that were dirtyand lacked sufficient food and supplies. Both President Johnson and the American public were deeplyengaged in the crisis - reading daily updates in the papers and watching the latest on nightly news reports ontelevision. American forces outside Khe Sanh ultimately defeated the NVA, by resupplying the Marinesmanning the base, bringing in food, ammunition, and supplies, evacuating the wounded, and finally bombingthe NVA soldiers circling the base into retreat.

On January 30 of the same year, the communists

staged their largest military campaign, the letOffensive, a surprise attack of nearly all of SouthVietnam's major cities and the U.S. Embassy in 1968.

let, Lunar New Year, had been traditionallyobserved as a time of cease-fire for Vietnam's most

important holiday and with the exception of KheSanh, American forces had expected a relativelyquiet holiday. In a coordinated attack by the VietCong and the North Vietnamese forces, Americantroops were at first surprised, but quickly rallied topush back the communist offensive.

Battle of Homo Village during Tel, 1968.Source: National Archives. ARC Identifier # 532451.

Prisoners of War / Missing in ActionHundreds of American troops were held as prisonersof war (POW) during the Vietnam War. Often, theywere pilots and airplane crews shot down as theyconducted bombing missions. Many POWs wereheld in prisons in North Vietnam; the most famous ofthese was Hoa Lo prison, known to Americans as the

"Hanoi Hilton." Conditions in these prisons were

exceedingly harsh - beatings and torture were

common occurrences, as the North Vietnamese

captors sought tactical military information from theAmerican prisoners. The Communists also used the

POWs as part of their propaganda campaign, puttingthem in front of cameras or forcing them to writeletters home detailing crimes committed byAmerican forces against the Vietnamese people.

, c h mcm , .. „ Communication between prisoners and with theJames Scott Graham, US Navy, shot down over Vietnam on May 4,1967. ^

oi/oi/i967. Source: National Archives. 6404008 outside world was restricted - many POWs were held

in solitary confinement for years. While some POWssuccumbed to their harsh treatment, others resisted by secretly communicating with each other or "confessing"

untrue information to trick the Vietnamese military. James Stockdale, a naval pilot who had led aerial attacks




from the U.S.S. Ticonderoga in the Gulf of Tonkinwas shot down in 1965 and spent the next seven andone-half years as a prisoner of war. John McCain,

who was elected to Congress in 1982 and becamethe Republican Presidential Nominee in 2008, wasshot down and captured by the North Vietnamese in1967, on his 23rd bombing mission in Vietnam. Agraduate of the Naval Academy whose father andgrandfather had been Admirals, McCain was offeredearly release by his North Vietnamese captors.

McCain refused, believing his family's connectionswould be used as propaganda by the communists.McCain spent five and one-half years in prison,

including time at the Hanoi Hilton. He wasrepeatedly beaten and tortured. Following hisrelease from prison in 1973 as part of the peacenegotiations, McCain was awarded the Silver andBronze Stars, a Purple Heart, and a Distinguished Flying Cross. 590 American POWs were eventually releasedby the North Vietnamese; more than 2000 were classified as Missing in Action.

IVU w/ [i.e., interview with] Lt. Comdr. John S. McCain, VietnamPOW/[TOH], Photographer: James O'Halloran, April 24,1973, U.S.

News & World Report Magazine Photograph Collection. Source:Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2003673983/

Cold War America Lesson #4: The Vietnam WarCopyright © 2013, The Regents of the University of California, All Rights Reserved

President Richard Nixon shifted America's military strategy with hiselection in 1968. Nixon advocated a policy of "Vietnamization," whichcalled for gradual reduction of American forces and increasing militaryleadership by the South Vietnamese. At the same time, Nixon's

Secretary of State began secret peace negotiations with the NorthVietnamese in Paris. These negotiations dragged on for years; a peace

treaty between the U.S. and North Vietnam wasn't signed until 1973.

In the interim period, the fighting continued and Nixon launched acontroversial bombing campaign in Cambodia designed to destroy thesupply bases supporting the communist forces. Public support forAmerican involvement in the conflict declined precipitously during theperiod as well, increasing pressure on the Nixon Administration to end

the war. Following the American departure from the war in 1973,South Vietnamese forces continued to fight until they were overrun in1975 with the fall of Saigon.

Page 36

The End of the War

Photograph of Marines of Company I inVietnam, 10/30/1969. Source: National

Archives, ARC Identifier # 532492

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